There was also no small amount of political opportunism at play.
The recall gave Newsom’s critics, mainly on the right, a chance to try to chase the Democrat from an office that Republicans, under normal circumstances, stood little chance of winning.
In the end, the recall effort amounted to scarcely more than a partisan tantrum. The result — 61.9% voting no, 38.1% voting yes — matched the outcome of the 2018 gubernatorial race down to the decimal. All that money and effort wasted on an election in which voters said pretty much, yep, we meant what we said. Not too long after, they gave Newsom a second term.
The plebiscite, and its pointlessness, underscored the many flaws inherent in California’s recall system. In November, voters will get a chance to remedy at least one of them, eliminating the chance a candidate could take office with just marginal support from voters.
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Trigger warning: What follows is a somewhat wonky explanation of election rules and procedures.
One choice, not two
Currently, a recall election is conducted in two parts. Voters are asked whether a lawmaker should be removed and, if so, who their replacement should be. If the incumbent is ousted, whoever gets the most votes takes their place, even if they fall well shy of attaining majority support. (Which is not out of the question in a large multi-candidate field; in 2003, 135 people were on the ballot, vying to replace Gov. Gray Davis.)
Among its provisions, Proposition 5 would amend the state Constitution so that voters would be asked a simple yes-or-no question: Do you wish to recall the incumbent? If so, the lieutenant governor would serve as governor for the rest of the ousted executive’s term — unless the recall occurred during the first two years a governor was in office and before the filing deadline for the next statewide election.
In that case, a special election would be held on the same date as the next primary and a candidate receiving a majority of votes would serve out the governor’s term. If no candidate received a majority, the top-two finishers would face each other in a November runoff, with the winner taking over as governor.
Still there?
Proposition 5 has two benefits. It would save taxpayer dollars by consolidating elections and it would enhance the legitimacy and political standing of a replacement governor by ensuring he or she assumed office with at least 50% support.
California makes it way too easy to qualify a gubernatorial recall measure.
Of the 19 states that allow their governor to be booted, California is by far the most permissive. Forcing an election requires signatures reflecting just 12% of the ballots cast in the prior gubernatorial contest. In Newsom’s case, proponents needed just under 1.5 million signatures in a state with more than 22 million voters and nearly 40 million residents.
Not exactly a thundering roar.
The threshold should be higher and the reasons for kicking a governor out of office should be more serious, such as corruption, official malfeasance or conviction for a serious crime. Not just because a governor is a member of the opposite party, or people on the losing end of an election are unhappy with the result.
“The system in its current form offers bad actors an incentive to target an elected official with whom they disagree and to have the official replaced by someone who otherwise would not enjoy the support of a majority of voters,” Josh Newman of Fullerton and Isaac Bryan of Los Angeles said in advocating change. The two Democratic lawmakers authored the constitutional amendment, which was placed on November’s ballot by the Legislature.
If you think overhauling the process is simply about protecting partisan interests, consider: Should Republican Steve Hilton pull off an epic upset and become California’s next governor, is there any doubt a recall effort would be underway before he and Mrs. Hilton even had the chance to start boxing their belongings for the move to Sacramento?
The recall is a vestige of the Progressive-era good-government movement. But the process needs to be revamped to reflect today’s bad-faith political environment.
The Little Hoover Commission, California’s independent oversight agency, has recommended several changes, including raising the signature requirement and prohibiting recalls undertaken during the first 90 days and the last six months of an officeholder’s term.
Elections, it’s said, have consequences. They also have — or should have — end dates and final results that are respected, not re-litigated until the losing side gets its way.
Proposition 5 is a step in the right direction. More should follow.
The trajectory of the political transition that many Venezuelans await since January 3 seems to have been clarifying over the past few weeks. The first expected milestone is the reform of the Supreme Court of Justice, although it remains to be seen how many of the new magistrates will be independent and how many tied to factions of the chavista elite. The expectation is that, before the end of the year, the agenda will include a new board of rectors for the CNE and the long-awaited electoral calendar. In Panama, María Corina Machado had opened to negotiating these matters directly with Delcy Rodríguez, but the United States decided to manage the institutional opening through a small group of opposition figures, former lawmakers from Primero Justicia and Voluntad Popular in the 2015 National Assembly. The discomfort of Machado and her inner circle with this decision is no secret. The opposition leader has stated that she does not intend to stand in the way. Individuals linked to her team and party have raised doubts about the negotiation’s initial legitimacy and early progress, while other longtime opposition figures have welcomed the recent releases of political prisoners and the roadmap the US has outlined.
At Caracas Chronicles, we sat down to talk with Guillermo Aveledo Coll, a political scientist, expert in Venezuelan political history, and researcher of the ideas that have shaped its parties and conflicts. Aveledo views the unfolding dialogue favorably. He believes general elections must take place in Venezuela as soon as possible, though not without first tying up loose ends related to the broad recognition of any electoral process and the stability of future governments. He also discussed the dynamics that could emerge among political parties amid a transition, both within the anti-chavista camp and inside the chavista movement. Much like Marco Rubio in January, he made reference to the Spanish Transition. Finally, he reflected on our last transition to democracy (1958–1968) and how Rómulo Betancourt and Acción Democrática adapted to move forward in the face of adversity.
Recently, María Corina Machado used a term typical in transition frameworks. She said that the transition to democracy cannot be an elite pact made behind the people’s backs and without a popular mandate. Does the agenda unfolding between a commission of the Delcy government and the Delegated Commission of the old 2015 National Assembly fall into the category of an elite pact? You have been a defender of the legacy of the Puntofijo Pact. Is an elite pact problematic in these particular circumstances?
What we are seeing, which points embryonically toward an elite agreement, will have to be filtered through the will of the population, because the ultimate source of legitimacy in a democratic republic passes through it. The Puntofijo Pact was a concrete agreement on political rules among parties. However, had those parties lacked inherent legitimacy and a firm foothold, those rules might have overwhelmed them. In those elections, an independent candidate backed by one of the historic parties, Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal, obtained a very high percentage of the vote and came in second. So it could very well have been something that surpassed them, that swallowed them up.
Venezuela will need elections. It also needs the freedoms and guarantees for those elections to take place. Not because winning them without those guarantees is impossible, but because the opposition’s victories haven’t been recognized without them, while a government win leaves reasonable doubts regarding legitimacy. And if a fundamental actor in that social recognition, María Corina Machado, remains sidelined, there is all the more reason. But that alone does not fix the system; once an agreement on guarantees, freedoms, and institutional restructuring is reached to allow a new electoral process, we will be talking about another stage—the delicate process of Venezuela’s redemocratization.
Moving on to the US and the difference between what Marco Rubio says, for example, and what Machado says. I believe the US approach, at least initially, was to seek a more gradual path. Machado rejects gradualism, connecting with majorities desperate for improvements in their day-to-day lives. Do you view gradualism as desirable in this case, or does it bring risks?
Right now, it is not a matter of desirable or undesirable. It must be viewed carefully. What does gradualism mean in this context? If it means the indefinite postponement of elections, then I agree there should be no gradualism. Elections must happen sooner rather than later. Now, must other things happen before elections? Of course. Certain decisions are necessary. For many Venezuelans, the existing electoral institution is neither trustworthy nor advantageous; going to an election feels risky—not so much because of the voting machines or the system itself, but because of the allocation rules, which heavily favor the plurality or the majority.
“If you keep the current allocation system, there will be such complete steamrolling that a significant yet minority sector will find itself far more diminished than political reality dictates.”
They are rules of steamrolling. If you have a 5-4 distribution, the practical result becomes 6-3; if you have a 3-1, it becomes 4 or 4.5 to 1. That poses a problem because we are in a process that did not open through social pressure overthrowing the system. The system is still there, and its existence must be dealt with. Today, the system is making concessions that, propaganda aside, respond to external pressure. Saying that nothing will change and that all this is meaningless is a different matter. If, instead, gradualism means taking the necessary steps to promote those elections so the outcome is recognized and governance is secure, then it is logical. These processes tend to be gradual when they happen.
What should come first: presidential elections, legislative elections, or both at once?
The broader the possibility for popular expression, the better. It is convenient for a new government, of any political line, to have significant parliamentary support. In my view, general elections—or at least national general elections covering national jurisdiction, including overseas voting—are advisable. This would generate two branches of power: the Legislative and the Executive. If we maintain the proportions that society currently suggests, it would likely be a moment of overwhelming majority for one sector over another. Politically, that is not necessarily desirable. What do I mean? For the stability of the present and future process, there needs to be a form of representation closer to the national mindset. Today, the PSUV represents a significant minority, but a smaller one than in other historical moments. We will see how that translates in an environment of freedom, without infringement, and without pressure from the bureaucracy or the State as an employer. Perhaps the result could be different for chavismo now. But relying on polls that indicate a four-to-one or three-to-one gap, if you keep the current allocation system, there will be such complete steamrolling that a significant yet minority sector will find itself far more diminished than political reality dictates.
“It is likely that chavismo as an entity will take various forms and fragment. Is it convenient for it to disappear? I think doing so artificially is dangerous.”
That is not necessarily a good start. Democratic zeal and sectarianism in other transitions have weakened a democracy’s ability to respond and advance—which is ultimately what all democratic sectors want. I prefer a solid democracy with a significant, albeit limited, representation of chavismo over the alternative, simply because of what they represent in political life. Furthermore, remember: they could not be extracted—or rather, removed—from power as a structure. That carries weight. Does that mean I wish for an authoritarian leftist force like chavismo turned out to be at the height of its power? No. I believe there should be a force representing the political identity that chavismo is—as a cultural, political, and ideological identity that existed before fading due to its own dynamics. Who holds the broad banner of chavismo today? I do not know. The ones in Miraflores? I don’t know if they are indisputable figures within that movement, or if the discontent and dismay throughout this period generate fragmentation.
As happened in other transition experiences, the government party sometimes splits once it opens up, gets overtaken, and the opposition takes power. It is probable that chavismo as an entity will take various forms and fragment. Is it convenient for it to disappear? I think doing so artificially is dangerous. From 1945 to 1948, the majority force believed no other party was democratic. That gave us 10 years of harsh dictatorship. I prefer to see chavismo divide around democracy: some supporting the transition and others supporting an authoritarian or violent return to power, allowing us to face them within that framework.
A few years ago, there was much talk about the decline of Venezuelan opposition parties, even the idea that these parties are dead. A set of parties, to an extent heirs to the old two-party system, retain certain references and machinery. What are the challenges for these parties moving forward, beyond the known consequences of prolonged repression and State harassment? Can they grow stronger?
The dynamics will emerge naturally. Obviously, parties retain elements of historical legitimacy, identity, and roots, but a sifting process toward other options is very likely. My desire, of course, is for a party bloc to form around democracy. But then we face the issue of the primus inter pares. María Corina Machado is the leader and the most popular political figure in Venezuela’s recent history—the most individually popular since the death of Chávez. She holds a massive advantage, though that isn’t necessarily true for her party, Vente Venezuela. I don’t mean to diminish Vente’s value. That is why a bloc, agreements, and that collective notion are more suitable. Some argue this spirit broke after the start of negotiations, that the spirit of Panama was lost. I see it more as a pivot toward the direction Panama points. It is not the form the Panama Agreement indicated, but it aligns with the expectations it set. These are not completely unfamiliar actors; an abnormal arrangement is not being forced upon Venezuelan society.
Now, should the parties emerge? That will happen in due time. It took time for the Spanish Right to consolidate after Adolfo Suárez’s UCD and the dissolution of Francoist parties. Those fell into oblivion and later merged into a party representing that world sociologically, which became the People’s Party (PP). In the case of the Spanish Left, the multitude of cacophonous acronyms from the Spanish Civil War and exile sifted into the PSOE, which had the advantage of being a historic party. It didn’t acquire a new personality, but it began gathering people from other parties, both left-liberals and more heterodox leftists. Here, it could very well settle into one, two, or three major parties forming a bloc. What is the concrete difference between Voluntad Popular, Un Nuevo Tiempo, and Acción Democrática in ideological terms? Or between the other Democratic Unity parties and Vente Venezuela? “Oh, Vente is liberal-capitalist and the others are not.” Are the others not pro-market? Let’s be clear, they have been for a long time. It’s not that they are neoliberal, but they aren’t socialist in the sense of nationalizing the means of production. We should keep that in mind.
Regarding the Venezuelan Left, Chávez was the first major charismatic figure linked to that world who swallowed all leftist parties. That is the essence of PSUV. The Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) and the Unitary Platform positioned themselves as its antithesis: “What unites all of us who hold these ideological differences? The desire for democracy.” What might happen is that a single party—new or distinct—swallows the archipelago of parties that emerged under this system. But it is very probable, as seen in other processes, that a different party system will emerge. What is desirable? That they be democratic parties. What is desirable? That extremist parties, meaning those that do not believe in elections or democracy, can operate legitimately. That would be a danger to them. In its 20-year history, PSUV has opposed pluralism and free, competitive elections; that is how it operated from power. Could it act differently from another perspective? It might, as happened with other parties in different transitions. The PP is an example.
Returning to María Corina, who will likely be a central figure in the upcoming period, I wanted to discuss Rómulo Betancourt, the most prominent figure of our former transition. She once admitted he’s the best president Venezuela ever had. Betancourt both excelled at building consensus during that era and was firm in protecting his State project from extremes. Is he a useful reference point now? What lessons does Betancourt offer María Corina, and what are not lessons?
An important lesson is that he spoke with people who had sent him into exile and prison, admitting them into the new status quo. The only person directly excluded from the system was Pérez Jiménez. Of course, those individuals had also been victimized by the dictatorship, enabling new understandings. With others, Betancourt had built a wall of fire. But in general, he skillfully won over the military and business sectors—building bridges he failed to establish during his first presidency, a lesson in how radicalism can fail. I believe that is a crucial example. Acción Democrática held massive majorities, yet could not sustain its first mandate. In his second term, Betancourt did not take power with an extraordinary majority, yet he gathered more allies. Are the allies of the Unitary Platform enough to support such an administration? If tomorrow there is a National Assembly with an overwhelming majority from a pro-Machado party—whether Vente or another—and the minority or that sector is steamrolled, you will have fewer allies to govern under very difficult circumstances. You may have a non-governing minority, yes, but you will face more discontented voices outside. In that scenario, you should be striving to reconcile.
“What concerns me is that a government led by María Corina—one desired by millions of Venezuelans, including myself—could become unstable because we tried to do too much too soon.”
Of course, there is the idea that reconciliation should be with the masses rather than the elites. Fantastic—I believe that is a genuine aspiration. But one must also consider that part of these sectors belong to those parties. How do the thousands of party militants who helped execute the 2023 primaries or the 2024 voting tally collection feel? Discontent may be brewing there, which does not serve us well. Naturally, demanding total calm and moderation from María Corina—asking her to step away from her historic trajectory—is difficult. Her distrust is not entirely unfounded: major adversaries who have acknowledged her leadership in recent months and years have also acted against her. Perhaps that is why a more institutional coordination between the Unitary Platform and Vente—which I found desirable to allow greater cohesion—never materialized. That places a burden on the parties as well: how much can they demand when their representation is small?
How can an organized Venezuelan society exert influence over this juncture?
By trying to support the possibilities opening up in this scenario, even regarding the most politically committed sectors. The success of the process in Caracas depends largely on restoring, sooner rather than later, the freedoms that allow political dynamics to settle into something genuine and verifiable. It benefits Venezuelan society to lean in that direction. Society must also organize its own demands; democracy requires tolerance and pluralism, but it also requires contestation. There is significant leadership representing that, but society itself must reorganize because organization has been limited and stunted for years—with very few exceptions—by repression and constraints on civil society. Here, I would like to return to María Corina Machado.
Sure, go ahead.
I spoke of Betancourt and what that implies for her, including steadfast leadership. But there is also the need for flexibility toward the Armed Forces and awareness of that function’s demands. That said, María Corina Machado should not be afraid to be herself, to maintain her standard and vision. It has worked well for her so far, despite many problems, risks, and sacrifices. It would feel somewhat pretentious of me to tell her: “Look, María Corina, do this one way or another.” What concerns me is that a government led by her—one desired by millions of Venezuelans, including myself—could become unstable because we tried to do too much too soon.
In what areas do you see risks?
To me, the main risk is having powerful adversaries emboldened by instability and by the difficulty of building consensus around the tough decisions a new government will have to make—serious, ground-breaking decisions that will require broader support. Disregarding support and consensus as unnecessary could become a problem.
Are privatizations a concern for you, or perhaps the issue of justice?
I am concerned about the inability to make the most grave decisions. The privatization of PDVSA is largely advanced through the Hydrocarbons Law; we are heading toward a framework where PDVSA remains significantly reduced. The disarmament or political neutralization of the judiciary is already on the table, so they won’t need to drive that from scratch. But issues of redistribution, labor rights, and State restructuring—deeper discussions where initial instincts may not be fully adequate to foster understanding—could create serious challenges. I do not mean to minimize her support, but popular backing has often failed to prevent adversaries from becoming emboldened and supplanting democracy during historical transitions. And I do not want us to return to an authoritarian system.
Welcome back to the Times of Troy newsletter, where I am thrilled to announce that the start of the USC football season is here. And a week before the rest of college football, no less!
We’ve reminded you enough by now that this is a make-or-break season for USC and for its head coach, Lincoln Riley. With a new defensive coordinator who’s in the College Football Hall of Fame, a new, state-of-the-art football facility and the nation’s top recruiting class in tow, USC has given Riley everything he needs to succeed.
So what if … he actually does?
Fight on! Are you a true Trojans fan?
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Last week, we walked you through the worst-case scenario for USC’s 2026 slate. So this week, let’s put on our cardinal-and-gold colored glasses and consider what this season might look like if everything actually goes right. Because there’s certainly a world in which USC earns a place in the College Football Playoff. Maybe even wins a game or two (or three?).
That picture-perfect scenario, however, hinges in my mind on how fast USC’s stellar freshman class rounds into form.
Imagine for a minute a Trojans defense with Luke Wafle, the nation’s top prospect in 2026, screaming off the edge a la the Bosa Bros at Ohio State. Or what about “Boobie” Feaster, the Trojans’ 17-year-old stud wideout, taking a tunnel screen to the house through the teeth of Oregon’s defense?
USC hasn’t had this much talent on the roster since I started covering the team in 2019. And while it’s fair to be hesitant about relying on so many freshmen, what if, when push comes to shove, they’re just the best players on the team?
It’s not hard to envision that being the case at wide receiver, at tight end and even along the defensive line. Freshmen could even be starting, at some point, on the offensive line, at linebacker and in the defensive backfield. (OK, this might not sound like a best-case yet, but bear with me here …)
USC has the first three weeks of its season to let the freshmen figure it out, followed by a trip across the country to Rutgers, and with no redshirts to worry about, I’d venture to say we’ll see the full breadth of freshmen Trojan talent over those four games. If USC can emerge from that stretch with the confidence of its young players soaring, then it should have a shot when Oregon comes to town.
If there’s one game that could decide the direction of USC’s season, it’s this one. It’s a critical moment for quarterback Jayden Maiava, who had his worst game of the year a season ago in Eugene. Any world in which USC makes a playoff run must include a major leap from Maiava. This is his time to prove that he’s taken that last step in his game, the one that could truly separate him as a first-round NFL draft pick. He has the talent, and in this case, he’ll have to show every bit of it.
Meanwhile, USC’s defense could cast some doubt on the potential of the Ducks’ own quarterback with a promising performance here. Dante Moore has yet to face a ranked team in a true road environment as Oregon’s starter. And the Coliseum is going to be rocking that night. I could see him slipping up on the road.
If Maiava can play to his potential and the defense can rise to the occasion, USC can beat Oregon for the first time in a decade. And if it does, a world of possibilities open up for USC.
With the confidence of its fabulous freshmen soaring, USC rolls through Washington at home. A trip to Penn State, during what’s sure to be a White Out game, marks the second moment in which the Trojans’ young stars could be seriously tested. But who’s to say that the Nittany Lions, under Matt Campbell, have anywhere close to the talent the Trojans will bring to State College. And without its usual pass rush, I could see Maiava picking Penn State apart.
Wins over Maryland and on the road at Wisconsin are locks in this scenario, as is a stomping of crosstown rival UCLA and new coach Bob Chesney.
So what about Ohio State and Indiana, our last two national title winners? The more winnable of those two, in my opinion, is the Halloween home game with Ohio State, considering the questions on the Buckeyes’ defense. But Ohio State is still the deeper, more talented team, and by that point in the season, injuries will have surely affected USC’s roster.
As for Indiana, well, not only have the Hoosiers not lost at home under Curt Cignetti, but they’ve allowed just 10 points per game over Cignetti’s 15 home games as coach. USC has to slip up somewhere in the schedule, and my bet would be Bloomington.
Ten wins would surely secure USC its first-ever Playoff spot, delivering the statement that Riley so desperately needed in his fifth season. And if by this point, its fleet of freshmen just happen to be peaking, then there’s no telling how far this team could go from there.
Thanos down
Jahkeem Stewart (4) reacts against the Michigan State Spartans last season.
(Luke Hales / Getty Images)
In a brutal twist of fate for USC, just ahead of its Week 0 opener, defensive tackle Jahkeem Stewart is now likely to miss the nonconference slate with a foot injury.
It’s terrible news for the sophomore standout and for USC, which needs all the talent it can get along the defensive line. Stewart’s participation throughout camp had been a bit inconsistent already, presumably in an effort to keep him fresh for the season.
The fact that he’s likely to miss the first three games isn’t so much the main concern here. It’s that foot injuries are notoriously tricky. We don’t have much information on whether this was a aggravation or an entirely new problem, but a source downplayed the current injury’s severity. Still, it’s not a great sign for a player that was expected, at least by me, to be all-conference caliber this season.
Does Riley have any interest in adding old Trojans to the roster?
A court ruling bafflingly cleared the way last week for players who have already signed with NFL teams to gain some added college eligibility. And while no one has been added to the mix yet, USC’s coach said this week he wasn’t against adding under the right circumstances.
“Addition doesn’t always mean necessarily making you better, right?” Riley said. “And we feel very strongly about the group that we’ve put together, we feel very strongly about the kind of culture and attitude and vibe of this team right now, and so first and foremost, we’re going to protect that.”
Other than at linebacker, where USC would have to add someone new from the transfer portal midseason, or because of injuries, I don’t see a scenario in which it would really make sense. Anthony Lucas or Lake McRee just don’t move the needle at this point.
Class of ‘26 power rankings: Week 0
USC signed the top-ranked class last recruiting cycle, so as they finally hit the field, the Times of Troy will keep tabs on their progress by doing what we do best: Ranking their performance! In this case, we’ll rank them based on the freshmen we most expect to make a difference when USC kicks off against San José State.
Trent Mosley at USC spring football practice.
(Robert Gauthier / Los Angeles Times)
1. Luke Wafle, DE … the No. 1 overall prospect in 2026 should get plenty of run coming off the edge in these first few games. I wouldn’t be surprised if, over that stretch, he makes it impossible to keep him on the bench.
2. Trent Mosley, WR. Seemingly locked into a starting job since the spring, Mosley is 20 years old and much further along than most freshmen when it comes to football IQ. He could lead the team in targets if all breaks right.
3. Mark Bowman, TE. Bowman was in and out of practice through camp, which might be the only thing keeping him from the No. 1 spot on this list. Don’t be surprised if the breakout doesn’t come right away as he gets into the swing of things.
4. Kayden Dixon-Wyatt, WR. A standout of camp with Tanook Hines sidelined, Dixon-Wyatt should be thrust into a big role right away. He’s a big play waiting to happen, and of all the freshmen position players, he’s the one I’d expect to wow us first.
5. Elbert “Rock” Hill, CB. Another standout of camp, Hill is behind two surefire starters in Jontez Williams and Chasen Johnson. But from what we’ve seen and heard, the freshman cornerback is way ahead of schedule.
6. Boobie Feaster, WR. Feaster is so young — just turned 17 — but his talent is undeniable. He has the potential to be the No. 1 guy on this list by season’s end.
7. Tomuhini “Tom Tom” Topui, DT. Stewart’s injury could open the door for more young guys on the interior, including Topui, who really impressed me in the scrimmage and has been receiving rave reviews from teammates.
8. Talanoa Ili, LB. In a linebacker room with shallow depth, don’t be surprised if Ili emerges early. I like what I’ve seen.
9. Madden Riordan, S. One of the bigger surprises in the class, Riordan added critical weight and now should play a part in the defensive back rotation. Being 20 already helps.
10. Breck Kolojay, OG. Kolojay was a major standout of spring, then cooled in camp while dealing with injuries. He’s likely a next-man-up option on the offensive interior.
11. Tron Baker, WR. Baker has a lot of other freshman wideouts ahead of him on this list, but we’ve heard his name a lot listed among young players who impressed.
12. Deshonne Redeaux, RB/KR. I really like Redeaux’s smooth, effortless running style, and while he’s down the depth chart at running back, he could right away be the kick returner.
Poll results
We asked, “What is the fewest number of wins you’d accept from Riley and USC without calling for a change?” After 1,507 votes, the results:
Nine wins, 35.6% 10 wins/playoff appearance, 27.9% Eight wins, 24.6% Seven wins, 8.8% Six wins, 3.1%
Olympic sports spotlight
Jane Alukonis was named the Big Ten women’s soccer coach of the year in 2024, but the Trojans trudged their way to a 7-7-3 finish in 2025 and have a lot to prove as their 2026 season begins.
Lucky for Alukonis, she brings in the No. 1-ranked recruiting class in the nation according to Prep Soccer, a class highlighted by forward Jordan Hill, the No. 3 overall prospect, and defender Rhiannon Mahon, the No. 5 overall prospect.
But the Trojans were still picked in the preseason to finish seventh in the Big Ten. And with losses to Duke and Brigham Young already, USC is already facing an uphill climb to start the season.
What I’m Watching This Week
Anne Hathaway as Andy Sachs in “The Devil Wears Prada 2.”
(Macall Polay / 20th Century Studios)
No one told me before I watched “TheDevil Wears Prada 2” on a plane last weekend that it was a journalism movie! But even aside from commiserating about the state of journalism through the screen with Anne Hathaway, I enjoyed this second go-round.
So what if it was a blatant cash grab? Put Hathaway, Meryl Streep, Emily Blunt and Stanley Tucci in a room, and I’d probably watch whatever they come up. Tucci, in particular, was a standout for me in this sequel.
That concludes today’s newsletter. If you have any feedback, ideas for improvement or things you’d like to see, email me at ryan.kartje@latimes.com, and follow me on X at @Ryan_Kartje. To get this newsletter in your inbox, click here.
