Transition

Sustainable Hospitality Frameworks: Can Short-Term Luxury Rentals Align with Europe’s Green Transition?

European vacation rentals have entered a bizarre era where there’s more municipal red tape than luxury.

The romantic idea of escaping to a restored Tuscan farmhouse or a modernist villa overlooking the French Riviera, perhaps with a glass of local wine in hand while watching the sunset over olive groves that have stood for centuries, has run straight into the cold reality of the European Union’s fight against carbon.

How does that reconcile with holidayers who expect 3m pools heated to an exact temperature? Whole-house air conditioning? Double-door refrigerators? Massive panoramic windows?

We don’t know, but we do know that local councils are staring down energy grids that are already stressed to their absolute limits. Sustainability isn’t just a case of putting a small wooden sign in the bathroom asking guests to reuse their towels anymore.

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WTTC Initiatives and the Corporate Push for Greener Stays

The World Travel & Tourism Council has spent the last few years trying to bring about that reconciliation. A massive partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme is pushing circular economy guidelines down the throats of major hospitality operators, hoping that global standards will somehow trick independent luxury property managers into compliance. It sounds great on paper. The industry wants independent certification schemes to look uniform across borders, because global corporations hate dealing with twenty different regional rules when they could just tick a single corporate checkbox instead.

For property managers, it’s trickle-down bureaucracy at its finest. You can’t just call a rental “eco-friendly” anymore because you bought organic cotton sheets, left a bottle of locally sourced olive oil on the kitchen counter, installed a Nest thermostat, and planted some lavender in the garden. The standards are tightening.

The WTTC is pushing for genuine data transparency, which means tracking actual water stewardship metrics, managing real-time grid feedback loops, auditing supply chains, and proving carbon offsets. It’s an administrative headache for anyone who just wanted to rent out a luxury apartment while drinking espresso on a private terrace.

With sustainability metrics becoming a core driver of soft power and local tourism compliance across European markets, consumer-facing tech platforms are reacting by categorizing eco-certified accommodations. Advanced search ecosystems such as Villa Picker are facilitating this transition, allowing travelers to filter properties by energy efficiency standards and regional sustainability benchmarks without sacrificing premium amenities.

Balancing High-End Amenities with Low-Impact Operations

This leaves high-end property operators in a tricky bind. Holidayers don’t want a lecture on carbon footprints when they’re paying thousands of euro a night and retrofitting a centuries-old villa with triple glazing, thick cavity wall insulation, solar roof tiles, and ground-source heat pumps is an architectural nightmare that costs a fortune.

Operators are forced to play a complicated game of smoke and mirrors with smart home technology. They’re installing automated sensors that kill the climate control the second a guest steps outside, investing in invisible greywater recycling systems, choosing low-flow rainfall showerheads that disguise water conservation as a spa experience, and buying electric vehicle charging stations that look sleek next to a rented sports car. It’s a delicate compromise. If Europe’s green transition succeeds, it’ll be because the luxury rental market figured out how to hide the machinery of sustainability behind a velvet curtain of premium comfort.

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Two Parliaments and the Trump Administration Chart the Course Toward Transition

This July 14th appears to be one of the key days in the political process that Venezuela has been experiencing since January 3rd. Early in the morning, the 2015 National Assembly announced a joint work agenda starting August 1st “as a roadmap to promote stability, democracy, and national recovery.”

The announcement was retweeted by Marco Rubio from his personal account on X. Then, Jorge Rodríguez, president of the 2026 National Assembly, announced the start of “a joint roadmap with former members of the 2015-2020 National Assembly.”

At the time of writing, there has been no statement from María Corina Machado.

As we stated just over a week ago, if the Trump administration does not want Machado to lead the process toward free elections, and the last clear signal it sent was to involve the 2015 National Assembly, perhaps that is the path to follow.

It is now clear that this is the Trump administration’s preferred route.

But, as we also pointed out, this does not mean that Machado cannot be a candidate. What we can infer from these recent events is that the Trump administration prefers that the institutional path be built between the 2015 National Assembly and the 2026 National Assembly.

The election of a new CNE is urgent, and the process of selecting TSJ justices must be resumed. It is also necessary to restore control of political parties to their legitimate leaders.

From a legal standpoint, it is difficult to argue that the 2015 National Assembly is the current National Assembly of Venezuela. Yes, it was the last legitimately elected National Assembly, held under minimal conditions of electoral integrity, and it is the last state institution explicitly recognized by the US until January 3, 2026. On March 11, the Department of Justice filed a letter with the Southern District Court of New York, along with a letter from the State Department, stating that “the United States recognizes Delcy Rodríguez as the sole Head of State, empowered to act on behalf of Venezuela.”

Therefore, the value of the 2015 National Assembly lies in this: it was the last parliament elected in a minimally competitive election and has the political backing of the Trump administration to advance the institutional path toward transition.

The discussion about the institutional path is urgent because reaching elections will take time. First, minimum conditions of integrity must be created to hold an acceptable election. Second, the return of Machado and the other political exiles must take place. Third, the campaign must take place in an environment acceptable to the president, without any way of measuring what the president might understand as an acceptable environment for elections. This is especially true after the earthquakes.

Transparency Venezuela and the Andrés Bello Catholic University mapped out what is needed to achieve these conditions of electoral integrity. That work has already been done. Now, the setting of deadlines for these processes is yet to begin. The election of a new National Electoral Council (CNE) is urgent, and the process of selecting Supreme Court justices must be resumed. It is also necessary to restore control of political parties to their legitimate leaders.

Jorge Rodríguez said this week that reconstruction was the only priority and that it was immoral to focus on renewing the Supreme Court and the CNE, since what mattered now was attending to the survivors. But all of this is even more urgent due to the precarious constitutional situation of the presidency. Right now, the 30-day period within which elections must be held is running, given Nicolás Maduro’s absolute absence. It sets a very bad precedent for this process to begin with such a massive violation of the Constitution.

For all these reasons, we need to start talking to answer this question: what is the institutional path that will be followed for the Venezuelan transition?

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UCLA Unlocked: Gabriela Jaquez makes smooth transition to WNBA

When Gabriela Jaquez checked into Friday’s game against the Sparks, it was so familiar. The aura of the arena, the cheers from her friends and family.

But it was actually Jaquez’s first time playing on that court. Growing up in Camarillo, she spent her childhood watching Lakers and Sparks games, as she said, “back when it was Staples Center.”

At Crypto.com Arena, though, she was a professional. Months after winning a national title with UCLA, Jaquez was facing her hometown WNBA squad as a member of the Chicago Sky.

“All the legends that have played here, all the games that I have attended here,” she said ahead of Friday’s game. “I’m just like, I walked out there, I told Jacy [Sheldon,] my teammate, that I was like, ‘This is so crazy.’ Like I’m just playing in here. I’ve watched so many games.”

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In her first WNBA season, Jaquez has averaged 23 minutes, 8.7 points, 3.9 rebounds and 1.2 assists per game. She has started 15 games, but came off the bench Friday when she scored a team-leading 15 points with five rebounds and shot six for 12 in front of what she said was two suites full of friends and family.

Jaquez was the Sky’s first-round selection at fifth overall a week after she helped the Bruins to their national title. She was one of six UCLA players taken in that draft and five in the first round, setting a WNBA record for a single program.

“It’s a very quick transition,” Jaquez said. “I don’t think you can fully prepare for that transition just because I don’t think there’s anything like it. But I did know that it was going to be quick and it was going to be fast, but I just try to stay grateful through it all.”

Sparks coach Lynne Roberts faced Jaquez in the Pac-12 while Roberts was at Utah and nearly recruited Jaquez to join the Utes many years ago.

The Chicago Sky's Gabriela Jaquez drives to the basket under pressure from the Wings' Azzi Fudd on Sunday in Dallas.

The Chicago Sky’s Gabriela Jaquez drives to the basket under pressure from the Wings’ Azzi Fudd on Sunday in Dallas.

(Sam Hodde / Getty Images)

“[UCLA coach] Cori [Close] and I were joking the other day,” Roberts said. “I was close [with Jaquez] and she just kept saying, ‘Well, I’m just waiting to see what UCLA does.’ So I was texting Cori, like, ‘Would you please cut her loose or offer her?’ I’ve always been a big fan of hers. But I think all those guys, they learned how to play with other stars. I think that’s a key in being a WNBA player. You’ve got to learn you’re not the one anymore. And I think at UCLA with that roster they had, they all had to learn how to, you know, sacrifice something to get the ultimate goal. So they’re coming in as team players.”

Close did not cut Jaquez loose and she went on to become a hometown hero with the Bruins. After three solid seasons, Jaquez became a much stronger scoring threat as a senior, shooting a career-high 53.9% with 13.5 points per game during the NCAA title-winning season.

Already established as a strong rebounder and defender, adding that offensive element raised her draft stock year-over-year higher than any other prospect.

“There’s so much to learn coming into this league,” Jaquez said. “I don’t know if I could really name one [thing], but it’s just a lot of games. That’s kind of like the main one that comes to my mind is just the amount of games that you’re playing.”

UCLA Bruins Angela Dugalic, Kiki Rice, Gianna Kneepkens, Lauren Betts and Gabriela Jaquez pose at the WNBA draft.

UCLA Bruins Angela Dugalic, Kiki Rice, Gianna Kneepkens, Lauren Betts and Gabriela Jaquez pose at the WNBA draft. All five were selected in the first round of the draft.

(Angelina Katsanis / Getty Images)

The seniors and graduate students on the 2025-26 UCLA national championship team remain close. Jaquez has faced off against former teammates Charlisse Leger-Walker, Gianna Kneepkens and Kiki Rice.

“We still keep that senior group chat alive, just kind of updating each other,” Jaquez said. “Obviously, when we play each other I’ll text, ‘I’m coming into town,’ or they’ll text me and we always can get dinner the night before, and so that’s always super special. Especially me being in a new state [and] a new city, as I’ve been in Southern California my whole life until now, it’s great to see familiar faces and I’m really grateful that I could catch up with my [former] teammates.”

Roch Cholowsky headlines Bruins in MLB draft

Roch Cholowsky throws a ceremonial first pitch before the White Sox played the Athletics in Chicago on Sunday.

No. 1 MLB draft pick Roch Cholowsky throws a ceremonial first pitch before the White Sox played the Athletics in Chicago on Sunday.

(Nam Y. Huh / Ap Photo/nam Y. Huh)

After an elite UCLA career, Roch Cholowsky was drafted by the Chicago White Sox with the No. 1 overall pick Saturday.

He became the third Bruin to be selected No. 1, joining Gerrit Cole (2011) and Chris Chambliss (1970).

On Monday, MLB.com reported Cholowsky passed his physical and is set to receive a record-setting signing bonus of $10.35 million. The White Sox have not yet announced the deal.

Cholowsky’s bonus tops the $9.3 million bonuses the Reds gave Chase Burns and the Rockies gave Charlie Condon in 2024, according to MLB.com.

Cholowsky said he was thrilled to be drafted by Chicago, where he enjoyed pre-draft meetings with team officials and mingled in the clubhouse of a team that entered the All-Star break leading the AL Central.

“It really felt like to me like a college clubhouse,” Cholowsky told the Associated Press. “It’s just a different feel in there.”

Cholowsky was one of 10 Bruins selected in the MLB draft.

Logan Reddemann (No. 38, Colorado Rockies), Mulivai Levu (No. 70, Cincinnati Reds) and Roman Martin (No. 111, Athletics) joined Cholowsky getting selected on the first day of the draft.

Bruins Cal Randall (No. 146, St. Louis Cardinals), Will Gasparino (No. 161, Philadelphia Phillies), Dean West (No. 222, Toronto Blue Jays), Cashel Dugger (No. 256, Washington Nationals), Michael Barnett (No. 587, Minnesota Twins) and Justin Lee (No. 609, Philadelphia Phillies) were drafted on the second day.

Walt Hazzard to be inducted into Collegiate Basketball Hall of Fame

UCLA's Walt Hazzard carries the NCAA national championship trophy as the team arrives at LAX in 1964.

UCLA’s Walt Hazzard carries the NCAA national championship trophy as the team arrives at LAX in 1964.

(Harold Matosian / Associated Press)

Former UCLA player and coach Walt Hazzard will be inducted into the National Collegiate Basketball Hall of Fame, a selection committee announced Monday.

Hazzard, who died in 2011 at the age of 69, was a senior co-captain on the 1963-64 UCLA basketball team that won the first national title in the program’s history and posted a 30-0 record. He averaged a career-best 18.6 points for the title-winning team, earning most outstanding playerhonors at the Final Four. He also won national player of the year honors.

The 6-foot-2 point guard who grew up in Philadelphia won an Olympic gold medal in 1964 and was a two-time All-American under the direction of Bruins coach John Wooden.

Hazzard went on to coach at Compton College, Chapman and UCLA, leading the Bruins to an NIT title and Pac-10 regular season tournament titles during his four seasons leading the program. His Hall of Fame induction, however, is solely based on his performance as a player.

The 2026 induction class was selected by a committee comprised of college basketball leaders from around the country. The National Collegiate Basketball Hall of Fame is administered by the National Assn. of Basketball Coaches Foundation.

In case you missed it

Chicago White Sox select UCLA shortstop Roch Cholowsky with No. 1 pick in MLB draft

‘I want to have fun with it.’ Katelyn Ohashi chasing joyful L.A. Olympic dream at 29

UCLA basketball lands highly touted Serbian small forward Nikola Kusturica

UCLA Unlocked: Former Bruin Jordin Canada is enjoying a Dream season

Have something Bruin?

Do you have a comment or something you’d like to see in a future UCLA newsletter? Email newsletters editor Houston Mitchell at houston.mitchell@latimes.com. To get this newsletter in your inbox, click here.

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How to Push the Venezuelan Transition

Six months after Nicolás Maduro’s military removal by US forces, the political situation in Venezuela can be summarized very schematically.

Under the 1999 Constitution, on July 3, Maduro’s absence became absolute. Under this assumption, Article 233 of the Constitution states that presidential elections must be held within 30 consecutive days following July 3. Meanwhile, Delcy Rodríguez remains as acting president, filling Maduro’s absolute absence.

The elections would be the final part of the third phase of the plan that Trump administration officials and Marco Rubio in particular often mention.

However, we know that elections will not be held in the short term, as there is a consensus that a new National Electoral Council (CNE) and conditions of electoral integrity are necessary. That is because, in theory, the first two phases outlined by the US government—stabilization and recovery—should first be completed.

So, how can the Venezuelan opposition push for free elections someday?

To do so, Venezuelans must first determine who within the Venezuelan opposition should lead the charge.

Naturally, it would be María Corina Machado. However, there is evidence that the Trump administration does not want her to be that lead person. I am not saying the White House does not want Machado to be a presidential candidate, but that everything seems to suggest that the Trump administration does not want her to lead the process toward those elections. Which is a different matter.

No political actor can achieve anything significant without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the US.

Therefore, if the US government does not want Machado to lead the political process that will lead us to free elections, who is the US government backing? It has only given two indications so far.

One, somewhat farcical even in terms of US foreign policy, was that Trump invited Enrique Márquez, a satellite political leader, to the State of the Union address. It was a message to say that the US president does not want Machado leading the process that would lead to free elections.

The other was the return of Dinorah Figuera, president of the 2015 National Assembly Delegated Commission, to Venezuela, at the invitation of the US, where she was received at the airport by US embassy personnel. Upon arrival, Figuera met with Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett and National Assembly president Jorge Rodríguez. In this way, the Trump administration emphasized its vision of who would be the opposition’s interlocutor.

Finally, after the earthquakes, there was a third, even clearer message: to disavow Machado’s trip to Venezuela.

At this point, it is worth remembering that at this moment in Venezuelan political history, no political actor can achieve anything significant without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the US. Like it or not, the result of the January 3rd operation is that we find ourselves under a tutelage of both the regime and the opposition.

Given this reality, where should we push for the Venezuelan transition?

The 2015 National Assembly, with US support, could dedicate itself to building the electoral roadmap together with the 2026 National Assembly.

If the Trump administration doesn’t want Machado to lead the process toward free elections, and the last clear signal it sent was to involve the 2015 National Assembly, perhaps that’s the path we should follow.

From what we understand, the idea of ​​involving the 2015 National Assembly, through 6 or 12 of its members, is to work with the 2026 National Assembly to build an institutional roadmap leading to elections, specifically the appointment of a new board for the CNE, and perhaps the formation of a new Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ).

It is known that this option generates deep distrust in Machado, who attempted to thwart it, apparently unsuccessfully, with the Panama Manifesto, in which she declared, among other things, that she should lead the negotiations with the interim regime. However, it seems that if a definitive break with the Trump administration is not desired, Machado and the 2015 National Assembly should reach agreements.

The first could be that the 2015 National Assembly, with the support of the US government, dedicates itself to building the electoral roadmap together with the 2026 National Assembly. Naturally, Machado’s opinion would be taken into account at all times. This should lead to the appointment of a new CNE board and a new TSJ. Then, the electoral legislation and administrative regulations would have to be reformed to create conditions that allow for truly free elections. Machado’s opinion would also be taken into account at all times.

Finally, a primary election could be held within the opposition, allowing opposition voters to express their views. It is likely that Machado will be re-elected as the opposition candidate. This way would open an acceptable option for those who control this process: an electoral path around the 2015 and 2026 National Assembly elections, and then presidential elections in which, predictably, María Corina Machado will win.

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How the Venezuelan Opposition Can Move Beyond Just Demanding Elections

This article is also published in Spanish on the Hacha y Machete Substack

Last weekend, the opposition achieved the familiar show of unity in Panama City, something that is not always easy to pull off. Party representatives agreed to fight for free elections and to back María Corina Machado as the candidate in any eventual vote. Machado, for her part, promised to return before the end of 2026. 

This is a milestone that should inspire at least some optimism. Five months ago, this group of people was scattered, waiting, in exile or in hiding. But given the sheer scale of Venezuela’s democratic challenge, the unity photo-op, the return of exiled leaders, and the reemergence of figures from hiding remain insufficient. 

Some politicians have returned to the country or emerged from hiding, but without a clear, politically binding agenda for achieving free elections recognized by all actors. The current dynamics still force us to react to the regime’s horrors. The case of Víctor Quero and Carmen Teresa Navas is among the clearest examples. 

Before Venezuela can achieve a true transition, the country’s pro-democracy movement must first undergo its own internal transition. Returns and displays of unity can alter incentives only if they become part of a public, coordinated, and understandable strategy. These are the main elements such a strategy should include.

A clear division of roles and responsibilities

Opening up the political playing field requires a clear division of roles and responsibilities. María Corina Machado and Juan Pablo Guanipa can embody a kind of “good cop/bad cop” dynamic within the democratic movement. The “good cop” would be Machado, whose messaging is already closely aligned with Trump’s policy toward Venezuela. The “bad cop” is Guanipa, whose rhetoric has become increasingly impatient regarding the goal of democratic transition.

If the democratic transition is truly a la venezolana, the debate about it must be taken out of the conference rooms in Washington and Caracas. 

But that differentiation cannot remain confined to national leadership figures alone. Student organizations, victims’ groups and human rights defenders, labor unions, and social organizations are equally crucial. These actors have earned legitimacy on the ground before January 3, when many were swept aside by a brutal wave of repression from which parties are still recovering. Since then, civil society has reaffirmed new leadership figures who, despite lacking party experience, could play important roles in the looming political cycle.

What matters is that this differentiation of roles be coordinated rather than improvised or competitive. Opening up the political field does not mean diluting political leadership. It means expanding the democratic movement’s range of action.

Combine negotiation with protest

There is no contradiction between the two. Negotiation without social pressure does little more than managing stagnation. Protest without a political roadmap burns out. What is needed is to give the streets political content: mobilizing not only against the regime’s abuses, but also in favor of a concrete transition agenda.

The role of movements is to protest, propose, and articulate the kind of transition they want. Just as students in 2007 embraced the campaign against the constitutional referendum and defeated Hugo Chávez, these grassroots movements should also assume a proactive role in shaping the type of transition they identify with.

That requires organizing a kind of “social roundtable” capable of coordinating different causes. These are autonomous rivers that can converge into the same lake: free elections and a broad national agreement on the direction of post-electoral public policy. Each movement has its own identity and internal dynamics, but there must be some degree of coordination and communication among them and with the broader national political agenda.

Protests also present a constant dilemma for the ruling Rodríguez siblings, a litmus test for their supposed liberalization. Demonstrations must remain peaceful and disciplined in order to deepen their dilemma.

Open up the conversation about democratic transition

The Machado-led opposition coalition and its allies have a responsibility to promote an open discussion about transition: what it means, how it is built, and what dilemmas it entails.

Dilemmas are never truly solved. They are weighed in terms of risks, benefits, opportunities, and threats. If the democratic transition is truly a la venezolana, the debate about it must be taken out of the conference rooms in Washington and Caracas. Not everything was decided in Panama City.

This time, the goal would be to bring together different groups and individuals to debate the diverse and legitimate visions of our own transition.

That conversation should include at least three dimensions:

The political-institutional dimension: What minimum guarantees would make a transition possible? What conditions would make an election politically binding? Should Venezuela pursue a constituent assembly? Should the process begin with a presidential election or a parliamentary one? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each option?

The social-humanitarian dimension: How do institutional reforms connect with people’s daily needs, such as wages, public services, security, justice and family reunification?

The electoral dimension: What should the sequencing of elections look like? (As far as we know, there was no agreement on this point in Panama). Should Venezuela return to a manual voting system? How can a trustworthy electoral authority (CNE) be guaranteed, and who should be part of it? What expectations and steps are required to secure the political inclusion of the diaspora and of millions of citizens inside Venezuela who cannot vote in the current circumstances?

Before the 2023 opposition primaries, there was one essential experience that helped build momentum: the Hablan los Candidatos debate, organized by students and activists in July 2023 at the Aula Magna of Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. Now imagine an event, or a series of events on a much larger scale. But this time, rather than candidates, the goal would be to bring together different groups and individuals to debate the diverse and legitimate visions of our own transition.

Use technology boldly

Technology can become a central tool to expand this deliberative process. Digital consultations, hybrid assemblies, spaces for dialogue with the diaspora, coordination mechanisms among professional associations, students, parties, unions, victims, and social organizations: all of this can help rebuild a democratic infrastructure for participation.

Producing a political milestone is not enough. A sequence must be built.

During both the primaries and July 28, the democratic movement used technology in exemplary and innovative ways. Through different applications, people found their polling centers, filed complaints, participated in defending the vote, and helped publish the real results. We need to use technology with that same boldness again, this time within a broader strategy of deliberating, coordinating, and disseminating the agenda of democratic transition.

Plan the sequence

The experience of January 2019 reminds us of something important: political milestones are never improvised. That strategy (whether or not one agrees with its tactics and consequences) was planned months in advance among political parties, civil society, and the leadership of the 2015 National Assembly. What is needed today is a similar level of preparation, but with one additional lesson that may prove decisive: producing a political milestone is not enough. A sequence must be built.

A unity photo may mark the beginning of a new phase. The return of political leaders may help shift public expectations or reshape the outlook of potential voters. A protest met with repression can show  the limits of the regime’s liberalization, something we have already seen this year with students, public-sector workers, and pensioners. A public debate can help organize competing visions of transition, giving oxygen and substance to a public sphere that must continue looking for spaces for deliberation. But none of these things, in isolation, constitutes a strategy.

The democratic movement has already found innovative, intelligent, and popular solutions to political dilemmas. It has pulled rabbits out of hats, brilliant plays in a perverse game, such as the feat of July 28, 2024. However, even rabbits do not appear by magic. The next move must emerge from the lessons and achievements that are already part of the movement’s democratic inheritance. 

We should do what we have already done and know we can do: open up the political field, bring people down from the stands, turn indignation into an agenda, and transform the return of many into movement-building.



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Trump’s “Transition” in Venezuela is Starting to Reek

One day Delcy Rodríguez calls for a reform to the justice system after announcing the sudden revocation of the amnesty law her brother sponsored. The other, rumors suggest she’ll reshuffle the country’s higher court without providing any indication of who the new magistrates are going to be. The central bank president she recently named prepares to disclose figures to the IMF for the first time in decades.

The public does little else than follow the news, as if things were normal. Futile debate has emerged on social media over whether the new US chief of mission in Caracas is more hawkish than his predecessor. Or if the opposition has racist tendencies because a singer (once popular in the 2000s) called Delcy an ape in the opposition’s largest rally in years.

The picture of the country in recent weeks is one of Delcy Rodríguez calling the shots with near-total freedom. She has been enjoying a clear head start over a potential presidential election, as she crisscrosses Venezuela on what amounts to an unofficial campaign tour. In Caracas, she keeps changing everything so that nothing really changes. She is intent on controlling government offices in the next four years through newly promoted loyalists and a clean inflow of petrodollars. The chavista elite has looked more confident in the meantime, touring with Delcy in sky-blue outfits, leading cartoonish chants for peace and national union as if the internal contradictions that surfaced two months ago were now less important, because the possibility of survival looks clearer.

Back in February, optimists would discuss the scope of Washington’s coercion capacity over the “caretaker” regime, the boundaries that (if crossed) would trigger a “second wave” of attacks, the disappearance of Alex Saab as a prelude of a broader purge against other “untouchables” that overtly normalized the commission of terror. Now, lunatics like Diosdado Cabello’s nephew, Alejandro Rondón, claim on social media that “the recess is about to end” the same day Delcy says the amnesty scheme ran its course and Cabello recounts an unlikely justice system crackdown.

What followed January 3rdwas a paradigm change with positive practical consequences for society that chavismo quickly learned to manage if not reverse.

Alejandro doesn’t look like the brightest dude. He’s another chavista nepo-kid working for the other Cabello uncle that controls Venezuela’s taxing authority, Jose David, though Alejandro made a name for himself with rage-baiting tweets that celebrated Maduro’s “victory” in 2024 and claimed the opposition were terrorists who falsified the official voting records (i.e. Diosdado’s talking points during the tun-tun operation).]

But an emboldened member of the Cabello Rondón clan is a troubling sign for those who fled the country after being placed on “treason” blacklists. It also undercuts the very notions of pluralism and national reconciliation that Marco Rubio invoked three months ago when outlining his vision for Venezuela’s democratic transition before US senators. Shortly thereafter, Rondón drove the point home by publicly wishing Donald Trump well after the shooting at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner. The message seems clear: the arrangement with Team Trump is comfortable enough that, however fraught the geopolitical backdrop, they can afford to be flippant—even in public. They remain, unmistakably, the bullies in town. 

The long wait for elections (or just a calendar?)

What followed January 3rd was a paradigm change with positive practical consequences for society that chavismo quickly learned to manage if not reverse. Allies of Maria Corina  Machado who spent the past two years jailed or hiding are back in the street, even providing testimonies about their imprisonment. The student movement has undergone a revival, liaising with human rights groups to set up carefully-controlled protests. Censorship isn’t what it used to be, so journalists have tried to take advantage of that opening. Pensioners and public workers have perhaps become the loudest actor in confronting Rodríguez, despite having to face colectivos and National Guards whenever they hit the streets.

Repression has become less intense, but the lack of a clear electoral calendar keeps the opposition on the sidelines, waiting for the arrival of Machado, which is no less paralyzing. The amnesty law passed on February 19 effectively funneled the release of political prisoners, shattering expectations of a “landmark outcome” that would speed up the process. 

Indeed, the statute’s contents make more than 180 supposed military rebels ineligible, although the release of a handful of FANB officers in recent days reinforces the idea that a law wasn’t necessary to get people out of jail. Nearly 300 civilians are still imprisoned, and we haven’t seen significant breakthroughs in the past few weeks.

According to figures from NGO Foro Penal (based on documented cases), the political prisoner population fell by 40% in the two months following the US military intervention—dropping from 863 detainees in late December to 526 by March 2. The pace has clearly slowed since then. Chavismo released 36 people between March and April, and 17 over the past 18 days (about 6% of the pre–January 3 total). The regime still resorts to sporadic arbitrary arrests and intimidation. Alexis Paparoni, an opposition figure in Mérida (and brother of Carlos Paparoni), was briefly detained while traveling and later released under precautionary measures. A similar incident occurred last weekend with a government employee in Guárico, who was detained for having a note on his desk bearing the now-infamous slur directed at Delcy.

“These prisoners are currently incarcerated because POTUShas chosen to appease and praise the perpetrators instead of supporting their victims,” Burelli recently told Senator Scott.

The White House appears satisfied with results so far. Venezuela is now subject to sweeping sanctions relief across oil, gas, minerals, and fertilizers, while OFAC has issued waivers allowing operations with public banks. Most notably, Delcy Rodríguez has been removed from the Specially Designated Nationals list—effectively unfreezing her US-based assets and clearing the way for financial dealings under American jurisdiction. 

The opposition leadership has largely stuck to its 2025 strategy of projecting trust and patience toward Donald Trump. María Corina Machado continues to argue that Trump is the head of state who has done the most to advance Venezuela’s liberation and maintains that the Rodríguez government is dismantling the Maduro-era “structures of corruption and repression.” However, she acknowledged last week that a bout of political instability cannot be ruled out. 

“The risk is that if people feel the path [toward freedom and democracy] is beginning to close, they may start to push back in a disorganized and potentially anarchic way,” she told esRadio hosts in Madrid. “That’s why a clearly defined electoral calendar is a guarantee of peace and stability. That would help people accept that this process will last a bit longer, as institutions must be strengthened and we need to take time to prepare for a truly impeccable election.”

Running out of patience

Criticism of the Trump administration’s handling in Venezuela continues to grow among groups of scholars and foreign policy observers, while opposition parties remain largely quiet and prefer to let Machado formulate their stance.

But in general, there’s a tense awareness that the waters are getting muddy. Some in journalism, and other opposition allies are starting to lose their patience.

Venezuelan journalist Sebastiana Barraez, an outspoken critic of chavismo and popular source on repression, told her audience that Venezuelan people have no guarantees about their future. Two days ago, she admitted the overthrow of Nicolás Maduro had raised hopes of a new democracy and true institutional recovery.

“It turns out none of that is happening,” Barráez said. “In Venezuela, Trump is promoting the interests of the United States. The problem is that those interests are not compatible with what we Venezuelans are looking for.”

Pedro Mario Burelli, an independent advisor for the opposition, is among the few figures to be pressing Washington over its ties with Delcy Rodríguez, calling Trump’s decision to elevate her an “incoherent strategy.” He has warned that doing business with Minerven makes the US an effective enabler of environmental crimes in Venezuela’s south. In March, he told The Atlantic that the remaining political prisoners now belong to Trump and Rubio.

“These prisoners are currently incarcerated because POTUS has chosen to appease and praise the perpetrators instead of supporting their victims. Constantly praising Delcy is disgraceful and an insult to the vast majority of Venezuelans”, Burelli told GOP Senator Rick Scott on Sunday.“Faulting her, as you and some of your colleagues do, is disingenuous. Venezuelans rightfully expect, and deserve, much more from democratically elected US officials.”

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