Taiwan

China renewed its strong opposition to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan ahead of the high profile summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing.

Taiwan is expected to be one of the most sensitive issues discussed during the two day meeting, alongside trade disputes, regional security, and the ongoing Iran conflict.

Beijing considers Taiwan part of its territory, while the United States maintains unofficial relations with Taipei and remains legally committed to helping the island defend itself.

China Repeats Opposition to Arms Sales

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned Washington against expanding military cooperation with Taiwan and criticized U.S. weapons sales to the island.

Spokesperson Zhang Han described Taiwan as a core Chinese national interest and called on the United States to honor previous commitments under the One China framework.

Beijing argues that Taiwan is an internal Chinese matter and strongly opposes any foreign military involvement with the island.

Record US Weapons Package Raises Tensions

The Trump administration approved an $11 billion weapons package for Taiwan in December, marking the largest U.S. arms sale to the island to date.

Reports have also suggested that another arms package worth around $14 billion could be approved after Trump’s visit to China, though its current status remains unclear.

The United States says such sales are necessary to ensure Taiwan can defend itself against possible military pressure from China.

Taiwan Defence Budget Faces Scrutiny

The issue gained further attention after Taiwan’s opposition controlled parliament approved only part of a proposed $40 billion defense budget requested by President Lai Ching-te.

The approved funding prioritizes purchases of U.S. weapons while reducing spending on some domestic defense programs, including drones.

American officials reportedly expressed disappointment that the budget fell short of what Washington believes Taiwan needs for adequate defense preparedness.

Taiwanese officials fear Beijing could use the reduced spending as leverage during talks with Trump to argue against further U.S. military support for the island.

Taiwan Rejects Beijing Sovereignty Claims

Speaking at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit, Lai described Taiwan as a sovereign and independent nation that would not yield to external pressure.

China quickly rejected those remarks, reiterating that Taiwan has never been and will never become an independent country.

Beijing also repeated warnings that it retains the option of using force to bring Taiwan under its control, although it continues to publicly favor peaceful reunification.

Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party responded by emphasizing the island’s democratic system, independent government, and military institutions.

Taiwan Remains Central to US China Rivalry

Taiwan has become one of the most dangerous flashpoints in U.S. China relations, with both powers viewing the issue as tied directly to national credibility and regional influence.

For China, Taiwan represents sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. For the United States, support for Taiwan is linked to maintaining regional stability and reassuring allies in the Indo Pacific.

Analysts warn that increasing military activity, arms sales, and political tensions surrounding Taiwan continue to raise the risk of miscalculation between Washington and Beijing.

Analysis

China’s warning ahead of the Trump Xi summit highlights how deeply the Taiwan issue shapes the broader strategic rivalry between the United States and China.

Despite ongoing diplomatic engagement and trade negotiations, Taiwan remains the most sensitive and potentially explosive issue in the bilateral relationship. Both sides see compromise on Taiwan as politically risky and strategically costly.

The large U.S. arms packages demonstrate Washington’s determination to strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities, especially as China rapidly expands its military presence around the island.

At the same time, Taiwan’s internal political debates over defense spending reveal concerns within the island about balancing military preparedness with economic and domestic priorities.

For Beijing, any increase in U.S. military support for Taiwan is viewed as interference in China’s internal affairs and a challenge to its sovereignty claims.

The summit between Trump and Xi may help reduce immediate tensions, but the fundamental disagreement over Taiwan is unlikely to ease. As military capabilities expand and political rhetoric hardens on all sides, Taiwan will remain a central test of whether the United States and China can manage strategic competition without drifting toward confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

Taipei, Taiwan – Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to seek concessions on Taiwan and US tariffs when he meets United States President Donald Trump for a high-stakes summit taking place in the shadow of the war on Iran.

Trump will arrive in China on Wednesday evening for a three-day visit that will mark the first trip by a US leader to the country since 2017, when Trump visited in the early days of his first term.

Unlike Trump, who is renowned for his mercurial policymaking, Xi is widely seen as predictable in his goals for the summit, particularly as they concern Beijing’s longstanding “core interests” related to national security and territorial integrity.

At the top of that list is Taiwan.

While Taiwan’s government considers itself the head of a de facto sovereign state, Beijing views the island as an inalienable part of its territory.

The US formally cut ties with Taiwan – also known as the Republic of China – decades ago, but is committed to aiding the self-governing democracy’s defence under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.

Under the law, Washington has provided Taiwan with billions of dollars in arms and pursued cooperation in areas such as military training and intelligence sharing, which Beijing considers interference in its internal affairs.

The US government officially acknowledges that China views Taiwan as part of its territory, but does not express a stance on whether it agrees.

Washington is also intentionally vague about whether it would intervene to defend Taiwan if China sought to annex it by force.

In a call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio last month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made clear that Taiwan would be raised at the summit, describing the issue as “the biggest risk in the China-US relationship”, according to a Chinese readout of the call.

China’s embassy in Washington, DC, reiterated that message after Trump’s departure for the summit on Tuesday, naming Taiwan as the first of “four red lines” that “must not be challenged”.

While analysts say it is unlikely that the US will change its position on Taiwan due to Chinese pressure, Trump said this week that the summit’s agenda would include US arms sales to the island, raising questions about the future of a stalled multibillion-dollar arms deal.

The US Congress approved the arms package reportedly worth $14bn earlier this year, but the sale still requires Trump’s final approval.

Xi will use his meetings with Trump to “influence and potentially convince Trump to agree to scale back, if not completely suspend, sales to Taiwan,” William Yang, a Taipei-based analyst at the Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera.

If Trump were to make concessions on weapons sales to Taiwan, he would be breaking with a longstanding policy against consulting with Beijing that dates back to former US President Ronald Reagan.

Cancelling or watering down the deal would be a serious blow to Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te, who is locked in an intense fight with the opposition over defence spending, Yang said.

“They are hoping to first influence Trump’s decision around this issue and potentially create a situation where it will be much harder for [Lai’s] government to request more special defensive spending in the future,” Yang said.

Restoring the US-China framework

Xi is also eager to smooth over US-China relations after a tumultuous 18 months that saw Trump launch a second trade war with the world’s second-largest economy, according to analysts.

The standoff saw each side roll out escalating tit-for-tat tariffs – briefly sending duties well above 100 percent – and other punitive measures, such as export controls, before Washington and Beijing hit pause in May.

During their last meeting in South Korea in October, Xi and Trump agreed to a one-year reprieve in their trade war, while keeping some trade measures in place, including certain tariffs and export controls.

Over the past month, the US has rolled out several rounds of new sanctions targeting Chinese firms, including refiners accused of buying Iranian oil and companies accused of helping Tehran obtain materials to build drones and missiles.

Earlier this month, Beijing issued a “prohibition order” directing firms to disregard the US sanctions on its oil refineries.

“Beijing wants predictability and certainty for the remainder of Trump’s term through January 2029, because Beijing needs to be able to plan its own economic policies,” Feng Chucheng, a founding partner of Beijing-based Hutong Research advisory, told Al Jazeera.

These policy considerations include understanding tariff levels the US will apply to China and its trade partners, Feng said.

Wang Wen, dean of the school for global leadership at Renmin University in Beijing, said China wishes to return to a relationship based on “peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation”.

“We hope that this meeting will bring the US policy towards China back to these three principles,” Wang told Al Jazeera.

The stakes are high for Beijing, where the view of Trump has shifted from a “predictable transactional counterpart” to a “more action-oriented and harder-to-restrain opponent,” Hung Pu-Chao, deputy executive director of the Center for Mainland China and Regional Development Research at Taiwan’s Tunghai University, told Al Jazeera.

Restoring the US-China relationship to a stable footing is one way to mitigate these risks, Hung said.

Rather than secure concessions, Hung said, China’s priority is “trying to adjust the current strategic position and negotiating pace that are unfavourable to it, and bring US-China interactions back into a framework that it can better control”.

At the summit, Xi is likely to agree to increase purchases of US agricultural exports and Boeing planes, Feng said, and could also back Trump’s plan to create a “Board of Trade” and a “Board of Investment” to oversee US-China economic ties.

But China is unlikely to make compromises on rare earths – a sector it dominates – unless the US makes major political concessions, Feng said.

Calling for dialogue on the war on Iran

The US-Israel war on Iran will loom large over the summit.

Although not a main player in the conflict, China has been hit by the economic fallout of the war and the shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of global oil and natural gas supplies usually pass.

Beijing has called for negotiations and a comprehensive ceasefire since the start of the conflict, a message Xi is likely to reiterate in his talks with Trump, according to Jodie Wen, a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

“Xi will talk about this issue with Donald Trump and say that we all know that the war has a huge impact on the world, on Asian countries and the US, so we must have dialogue,” Wen told Al Jazeera.

Trump said on Tuesday that he does not need China’s “help” resolving the war, though the White House has pressured Beijing to lean on Iran to reopen the strait.

Xi and his top diplomat, Wang, have met more than a dozen global leaders and high-level officials since the start of the war, playing a behind-the-scenes mediating role.

China has had a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Iran since 2016, and buys more than 80 percent of its oil.

Wen, the postdoctoral fellow at Tsinghua University, said Xi is unlikely to agree to any involvement except as a mediator, which she described as consistent with China’s longstanding approach to global affairs.

“China’s foreign policy principle is non-intervention,” she said. “This is our principle.”

United States President Donald Trump has departed for Beijing ahead of a high-stakes summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, after weeks of unsuccessful US efforts to persuade China to help bring Iran back to negotiations and ease tensions around the Strait of Hormuz.

The leaders of the world’s two largest economies are due to meet on Thursday and Friday during Trump’s first visit to China since 2017, with talks expected to focus on trade, Taiwan, artificial intelligence and the war involving Iran.

Here is what we know about the upcoming summit and the key issues expected to dominate the agenda.

Why does the Trump-Xi summit matter?

The Trump-Xi summit is a high-level meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping taking place in Beijing as the world’s two largest economies face growing tensions over trade, technology, Taiwan and the Iran war.

The summit is particularly significant because Trump will be the first US leader to visit China in nearly a decade, while the talks also come at a time of heightened geopolitical and economic uncertainty. Originally expected earlier this year, the meeting was delayed by the war on Iran.

Before departing for Beijing, Trump said he and Xi would have a “long talk” about Iran, although he stressed that trade would remain the central focus of the visit.

“Trade remains politically powerful, especially for Trump, because it gives rivalry a language that voters can easily understand,” said Salvador Santino Regilme, associate professor and programme chair of international relations at Leiden University. “Yet the deeper conflict concerns hierarchy, legitimacy and the future architecture of global order.”

Regilme added that both countries remain locked in a relationship shaped by strategic rivalry and deep economic dependence.

“The United States still relies heavily on China’s manufacturing capacity and low-cost production, while China depends on access to US consumers, technology, capital markets and the wider stability of the dollar-centred global economy.”

“This is the paradox of US-China rivalry: each side wants greater autonomy, yet both remain tied to a structure of mutual dependence that neither can easily dismantle without hurting itself,” Regilme added.

What are the biggest issues at the Trump-Xi summit?

Analysts say the US and China are entering the summit with different priorities.

Trump is expected to focus heavily on trade with the aim of securing what he can present as economic wins ahead of November’s midterm elections. Washington has pushed for China to increase purchases of American goods, including Boeing aircraft, beef and soya beans, while also seeking closer investment and trade cooperation.

Beijing, meanwhile, is expected to press the US to ease restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports and roll back measures limiting China’s access to critical chip-making technology. Taiwan is also likely to remain one of the most sensitive and contested issues in the summit.

Trump has also said he plans to raise the case of Jimmy Lai, the jailed Hong Kong media tycoon and pro-democracy figure sentenced earlier this year under Beijing’s national security law.

Beyond bilateral disputes, the two leaders are also expected to discuss the war on Iran, tensions around the Strait of Hormuz and the growing risks linked to artificial intelligence.

The biggest flashpoints include:

Tech vs rare earths

Technology and supply chains are expected to be among the key issues at the summit, as Washington and Beijing remain locked in a widening battle over semiconductors and critical minerals.

The US has tightened restrictions on advanced chips and chip-making equipment going to China, saying the measures are needed to slow Beijing’s military and AI development.

China, meanwhile, controls roughly 90 percent of global rare earth refining, materials essential for semiconductors, electric vehicles, military equipment and electronics, and has responded with tighter export controls on several critical minerals.

Beijing is expected to push for fewer US technology restrictions, while Washington wants China to resume shipments of rare earths and critical minerals after export controls disrupted parts of the American automotive and aerospace sectors.

 Iran war and the Strait of Hormuz

The Iran war is expected to be one of the most closely watched issues at the summit.

Analysts expect Washington to press Beijing to use its influence over Tehran, particularly because China remains the largest buyer of Iranian oil — by far — purchasing more than 80 percent of Iran’s shipped crude exports. US officials have also urged China to support efforts to reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz, a vital route for global energy supplies.

The conflict has also increased pressure on China’s economy and energy security. About half of China’s crude oil imports come from the Middle East, while disruptions in the Gulf have left commercial shipping vulnerable to attacks and delays.

“I have no doubt that Trump is going to at least try to enlist Xi Jinping to assert some pressure for the Iranians to come back to the table and agree to a settlement,” said Dan Grazier, a senior fellow and director of the National Security Reform programme at the Stimson Center.

Experts say Iran may be one of the few areas where US and Chinese interests overlap, as both countries benefit from stable energy flows through the Gulf.

“Both sides would like to see the strait opened,” said Gregory Poling, director and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), but he noted Beijing is unlikely to align itself too closely with Washington’s approach towards Tehran.

While China wants shipping through the Strait of Hormuz restored, Poling argued the diplomatic and strategic pressure created by the disruption is falling far more heavily on Washington.

“It is not China being humiliated in the strait … It’s the US.”

Taiwan: An existential problem

Taiwan is expected to be one of the most sensitive issues, with Beijing repeatedly warning that it remains the biggest source of tension in US-China relations.

China claims the self-ruled island as part of its territory and has increased military pressure on Taiwan in recent years through regular air and naval operations around the island.

Tensions have risen further under Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing has sharply criticised because his party views Taiwan as already sovereign.

The US officially recognises the communist mainland as China but is legally committed under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defence, a policy that has long angered China. Washington has approved tens of billions of dollars in military sales to Taiwan over the years, including an $11bn package announced last year, and Trump recently said he discussed the issue with Xi ahead of the summit.

Analysts say Taiwan will be paying close attention to what Trump and Xi say publicly after the summit, especially on defence and arms sales.

“What matters is the precise wording,” Regilme said. “Whether Trump reaffirms support for Taiwan’s defence, whether he sounds ambiguous on arms sales, and whether he gives Xi any rhetorical opening to claim that Washington is restraining Taipei.”

Regilme said Beijing is likely to push for limits on US arms sales and stronger political restrictions on Taiwan, while also discouraging any movement towards formal independence. At the same time, Taipei fears it could become part of a broader geopolitical bargain between Washington and Beijing.

“In great-power politics, small words often carry large consequences, especially for those whose survival depends on the credibility of others,” Regilme added.

Tariffs

Trade is also expected to be a sticking point after years of friction between the US and China over tariffs and economic competition.

The latest trade dispute intensified last year when Trump imposed new tariffs on Chinese goods. China responded with its own tariffs.

At the height of the dispute, tariffs on some goods climbed above 100 percent, prompting concerns about the impact on global trade and supply chains.

The two countries later agreed to temporarily lower tensions through a trade truce reached during talks in South Korea. As part of the deal, China agreed to buy more US agricultural products, including soya beans, while Washington rolled back some tariffs.

What would count as a successful outcome for Trump and Xi?

Analysts say a successful outcome for Trump would likely need to be visible and easy to sell politically at home. That could include Chinese purchases of US goods, movement on tariffs, cooperation on Iran, or progress on rare earth exports.

“Trump’s foreign policy style places enormous value on the public performance of dealmaking, so the optics of success may matter almost as much as the substance,” Regilme said.

For Xi, success would mean preserving stability without appearing to bow to Washington, while securing greater economic predictability and recognition of China as a global power.

“A comprehensive trade deal seems unlikely because the structural sources of rivalry remain unresolved,” Regilme added.

Instead, he said a limited agreement is more likely, potentially involving tariff pauses, purchase commitments, rare earth arrangements or a framework for future negotiations.

“Such an agreement would manage the rivalry temporarily, while leaving untouched the deeper problem: the two economies remain mutually dependent, but their governments increasingly treat that dependency as a strategic danger.”

BEIJING — The Trump administration has repeatedly framed the war in Iran as a quick, winnable fight, vowing to defeat the Islamic Republic “totally and decisively” — incomparable to the “dumb” wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But from China’s perspective, the parallels are clear.

“You can blow everything up — destroy it all,” one Chinese official told The Times, describing the Americans, “but you don’t have a strategy.”

President Trump arrives in Beijing this week for talks with a Chinese government that is confident as ever in its ascendance on the world stage, taking stock of its leverage and still baffled the U.S. administration chose yet another costly war in the Middle East.

China has watched as the United States, over seven weeks of fighting an outmatched enemy, has depleted nearly half of its stockpiles of high-end munitions — including its THAAD and Patriot batteries — and fired its Army chief of staff, among other Pentagon leaders, who had warned of critical shortages.

Marco Rubio, Trump’s national security advisor and secretary of State, has said the military operation that started the war known as Operation Epic Fury “is over.”

But the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most vital commercial waterways, remains effectively shuttered. Iranian attacks in the region continue. And talks between Washington and Tehran have failed to reach a diplomatic agreement to bring a definitive end to the conflict.

“The Chinese have high regard for the operational proficiency of U.S. forces, but they recognize that, thus far at least, the Trump administration has not achieved its core objectives in going to war with Iran,” said David Ochmanek, a former deputy assistant secretary of Defense now with the Rand Corp.

The war has given Beijing an opportunity, Ochmanek said, “to double down on the claim they have made for the past year and a half that the [People’s Republic of China], not the U.S., is a force for global stability.”

The war has allowed China to demonstrate some diplomatic prowess. An initial ceasefire reached between the United States and Iran last month was only clinched after Beijing pressured Tehran to agree. And China’s advocacy for an open strait — rejecting Iranian attempts to impose a toll system — while opposing the U.S. war itself has allowed Beijing to maintain leverage with both sides.

It has also inflicted costs. Allies of Beijing noticed when the government did not leap to the defense of Tehran at the start of the war. And China has its own vested interest in a free and open waterway, where nearly 50% of the country’s crude oil imports pass through each day.

Building up to the start of the war and throughout its initial weeks, Washington diverted significant military assets from Asia — where Trump’s own national security strategy says they are needed most — to the Middle East.

The USS Abraham Lincoln was redirected from the South China Sea, along with scores of advanced missile interceptors from South Korea and Japan and nearly the entire U.S. inventory of long-range air-to-surface missiles in the Pacific.

Policy experts at the Pentagon were brought in to discuss a potential invasion of Kharg Island, the jewel of Iran’s oil industry, to draw lessons from planning a defense of Taiwan, according to a Defense official, who was granted anonymity to speak candidly. A Marine expeditionary unit was sent from Okinawa to the region for the potential operation.

Chinese officials and analysts have been candid in their assessments of U.S. hard power, impressed by a military they acknowledge remains the best in the world.

But Beijing sees a persistent flaw in U.S. strategy: the belief that military strength alone can reshape political realities, a view further weakened by the pressures on a democratic government whose public grows impatient with wars that drag on beyond days or weeks.

China’s autocracy is free from accountability to the public — and anyway has confidence that Chinese public opinion would be on its side if it were to launch a major military operation against its main target, Taiwan.

But there are lessons of caution to be learned from the Americans, as well.

Over the last year, the Taiwanese Navy has been practicing the rapid deployment of cheap and domestically produced smart mines for the sea — a potential bulwark against enemy blockades of ports and hostile invasion forces.

It is the type of asymmetric warfare that has so far frustrated the U.S. military in the Strait of Hormuz, protracting a war that Trump vowed would last a month or less.

Taiwan, too, would confront Beijing with political realities that military force cannot erase. Nearly 90% of the Taiwanese people oppose a Chinese takeover, and about 60% say they would resist it at all costs.

“Chinese analysts see two things at once,” said Craig Singleton, senior director of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “They are impressed by U.S. military reach, precision and operational capability, but they also see a familiar pattern of American power struggling to translate battlefield success into a durable political outcome.”

That matters for Taiwan, Singleton said, “because China’s own military modernization has borrowed heavily from the American model, relying heavily on joint operations, high-tech precision strikes, decapitation concepts and information dominance.

“If the world’s most experienced military can still struggle to convert military pressure into political success,” he added, “Beijing has to ask whether the [People’s Liberation Army] could do better in a far more complex Taiwan scenario.”

China has intensified its diplomatic rhetoric against Santiago Peña following his recent visit to Taiwan, reflecting Beijing’s growing efforts to isolate Taipei internationally and weaken the remaining countries that maintain formal diplomatic ties with the island.

Paraguay is one of only 12 states that officially recognize Taiwan instead of the People’s Republic of China. During his visit, Peña reaffirmed support for Taiwan and described relations with Taipei as rooted in shared democratic values and political freedom.

Beijing responded sharply, accusing Paraguayan politicians of serving as “pawns” of Taiwanese separatist forces and suggesting that leaders supporting Taiwan may have “ulterior motives.” The unusually aggressive language highlights how sensitive the Taiwan issue has become within China’s broader foreign policy strategy.

Why Paraguay Matters to China and Taiwan

Although Paraguay is not a major global power, its diplomatic recognition carries significant symbolic and strategic importance for both China and Taiwan.

For Taiwan, maintaining formal diplomatic allies is essential to preserving international legitimacy and resisting Beijing’s efforts to diplomatically isolate the island. Each country that continues to recognize Taiwan represents political resistance against China’s One China principle.

For China, reducing Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partnerships is part of a long term strategy aimed at reinforcing Beijing’s claim that Taiwan lacks the status of an independent state. Over the past decade, several countries have switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing after economic and political engagement with China.

Paraguay therefore represents one of Taiwan’s most important remaining diplomatic footholds in South America.

Economic Pressure Shapes the Debate

The controversy surrounding Paraguay’s Taiwan relationship is increasingly driven by economic considerations. Some Paraguayan politicians, agricultural exporters, and business groups argue that maintaining ties with Taiwan limits access to Chinese markets and investment opportunities.

China is the world’s second largest economy and a major importer of agricultural products, making diplomatic recognition economically attractive for many developing states.

Supporters of relations with Beijing argue that Paraguay could gain greater trade access, infrastructure investment, and financial opportunities if it abandoned Taiwan.

However, Peña and supporters of Taiwan emphasize ideological and political considerations, framing the relationship as a partnership based on democratic governance and political sovereignty rather than purely economic interests.

This reflects a broader global trend where smaller states increasingly face pressure to balance economic incentives against political alignment and strategic values.

China’s Diplomatic Messaging Is Becoming More Aggressive

The sharp rhetoric from China’s foreign ministry demonstrates Beijing’s increasingly confrontational diplomatic approach on issues related to Taiwan.

By describing Paraguayan leaders as “pawns” and questioning their motivations, China is signaling that support for Taiwan will be treated not merely as a diplomatic disagreement but as active opposition to Chinese national interests.

This language also serves multiple audiences simultaneously.

Internationally, Beijing seeks to discourage other governments from strengthening ties with Taiwan.

Domestically, strong rhetoric reinforces nationalist narratives surrounding territorial sovereignty and reunification.

Regionally, China is attempting to increase pressure on Paraguay by suggesting that continued support for Taiwan contradicts public opinion and economic interests.

The emphasis on opinion polls claiming support for relations with Beijing also reflects China’s strategy of portraying diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as politically unsustainable.

Taiwan’s Shrinking Diplomatic Space

The dispute illustrates Taiwan’s increasingly difficult international position as China expands its diplomatic, military, and economic influence globally.

Under President Lai Ching-te, Taiwan has continued emphasizing democracy, sovereignty, and international partnerships. However, Beijing views Lai as supporting separatist policies and has intensified political and military pressure against Taipei.

Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies have steadily declined over recent decades as China has used economic incentives and geopolitical influence to persuade states to switch recognition.

As a result, every remaining ally now carries outsized symbolic importance for Taipei’s international visibility and diplomatic legitimacy.

Analysis

China’s reaction to Peña’s Taiwan visit demonstrates how the Taiwan issue has evolved into one of the most emotionally and strategically sensitive dimensions of Chinese foreign policy.

Beijing no longer views diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as a minor symbolic issue. Instead, it increasingly interprets international engagement with Taipei as a challenge to China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and geopolitical authority.

The pressure on Paraguay also reflects the broader transformation of global diplomacy under growing United States China rivalry. Smaller countries are increasingly caught between competing geopolitical and economic pressures, particularly when balancing relations with democratic partners against the economic power of China.

For Paraguay, the debate is ultimately about strategic identity as much as economics. Maintaining relations with Taiwan offers political alignment with democratic values and preserves diplomatic independence from Beijing’s influence. Switching recognition to China could deliver economic benefits but may also reduce Paraguay’s foreign policy autonomy.

For Taiwan, retaining Paraguay is important not only diplomatically but psychologically. Every diplomatic loss strengthens Beijing’s narrative that international recognition of Taiwan is disappearing and that eventual reunification is inevitable.

The dispute therefore reflects a much larger geopolitical contest over legitimacy, influence, and the future international status of Taiwan. As competition between China and Taiwan intensifies, diplomatic battles involving even relatively small states are likely to become increasingly significant within global geopolitics.

With information from Reuters.

TAIPEI, Taiwan — A resolute Secretary of State Marco Rubio took to the White House lectern Tuesday and declared the United States, under President Trump’s leadership, had launched a bold new operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, based on the principle that international waterways must remain free.

An hour later, Trump walked it all back, ending the complex military endeavor after less than a day.

It was just the latest evidence to America’s allies that the word of the U.S. government is subject entirely to the president’s whims. And such is the worry fueling concerns in Taipei ahead of Trump’s state visit to China this week.

Privately, senior administration officials have assured Taiwanese leadership ahead of the trip that Trump has no intention of changing long-standing U.S. policy on the island, two sources familiar with the discussions said — a stance of “strategic ambiguity” that has avoided any declarative statements on Taiwanese independence since it was coined by Henry Kissinger 55 years ago.

A White House official was definitive that U.S. policy toward Taiwan “remains the same as the first Trump administration.”

“The U.S. One China policy, as our cross-strait policies are collectively known, is based on the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques and the Six Assurances to Taiwan,” the official said. “There is no change to our policy with respect to Taiwan.”

But Chinese officials told The Times that their president, Xi Jinping, intends to raise the matter as a top priority, knowing that only one person — Trump himself — speaks for the administration today.

Whether Xi can leverage the intimacy of a private audience to shift Trump’s stance, potentially linking it to other U.S. objectives, is the source of significant concern here.

Taiwanese officials fear even the most subtle rhetorical change in policy from Trump could imperil a delicate status quo that has held, to its benefit, for decades. They have similarly sought assurances that the administration will follow through on a pending U.S. arms sale worth over $10 billion, which received approval from Taiwan’s legislature on Friday.

“The most serious scenario would be if President Trump were to make an impromptu statement, such as, ‘I oppose Taiwanese independence,’ particularly if he were to link this to trade, the Iran issue, or a summit agreement,” said Chienyu Shih, of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taiwan. “This would constitute a rhetorical concession of substantial significance to Beijing.”

Rubio told reporters at his news conference Tuesday — with a similar confidence he expressed on the Iran file — that China understands Washington’s long-standing position on the island.

“I’m sure Taiwan will be a topic of conversation. It always is. The Chinese understand our position on that topic — we understand theirs,” Rubio said.

“I think both countries understand that it is in neither one of our interests to see anything destabilizing happen in that part of the world,” he added. “We don’t need any destabilizing events to occur with regards to Taiwan, or anywhere in the Indo-Pacific. And that’s to the mutual benefit of both the United States and the Chinese.”

Trump has suggested a willingness to shift U.S. policy on Taiwan before.

During his initial campaign for the presidency in 2016, Trump openly questioned the One China policy, drawing ire from Beijing for suggesting he might endorse Taiwanese independence. He accepted a call from Taiwan’s president after his victory and would later support significant arms sales to Taipei.

And yet, at a 2017 meeting with Xi, Trump vacillated, telling the Chinese leader he could “deal with” the Taiwan issue in “a matter of months,” according to the Wall Street Journal. The Chinese were reportedly so flabbergasted by the comment that they dismissed it as rhetorical flourish.

“There is concern that the conversation between the two leaders could veer into sensitive territory on the topic of Taiwan,” said Brian Hart, deputy director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “but there are many in the administration who would still appreciate the importance of general continuity in U.S. policy.”

U.S. support for Taiwan’s democratic movement used to be a matter of principle. Today, Washington sees it as a matter of national security. Over 60% of semiconductors are produced in Taiwan, including 90% of the world’s most advanced chips. And it is viewed as the clasp of the first island chain guarding against Chinese maritime expansion.

A robust debate between Taiwan’s Cabinet and the opposition in parliament ended Friday not over whether to accept U.S. defense equipment, but over how much to spend. The Legislative Yuan approved $24 billion in purchases — including a defense package passed by Congress in December and the pending arms sale — falling short of Taipei’s $40-billion proposal.

Anticipation for the president’s state visit is high here in the capital city, where local news is filled with questions over the influence Trump’s war in Iran might have on his appetite for supporting Taiwan.

Chinese defense analysts have seen the war as a sign of U.S. weakness. But Taiwanese defense experts have taken away a different lesson: cheap equipment from a lesser military, such as dumb mines thrown in a strait, may just be enough to paralyze a superpower.

The latest U.S. National Security Strategy, released by the Trump administration in December, emphasized the importance of support for Taiwan and the status quo.

But the Taiwanese took note that the strategy also called for an end to forever wars in the Middle East, offering little preview of the president’s sudden strategic pivot on Iran in February, launching a war few saw coming.

What Trump chooses to say in China “might be difficult to predict,” said Jyh-Shyang Sheu, a scholar of Chinese politics and military capabilities based in Taiwan.

But “in Taipei, we are still focusing on the U.S. policy,” he added, “more focusing on what he does instead of what he says.”

Taiwan has downplayed the impact of new Chinese sanctions targeting European defense companies involved in arms sales to the island. The measures, announced by China, restrict exports of dual use goods to seven firms, marking a rare move against European entities over Taiwan related issues.

Despite the escalation, Taiwan’s Defence Minister Wellington Koo said the sanctions would not disrupt the island’s ability to procure military equipment.

China’s Expanding Use of Sanctions

Beijing has increasingly used economic and trade restrictions to respond to foreign involvement in Taiwan’s defense. While similar sanctions have frequently targeted U.S. arms manufacturers, extending them to European companies signals a broader willingness to pressure multiple partners simultaneously.

The move reflects China’s ongoing effort to isolate Taiwan internationally and deter military cooperation with the island.

Limited European Military Role

Europe’s direct role in arming Taiwan has historically been limited. Major defense exports such as fighter jets have not been supplied for decades due to concerns about damaging relations with China.

However, smaller scale cooperation and component level trade have continued, making these sanctions symbolically significant even if their immediate practical impact is modest.

Diversified Supply Strategy

Taiwan relies heavily on the United States for its defense needs, but it has also worked to diversify procurement channels in recent years. According to Koo, this strategy ensures that disruptions from any single source, including sanctioned European firms, can be mitigated.

Growing support from parts of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has also provided Taiwan with additional diplomatic and logistical avenues.

Geopolitical Context

The sanctions come amid heightened global tensions and shifting alliances. China views Taiwan as its own territory and strongly opposes any foreign military assistance to the island.

At the same time, Taiwan’s security concerns have intensified, prompting it to strengthen international partnerships and defense preparedness.

Analysis

China’s decision to target European companies represents an escalation in its economic statecraft, aiming to widen the cost of supporting Taiwan beyond the United States. While the immediate impact on Taiwan’s military capabilities appears limited, the move could have a chilling effect on future European involvement.

Taiwan’s confidence reflects its reliance on U.S. support and its broader diversification strategy. However, repeated sanctions and pressure campaigns could gradually narrow its options, especially if European firms become more risk averse.

For Europe, the sanctions pose a strategic dilemma between economic ties with China and growing political alignment with Taiwan and its partners. For China, they reinforce its stance on sovereignty while testing how far it can push back against international support for Taiwan without triggering broader backlash.

Overall, the episode underscores how economic tools are increasingly being used in geopolitical competition, even when their direct material impact remains limited.

With information from Reuters.

April 23 (UPI) — As tensions simmer across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan is quietly accelerating a shift toward drone-centric defense.

The nation is betting that swarms of low-cost, domestically produced systems can help offset the numerical and industrial advantages of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy and its expanding network of maritime auxiliaries.

This approach reflects a broader recalibration in Taipei — a move away from expensive, vulnerable platforms toward distributed, resilient and scalable capabilities designed to complicate any attempt at invasion or blockade.

At its core lies a simple calculation. In a high-intensity Indo-Pacific conflict, quantity, adaptability and survivability may matter more than traditional firepower.

From platforms to swarms

Taiwan’s embrace of drones is rooted in the concept of asymmetric warfare. Rather than matching China ship-for-ship or missile-for-missile, Taipei is investing in systems that can be mass-produced, dispersed and rapidly replaced.

“It’s not really about ‘swarms’ yet — it’s about mass. Large volumes of drones used in salvos to overwhelm defenses and increase the probability of a successful strike,” said Molly Campbell, analyst at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C.

Government plans call for the procurement of up to 200,000 drones over the coming decade, spanning aerial, maritime and hybrid platforms in what officials describe as a whole-of-society approach to resilience.

These include a broad mix of air (UAV), surface (USV) and underwater (UUV) drones, designed to operate in contested littoral environments.

The objective is clear: saturate defenses, disrupt amphibious operations and raise the cost of any Chinese military action.

“What Taiwan is trying to do is shift from heavy, high-end defense platforms to a more dispersed and resilient model,” Simona Alba Grano, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told UPI.

In Taiwan’s case, where the goal is not to defeat China outright, but to make any invasion “extremely costly and uncertain,” such systems fit squarely within a broader denial strategy.

Lessons from Ukraine — with limits

Taiwan’s drone push has been influenced by Ukraine’s battlefield innovations, where low-cost unmanned systems have reshaped modern warfare.

Ukraine’s use of maritime drones in the Black Sea, striking high-value naval targets with relatively inexpensive systems, provides a compelling reference point. It has also highlighted the importance of rapid iteration, short development cycles and close integration between operators and industry.

Taiwanese companies have begun engaging with this ecosystem, supplying components and spare parts to Ukrainian operators and seeking to gain exposure to combat-driven innovation.

Yet, the analogy has limits.

The Taiwan Strait presents a far more demanding operational environment as it is wider, more exposed and subject to extreme weather conditions. Systems must operate over longer distances, carry heavier payloads and withstand harsher maritime conditions.

At the same time, Ukraine’s drone ecosystem is shaped by continuous battlefield validation, giving its manufacturers a level of operational credibility that remains difficult to replicate elsewhere.

Advances in unmanned systems, including long-range platforms and “mothership” concepts, also are eroding the Taiwan Strait’s traditional role as a natural buffer, increasing the tempo of gray-zone interactions.

Ukraine has demonstrated what is possible. Taiwan must now determine what is adaptable to its own operational environment.

Industrial ambition meets resistance

Taiwan’s challenge is no longer strategic clarity, but execution on the ground. The gap between planning and implementation, particularly in scaling capabilities and coordinating across agencies, now defines the island’s defense posture.

“Ukraine’s drone production is on a completely different scale. It’s nowhere near comparable to what Taiwan is currently able to produce, ” Campbell said.

Authorities have signaled openness to integrating foreign expertise, pursuing joint production and accelerating domestic manufacturing. Yet, progress has been uneven.

Industry insiders point to reluctance among local manufacturers to share market opportunities within a rapidly expanding defense budget. This has constrained collaboration both domestically and internationally, slowing efforts to build a more integrated ecosystem.

This dynamic is particularly visible in Taiwan’s interactions with Ukraine. Despite Kyiv’s operational experience and willingness to cooperate, Taiwanese firms have at times resisted incorporating Ukrainian know-how into their platforms, limiting co-development opportunities.

At the same time, Taiwanese companies have sought to market their own systems abroad, often with limited success in operationally mature environments. The result is a mismatch between industrial ambition and battlefield credibility in a highly competitive, experience-driven sector.

The fragmentation of Taiwan’s drone ecosystem comes at a critical moment, when speed, scale and integration are essential.

Cutting the China supply chain

Another pillar of Taiwan’s strategy is reducing reliance on Chinese components, long a structural vulnerability in the global drone industry.

“Taiwan is making a concerted effort to eliminate Chinese components from its drone supply chain to reduce dependence and mitigate security risks, said Ava Shen, an analyst at the Eurasia Group.

Taipei is working with international partners, particularly the United States, to develop a secure, China-free supply chain for unmanned systems. This effort is now backed by policy initiatives in Washington, where bipartisan legislation seeks to expand joint drone production and strengthen industrial resilience between the two partners.

The objective is not only to secure supply chains, but also to align production ecosystems in ways that enhance interoperability and long-term sustainability.

However, decoupling comes with trade-offs. Eliminating Chinese components increases production costs, extends timelines and complicates scaling. These constraints risk slowing deployment at a moment when speed is critical.

Meanwhile, China continues to expand its own unmanned capabilities, including drone swarms, electronic warfare systems and the conversion of legacy platforms into remotely operated assets. The scale of its industrial base and the integration of civilian and military sectors present a formidable challenge.

If Taiwan’s approach emphasizes agility and innovation, China’s rests on mass, coordination and systemic depth.

Southeast Asia as regional test bed

Beyond Taiwan, Southeast Asia, particularly along the South China Sea littoral, is emerging as a practical testing ground for unmanned systems.

The United States has expanded drone support to regional partners, providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms such as the ScanEagle, RQ-20 Puma and Skydio X10 UAVs to countries including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. These systems are primarily used to enhance maritime awareness in contested areas.

The Philippines, under sustained pressure from Beijing, has become a focal point. The United States has deployed MQ-9A Reaper for extended surveillance missions and introduced maritime drones, such as the Devil Ray T-38.

Together, these deployments are turning parts of Southeast Asia into a real-world environment for testing unmanned concepts short of conflict, particularly in maritime surveillance and denial.

China has also deployed uncrewed surface vehicles such as the Sea Wing and Wave Glider types, many of which have been lost or recovered by fishermen and coast guards, in the South China Sea as well as in the Java Sea, highlighting both the spread and the fragility of these systems in contested waters.

Deterrence, escalation and uncertainty

Drones offer Taiwan a pathway to strengthen deterrence by denial, increasing the cost, complexity and uncertainty of any military action. But they also introduce new risks.

The proliferation of low-cost systems may lower the threshold for escalation, especially in ambiguous encounters involving coast guard or maritime militia vessels. What begins as signaling or harassment could escalate more rapidly in an environment saturated with autonomous or semi-autonomous platforms.

Moreover, drone networks depend heavily on communications, data links and supply chains – all of which are vulnerable to disruption through cyber operations or electronic warfare.

Race against time

For Taiwan, the shift toward drone-centric defense is both an opportunity and a race against time.

Drones offer a scalable and cost-effective means of offsetting China’s advantages. But success depends on overcoming internal fragmentation, accelerating production and adapting technologies to local operational realities.

The central question is no longer whether drones will shape the balance in the Taiwan Strait, but whether Taiwan can scale and integrate them fast enough to make deterrence credible.

As China continues to refine its own capabilities, the balance in the Strait may increasingly hinge on a simple but decisive factor: which side can deploy, adapt and sustain unmanned systems at scale.

April 21 (Asia Today) — China has denied entry to South Korea’s intelligence chief and signaled reluctance to improve bilateral relations, amid growing tensions over Seoul’s perceived stance on Taiwan, according to diplomatic sources.

A South Korean delegation led by lawmaker Cho Jung-sik of the Democratic Party of Korea recently visited Beijing and returned Sunday after holding talks on political issues and bilateral relations. The delegation had initially planned to include National Intelligence Service Director Lee Jong-seok.

However, Chinese authorities reportedly refused Lee’s visit, citing remarks in which he suggested that engagement with Taiwan could be used as leverage to encourage China’s cooperation in improving inter-Korean relations.

According to a diplomatic source in Beijing, China reacted strongly to the comments and demanded an explanation through diplomatic channels. The delegation was subsequently restructured to include deputy officials and retired military officers instead of Lee.

Although the visit proceeded, its outcomes were limited. Chinese officials maintained protocol by assigning a vice foreign minister to host the delegation, but expectations for substantive progress were low, sources said.

Beijing is believed to be increasingly dissatisfied with what it views as South Korea’s ambiguous position – publicly supporting the “One China” principle while maintaining a level of engagement with Taiwan.

Tensions have also been fueled by a recent dispute over how Taiwan is officially referenced, in which South Korea appeared to adjust its position following objections from Taipei. Chinese officials reportedly viewed the move as inconsistent and unfavorable.

The strained atmosphere has cast doubt on the possibility of a visit to South Korea this year by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, which Seoul has sought as part of efforts to stabilize ties.

Analysts say the situation highlights the need for South Korea to carefully manage relations with China while balancing broader regional dynamics.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

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Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260421010006584