US-Venezuela Relations

There Will Soon Be Elections in Venezuela

US officials have openly meddled in Venezuelan affairs since January. (Archive)

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Everything is going according to the plan of the “foreign sentinel.”(1) One could almost add that the current scenario resembles that of the late twentieth century, when Venezuelan society decided that the best option was change by peaceful and democratic means. But this is no time to make concessions to the past. As the President of the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference declared: “We must all acknowledge, with humility, that we arrived at January 3 because, as a society, although we tried by every means within our reach… we did not find a common course of action,” and “for that reason an external agent had to intervene.”(2) We tried, but we were not capable of it. The moment demands more of us than a gesture of contrition. It is time to turn the page.

One must also recognize, as Monsignor Jesús González de Zárate might have said, that the “external agent” does not want another Iraq. Thank God. Indeed, this is what the State Department says: “we would prefer not to have bloodshed and not have instability and not have civil war in a place. We would prefer the peaceful transition process, which is why we are required to, as a result, work with the interim authorities to make all of these reforms and to use the leverage we have to ensure that these reforms continue to move forward on a proper pace.” The “leverage” is such that, in reality, the “collaboration” is mutual. Even so, there is impatience, dissatisfaction, perhaps even incomprehension: the transition is moving very slowly. There is a desire for revenge.

In response, the State Department adopts a condescending tone: it acknowledges that the issue of political reforms “really hasn’t gotten nearly as much attention as some of the other more higher-profile things on the economic side, the oil deals and et cetera,” but asks us to understand that the political must be kept in step with the economic. There could be elections in the very short term, because it must be admitted that “they [the Venezuelan authorities] know how to run” them, but the current institutions might refuse to recognize the results. It says it is on the way to resolving this matter, but explains that there is another one that is much more important and therefore a priority: “if you want a democratically elected government to succeed, you don’t want them to inherit an economic apocalypse that brings it down. Because you’ll have an election, everybody will be happy, but a month later everyone’s gonna be mad that there’s fuel shortages, that there’s no electricity.” It insists: “if you want a democratically elected government to succeed, … you can’t leave them saddled with an economic calamity, because eventually no matter how happy people are, they had an election, they still want to eat. They still want to be able to pay their bills, and they still want the electrical power to not … suffer from chronic blackouts.”

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Ever since, we have witnessed a curious spectacle: an army of analysts racking their brains, trying to decipher the mystery hidden behind those words, some clue that might let them guess when presidential elections will be held. It is like walking down the street and coming upon a small crowd gathered around one of those loudmouthed, quick-fingered characters running the shell game. Something similar happens every time some imperial spokesman decides to try out the phrase: “All options are on the table.” There will always be someone who bets and loses.

The answer is very simple and there is no mystery: there will be elections when the US government decides so. The bettor will never find the coin, skillfully hidden in the hands of the one moving the shells. Whoever accepts that someone else decides what all the options are has lost in advance.

Everything unfolds according to the rules of street magic: the “external agent” acts as if it had nothing to do with the “economic apocalypse,” with the fuel shortages, with the power cuts, with people’s difficulty in putting food on the table and paying their bills, and tells us it is working to create the conditions that will allow us to hold free and fair elections. It also acts to favor, electorally, political figures who, for their part, behave as if they were angels who have never in their lives broken any of the first four seals. As a finishing touch, it offers us the “chance” of an “enduring republic” when in reality it intends to deny us the option of existing as a true republic.

It may be true that the USA does not want another Iraq in Venezuela. And the real reasons for this can be debated. But what matters here is that, when it comes to defining its goal, the State Department has no qualms about trying out its crude and clumsy version of the Kingdom of God on Earth. But when it comes to talking about options on the table, try as it might, it cannot help showing itself as it is: a “foreign sentinel” acting as a regressive force. There are only two options: “peaceful transition” or “civil war.” One way or another, the goal will be achieved: the “democratic transition.” Make no mistake: the USA would prefer “not to have bloodshed and not have instability and not have civil war.” But things have to be done its way. “I am democracy,” the State Department tells us, in the finest tradition of nineteenth-century Bonapartism.

If things can only be done Washington’s way, it is because the possibility of doing them the Venezuelan way has been denied in advance. That denial is, in itself, an act of violence. It is the continuation of a war that began without a formal declaration. A “peaceful transition” is under way, we are told, but the [1999] Constitution that we ratified by popular vote is systematically violated, whether de facto or through legislative acts of regressive content enacted at the request of the “foreign sentinel.” This is violence with dramatic material effects. One need only look at any of the fundamental problems of Venezuelan society: the value of its labor power, the state of its public services, the exploitation of its natural resources, and so on. Any decision relating to any of these matters is taken to safeguard the interests of the US government, of its corporations and, of course, of the local businesses aligned with this exercise in continued plunder.

It is not that things cannot be done the Venezuelan way, that is, by putting the interests of the nation first, simply because we tried and did not find a path, so that we must now accept external intervention as a fatality, given our errors and omissions, as the Episcopal Conference has put it. In reality, the US government has not come to resolve the situation. The “economic calamity” was, is and will be: it was the result, partial but decisive, of US meddling; it is a precondition for the intervention under way; and it will be the consequence of the continued plunder of our wealth, of its control over our economy in particular and our institutions in general, that is, of our loss of sovereignty.

Venezuelan reality contradicts any resemblance to the rhetoric of the State Department, which is rather the stuff of utopian millenarianism, and is akin to dystopia, and that in the best of cases. For it can only be dystopian, if not simply cynical, a rhetoric that promises “democratic transition” to a society that should consequently be celebrating the imminent advent of freedom, when the stubborn facts speak to us of continuity and deepening of the catastrophe, but with our own faces, once elections are held. “O, what a goodly outside falsehood hath!” [Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice]

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And how deceptive popular victories can seem when they are in the mouths of those who traffic in historical truth.

The State Department’s rhetoric, with its references to the present “economic apocalypse,” would be the vanguard of the form taken by the narrative that, broadly speaking, the Venezuelan right has built about the Bolivarian Revolution: that of an eschatology of the past. The apocalypse has already happened, and the survivors of the horror bear witness to it today.

Building a solid and genuine popular option that allows us to recover our condition as a free, sovereign and independent nation requires putting this eschatological interpretation of our recent history in its place. Under the leadership of Hugo Chávez, the Bolivarian Revolution could have been many things: a timid reformist attempt, a promising democratic experiment razed with blood and fire by the oligarchy, a process drowned under the weight of its own contradictions. On the contrary, it was a successful experience, with more than tangible results, with its corresponding lights and shadows.

Thus, for example, between 2003 and 2012 the percentage of Venezuelan households in poverty fell from 54% to 21.2%, while the percentage of households in extreme poverty dropped from 25.1% to 6%. By 2012, the number of undernourished people estimated for 1990 had been cut by half or more. Between 1978 and 1999, annual growth in gross domestic product per capita turned negative, at a rate close to -2%. By contrast, GDP per capita rose 58.1% between 2003 and 2012. In 2012, the integral minimum wage was around $644, and the country recorded the highest Real Minimum Wage Index in Latin America. Also in 2012, Venezuela was the second least unequal country in the region (Gini index). That same year, Chávez approved an Organic Labor Law that restored the retroactivity of social benefits, reduced the working day to 40 hours a week (8 hours a day) and expressly prohibited the outsourcing or subcontracting of permanent activities.(3) What horror!

The Colombian writer William Ospina stated that “Chávez’s revolution has consisted of economic decisions and political mobilizations: not of executions, nor proscriptions, nor censorship. This is perhaps what gives the process led by Hugo Chávez its historic magnitude: no one can ignore the importance of what is happening, no one can ignore the enormity of the urgent problems it has faced, the enormity of the solutions it has attempted, and yet it has been carried out in a climate of peace, of respect for life, within the framework of institutions, and heeding high principles of humanity and dignity.”(4)

At the antipodes of apocalypse or calamity, the time of the Bolivarian Revolution under Chávez’s leadership meant, for the popular majorities, the temporary interruption of the catastrophe.(5) And it was so, in large measure, because it had the historic good judgment to confront the trilemma: “what to produce, how to produce and for whom to produce,” which Domingo Alberto Rangel defined as the “unshakable foundations of an economic order.”(6) Ospina himself pointed out “how arrogant and insensitive oil elites strolled around the world like Saudi sheikhs while the Venezuelan people sank into poverty and abandonment. No one can deny that those elites were the ones who educated the country in the precarious logic of subsidies and who never made serious efforts to ‘sow the oil,’ to convert oil wealth into a diverse economy that would stimulate social labor and community initiative. Later they would reproach Chávez for not having fully accomplished in ten years the sowing and diversification that they did not attempt in 50.” Nowadays, with a levity worthy of better purposes, it is common to hear voices from across the political spectrum making exactly the same reproach.

Appealing to the need to grasp the sign of the times, perhaps in an attempt to avoid the difficult plight of being singled out as political species on the road to extinction, there are those who argue that going back over the history of the Bolivarian Revolution amounts to living in the past. Walter Benjamin already warned us of the dangers of swimming with the current.(7) To brush history against the grain means today to muster the strength of spirit needed to undertake an indispensable task: to narrate the trajectory of a revolutionary experience that knew how to be the interruption of the catastrophe and, perhaps more important still, to give an account of its own interruption, for which, incidentally, responsibility cannot fall on Hugo Chávez.

The interruption of the progressive trajectory of the Bolivarian experience was accepted by the popular majorities as a fait accompli a decade ago. Denying the evidence is self-defeating, because it amounts to continuing to spend what one no longer has: an enormous political energy. The same happened with time: in trying to gain it, a precious historic opportunity was squandered. Today the situation is very different and the accumulated debt is enormous.

There will soon be elections in Venezuela, and there will be those who celebrate in the streets, thus consummating a transition that will really be continuity. They will go on talking about democracy to a country that has had its freedom snatched away, and once again popular rage will be expressed. The majorities will fight to reverse the situation, that is, to put things in their place. Then they will celebrate, this time for real, massively and noisily, and they will raise a toast to the health of those who in their day knew how to recognize themselves in “the deep wisdom, the cunning, the mischief and the courage of the popular soul.” It is a matter of time. There is no sleight of hand. This is a people who have never stopped fighting. Whether it happens sooner or later will depend, in large measure, on the will to settle accounts with our own history.

References

(1) Antonio Gramsci. Notas sobre Maquiavelo, sobre la política y sobre el Estado moderno [Notes on Machiavelli, on Politics, and on the Modern State]. Nueva Visión, Buenos Aires, 1972, p. 61. [English]

(2) Leopoldo Puchi. El «tuvo que» de la CEV [The “Had To” of the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference]. El Universal, October 25, 2026.

(3) Poverty and extreme poverty: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Undernourishment: FAO. GDP per capita: Alí Rodríguez Araque and Bernard Mommer. “Primer centenario de la Venezuela exportadora de petróleo” [First Centenary of Oil-Exporting Venezuela]. Aporrea, November 28, 2017. Also: Malfred Gerig. La Larga Depresión venezolana. Economía política del auge y caída del siglo petrolero [The Long Venezuelan Depression. Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Oil Century]. Centro de Estudios para la Democracia Socialista, Trinchera. Caracas, Venezuela, 2022, pp. 70-71. Integral minimum wage: Reinaldo Iturriza López. El chavismo en el laberinto hegemónico (y una novedad histórica) [Chavismo in the Hegemonic Labyrinth (and a Historical Novelty)]. Saber y Poder, December 16, 2021. Real Minimum Wage Index: ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; CEPAL in Spanish). Gini index: ECLAC. Social benefits, working hours, subcontracting: Ley Orgánica del Trabajo, los Trabajadores y las Trabajadoras [Organic Law on Labor, Male Workers and Female Workers].

(4) William Ospina. Chávez: una revolución democrática [Chávez: A Democratic Revolution]. El Espectador, March 9, 2013.

(5) Reinaldo Iturriza López. Hipótesis sobre nuestro tiempo del ahora [Hypotheses on Our Time of the Now]. Saber y Poder, October 19, 2026.

(6) Domingo Alberto Rangel. Capital y desarrollo. Tomo I: La Venezuela agraria [Capital and Development. Volume I: Agrarian Venezuela]. Universidad Central de Venezuela. Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales. Caracas, Venezuela, 1969, p. 14.

(7) Walter Benjamin. Tesis sobre la historia y otros fragmentos. Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México. Editorial Ítaca. Mexico, 2008, p. 46. [Theses on the Philosophy of History]

Translation by Fausto Giudice, with minor edits from Venezuelanalysis.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Source: Saber y Poder

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Venezuela: Rodríguez Praises George Washington’s ‘Legacy’ in Plaza Reinauguration

Rodríguez and Barrett lay wreaths honoring George Washington and US independence. (Presidential Press)

Mérida, November 9, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government publicly reinaugurated the George Washington Plaza in El Paraíso, southwestern Caracas, alongside the US embassy on Friday.

The ceremony commemorated the 250th anniversary of the US independence. The Caracas mayor’s office restored the 2,400-square-meter plaza, originally inaugurated in 1921, while also refurbishing Washington’s statue.

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez led the state delegation, alongside ministers and municipal authorities.

“This year marks the 191st anniversary of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the United States,” she highlighted to the press. “This reopening of the plaza is a tribute to Washington, an independence leader, a founding father. It serves as a heartfelt homage to his leadership and historical legacy.”

Rodríguez went on to claim that Washington was a source of inspiration for Venezuelan independence leader Simón Bolívar.

“For the children present here: it is important to know your country’s history, but also to recognize the heroes from other countries,” she concluded.

The commemorative gathering began with an official wreath-laying ceremony at the reopened public square. Local schoolchildren from the El Paraíso parish gathered at the venue, waving small US flags alongside Venezuelan ones.

As part of the official program, the Caribbean nation’s Simón Bolívar Youth and Children’s Symphonic Orchestra performed the US and Venezuelan national anthems, as well as classical pieces from its repertoire.

Heading the US embassy delegation, US Chargé d’Affairs John Barrett echoed Rodríguez in framing Washington as “a leader much like Bolívar.” 

“We should view that statue of George Washington with pride,” he said. “These two figures symbolize new friendship between the United States and Venezuela. And I want to thank all Venezuelans, as well as the president, for their support.”

The US embassy’s celebrations of the 250th anniversary of independence were originally postponed by the June 24 double earthquake.

On Thursday, Barrett hosted a formal diplomatic reception for international diplomats, business sector representatives, and high-ranking Venezuelan officials such as the President of the National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez.

“We accepted the invitation […] to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the US Declaration of Independence,” he posted on his X account. “The close cooperation between our governments serves as a tool for the prosperity of all our people.”

Since the January 3 US military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, Washington and Caracas fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement that included the reopening of their respective embassies after seven years of broken ties.

The Venezuelan leaders’ friendly overtures towards the US contrast with the stances of the Maduro and Hugo Chávez governments. Both former presidents were adamant in condemning the US’ past and present role in imposing its interests at the expense of Global South countries. They also had to contend with recurring US-backed destabilization efforts, including coup attempts and economic sanctions.

Caracas’ renewed rhetoric was likewise on display at the XXX Ibero-American Summit, held on November 4-5 in Madrid, Spain. The Venezuelan delegation was led by newly appointed Foreign Minister Oliver Blanco.

“We are convinced that a more stable, more democratic, and more prosperous Venezuela, fully integrated into international markets, will contribute to the development of all of Ibero-America,” Blanco stated.

The Venezuelan official went on to tout an ongoing US-backed dialogue process with a sector of the opposition that is focused on judicial and electoral reforms, stressing that the South American country is undergoing a “democratic transformation” under the acting Rodríguez presidency.

“One significant agreement from this process is the renewal of the Supreme Court. […] We have requested technical assistance from the European Union to strengthen the rule of law and modernize our justice system,” he added.

Blanco additionally highlighted cooperation prospects and a “shared history” between Latin America and Spain. 

To mark the country’s participation in the Ibero-American Summit, state broadcaster VTV published an AI-generated spot hailing Spain’s “heritage” in Venezuela as a “cultural matrimony” and a “meeting of two worlds.” The narrative was markedly different from the discourse under Chávez and Maduro, who fiercely condemned Spanish colonialism, the genocide of native peoples, and the slave trade.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

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Claudio Fermín: ‘We Must Forge a Consciousness Against the Recolonization of Venezuela’

Claudio Fermín. (Venezuelanalysis)

Claudio Fermín is a university professor and veteran political leader in Venezuela. Cutting his political teeth with Acción Democrática (AD) party, he became Caracas’s first elected mayor (1990-93). He went on to become a member of the 1999 Constituent Assembly as well as a perennial presidential candidate. Within the Venezuelan opposition, he has been known for his commitment to dialogue and opposing US sanctions.

In this exclusive interview, Fermín reflects on his role in the Venezuelan opposition, the consequences of the blockade against the Caribbean nation, the US “theft” of natural resources following the January 3 attack, and the challenge of recovering sovereignty.

Going back more than two decades, what was your relationship with former President Hugo Chávez like?

Chávez had a sharp tongue that spared no one. Yet whenever he referred to me, he always did so with respect and affection. I am grateful for his generosity.

In the early years, Chavismo was not just a vast popular movement but almost a religion. Since President Chávez spoke of me with such consideration, I think that filtered down to the base as well, and grassroots Chavistas have always been very warm toward me. I have never stopped going anywhere in my life, not even to the Esquina Caliente [a Chavista spot in downtown Caracas’ Plaza Bolívar]. Chavistas or Adecos [AD supporters], I greet them all the same. I have been fortunate in that regard.

My relationship with Chávez was always one of respect and consideration. As a conciliator, what people call a moderate, someone who doesn’t get carried away by extremes, I have always demanded respect for President Chávez and have always acknowledged the positive things his government did. Sometimes journalists are surprised and ask me for an example. I talk about Misión Vivienda [the public housing program], about the people who live much better there than in the shack where they used to live. And that is just one example; I could give you 30 more Chavista achievements that I defend, just as I could give you as many things I object to.

Chavismo knows that my criticisms are honest and sincere. We have had a good relationship. I deeply regret that it is, in my view, a very closed-off movement. Beyond its record in government, from a political standpoint my criticism would be its lack of self-criticism.

Claudio Fermín and Hugo Chávez took part in a presidential debate in March 1998. (Archive)

What is your assessment of the Maduro government?

President Maduro faced a very difficult period, much more difficult than President Chávez’s, in my opinion. These were years of an infamous [US] blockade and terrible conspiracies. I think he was very brave when he lifted currency and price controls, and when he proposed the special economic zones, which practically amounted to a wholesale critique of the Chavista economic model.

That is very easy to propose when you are in the opposition. But to take those measures from within a Chavista government… It was very hard to survive that storm for 14 straight years. Oil revenues, which had topped $50 billion a year, fell to less than $1 billion.

In recent years you have tried to build spaces for unity within the opposition, for example in Henri Falcón’s 2018 presidential campaign. However, those attempts ended up fractured by extremist figures such as María Corina Machado. Why has it been so hard for the opposition to build a coherent alternative?

To answer that, I think a brief look back at history is useful. Chávez’s early years were a time of endless promises, when everything seemed possible and there was money to back it up. Everything was in crescendo. Chávez, besides his electric, truly mesmerizing charisma, was also a man who carried a heroic narrative.

The initial opposition to the Chávez government was class-based and bent on confrontation. The Carmonazo [the 2002 coup] and the oil lockout failed because the people saw them as alien initiatives, the exclusive project of a political class. And the honeymoon with Chávez was still ongoing. However, that period gave rise to very confrontational behavior on both sides of Venezuelan politics.

There came a point when showing the greatest aversion, the greatest hostility toward Chavismo, meant being against the system and not participating. That is how María Corina Machado and her [US-funded] NGO Súmate got started, directly or indirectly encouraging abstention. The 2018 elections and those that followed cannot be understood without this induced abstention, which ended up benefiting Chavismo. That is not to take away from Chavismo’s own strengths, such as its organizational capacity and grassroots work.

However, in 2015 there was high turnout and the opposition won a majority in the National Assembly…

The 2015 elections were a very particular moment. It was an important election, now facing Chavismo without Chávez, and the opposition, which had been completely fragmented, came together. I think it has certain parallels with Chávez’s election in 1998, when there was a desire to punish, to make someone pay, which made it possible to bring scattered groups together.

If we look back over the years at the speeches of opposition leaders, Julio Borges, Leopoldo López, Henrique Capriles, Henry Ramos Allup and so on, they spent their time insulting one another. But in 2015 they called a sort of truce and were electorally smart in running on a single ticket, avoiding fragmentation.

But it was an exceptional moment. As soon as they reached the National Assembly the squabbling started again, for instance over who would hold the presidency of the parliament. In 2019 a new fight broke out between Guaidó’s faction and the others, whom they called “alacranes” [scorpions]. Guaidó ended up losing the National Assembly in the middle of his “interim presidency,” which was nothing more than a crude coup attempt.

Claudio Fermín presently heads the opposition party Soluciones. (Cronica Uno)

Although you are an opposition politician, you have firmly denounced US sanctions against Venezuela. Can you tell us a bit about the economic reality of recent years?

Starting in 2015, thanks to President Obama – whom I once admired – a defenseless country was attacked, a country where store shelves were empty and pensioners were begging to survive. It was a country terribly battered by the economic situation, mired in an endless internal conflict. And the last thing it needed was sanctions and an economic blockade.

However, we also have to look further back. Thirty to thirty-five years ago, Venezuela exported aluminum, iron, and cattle. There was at least a minimum of economic diversification. But by 2015 it was a poor, single-product economy, and on top of that a blockade fell on us, which led to the country’s total impoverishment. Sanctions are a serious attack on human rights in Venezuela. Every nation has the right to trade freely.

The intention was to starve Venezuela. I remember some despicable statements by former US Ambassador [William] Brownfield, who said it didn’t matter how many people died as long as the government fell. They had not been able to beat Chávez’s charisma, or Maduro, because of the opposition’s mistakes, so they tried to strangle the country. The blockade has been a criminal act that brought about a total collapse in investment. The impact on pensions, wages, hospitals, and the electrical grid has been terrible. And figures like María Corina Machado or Leopoldo López called for sanctions in the morning and demanded wage increases in the afternoon. That is the level of cynicism and demagoguery they reached.

The plan had the desired consequences: investment dried up, discontent grew, and the quality of life collapsed. But that did not bring down the government; the US had to do it with a military intervention on January 3.

Over the last 10 years, Venezuela only had resources thanks to trade with countries that defied the blockade, such as Russia, China, and Iran. But it was done covertly, on the high seas, through parallel channels, and all of that was fertile ground for corruption.

By the same token, we have to point out what I call administrative mistakes. For example, in the midst of that terrible blockade, how can you justify keeping more than 30 ministries and 6 vice presidencies? Those mistakes have to be pointed out and analyzed, but to me they are of a much smaller magnitude than the impact of the blockade. I am not saying this to back Maduro; one simply has to keep a sense of proportion.

Venezuela went from a blockaded economy before January 3 to one controlled by the US. What is your reading of the present context?

Venezuela has been the victim of an outrageous and barefaced theft. On the one hand, the countries that dared to open a door for Venezuela to bring in foreign currency are now off limits. The United States imposes an iron curtain and says we can only have relations with it. The self-proclaimed champion of the free world prohibits free trade, using terrorist threats against those who do not obey.

On top of that, in an act of piracy, the US seized several Venezuelan oil tankers and then took 40 million barrels that we had in storage because a naval blockade was preventing us from selling crude.

January 3 raised enormous expectations. I admit it myself: I welcome much-needed investment, the investment the blockade kept out. But I don’t want it to come at the expense of our sovereignty. Yet in these months, instead of bringing dollars in, they [the US] have taken them out, stolen them. The Financial Times reported $13 billion in the first six months of the year. They have also taken shipments of gold. The money is deposited in US accounts. Absolutely nothing has been returned.

On top of that theft, our resources are still frozen: the IMF special drawing rights, close to $5 billion, as well as the gold held hostage at the Bank of England. These are resources we badly need, in addition to what the US is taking and to its barring us from relations with certain countries.

You have also focused on the foreign debt and the announced restructuring plans. Can you tell us why this issue matters?

Indeed. A narrative had taken hold that Venezuela owed $150 billion. And overnight that became $240 billion. That is absolutely false. Venezuela does not owe that money to anyone.

Of course Venezuela has to meet its obligations. The country has not paid its foreign debt since 2017. But with the blockade, with what resources were we supposed to pay it? That is why I insist that this debt must be audited.

The debt includes bonds, but people who bought them on the cheap now expect to be paid at face value. Then there are the debts to multilateral organizations, arbitration awards, commercial debts, and so on. All of that has to be audited by professional firms, and there has to be a debt restructuring committee made up of Venezuelans.

It seems that in Venezuela we can’t do arithmetic, and it has to be Marco Rubio who appoints the firm in charge of the restructuring: Centerview Partners. This firm charges $50,000 a month plus 0.1% of the debt. In other words, the fox is guarding the henhouse. It is in its interest for the amount to be as high as possible. It is armed robbery in broad daylight.

The opposition politician called for national unity to defend Venezuelan sovereignty. (EFE)

Let’s return to January 3, a turning point in Venezuela’s recent history. How do you assess that attack and everything that followed?

The theft I was describing is a consequence of January 3, when a foreign army bombed our country. It was an unforgivable act of aggression by the United States.

They kidnapped the president after fabricating a campaign claiming he was the head of the Cartel de los Soles. Now the CIA and Southern Command have been here for months, and they haven’t investigated a single military officer for drug trafficking. Where is the Cartel de los Soles? It is a monumental lie, like Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

What we are experiencing is a crude recolonization, by force. By force the US is taking millions of barrels of oil; by force they imposed changes to the Hydrocarbons Law and the Mining Law. Under the supposed pretext of making the sector attractive to investors and giving them security, what was actually done was to hollow out the Venezuelan state. They leave it powerless, reducing royalties and taxes to a bare minimum.

Today we have a Venezuelan state that depends on a single product. What revenue will it have if it can’t collect anything from its main industry, or from mining? What’s more, if a restructuring of this abusive debt goes ahead, how is it going to be paid? What is being done with Venezuela’s resources is monstrous.

But there is no shortage of people eager to hand the country over, from “activists” who write letters to the US chargé d’affaires asking for supplies for this or that hospital, to fake trade unionists who ask him for wage increases. I find it undignified and humiliating. Even María Corina Machado gave her Nobel Prize to Trump and still can’t get him to give her the time of day.

January 3, and everything that followed, was not an attack on Chavismo. It was an operation to seize Venezuela’s resources. We have to create consciousness against that. And Trump is not going to be there forever. It pains me to see the naivety of certain voices who think Trump is saving the country. Venezuela is living through an hour of infamy, confusion, uncertainty and shame. If we can’t unite even in the face of an aggression as serious as the one we are suffering…

Venezuela has undoubtedly been the great triumph, perhaps the only one, of Trump’s foreign policy. What is your view of Trump’s stance on Venezuela and of current relations between Caracas and Washington?

First of all, it must be said that this so-called dialogue is a mockery of the country. Trump and Rubio pulled out of their pocket, like someone finding something they had forgotten, this National Assembly whose term expired in 2020. And they forced that [defunct] parliament into talks with the current one. So we have two parliaments of “yes men” following the White House’s directives. And it is Mr. Rubio who announces what is going to happen in the country with his three-phase plan.

Trump mocks us, saying people are dancing in the streets and offering to make us the 51st state. A tremendous disrespect, and nobody raises their voice against it. Venezuela needs a strategy to denounce to the world what is happening, this imperialist colonization based on terrorist threats.

Venezuela has lost its sovereignty, and that is very serious. It is painful, but it is an undeniable fact. Venezuela has every interest in having good relations with the United States, as it has had for almost all of our history, but we cannot accept these conditions. We want investment and to trade with the whole world, but not at the cost of losing our sovereignty as a nation. Giving up sovereignty is not a necessary condition.

Having made that diagnosis, what, from your standpoint, is the way forward?

For the last 28 years I have been called a moderate, ambiguous, a “nini” [neither-nor], for defending my views. But I simply don’t agree with the fanatical positions of the extremes, and I denounce what is happening in my country today.

Ever since I started raising my voice about the seriousness of this situation, from January 3 onward, I have hardly ever been invited for an interview. There is a grave silence, and we are talking about the national interest here. Whether you are a Chavista or an Adeco, a businessperson or a street vendor, the national interest calls on all of us. If a nation cannot agree even to defend its sovereignty, it is finished. This is an existential question, not a matter of who wants to carry out Trump’s orders.

I don’t have a recipe, but we have to react. Let’s sit down and talk, look for common ground. But let’s start by admitting that we have a problem. Of course we have to sit down with the Trump administration. But with a minimum of dignity, not with this tone of capitulation, as if nothing had happened here.

I am not calling on us to confront anyone. We also have to be aware of our weaknesses. But I am calling on us to defend what is ours. Let’s build an agenda, a plan to recover our sovereignty, to explain to the United States that, while we are willing to have good relations and receive investment, we are an independent country and we will fight for that.

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US Pushing for Permanent Venezuela Military Presence: New York Times

The New York Times and Wall Street Journal have suggested that US forces piloted the drones that targeted the ELN. (MDAA)

Caracas, November 4, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Donald Trump administration is negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Venezuela that would lay the groundwork for a potential long-term US military presence in the country, according to US officials cited by the New York Times.

According to the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, negotiations over the military pact are being led by the State Department under Secretary of State Marco Rubio. However, details regarding the number of troops and ground missions would be left for future discussions.

According to US officials, SOFA accords “provide a clear and predictable legal framework for US forces to work on mutually agreed activities with our security partners, such as ship visits, training, exercises, and humanitarian assistance.” 

The US currently has SOFA agreements in place with several Latin American countries, including Paraguay, Ecuador, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago, to “address shared threats such as drug trafficking and transnational organized crime.” Washington likewise operates multiple bases in the hemisphere and recently launched the “Shield of the Americas” initiative alongside regional allies with the declared purpose of tackling transnational crime and illegal immigration.

The New York Times sources did not clarify whether Washington intends to establish military bases in Venezuela or deploy US troops at existing Venezuelan bases. One official said only that the issue remains “far in the future” in the discussions, citing Venezuela’s “poor infrastructure” and the lack of interaction between the Venezuelan and US militaries in recent decades.

The newspaper warned that the military cooperation talks could be both “significant” and “risky.” Article 13 of Venezuela’s Constitution prohibits the establishment of foreign military bases or facilities serving the military purposes of other countries.

The story comes on the heels of a reported attack involving drones and helicopters against a camp belonging to Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN) on Friday in Apure State, close to the two countries’ shared border. 

According to the New York Times, the operation counted on US intelligence assistance, with military personnel helping identify the camp, which was claimed to be a “hub” for drug trafficking. 

The death toll, initially reported at 19 by local NGO Fundaredes, has risen to 23. Fundaredes’ Apure coordinator Juan García said that interviews conducted with survivors and victims’ relatives indicated that the strike also killed civilians not associated with the guerrilla group.

The Times stated that it was “not clear who piloted the drones” which are typically operated by US forces. The Wall Street Journal claimed US military drones executed the attack with “cooperation” from the Venezuelan government. For its part, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government and the Venezuelan armed forces have yet to issue any public comment on the mission targeting the ELN.

The ELN is the longest active guerrilla group in Colombia, having sustained a decades-long insurgency against the Colombian state. The organization maintained an arms-length relationship with the Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro governments, operating across the vast and porous southwestern border uncontrolled by both nations and at times cooperating with Venezuelan authorities against Colombian paramilitaries and dissident FARC elements.

Since the January 3 bombing and kidnapping of Maduro, senior US military brass have visited the Caribbean country.

In June 2026, US forces carried out an airstrike on Venezuelan territory that neutralized Héctor “Niño” Guerrero, an alleged leader of the criminal organization Tren de Aragua. The operation involved CIA intelligence work, with US authorities thanking Venezuelan counterparts for cooperation. Likewise, following the June 24 double earthquake, the US Southern Command deployed around 2,000 troops in Venezuelan territory, temporarily taking control of the country’s main airport.

In May, the US military held “rapid response” military drills, flying Osprey MV-22B aircraft over Caracas and landing at the US Embassy. The exercise drew fierce protests from Venezuelan social movements.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

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Venezuela: Foreign Minister Blanco Meets Trump Officials, Touts ‘Cooperation’

The former opposition cadre rose quickly to become Venezuela’s top diplomat. (Cancillería)

Mérida, November 3, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Foreign Minister Oliver Blanco held meetings with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent during a trip to Washington, DC, on Monday.

Blanco, who was appointed as the Caribbean nation’s top diplomat on October 30, is the highest-ranking Venezuelan official to be hosted by the Trump administration.

His morning summit with Rubio included a photo-op but no statements to the press. On social media, Blanco reaffirmed the acting Delcy Rodríguez government’s “commitment to continue building spaces for understanding for the benefit of Venezuela.”

“During the meeting, we discussed bilateral relations, regional challenges, cooperation, and energy security between our countries,” he wrote.

For his part, Rubio stressed the Trump administration’s “three-phase plan” for Venezuela, which comprises “stabilization, economic recovery and political reconciliation, and democratic transition.”

“[Rubio and Blanco] discussed progress in the Venezuelan-led reconciliation talks, including institutional reforms that lay the groundwork for free, fair, and credible elections,” a State Department press statement read.

The head of Venezuelan diplomacy followed up with a meeting with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent which reportedly focused on “conditions for Venezuela’s full economic development.” Blanco added that the pair discussed Venezuela’s “access to multilateral financial bodies and bilateral economic cooperation opportunities.”

Despite reestablished diplomatic ties and significant US control over Venezuela’s economy and the oil industry, the US Treasury Department has maintained its wide-reaching sanctions program against the South American country, issuing only limited licenses granting exemptions to specific corporations.

The US Treasury Secretary congratulated Blanco on his recent appointment and claimed the White House is “committed to supporting Venezuela’s economic recovery.” 

“This Administration is committed to supporting Venezuela’s economic recovery, revitalizing critical sectors, boosting energy production, and reconnecting its financial sector to restore confidence, attract investment, and lay the groundwork for a more prosperous future,” Bessent stated on X.

The high-level Washington, DC meetings were Blanco’s first trip abroad as foreign minister. He had previously served as vice minister for Europe and North America. 

The 34-year-old foreign relations graduate hails from the ranks of the opposition Acción Democrática party and had been an outspoken critic of the Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro governments. In 2013, Blanco celebrated Chávez’s death, claiming he was in hell alongside Muammar Gaddafi and Osama Bin Laden. The tweet was recently deleted.

In 2016, Blanco was appointed head of communications for the opposition-controlled National Assembly that unsuccessfully tried to oust the Maduro government.

Since the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, Washington and Caracas fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement that included the reopening of their respective embassies after seven years of broken ties.

The Trump administration has backed legislative reforms, spearheaded energy deals, endorsed a dialogue process with the Venezuelan opposition, while also reportedly engaging in military and intelligence cooperation.

After assuming his role in the foreign ministry, Blanco became one of the most visible figures in the renewed relations with the US, often accompanying US Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett on visits and meetings around the country.

Barrett was among the first to congratulate Blanco following his promotion to head Venezuela’s diplomacy, wishing him “success as we work together on the three-phase plan.”

The two held a “cordial and constructive” meeting on Friday. 

Blanco flew to Spain following his US trip to take part in the Iberoamerican Summit taking place on Wednesday and Thursday.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

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The Turkish Soap Opera of Venezuela Business Dealings

Turhan Mildon appears to have leveraged is White House connections to retain his Venezuela ventures. (Venezuelanalysis)

In Venezuela, reality feels more and more like a puzzle. We have to look at what officials choose to say and not say, what is leaked, what remains behind the curtain, and try to weave a plausible narrative out of that.

The government’s opacity has become the norm. There are key decisions about the country’s future with little to no public explanation, contradictory statements, figures that are hard to believe or put into context. Affairs that should be debated and familiar to everyone are shrouded in uncertainty.

For years, the justification was that the US blockade forced everything to be kept secret, so that the enemy would not use that information to its advantage. Then, when corruption scandals broke out, we were told it was the price to pay for doing business under sanctions.

Fast forward to the present, and the blockade has given way to US neocolonial tutelage. But opacity has only gotten worse. Sometimes Trump officials are the ones explaining what happens in our country. The greatest example is the recent oil deal, but there is another sector plagued by these dark interests: the cement industry, which is especially important now amid the post-earthquake reconstruction needs.

A few days after the June 24 double earthquake, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez ordered an audit of Vencement, a company belonging to the Miller Holding conglomerate, whose CEO is Turkish businessman Turhan Mildon. In March 2025, the young entrepreneur reportedly received a concession to operate 10 cement plants owned by the Venezuelan state. The factories belong to the Socialist Cement Corporation, created by Chávez in 2009 after nationalizing the industry.

The concession to Mildon was greenlit by former Minister of Industry Alex Saab, who was surrendered to US agencies in May to face money laundering charges. In that case, we likewise did not have the privilege of an official explanation[a] for why a naturalized Venezuelan-Colombian dual citizen could be “deported” to the US, contrary to the constitution.

With the announced review of cement contracts, and in line with Washington’s directive of cutting out the insiders who had privileged treatment during the Maduro government, Rodríguez unilaterally canceled the concession, alleging non-fulfilment of investment targets.

This sector has been mired in controversy due to the shortages of cement and speculation with its prices. Though production costs for a 42-kilo cement bag are around $8, scarcity or hoarding often led to prices above $35. With the official investigation, there was an order to surveil the plants, block any removal of material, and restrict Vencement personnel from doing inventory or fulfilling existing orders.

But Vencement was not Mildon’s only venture in Venezuela. In November 2025, Saab intervened in the Lamar Group, a company from Zulia State that produced and exported shrimp, which was awarded to the Turkish businessman. The official explanation was that Lamar’s former owner, José Enrique Rincón, was involved in financing an alleged coup attempt against Maduro. In parallel, the government handed Café Madrid and Fama de América, two coffee producers nationalized around 15 years ago, to Mildon as well.

According to Forbes Turkey, Miller Holding and its affiliates, particularly in Venezuela and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Mildon also became extremely influential overnight, had $2.6 billion in profit in 2025. Nevertheless, because the companies are not publicly traded, it is hard to assess their true value. The business sector in Turkey is hardly a paragon of transparency either.

Mildon stated in the same interview that he felt “very sad” when US forces kidnapped Maduro in January, but added that he was not concerned about his businesses. “In my grandfather’s time, professional experience was key. Nowadays, it’s who you know,” the businessman said.

This prompts  multiple questions. How did Mildon get a concession for a sector as strategic as cement, not to mention his other endeavors? His representatives claimed that there were four other competitors, but government sources told the New York Times that the private businesses that receive state assets to operate under “strategic alliances” are handpicked.

Furthermore, Mildon claims Vencement is currently producing 4.5 million tons of cement per year, whereas the NYT reported that, according to data shared by government insiders, output is actually around a third of that. Maybe authorities would like to clarify?

Another obvious question is, why Mildon? Some mention his family’s ties to the Turkish government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with Mildon’s conglomerate receiving over a dozen important contracts in recent years. Amid US sanctions against Venezuela, risk-taking Turkish businessmen secured juicy opportunities in Venezuela. Others add that a separate advantage was Mildon getting access to inner circles thanks to his relationship with María Eugenia Ceballos, daughter of Chief Admiral and former Interior Minister Remigio Ceballos. Surely love cannot trump a fair bidding process, or can it?

It looks like it, because Mildon’s Turkish soap opera was not canceled with Maduro’s kidnapping and Saab’s handover. Mildon reportedly managed to preserve his assets in Venezuela after getting engaged and married to Alina Habba, a lawyer with close ties to Trump who worked in the Justice Department.

Habba, who also possesses quite the dubious CV for all the influence she wields, got the US president to pardon Venezuelan banker Julio Herrera Velutini, who had been charged with bribery and fraud before being convicted of a campaign finance violation misdemeanor. Habba received a $50 million contract, while still working in the Justice Department, from Concord Partners, a company created by the Herrera Velutini family in Florida. This honestly looks like Olympic-level competition for lack of transparency and shady deals.

But returning to Mildon and Habba, their lavish wedding at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York featured senior Trump officials such as US Attorney General Todd Blanche, FBI Director Kash Patel, and White House attorney Will Scharf.

Apparently, Mildon’s new romance led Rodríguez to change course, declaring that the cancelation of the cement contracts had been a clerical error. On October 13, the Miller conglomerate issued a press statement clarifying that none of its agreements had been canceled.

Beyond the Turkish soap opera that has taken hold in Venezuela, we go back to the fundamental question: what conditions do private businesses need to clear before getting hold of strategic Venezuelan state companies? Who is following up on the investment, production, and fiscal commitments? What mechanisms ensure that these concessions will lead to any economic benefits apart from corporate profits? It seems like all these questions get trumped by contractors’ White House connections .

One of the characteristics of the Venezuelan political shift in recent months has been the sanctification  of private investment. Amid legislative reforms and commissions charged with determining which “non-strategic” assets should be privatized, key sectors such as electricity or the basic industries might soon be in the hands of multinational corporations.

I’m not a big believer in trickle-down economics, in this case that Venezuelans’ well-being will come once corporate profits are assured. But if on top of that, business is the outcome of the most vulgar influence trafficking, we are truly doomed. This soap opera needs a plot twist.

Jessica Dos Santos is a Venezuelan university professor, journalist and writer whose work has appeared in outlets such as RT, Épale CCS magazine and Investig’Action. She is the author of the book “Caracas en Alpargatas” (2018). She’s won the Aníbal Nazoa Journalism Prize in 2014 and received honorable mentions in the Simón Bolívar National Journalism prize in 2016 and 2018.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

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Venezuela: Rodríguez Pledges to Return Nationalized Assets to Former Owners

Rodríguez announced that workers’ incomes would follow GDP growth, though increases might still fall below inflation. (Presidential Press)

Caracas, October 29, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez defended an ongoing plan to privatize state assets and return nationalized companies to former owners on Thursday.

“I have ordered the evaluation of non-essential state assets to be offered to the private sector or returned to their previous owners,” she said in a televised address to the nation.

“This is already in motion. The right to private property is guaranteed by our Constitution,” Rodríguez added.

In April, the acting president established a commission to evaluate the “strategic” value of state-owned companies, land, and other assets, to determine whether they should be retained, privatized, or liquidated.

Former President Hugo Chávez implemented a program of nationalizations in the 2000s to assert state control over strategic economic sectors, including electricity, telecommunications, and heavy industries.

After enacting a pro-business overhaul of hydrocarbon and mining legislation earlier this year, the Venezuelan parliament is on the verge of approving the partial privatization of the electricity sector. Foreign companies are likewise in talks to acquire the country’s largest aluminum smelter, while a consortium headed by Sunergon Oil is reportedly pushing the takeover of several industrial plants associated with the oil industry.

Business sector representative Luigi Pisella, who heads the commission, recently proposed a law enshrining multinational corporate participation in privatized public entities alongside local capital.

“I have encountered no resistance to this idea,” he stated in an interview with Banca y Negocios. “Most investors agree it is indispensable to have local partners whose experience is essential to navigate the complex Venezuelan environment.”

Pisella added that “different models of private participation” are being evaluated, but ruled out the “strategic alliances” whereby the state grants the assets in a concession-type deal while retaining ownership. The business sector spokesman argued that “no one is going to invest” without the full transfer of property.

In Thursday’s address, Acting President Rodríguez also promised that workers’ incomes would be increased quarterly next year, with the raise being at least on a par with GDP growth. 

“For 2027 we are scheduling increases to workers’ incomes in four different moments, in amounts that can never fall short of economic growth in the preceding trimesters,” she explained. 

Rodríguez did not mention adjusting the minimum wage, which has been frozen since 2022 and is currently worth around US $0.15. Instead, Venezuelan authorities have leaned on non-wage bonuses, which do not factor into vacation pay, severance, and other labor benefits in what amounts to a de facto subsidy to employers. Public sector workers currently have a monthly income floor of $240.

While Venezuela’s GDP is predicted to grow 5-10 percent in 2026, even raising non-wage bonuses by that amount falls short of inflation. Finance website Ecoanalitica estimates that prices measured in USD will end up rising 20-30 percent in 2026, meaning that an income adjustment pegged to GDP growth would amount to a loss of purchasing power.

In her message, Rodríguez went on to tout ongoing labor reform talks involving business lobbies and select trade unions. 

Private sector associations such as FEDECÁMARAS and FEDEINDUSTRIA want to slash labor costs for employers, further reducing social security contributions and eliminating the retroactive nature of severance pay and other benefits such that any future wage hike would not trigger corresponding increases.

Finally, the acting president defended recent judicial reforms and ongoing US-endorsed talks with a sector of the Venezuelan opposition that will appoint a new Supreme Court and National Electoral Council. The US State Department has claimed that new presidential elections will be held in 2027.

Rodríguez offered no specifics on an electoral timetable, stating only that “there will be elections, with a renewed electoral authority and the world as a witness.”

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

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US State Department Targets Venezuelan Electoral Reform, Presidential ‘Vacancy’

The US Secretary of State hosted far-right Machado in March. (EFE)

Caracas, October 27, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Trump administration has announced plans to back electoral reforms in Venezuela and push for presidential elections.

In a press briefing with international journalists on Monday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Venezuela’s electoral infrastructure “designed to rig elections” and argued it must be replaced quickly to ensure a valid vote.

Rubio, who has been the Trump administration’s chief architect of US policy toward Venezuela, said talks between Acting President Delcy Rodríguez’s government and opposition sectors led by Dinorah Figuera were moving toward the appointment of a new Supreme Court (TSJ) before the end of the year, followed shortly afterward by the renewal of the National Electoral Council (CNE).

“Obviously, we need to use our influence with the interim [Venezuelan] authorities, to ensure that the process moves forward responsibly (…) Our goal is to have an election,” Rubio said. He welcomed what he described as “serious progress in that direction” and warned that “if anyone tries to derail the process, they will seriously harm Venezuela.”

In a separate press briefing, a senior State Department official added that, once both institutions have been reconstituted, the Venezuelan presidency will be declared permanently vacant, triggering a six-month constitutional deadline for presidential elections to be held “under competitive conditions.”

The anonymous official stressed that the process would also require political guarantees and regulations on access to the press. The official also defended the inclusion of pro-government sectors in a “transition,” arguing that peaceful democratic processes often require cooperation from outgoing factions, citing Spain and Portugal as precedents.

Asked about a specific election date, Rubio said the Rodríguez administration had complied with US timetables so far. 

“Are we going to wait two years [for an election]? That’s not going to happen. At best, I have two years and two months left in this position,” he added.

His remarks coincide with statements by Dinorah Figuera, who heads the opposition delegation in talks with government representatives and forecast presidential elections to take place in late 2027 or early 2028.

Meanwhile, the third round of political dialogue in Venezuela agreed to review four laws governing political participation, pluralism, and the autonomy of political organizations, including the Law on Political Parties, Public Meetings, and Demonstrations. The discussions also addressed disqualifications from holding public office and the review of legal frameworks related to political rights.

In parallel, Venezuela’s National Assembly formally launched the process to renew the 32 justices of the Supreme Court (TSJ). Applications from legal professionals seeking to join the court will be accepted from Wednesday, October 28, through Wednesday, November 11. The fourth round of dialogue is scheduled for November 11–15.

Rodríguez and other Venezuelan high-ranking officials have not commented on the State Department announcements.

The White House’s claims relating to Venezuelan reforms and elections coincided with the return of opposition leader María Corina Machado to the country on Sunday. The far-right politician had spent more than a year abroad and her supporters have called for her inclusion in the ongoing negotiations.

Asked about Machado’s return, Rubio said he had told the Rodríguez government “weeks ago” that Machado should be able to come back without obstacles. The secretary of state denied that Washington had obstructed Machado’s return, stating only that she was advised against traveling immediately after the June 24 double earthquake.

Rodríguez, for her part, said the opposition politician could have avoided the “show” of appearing at a church in Lara state before traveling 400 kilometers to Caracas at the head of a motorcade, amid chants of “freedom” and calls for immediate presidential elections.

“The airports are there. Let’s move away from the show (…) Many people who have benefited from the amnesty law and this process, which seeks peaceful coexistence, have been able to enter through the airport’s new transitional structures,” Rodríguez said.

The acting president declined to clarify which route Machado had taken to reenter Venezuela. Machado left the country in December 2024 for Oslo, where she received the Nobel Peace Prize before gifting it to Trump. She and her party maintain that the government prevented her from returning on seven previous occasions, a claim the authorities deny.

Asked whether the justice system would take action against Machado, Rodríguez replied that she hoped there would be “repentance and a change of course” from the opposition figure and that the opposition leader would be able to “contribute something to the country.” In recent years, Machado endorsed economic sanctions and a foreign military attack against Venezuela.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

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Western Media Accept Trump’s Plundering of Venezuelan Oil as Business as Usual

Corporate outlets are concerned about the long-term prospects of multinational corporations. (Reuters)

Guardian (9/26/26): “Donald Trump has long coveted the oilfields of other nations.”

Since the January 3, 2026, military strikes and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the Trump administration has imposed semi-colonial rule over Venezuela, forcing dramatic shifts in the country’s domestic and foreign policies.

The capstone of the new tutelary regime is an oil deal announced in late August that Trump called “the biggest in history.” The agreement turns over 17 prime oilfields, holding over 20% of the country’s reserves, to a Pentagon-controlled corporation tasked with supplying cheap fuel to the US war machine for decades to come.

After spending years manufacturing consent for US-sponsored regime change in Venezuela (e.g., FAIR.org, 6/4/21, 1/11/23, 2/12/25), having a government in Caracas subservient to Washington represented a new scenario for the corporate media. The novel conditions have raised few significant qualms for Western outlets. Tactical objections notwithstanding, there is no fundamental disagreement with the US running the affairs of a Global South country.

Not ‘stealing Venezuela’s oil’

Energy Secretary Chris Wright (France 24, 3/9/26): “I’ve seen those headlines. ‘We’re Stealing Venezuelan Oil.’ Of course, that’s not true at all.”

Working hand in glove with the Trump administration, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government has overhauled Venezuela’s hydrocarbon legislation (Venezuelanalysis, 7/13/26) to offer what oil experts consider a business environment more favorable to foreign capital than at any point in the country’s history. The new oil agreement with the White House manages to go even further.

The 17 oilfields in question will be taken over by North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), a private company in which the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) will get a 35% stake while investing nothing—and wielding veto power over its board.

Furthermore, according to the White House, the US State Department will secure 20% of NABEP’s output at cost, and have a right of first refusal over the remaining 80%. On top of this, Venezuelan officials have already suggested Washington would be given an additional “sales discount”  (Venezuelanalysis, 9/9/26).

In summary, Trump is looking to secure cheap crude supplies at a time when his disastrous Iran debacle has thrown global energy markets into upheaval. The agreement is so blatantly skewed that US Energy Secretary Chris Wright felt he needed to clarify that Washington was not “stealing Venezuela’s oil” (AFP, 9/3/26).

Nevertheless, Western media outlets were largely unfazed by such an obvious oil grab, euphemistically referring to the deal as “highly unusual” (New York Times, 8/29/26) or “remarkable” (BBC, 9/1/26), at most as “contentious” (Guardian, 9/1/26).

Corporate journalists did raise objections over the central role played by NABEP owner Alejandro Betancourt, a shady Venezuelan businessman who faced multiple money-laundering probes before the Trump administration intervened, and pressured judicial authorities at home and abroad to drop the investigations (BBC, 9/2/26; CNN, 9/4/26; New York Times, 9/4/26).

But media seemed satisfied with Trump’s state and energy secretaries Marco Rubio and Chris Wright pledging that US oversight will keep proceedings honest (Reuters, 9/2/26; New York Times, 9/4/26), despite the fact that billions in Venezuelan oil revenues, controlled by the US Treasury Department since January, are unaccounted for (Council on Foreign Relations, 6/3/26; Financial Times, 7/22/26).

Procedurally transparent plunder

The New York Times (5/5/26) wrote positively of “a new era of accountability” in which “the United States would control Venezuelan oil sales” and “Venezuela would submit monthly budgets to the White House.”

Objections to the Venezuela/NABEP/Pentagon venture were mostly procedural and out of concern for appearances, not driven by any principled opposition to US imperialist predation. Faced with outright colonial plunder of Venezuela, the political and media establishment only demands “accountability” and “transparency” (New York Times, 5/5/26; Financial Times, 9/18/26).

For months, the White House has controlled Venezuelan oil export revenues, with Trump officials openly calling them “one of the largest assets ever to go on the US balance sheet,” and a source of “leverage” over Caracas. Yet Trump’s Democratic opponents have found no issue with seizing another country’s income, raising only questions about the allocation of the funds in reference to alleged corruption on the part of Caracas and Trump insiders (The Hill, 9/30/26; Washington Post, 9/17/26). This despite the fact that the Venezuelan government has to submit a “monthly budget” to access its own funds (New York Times, 1/28/26) and is subjected to US-imposed auditors (Reuters, 4/27/26).

The other source of disappointment with Trump stomping all over Venezuelan sovereignty, but prioritizing oil over regime change, is impatience for the restoration/recovery/return of “democracy” to Venezuela (Politico, 9/2/26; Guardian, 8/30/26; CBC, 9/3/26). Despite  widely acknowledgement that Trump is eroding democracy at home (New York Times, 8/20/26, 10/14/26; Guardian, 10/8/26), somehow pundits expected him to prioritize it in an oil-rich foreign country.

In the establishment’s consensus, “democracy” does not mean a political system that meaningfully reflects the Venezuelan people’s collective will, but simply one that empowers opposition figures that have been groomed for years, like far-right María Corina Machado, their undemocratic credentials notwithstanding (FAIR.org, 10/23/25).

Eager to stay in power, Rodríguez has over-complied with every US demand, going as far as adopting language about Venezuela undergoing a “democratic transformation.” Her pliancy has earned her favorable corporate media profiles that completely contrast with the demonization of Maduro.

After securing an exclusive interview, Time (7/30/26) described the acting leader as a “disciplined operator” who “advocate[s] for greater economic openness,” in contrast to the “authoritarian” Maduro, who oversaw “economic collapse.” Along the same lines, the Guardian (9/12/26) presented Rodríguez as a “a pragmatic, witty and intelligent workaholic,” unlike her “authoritarian” and “incompetent” predecessor in the presidential palace.

Nevertheless, given the broad Beltway consensus for comprehensive regime change, it is unlikely that the Rodríguez administration’s subservience to Trump will secure any leeway in determining its political path forward, free from outside meddling—especially if, as is anticipated, the GOP lawmakers most likely to be impressed by such obsequiousness lose power in the US’s upcoming midterm elections (Axios, 9/23/26; Financial Times, 10/9/26).

Please think of the corporations!

Reuters (9/1/26): ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips “have repeatedly said that their requirements of legal certainty and contract sanctity ‌have not ⁠yet been met.”

Alongside their exceptionalist expectations about “democracy,” legacy outlets also focus on those they consider the true victims of Trump’s neocolonial offensive in Venezuela: multinational oil corporations.

According to Reuters (9/1/26), the recent oil deal “raises red flags for major producers,” who fear having their reputation sullied by being “seated at the same table with Betancourt,” as well as the prospect of the US government becoming a “competitor.”

Bloomberg (8/30/26) raised concerns that the agreement “reprises [the] neocolonial past” of Venezuela’s oil industry. The warning stems not from apprehension that the Venezuelan people’s future is being determined by a foreign nation, but from fear that the US’s “out-sized power” might lead to “popular unrest.” This could create conditions for what the business mouthpiece views as a catastrophic outcome: the nationalization of foreign-owned oil assets.

“The troubled history of Venezuela’s oil offers a cautionary tale,” Bloomberg’s Kevin Crowley and Patricia Garip wrote:

The country was once dominated by US and European operators and was among the world’s largest producers. But assets owned by ExxonMobil Holdings Corps. and ConocoPhillips were seized and nationalized during political upheaval in the 2000s.

Corporate media present companies that made massive profits in Venezuela for decades as victims, because the Chávez government wanted them to comply with new laws and accept minority stakes in joint ventures.

The New York Times (9/1/26) complains that the two corporations “have spent years trying to get the country to repay them for their seized assets, with little success.” The statement conceals the fact that the Venezuelan government, when it enacted the 2007 decree imposing state majority in all Orinoco Oil Belt projects, offered to compensate ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips for their transition to minority partners, or to buy out their assets altogether. However, both corporations rejected the offers in order to pursue international arbitration. The former has already recouped most of what it was granted, while the latter will eventually collect on a significant award.

Despite the fact that Chevron, BP, Shell and other energy giants have signed deals in recent months taking advantage of the reformed hydrocarbon law (Venezuelanalysis, 9/3/26), pundits complain that ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips remain “hesitant” (CBS, 8/31/26) and need to be “lured” (Reuters, 9/1/26). Still, the Western corporations are likely to return to the country with favorable deals (Reuters, 9/16/26).

The victor and his spoils

Belén Fernández (Al Jazeera, 9/24/26): “You’re not technically supposed to admit that you attacked a country just to get its oil.”

Faced with strategic defeat in West Asia, Trump has clung to his Venezuela success, stating on multiple occasions that “to the victor belong the spoils,” in reference to the US hijacking the Venezuelan oil industry following the January 3 attacks and presidential kidnapping (Al Jazeera, 9/24/26; Guardian, 9/26/26).

Furthermore, Trump has not been shy in boasting about the US winning a “war” against Venezuela (Financial Times, 9/18/26; New York Times, 6/26/26). Corporate journalists have rarely pointed out that this stance directly contradicts the administration’s official position that the kidnapping of Maduro and Flores was a “law enforcement” operation (New York Times, 1/6/26; PBS, 1/8/26) in order to justify bypassing congressional approval.

The US president has likewise claimed to have recovered the costs of the military operation “many times over” (Al Jazeera, 3/3/26; Guardian, 6/28/26), a fact confirmed by Luigi Pisella, a business sector spokesperson with close ties to the acting Rodríguez administration (Venezuelanalysis, 8/10/26). Pisella stated that the US has retained $4.7 billion from the Venezuelan export revenues it controls to cover the costs of its military operation.

In spite of their ostensible hostility to Trump, corporate outlets have historically been complicit with his Venezuela policies, from whitewashing a deadly sanctions program (FAIR.org, 6/13/22) to endorsing a military buildup over debunked “narcoterrorism” accusations (FAIR.org, 11/19/25). The New York Times and Washington Post went as far as to withhold information in order to not jeopardize the January 3 operation (FAIR.org, 1/13/26).

Now, with a semi-colonial regime in place, the only concerns are about procedural transparency, democratic appearances and the well-being of multinational corporations. The Venezuelan people always get the short end of the stick.

Source: FAIR

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The Venezuelanalysis Podcast Episode 48: Venezuela and 21st-Century Neocolonialism

Nine months after the US’ January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelanalysis team got together to take stock of a whirlwind of changes in Caracas’ domestic and foreign policies.

Lead editor Ricardo Vaz was joined by fellow staff members Jessica Dos Santos, Silvana Solano, and Lucas Koerner. They broke down the US’ semi-colonial regime, the gaps between the official discourse and reality, and the prospects for the different political sectors.

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Note: this episode was recorded in Spanish. See the YouTube video above for a subtitled version.

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Venezuela: From Revolution to Recolonization

Venezuelan leaders went from threatening a new Vietnam to fawning over Trump. (Presidential Press)

Between smiles and a handshake, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez thanked US President Donald Trump for “supporting the country’s return to multilateral forums,” following a face-to-face meeting on September 22 that she called “historic.”

In her address before the UN General Assembly one day later, Rodríguez reiterated her gratitude to Trump while promising a “democratic transformation” of her country. The acting leader’s trip to New York, a mere nine months after the January 3 US bombings and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, perfectly encapsulated the Venezuelan government’s international and domestic realignment with US imperialism in general and its MAGA faction in particular.

In her speech, she euphemistically called the January 3 military strikes “the outcome of the exhaustion of domestic politics and heightened confrontation with the US,” basically holding Venezuela partially responsible for the imperialist attack it suffered.

The abandonment of Maduro

Rodríguez’s trip was as symbolic for what was said as for what was left unsaid. The acting leader and her entourage heaped praise on Trump and took turns posing for pictures. Rodríguez also maintained an undignified silence when Trump, addressing the UN, gloated about the January 3 military operation and abduction of Maduro, whom he called an “outlaw dictator,” while shamelessly boasting that “to the victor belong the spoils.”

Maduro and Flores – currently detained in Brooklyn just 10 miles from UN headquarters and facing a show trial on ludicrous “narcoterrorism” charges – were not worth a single mention by Rodríguez. This stance has been backed by pro-government pundits who are increasingly dropping the “acting” label when referring to Rodríguez.

Her government has effectively undermined Maduro and Flores’ sovereign immunity argument to get their charges dismissed. US Justice Department prosecutors told the court that Caracas, via its embassy in the US, had advocated to the State Department for Rodríguez to receive head-of-state immunity in an unrelated civil lawsuit in Florida. But, Venezuelan authorities have declined to do the same vis-à-vis Maduro and Flores in what the US Justice Department called “devastating silence.”

The official indifference is even more remarkable given Flores’ documented health issues, heavily aggravated by the brutal kidnapping, which led defense attorneys to request that she be moved to house arrest during the trial. This silence contrasts with the Maduro government’s loud defense of Alex Saab, which repeatedly brought up his health issues under incarceration during the international campaign for his release.

Saab is another prime example of the Rodríguez administration’s pragmatic rapprochement with Washington. He was irregularly handed over to US agencies in May and recently pleaded guilty in a US federal court in Miami, promising to cooperate against unnamed Venezuelan officials.

An imperial satellite

The Venezuelan leadership’s diplomatic activity in New York more broadly showcased a new foreign policy direction that is now unmistakably marching to Washington’s drum.

Rodríguez held talks with International Monetary Fund and World Bank representatives, deepening reengagement with the Washington-based financial institutions that former President Hugo Chávez denounced as instruments of US imperialism and booted them out of the country. The specter of another IMF loan-and-adjustment package returns as the Rodríguez administration begins negotiations to restructure the country’s enormous and illegitimate debt.

In addition, Rodríguez held sideline meetings with US allies only, such as Netherlands PM Rob Jetten, Trinidad and Tobago PM Kamla Persad-Bissessar and Chilean President José Antonio Kast. Rodríguez also hosted Paraguayan President Santiago Peña in Caracas before flying to the US. 

The right-wing Chilean and Paraguayan administrations had firmly backed US regime change efforts in Venezuela, leading the Maduro government to sever ties. Trinidad and Tobago’s case was even more egregious, with Caracas suspending all cooperation, including in key cross-border natural gas projects, after Port of Spain endorsed Washington’s military buildup and extrajudicial boat bombings on Venezuela’s doorstep in late 2025.

Rodríguez and her team also broke with the Chavista tradition of holding meetings with global majority countries similarly under Washington’s gun, especially allies and strategic partners like Cuba, Iran, China and Russia. A customary event in Harlem, alongside Cuban officials and international solidarity movements, was scrapped as well.

The acting president’s UN address exposed how anti-imperialism and the defense of multipolarity have vanished from the official discourse. Absent was the hitherto denunciation of Washington’s criminal wars across the globe, replaced by a vague expression of solidarity with “peoples who suffer war.” Nor was there any condemnation of US economic sanctions, which remain in place against Venezuela and its former allies.

Rodríguez offered no words of support for Cuba as it faces a US blockade that gets more murderous by the day. There was no mention of Palestine either. Before January 3, Venezuelan representatives had never wasted an opportunity to reiterate support for the Palestinian cause and to expose the international community’s failure to rein in the genocidal, Western-sponsored settler colony.

In contrast, Venezuela joined the US, Israel, Ukraine, Western European countries and Latin American right-wing governments in boycotting the UN’s commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Durban Declaration. The 2001 World Conference Against Racism marked a milestone in the ongoing struggle to end racism and colonialism, provoking the ire of the US and Israel, which have led boycotts of every one of its commemorations.

Fuel for a sputtering empire

Along with the 180-degree foreign policy shift, the Rodríguez administration has moved to restructure the economy to the benefit of a declining US hegemon reeling from its strategic defeat in the war against Iran.

With US officials’ input and supervision, Venezuelan authorities have overhauled energy and mining laws in the interest of multinational corporations, slashing taxes and royalties as well as ceding operational and commercial control. Corporate executives, often shepherded by Trump aides, have paraded through the presidential palace to sign agreements carving up Venezuela’s immense subsoil resources.

A recent oil deal with the Trump administration, which Rodríguez also hailed as “historic,” will turn over 17 prime oilfields holding more than a fifth of Venezuela’s crude reserves to a private petroleum company, NABEP, controlled by the Pentagon. Furthermore, the US State Department will be able to buy 20 percent of NABEP’s output at cost, while having a right of first refusal for the remaining 80 percent, for which a Venezuelan oil official promised a major “sales discount.” In other words, Venezuela is going to supply energy below market price to the imperial war machine.

Whatever revenue is ultimately left for Caracas is still going to be controlled by the US Treasury Department, under what Venezuelan state oil company (PDVSA) chief defended as a “state-to-state agreement.” A recent Financial Times report revealed that the White House is presently barring Venezuela from paying dividends to Russian and Chinese joint venture partners in a flagrant attempt to drive them out.

Washington’s semi-colonial control extends beyond privileged access to natural resources, including strategic minerals. A looming privatization drive and debt restructuring process are likely to further entrench Venezuelan dependence on Western monopoly capital. At the same time, the US is also looking to turn the South American country into a captive market for its heavily subsidized agricultural output. Venezuela’s imports of staples such as rice and corn have skyrocketed this year, seriously threatening national production, especially small and mid-size campesino farms supplying much of the country’s food.

(Ab)uses of history

The speed and scope of Caracas’ realignment with Washington has made it an uphill battle for those still insisting that the acting Rodríguez government is merely conducting a “tactical retreat” without straying from the Bolivarian Revolution’s strategic horizon.

One early line of argument was to invoke historical examples, such as the Brest-Litovsk treaty, to rationalize difficult concessions at gunpoint. However, the analogy grew ever more dubious with the passing months, as the Bolsheviks never renounced their anti-imperialist internationalism nor the nascent socialist state’s sovereignty over the commanding heights of the economy.

The argument that subordinating the economy to US-led capital was akin to China’s post-1978 opening up belies the reality that Venezuela does not even manage its own export revenues and must have its expenses approved by the US State Department, subject to auditing by CIA-linked firms like Deloitte.

Venezuelan government officials and unofficial spokespeople have also abused examples related to Chávez, namely his call for troops to stand down in the failed 1992 insurrection and the fact that he did not martyr himself in the 2002 coup that briefly overthrew his democratically-elected government. However, in both cases, Chávez never surrendered his core principles concerning independence and sovereignty. In 2002, he allowed himself to be taken prisoner by the putschists to avoid a bloodbath, but he did not resign and would not have sat quietly if Venezuela were turned into a US semi-colony overnight. On multiple occasions, Chávez underscored he was prepared to fight and die on the frontlines should Venezuela face an Iraq-style US invasion.

There are other historical analogies that are, unfortunately, more appropriate. Iraq after the US invasion, like Venezuela, to this day does not control its oil revenues, which are deposited in a New York Federal Reserve account. Iraq was until recently under US military occupation, hosting some two dozen bases – a possibility that Trump has recently left open for Venezuela. In past months, the US has carried out extrajudicial executions on Venezuelan soil and deployed military assets in the wake of July’s double earthquake, including temporarily taking over operations at the Simón Bolívar International Airport and La Guaira port.

Egypt under President Anwar Sadat is likewise a very instructive precedent. Sadat never renounced his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser, simply presenting his program as a “correction” of past mistakes. Yet he progressively dismantled the achievements of Nasserism, rolling back land reform and industrialization policies in favor of imperialist capital. Sadat also realigned Egypt from the Soviet Union to the US camp, going on to reestablish ties with Israel and abandon the Palestinian cause.

Vietnam: The forgotten analogy

Lacking justifications for the new alliance with the Trump administration, Venezuelan government officials and influencers have resorted to straw man arguments, claiming that the “international left” wanted the Venezuelan people to immolate themselves by confronting a vastly superior military foe.

The official rhetoric eclipses what was until recently Caracas’ preferred historical analogy: Vietnam. In late 2025, as the US ramped up its military buildup, Venezuelan leaders warned that Trump would face a “second Vietnam” if he dared to attack. There were months of military drills and detailed preparations across the country, consistent with Venezuela’s asymmetric doctrine of “prolonged people’s war”. 

Ultimately it is impossible to know how much resistance Venezuela could have mounted against the US onslaught because the leadership opted not to fight. US air superiority and electronic warfare notwithstanding, Venezuelan defense officials have neglected to explain why only one of Venezuela’s 5,000 Russian-made Igla-S manpads – ideal for taking down low-flying helicopters and combat aircraft – was used. Venezuela’s armed forces offered no organized resistance on that fateful morning, leaving Maduro’s Cuban security detail virtually alone to confront the invader in what reportedly still proved a fiercely heroic firefight that left 32 Cubans dead.

Though Venezuela might have been unable to avoid decapitation of its top leadership – either via capture or assassination – it could have raised the costs for the US empire to a politically unacceptable degree, potentially miring it in the sort of Iraq-style quagmire that the Trump administration most feared. 

Instead, almost overnight, the acting government seamlessly pivoted from vowing to combat imperialism by all means necessary to fawning over Trump and his underlings. Promises that not a “single drop” of Venezuelan oil would be shipped to the US in case of an attack were replaced by risible claims that supplying crude at cost to the Pentagon was Chávez’s plan all along.

Unable to present a convincing case for the domestic and foreign policy U-turns, official and unofficial government spokespeople have also lashed out at criticism from the Latin American left. Most recently, former Colombian President Gustavo Petro slammed the Rodríguez administration for giving away the nation’s oil to Trump. Caracas responded with ad hominem invectives.

At Washington’s behest, Venezuela has also halted all subsidized oil shipments to Cuba, which has added to the island’s gravest energy crisis in its history. Cuba’s Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío recently said that Venezuela remained a “friendly” country, but added that “ally is too strong a word.”

The cost of capitulation 

The human toll of resistance, whether in sanctions-besieged Venezuela or on the battlefields of West Asia, is always immense. However, as national liberation movements have long understood, the price of capitulation is inevitably higher, especially in the medium and long term. Chávez and Maduro clearly grasped this reality, rallying the masses to withstand decades of US hybrid warfare and forging close alliances with anti-imperialist states from Cuba to Iran. 

The cost of submission, meanwhile, is being borne by the Venezuelan laboring classes, from small farmers hard hit by US agricultural dumping to the urban semi-proletariat devastated by spiraling inflation resulting from Washington’s pilfering of the nation’s export earnings. 

For its part, Venezuela’s comprador bourgeoisie, in both its traditional and emergent fractions, stands to reap fabulous rewards from the demolition of the legislative pillars of the Bolivarian Revolution – viz., hydrocarbons, mining, housing and real estate, or forthcoming axing of labor and land laws – reasserting itself as a servile intermediary for US imperialism. 

There is no better example than NABEP owner Alejandro Betancourt, an oil mogul who amassed a fortune from often-unfulfilled state contracts dating back to 2009 and was hand-picked by the Trump administration as a middleman in the 25-year agreement backstopped by the Pentagon. The White House went as far as pressuring domestic and foreign courts to drop money laundering accusations against Betancourt.

Rodríguez and her leadership faction likewise benefit from what analyst William Serafino has called the new regime of “co-government” with the Trump White House, tying their fortunes to the latter to outflank rivals and solidify the strategic alliance with local and imperialist capital. 

The current acting president is one of the architects of the post-2018 neoliberal economic package that was the fulcrum of a new governability pact with the local bourgeoisie, freezing wages and social spending in exchange for social “peace”. Indeed, as then vice president, Rodríguez reportedly brought Betancourt back to Venezuela in 2023, shuttering an investigation into his alleged corruption and key role in financing the self-proclaimed Juan Guaidó “interim presidency” during the first Trump administration. The episode is symptomatic of the Venezuelan government’s Faustian gambit to appease business sectors and maintain a modest economic recovery under crushing sanctions, but at the cost of slowly eroding its popular support base.

The Maduro administration’s concessions hollowed out the Bolivarian Revolution’s sovereign edifice but its institutional foundations remained formally intact alongside the internationalist geopolitical scaffolding binding Venezuela to the broader Axis of Resistance. The post-January 3 semi-colonial offensive has set about demolishing this structure of political-military and economic independence. While the destruction can be repaired through sustained bottom-up mobilization advancing a national popular alternative to capitulation, it will likely be the outcome of a medium- and long-term process. Nevertheless, there are growing signs of revolutionary movements and intellectuals organizing to confront the US empire and its local agents and reconquer sovereignty as the cornerstone of any future socialist construction.

What should be clear without a sliver of a doubt is that the “Rodrigato” – and the lumpen bourgeoisie it represents – has opted to pact with the Trump administration. Any revolutionary strategy to resist re-colonization must begin from concrete analysis of concrete conditions. Ignoring the acting Venezuelan leadership’s discourse and policies, pretending that there is a cunning secret plan being devised or trying to frame everything as a masterful 3D chess move, will ultimately hamper the most important task: fighting US imperialism.

Source: Sovereign Media

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Swiss, US Authorities Remove Individual Sanctions Against Venezuelan Officials

Switzerland added Saab, Pulido and four other Venezuelan nationals to its blacklist. (Reuters)

Caracas, October 19, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has lifted “precautionary asset freezes” against Marleny Contreras, wife of Venezuelan Interior, Justice, and Peace Minister Diosdado Cabello, and United Socialist Party (PSUV) lawmaker Jorge Arreaza.

The country’s authorities stated that their inclusion on a list of sanctioned Venezuelan officials was “a mistake” after determining that neither holds assets in Swiss territory nor faces corruption accusations.

The asset freeze was imposed on January 5, two days after US forces bombed Caracas and kidnapped Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Bern claimed the measure was intended to prevent potentially illicit assets from leaving Switzerland amid eventual legal investigations.

The legal measure remains in force until 2030 and includes a formal commitment to return to the Venezuelan people any resources proven to have been illicitly acquired. Over 40 current and former Venezuelan officials, as well as direct relatives and alleged associates, remain on the list.

Alongside the removal of Contreras and Arreaza, the Swiss government added six individuals to the register. New additions include former Venezuelan government envoy and Industry Minister Álex Saab and his business associate Álvaro Pulido. 

Pulido appeared before a Miami court on October 13 after being handed over by Venezuelan authorities to face money laundering charges. Saab was likewise surrendered to US agencies and pleaded guilty to money laundering accusations, pledging to “cooperate” with other US legal investigations.

Saab and Pulido were joined in the Swiss blacklist by José Vicente Amparan Croquer, a lawyer whom US authorities have accused of laundering money from an alleged US $1.2 billion embezzlement scheme at Venezuelan state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), and Mario Enrique Bonilla Vallera, a businessman identified as an alleged front man for Nicolás Maduro’s stepsons.

The list also includes the wife and former wife of two former deputy electricity ministers who were already on the blacklisteed: Milagros Coromoto Torres Morán, wife and business partner of Nervis Villalobos, and María Consuelo Pardi Celis, former wife of Javier Alvarado Ochoa.

The Swiss decision came two days after the US Treasury Department removed Jorge Rodríguez, president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, chief negotiator in a US-backed dialogue process with an opposition faction, and brother of Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, from its own sanctions list. Delcy Rodríguez herself was removed from the Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list last April.

Jorge Rodríguez was first targeted on September 25, 2018, during Trump’s first term in office. Individual sanctions block any assets the person may have on US soil and bar US individuals and companies from engaging in any transactions. The measures lead to issues of overcompliance.

Spanish daily ABC’s White House correspondent David Alandete argued that the parliamentary leader’s removal from the SDN list was a reward for his “cooperation” in a “new phase of relations between Caracas and the White House.”

The move was announced on the same day that Delcy Rodríguez’s acting government and the opposition delegation led by former lawmaker Dinorah Figuera began a third round of US-endorsed talks in Caracas. The discussions are intended to address the continuation of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) renewal process, as well as political rights and guarantees.

Nevertheless, 254 individuals and entities remain on the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions list. The Trump administration also maintains wide-reaching coercive measures against key Venezuelan economic sectors, including oil, mining, and banking.

Since January, Washington has issued sanctions waivers to allow select Western corporations to secure access to Venezuelan oil and mineral resources under favorable conditions. The White House has also greenlit select US companies to export and import products to and from the Caribbean nation. However, revenues from Venezuelan exports are deposited in a US Treasury account, with US officials deciding when and how much to disburse to Caracas.

Last week, the Trump administration issued General License 60A. The license authorizes humanitarian assistance transactions focused on addressing damage caused by Venezuela’s June 24 double earthquake until April 21, 2027.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

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