Taiwan

Nvidia’s (NVDA) CEO Jensen Huang said the company plans to invest about $150B a year in Taiwan while announcing a new expanded campus in Taipei.

“Four years ago, five years ago, Nvidia was spending about 10, 15 billion dollars a year in Taiwan. Now

Taipei, Taiwan – For Li, an engineer at Taiwanese computer giant ASUS, the AI boom sweeping Taiwan has made it an exciting time to work in tech.

Taiwan is a semiconductor powerhouse, producing about 90 percent of the most advanced chips used to power leading AI models such as ChatGPT and Claude.

“I’ve felt Taiwan’s tech and computer industry becoming more vibrant,” Li, who asked not to be identified by his real name, told Al Jazeera, pointing to events such as the upcoming Computex tech and AI expo running from June 2 to 6.

Still, Li worries that the spoils of Taiwan’s AI windfall are not being shared equally.

“Most industries unrelated to tech don’t seem to be feeling the benefits, so it doesn’t feel evenly distributed at the moment,” Li said, explaining that many of his former classmates working outside of tech do not appear to be doing as well.

“It’s mainly the industries at the front of this tech wave that are benefitting.”

Taiwan’s economy is growing at a pace that would be the envy of any country.

Gross domestic product (GDP) rose 8.63 percent in 2025, followed by a heady 13.69 percent expansion in the first three months of this year.

Exports surged 34.9 percent last year to $640.7bn, with more than two-thirds of the total being tech-related goods and services.

Semiconductors alone account for more than 20 percent of Taiwan’s GDP, according to US trade data, with the vast majority of production handled by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), whose top customers include Nvidia and Apple.

TSMC by itself accounts for more than 40 percent of the value of the island’s stock market.

While impressive, the rapid economic expansion has raised concerns about being overreliant on the growth of AI.

Taiwan’s Central Bank Governor Yang Chin-lung has sounded the alarm about an emerging “K-shaped economy,” where certain sectors grow rapidly while others fall into stagnation.

While critical to Taiwan’s economy, the semiconductor industry is far from the largest source of jobs.

The sector employs only about 300,000 people in a workforce of 11 million, according to data compiled by Dachrahn Wu, director of National Central University’s Research Center for Taiwan Economic Development.

The broader electronics and IT manufacturing industry employs about one million people, compared with about seven million working in the service sector, according to Wu’s data.

The heavy reliance on a single industry for growth marks a shift from the Asian Tiger era of the 1960s to 90s, when Taiwan’s economy was driven by hundreds of thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), according to James Lin, a historian who specialises in Taiwan’s post-war economic transformation.

“From the 1970s to 1990s, economic growth was concentrated in the hands of small and medium family enterprises that exemplified the ‘living room factory’ model, where family-owned businesses focused on producing one part for a consumer product,” Lin told Al Jazeera.  

“The benefits of this period were thus more widely distributed across Taiwanese society,” Lin said.

“By contrast, today, wealth inequality is growing in Taiwan as land is becoming more expensive and large corporations like TSMC attract the lion’s share of foreign capital investment rather than small corporations.”

Alicia Garcia Herrero, chief economist for Asia Pacific at French investment bank Natixis, said Taiwan’s economic model has left it at risk of becoming a “dual society” where tech sweeps up talent, funding and resources at the expense of other industries.

“It’s very hard if you’re not in [the semiconductor] sector in Taiwan right now,” Garcia Herrero told Al Jazeera, pointing to low wages for workers in non-tech roles and rising costs for businesses.

Some of Taiwan’s challenges are out of its control, said Chao-Hsi Huang, associate dean at the Taipei School of Economics and a former director at Taiwan’s central bank.

Those challenges include US President Donald Trump’s tariffs, which have partially exempted semiconductors but hit exporters in non-tech industries.

“The traditional [manufacturing] sector suffers higher tariffs than other competing countries like Korea or Japan, or even Southeast Asian countries, due to the fact we are not able to sign free trade agreements,” Huang told Al Jazeera.

“We are treated differently, and that’s a difficulty we are facing.”

Critics have placed other issues on the shoulders of the government, including a weak currency that has made exports more competitive but chipped away at consumers’ purchasing power.

Taiwan’s government denies engaging in currency manipulation, though it acknowledges intervening in the market to smooth out “volatility” when the new Taiwan dollar falls or rises sharply against other currencies.

After two decades of stagnation through the 2010s, wages are growing again – albeit unevenly.

Real average wages grew 1.4 percent in 2025, while median wages rose 1.35 percent, according to the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS).

Still, 70 percent of Taiwanese earned less than the average, a statistic attributable to the distorting effect of much higher salaries in the tech sector, where pay is nearly double the national average.

For Taiwanese frustrated with stagnant pay, Taiwan’s soaring stock market has offered some consolation.

Riding the AI boom, the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) more than doubled in value between 2019 and 2025 to $2.2 trillion, according to HSBC.

Regulatory changes introduced in 2020 made it easier for small-time investors to buy single stocks, encouraging a rush of everyday Taiwanese into the market.

In January, the TWSE reported that the number of trading accounts had reached 13.77 million – equivalent to 60 percent of Taiwan’s population – while hailing the bourse as a “cornerstone for inclusive prosperity and shared growth”.

Though more equal than neighbours such as Singapore, Hong Kong and China, Taiwan’s wealth divide has grown over the decades.

In 1980, Taiwan had a Gini coefficient of 0.308 – a measurement of wealth distribution where 0 indicates perfect equality – putting it on par with contemporary Norway, according to the DGBAS.

By 2024, Taiwan’s Gini coefficient had grown to 0.341 – lower than many countries but still a significant rise.

“I feel that the benefits of economic growth haven’t been distributed evenly,” Ryan, an engineer in the local tech sector who asked not to be identified by his real name, told Al Jazeera.

“Some industries or asset holders benefit significantly, but ordinary office workers often experience a rise in prices and housing costs, rather than an easier life,” he said.

Wei-ting Yen, an assistant research fellow at the research institution Academia Sinica, said while the semiconductor and stock market booms have helped some Taiwanese, they have heightened the angst of others.

In a survey of 1,195 Taiwanese voters carried out last month, 40 percent said their household was financially either “anxious” or “very anxious” due to rising living costs, particularly housing.

“I think subjectively, they’re anxious that they’re not accumulating wealth and it’s not enough to help them buy a house or an apartment,” Yen told Al Jazeera.

“Housing prices have been going crazy worldwide, and the stock market has been going crazy, [but] for people who do not have extra money to invest in those two options, it creates even more frustration and anxiety around them,” she said.

Strategic ambiguity, the US policy of neither explicitly supporting nor opposing Taiwanese independence, has been considered effective for decades in maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait. However, the summit between Trump and Xi Jinping on May 14-15, 2026, in Beijing revealed signs that this formula’s effectiveness is beginning to be limited. China pushed the US not merely to “not support” but to actively “oppose” Taiwanese independence. The US responded by displaying an inconsistent position. Taiwan openly asserted its sovereignty. All three responses emerged within less than 24 hours, and no international forum was able to manage the contradictions.

AT His strategic ambiguity is not simply a matter of US foreign policy. It reflects deeper limitations in the global governance system in addressing unresolved sovereignty issues. At the same time, China is actively promoting an alternative world order through its Belt and Road Initiative, non-interventionist principles, and multipolarity agenda, which indirectly influence how the Taiwan issue is positioned on the international stage. Without a concrete framework for joint governance, the potential for miscalculations across the Taiwan Strait will continue to increase.

On May 16, 2026, the day after Trump left Beijing, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement. Taiwan is a sovereign and independent nation. It is not under Chinese rule. This statement was not new rhetoric.

What makes this significant is the context. Trump had just called a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan a bargaining chip in negotiations with Xi Jinping. China had just successfully pushed the US to soften its tone on Taiwan. In less than 24 hours, three main actors make statements that cannot all be true at the same time. And there is no one international institution that has the authority to decide which is more valid.

This isn’t a sudden diplomatic failure. It’s the result of a policy of strategic ambiguity that has been in place for more than five decades and is now beginning to show its limitations.

Strategic ambiguity was once effective because all parties had an incentive not to test its limits. That situation is changing. China is becoming increasingly assertive. militarily and increasingly actively shaping an alternative global order. Taiwan is becoming more assertive in claiming its political identity. The US under Trump is increasingly unpredictable. In these conditions, the ambiguity that once served as a buffer for stability has now become a source of uncertainty. The global governance system lacks adequate instruments to fill the gaps left by this increasingly outdated formula.

Starting from the background, a US strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan was born of deliberate compromise. In the Shanghai Communique (1972), Washington used the word “recognizes” China’s position that Taiwan is part of China, not “accepts.” The difference in vocabulary was no accident. It opened diplomatic normalization with Beijing without formally abandoning Taipei.

This formula was then codified through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and three joint US-China communiques. During the Cold War era and the two decades that followed, this formula remained relatively stable because China was not yet strong enough to challenge it militarily and Taiwan was not yet confident enough to challenge it politically. As noted by T.Y. Wang in the journal Politics and Policy, strategic ambiguity is designed not only to deter China from attacking Taiwan but also to restrain Taiwan from taking steps that Beijing might deem provocative.

But the conditions that made that formula effective have changed structurally. Taiwan’s democratization since the 1990s has produced a political identity increasingly independent of the “One China” narrative. The PLA’s military modernization has changed the cost calculations of conflict. And Trump’s return to the White House has brought a transactional approach that, as noted by the Global Taiwan Institute, exacerbates existing ambiguities with conflicting signals that are record arms sales accompanied by a striking rhetorical silence on US security commitments to Taiwan.

On the ground, this uncertainty has already resulted in a measured escalation. Military exercises: Justice Mission 2025 In December 2025, a full-scale blockade of Taiwan was simulated, with over 90 aircraft crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait in a single day. These median line violations were not an anomaly. Since 2022, they have become increasingly routine and have rarely elicited an organized response from the international community.

The most important part to understand next is about the One China Policy. The One China Policy affirms that a single label includes three irreconcilable positions. Beijing maintains that Taiwan is an unreturned province and that reunification is a non-negotiable goal. Taipei maintains that the Republic of China (ROC) is a sovereign state that predates the People’s Republic of China and that the two have never ruled each other. Washington maintains its own version, based on the Taiwan Relations Act, that recognizes Beijing’s position without explicitly endorsing it.

These three positions exist simultaneously because they have never been tested in an international forum that has the authority to decide which is more valid. Brookings Institution; he noted that this policy was originally designed for a period when China was not yet acting like a revisionist power. Now, conditions have changed, and the old formula requires a recalibration that has yet to materialize.

There’s a compelling argument here. Strategic ambiguity has also served as a deterrent to war. It prevents China from attacking because it’s unsure whether the US will intervene. It also prevents Taiwan from declaring formal independence because it’s unsure whether the US would defend it. In this logic, ambiguity is a feature, not a bug.

However, analyst Brandon K. Yoder in the European Journal of International Relations, The effectiveness of deterrence hinges on credibility, which is currently eroding. When Trump called weapons for Taiwan a “negotiating chip,” he indirectly communicated to Beijing that the US commitment was conditional. When commitments are conditional, their deterrent effect is significantly weakened.

What results is not new stability, but rather an increasingly unpredictable gray area. Each party operates based on its own assumptions about the limits that can be tested. Without governance mechanisms that explicitly clarify these limits, the risk of miscalculation continues to grow.

The Taiwan issue cannot be read in isolation from China’s broader agenda of reshaping the global order. Over the past two decades, Beijing has not only protested the existing international system but also actively developed an alternative.

The Belt and Road Initiative, which now encompasses more than 140 countries, is more than just an infrastructure project. As analyzed in China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, BRI serves as both a governance and economic mechanism, linking infrastructure development with new standards of connectivity and cooperation that reflect the Chinese model of development without political conditions.

Beyond the BRI, China is actively pushing three major initiatives: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. They share a common thread that is strengthening the norm of sovereignty, rejecting intervention based on Western values, and promoting multipolarity as a substitute for single-party hegemony. Bruegel noted that the concept of “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” popularized by Xi at Davos 2017 has even been included in several UN General Assembly resolutions, demonstrating how far China has succeeded in pushing its global narrative into multilateral institutions.

The relevance to the Taiwan issue is that the more countries accept China’s sovereignty-based, non-interference-based governance framework, the more limited the space for international mechanisms to challenge Beijing’s claims to Taiwan. China’s global governance agenda and its claims to Taiwan are not separate issues. They are part of the same project: redefining who has the right to set the rules of the game in what have traditionally been called “internal affairs.”

This also makes Trump’s and Xi’s bilateral approach a more suitable instrument for China’s interests. When the Taiwan issue is managed through negotiations between the two great powers, broader norms, such as the right to self-determination and representation of sovereign entities, are not discussed. Observer Research Foundation noted that BRI cooperation with the UN from 2015 to 2019 was more about mutual legitimacy than structural integration, and a similar pattern is seen in the way China uses multilateral forums to validate its diplomatic positions without actually committing to the process.

Trump’s and Xi’s meeting in May 2026 shows a pattern that deserves serious attention. That is, the Taiwan issue is now managed almost entirely outside the multilateral framework. There are no regional forums, no UN mechanisms, no activated joint protocols. There are just two leaders, two delegations, and an agenda far broader than just Taiwan.

Observation: Both sides reveal a glaring asymmetry. In China’s version, Taiwan is referred to as the “most important issue,” and Xi warned of potential conflict if handled incorrectly. In the US version, Taiwan is not mentioned at all. CSIS noted that the meeting resulted in a commitment to “strategic stability” without concrete instruments to realize it. The lack of crisis communication protocol. Limited incident management framework. There isn’t any commitment to refrain from provocative military exercises.

This is not simply a shortcoming of the meeting. It reflects a more systemic limitation. namely the limitations There is no sufficiently authoritative multilateral platform to address this issue. The UN Security Council is hampered by Beijing’s veto power. ASEAN adheres to the principle of non-intervention, which actually benefits China’s narrative. The G20 has no mandate to address sovereignty disputes.

The result is what could be called a governance deficit. This doesn’t mean there are no institutions, but rather that the existing ones are insufficiently effective for the situation. And it’s in this deficit that military escalation moves in to fill the space that structured diplomacy should be filling. Modern Diplomacy noted that the US approved an $11.1 billion arms package for Taiwan by 2025 while simultaneously sending ambiguous rhetorical signals, a combination that makes it difficult for both China and Taiwan to read exactly where the real line is.

The following three recommendations are not intended to resolve the Taiwan status question. Their purpose is more limited and more immediate. namely for reducing the risk of miscalculation before a minor incident escalates into an uncontrollable crisis. All three rely on existing political conditions and momentum.

First, the momentum of the Trump-Xi meeting should be used to establish a permanent, dedicated military crisis communication channel for incidents in the Taiwan Strait. The most relevant precedent is the Washington-Moscow hotline, established after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, precisely because the world had nearly come to war due to miscommunication, not intention. CNBC noted the May 2026 meeting resulted in a relatively constructive atmosphere between the two leaders. This is a rare window of opportunity and should be used for something concrete.

Second, Indonesia, as a BRICS member and ASEAN dialogue partner with a relatively balanced working relationship with Washington and Beijing, could propose a regional consultation forum focused on managing incidents in the Taiwan Strait. This would not be a forum to decide Taiwan’s status, but rather a technical mechanism for de-escalation procedures and crisis communication. ASEAN has the foundation for this through the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and Indonesia’s current position within BRICS provides added legitimacy in Beijing’s eyes.

Third, the US, China, Japan, and South Korea need to negotiate a joint commitment that no party will change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through force. This is inspired by the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which successfully committed European countries not to change their borders by force, despite many of their mutual distrust. The agreement did not resolve existing disputes, but it did raise the costs of escalation measurably. With Xi seeking economic stability before 2027 and Trump seeking to avoid military engagement far from the US mainland, both sides’ calculations are now more open to this type of commitment than in previous periods.

It can be concluded that strategic ambiguity is one of the most ingenious products of Cold War diplomacy. It maintained stability in the Taiwan Strait for decades, not by solving the problem, but by making all parties unsure whether testing its limits was a good idea.

The conditions that make that formula work are changing simultaneously. China is stronger and more assertive. Taiwan is more assertive in its political identity. And the US under Trump is sending signals that are more easily read as conditional than committed. These three changes are not occurring one after the other, but simultaneously, and the global governance system has not yet responded accordingly.

The Trump-Xi meeting in May 2026 is neither a turning point in the war nor a step toward a resolution. It is a reflection of the current situation: three actors with three different interpretations, no referee, and increasingly little room for error.

What’s needed isn’t a final solution on Taiwan’s status, as that won’t come anytime soon. What’s needed are concrete steps that reduce the risk of miscalculation while keeping all options open. Crisis channels, regional consultative forums, and non-escalation commitments are small steps but have clear historical precedent. The question is whether the political will for these small steps can still be found amidst the escalating rivalry.

Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao’s remarks come as US President Donald Trump gives mixed signals on the sale.

A top United States military official has said Washington is pausing a $14bn arms sale to Taiwan to conserve munitions for its war on Iran.

Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao provided the update to lawmakers during a Senate hearing on Thursday, a week after the weapons sale took centre stage in talks between US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing.

“Right now, we’re doing a pause in order to make sure we have the munitions we need for Epic Fury – which we have plenty,” Cao told the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.

“But we’re just making sure we have everything, but then the foreign military sales will continue when the administration deems necessary.”

Cao said any decision to move forward with the sale – which would be the largest ever weapons transfer to Taiwan – would be made by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

The war has been paused since the US and Iran agreed to a ceasefire on April 8, but the sides have yet to reach a permanent peace deal.

The US Congress approved the weapons package for Taiwan in January, but the sale requires Trump’s sign-off to move forward.

If approved, the sale would surpass a record-breaking $11bn arms package for Taiwan approved by Trump in December.

Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai told reporters on Friday that Taiwan would continue to pursue arms purchases, according to Taiwanese news outlet FTV News.

William Yang, senior analyst for northeast Asia at the Crisis Group, said in a social media post that the pause will “exacerbate anxiety and scepticism about US support in Taiwan and make it difficult for the Taiwanese government to request additional defence budget for the foreseeable future”.

Trump, who has confirmed that he discussed the arms sale with Xi, said last week in an interview with Fox News that he “may” or “may not” approve the package.

Trump has also suggested that the package could be used as a “negotiating chip” – despite a decades-old precedent against consulting with Beijing on arms sales.

China claims self-governing Taiwan as part of its territory, and objects to Washington’s ongoing but unofficial support for Taipei.

The US government does not officially recognise Taiwan but is committed to helping the island to defend itself under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, enacted shortly after Washington severed diplomatic ties with Taipei.

Trump has continued to test the status quo on Taiwan in other ways, saying earlier this week that he would consider speaking to Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te about the arms deal.

Such a move would break with four decades of diplomatic protocol against direct talks with the Taiwanese leader and almost certainly provoke an angry response from Beijing.

Trump held a phone call with former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen after his 2016 election win, but their talks took place before he was sworn in as president.

President Lai says Taiwan’s future is up to its people as the island faces Chinese and US headwinds.

Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te said the future of Taiwan should not be decided by “foreign forces” but is instead in the hands of its 23 million citizens.

Speaking on the second anniversary of his inauguration on Wednesday, Lai said his goal as president continued to be maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait – the 180km (112-mile) waterway dividing Taiwan from China – and to prevent “external forces” from altering the island’s political status quo.

The president said he was still willing to engage with Beijing, which cut off communication with Taipei in 2016, but only through “orderly exchanges” based on the principles of “equality and dignity”.

Taiwan is a responsible member of the international community, not a “party that undermines stability”, he also said, in an apparent swipe at Beijing.

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office on Wednesday accused Lai of inciting “cross-strait confrontation” by supporting “Taiwan independence” in remarks coinciding with his anniversary.

The office’s spokesperson, Zhu Fenglian, said Lai “peddles separatist fallacies” while using a narrative of “democracy versus authoritarianism” to describe the Taiwan-China relationship.

Zhu also accused Lai of ignoring the wellbeing of the Taiwanese public to pander to “external forces attempting to ‘seek independence through foreign aid’ and ‘seek independence through force’.”

Lai has faced a tumultuous 24 months as president, with pressures from both inside and outside Taiwan, including from traditional ally the United States.

The opposition-controlled legislature cut down a signature special defence budget from $40bn to $25bn, and this week tried and failed to impeach him over a tax revenue dispute.

He has a 38 percent approval rating, according to a poll conducted earlier this month by news network TVBS, which, while low, is still better than his 32 percent approval rating during his first year in office.

His disapproval rating has also fallen from 55 percent to 44 percent.

Lai said on Wednesday that his government would take other measures to make up the shortfall in Taiwan’s defence spending.

As president, Lai has also had to contend with uncertainty from the US, Taiwan’s longstanding unofficial ally, amid growing pressure from China, which has staged five rounds of military exercises around Taiwan since his May 2024 inauguration.

US President Donald Trump said last week that US arms sales to Taiwan could be used as a “very good negotiating chip” with Beijing.

Trump’s remarks followed a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, where the Chinese leader called on Trump to take a stronger stance on Taiwan’s political status.

The US has for decades maintained a deliberately ambiguous stance on the issue.

Lai was also forced to delay a state visit to Eswatini, formerly known as Swaziland, Taiwan’s only diplomatic ally in Africa, in April when several countries denied him access to their airspace due to alleged Chinese pressure. He later made the trip through a circuitous route on board Eswatini King Mswati III’s private jet.

May 18 (UPI) — Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te said Taiwan would not do anything to trigger confrontation with China but vowed the island would never allow itself to be traded away or give up sovereignty.

In an online post Sunday, Lai said that “as a responsible party in the region and across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan will not provoke or escalate conflict,” but neither would it yield to pressure to relinquish its “national sovereignty and dignity, or its democratic and free way of life.”

Lai’s statement came after Beijing warned U.S. President Donald Trump to be “extra cautious” over Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a breakaway province, saying it could result in clashes and potential conflict that could place the entire Sino-U.S. relationship “in great jeopardy.”

Speaking aboard Air Force One on his way back to Washington from his summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Trump said he had “made no commitment” either way on the Taiwan question or an $11 billion deal to sell arms to the island that was sent to Congress for approval in December.

Trump said he and Xi had discussed the arms deal in depth and that he would make a determination on whether it would go through “over the next fairly short period of time.”

“I’m going to say I have to speak to the person that right now is, you know, you know who he is, that’s running Taiwan,” Lai’s name apparently having slipped his mind.

Trump also strictly adhered to Washington’s long-held position of strategic ambiguity by refusing to answer questions over whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s aid militarily, were it attacked.

Beijing wants reunification and has not ruled out retaking Taiwan by force, particularly if it declared independence.

Back in the United States, Trump appeared to urge caution over Taiwan independence, telling Fox News on Friday that while nothing in the United States’ policy on Taiwan had changed, he wasn’t “looking to have somebody go independent.”

“I’m not looking to have somebody go independent. And, you know, we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I’m not looking for that. I want them to cool down. I want China to cool down,” he said.

Although the United States switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei in favor of Beijing in 1979 and acknowledged there is only one China of which Taiwan is a part– the so-called “One China” policy it follows to this day — the Taiwan Relations Act requires it to treat any effort to alter Taiwan’s future by force as a threat to peace in the region and U.S. interests.

The legislation requires the United States to provide the island with arms to defend itself and for the United States to maintain its own capacity “to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”

However, there is no guarantee of committing U.S. troops to help defend the island.

In his post, Lai expressed gratitude for the United States’ “continued support” for peace in the Taiwan Strait, as well as ongoing military assistance.

“Given China’s unwavering commitment to the use of force to annex Taiwan and its continued military expansion in an attempt to alter the regional and cross-strait status quo, the United States’ continued arms sales to Taiwan and its deepening of U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation, even to the point of necessity, are crucial elements in maintaining regional peace and stability,” wrote Lai.

Taiwan has expressed openness to a direct conversation between US President Donald Trump and Taiwanese President Lai Ching te, following heightened diplomatic attention after Trump’s recent summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing.

The discussion comes amid renewed sensitivity over Taiwan’s political status and security, an issue that remains one of the most contested points in US China relations. During the summit, Taiwan was reportedly discussed, with Xi warning of potential conflict if the issue is not handled carefully.

Trump made several public comments on Taiwan following the meeting, including uncertainty over future arms sales and remarks interpreted as cautious on Taiwan independence.

Why the Issue Matters Now

A direct call between a US president and Taiwan’s leader would be highly significant, as no such conversation has taken place since Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979.

Taiwan relies heavily on the United States for security support and arms supplies, making US political signaling on the issue highly consequential for regional stability.

Taiwanese officials said recent remarks had created some uncertainty domestically, even as the government maintains that its core policy position has not changed.

Taiwan Diplomatic Position

Taiwan’s foreign ministry indicated that it would welcome a direct conversation if the opportunity arises, while also seeking clarity on Washington’s intentions.

Officials emphasized that Taiwan continues to view its relationship with the United States as stable, even amid shifting rhetoric following high level US China engagement.

Taipei reiterated that its political future must be determined by its own population, rejecting Beijing’s sovereignty claims.

US China Taiwan Triangle

The situation reflects the broader strategic competition between United States and China, where Taiwan remains a central geopolitical flashpoint.

Beijing considers Taiwan part of its territory, while Washington maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity, supporting Taiwan’s defense capabilities without formally recognizing it as an independent state.

Analysis

The possibility of direct engagement between Trump and Lai would represent a notable diplomatic signal, even if symbolic in nature. It would likely be interpreted differently by Washington, Taipei, and Beijing, each of which assigns distinct strategic meaning to Taiwan related communication.

For Taiwan, such contact would reinforce political visibility and strengthen informal ties with its key security partner. For the United States, it could serve as a calibrated message of support while still avoiding formal diplomatic recognition.

However, it also carries escalation risks. Any perceived shift in US Taiwan engagement often triggers strong reactions from Beijing, increasing regional tension.

Overall, the development highlights how Taiwan remains a central pressure point in US China relations, where even limited diplomatic gestures can have outsized geopolitical impact.

With information from Reuters.

HONG KONG — As President Trump left Beijing on Friday, Chinese social media resurfaced a familiar nickname for the president — flattering at first glance — declaring that Chuan Jianguo, the “Nation Builder,” had returned.

It was not meant as a compliment. The nation he is building, according to the Chinese, is not the United States but their own, through a series of inadvertent yet costly mistakes inflicted by Trump at home and abroad.

• Share via Close extra sharing options

If the Chinese government was self-assured entering Trump’s summit with Xi Jinping, then the results of the state visit, in which Beijing refused to offer Trump any meaningful deals or concessions, signal their unmistakable confidence in American decline.

Chinese government statements in local media stating as much made their way back to Trump as he was departing, aggravating the president, a U.S. official said. But the White House secured a clarification from the Chinese that seemed to placate Trump. America was only declining under President Biden, they said — not anymore.

President Trump and President Xi Jinping tour Zhongnanhai Garden on Friday in Beijing.

(Evan Vucci / Pool via Getty Images)

The Trump administration argues the trip was a success, having secured the display of conciliation and partnership the president had sought after years of increasingly dangerous acrimony.

Foreign policy hawks on China will be displeased with his new direction of friendship and cooperation with a government they view as openly hostile to the United States. But Trump seems to have reached a similar conclusion as past administrations, that China might require a relationship in pursuit of, as Xi put it, “constructive strategic stability.”

Trump was notably out of character throughout his stay here, deferential to his host, marveling at displays of Chinese power and reticent to speak with the press.

Five times over two days, Trump referred to Xi as his friend, taking every public opportunity to offer his compliments and pats on the back. None of it was reciprocated. The Chinese leader, Trump told Fox News in an interview, was “all business” in private, as well, apparently uninterested in his overtures of personal goodwill.

Presidents Xi and Trump tour Zhongnanhai Garden on Friday.

(Evan Vucci—Pool/Getty Images)

The summit may ultimately be remembered as the moment when Trump recognized a shifting power dynamic, where an American president had the rare and uncomfortable experience of entering a meeting clearly overmatched.

“I think the most important thing is relationship,” Trump said in the interview, describing the summit as “historic.”

“It’s all about relationship,” he added. “I have a very good relationship with President Xi.”

Taiwan was discussed ‘the whole night’

Little of substance was accomplished over two days of talks. But Chinese officials expected no less after warning Trump’s team before the summit that its minimal preparation had failed to lay the groundwork for diplomatic agreements.

Still, the lack of breakthroughs may come as a relief to some in Washington. Trump appears to have held to a long-standing U.S. line on Taiwan, for now, refusing to provide Xi with clarity on whether the United States would defend the self-ruled island if China tries to reclaim it by force.

The two men discussed the matter “the whole night,” Trump told Fox.

If China attacked, “they would be met harshly, and bad things will happen,” Trump said. Yet within the same answer, he questioned Taiwan’s “odds” against China if war were to break out, even with U.S. help, noting its proximity to the Chinese mainland and its vast distance away from the United States.

Whether Trump will proceed with arms sales to Taiwan — passed by Congress and obligated by law under the Taiwan Relations Act — is still an open question.

“If you kept it the way it is, I think China is going to be OK with that,” Trump said, referencing an ambiguous status quo around Taiwan’s status, “but we’re not looking to have somebody say, ‘Let’s go independent because the United States is backing us.’ ”

“Taiwan would be very smart to cool it a little bit,” he added. “China would be smart to cool it a little bit. They ought to both cool it.”

President Trump departs as President Xi looks on after a visit to Zhongnanhai Garden on Friday.

(Evan Vucci/ Pool via Getty Images)

Curious company

Trump’s choice of company in the U.S. delegation left the Chinese with questions over the purpose of the trip.

Lara Trump, a Fox News host and the president’s daughter-in-law, attended alongside her husband, Eric Trump, whose presence as a private citizen running the Trump Organization was a direct appeal to Beijing to treat the administration like a family business. Brett Ratner, director of the “Rush Hour” series and a documentary on the first lady that bombed at the box office, was given prime placement along with America’s top business leaders.

The last time a secretary of Defense attended a presidential state visit to China was on Richard Nixon’s famous trip in 1972. Chinese officials were unsure what to make of Pete Hegseth’s presence — whether it was meant to convey a softer stance, a hardening one, or simply an ignorance of basic diplomatic protocol.

Trump said he felt personally honored by the lavish welcome he received on the edge of Tiananmen Square, outside the Great Hall of the People, where China hosts all visiting dignitaries.

Before a lunch at Zhongnanhai, the secretive headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party, Trump asked Xi if he was special for getting to visit the compound. He was the fourth U.S. president to do so.

While the Trump administration offered itself glowing reviews of the outcome of the summit, the Chinese government offered little to say as he departed. And Chinese media highlighted Beijing’s resolute stance on American priorities — from trade to the Iran war — as evidence of Chinese confidence and American decline.

But all that business wasn’t the point of the trip, Trump told Fox’s Bret Baier. For the president, it was all personal.

“I want to thank President Xi, my friend, for this magnificent welcome,” Trump said in his toast at the state banquet, repeating the personal overture. “The American and Chinese people share much in common. We value hard work. We value courage and achievement. We love our families and we love our countries.

“Together, we have the chance to draw on these values to create a future of greater prosperity, cooperation and happiness and peace for our children,” Trump added. “We love our children. This region and the world — it’s a special world, with the two of us united and together.”

Taiwan stressed that it is a “sovereign and independent” nation after US President Donald Trump raised uncertainty over a major weapons sale to Taipei. The Chinese government pledged to deepen security cooperation with the US while insisting that Beijing has no right to claim the island.

US President Donald Trump concluded a two-day summit in Beijing with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The high-profile visit, in which Trump aimed to reset relations with Beijing, saw discussions on trade, Taiwan, and the war on Iran.

US President Donald Trump said he discussed US arms sales to Taiwan with Chinese leader Xi Jinping during talks in Beijing. Trump also said he is considering lifting sanctions on Chinese companies that buy Iranian oil.

United States President Donald Trump concluded his final round of discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing while attempting to present the visit as a major economic success. The summit came at a sensitive moment for both countries as tensions over trade, Taiwan, artificial intelligence technology, and the Iran conflict continue to shape relations between the world’s two largest economies.

Trump emphasized trade agreements and commercial cooperation during the visit, hoping to strengthen his political standing ahead of important midterm elections in the United States. China, however, used the occasion to deliver clear warnings regarding Taiwan and to criticize the ongoing Iran conflict, signaling that major strategic disagreements remain unresolved despite the positive diplomatic atmosphere.

Trump Highlights Economic Progress

During meetings at the Zhongnanhai leadership compound in Beijing, Trump promoted what he described as successful trade negotiations between Washington and Beijing. He stated that both sides had reached agreements that would benefit their economies and help stabilize commercial relations after years of tariff disputes and economic uncertainty.

The United States announced several proposed agreements involving agricultural exports, beef, and energy sales to China. Officials also discussed mechanisms to manage future trade disputes and identified billions of dollars in potential goods trade between the two countries.

One of the most closely watched announcements involved aircraft manufacturer Boeing. Trump claimed China had agreed to purchase 200 Boeing aircraft, marking China’s first major order of American commercial planes in nearly ten years. However, investors reacted negatively because markets had anticipated a significantly larger agreement. Boeing shares declined after the announcement, reflecting disappointment over the scale of the deal.

The summit also failed to produce a breakthrough regarding advanced artificial intelligence technology exports. Expectations had been growing that restrictions on the sale of advanced AI chips from NVIDIA to China might ease, especially after company chief executive Jensen Huang joined the trip. No major agreement emerged on that issue.

China Pushes Back on Iran Conflict

While Trump focused publicly on economic achievements, China used the summit to voice frustration over the war involving Iran. Beijing stated that the conflict should never have started and called for diplomatic efforts to restore peace.

The Iran crisis has become a major international concern because of its impact on global energy markets. Rising instability in the Middle East has pushed oil prices upward and increased fears about disruptions to energy supplies traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical shipping routes.

China’s position reflects both economic and strategic interests. Beijing relies heavily on stable energy imports and also views Iran as an important geopolitical partner that can balance American influence in the Middle East. Analysts believe China is unlikely to pressure Tehran aggressively because maintaining strong relations with Iran supports Beijing’s broader strategic goals.

Although Trump stated that he and Xi shared similar views on Iran, Chinese officials avoided publicly endorsing Washington’s approach. This difference highlighted the continuing gap between the two powers on international security issues.

Taiwan Remains the Most Sensitive Issue

Despite the friendly diplomatic setting, Taiwan emerged as one of the summit’s most serious areas of tension. Xi warned that mishandling the Taiwan issue could lead to conflict, reinforcing Beijing’s longstanding position that the island is part of China.

Taiwan remains one of the most dangerous flashpoints in global politics. China has repeatedly stated that it does not rule out the use of military force to bring Taiwan under its control, while the United States continues to support Taiwan’s defensive capabilities under American law.

American officials maintained that United States policy toward Taiwan had not changed. Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized that Washington continues to support regional stability while maintaining its established position on Taiwan.

The issue remains highly sensitive because any military escalation involving Taiwan could severely disrupt global trade, semiconductor production, and international security across the Indo Pacific region.

A Fragile Trade Truce Continues

One of the summit’s most important outcomes may simply be the continuation of the fragile trade truce reached during earlier talks between the two leaders. Previous negotiations had temporarily paused extremely high tariffs and reduced tensions over rare earth mineral exports that are essential for modern technology manufacturing.

However, uncertainty remains about whether the current trade arrangements will continue beyond the end of the year. American officials indicated that no final decision had been made regarding the future of tariff suspensions and broader economic cooperation.

This uncertainty reflects the deeper structural rivalry between the United States and China. While both countries benefit economically from stable trade relations, they remain competitors in technology, military influence, and geopolitical leadership.

Human Rights Concerns Surface

Human rights issues also appeared during the summit. Trump reportedly raised the case of Hong Kong media businessman and democracy advocate Jimmy Lai, who was sentenced to prison under Hong Kong’s national security law.

American officials expressed hope that Lai could eventually be released, while China maintained that Hong Kong affairs are internal matters and rejected foreign criticism.

The discussion demonstrated that human rights disputes continue to complicate relations between Washington and Beijing even during periods of economic cooperation.

Analysis

The Trump Xi summit demonstrated the increasingly complex nature of United States China relations. Both sides attempted to project stability and cooperation, particularly on trade and economic matters, yet major disagreements remained visible beneath the surface.

Trump sought to frame the visit as proof of economic leadership and diplomatic success. However, the relatively modest scale of announced agreements and the lack of major breakthroughs on technology exports limited market enthusiasm.

China, meanwhile, used the summit to reinforce its strategic priorities. Beijing signaled that Taiwan remains a non negotiable issue, defended its relationship with Iran, and resisted external pressure on human rights matters.

The summit ultimately reflected a broader reality in global politics. The United States and China are deeply interconnected economically, but they are also strategic rivals competing for influence across multiple regions and industries. Cooperation may continue in trade and commerce, but tensions over security, technology, and global power are unlikely to disappear soon.

With information from Reuters.

BEIJING — A conciliatory President Trump on Friday hailed success in his state visit to China, claiming a tonal reset with Xi Jinping despite departing Beijing with few concrete achievements.

The visual spectacle around Trump’s visit was itself considered a breakthrough by the two sides, who expressed an eagerness entering the talks to move on from a yearslong stretch of deteriorating relations.

But Trump’s homage and deference to Xi were a striking display of an often commanding president adapting to a new power dynamic, understanding China’s rise and its emerging role in the world.

Trump deployed a charm offensive throughout his stay here, confident in the impact of his personal touch on world leaders, often seen patting Xi on the back and repeatedly calling him his friend.

Yet in private, tensions gripped negotiations that touched nearly every major issue on Trump’s agenda, from trade relations to the U.S. war in Iran.

“He’s all business,” Trump said from Beijing in an interview with Fox.

China agreed to buy 200 Boeing jets and spend billions on American agricultural products, U.S. officials said — modest deals that fall short of restoring Chinese investment levels to their pre–2025 highs, before Trump launched a trade war that aggressively targeted Beijing.

Nevertheless, Trump referred to the trade agreements as “fantastic,” and said Xi had also pledged to purchase U.S. energy going forward. Beijing did not confirm any such agreement.

Nor did the Chinese Foreign Ministry comment on any commitment to help the United States reopen the Strait of Hormuz, effectively shuttered by Iran since the Trump administration launched a war against the Islamic Republic earlier this year.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and President Trump participate in a friendship walk through Zhongnanhai Garden Fridah in Beijing.

(Evan Vucci / Pool / Reuters via Associated Press)

“We feel very similar on Iran, we want that to end,” Trump said Friday. “We don’t want them to have a nuclear weapon. We want the straits opened, and we want them to get it ended, because it’s a crazy thing — they’re a little bit crazy.”

At the beginning of the summit, Xi warned the Trump administration that the longstanding U.S. position of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan had set the two nations on a collision course, Chinese state media reported. But departing Beijing, Marco Rubio, the president’s national security advisor and secretary of state, said that Washington’s position on Taiwan remained “unchanged.”

Their second day of meetings was held at Zhongnanhai, an imperial garden and lake district that has served as the secretive seat of power for the Chinese Communist Party since the revolution of 1949.

The two men strolled quiet pathways dotted with Chinese roses and ornamental archways before taking tea and lunch in Xi’s private quarters. Trump was offered rose seeds to bring home for the White House Rose Garden, the Chinese said.

“This has been an incredible visit,” Trump told reporters at the compound. “A lot of good has come of it.”

It was not the first time that Xi has hosted a president at the historic compound. In 2014, the Chinese leader, still relatively new to the presidency, hosted President Obama overnight at Zhongnanhai, where the two met in private over dinner.

President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping tour Zhongnanhai Garden.

(Evan Vucci / Pool / Getty Images)

It was another smoggy day for Trump in the Chinese capital, although cooler than Thursday, when Xi greeted Trump at the footsteps of Tiananmen Square with a lavish state welcome. There, Xi hosted Trump and his delegation at the Great Hall of the People for a day of meetings and a banquet dinner of Peking duck and pan-fried pork buns.

The two men will have future opportunities to meet, with Trump inviting Xi to Washington for a state visit at the White House in September.

“He’s a man I respect greatly,” Trump said.

US President Donald Trump returns to Beijing after nine years to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping. The trade war, conflict in Iran, and rising fears over Taiwan shape the talks. With global tensions mounting, can the two leaders find common ground, or will rivalry push the world further into crisis?

In this episode: 

Episode credits:

This episode was produced by Marcos Bartolomé and Sarí el-Khalili with Spencer Cline, Catherine Nouhan, Tuleen Barakat, Alexandra Locke, and our guest host, Kevin Hirten. It was edited by Tamara Khandaker. 

Our sound designer is Alex Roldan. Our video editors are Hisham Abu Salah and Mohannad al-Melhem. Alexandra Locke is The Take’s executive producer. 

Connect with us:

@AJEPodcasts on X, Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube

BEIJING — President Trump arrived in Beijing on Wednesday for his hotly anticipated talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the Iran war, trade and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

The meat of the summit doesn’t start until Thursday, when the leaders hold bilateral talks, visit the Temple of Heaven, where Chinese emperors once prayed for bumper crops, and take part in a formal banquet. But the Chinese offered Trump a pomp-filled welcome, literally rolling out the red carpet for him after Air Force One landed in the Chinese capital.

The president was greeted by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng; Xie Feng, China’s ambassador to Washington; Ma Zhaoxu, executive vice minister of foreign affairs; and the U.S. envoy to Beijing, David Perdue.

The welcoming ceremony included a military honor guard, a military band and some 300 Chinese youths waving Chinese and American flags and chanting, “Welcome, welcome! Warm welcome!” as Trump made his way to his waiting limousine. The youth greeters were decked out in white and robin’s egg blue outfits that matched the paint job of the iconic presidential plane.

President Trump walks with China’s Vice President Han Zheng during an arrival ceremony Wednesday at Beijing Capital International Airport, as Eric and Lara Trump, Elon Musk, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer follow.

(Mark Schiefelbein / Associated Press)

“We’re the two superpowers,” Trump told reporters as he departed the White House on Tuesday for the long flight to Beijing. “We’re the strongest nation on Earth in terms of military. China’s considered second.”

While Trump likes to project a sense of strength, the visit occurs at a delicate moment for his presidency as his popularity at home has been weighed down by the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran and rising inflation as a consequence of that conflict. The Republican president is seeking a win by signing deals with China to buy more American soybeans, beef and aircraft, saying he’ll be talking with Xi about trade “more than anything else.”

The Trump administration hopes to begin establishing a Board of Trade with China to address differences between the countries. The board could help prevent the trade war ignited last year after Trump’s tariff hikes, an action China countered through its control of rare earth minerals. That led to a one-year truce last October.

But Trump is visiting Beijing when Iran continues to dominate his domestic agenda. The war has led to the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, stranding oil and natural gas tankers and causing energy prices to spike to levels that could sabotage global economic growth. The U.S. president declared that Xi didn’t need to assist in resolving the conflict, even though Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was in Beijing last week.

Fellow rescuers carry the coffins of two members of the civil defense who were reportedly killed in Israeli airstrikes in Nabatieh the previous day, during their funeral in the southern city of Sidon on May 13, 2026. Israel hammered south Lebanon with strikes on May 12 ahead of talks between the two countries in Washington, as Beirut reported 380 people killed in Israeli attacks since an April 17 ceasefire took effect.

(Mahmoud Zayyat/AFP via Getty Images)

“We have a lot of things to discuss. I wouldn’t say Iran is one of them, to be honest with you, because we have Iran very much under control,” Trump told reporters Tuesday.

Taiwan high on the agenda

The status of Taiwan also will be a major topic as China is displeased with U.S. plans to sell weapons to the self-governing island, which the Chinese government claims as part of its own territory.

Trump told reporters on Monday that he would be discussing with Xi an $11 billion weapons package for Taiwan that the U.S. administration authorized in December but has not yet begun fulfilling. The arms package is the largest ever approved for Taiwan.

But Trump has demonstrated greater ambivalence toward Taiwan, an approach that’s raising questions about whether the U.S. leader could be open to dialing back support for the island democracy.

The Taiwanese flag at Democracy Boulevard is lowered at the end of the day as the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is seen in the background in Taipei on May 13, 2026.

(I-Hwa Cheng/AFP via Getty Images)

At the same time, Taiwan — as the world’s leading chipmaker — has become essential for the development of artificial intelligence, with the U.S. importing more goods so far this year from Taiwan than China. Trump has sought to use Biden-era programs and his own deals to bring more chipmaking to America.

The Chinese Communist Party’s news outlet, People’s Daily, published a strongly worded editorial ahead of Trump’s arrival underscoring that Taiwan is “the first red line that cannot be crossed in China-U.S. relations” and is “the biggest point of risk” between the two nations.

Trump was already portraying the trip as a success before he even left White House grounds. He openly mused about Xi’s planned reciprocal visit to the U.S. later this year, lamenting that the White House ballroom under construction would not be completed in time to properly fete the Chinese leader.

“We’re going to have a great relationship for many, many decades to come,” Trump said of the U.S. and China.

Counter snipers and other security forces watch over Air Force One while refueling at Joint Base Elmendorf during a trip with US President Donald J. Trump in Anchorage, Alaska, on May 12, 2026. Donald Trump was due in Beijing on May 13, 2026 on the first visit to China by a US president in nearly a decade, as he seeks to ramp up trade despite potential friction over Taiwan and Iran.

(Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images)

Trump embarked on Air Force One for the big meeting with a coterie of aides, family members and business world titans, including Nvidia’s Jensen Huang and Tesla and SpaceX’s Elon Musk. While en route to Beijing, he posted on social media that his “first request” to Xi during the visit will be to ask the Chinese leader to bolster the presence of U.S. firms in China.

“I will be asking President Xi, a Leader of extraordinary distinction, to ‘open up’ China so that these brilliant people can work their magic, and help bring the People’s Republic to an even higher level!” Trump wrote.

Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon and China’s President Xi Jinping attend a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People on Tuesday, in Beijing.

(Maxim Shemetov—Pool / Getty Images)

Despite Trump’s outward confidence, China appears to be entering the meeting from “a much stronger place,” said Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser on Chinese business and economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

China would like to reduce tech restrictions on accessing computer chips and find ways to reduce tariffs, among other goals.

“But even if they don’t get much on any of those things, as long as there’s not a blow-up in the meeting and President Trump doesn’t go away and look to re-escalate, China basically comes out stronger,” Kennedy said.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng met on Wednesday to discuss economic and trade issues at Incheon International Airport, just west of the South Korean capital of Seoul, according to the Chinese state run Xinhua News Agency.

Bystanders are kept back by police tape as they film the motorcade of President Donald Trump as he arrives at the Four Seasons Hotel on Wednesday in Beijing.

(Kevin Frayer / Getty Images)

Trump wants 3-way nuclear arms deal

Trump also intends to raise the idea of the U.S., China and Russia signing a pact that would set limits on the nuclear weapons each nation keeps in its arsenal, according to a senior Trump administration official who briefed reporters ahead of the trip. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the White House.

China has previously been cool to entering such a pact. Beijing’s arsenal, according to Pentagon estimates, exceeds more than 600 operational nuclear warheads and is far from parity with the U.S. and Russia, which each are estimated to have more than 5,000 nuclear warheads.

The last nuclear arms pact, known as the New START treaty, between Russia and the United States expired in February, removing any caps on the two largest atomic arsenals for the first time in more than a half-century. As the treaty was set to expire, Trump rejected a call by Russia to extend the two-country deal for another year and called for “a new, improved, and modernized” deal that includes China.

The Pentagon estimates China will have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.

Madhani, Weissert and Boak write for the Associated Press. Boak reported from Washington. AP writers Darlene Superville in Washington, Huizhong Wu in Bangkok, Hyung-jin Kim in Seoul, South Korea, and Kanis Leung in Hong Kong contributed to this report.

China renewed its strong opposition to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan ahead of the high profile summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing.

Taiwan is expected to be one of the most sensitive issues discussed during the two day meeting, alongside trade disputes, regional security, and the ongoing Iran conflict.

Beijing considers Taiwan part of its territory, while the United States maintains unofficial relations with Taipei and remains legally committed to helping the island defend itself.

China Repeats Opposition to Arms Sales

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office warned Washington against expanding military cooperation with Taiwan and criticized U.S. weapons sales to the island.

Spokesperson Zhang Han described Taiwan as a core Chinese national interest and called on the United States to honor previous commitments under the One China framework.

Beijing argues that Taiwan is an internal Chinese matter and strongly opposes any foreign military involvement with the island.

Record US Weapons Package Raises Tensions

The Trump administration approved an $11 billion weapons package for Taiwan in December, marking the largest U.S. arms sale to the island to date.

Reports have also suggested that another arms package worth around $14 billion could be approved after Trump’s visit to China, though its current status remains unclear.

The United States says such sales are necessary to ensure Taiwan can defend itself against possible military pressure from China.

Taiwan Defence Budget Faces Scrutiny

The issue gained further attention after Taiwan’s opposition controlled parliament approved only part of a proposed $40 billion defense budget requested by President Lai Ching-te.

The approved funding prioritizes purchases of U.S. weapons while reducing spending on some domestic defense programs, including drones.

American officials reportedly expressed disappointment that the budget fell short of what Washington believes Taiwan needs for adequate defense preparedness.

Taiwanese officials fear Beijing could use the reduced spending as leverage during talks with Trump to argue against further U.S. military support for the island.

Taiwan Rejects Beijing Sovereignty Claims

Speaking at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit, Lai described Taiwan as a sovereign and independent nation that would not yield to external pressure.

China quickly rejected those remarks, reiterating that Taiwan has never been and will never become an independent country.

Beijing also repeated warnings that it retains the option of using force to bring Taiwan under its control, although it continues to publicly favor peaceful reunification.

Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party responded by emphasizing the island’s democratic system, independent government, and military institutions.

Taiwan Remains Central to US China Rivalry

Taiwan has become one of the most dangerous flashpoints in U.S. China relations, with both powers viewing the issue as tied directly to national credibility and regional influence.

For China, Taiwan represents sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity. For the United States, support for Taiwan is linked to maintaining regional stability and reassuring allies in the Indo Pacific.

Analysts warn that increasing military activity, arms sales, and political tensions surrounding Taiwan continue to raise the risk of miscalculation between Washington and Beijing.

Analysis

China’s warning ahead of the Trump Xi summit highlights how deeply the Taiwan issue shapes the broader strategic rivalry between the United States and China.

Despite ongoing diplomatic engagement and trade negotiations, Taiwan remains the most sensitive and potentially explosive issue in the bilateral relationship. Both sides see compromise on Taiwan as politically risky and strategically costly.

The large U.S. arms packages demonstrate Washington’s determination to strengthen Taiwan’s defense capabilities, especially as China rapidly expands its military presence around the island.

At the same time, Taiwan’s internal political debates over defense spending reveal concerns within the island about balancing military preparedness with economic and domestic priorities.

For Beijing, any increase in U.S. military support for Taiwan is viewed as interference in China’s internal affairs and a challenge to its sovereignty claims.

The summit between Trump and Xi may help reduce immediate tensions, but the fundamental disagreement over Taiwan is unlikely to ease. As military capabilities expand and political rhetoric hardens on all sides, Taiwan will remain a central test of whether the United States and China can manage strategic competition without drifting toward confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

Taipei, Taiwan – Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to seek concessions on Taiwan and US tariffs when he meets United States President Donald Trump for a high-stakes summit taking place in the shadow of the war on Iran.

Trump will arrive in China on Wednesday evening for a three-day visit that will mark the first trip by a US leader to the country since 2017, when Trump visited in the early days of his first term.

Unlike Trump, who is renowned for his mercurial policymaking, Xi is widely seen as predictable in his goals for the summit, particularly as they concern Beijing’s longstanding “core interests” related to national security and territorial integrity.

At the top of that list is Taiwan.

While Taiwan’s government considers itself the head of a de facto sovereign state, Beijing views the island as an inalienable part of its territory.

The US formally cut ties with Taiwan – also known as the Republic of China – decades ago, but is committed to aiding the self-governing democracy’s defence under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.

Under the law, Washington has provided Taiwan with billions of dollars in arms and pursued cooperation in areas such as military training and intelligence sharing, which Beijing considers interference in its internal affairs.

The US government officially acknowledges that China views Taiwan as part of its territory, but does not express a stance on whether it agrees.

Washington is also intentionally vague about whether it would intervene to defend Taiwan if China sought to annex it by force.

In a call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio last month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made clear that Taiwan would be raised at the summit, describing the issue as “the biggest risk in the China-US relationship”, according to a Chinese readout of the call.

China’s embassy in Washington, DC, reiterated that message after Trump’s departure for the summit on Tuesday, naming Taiwan as the first of “four red lines” that “must not be challenged”.

While analysts say it is unlikely that the US will change its position on Taiwan due to Chinese pressure, Trump said this week that the summit’s agenda would include US arms sales to the island, raising questions about the future of a stalled multibillion-dollar arms deal.

The US Congress approved the arms package reportedly worth $14bn earlier this year, but the sale still requires Trump’s final approval.

Xi will use his meetings with Trump to “influence and potentially convince Trump to agree to scale back, if not completely suspend, sales to Taiwan,” William Yang, a Taipei-based analyst at the Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera.

If Trump were to make concessions on weapons sales to Taiwan, he would be breaking with a longstanding policy against consulting with Beijing that dates back to former US President Ronald Reagan.

Cancelling or watering down the deal would be a serious blow to Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te, who is locked in an intense fight with the opposition over defence spending, Yang said.

“They are hoping to first influence Trump’s decision around this issue and potentially create a situation where it will be much harder for [Lai’s] government to request more special defensive spending in the future,” Yang said.

Restoring the US-China framework

Xi is also eager to smooth over US-China relations after a tumultuous 18 months that saw Trump launch a second trade war with the world’s second-largest economy, according to analysts.

The standoff saw each side roll out escalating tit-for-tat tariffs – briefly sending duties well above 100 percent – and other punitive measures, such as export controls, before Washington and Beijing hit pause in May.

During their last meeting in South Korea in October, Xi and Trump agreed to a one-year reprieve in their trade war, while keeping some trade measures in place, including certain tariffs and export controls.

Over the past month, the US has rolled out several rounds of new sanctions targeting Chinese firms, including refiners accused of buying Iranian oil and companies accused of helping Tehran obtain materials to build drones and missiles.

Earlier this month, Beijing issued a “prohibition order” directing firms to disregard the US sanctions on its oil refineries.

“Beijing wants predictability and certainty for the remainder of Trump’s term through January 2029, because Beijing needs to be able to plan its own economic policies,” Feng Chucheng, a founding partner of Beijing-based Hutong Research advisory, told Al Jazeera.

These policy considerations include understanding tariff levels the US will apply to China and its trade partners, Feng said.

Wang Wen, dean of the school for global leadership at Renmin University in Beijing, said China wishes to return to a relationship based on “peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation”.

“We hope that this meeting will bring the US policy towards China back to these three principles,” Wang told Al Jazeera.

The stakes are high for Beijing, where the view of Trump has shifted from a “predictable transactional counterpart” to a “more action-oriented and harder-to-restrain opponent,” Hung Pu-Chao, deputy executive director of the Center for Mainland China and Regional Development Research at Taiwan’s Tunghai University, told Al Jazeera.

Restoring the US-China relationship to a stable footing is one way to mitigate these risks, Hung said.

Rather than secure concessions, Hung said, China’s priority is “trying to adjust the current strategic position and negotiating pace that are unfavourable to it, and bring US-China interactions back into a framework that it can better control”.

At the summit, Xi is likely to agree to increase purchases of US agricultural exports and Boeing planes, Feng said, and could also back Trump’s plan to create a “Board of Trade” and a “Board of Investment” to oversee US-China economic ties.

But China is unlikely to make compromises on rare earths – a sector it dominates – unless the US makes major political concessions, Feng said.

Calling for dialogue on the war on Iran

The US-Israel war on Iran will loom large over the summit.

Although not a main player in the conflict, China has been hit by the economic fallout of the war and the shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of global oil and natural gas supplies usually pass.

Beijing has called for negotiations and a comprehensive ceasefire since the start of the conflict, a message Xi is likely to reiterate in his talks with Trump, according to Jodie Wen, a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

“Xi will talk about this issue with Donald Trump and say that we all know that the war has a huge impact on the world, on Asian countries and the US, so we must have dialogue,” Wen told Al Jazeera.

Trump said on Tuesday that he does not need China’s “help” resolving the war, though the White House has pressured Beijing to lean on Iran to reopen the strait.

Xi and his top diplomat, Wang, have met more than a dozen global leaders and high-level officials since the start of the war, playing a behind-the-scenes mediating role.

China has had a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Iran since 2016, and buys more than 80 percent of its oil.

Wen, the postdoctoral fellow at Tsinghua University, said Xi is unlikely to agree to any involvement except as a mediator, which she described as consistent with China’s longstanding approach to global affairs.

“China’s foreign policy principle is non-intervention,” she said. “This is our principle.”

United States President Donald Trump has departed for Beijing ahead of a high-stakes summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, after weeks of unsuccessful US efforts to persuade China to help bring Iran back to negotiations and ease tensions around the Strait of Hormuz.

The leaders of the world’s two largest economies are due to meet on Thursday and Friday during Trump’s first visit to China since 2017, with talks expected to focus on trade, Taiwan, artificial intelligence and the war involving Iran.

Here is what we know about the upcoming summit and the key issues expected to dominate the agenda.

Why does the Trump-Xi summit matter?

The Trump-Xi summit is a high-level meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping taking place in Beijing as the world’s two largest economies face growing tensions over trade, technology, Taiwan and the Iran war.

The summit is particularly significant because Trump will be the first US leader to visit China in nearly a decade, while the talks also come at a time of heightened geopolitical and economic uncertainty. Originally expected earlier this year, the meeting was delayed by the war on Iran.

Before departing for Beijing, Trump said he and Xi would have a “long talk” about Iran, although he stressed that trade would remain the central focus of the visit.

“Trade remains politically powerful, especially for Trump, because it gives rivalry a language that voters can easily understand,” said Salvador Santino Regilme, associate professor and programme chair of international relations at Leiden University. “Yet the deeper conflict concerns hierarchy, legitimacy and the future architecture of global order.”

Regilme added that both countries remain locked in a relationship shaped by strategic rivalry and deep economic dependence.

“The United States still relies heavily on China’s manufacturing capacity and low-cost production, while China depends on access to US consumers, technology, capital markets and the wider stability of the dollar-centred global economy.”

“This is the paradox of US-China rivalry: each side wants greater autonomy, yet both remain tied to a structure of mutual dependence that neither can easily dismantle without hurting itself,” Regilme added.

What are the biggest issues at the Trump-Xi summit?

Analysts say the US and China are entering the summit with different priorities.

Trump is expected to focus heavily on trade with the aim of securing what he can present as economic wins ahead of November’s midterm elections. Washington has pushed for China to increase purchases of American goods, including Boeing aircraft, beef and soya beans, while also seeking closer investment and trade cooperation.

Beijing, meanwhile, is expected to press the US to ease restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports and roll back measures limiting China’s access to critical chip-making technology. Taiwan is also likely to remain one of the most sensitive and contested issues in the summit.

Trump has also said he plans to raise the case of Jimmy Lai, the jailed Hong Kong media tycoon and pro-democracy figure sentenced earlier this year under Beijing’s national security law.

Beyond bilateral disputes, the two leaders are also expected to discuss the war on Iran, tensions around the Strait of Hormuz and the growing risks linked to artificial intelligence.

The biggest flashpoints include:

Tech vs rare earths

Technology and supply chains are expected to be among the key issues at the summit, as Washington and Beijing remain locked in a widening battle over semiconductors and critical minerals.

The US has tightened restrictions on advanced chips and chip-making equipment going to China, saying the measures are needed to slow Beijing’s military and AI development.

China, meanwhile, controls roughly 90 percent of global rare earth refining, materials essential for semiconductors, electric vehicles, military equipment and electronics, and has responded with tighter export controls on several critical minerals.

Beijing is expected to push for fewer US technology restrictions, while Washington wants China to resume shipments of rare earths and critical minerals after export controls disrupted parts of the American automotive and aerospace sectors.

 Iran war and the Strait of Hormuz

The Iran war is expected to be one of the most closely watched issues at the summit.

Analysts expect Washington to press Beijing to use its influence over Tehran, particularly because China remains the largest buyer of Iranian oil — by far — purchasing more than 80 percent of Iran’s shipped crude exports. US officials have also urged China to support efforts to reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz, a vital route for global energy supplies.

The conflict has also increased pressure on China’s economy and energy security. About half of China’s crude oil imports come from the Middle East, while disruptions in the Gulf have left commercial shipping vulnerable to attacks and delays.

“I have no doubt that Trump is going to at least try to enlist Xi Jinping to assert some pressure for the Iranians to come back to the table and agree to a settlement,” said Dan Grazier, a senior fellow and director of the National Security Reform programme at the Stimson Center.

Experts say Iran may be one of the few areas where US and Chinese interests overlap, as both countries benefit from stable energy flows through the Gulf.

“Both sides would like to see the strait opened,” said Gregory Poling, director and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), but he noted Beijing is unlikely to align itself too closely with Washington’s approach towards Tehran.

While China wants shipping through the Strait of Hormuz restored, Poling argued the diplomatic and strategic pressure created by the disruption is falling far more heavily on Washington.

“It is not China being humiliated in the strait … It’s the US.”

Taiwan: An existential problem

Taiwan is expected to be one of the most sensitive issues, with Beijing repeatedly warning that it remains the biggest source of tension in US-China relations.

China claims the self-ruled island as part of its territory and has increased military pressure on Taiwan in recent years through regular air and naval operations around the island.

Tensions have risen further under Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing has sharply criticised because his party views Taiwan as already sovereign.

The US officially recognises the communist mainland as China but is legally committed under the Taiwan Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defence, a policy that has long angered China. Washington has approved tens of billions of dollars in military sales to Taiwan over the years, including an $11bn package announced last year, and Trump recently said he discussed the issue with Xi ahead of the summit.

Analysts say Taiwan will be paying close attention to what Trump and Xi say publicly after the summit, especially on defence and arms sales.

“What matters is the precise wording,” Regilme said. “Whether Trump reaffirms support for Taiwan’s defence, whether he sounds ambiguous on arms sales, and whether he gives Xi any rhetorical opening to claim that Washington is restraining Taipei.”

Regilme said Beijing is likely to push for limits on US arms sales and stronger political restrictions on Taiwan, while also discouraging any movement towards formal independence. At the same time, Taipei fears it could become part of a broader geopolitical bargain between Washington and Beijing.

“In great-power politics, small words often carry large consequences, especially for those whose survival depends on the credibility of others,” Regilme added.

Tariffs

Trade is also expected to be a sticking point after years of friction between the US and China over tariffs and economic competition.

The latest trade dispute intensified last year when Trump imposed new tariffs on Chinese goods. China responded with its own tariffs.

At the height of the dispute, tariffs on some goods climbed above 100 percent, prompting concerns about the impact on global trade and supply chains.

The two countries later agreed to temporarily lower tensions through a trade truce reached during talks in South Korea. As part of the deal, China agreed to buy more US agricultural products, including soya beans, while Washington rolled back some tariffs.

What would count as a successful outcome for Trump and Xi?

Analysts say a successful outcome for Trump would likely need to be visible and easy to sell politically at home. That could include Chinese purchases of US goods, movement on tariffs, cooperation on Iran, or progress on rare earth exports.

“Trump’s foreign policy style places enormous value on the public performance of dealmaking, so the optics of success may matter almost as much as the substance,” Regilme said.

For Xi, success would mean preserving stability without appearing to bow to Washington, while securing greater economic predictability and recognition of China as a global power.

“A comprehensive trade deal seems unlikely because the structural sources of rivalry remain unresolved,” Regilme added.

Instead, he said a limited agreement is more likely, potentially involving tariff pauses, purchase commitments, rare earth arrangements or a framework for future negotiations.

“Such an agreement would manage the rivalry temporarily, while leaving untouched the deeper problem: the two economies remain mutually dependent, but their governments increasingly treat that dependency as a strategic danger.”

BEIJING — The Trump administration has repeatedly framed the war in Iran as a quick, winnable fight, vowing to defeat the Islamic Republic “totally and decisively” — incomparable to the “dumb” wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But from China’s perspective, the parallels are clear.

“You can blow everything up — destroy it all,” one Chinese official told The Times, describing the Americans, “but you don’t have a strategy.”

President Trump arrives in Beijing this week for talks with a Chinese government that is confident as ever in its ascendance on the world stage, taking stock of its leverage and still baffled the U.S. administration chose yet another costly war in the Middle East.

China has watched as the United States, over seven weeks of fighting an outmatched enemy, has depleted nearly half of its stockpiles of high-end munitions — including its THAAD and Patriot batteries — and fired its Army chief of staff, among other Pentagon leaders, who had warned of critical shortages.

Marco Rubio, Trump’s national security advisor and secretary of State, has said the military operation that started the war known as Operation Epic Fury “is over.”

But the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most vital commercial waterways, remains effectively shuttered. Iranian attacks in the region continue. And talks between Washington and Tehran have failed to reach a diplomatic agreement to bring a definitive end to the conflict.

“The Chinese have high regard for the operational proficiency of U.S. forces, but they recognize that, thus far at least, the Trump administration has not achieved its core objectives in going to war with Iran,” said David Ochmanek, a former deputy assistant secretary of Defense now with the Rand Corp.

The war has given Beijing an opportunity, Ochmanek said, “to double down on the claim they have made for the past year and a half that the [People’s Republic of China], not the U.S., is a force for global stability.”

The war has allowed China to demonstrate some diplomatic prowess. An initial ceasefire reached between the United States and Iran last month was only clinched after Beijing pressured Tehran to agree. And China’s advocacy for an open strait — rejecting Iranian attempts to impose a toll system — while opposing the U.S. war itself has allowed Beijing to maintain leverage with both sides.

It has also inflicted costs. Allies of Beijing noticed when the government did not leap to the defense of Tehran at the start of the war. And China has its own vested interest in a free and open waterway, where nearly 50% of the country’s crude oil imports pass through each day.

Building up to the start of the war and throughout its initial weeks, Washington diverted significant military assets from Asia — where Trump’s own national security strategy says they are needed most — to the Middle East.

The USS Abraham Lincoln was redirected from the South China Sea, along with scores of advanced missile interceptors from South Korea and Japan and nearly the entire U.S. inventory of long-range air-to-surface missiles in the Pacific.

Policy experts at the Pentagon were brought in to discuss a potential invasion of Kharg Island, the jewel of Iran’s oil industry, to draw lessons from planning a defense of Taiwan, according to a Defense official, who was granted anonymity to speak candidly. A Marine expeditionary unit was sent from Okinawa to the region for the potential operation.

Chinese officials and analysts have been candid in their assessments of U.S. hard power, impressed by a military they acknowledge remains the best in the world.

But Beijing sees a persistent flaw in U.S. strategy: the belief that military strength alone can reshape political realities, a view further weakened by the pressures on a democratic government whose public grows impatient with wars that drag on beyond days or weeks.

China’s autocracy is free from accountability to the public — and anyway has confidence that Chinese public opinion would be on its side if it were to launch a major military operation against its main target, Taiwan.

But there are lessons of caution to be learned from the Americans, as well.

Over the last year, the Taiwanese Navy has been practicing the rapid deployment of cheap and domestically produced smart mines for the sea — a potential bulwark against enemy blockades of ports and hostile invasion forces.

It is the type of asymmetric warfare that has so far frustrated the U.S. military in the Strait of Hormuz, protracting a war that Trump vowed would last a month or less.

Taiwan, too, would confront Beijing with political realities that military force cannot erase. Nearly 90% of the Taiwanese people oppose a Chinese takeover, and about 60% say they would resist it at all costs.

“Chinese analysts see two things at once,” said Craig Singleton, senior director of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “They are impressed by U.S. military reach, precision and operational capability, but they also see a familiar pattern of American power struggling to translate battlefield success into a durable political outcome.”

That matters for Taiwan, Singleton said, “because China’s own military modernization has borrowed heavily from the American model, relying heavily on joint operations, high-tech precision strikes, decapitation concepts and information dominance.

“If the world’s most experienced military can still struggle to convert military pressure into political success,” he added, “Beijing has to ask whether the [People’s Liberation Army] could do better in a far more complex Taiwan scenario.”

China has intensified its diplomatic rhetoric against Santiago Peña following his recent visit to Taiwan, reflecting Beijing’s growing efforts to isolate Taipei internationally and weaken the remaining countries that maintain formal diplomatic ties with the island.

Paraguay is one of only 12 states that officially recognize Taiwan instead of the People’s Republic of China. During his visit, Peña reaffirmed support for Taiwan and described relations with Taipei as rooted in shared democratic values and political freedom.

Beijing responded sharply, accusing Paraguayan politicians of serving as “pawns” of Taiwanese separatist forces and suggesting that leaders supporting Taiwan may have “ulterior motives.” The unusually aggressive language highlights how sensitive the Taiwan issue has become within China’s broader foreign policy strategy.

Why Paraguay Matters to China and Taiwan

Although Paraguay is not a major global power, its diplomatic recognition carries significant symbolic and strategic importance for both China and Taiwan.

For Taiwan, maintaining formal diplomatic allies is essential to preserving international legitimacy and resisting Beijing’s efforts to diplomatically isolate the island. Each country that continues to recognize Taiwan represents political resistance against China’s One China principle.

For China, reducing Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partnerships is part of a long term strategy aimed at reinforcing Beijing’s claim that Taiwan lacks the status of an independent state. Over the past decade, several countries have switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing after economic and political engagement with China.

Paraguay therefore represents one of Taiwan’s most important remaining diplomatic footholds in South America.

Economic Pressure Shapes the Debate

The controversy surrounding Paraguay’s Taiwan relationship is increasingly driven by economic considerations. Some Paraguayan politicians, agricultural exporters, and business groups argue that maintaining ties with Taiwan limits access to Chinese markets and investment opportunities.

China is the world’s second largest economy and a major importer of agricultural products, making diplomatic recognition economically attractive for many developing states.

Supporters of relations with Beijing argue that Paraguay could gain greater trade access, infrastructure investment, and financial opportunities if it abandoned Taiwan.

However, Peña and supporters of Taiwan emphasize ideological and political considerations, framing the relationship as a partnership based on democratic governance and political sovereignty rather than purely economic interests.

This reflects a broader global trend where smaller states increasingly face pressure to balance economic incentives against political alignment and strategic values.

China’s Diplomatic Messaging Is Becoming More Aggressive

The sharp rhetoric from China’s foreign ministry demonstrates Beijing’s increasingly confrontational diplomatic approach on issues related to Taiwan.

By describing Paraguayan leaders as “pawns” and questioning their motivations, China is signaling that support for Taiwan will be treated not merely as a diplomatic disagreement but as active opposition to Chinese national interests.

This language also serves multiple audiences simultaneously.

Internationally, Beijing seeks to discourage other governments from strengthening ties with Taiwan.

Domestically, strong rhetoric reinforces nationalist narratives surrounding territorial sovereignty and reunification.

Regionally, China is attempting to increase pressure on Paraguay by suggesting that continued support for Taiwan contradicts public opinion and economic interests.

The emphasis on opinion polls claiming support for relations with Beijing also reflects China’s strategy of portraying diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as politically unsustainable.

Taiwan’s Shrinking Diplomatic Space

The dispute illustrates Taiwan’s increasingly difficult international position as China expands its diplomatic, military, and economic influence globally.

Under President Lai Ching-te, Taiwan has continued emphasizing democracy, sovereignty, and international partnerships. However, Beijing views Lai as supporting separatist policies and has intensified political and military pressure against Taipei.

Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies have steadily declined over recent decades as China has used economic incentives and geopolitical influence to persuade states to switch recognition.

As a result, every remaining ally now carries outsized symbolic importance for Taipei’s international visibility and diplomatic legitimacy.

Analysis

China’s reaction to Peña’s Taiwan visit demonstrates how the Taiwan issue has evolved into one of the most emotionally and strategically sensitive dimensions of Chinese foreign policy.

Beijing no longer views diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as a minor symbolic issue. Instead, it increasingly interprets international engagement with Taipei as a challenge to China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and geopolitical authority.

The pressure on Paraguay also reflects the broader transformation of global diplomacy under growing United States China rivalry. Smaller countries are increasingly caught between competing geopolitical and economic pressures, particularly when balancing relations with democratic partners against the economic power of China.

For Paraguay, the debate is ultimately about strategic identity as much as economics. Maintaining relations with Taiwan offers political alignment with democratic values and preserves diplomatic independence from Beijing’s influence. Switching recognition to China could deliver economic benefits but may also reduce Paraguay’s foreign policy autonomy.

For Taiwan, retaining Paraguay is important not only diplomatically but psychologically. Every diplomatic loss strengthens Beijing’s narrative that international recognition of Taiwan is disappearing and that eventual reunification is inevitable.

The dispute therefore reflects a much larger geopolitical contest over legitimacy, influence, and the future international status of Taiwan. As competition between China and Taiwan intensifies, diplomatic battles involving even relatively small states are likely to become increasingly significant within global geopolitics.

With information from Reuters.

TAIPEI, Taiwan — A resolute Secretary of State Marco Rubio took to the White House lectern Tuesday and declared the United States, under President Trump’s leadership, had launched a bold new operation to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, based on the principle that international waterways must remain free.

An hour later, Trump walked it all back, ending the complex military endeavor after less than a day.

It was just the latest evidence to America’s allies that the word of the U.S. government is subject entirely to the president’s whims. And such is the worry fueling concerns in Taipei ahead of Trump’s state visit to China this week.

Privately, senior administration officials have assured Taiwanese leadership ahead of the trip that Trump has no intention of changing long-standing U.S. policy on the island, two sources familiar with the discussions said — a stance of “strategic ambiguity” that has avoided any declarative statements on Taiwanese independence since it was coined by Henry Kissinger 55 years ago.

A White House official was definitive that U.S. policy toward Taiwan “remains the same as the first Trump administration.”

“The U.S. One China policy, as our cross-strait policies are collectively known, is based on the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques and the Six Assurances to Taiwan,” the official said. “There is no change to our policy with respect to Taiwan.”

But Chinese officials told The Times that their president, Xi Jinping, intends to raise the matter as a top priority, knowing that only one person — Trump himself — speaks for the administration today.

Whether Xi can leverage the intimacy of a private audience to shift Trump’s stance, potentially linking it to other U.S. objectives, is the source of significant concern here.

Taiwanese officials fear even the most subtle rhetorical change in policy from Trump could imperil a delicate status quo that has held, to its benefit, for decades. They have similarly sought assurances that the administration will follow through on a pending U.S. arms sale worth over $10 billion, which received approval from Taiwan’s legislature on Friday.

“The most serious scenario would be if President Trump were to make an impromptu statement, such as, ‘I oppose Taiwanese independence,’ particularly if he were to link this to trade, the Iran issue, or a summit agreement,” said Chienyu Shih, of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taiwan. “This would constitute a rhetorical concession of substantial significance to Beijing.”

Rubio told reporters at his news conference Tuesday — with a similar confidence he expressed on the Iran file — that China understands Washington’s long-standing position on the island.

“I’m sure Taiwan will be a topic of conversation. It always is. The Chinese understand our position on that topic — we understand theirs,” Rubio said.

“I think both countries understand that it is in neither one of our interests to see anything destabilizing happen in that part of the world,” he added. “We don’t need any destabilizing events to occur with regards to Taiwan, or anywhere in the Indo-Pacific. And that’s to the mutual benefit of both the United States and the Chinese.”

Trump has suggested a willingness to shift U.S. policy on Taiwan before.

During his initial campaign for the presidency in 2016, Trump openly questioned the One China policy, drawing ire from Beijing for suggesting he might endorse Taiwanese independence. He accepted a call from Taiwan’s president after his victory and would later support significant arms sales to Taipei.

And yet, at a 2017 meeting with Xi, Trump vacillated, telling the Chinese leader he could “deal with” the Taiwan issue in “a matter of months,” according to the Wall Street Journal. The Chinese were reportedly so flabbergasted by the comment that they dismissed it as rhetorical flourish.

“There is concern that the conversation between the two leaders could veer into sensitive territory on the topic of Taiwan,” said Brian Hart, deputy director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “but there are many in the administration who would still appreciate the importance of general continuity in U.S. policy.”

U.S. support for Taiwan’s democratic movement used to be a matter of principle. Today, Washington sees it as a matter of national security. Over 60% of semiconductors are produced in Taiwan, including 90% of the world’s most advanced chips. And it is viewed as the clasp of the first island chain guarding against Chinese maritime expansion.

A robust debate between Taiwan’s Cabinet and the opposition in parliament ended Friday not over whether to accept U.S. defense equipment, but over how much to spend. The Legislative Yuan approved $24 billion in purchases — including a defense package passed by Congress in December and the pending arms sale — falling short of Taipei’s $40-billion proposal.

Anticipation for the president’s state visit is high here in the capital city, where local news is filled with questions over the influence Trump’s war in Iran might have on his appetite for supporting Taiwan.

Chinese defense analysts have seen the war as a sign of U.S. weakness. But Taiwanese defense experts have taken away a different lesson: cheap equipment from a lesser military, such as dumb mines thrown in a strait, may just be enough to paralyze a superpower.

The latest U.S. National Security Strategy, released by the Trump administration in December, emphasized the importance of support for Taiwan and the status quo.

But the Taiwanese took note that the strategy also called for an end to forever wars in the Middle East, offering little preview of the president’s sudden strategic pivot on Iran in February, launching a war few saw coming.

What Trump chooses to say in China “might be difficult to predict,” said Jyh-Shyang Sheu, a scholar of Chinese politics and military capabilities based in Taiwan.

But “in Taipei, we are still focusing on the U.S. policy,” he added, “more focusing on what he does instead of what he says.”