Transition

El Chigüire Bipolar, our award-winning equivalent of The Onion, recently ran a headline that nicely captures the domestic fatigue surrounding the months-old rhetoric of the secretary of state: Marco Rubio anuncia que ya ahora sí, de pana, de panita, pronto viene la transición. That translates roughly to: “Rubio announces that now it’s time for the transition to happen soon, this time for sure, for real, I swear.”

It was four days after a military intervention toppled Maduro that Marco Rubio first spoke of the famous three-phase that US diplomats and officials love to quote. He later laid out his expectations for the process currently unfolding. We summarized his comments from the January 28 Senate hearing:

Rubio was reluctant to provide a precise timeline for the current arrangement between Venezuelan authorities and the US. The Trump administration wants to see rapid progress, he suggested. And in five months, the situation must be different (…) In the long term, the US wants Venezuela to have a democratically elected government (…)  Rubio said he wants María Corina to be part of the transition and to be able to run for election eventually.

Fast forward to July, and the messaging from out from the White House has become increasingly unnerving to many. We’ve published plenty of stuff that describes the Rodríguez regime’s response to the disaster (ultimately sluggish and dwarfed by the efforts of ordinary people and foreign rescuers) and Delcy’s inability to deploy the Venezuelan military in a meaningful way.

One must not overestimate the influence of the Secretary of State. Rubio is part of the Trump administration, and he cannot break with the president’s overarching goals.

The gringos, however, are adamant that the chavista elite has been fully compliant with aid efforts. Chief of Mission John Barrett expressed strong confidence in local authorities soon after the quakes. A picture of him amicably grabbing the arm of Diosdado Cabello before a team of US rescuers drew social media outage. So did another of Cabello sharing a laugh with a US general, garnering headlines about the Americans’ willingness to work closely with an alleged narco-terrorist.

Rubio’s priorities in the Venezuela portfolio

In the Trump government, one can identify three figures or groups that have stood out for their distinct talking points and approaches to the country.

There is Donald Trump himself, who seems exhilarated whenever he mentions Delcy Rodríguez and the oil riches the US is extracting there without transparency or accountability. The US president is still eager to use Venezuela to advance his domestic agenda; he recently invoked a CIA report on potential electronic fraud in Venezuelan voting machines, a move perhaps meant to cast doubt on election integrity in US states using that technology.

Then you have a network of whisperers and operatives around Trump, which includes both administration officials and external figures, that intend to covertly influence the Venezuela portfolio behind the scenes, sometimes attempting to lobby through journalists and social media. From the outside, the likes of Laura Loomer and Harry Sargeant featured in 2025. In the White House, one figure that doesn’t talk much but is definitely part of the “Venezuela core” is political advisor Stephen Miller, as he reluctantly admitted last week. JD Vance, a likely candidate in the next presidential race, represents the isolationist faction of the administration. And there’s Rubio, who many Venezuelans and the Machado-led opposition perceive as their ally.

Rubio remains the only relevant US official who consistently discusses the purported goals of democratization and institutional reconstruction. He is also the leading figure in the Venezuela dossier, and we believe he genuinely wants to put an end to chavista rule once and for all. His record as an anti-chavista (and anti-Castro) hawk is widely known but, as this Substack post points out, he’s had to seek a middle ground between a regime-change strategy and the Ric Grenell-backed normalization agenda revealed in 2025. A week ago, Rubio welcomed the “reconciliation and transition talks” that a Rodríguez-led delegation and a Machado-less opposition group agreed to begin on August 1. He said the US will be “very engaged” in this process, while suggesting it will operate independently. It clearly won’t. The talks are happening because the State Department is sponsoring them. Which, as it happens, is not bad news at all.

Neither Edmundo González nor Dinorah Figuera possessed significant political capital until a major player backed them. Both, too, are likely easy to guide and control.

Still, one must not overestimate the influence of the Secretary of State. Rubio is part of the Trump administration, and he cannot break with the president’s overarching goals.

One of Rubio’s main goals here is to keep the situation stable. If the recent off-the-record skirmishes with María Corina Machado were to escalate into open conflict between the opposition leader and Trump, framing the Venezuela portfolio as a foreign policy success would become far more difficult. As a Secretary of State, Rubio has become accustomed to defending Trump’s rhetoric and actions in a professional and composed tone while reassuring allied figures and governments in private (including some whom the president has publicly humiliated). This same dynamic likely governs his approach to Machado, whom Rubio insists can play a role in the transition even as Trump continues to shun her.

Machado, who has recently challenged Washington, cannot afford to break with her sole reliable, long-time ally in the US government, Rubio, if she wants to avoid a damaging fallout. Rubio, meanwhile, can’t break with Trump either if he hopes to run for president in 2028, given Trump’s grip on the Republican Party and the MAGA voter base. Rubio would probably like to engineer elections in Venezuela in a way that maximizes his political credit. With the Republican presidential primaries scheduled for the first half of 2028, showing off Venezuelan elections as a personal triumph while the GOP selects its nominee would require those elections to take place in late 2027 or early 2028.

Washington’s proxy

Rubio wants to control this process through Dinorah Figuera and a group of former opposition lawmakers from Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular, the parties who backed the creation of the Comisión Delegada Figuera presides. To Washington, Figuera represents what Edmundo González was to Machado in the 2024 election: a figure with enough legitimacy who was admitted as a competitor by the chavista-controlled institutions. Just as the opposition leader needed an opposition proxy to stand in for her when she was banned from running, Rubio needs a Venezuelan politician coming from the 2015 National Assembly to claim that negotiations for democracy and reconciliation are Venezuelan-led. Neither González nor Figuera possessed significant political capital until a major player backed them. Both, too, are likely easy to guide and control.

Much like the president-elect, Figuera has shown little political ambition beyond serving as a viable, cooperative figure under these circumstances (much as González did after the Maduro regime disqualified dozens of potential opposition candidates). Figuera has described herself as “an instrument” of the reinstitutionalization and democratization process. She hopes to guarantee the participation of political parties and Machado, whom she acknowledges as the opposition’s leader but notes that she holds “a different vision.”

We expect the Rodríguez-Figuera talks to make progress before the end of 2026.

The upcoming talks will be like nothing we have ever seen, in terms of the US operating as an all-powerful actor wielding immense coercive capacity and veto power. The members of the opposition delegation, whose full roster is not yet public, are expected to serve more as liaisons in constant communication with the Department of State and Trump administration personnel, than as fully-empowered negotiators over the major issues at stake.

Figuera claims this process should lead to a trustworthy CNE and a reformed Supreme Court with new magistrates across its entire structure—not just the chamber overseeing elections. Repressive statutes passed in the Maduro era, used to seize the assets of the regime’s opponents or to punish citizens under the chavista definition of hate speech, are expected to be revoked too. 

With the Delcy regime unable to make progress on multiple fronts and definitely after the government’s lame emergency response, her position before the United States seems weaker as we approach the end of the year. Our latest Political Risk Report quotes Rodríguez government sources suggesting the Trump administration wants to accelerate political developments in Venezuela ahead of the November midterms, so its ventures in Caracas can be framed as a clearer success.

We expect the Rodríguez-Figuera talks to make progress before the end of 2026. Whether that progress will translate into preparations for a new presidential election, as Machado and most Venezuelans would hope, remains to be seen

We know from statements issued by the 2015 National Assembly Delegated Commission, the 2026 National Assembly, and the State Department that August 1 was set as the launching date of a roadmap leading to a political transition in Venezuela.

The incentives for the various actors to accelerate or delay this political negotiation process are clear. The Venezuelan interim government (as the State Department statement refers to it) will have an interest in delaying the process as much as possible to prolong its time in power and preserve the current state of affairs. For the 2015 National Assembly Delegated Commission, it offers a window of opportunity to gain relevance and demonstrate its ability to accelerate the agenda that Dinorah Figuera announced before any other actor. The Trump administration will want this process to proceed at a pace that does not jeopardize its control of the country until the elections (and perhaps even after). It is in María Corina Machado’s best interest for the situation to develop in a way that allows her to gain control and create the conditions for her to be the opposition candidate in the upcoming presidential elections.

Other, less prominent actors will try to influence the process. We have already seen AD leader Henry Ramos Allup trying to position himself, for example, to defend Machado’s participation, as did Henrique Capriles, and other voices will surely emerge along those lines in the coming days. Those aspiring to a new National Assembly and new elections for governorships and mayoralties will certainly also try to influence the process.

But let’s turn to the most relevant conversation, with just under two weeks until August 1: what could be the institutional path to achieving this political transition through free elections?

A new National Electoral Council (CNE)

Since the elections are administered by the National Electoral Council, it would seem that the first step should be, precisely, to elect a new CNE board.

Choosing a reliable one could be the first challenge. What has been offered previously is insufficient: a majority of three or four people close to or allied with the government and one or two “independents” or those close to the opposition. A board is needed that complies with Article 296 of the Constitution, composed of “five people not affiliated with political organizations.”

This CNE must begin with an essential task: the purging and updating of the Permanent Electoral Registry. It is crucial that Venezuelans abroad be allowed to vote and that the necessary logistical and diplomatic conditions be established to make this possible.

A new Supreme Court

Under the Venezuelan constitutional system, the decisions of the CNE can be subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ). Directly by the Electoral Chamber. Indirectly by the Constitutional Chamber.

Therefore, the appointment of new justices to both the Electoral Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber is necessary at the outset of this process. Article 263 of the Constitution clearly outlines the requirements for becoming a Supreme Court Justice. In May of this year, the Supreme Court Law was amended to increase the number of justices from 20 to 32. The Constitutional Chamber (the most important chamber) is composed of seven justices. This increase means that 12 new justices must be elected. Furthermore, a significant number of the current 20 justices are of retirement age.

This, as with the CNE, is debated and decided in the National Assembly, whose majority is controlled by Jorge Rodríguez. It would have to be a decision by chavismo, or the result of a political rupture, for the political rights of the non-government-controlled population to be considered both when electing CNE board members and when appointing Supreme Court justices. This relates to the next point.

Restoring civil and political rights

For several years, Venezuela’s main political parties and actors were subjected to confiscation and persecution through various administrative measures, such as those issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic to disqualify candidates, and even judicial measures to replace the boards of directors of opposition parties like COPEI, Primero Justicia, and Acción Democrática. It is essential to compile a report detailing all these measures and establish an action plan to reverse them, allowing political parties and leaders to operate and return to Venezuela.

Then, reforms must be made to those laws and administrative regulations that, long before January 3rd, restricted freedom of expression and the conditions for holding elections, such as the Constitutional Law Against Hatred, the Simón Bolívar Law, and the Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The same must be done with respect to the resolutions of the CNE that have restricted political and civic participation in the electoral processes. Furthermore, cases where it has been argued that the 2026 Amnesty Law is inapplicable, such as that of María Corina Machado, must be reviewed.

Given that the incentives of the actors in this process are not and will not be aligned, as shown above, it is crucial to immediately establish timelines for the phases of the process, beginning August 1. This will allow us to gauge the level of commitment among the parties to move forward with the transition.

There are certainly conditions attached to this process that are not public, and that will shape its phases and pace. However, we must begin a public conversation about ideas for addressing this crucial phase of political life starting August 1.

European vacation rentals have entered a bizarre era where there’s more municipal red tape than luxury.

The romantic idea of escaping to a restored Tuscan farmhouse or a modernist villa overlooking the French Riviera, perhaps with a glass of local wine in hand while watching the sunset over olive groves that have stood for centuries, has run straight into the cold reality of the European Union’s fight against carbon.

How does that reconcile with holidayers who expect 3m pools heated to an exact temperature? Whole-house air conditioning? Double-door refrigerators? Massive panoramic windows?

We don’t know, but we do know that local councils are staring down energy grids that are already stressed to their absolute limits. Sustainability isn’t just a case of putting a small wooden sign in the bathroom asking guests to reuse their towels anymore.

WTTC Initiatives and the Corporate Push for Greener Stays

The World Travel & Tourism Council has spent the last few years trying to bring about that reconciliation. A massive partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme is pushing circular economy guidelines down the throats of major hospitality operators, hoping that global standards will somehow trick independent luxury property managers into compliance. It sounds great on paper. The industry wants independent certification schemes to look uniform across borders, because global corporations hate dealing with twenty different regional rules when they could just tick a single corporate checkbox instead.

For property managers, it’s trickle-down bureaucracy at its finest. You can’t just call a rental “eco-friendly” anymore because you bought organic cotton sheets, left a bottle of locally sourced olive oil on the kitchen counter, installed a Nest thermostat, and planted some lavender in the garden. The standards are tightening.

The WTTC is pushing for genuine data transparency, which means tracking actual water stewardship metrics, managing real-time grid feedback loops, auditing supply chains, and proving carbon offsets. It’s an administrative headache for anyone who just wanted to rent out a luxury apartment while drinking espresso on a private terrace.

With sustainability metrics becoming a core driver of soft power and local tourism compliance across European markets, consumer-facing tech platforms are reacting by categorizing eco-certified accommodations. Advanced search ecosystems such as Villa Picker are facilitating this transition, allowing travelers to filter properties by energy efficiency standards and regional sustainability benchmarks without sacrificing premium amenities.

Balancing High-End Amenities with Low-Impact Operations

This leaves high-end property operators in a tricky bind. Holidayers don’t want a lecture on carbon footprints when they’re paying thousands of euro a night and retrofitting a centuries-old villa with triple glazing, thick cavity wall insulation, solar roof tiles, and ground-source heat pumps is an architectural nightmare that costs a fortune.

Operators are forced to play a complicated game of smoke and mirrors with smart home technology. They’re installing automated sensors that kill the climate control the second a guest steps outside, investing in invisible greywater recycling systems, choosing low-flow rainfall showerheads that disguise water conservation as a spa experience, and buying electric vehicle charging stations that look sleek next to a rented sports car. It’s a delicate compromise. If Europe’s green transition succeeds, it’ll be because the luxury rental market figured out how to hide the machinery of sustainability behind a velvet curtain of premium comfort.

This July 14th appears to be one of the key days in the political process that Venezuela has been experiencing since January 3rd. Early in the morning, the 2015 National Assembly announced a joint work agenda starting August 1st “as a roadmap to promote stability, democracy, and national recovery.”

When Gabriela Jaquez checked into Friday’s game against the Sparks, it was so familiar. The aura of the arena, the cheers from her friends and family.

But it was actually Jaquez’s first time playing on that court. Growing up in Camarillo, she spent her childhood watching Lakers and Sparks games, as she said, “back when it was Staples Center.”

At Crypto.com Arena, though, she was a professional. Months after winning a national title with UCLA, Jaquez was facing her hometown WNBA squad as a member of the Chicago Sky.

“All the legends that have played here, all the games that I have attended here,” she said ahead of Friday’s game. “I’m just like, I walked out there, I told Jacy [Sheldon,] my teammate, that I was like, ‘This is so crazy.’ Like I’m just playing in here. I’ve watched so many games.”

In her first WNBA season, Jaquez has averaged 23 minutes, 8.7 points, 3.9 rebounds and 1.2 assists per game. She has started 15 games, but came off the bench Friday when she scored a team-leading 15 points with five rebounds and shot six for 12 in front of what she said was two suites full of friends and family.

Jaquez was the Sky’s first-round selection at fifth overall a week after she helped the Bruins to their national title. She was one of six UCLA players taken in that draft and five in the first round, setting a WNBA record for a single program.

“It’s a very quick transition,” Jaquez said. “I don’t think you can fully prepare for that transition just because I don’t think there’s anything like it. But I did know that it was going to be quick and it was going to be fast, but I just try to stay grateful through it all.”

Sparks coach Lynne Roberts faced Jaquez in the Pac-12 while Roberts was at Utah and nearly recruited Jaquez to join the Utes many years ago.

The Chicago Sky’s Gabriela Jaquez drives to the basket under pressure from the Wings’ Azzi Fudd on Sunday in Dallas.

(Sam Hodde / Getty Images)

“[UCLA coach] Cori [Close] and I were joking the other day,” Roberts said. “I was close [with Jaquez] and she just kept saying, ‘Well, I’m just waiting to see what UCLA does.’ So I was texting Cori, like, ‘Would you please cut her loose or offer her?’ I’ve always been a big fan of hers. But I think all those guys, they learned how to play with other stars. I think that’s a key in being a WNBA player. You’ve got to learn you’re not the one anymore. And I think at UCLA with that roster they had, they all had to learn how to, you know, sacrifice something to get the ultimate goal. So they’re coming in as team players.”

Close did not cut Jaquez loose and she went on to become a hometown hero with the Bruins. After three solid seasons, Jaquez became a much stronger scoring threat as a senior, shooting a career-high 53.9% with 13.5 points per game during the NCAA title-winning season.

Already established as a strong rebounder and defender, adding that offensive element raised her draft stock year-over-year higher than any other prospect.

“There’s so much to learn coming into this league,” Jaquez said. “I don’t know if I could really name one [thing], but it’s just a lot of games. That’s kind of like the main one that comes to my mind is just the amount of games that you’re playing.”

UCLA Bruins Angela Dugalic, Kiki Rice, Gianna Kneepkens, Lauren Betts and Gabriela Jaquez pose at the WNBA draft. All five were selected in the first round of the draft.

(Angelina Katsanis / Getty Images)

The seniors and graduate students on the 2025-26 UCLA national championship team remain close. Jaquez has faced off against former teammates Charlisse Leger-Walker, Gianna Kneepkens and Kiki Rice.

“We still keep that senior group chat alive, just kind of updating each other,” Jaquez said. “Obviously, when we play each other I’ll text, ‘I’m coming into town,’ or they’ll text me and we always can get dinner the night before, and so that’s always super special. Especially me being in a new state [and] a new city, as I’ve been in Southern California my whole life until now, it’s great to see familiar faces and I’m really grateful that I could catch up with my [former] teammates.”

Roch Cholowsky headlines Bruins in MLB draft

No. 1 MLB draft pick Roch Cholowsky throws a ceremonial first pitch before the White Sox played the Athletics in Chicago on Sunday.

(Nam Y. Huh / Ap Photo/nam Y. Huh)

After an elite UCLA career, Roch Cholowsky was drafted by the Chicago White Sox with the No. 1 overall pick Saturday.

He became the third Bruin to be selected No. 1, joining Gerrit Cole (2011) and Chris Chambliss (1970).

On Monday, MLB.com reported Cholowsky passed his physical and is set to receive a record-setting signing bonus of $10.35 million. The White Sox have not yet announced the deal.

Cholowsky’s bonus tops the $9.3 million bonuses the Reds gave Chase Burns and the Rockies gave Charlie Condon in 2024, according to MLB.com.

Cholowsky said he was thrilled to be drafted by Chicago, where he enjoyed pre-draft meetings with team officials and mingled in the clubhouse of a team that entered the All-Star break leading the AL Central.

“It really felt like to me like a college clubhouse,” Cholowsky told the Associated Press. “It’s just a different feel in there.”

Cholowsky was one of 10 Bruins selected in the MLB draft.

Logan Reddemann (No. 38, Colorado Rockies), Mulivai Levu (No. 70, Cincinnati Reds) and Roman Martin (No. 111, Athletics) joined Cholowsky getting selected on the first day of the draft.

Bruins Cal Randall (No. 146, St. Louis Cardinals), Will Gasparino (No. 161, Philadelphia Phillies), Dean West (No. 222, Toronto Blue Jays), Cashel Dugger (No. 256, Washington Nationals), Michael Barnett (No. 587, Minnesota Twins) and Justin Lee (No. 609, Philadelphia Phillies) were drafted on the second day.

Walt Hazzard to be inducted into Collegiate Basketball Hall of Fame

UCLA’s Walt Hazzard carries the NCAA national championship trophy as the team arrives at LAX in 1964.

(Harold Matosian / Associated Press)

Former UCLA player and coach Walt Hazzard will be inducted into the National Collegiate Basketball Hall of Fame, a selection committee announced Monday.

Hazzard, who died in 2011 at the age of 69, was a senior co-captain on the 1963-64 UCLA basketball team that won the first national title in the program’s history and posted a 30-0 record. He averaged a career-best 18.6 points for the title-winning team, earning most outstanding playerhonors at the Final Four. He also won national player of the year honors.

The 6-foot-2 point guard who grew up in Philadelphia won an Olympic gold medal in 1964 and was a two-time All-American under the direction of Bruins coach John Wooden.

Hazzard went on to coach at Compton College, Chapman and UCLA, leading the Bruins to an NIT title and Pac-10 regular season tournament titles during his four seasons leading the program. His Hall of Fame induction, however, is solely based on his performance as a player.

The 2026 induction class was selected by a committee comprised of college basketball leaders from around the country. The National Collegiate Basketball Hall of Fame is administered by the National Assn. of Basketball Coaches Foundation.

In case you missed it

Chicago White Sox select UCLA shortstop Roch Cholowsky with No. 1 pick in MLB draft

‘I want to have fun with it.’ Katelyn Ohashi chasing joyful L.A. Olympic dream at 29

UCLA basketball lands highly touted Serbian small forward Nikola Kusturica

UCLA Unlocked: Former Bruin Jordin Canada is enjoying a Dream season

Have something Bruin?

Do you have a comment or something you’d like to see in a future UCLA newsletter? Email newsletters editor Houston Mitchell at houston.mitchell@latimes.com. To get this newsletter in your inbox, click here.

Six months after Nicolás Maduro’s military removal by US forces, the political situation in Venezuela can be summarized very schematically.

Under the 1999 Constitution, on July 3, Maduro’s absence became absolute. Under this assumption, Article 233 of the Constitution states that presidential elections must be held within 30 consecutive days following July 3. Meanwhile, Delcy Rodríguez remains as acting president, filling Maduro’s absolute absence.

The elections would be the final part of the third phase of the plan that Trump administration officials and Marco Rubio in particular often mention.

However, we know that elections will not be held in the short term, as there is a consensus that a new National Electoral Council (CNE) and conditions of electoral integrity are necessary. That is because, in theory, the first two phases outlined by the US government—stabilization and recovery—should first be completed.

So, how can the Venezuelan opposition push for free elections someday?

To do so, Venezuelans must first determine who within the Venezuelan opposition should lead the charge.

Naturally, it would be María Corina Machado. However, there is evidence that the Trump administration does not want her to be that lead person. I am not saying the White House does not want Machado to be a presidential candidate, but that everything seems to suggest that the Trump administration does not want her to lead the process toward those elections. Which is a different matter.

No political actor can achieve anything significant without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the US.

Therefore, if the US government does not want Machado to lead the political process that will lead us to free elections, who is the US government backing? It has only given two indications so far.

One, somewhat farcical even in terms of US foreign policy, was that Trump invited Enrique Márquez, a satellite political leader, to the State of the Union address. It was a message to say that the US president does not want Machado leading the process that would lead to free elections.

The other was the return of Dinorah Figuera, president of the 2015 National Assembly Delegated Commission, to Venezuela, at the invitation of the US, where she was received at the airport by US embassy personnel. Upon arrival, Figuera met with Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett and National Assembly president Jorge Rodríguez. In this way, the Trump administration emphasized its vision of who would be the opposition’s interlocutor.

Finally, after the earthquakes, there was a third, even clearer message: to disavow Machado’s trip to Venezuela.

At this point, it is worth remembering that at this moment in Venezuelan political history, no political actor can achieve anything significant without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the US. Like it or not, the result of the January 3rd operation is that we find ourselves under a tutelage of both the regime and the opposition.

Given this reality, where should we push for the Venezuelan transition?

The 2015 National Assembly, with US support, could dedicate itself to building the electoral roadmap together with the 2026 National Assembly.

If the Trump administration doesn’t want Machado to lead the process toward free elections, and the last clear signal it sent was to involve the 2015 National Assembly, perhaps that’s the path we should follow.

From what we understand, the idea of ​​involving the 2015 National Assembly, through 6 or 12 of its members, is to work with the 2026 National Assembly to build an institutional roadmap leading to elections, specifically the appointment of a new board for the CNE, and perhaps the formation of a new Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ).

It is known that this option generates deep distrust in Machado, who attempted to thwart it, apparently unsuccessfully, with the Panama Manifesto, in which she declared, among other things, that she should lead the negotiations with the interim regime. However, it seems that if a definitive break with the Trump administration is not desired, Machado and the 2015 National Assembly should reach agreements.

The first could be that the 2015 National Assembly, with the support of the US government, dedicates itself to building the electoral roadmap together with the 2026 National Assembly. Naturally, Machado’s opinion would be taken into account at all times. This should lead to the appointment of a new CNE board and a new TSJ. Then, the electoral legislation and administrative regulations would have to be reformed to create conditions that allow for truly free elections. Machado’s opinion would also be taken into account at all times.

Finally, a primary election could be held within the opposition, allowing opposition voters to express their views. It is likely that Machado will be re-elected as the opposition candidate. This way would open an acceptable option for those who control this process: an electoral path around the 2015 and 2026 National Assembly elections, and then presidential elections in which, predictably, María Corina Machado will win.

This article is also published in Spanish on the Hacha y Machete Substack

Last weekend, the opposition achieved the familiar show of unity in Panama City, something that is not always easy to pull off. Party representatives agreed to fight for free elections and to back María Corina Machado as the candidate in any eventual vote. Machado, for her part, promised to return before the end of 2026. 

This is a milestone that should inspire at least some optimism. Five months ago, this group of people was scattered, waiting, in exile or in hiding. But given the sheer scale of Venezuela’s democratic challenge, the unity photo-op, the return of exiled leaders, and the reemergence of figures from hiding remain insufficient. 

Some politicians have returned to the country or emerged from hiding, but without a clear, politically binding agenda for achieving free elections recognized by all actors. The current dynamics still force us to react to the regime’s horrors. The case of Víctor Quero and Carmen Teresa Navas is among the clearest examples. 

Before Venezuela can achieve a true transition, the country’s pro-democracy movement must first undergo its own internal transition. Returns and displays of unity can alter incentives only if they become part of a public, coordinated, and understandable strategy. These are the main elements such a strategy should include.

A clear division of roles and responsibilities

Opening up the political playing field requires a clear division of roles and responsibilities. María Corina Machado and Juan Pablo Guanipa can embody a kind of “good cop/bad cop” dynamic within the democratic movement. The “good cop” would be Machado, whose messaging is already closely aligned with Trump’s policy toward Venezuela. The “bad cop” is Guanipa, whose rhetoric has become increasingly impatient regarding the goal of democratic transition.

If the democratic transition is truly a la venezolana, the debate about it must be taken out of the conference rooms in Washington and Caracas. 

But that differentiation cannot remain confined to national leadership figures alone. Student organizations, victims’ groups and human rights defenders, labor unions, and social organizations are equally crucial. These actors have earned legitimacy on the ground before January 3, when many were swept aside by a brutal wave of repression from which parties are still recovering. Since then, civil society has reaffirmed new leadership figures who, despite lacking party experience, could play important roles in the looming political cycle.

What matters is that this differentiation of roles be coordinated rather than improvised or competitive. Opening up the political field does not mean diluting political leadership. It means expanding the democratic movement’s range of action.

Combine negotiation with protest

There is no contradiction between the two. Negotiation without social pressure does little more than managing stagnation. Protest without a political roadmap burns out. What is needed is to give the streets political content: mobilizing not only against the regime’s abuses, but also in favor of a concrete transition agenda.

The role of movements is to protest, propose, and articulate the kind of transition they want. Just as students in 2007 embraced the campaign against the constitutional referendum and defeated Hugo Chávez, these grassroots movements should also assume a proactive role in shaping the type of transition they identify with.

That requires organizing a kind of “social roundtable” capable of coordinating different causes. These are autonomous rivers that can converge into the same lake: free elections and a broad national agreement on the direction of post-electoral public policy. Each movement has its own identity and internal dynamics, but there must be some degree of coordination and communication among them and with the broader national political agenda.

Protests also present a constant dilemma for the ruling Rodríguez siblings, a litmus test for their supposed liberalization. Demonstrations must remain peaceful and disciplined in order to deepen their dilemma.

Open up the conversation about democratic transition

The Machado-led opposition coalition and its allies have a responsibility to promote an open discussion about transition: what it means, how it is built, and what dilemmas it entails.

Dilemmas are never truly solved. They are weighed in terms of risks, benefits, opportunities, and threats. If the democratic transition is truly a la venezolana, the debate about it must be taken out of the conference rooms in Washington and Caracas. Not everything was decided in Panama City.

This time, the goal would be to bring together different groups and individuals to debate the diverse and legitimate visions of our own transition.

That conversation should include at least three dimensions:

The political-institutional dimension: What minimum guarantees would make a transition possible? What conditions would make an election politically binding? Should Venezuela pursue a constituent assembly? Should the process begin with a presidential election or a parliamentary one? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each option?

The social-humanitarian dimension: How do institutional reforms connect with people’s daily needs, such as wages, public services, security, justice and family reunification?

The electoral dimension: What should the sequencing of elections look like? (As far as we know, there was no agreement on this point in Panama). Should Venezuela return to a manual voting system? How can a trustworthy electoral authority (CNE) be guaranteed, and who should be part of it? What expectations and steps are required to secure the political inclusion of the diaspora and of millions of citizens inside Venezuela who cannot vote in the current circumstances?

Before the 2023 opposition primaries, there was one essential experience that helped build momentum: the Hablan los Candidatos debate, organized by students and activists in July 2023 at the Aula Magna of Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. Now imagine an event, or a series of events on a much larger scale. But this time, rather than candidates, the goal would be to bring together different groups and individuals to debate the diverse and legitimate visions of our own transition.

Use technology boldly

Technology can become a central tool to expand this deliberative process. Digital consultations, hybrid assemblies, spaces for dialogue with the diaspora, coordination mechanisms among professional associations, students, parties, unions, victims, and social organizations: all of this can help rebuild a democratic infrastructure for participation.

Producing a political milestone is not enough. A sequence must be built.

During both the primaries and July 28, the democratic movement used technology in exemplary and innovative ways. Through different applications, people found their polling centers, filed complaints, participated in defending the vote, and helped publish the real results. We need to use technology with that same boldness again, this time within a broader strategy of deliberating, coordinating, and disseminating the agenda of democratic transition.

Plan the sequence

The experience of January 2019 reminds us of something important: political milestones are never improvised. That strategy (whether or not one agrees with its tactics and consequences) was planned months in advance among political parties, civil society, and the leadership of the 2015 National Assembly. What is needed today is a similar level of preparation, but with one additional lesson that may prove decisive: producing a political milestone is not enough. A sequence must be built.

A unity photo may mark the beginning of a new phase. The return of political leaders may help shift public expectations or reshape the outlook of potential voters. A protest met with repression can show  the limits of the regime’s liberalization, something we have already seen this year with students, public-sector workers, and pensioners. A public debate can help organize competing visions of transition, giving oxygen and substance to a public sphere that must continue looking for spaces for deliberation. But none of these things, in isolation, constitutes a strategy.

The democratic movement has already found innovative, intelligent, and popular solutions to political dilemmas. It has pulled rabbits out of hats, brilliant plays in a perverse game, such as the feat of July 28, 2024. However, even rabbits do not appear by magic. The next move must emerge from the lessons and achievements that are already part of the movement’s democratic inheritance. 

We should do what we have already done and know we can do: open up the political field, bring people down from the stands, turn indignation into an agenda, and transform the return of many into movement-building.