This year, in the US-China trade war and the grand military parade, China demonstrated economic and military strength that forced the United States to back down. However, Beijing merely displayed its power; various parties discovered that this giant does not know how to wield it.
The US paused its economic attacks on China, but the Dutch government directly “took control of” a Chinese-owned company in the Netherlands—Nexperia—through public authority. The EU expanded anti-dumping measures against China, with France as the main driver behind anti-China economic policies.
The US publicly acknowledged that China’s rising military power in the Western Pacific can no longer be suppressed and adjusted its global strategy to focus on the Western Hemisphere. Yet Japan shifted the Taiwan issue from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, adopting a more confrontational posture and challenging China’s bottom line. Regional countries, in various ways, have called for “peace” in the Taiwan Strait—support that amounts to nothing less than opposing China’s unification and indirectly endorsing Japan’s position. Meanwhile, the Philippines, mired in internal chaos, continued to provoke China in the South China Sea.
Since China has the capability to confront the US, it should have the ability to punish Europe, Japan, and the Philippines for their unfriendliness toward China. But Beijing did not do so. When facing challenges from these parties, it only issued symbolic verbal protests or took measures that failed to eradicate the problems—putting on a full defensive posture but lacking concrete and effective actions. As a result, events often started with thunderous noise but ended with little rain, fizzling out in the end.
From Beijing’s appeasement toward Europe, Japan, and the Philippines, all parties have reason to believe that China is a giant that doesn’t know how to use its own power. This presents a strategic opportunity for the weak to overcome the strong—especially now, as the US contracts its global strategy and distances itself from its allies. Maximizing benefits from China’s side is the rational choice.
For example, with Japan: Beijing responded to Tokyo’s intervention in the Taiwan issue with high-intensity verbal criticism, but its actions were inconsistent with its words. Although it revisited the “enemy state clauses” at the UN, raised the postwar Ryukyu sovereignty issue, and even conducted joint military exercises with Russia 600 kilometers from Tokyo, these actions were far less intense than the rhetoric. Even the verbal criticism cooled down after a month.
The US maintained a low profile on the China-Japan dispute, adopted a cool attitude toward Tokyo, and even indirectly expressed condemnation—likely the main reason Beijing de-escalated. This shows that China’s original intent in handling the incident was to force the US to “decouple” from Japan on the Taiwan issue and isolate Tokyo, which maintains close ties with Taipei.
Influenced by official attitudes, the Chinese people once again mistook official rhetoric for commitments, believing Beijing would go to war if necessary to eradicate Japan’s interference in internal affairs. After all, unresolved deep-seated hatred—akin to a sea of blood—remains between China and Japan. Moreover, this year marks the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, with various events held throughout the year to engrave in memory the national humiliation of Japan’s invasion of China.
But after Trump indirectly criticized Japan for provoking unnecessary disputes, Beijing seemed satisfied and stepped down gracefully. Although the dispute has not ended and continues to develop, like its handling of Philippine provocations, China has placed disputes with neighbors into long-term games, effectively shelving the issues—and causing the Chinese people renewed frustration.
After this three-way interaction, the asymmetry between Beijing’s words and actions has likely become deeply ingrained. In the future, it will be much harder for Beijing to mobilize the 1.4 billion people’s shared enmity.
The key point: In this dispute, who—China, Japan, or the US—gained the greatest substantive strategic benefits? So far, it’s hard to say who won the first round. China appeared to come out looking the best, preserving the most face, yet Japan also gained, and the US obtained leverage for future talks with China.
In the first round of this dispute, China strategically established the legitimacy of denying Japan’s intervention in the Taiwan issue, narrowing Tokyo’s diplomatic space for anti-China actions via Taiwan. Japan’s right wing advanced toward national normalization, hollowing out its peace constitution to cope with US strategic contraction; additionally, the Liberal Democratic Party regained public support. The US demonstrated its influence in East Asia—even after “withdrawing” its military to the second island chain—and raised its bargaining chips at the US-China negotiation table.
However, from a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan gains nothing worth the loss: the Ryukyu Islands will become a burden rather than an outer defense wall. The two major powers, China and the US, will orderly redraw their spheres of influence in East Asia; the US will gain a dignified pretext for abandoning Taiwan, while China will recover Taiwan at a lower cost.
Conversely, beyond the asymmetry between words and actions, there is also asymmetry between actions and strength. Beijing’s greatest loss is that the international community—especially its neighbors and Europe—has seen through China’s essence of appearing fierce but being timid inwardly. They have once again discovered that antagonizing China brings no adverse consequences; on the contrary, it can yield unexpected benefits—provided they give China the face it needs to achieve strategic gains.
For example, Vietnam: After the China-Japan dispute cooled, a Vietnamese warship transited the Taiwan Strait under the pretext of freedom of navigation without prior notification to China, signaling it is not a vassal of Beijing and aligning with Washington’s position.
Vietnam is a major beneficiary of the US-China confrontation, with massive Chinese goods rerouted through Vietnam to the US; transit trade has skyrocketed its economic growth. Thus, it firmly believes maximizing benefits lies in a neutral stance between China and the US. However, from a supply chain perspective, China is the supplier and the US the customer—the latter slightly more important. Factoring in China-Vietnam South China Sea disputes and China’s habitual concessions versus the lethal US carrot-and-stick approach, Vietnam naturally leans more pro-US.
Additionally, during the China-Japan dispute, Singapore’s prime minister publicly sympathized with Japan, while Thailand and Vietnam jointly called for peace in the Taiwan Strait—showing Southeast Asian nations, like Japan, hope to maintain the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait and oppose military conflict in the region, which is equivalent to opposing China’s recovery of Taiwan. Of course, Northeast Asia’s South Korea holds the same view; some countries publicly state it due to internal and US factors, while others choose silence.
China’s neighboring countries all see the fact that the Philippines’ intense anti-China stance has gone unpunished. Despite deep internal political turmoil, Manila can still spare efforts to provoke China in the South China Sea—clearly a profitable path. Neighbors conclude: If China can concede on core interests, what can’t it concede?
On the other side of the globe, Europe has noticed this phenomenon too. The Dutch government rashly took over a Chinese enterprise, severely damaging China’s interests and prestige; Beijing’s response started strong but ended weakly—mainly to avoid impacting China-EU trade, even amid decoupling risks everywhere. No wonder Britain subsequently sanctioned two Chinese companies on suspicion of cyberattacks, unafraid of angering Beijing just before Prime Minister Starmer’s planned January visit to China.
In short, whether on the regional Taiwan issue or extraterritorial China-EU economic issues, China faces a broken windows effect. Although from a grand strategic view, all related events remain controllable for Beijing, appeasement only invites more trouble. It’s not impossible that China will eventually be unable to suppress public indignation and be forced to suddenly take tough measures—like at the end of the pandemic, when people took to the streets and Beijing immediately lifted lockdowns, rendering all prior lockdown justifications untenable overnight.
Indeed, China currently appears as a giant that doesn’t know how to use its power. But when a rabbit is cornered, it bites. When Beijing is forced to align actions with strength, the intensity will be astonishing; then, China will want more than just face.
There’s a saying: Attack is the best defense. But with its long history, this nation views offense and defense more comprehensively. The Chinese believe that when weak, attack is the best defense; when holding an advantage, defense is the best attack. As long as the opponent’s offense can be controlled within acceptable limits, persistent defense inflicts less damage than the opponent’s self-exhaustion in stamina. Conversely, when at a disadvantage, a full assault is needed to reverse it.
In other words, China doesn’t fail to know how to use power; it deems using power uneconomical. This explains why the West walks a path of decline while China continues rising—the latter accumulates power, and the former overdraws it.
President Trump is shrewd and pragmatic; he knows cornering China awakens the giant, so he eased US-China relations. But simultaneously, the US doesn’t mind—and even quietly encourages—its allies to provoke China, while positioning itself as a mediator to benefit. This is a reasonable tactic and the most effective offensive against China.
Xi Jinping once said China has great patience—implying that if patience is exhausted, the world will see a completely different China, one that uses power without regard for cost.
