US-Venezuela Relations

Caracas, October 6, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Justice Department has urged New York District Judge Alvin Hellerstein to reject Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores’ sovereign immunity claims amid their ongoing legal case.

In a court filing submitted on October 2, prosecutors told the court that Maduro and Flores’ motions to dismiss their indictments “should be denied.”

The Venezuelan president and first lady, who is also a legislator, were kidnapped in Caracas by US forces on January 3. They were charged with drug trafficking conspiracy and weapons possession, with Maduro additionally facing a “narco-terrorism” accusation.

The pair’s defense teams filed motions to dismiss the case in September, arguing that their respective positions in the Venezuelan government should make them immune to criminal prosecution in a third country.

In response, the Justice Department stated that the recognition of a foreign head of state is the exclusive competency of the executive branch, and that Washington has not recognized Maduro since 2019. Historically, US courts have deferred to the White House and State Department on foreign policy matters.

However, in the ongoing case, Justice Department officials sought to bolster their argument by stating that the Venezuelan government, led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, has declined to invoke immunity for Maduro and Flores.

“If Venezuela wished to assert its view that the defendants were entitled to immunity in this, it could have,“ the submitted document read. “The defendants’ attempt to claim the contrary is an admission that such silence is devastating to their claims.”

The prosecutors pointed to an ongoing civil lawsuit in Florida against Maduro, Rodríguez, and other defendants, where the Venezuelan government, through its US embassy, requested that the Trump administration communicate to the respective court that the acting president should “enjoy absolute immunity from judicial proceedings in foreign domestic courts.”

The State Department sent a letter in June calling on the Florida district court to “promptly dismiss the proceedings.” The White House likewise communicated to the court that all claims against Rodríguez should be “dismissed without prejudice.”

In August 2025, three US nationals who were imprisoned in Venezuela sued Maduro, Rodríguez, and several other current and former state officials. The plaintiffs claimed to have suffered “torture” and to have been used in “hostage diplomacy.” The judge issued a default ruling after Maduro and other defendants failed to show and awarded $314 million in damages to the plaintiffs.

“Venezuela did not request immunity in this case, despite every opportunity to do so. Indeed, there is no doubt that the current Venezuelan government knows how to request immunity,” the Justice Department’s recent filing continued.

Prosecutors went on to claim that the Trump administration’s foreign policy views, coupled with the Venezuelan government not explicitly invoking immunity, should outweigh the defense’s assertion that the United Nations recognized Maduro’s presidency.

Hellerstein is scheduled to hear oral arguments on the pre-trial motions to dismiss on November 17 before issuing a ruling. If the trial goes forward, it will begin on June 1, 2027.

Caracas has not commented on the latest developments in Maduro and Flores’ legal case. In recent months, Venezuelan officials have occasionally expressed hope that the two will eventually return to the country but without demanding their immediate release.

Rodríguez made no mention of Maduro and Flores’ kidnapping and prosecution during her recent trip to New York for the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. In a July interview, she claimed that Maduro has the right to “demonstrate the truth” before the US Justice system but did not call for his liberation.

The Venezuelan government is covering the pair’s legal defense costs after the US Treasury Department lifted restrictions blocking it.

In his UN speech on September 22, Trump celebrated the military operation that led to the abduction of Maduro, whom he called an “outlaw dictator.” Trump and Rodríguez met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, with the Venezuelan leader thanking the US president for supporting “Venezuela’s reinsertion into multilateral spaces.”

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Friday morning. The electric fluctuations were so frequent that I decided to go to the gym and work out for a bit. Though I was tempted to get angry with my work being interrupted, I remembered that Caracas is a bubble when it comes to electricity. In other parts of the country, blackouts happen sometimes twice a day, sometimes lasting for 16 hours in total.

In their anguish, people have taken to the streets, burning tires and blocking highways. Without fans or air conditioning it is hard to survive the Super El Niño phenomenon, which recently joined our catalog of misfortunes by raising temperatures across the board. Children who can’t sleep at night end up falling asleep in school the next day.

Not only that, these blackouts and power surges damage appliances and put water pumping stations offline, leaving communities without water supply. What makes everything worse is that authorities do not publish rationing schedules, making it impossible for families and businesses to undertake any minimal planning.

To “explain” things, the acting Delcy Rodríguez government celebrated the fact that national electricity demand exceeded 16,424 megawatts (MW) on September 22, calling it a “historic milestone” and highlighting a 9% increase compared to the peak demand in 2025.

What officials failed to mention is that in 2013 Venezuela recorded a demand of 18,700 MW, far, far higher than the figure announced this month, without any blackouts.

Furthermore, the supposed economic improvement is that oil production rose to 1.23 million barrels per day, but it appears that the United States is the only one benefiting from the additional revenue. The vast majority of the Venezuelan population is seeing absolutely no economic benefit, neither before nor after the twin earthquakes. Between shady business deals and power outages, we are truly in the dark.

Meanwhile, Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello assured that he “wouldn’t sugarcoat things for the people” and admitted that the electricity crisis “is a serious problem.” However, his solution was to ask mayors and governors to request that private companies with power plants generate their own electricity. We will then surely see a “record high” diesel demand, which will leave the agricultural sector without fuel.

The truth is that the blackouts are causing massive paralysis, costing the industrial sector up to 44% of its productive hours. In a country that has advocated  “economic diversification” for years, the little energy that is available is prioritized to keep oil production going in the oil-producing regions – lest Trump and the corporations get upset – and to try and mitigate the impact on the country’s capital. 

What is rarely mentioned is that although Venezuela has a nominal installed capacity of approximately 35,000 MW, a figure that doubles the national peak demand, actual stable generation barely reaches 12,000 MW. This operational deficit is what causes the constant blackouts the population is currently enduring. The 1,300 MW that the authorities promise to bring back online in the coming months will only slightly alleviate the issue.

The deterioration of the National Electric System (SEN) is structural and affects both transmission and distribution. The transmission grid exceeds its technical safety limits almost daily by transmitting more power than allowed, causing voltage fluctuations. At the same time, the distribution system has been deteriorating for years. There is a shortage of basic spare parts, transformers, and distribution cables resulting from years of US sanctions.

To add to the paradox, what is the proposed solution? Privatization! At a time when service is at its worst, the National Assembly has preliminarily approved reform of the Organic Law of the National Electricity System and Service to open up generation, transmission, distribution, and commercialization to private operators. The incentive is a new tariff structure designed to reflect “the real costs” of the service and generate “reasonable returns” for investors. 

Truth be told, if we were to pay “the real costs” of the current service, we would have to be compensated day after day. Perhaps people will go from having no electricity due to the condition of the power grid to having no electricity because they cannot afford the bill.

Even in a country where we’ve grown accustomed to hearing extravagant promises – ranging from millions of barrels of daily crude output to imminent economic prosperity – the outlook for electricity is far from encouraging. Preliminary assessments from experts suggest that a complete overhaul to prevent blackouts and modernize the grid in the medium and long term could cost up to $40 billion.

Maybe the US would be willing to “lend” us some of our own money to do this? Even if it did, we would obviously have to do it through US corporations, because if there’s one thing Washington knows how to do, it’s paying itself and keeping the change.

The best example is the recent oil deal, “the biggest in history” according to Trump. From what has been reported, Venezuela is going to hand over 17 prime oil fields, some producing extra-heavy crude in the vast Orinoco Belt and others producing light crude in Lake Maracaibo, to a company that seems straight out of a lazy Hollywood movie script.

The company in question is NABEP, owned by Alejandro Betancourt – who deserves a column all to himself – and which will now be under the control of the Pentagon. The US will have preferential access to the oil produced, including 20% at cost. The most screwed-over country in the hemisphere, handing over subsidized oil to the superpower that kept it under a vicious blockade for more than a decade.

Which brings us back to the electricity problem. From the oil deal to the state of the electrical grid, propagandists want us to believe that once the US is satisfied, once the transnational corporations and their local allies are making enough money, things will improve for the Venezuelan people. We have seen that movie before and it turns out differently. Let the last one out turn off the lights.

Jessica Dos Santos is a Venezuelan university professor, journalist and writer whose work has appeared in outlets such as RT, Épale CCS magazine and Investig’Action. She is the author of the book “Caracas en Alpargatas” (2018). She’s won the Aníbal Nazoa Journalism Prize in 2014 and received honorable mentions in the Simón Bolívar National Journalism prize in 2016 and 2018.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

William Serafino is a political scientist with a master’s degree in history. His research and analysis have focused on geopolitics. In this interview, he discusses Venezuela’s current relationship with the United States, including a major oil deal and what Donald Trump and Delcy Rodríguez seek to gain from it.

In New York, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez thanked Trump for his support and described their bilateral meeting as “historic.” Nearly nine months after the January 3 US bombing and kidnapping of President Maduro, how would you describe the current relationship between Caracas and Washington? Which elements are short-term Trump gimmicks, and which ones will structurally define the relationship in the future?

It is difficult to find a precise definition. Many speak of a protectorate-like condition; some even go so far as to describe it as a relationship of colonial or neocolonial subjugation. Others, however, define it as a process of political, economic, and energy normalization in which the Venezuelan acting government makes tactical concessions, but without formally compromising national sovereignty. I believe the devil is in the details, not in one-size-fits-all approaches. At the level of inter-state relations, what I observe is a strategic attachment of Venezuela to the US sphere of influence and an energy realignment that operates with significant geopolitical restrictions in what concerns relations with Russia, China, and Iran.

At the governmental level, an asymmetrical alliance (favorable to Trump) has been forged in the wake of the military defeat on January 3, from which Caracas and Washington derive immediate and existential gains: Trump cherishes the sole geopolitical achievement of his second term, and Rodríguez gains relief and fresh revenue to govern after more than a decade of suffocating sanctions, within a framework defined by US interests. This reality can hardly be classified as a protectorate, in which a foreign power takes control of diplomacy, defense, and other strategic elements of the subordinate state. Could one speak of a sui generis, or “soft,” protectorate? Perhaps, but that would be an acknowledgment that the concept is not entirely effective in explaining the situation. 

The same is true of the thesis of a “retreat with full sovereignty,” which is difficult to sustain when the US is clearly shaping the portrayal of the new national political dynamic and controlling the country’s oil revenues. That is why I have ventured –at the risk of being wrong –to speak of “joint governance” or “co-government,” in which Washington and Caracas divide areas of responsibility and share the political costs of each move so that the alliance endures and each party can, albeit unequally, reap its corresponding share of the benefits.

Trump, despite his constant demeaning tone, needs the Rodríguez administration to be strong enough to lead the country in order to get what he wants; only under such conditions can he extract the oil. And she, too, needs Trump to remain in power so that the oil agreement and other commitments can move forward in the medium term. This is the only way to stay in power and hope to gain legitimacy through performance. I believe that, described in this way, we are talking neither of classic colonialism nor of uncompromised sovereignty, but of something more unique that requires developing other analytical categories.

In your articles, you have pointed out that the US-Venezuela oil deal must be analyzed beyond the announced figures. What do you consider to be the true political and geopolitical scope of this agreement, and what benefits do the various actors seek to extract from it?

I see it more as a political arrangement than a formal agreement. Its function is not legal or institutional, but political. The announcement gave Trump narrative ammunition to promise that gas prices will drop, a necessity driven by his debacle in Iran. By not having signed anything, he avoids going through Congress, sends a message to his core electorate that he is guaranteeing the country’s energy security, and reassures energy corporations to go ahead and invest in Venezuela because the relationship with Caracas is solid and unshakable. Rodríguez, on the other hand, benefits from the fact that the agreement shuts the door on María Corina Machado in Washington’s power circles and thereby helps reestablish her domestic legitimacy, promising a secure path to economic and social recovery underpinned by US investment.

I would go as far as saying that the agreement is Rodríguez’s trump card in a potential presidential campaign, where she will be able to present herself as the only political actor capable of boosting the economy, as opposed to potential rivals who lack influence in the White House and do not have a reliable plan to pull the country out of the spiral of inflation and economic frustration in which it finds itself after years of sanctions. 

Both sides stand to gain politically, and the agreement appears to be designed to avoid institutional resistance: neither is forced to face the hassle of legislative approval nor the criticism from political opponents. Since there are no specific clauses, they can more easily divert attention and focus their message on the eventual economic benefits. This level of coordination is a sign of partnership, not of one-sided imposition. If that were the case, Trump could force Rodríguez to sign a bilateral treaty in the National Assembly, and that is not what we are seeing.

You have paid special attention to the role of the Pentagon and the involvement of its Office of Strategic Capital in the structure of the agreement. Why is it so significant that the US defense establishment is a formal actor in a Venezuelan oil deal?

It seems to me that the Pentagon’s involvement serves as a coercive cover—an insurance policy backed by force—to ensure, in the medium and long term, US commercial and financial advantages in the exploitation of the oil fields included in the agreement. Let us imagine that the current government, or another one in the future, wants to modify the arrangement and secure better terms. At that point, it would not be dealing with a conventional transnational corporation, but with one controlled by the Department of War. It doesn’t take much thought to realize that negotiating under such conditions would scare anyone off: the language of business would be replaced by the language of weapons, and after January 3, no one would want to venture into this murky territory.

Furthermore, I believe that the Pentagon’s involvement sends a message to companies to invest and feel secure in the knowledge that the Department of War guarantees their investments and capital commitments in the Venezuelan energy sector. For the US, Venezuela’s oil reserves are not being treated as an economic asset, but rather as a matter of “national security.” As we well know, when that term is used, any coercive tool is fair game against a country’s sovereignty.

You have argued that the relationship between Caracas and Washington is taking on the characteristics of a negotiation marked by a profound power asymmetry. And many official spokespeople or analysts ask, “But what alternative do we have?” whenever criticism is raised about the path the government has chosen. What real ability does Venezuela have today to negotiate different terms or reject certain demands from the United States?

Right now, those capabilities are very limited, because, as I said, it’s not just a matter of US impositions, but also of calculating how to obtain tangible benefits from an asymmetrical relationship. But politics also takes place outside institutional spaces, and I believe there is much to be done there. What I’m about to say won’t, I don’t think, resolve the dilemma you’ve raised, but it could be a path toward regaining political vitality and initiative: strengthening social consensus on national sovereignty, refusing to concede the battle for historical memory regarding a century-long history of US plunder, and fostering a broad discussion on the vision for the nation’s future. These steps could help break the inertia somewhat and prepare the country for more favorable political conditions in the near future. In contrast, suggesting specific policies or positions to the current government would be irresponsible, because I’m not the one who has to deal with a Trump and his violent ego.

My message is directed at all of us who do not hold such high-stakes positions and can contribute, from our own small spheres of influence or through our individual activism, to rebuilding a patriotic consciousness that must adapt to a new reality. How many open forums are being promoted to discuss the educational model, the economic model, and the model of income distribution? Which bodies are evaluating the trajectory of the bilateral relationship with the US in order to better address it? Are these discussions conceptually limited? Perhaps these debates will not change the current situation of Trump’s disproportionate influence, but they would give us autonomy in our vision and in shaping the future. If Venezuela does not have its own vision on major national issues, there is a risk that they will end up being imposed from Washington. That would be committing the perfect crime, and I believe we must avoid it: with national unity, transcending political divisions.

In your articles and social media posts, you have criticized political elites who, historically, have lacked “imagination” beyond offering lucrative deals to the US. How did Chávez manage to break that mold? How could Venezuela return to a more sovereign path?

To be fair, Chávez broke the mold but the political and geopolitical conditions were ripe for it. The weakness of the national elites, discredited by a society weary of inequality and injustice, coincided with the US being drunk on power at the end of the Cold War. In its plans to establish itself as a unipolar superpower, Latin America did not figure as the central battleground. The inattention of an empire more concerned with reshaping West Asia, forcing China into the “rules-based order,” and eliminating the last strongholds of the socialist bloc (Tito’s Yugoslavia) in turn allowed Chávez to implement his agenda without facing a full-scale war, although he did face numerous coup attempts. 

The present conditions are different. There is a hemispheric imperial retreat underpinned by a militarized reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, which drastically raises the cost of sovereignty-oriented proposals. Still, I believe that what is most commendable about Chávez, and which can be of use in this new context, is his ability to clearly identify favorable conditions and act upon them.

I believe that anyone who considers themselves a political figure must build upon these principles to take on the new challenges of the present, developing and defending a dignified vision of the nation’s future. I believe that, rather than waiting for another Chávez to emerge, we should instead study his thought in depth and draw on the best of it to renew political practices, always interpreting the situation for what it is: changing, volatile, and full of opportunities. Chávez is a great political school, but it has been reduced to a crude tool for private interests of all kinds.

Photographic evidence

There is a photograph that serves as evidence: Delcy Rodríguez and Donald Trump, together, smiling, in New York. Hundreds of narratives can be constructed around that photo. Diplomatic, tactical, or strategic explanations can be devised. Some may speak of pragmatism, power dynamics, negotiation, or political necessity. All of that is open to debate. But there is something that remains true regardless of any narrative: the photograph is evidence and depicts a specific scene. And that scene is difficult to reconcile with much of the political tradition from which Delcy Rodríguez hails.

Because there is another image from the same day that completes the picture: Delcy Rodríguez approaching [Spanish President] Pedro Sánchez while he is on the phone, waiting for him to finish so she can greet him. The image conveys something difficult to reconcile with the power of the Bolivarian Revolution’s historic leadership: a desire to reach out, almost like a student waiting for the other person to hang up the phone so she can greet him; an attitude that seems a far cry from the dignity and authority with which Chavismo once stood up to global powers. And a few hours later, the photo-op with Trump appears. Two images from the same day that speak for themselves, because diplomacy is one thing, and the position from which it is exercised is another; negotiating is one thing, and showing subordination is another. That is what it looks like.

Chavismo’s tradition

And what we see today is a far cry from Hugo Chávez’s “Go to hell, you fucking Yankees.” It’s a far cry from that rebellious Chavismo that could stand up to the King of Spain, that could publicly confront the United States, and that built much of its political identity around an idea of sovereignty, dignity, and resistance in the face of imperial power. There was a political force there, a capacity to stand up to power, a way of exercising leadership, that is hard to find in these recent images.

When the narrative trumps reality

We live, at the same time, in a dystopian world in which artificial intelligence, technological advances, and algorithms often lead us to be unaware of reality or to experience it from a perspective different from what is actually observed. We can construct stories, narratives, and entire universes around a single scene until the narrative ends up overtaking reality. While the world’s wealthy talk about moving to Mars or colonizing other planets, perhaps the biggest debate we face is much more fundamental: aligning stories, narratives, and algorithmic trends with reality.

Assuming that reality is something different from what we see often leads us to explore ideas, utopias, or even political stances from a perspective increasingly distant from what is actually happening. And perhaps today, a revolutionary leap would be to align reality with what is being recounted or narrated. Ideas, utopias, and political stances need to stem from reality—not from a reality constructed to align with what we need to believe. When the narrative begins to take the place of facts, we stop interpreting reality and start adapting it to our needs.

The power of what is seen

That is why the power lies in what is seen. And what is seen is not just a photograph of Delcy Rodríguez and Donald Trump. That photograph appears in the wake of a US military intervention in Venezuela, which led to the kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores, and after Trump publicly took credit for the operation. What we see is Delcy Rodríguez standing before the man who brags about this operation and presents its outcome as a victory. And this matters because the photograph isn’t floating in a vacuum: it has a context—it involves deaths, a military attack, a captured Venezuelan president, strategic resources at stake, and a US president claiming credit for the outcome of that operation.

At this very moment, paradoxically and surprisingly, an entire epic narrative of triumph and “peace diplomacy” is emerging, a grandiloquent celebration of a supposed victory. And the important thing is to state something very simple: defeat is not epic. A defeat can simply be a defeat. What can be discussed is how one faces it, what stance one takes in the face of it, and what dignity one maintains when conditions are adverse. But a defeat does not become a victory simply because we construct a grand narrative around it. Reality retains a dimension that rhetoric cannot erase.

The words of the victor

What we see is a Delcy Rodríguez who tolerates Trump saying outrageous things. Trump spoke of the US operation in Venezuela in terms of victory and the victor; he justified the use of force and even spoke of the spoils that belong to the victor. This is an offensive affront to the dead—who are not only Venezuelans but also Cubans—and, fundamentally, to those killed in an intervention on Latin American soil. That context does not disappear simply because a diplomatic facade is later constructed or by conjuring a strategic explanation for every gesture.

It happened. And it is incomprehensible that Delcy Rodríguez would then appear in a triumphant, smiling manner in the face of that display of power and in the presence of the very person who has abducted Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores. We can discuss the reasons for the negotiations, the balance of power, the tactical necessities, the circumstances, and the alternatives. All of that is part of politics and can be analyzed. But there is something that comes before all those explanations: what actually happened.

Tactics and consistency

And this raises a question we should not shy away from: What is the difference between Milei’s stance and Delcy Rodríguez’s stance with regard to the US? No doubt, in the coming hours, explanations will emerge aimed at establishing profound differences between the two, and we will be told that they follow different logics, that one expresses subordination and the other a tactic, that one represents a political project and the other a historical necessity. All of that is open to debate. But it is important to look at the concrete attitude, because if politics can always be explained away as a tactic, then consistency begins to lose all specific weight. And when consistency loses its specific weight, almost anything can become a strategy: a concession can be presented as a victory, subordination as pragmatism, a defeat as peace diplomacy, and a photograph as an epic moment. Reality, however, remains.

A model of dignity

If there is a model to look to today—as we saw on January 3—it was Cuban dignity, which fought to the very end against US troops and delivered a fierce, dignified response, despite being outmatched in firepower and at a disadvantage in every respect. At the UN General Assembly, too, it was the Cuban delegation that stood up and walked out [during Trump’s speech]. Therein lies a model of dignity—a model from which to fight and from which to view ourselves. There are moments when politics needs to reclaim the ability to set boundaries against power.

And this matters especially for those of us who see ourselves within a tradition of the left, of sovereignty, of emancipation, and of transformation. Because we cannot lose the ability to recognize a point of reference when we see it. We cannot construct an artificial epic around something that offers us no point of reference. And we cannot turn a scene of subordination into a revolutionary one simply because we need to preserve a certain narrative.

Surrender is also conceptual

If we fall into this pragmatic, tactical logic—where consistency seems to carry little weight and reality can be distorted through grandiloquent rhetoric—we lose something far more important than a short-term political debate: we lose the ability to think. What we see is a very happy Delcy Rodríguez standing next to Trump. What we see is a Venezuelan historical process that we have admired but which no longer serves as a point of reference, because today it is part of mechanisms that strengthen Donald Trump and of a strategic surrender of resources—not only natural ones but also conceptual and ideological ones.

And the latter is perhaps even more important, because it is not just about oil, natural resources, or economic agreements. Symbols, references, words, and political traditions are also being surrendered. A tradition that for years was built around resistance to imperialism may end up being used to legitimize a new relationship of subordination. And when that happens, the surrender is not only material—it is also conceptual. A part of what for years allowed us to construct a worldview, a way of interpreting sovereignty, and a way of understanding emancipation is being surrendered.

Intellectual honesty

So there is no turning back. As a matter of dignity, as activists, it is important not to betray our intellect and to realize that this is what it looks like.

Some will come forward in the next few hours to say, “No, it’s a tactic.” Well, but no revolutionary process has ever come about that way. Can you imagine Fidel Castro celebrating with Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs? It would be something similar. The comparison may seem harsh, but it actually helps us understand the problem: it’s one thing to negotiate with an adversary and quite another to stage a celebration with someone who has just bragged about a military intervention; it’s one thing to manage a defeat and quite another to build an epic out of a defeat.

Back to reality

Perhaps the problem of our time is precisely this: we have learned to construct narratives capable of altering our perception of reality. Artificial intelligence can do it, algorithms can do it, political narratives can do it, the great powers can do it, and we ourselves can do it when we need reality to resemble what we want to believe. That is why, perhaps, a revolutionary leap today is something much more fundamental and, at the same time, much more difficult: returning to reality, aligning what is with what is reported and narrated; not abandoning utopias but preventing them from becoming an excuse to ignore the facts; not abandoning politics but preventing politics from forcing us to deny what is right before us; not ceasing to think strategically but reclaiming coherence as a dimension of strategy.

And perhaps the first obligation of those of us who still believe that politics can transform reality is not to betray our intellect in order to save the narrative. To look at reality, to think from within it, and to hold our ideas up against what is actually happening. Because before any explanation, before any epic, and before any narrative construction, there is something that remains right before us.

It is what it looks like.

Translated by Venezuelanalysis.

Source: Barrio Adentro

Caracas, September 22, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez and US President Donald Trump held a first face-to-face meeting on Tuesday night in New York amid the rapid rapprochement between Washington and Caracas.

The closed-door gathering took place at the Lotte New York Palace hotel during a reception for world leaders participating in the ongoing 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly. Trump was flanked by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and other White House officials, while Rodríguez was joined by Foreign Minister Félix Plasencia.

The Venezuelan government published photos of the meeting, with the two leaders smiling for the cameras in front of the countries’ flags.

On her social media channels, Rodríguez praised the “historic” sit-down with Trump and reported that the discussions focused on strengthening “cooperation in strategic areas such as energy and mining.”

“We thanked President Trump and his government […] for its support for Venezuela’s reinsertion into multilateral spaces,” she stated. “Venezuela and the United States share a historic relation that, in this new era, we must drive forward through dialogue.”

Tuesday’s summit was the first between US and Venezuelan leaders since a brief encounter between Barack Obama and Nicolás Maduro during the 2015 Summit of the Americas in Panama.

Rodríguez is also set to be the first Venezuelan head of state to participate in the UN General Assembly since Maduro in 2018, during Trump’s first term. In 2019, then as vice president, Rodríguez addressed the UN General Assembly, denouncing US sanctions as a form of “state terrorism” and accusing Trump of “sticking his imperial claws” against Venezuela and Cuba

The high-level meeting follows a rapid diplomatic rapprochement between Caracas and Washington following the January 3 US bombings and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores. In the months since, the acting Rodríguez administration has fast-tracked energy and mining reforms tailored to US and Western corporate interests while also realigning the country’s foreign policy.

The Venezuelan acting president and her diplomatic team have yet to mention Maduro in their New York trip. Maduro and Flores are presently detained in Brooklyn, some 10 miles from the UN headquarters, and facing drug trafficking conspiracy charges. Both pleaded not guilty.

At the time of writing, the White House has offered no details on Tuesday’s summit with Rodríguez.

However, in his UN speech earlier in the day, Trump hailed the US’ military operation to kidnap “outlaw dictator” Maduro.

“Our actions in Venezuela are proof that the United States will no longer permit threats to America to gain a foothold anywhere in the Western Hemisphere. And if necessary, we will use our unmatched military might to secure the vital national interests of the United States,” he said.

Trump went on to boast about US corporations entering the Venezuelan energy sector and praised a recent deal giving privileged access to more than 20 percent of the Caribbean nation’s reserves to a Pentagon-controlled firm as “perhaps the biggest deal ever made.”

“To the victor belong the spoils,” he added. Rodríguez and the Venezuelan delegation were shown listening to Trump’s speech in the UN live broadcast.

Prior to the high-profile Trump sit-down, Venezuela’s acting president held meetings with Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) President Ilan Goldfajn, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, and World Bank President Ajay Banga to discuss Venezuela’s reintegration into international financing and cooperation mechanisms.

“We are promoting new stages of engagement with the international financial system and working to ensure joint efforts for the benefit of the Venezuelan people. Venezuela’s future is built through partnerships, hard work, and the firm determination to keep moving forward and creating opportunities for our nation,” Rodríguez said. 

She also met with UN Secretary-General António Guterres, with whom she reportedly discussed Venezuela’s political and economic situation, cooperation with the UN, human rights, and dialogue.

The Venezuelan leader likewise held a brief conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Lisbon, Portugal, September 17, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Continental Resources, a firm owned by billionaire and Trump donor Harold Hamm, struck a deal on Wednesday to exploit one of Venezuela’s largest oilfields.

Under the agreement with Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA, Continental will receive a long-term concession with “100 percent working interest” for the 500 square-kilometer Ayacucho 2 block in Venezuela’s Orinoco Oil Belt. The block contains an estimated 30 billion barrels of extra-heavy crude.

“Continental was built to recognize great resource opportunities and have the conviction to pursue them,” Hamm told Fox News, vowing that the deal would take his company to an “entirely new level.”

For her part, Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez claimed that the agreement would “strengthen [Venezuelan] oil production” and “create opportunities for economic growth.”

Hamm and PDVSA Vice President Jovanny Martinez signed the contract in Houston on the sidelines of the G20 energy summit. Martínez and Oil Minister Paula Henao attended the conference to pitch investment opportunities in Venezuela’s oil and gas sector.

PDVSA had previously assigned the Ayacucho 2 block to Chinese private firm Anhui Guangda in 2025. However, no information on investments or output were publicly disclosed, while Venezuelan authorities have not justified rescinding the contract with Anhui.

US government-controlled corporation NABEP, which recently received long-term concessions to 17 major Venezuelan oilfields containing 65 billion barrels in reserves, will also take over projects formerly run by Chinese enterprises, including state-owned CNPC. Beijing has called for its investments and interests in Venezuela to be respected.

Hamm was one of the corporate executives present at the White House on January 9, when Trump announced that Washington would control Venezuela’s oil industry and called on Western majors to invest. Since the January 3 US attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, the White House has managed the South American country’s crude export revenues.

The White House has also backed Venezuelan authorities’ pro-business overhaul of the energy sector while issuing sanctions exemptions to select US-aligned corporations. Chevron, Shell, and Eni are among the companies that have signed new contracts or renegotiated existing ones in recent months.

According to Bloomberg, ExxonMobil is in advanced talks to return to the Caribbean country after a litigious past. The energy giant is negotiating rights to four major oilfields in the Orinoco Oil Belt, two of which it previously owned before they were nationalized by former President Hugo Chávez.

In the 2000s, the Texas-based corporation refused to comply with reforms implemented to assert state sovereignty over the oil industry. ExxonMobil refused compensation offers and pursued international arbitration after its assets were nationalized. The company received an arbitration award significantly below its demands. 

ExxonMobil was additionally denounced repeatedly by Caracas after it spearheaded offshore drilling projects in the territorial waters of the disputed Essequibo Strip.

On Wednesday, Venezuelan authorities likewise inked a 20-year agreement with Florida-based Denarius Holding Group, controlled by Turkish energy group Çan2 Termik. Denarius is taking over the Petrokariña project in Anzoátegui state, which contains 10 oilfields producing a variety of crude types.

Heeney Capital receives gold mine concession

In parallel to its oil opening, Venezuelan authorities have also fast-tracked reforms opening the country’s mining sector to multinational corporations.

On Wednesday, New York-based Heeney Capital and commodities trader Mercuria Energy received a 30-year concession to operate the Chocó 10 mine in Bolívar State. The project holds considerable gold deposits and was run by Rusoro Mining in the 2000s before being nationalized by the Chávez government.

Heeney and Mercuria pledged US $1 billion in initial investment in the Chocó project. The two firms had struck a previous agreement with Caracas to purchase and trade Venezuelan minerals and other commodities.

One of Heeney’s co-founders, Sean Pi, signed the deal at the presidential palace in May and praised Trump’s “leadership” in defending US access to mining resources abroad. Pi has endorsed legislative initiatives deregulating and streamlining mining projects to bolster the US supply of critical minerals.

Under the trading agreement, Heeney and Mercuria are reportedly preparing to ship 15,000 metric tons of Venezuelan aluminum to the US. The corporate partners are likewise seeking to take over VENALUM, Venezuela’s biggest aluminum smelter. Glencore, an Anglo-Swiss mining and trading multinational, is also interested in VENALUM, according to reports.

Venezuelan authorities have not commented on the negotiations for the aluminum smelter. In April, Rodríguez appointed a commission to evaluate privatization of “non-strategic” state assets.

The Trump administration has identified securing access to Venezuelan mineral riches as a key national interest and is reportedly preparing an executive order to boost US corporate participation in Venezuelan mining projects.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Caracas, September 16, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Former Venezuelan Industry Minister and government envoy Alex Saab pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering and illicit financial transactions after reaching a plea deal with US prosecutors in a federal court in Miami.

Appearing before the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Saab changed his previous “not guilty” plea, entered on July 24, during a hearing before Judge Kathleen M. Williams. “Guilty, Your Honor,” the 54-year-old businessman stated during Tuesday’s session.

In his guilty plea, Saab admitted to participating, alongside “high-ranking officials” in the Nicolás Maduro government, in an “illegal scheme” involving bribes and illicit payments linked to the CLAP subsidized food program. The money allegedly obtained through the scheme was wired through accounts located in South Florida.

In the 12-page plea agreement, Saab named Socialist Party (PSUV) lawmaker José Gregorio Vielma Mora, who was governor of Táchira state at the time, as an alleged accomplice, alongside Colombian nationals Álvaro Pulido Vargas, Emmanuel Enrique Rubio González, and Carlos Rolando Lizcano. 

However, he also referred to two other individuals as “co-defendant 1” and “co-defendant 3.” Their identities have not been publicly disclosed by US prosecutors.

Saab also agreed to “fully cooperate” with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) by providing “truthful and complete information and testimony, and producing documents, records, and other evidence” in “any trial or judicial proceeding” requested by the US government.

He likewise agreed that he would not “protect any person or entity through false information or omission,” nor falsely implicate “any person or entity.”

The Colombian-born businessman also agreed to surrender US $195 million, along with properties and assets derived from the alleged crimes, to prosecutors. The government gave him 14 days to disclose all assets related to the offenses.

Saab, who stated that he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and takes antidepressants every night to sleep, could face a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison, as well as a $500,000 fine.

Nevertheless, prosecutors reportedly agreed to recommend a reduced sentence if his cooperation against the other defendants in the case proves valuable. His sentencing hearing has not been scheduled but is expected to take place in January.

The DOJ warned that it “reserves the right to evaluate the nature and extent of the defendant’s cooperation,” as well as the “quality and significance” of the information provided for the relevant investigations.

The agreement does not publicly specify which investigations Saab will be required to assist with or which other Venezuelan officials the US Justice Department is targeting. With Saab having been a key figure for Caracas to circumvent US economic sanctions, analysts have speculated that he could be a witness in the case against President Nicolás Maduro.

Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores are facing charges, including drug trafficking conspiracy, after being kidnapped by US special forces on January 3.

The current case is the second criminal prosecution Saab has faced in the United States. In 2020, when traveling as a Venezuelan government envoy, he was arrested in Cape Verde during a refueling stop and subsequently extradited to the United States. He was on trial for separate money laundering accusations.

However, in December 2023, then-President Joe Biden granted Saab a pardon as part of a prisoner exchange between the United States and Venezuela. Saab returned to Caracas and joined the government as minister of industry. Following Maduro’s kidnapping, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez removed the former envoy from the cabinet in January before authorities handed him over to US agencies in May.

Venezuelan high-ranking officials claimed that Saab had committed fraud in acquiring Venezuelan citizenship and vowed to present evidence of his alleged long-term cooperation with US agencies, but no further details have been released to date.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Caracas, September 14, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service announced a package of measures to boost US agricultural exports to Venezuela amid growing concerns about the South American country’s national production.

According to the USDA, the plan will facilitate Venezuelan corporations’ purchase of US food products and agricultural commodities through government-backed credit and will include the delivery of food assistance and training for Venezuelan technicians.

“The Trump administration is committed to Venezuela’s economic prosperity, and USDA is leveraging its export financing, market development programs, technical scholarships, and food assistance initiatives to address this situation,” said Under Secretary for Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs Luke J. Lindberg.

Lindberg added that he “looks forward to positioning US agriculture to help meet needs and build lasting trade relationships.” The US official visited Venezuela as part of an official delegation in early July.

Washington’s credit program for food exports will be provided through the reactivation of the GSM-102 guarantee program. The mechanism offers guarantees to exporters that reduce the risk for financial institutions backing the transactions in case importers fail to meet their commitments. 

The Agriculture Department also announced that it will lift restrictions to allow foreign banks to back Venezuela-related transactions.

A USDA report had already estimated that Venezuela would need to import 1.5 million metric tons of wheat during the 2026-2027 marketing year. Corn and soybeans are likewise identified as key staples to be exported to the Caribbean nation. The latest initiative 

The Trump administration also lifted restrictions under its Feed the Future Agricultural Resilience Mission Initiative and plans to include Venezuela in a regional agribusiness trade mission scheduled for early 2027.

A bigger influx of US farm products will place an additional strain on Venezuelan food production, with local campesinos increasingly protesting against imports from agribusiness corporations that seek to drive crop prices down.

On September 9, rice growers from Guárico and nearby states organized a “tractorazo,” blocking a major highway in Calabozo with trucks and tractors to demand that the government halt the entry of imported rice during the domestic harvest season and ensure that agroindustrial companies adhere to established prices.

Protesters complained that imports from countries where food production is subsidized, including the US, create unfair competition and risk driving Venezuelan campesinos bankrupt. The latest mobilization was sparked by the reported arrival of a shipment of 355 thousand tons of rice, more than half of the Venezuelan production in 2025. 

Rural organizations have likewise denounced the exoneration of tariffs and import taxes as another factor putting national production at a disadvantage. Venezuelan authorities, including the National Assembly and the Agriculture Ministry, have vowed to review the import issue but have offered no measures to date.

In the Calabozo protest, producers denounced that imported rice had saturated silos and storage facilities during the 2025-2026 winter-summer crop cycle, forcing them to sell below production cost or lose their crops altogether. Demonstrators demanded a $0.25-per-kilogram subsidy from the state to compensate for the losses incurred and vowed to take the protests to Caracas if they receive no response from authorities.

The September 9 “tractorazo” was the latest in a series of mobilizations in recent months in Venezuela’s main agricultural states. Rice growers have complained about high fuel and input costs and urged the government to establish and enforce fair crop prices. 

According to agriculture lobby FEDEAGRO, more than 2.2 million metric tons of white corn, yellow corn, and rice have entered the country so far in 2026, more than triple the recent combined high of 709,000 metric tons in 2023.

“We cannot continue depending on a neighbor’s pantry. That is a failure. In Venezuela, we have the land, a committed agricultural sector, and people investing in farming, but excessive imports place us at a dramatic disadvantage,” stressed FEDEAGRO President Osman Quero.

Quero stressed that foreign producers have access to credit programs, fuel and fertilizer subsidies, and better infrastructure, while Venezuelan farmers face inflation and a lack of financing programs.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Lisbon, Portugal.

Caracas, September 9, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The president of Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA, Héctor Obregón, backed the recent agreement with the Trump administration as a “win-win relationship” on Monday.

“We signed Productive Participation Contracts where we put forward crude reserves and qualified personnel. What were we missing? Foreign capital,” he said in an interview with Unión Radio.

Productive Participation Contracts (CPP) are concession-type agreements whereby energy projects are turned over to private corporations which run operations and commercialization while paying a negotiated portion of proceeds to the Venezuelan state.

The recent oil deal, hailed by Trump as “the biggest in history,” will see Venezuela transfer 17 prime oilfields, containing 65 billion in proven crude reserves, to private operator NABEP. The projects are split between extra-heavy crude fields in the Orinoco Oil Belt and mature light- and medium-crude ones in the Lake Maracaibo basin.

Obregón insisted on the mutual benefits, explaining that Venezuela will collect taxes and royalties while the US will be able to supply its domestic demand. Regarding the agreement’s timeline, which the White House has claimed to span 100 years, Obregón stated that the concession is for 25 years but may be renewed for similar periods “as many times as necessary.”

After initially vowing that NABEP would invest US $100 billion in the oilfields, a figure repeated by Venezuelan officials, the Trump administration changed the pledge to “more than $10 billion.” 

According to a White House “fact sheet” on the deal, the US State Department will be able to secure 20 percent of the NABEP’s output at cost and have a right of first refusal over the remaining 80 percent.

Obregón suggested that Washington could secure additional benefits, indicating that a reference $65 barrel would have a $15 “sales discount.” The oil official likewise estimated capital and operational expenditures at $12-15 and stated that NABEP would never secure a smaller portion of proceeds than the Venezuelan state, with the percentage increasing for greenfield projects.

The $19 revenue estimate offered by Venezuelan officials as the government’s take for a reference $65 barrel is significantly lower than the benchmarks established under the 2001 Hydrocarbon Law approved by former President Hugo Chávez and subsequent reforms. Under the previous framework, only PDVSA or PDVSA-majority joint ventures were allowed to operate oilfields, with the Venezuelan state securing as much as $0.80 for every $1 of oil proceeds in the latter case.

NABEP, owned by Venezuelan oil mogul Alejandro Betancourt, will grant a 35 percent stake at no cost to the Pentagon’s Office of Strategic Capital (OSC). Washington will likewise have veto power over NABEP’s board of directors. Betancourt has faced corruption accusations in Venezuela, with authorities issuing an arrest warrant in 2022 that was later dropped. For its part, the Trump administration has sought to halt money laundering investigations against the Venezuelan businessman both in the US and in Switzerland.

Obregón went on to acknowledge that Venezuelan export revenues are currently deposited in a US Treasury account before US officials decide on the disbursement amounts and timings back to Caracas.

“There is a state-to-state agreement to receive Venezuelan funds in Treasury accounts,” he disclosed, echoing Washington’s assertion that its seizure of Venezuelan export proceeds aims to protect them from potential creditor claims. 

“The channeling of revenues through the US Treasury could be considered a protection measure, since there are debt claims against PDVSA and creditors could target our accounts,” he argued.

Neither US nor Venezuelan authorities have disclosed the amount of revenue collected and disbursed back to Caracas. Luigi Pisella, an advisor to Acting President Delcy Rodríguez, claimed that the Trump administration is deducting the costs of its January 3 military operation against Venezuela from the country’s funds.

The costs of goods and services supplied by US-based exporters to Venezuela are also being directly deducted from the funds held in the Treasury accounts.

Apart from controlling export earnings, US officials have publicly participated in a pro-business overhaul of the Caribbean nation’s hydrocarbon law and regulations, including reviewing drafts of the legislation.

The Trump administration has maintained sanctions on the Venezuelan oil industry while issuing licenses for select Western corporations. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright oversaw the signing of agreements with Chevron, Eni, and smaller US-backed energy firms during a visit to Caracas earlier this month.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Mérida, September 7, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Defense attorneys representing Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores have formally requested the dismissal of criminal charges against them in the United States, invoking head-of-state and diplomatic immunity under international law.

In a motion filed before the US District Court for the Southern District of New York on September 2, defense counsel argued that domestic courts lack jurisdiction to indict, prosecute, or detain sitting foreign leaders.

Maduro and Flores’ legal teams emphasized that international treaties and long-standing legal principles shield active heads of state and high-ranking government officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, regardless of the status of bilateral relations between countries.

Lead defense attorney Barry Pollack asserted that the Justice Department’s indictment constitutes an unprecedented overreach of foreign judicial authority. 

“Under settled international law and long-standing diplomatic practice, foreign courts cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over a sitting head of state,” he stated in court filings.

Pollack underscored that Maduro is facing charges for acts that would have been part of his official duties and that he “vehemently denies” the US prosecutors’ allegations.

The Venezuelan leader is facing charges of “narcoterrorism,” drug trafficking conspiracy, and weapons possession offenses. Flores has been accused of the same alleged crimes except “narcoterrorism.” Maduro and Flores were kidnapped by US special forces on January 3 following military strikes in Caracas and surrounding states.

Under the established trial schedule, federal prosecutors have several weeks to respond to the immunity case and the motion to dismiss.

Subsequently, US District Judge Alvin Hellerstein is expected to evaluate written arguments and hold an evidentiary hearing on November 17 to decide whether to grant the defense’s request or proceed to trial. In the latter case, the trial would begin in June 2027.

Legal analysts have argued that the sovereign immunity case is unlikely to succeed given the US judicial system’s tradition of deferring to the executive branch on foreign policy matters. Under the “one voice” doctrine, domestic courts follow the White House and the Department of State regarding which authorities are formally recognized as representing a foreign country.

The first Trump administration refused to recognize Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate head of state following his 2018 reelection, instead backing the self-proclaimed “interim government” headed by Juan Guaidó. In 2023, Washington transferred its recognition to the defunct, opposition-majority parliament despite its term expiring two years earlier.

In March, the Trump administration recognized Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole leader.” As Maduro’s vice president, Rodríguez took over as acting president in January and has overhauled the Caribbean nation’s foreign policy in the months since. Caracas has reestablished diplomatic relations with Washington and strengthened ties with its global partners, including Israel, while distancing itself from historic allies such as China, Cuba, and Iran.

In his motion to dismiss, Pollack called it “incongruous” for the White House to recognize Rodríguez but not Maduro, who appointed her as vice president.

Venezuelan officials have not commented on the latest developments in Maduro and Flores’ case. After holding multiple rallies in the weeks following the January 3 kidnapping, Venezuelan authorities have significantly scaled back the public backing for the pair.

In a June interview, Rodríguez said that Maduro remains Venezuela’s legitimate president but stopped short of demanding his liberation, instead claiming that he has the right to “demonstrate the truth” before the US justice system.

In recent weeks, the Venezuelan government, through its official communications, as well as state-owned media channels, has increasingly dropped the “acting” label, referring to Rodríguez simply as “president.”

For their part, US-based international solidarity movements have staged monthly mobilizations demanding Maduro and Flores’ immediate release, including outside the federal detention center in Brooklyn where the pair is presently detained.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.