Transition

This article is also published in Spanish on the Hacha y Machete Substack

Last weekend, the opposition achieved the familiar show of unity in Panama City, something that is not always easy to pull off. Party representatives agreed to fight for free elections and to back María Corina Machado as the candidate in any eventual vote. Machado, for her part, promised to return before the end of 2026. 

This is a milestone that should inspire at least some optimism. Five months ago, this group of people was scattered, waiting, in exile or in hiding. But given the sheer scale of Venezuela’s democratic challenge, the unity photo-op, the return of exiled leaders, and the reemergence of figures from hiding remain insufficient. 

Some politicians have returned to the country or emerged from hiding, but without a clear, politically binding agenda for achieving free elections recognized by all actors. The current dynamics still force us to react to the regime’s horrors. The case of Víctor Quero and Carmen Teresa Navas is among the clearest examples. 

Before Venezuela can achieve a true transition, the country’s pro-democracy movement must first undergo its own internal transition. Returns and displays of unity can alter incentives only if they become part of a public, coordinated, and understandable strategy. These are the main elements such a strategy should include.

A clear division of roles and responsibilities

Opening up the political playing field requires a clear division of roles and responsibilities. María Corina Machado and Juan Pablo Guanipa can embody a kind of “good cop/bad cop” dynamic within the democratic movement. The “good cop” would be Machado, whose messaging is already closely aligned with Trump’s policy toward Venezuela. The “bad cop” is Guanipa, whose rhetoric has become increasingly impatient regarding the goal of democratic transition.

If the democratic transition is truly a la venezolana, the debate about it must be taken out of the conference rooms in Washington and Caracas. 

But that differentiation cannot remain confined to national leadership figures alone. Student organizations, victims’ groups and human rights defenders, labor unions, and social organizations are equally crucial. These actors have earned legitimacy on the ground before January 3, when many were swept aside by a brutal wave of repression from which parties are still recovering. Since then, civil society has reaffirmed new leadership figures who, despite lacking party experience, could play important roles in the looming political cycle.

What matters is that this differentiation of roles be coordinated rather than improvised or competitive. Opening up the political field does not mean diluting political leadership. It means expanding the democratic movement’s range of action.

Combine negotiation with protest

There is no contradiction between the two. Negotiation without social pressure does little more than managing stagnation. Protest without a political roadmap burns out. What is needed is to give the streets political content: mobilizing not only against the regime’s abuses, but also in favor of a concrete transition agenda.

The role of movements is to protest, propose, and articulate the kind of transition they want. Just as students in 2007 embraced the campaign against the constitutional referendum and defeated Hugo Chávez, these grassroots movements should also assume a proactive role in shaping the type of transition they identify with.

That requires organizing a kind of “social roundtable” capable of coordinating different causes. These are autonomous rivers that can converge into the same lake: free elections and a broad national agreement on the direction of post-electoral public policy. Each movement has its own identity and internal dynamics, but there must be some degree of coordination and communication among them and with the broader national political agenda.

Protests also present a constant dilemma for the ruling Rodríguez siblings, a litmus test for their supposed liberalization. Demonstrations must remain peaceful and disciplined in order to deepen their dilemma.

Open up the conversation about democratic transition

The Machado-led opposition coalition and its allies have a responsibility to promote an open discussion about transition: what it means, how it is built, and what dilemmas it entails.

Dilemmas are never truly solved. They are weighed in terms of risks, benefits, opportunities, and threats. If the democratic transition is truly a la venezolana, the debate about it must be taken out of the conference rooms in Washington and Caracas. Not everything was decided in Panama City.

This time, the goal would be to bring together different groups and individuals to debate the diverse and legitimate visions of our own transition.

That conversation should include at least three dimensions:

The political-institutional dimension: What minimum guarantees would make a transition possible? What conditions would make an election politically binding? Should Venezuela pursue a constituent assembly? Should the process begin with a presidential election or a parliamentary one? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each option?

The social-humanitarian dimension: How do institutional reforms connect with people’s daily needs, such as wages, public services, security, justice and family reunification?

The electoral dimension: What should the sequencing of elections look like? (As far as we know, there was no agreement on this point in Panama). Should Venezuela return to a manual voting system? How can a trustworthy electoral authority (CNE) be guaranteed, and who should be part of it? What expectations and steps are required to secure the political inclusion of the diaspora and of millions of citizens inside Venezuela who cannot vote in the current circumstances?

Before the 2023 opposition primaries, there was one essential experience that helped build momentum: the Hablan los Candidatos debate, organized by students and activists in July 2023 at the Aula Magna of Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. Now imagine an event, or a series of events on a much larger scale. But this time, rather than candidates, the goal would be to bring together different groups and individuals to debate the diverse and legitimate visions of our own transition.

Use technology boldly

Technology can become a central tool to expand this deliberative process. Digital consultations, hybrid assemblies, spaces for dialogue with the diaspora, coordination mechanisms among professional associations, students, parties, unions, victims, and social organizations: all of this can help rebuild a democratic infrastructure for participation.

Producing a political milestone is not enough. A sequence must be built.

During both the primaries and July 28, the democratic movement used technology in exemplary and innovative ways. Through different applications, people found their polling centers, filed complaints, participated in defending the vote, and helped publish the real results. We need to use technology with that same boldness again, this time within a broader strategy of deliberating, coordinating, and disseminating the agenda of democratic transition.

Plan the sequence

The experience of January 2019 reminds us of something important: political milestones are never improvised. That strategy (whether or not one agrees with its tactics and consequences) was planned months in advance among political parties, civil society, and the leadership of the 2015 National Assembly. What is needed today is a similar level of preparation, but with one additional lesson that may prove decisive: producing a political milestone is not enough. A sequence must be built.

A unity photo may mark the beginning of a new phase. The return of political leaders may help shift public expectations or reshape the outlook of potential voters. A protest met with repression can show  the limits of the regime’s liberalization, something we have already seen this year with students, public-sector workers, and pensioners. A public debate can help organize competing visions of transition, giving oxygen and substance to a public sphere that must continue looking for spaces for deliberation. But none of these things, in isolation, constitutes a strategy.

The democratic movement has already found innovative, intelligent, and popular solutions to political dilemmas. It has pulled rabbits out of hats, brilliant plays in a perverse game, such as the feat of July 28, 2024. However, even rabbits do not appear by magic. The next move must emerge from the lessons and achievements that are already part of the movement’s democratic inheritance. 

We should do what we have already done and know we can do: open up the political field, bring people down from the stands, turn indignation into an agenda, and transform the return of many into movement-building.

One day Delcy Rodríguez calls for a reform to the justice system after announcing the sudden revocation of the amnesty law her brother sponsored. The other, rumors suggest she’ll reshuffle the country’s higher court without providing any indication of who the new magistrates are going to be. The central bank president she recently named prepares to disclose figures to the IMF for the first time in decades.

The public does little else than follow the news, as if things were normal. Futile debate has emerged on social media over whether the new US chief of mission in Caracas is more hawkish than his predecessor. Or if the opposition has racist tendencies because a singer (once popular in the 2000s) called Delcy an ape in the opposition’s largest rally in years.

The picture of the country in recent weeks is one of Delcy Rodríguez calling the shots with near-total freedom. She has been enjoying a clear head start over a potential presidential election, as she crisscrosses Venezuela on what amounts to an unofficial campaign tour. In Caracas, she keeps changing everything so that nothing really changes. She is intent on controlling government offices in the next four years through newly promoted loyalists and a clean inflow of petrodollars. The chavista elite has looked more confident in the meantime, touring with Delcy in sky-blue outfits, leading cartoonish chants for peace and national union as if the internal contradictions that surfaced two months ago were now less important, because the possibility of survival looks clearer.

Back in February, optimists would discuss the scope of Washington’s coercion capacity over the “caretaker” regime, the boundaries that (if crossed) would trigger a “second wave” of attacks, the disappearance of Alex Saab as a prelude of a broader purge against other “untouchables” that overtly normalized the commission of terror. Now, lunatics like Diosdado Cabello’s nephew, Alejandro Rondón, claim on social media that “the recess is about to end” the same day Delcy says the amnesty scheme ran its course and Cabello recounts an unlikely justice system crackdown.

What followed January 3^rdwas a paradigm change with positive practical consequences for society that chavismo quickly learned to manage if not reverse.

Alejandro doesn’t look like the brightest dude. He’s another chavista nepo-kid working for the other Cabello uncle that controls Venezuela’s taxing authority, Jose David, though Alejandro made a name for himself with rage-baiting tweets that celebrated Maduro’s “victory” in 2024 and claimed the opposition were terrorists who falsified the official voting records (i.e. Diosdado’s talking points during the tun-tun operation).]

But an emboldened member of the Cabello Rondón clan is a troubling sign for those who fled the country after being placed on “treason” blacklists. It also undercuts the very notions of pluralism and national reconciliation that Marco Rubio invoked three months ago when outlining his vision for Venezuela’s democratic transition before US senators. Shortly thereafter, Rondón drove the point home by publicly wishing Donald Trump well after the shooting at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner. The message seems clear: the arrangement with Team Trump is comfortable enough that, however fraught the geopolitical backdrop, they can afford to be flippant—even in public. They remain, unmistakably, the bullies in town. 

The long wait for elections (or just a calendar?)

What followed January 3^rd was a paradigm change with positive practical consequences for society that chavismo quickly learned to manage if not reverse. Allies of Maria Corina  Machado who spent the past two years jailed or hiding are back in the street, even providing testimonies about their imprisonment. The student movement has undergone a revival, liaising with human rights groups to set up carefully-controlled protests. Censorship isn’t what it used to be, so journalists have tried to take advantage of that opening. Pensioners and public workers have perhaps become the loudest actor in confronting Rodríguez, despite having to face colectivos and National Guards whenever they hit the streets.

Repression has become less intense, but the lack of a clear electoral calendar keeps the opposition on the sidelines, waiting for the arrival of Machado, which is no less paralyzing. The amnesty law passed on February 19 effectively funneled the release of political prisoners, shattering expectations of a “landmark outcome” that would speed up the process. 

Indeed, the statute’s contents make more than 180 supposed military rebels ineligible, although the release of a handful of FANB officers in recent days reinforces the idea that a law wasn’t necessary to get people out of jail. Nearly 300 civilians are still imprisoned, and we haven’t seen significant breakthroughs in the past few weeks.

According to figures from NGO Foro Penal (based on documented cases), the political prisoner population fell by 40% in the two months following the US military intervention—dropping from 863 detainees in late December to 526 by March 2. The pace has clearly slowed since then. Chavismo released 36 people between March and April, and 17 over the past 18 days (about 6% of the pre–January 3 total). The regime still resorts to sporadic arbitrary arrests and intimidation. Alexis Paparoni, an opposition figure in Mérida (and brother of Carlos Paparoni), was briefly detained while traveling and later released under precautionary measures. A similar incident occurred last weekend with a government employee in Guárico, who was detained for having a note on his desk bearing the now-infamous slur directed at Delcy.

“These prisoners are currently incarcerated because POTUShas chosen to appease and praise the perpetrators instead of supporting their victims,” Burelli recently told Senator Scott.

The White House appears satisfied with results so far. Venezuela is now subject to sweeping sanctions relief across oil, gas, minerals, and fertilizers, while OFAC has issued waivers allowing operations with public banks. Most notably, Delcy Rodríguez has been removed from the Specially Designated Nationals list—effectively unfreezing her US-based assets and clearing the way for financial dealings under American jurisdiction. 

The opposition leadership has largely stuck to its 2025 strategy of projecting trust and patience toward Donald Trump. María Corina Machado continues to argue that Trump is the head of state who has done the most to advance Venezuela’s liberation and maintains that the Rodríguez government is dismantling the Maduro-era “structures of corruption and repression.” However, she acknowledged last week that a bout of political instability cannot be ruled out. 

“The risk is that if people feel the path [toward freedom and democracy] is beginning to close, they may start to push back in a disorganized and potentially anarchic way,” she told esRadio hosts in Madrid. “That’s why a clearly defined electoral calendar is a guarantee of peace and stability. That would help people accept that this process will last a bit longer, as institutions must be strengthened and we need to take time to prepare for a truly impeccable election.”

Running out of patience

Criticism of the Trump administration’s handling in Venezuela continues to grow among groups of scholars and foreign policy observers, while opposition parties remain largely quiet and prefer to let Machado formulate their stance.

But in general, there’s a tense awareness that the waters are getting muddy. Some in journalism, and other opposition allies are starting to lose their patience.

Venezuelan journalist Sebastiana Barraez, an outspoken critic of chavismo and popular source on repression, told her audience that Venezuelan people have no guarantees about their future. Two days ago, she admitted the overthrow of Nicolás Maduro had raised hopes of a new democracy and true institutional recovery.

“It turns out none of that is happening,” Barráez said. “In Venezuela, Trump is promoting the interests of the United States. The problem is that those interests are not compatible with what we Venezuelans are looking for.”

Pedro Mario Burelli, an independent advisor for the opposition, is among the few figures to be pressing Washington over its ties with Delcy Rodríguez, calling Trump’s decision to elevate her an “incoherent strategy.” He has warned that doing business with Minerven makes the US an effective enabler of environmental crimes in Venezuela’s south. In March, he told The Atlantic that the remaining political prisoners now belong to Trump and Rubio.

“These prisoners are currently incarcerated because POTUS has chosen to appease and praise the perpetrators instead of supporting their victims. Constantly praising Delcy is disgraceful and an insult to the vast majority of Venezuelans”, Burelli told GOP Senator Rick Scott on Sunday.“Faulting her, as you and some of your colleagues do, is disingenuous. Venezuelans rightfully expect, and deserve, much more from democratically elected US officials.”