SurfaceToAir

Germany is moving ahead with plans to give its unusually large F125 frigates a medium-range air-defense capability, helping address one of the most conspicuous weaknesses of a four-ship class that has long attracted attention for having relatively little combat power for its size.

Diehl Defense and Germany’s Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) have signed a contract to adapt and develop the IRIS-T SLM surface-to-air missile system for operational use aboard the German Navy’s F125 frigates. Under the agreement, Diehl will build prototypes and conduct comprehensive test firings intended to validate the system’s integration and performance within the existing F125 architecture. Each frigate will be fitted with two new launchers, each capable of holding 16 missiles, for a total of 32.

“The aim is to make the system mission-capable on the German Navy’s F125 frigates,” Diehl said in today’s announcement. The company described the prototype construction and test-firing phase as necessary to ensure “the seamless integration and maximum performance” of IRIS-T SLM within the frigate’s existing architecture.

The program has moved notably quickly, reflecting the urgency of the requirement.

Germany began examining the feasibility of integrating IRIS-T SLM with the F125 in 2024, with BAAINBw and Diehl studying the technical risks and requirements of adapting the normally land-based system for shipboard use. That effort led to the development of a navalized demonstrator in 2025. In October of that year, the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg took part in a German Navy Maritime Firing Exercise off Andøya, Norway, carrying an experimental anti-air warfare module based on IRIS-T SLM. Diehl says the module went from concept to firing in less than 10 months and met all established test and evaluation objectives.

The Bundeswehr subsequently reported that Baden-Württemberg fired three live IRIS-T SLM missiles during the exercise. The ship’s radar supplied target data to the missile system, demonstrating the basic integration between the F125’s sensors and the navalized air defense architecture.

The exercise established that the concept could work at sea; the contract signed now is intended to turn that demonstration into a qualified fleet capability.

The German parliament’s Budget Committee approved the adaptation effort on September 23, with the German Defense Ministry describing it as a means of expanding the F125’s self-defense capabilities in response to the current air threat. The ministry also pointed to IRIS-T SLM’s combat experience in Ukraine.

The effort needs to be seen in the context of why the F125 has been such a controversial warship in the first place.

As TWZ examined in 2017, the F125 is a roughly 7,200-ton, 490-foot warship with an unusually small core crew and a concept of operations centered on long-duration deployments, stabilization missions, crisis management, conflict prevention, and international intervention rather than high-end fleet combat. The class was designed to spend long periods away from Germany and operate with relatively modest manpower requirements.

But its armament does not remotely match the size and sophistication of the hull. A completed, the ships were equipped with eight RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a 127mm gun, remotely operated guns and, for close-quarters air defense, two RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers. The F125 has no medium- or long-range surface-to-air missile capability and no organic sonar or dedicated anti-submarine warfare weapon system.

At the same time, the TRS-4D/NR radar and other sensors can see far beyond the engagement envelope of the close-in air-defense weapons, but there is little the ship itself can do with that information against an aircraft or incoming missile at medium range.

Nearly a decade later, IRIS-T SLM is emerging as an answer to at least part of that problem.

Even with IRIS-T SLM, the F125 is well short of being an air warfare destroyer. It also still lacks an organic anti-submarine warfare capability or the kind of large vertical-launch missile battery found on Germany’s F124 frigates.

However, it does fill a gap between the F125’s originl short-range defenses and the capabilities of other ships or aircraft operating around it.

IRIS-T SLM is designed as a medium-range surface-to-air system, with an engagement range of around 25 miles and an altitude envelope of approximately 65,000 feet. As shown in the 2025 demonstration, the F125’s radar can feed information directly into the missile system, exploiting the ship’s existing sensor capabilities.

IRIS-T SLM (Medium Range Ground-Based Air Defence)

Rather than rely heavily on escorts for protection against airborne threats outside the short range of RAM, an IRIS-T-equipped F125 could at least contribute to its own medium-range air defense. Recent operations in the Middle East hve underscored the importance of this in contested maritime environments.

It also gives the ships a more useful role in a task group. The threat environment has changed substantially since the F125’s original concept was drafted. Cruise missiles, drones, loitering munitions, and increasingly sophisticated aircraft mean that even ships operating away from a major naval war can face threats well beyond the range of their existing close-in defenses.

In November 2024, Germany confirmed that the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg, returning from an Indo-Pacific deployment, would avoid the Red Sea and sail around Africa because of the Houthi missile and drone threat. The German Defense Ministry explicitly cited the ship’s limited air defense capability and its inability to provide an effective air-defense umbrella for itself or its accompanying replenishment ship.

Ironically, the F125’s large hull, extensive electrical power, sophisticated radar, substantial aviation facilities, long endurance and relatively spacious mission areas were always supposed to provide room for a flexible approach to future missions. Yet the class’s original weight and integration constraints made adding major weapons difficult, a concern TWZ also highlighted in 2017.

IRIS-T SLM offers Germany a way to add a meaningful capability without undertaking the much more invasive redesign associated with installing a conventional vertical-launch system. The 2025 demonstration used an AAW module mounted on the ship’s deck rather than a conventional VLS installation, and today’s program is focused on adapting the system to the F125 architecture.

Once IRIS-T SLM is installed, the F125 will still be an unusual frigate. It is enormous by the standards of its mission, optimized for endurance, and lacks some of the weapons traditionally associated with a high-end surface combatant. But it will bring more to a contested fight.

The program should give the class a credible medium-range air-defense role, and provide Germany with a way to get considerably more utility out of four ships whose original design philosophy was always somewhat controversial.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

An unusual shoulder-fired air defense missile seen in Russian use may be of Chinese or Iranian origin, raising questions about the movement of foreign weapons through the increasingly interconnected military supply networks linking Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran.

The man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) appeared in Russian television footage showing a mobile air defense group operating in the Rostov region, which borders Ukraine. The weapon was shown during an exercise said to have involved one of the elements of Russia’s 51st Air Defense Division. The footage was subsequently highlighted by the X account TheDeadDistrict.

The system does not closely resemble any of the Russian-made MANPADS families otherwise used by the country’s armed forces. Russian personnel seen with the weapon reportedly referred to it as “Iva,” although that designation by itself does not establish the weapon’s origin or model. The word Iva is Russian for willow (a type of tree), of which one particular species is named Verba — also the name of the Russian-made 9K333 MANPADS. This weapon looks very different to the example shown, but the connection is unlikely to be a coincidence.

A visual analysis of the newly observed launcher reveals comparisons with both the Iranian Misagh-3 and Chinese QW-series systems, particularly the QW-18/QW-18A and QW-19. In particular, a closer examination of the imagery highlights an additional box-like component toward the front of the launcher. That feature appears more consistent with photographs of Chinese QW-series systems rather than the Misagh.

There is also a scarcity of publicly available imagery of later Iranian variants to completely exclude an Iranian system. At the same time, the Misagh series itself is understood to be derived, or at least heavily influenced by Chinese designs.

Another possibility is that the weapon is a Russian-produced version or derivative of a Chinese or Iranian design, rather than an imported system.

The possibility of foreign-made or foreign-designed equipment appearing in Russian service has to be viewed against the much broader transformation of Moscow’s military relationships since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Russia’s relationship with China has deepened substantially since the invasion, with Beijing becoming a critical source of machinery, electronics, and other components that Russia’s defense industry can no longer obtain as readily from Western suppliers. Moscow and Beijing had already declared a “no limits” partnership shortly before the invasion, and their military relationship has subsequently included exercises and expanding military-technical cooperation. U.S. officials have accused China of supplying Russia with components used in weapons production, including microelectronics. Beijing has rejected accusations that it is providing lethal military assistance to Russia.

Iran has also become an important military partner. Russia has used Iranian-designed Shahed-series attack drones extensively in Ukraine and has worked with Tehran on local production and adaptation of those systems. Moscow and Tehran formalized their relationship further with a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in January 2025, which includes provisions for military-technical cooperation and joint exercises.

In return, Russia has supplied Iran with military technology and has cooperated with Tehran on sensitive weapons programs.

The possible Chinese connection takes on additional significance in light of a major reported procurement deal between China and Iran.

In July, Reuters reported that Iran was expected to receive the first shipment of a deal covering 300 to 400 Chinese-made MANPADS, with a reported value of $60 million to $70 million. The weapons identified by sources included the Chinese QW-12 and FN-16 systems.

Chinese missiles the United States fears… an unsleeping eye against drones and low‑flying aircraft

China’s QW‑12 and FN‑16 air‑defense systems intercept low‑altitude targets — including drones — forming a rapid defensive line against close‑range aerial threats. pic.twitter.com/kJZ6mnqmHg

— China Now (@ChinaNow24) August 23, 2026

The reported contract was signed with a Hong Kong-based company that sources described as an intermediary between the Iranian side and the Chinese supplier. Reuters said the initial deliveries were planned from Urumqi in western China, with the weapons then transiting through Pakistan before reaching Iran. Pakistan’s military publicly denied any involvement in such transfers, while China’s Foreign Ministry called the report “groundless.”

Reuters also reported that delivery schedules and quantities could still change.

More significantly for the Russian sighting, a European security source told Reuters that authorities were aware of several contracts under discussion involving the potential sale of QW-12, QW-18, and QW-19 MANPADS to Iran. A Middle Eastern security source separately claimed that Iran had been seeking QW-18 systems.

There is currently no evidence tying the launcher seen in Russian hands to the Iranian procurement from China.

At the same time, the possibility of an Iranian connection should not be ruled out, especially since Chinese-designed MANPADS have a documented history of appearing outside conventional state inventories.

Earlier TWZ reporting, drawing on research by the Small Arms Survey monitoring group, examined the illicit proliferation of Chinese-designed MANPADS and identified dozens of cases involving armed groups in multiple countries. That research included QW-series weapons and documented cases in which investigators linked Chinese-designed MANPADS to Iranian supply networks.

One particularly notable case involved the Jihan, a vessel intercepted in 2013 carrying weapons that investigators identified as including QW-18-pattern MANPADS. UN investigators, the U.S. government, and  Conflict Armament Research assessed Iran as the likely source of those weapons.

It is also worth noting that Chinese MANPADS have already appeared on the Ukrainian side of the war. In late 2025 and 2026, Ukrainian units were photographed with Chinese-made FN-6 and FN-16 systems, including an FN-6 associated with an air defense team reportedly engaging a Russian cruise missile. Exactly how the weapons reached Ukraine remains unclear, with possible third-party transfers or diverted shipments among the possible explanations.

A Chinese FN-6 MANPADS in service with the MFG of the 143rd JTC “Podillia.” It is reported that this MANPADS was used this morning to shoot down a ruSSian Kh-101 CM.
The FN-6 was developed in 2000 and supplied, among others, to Sudan, from where it likely found its way to Ukraine pic.twitter.com/9zA012ue3j

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 🦩🇬🇪🇺🇦🇺🇲🇬🇷 (@TheDeadDistrict) November 19, 2025

Reported as the downing of an Kh-101 cruise missile this morning using a Chinese FN-6 MANPADS. There is no public information confirming that this system has been supplied to or used by Ukraine, making this a notable development. pic.twitter.com/pUujFB81aH

— NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) November 19, 2025

Incidents like these demonstrate that Chinese MANPADS can move through indirect supply networks, including networks associated with Tehran.

Regardless of how it arrived in Russia, the appearance of a foreign or foreign-derived MANPADS there is notable.

Mobile fire groups have become an increasingly visible component of Russia’s layered air defense effort, particularly as the war in Ukraine has placed enormous emphasis on countering low-altitude drones and other threats, including deep inside Russia.

MANPADS are well suited to this mission because they can be dispersed among small teams, rapidly repositioned, and deployed without the larger radar and vehicle infrastructure associated with conventional surface-to-air missile batteries. In particular, they can be deployed around military installations and other sensitive infrastructure.

A foreign system appearing in a Russian mobile fire group might be an imported weapon, an Iranian-produced derivative, a Chinese system acquired for evaluation, a captured weapon, or even a previously unidentified Russian configuration.

model, or even that it is a brand new Chinese-made variant (its possible that I just hadn’t seen it, or seen it from these angles) but it is a notable new addition to Russia’s MANPADS inventory.

— Matt Schroeder (@MSchroeder77) September 28, 2026

Another possibility is that the MANPADS is North Korean in origin. Russia’s military relationship with Pyongyang has expanded significantly, including the provision of increasingly advanced military equipment and technology. There is no known North Korean MANPADS matching the configuration seen here, however, and the possibility remains speculative. North Korean weapons have also frequently incorporated or closely followed Chinese designs, meaning a Chinese-looking configuration would not necessarily rule out a North Korean origin.

Russia has dramatically expanded defense production since 2022, but its industry remains under heavy wartime demand and sanctions-related constraints. Western restrictions have complicated access to advanced electronics, machine tools and other components, while Russia has increasingly relied on domestic substitutes and foreign suppliers.

At the same time, Russia must replenish weapons consumed in Ukraine, meaning foreign supplies could supplement domestic production, fill specific gaps, or allow scarce industrial capacity to be directed elsewhere.

For Russia, even a limited number of additional shoulder-fired systems could therefore have practical value as Ukrainian long-range strike capabilities continue to expand.

For now, the exact model and provenance of the MANPADS in question remain unconfirmed, but the apparent Chinese or Iranian design characteristics are highly noteworthy. Further appearances of the system could provide the clues needed to determine what it is, where it came from, and whether this represents an isolated example or a more significant acquisition effort.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com