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Bangladesh is moving toward formal negotiations with China over a potential purchase of J-10CE fighters and attack helicopters, in what could become one of the country’s most significant defense acquisitions in years. The development also underscores the growing international interest in a Chinese fighter that has gained considerable attention since seeing combat in Pakistani service last year.

Bangladesh’s Prime Minister’s Information and Broadcasting Adviser Zahed Ur Rahman said Tuesday that a government panel is preparing a draft agreement that could pave the way for negotiations with Beijing. The government has not disclosed how many aircraft it intends to acquire, the potential value of the deal, or a delivery schedule, with those details expected to be determined during negotiations.

Local reporting has previously pointed to a potential requirement for as many as 24 J-10CEs.

If ultimately contracted and delivered, Bangladesh would become only the second confirmed foreign customer of the export version of the J-10C, after Pakistan. However, there has been growing speculation about other potential customers, too, fueled by imagery showing apparent export-standard J-10s being tested in China.

The potential acquisition comes as Bangladesh seeks to modernize its aging combat aircraft fleet. Dhaka already maintains a long-standing defense relationship with Beijing, which has supplied Bangladesh with combat aircraft, naval vessels, tanks, missile systems, and other military equipment over the past two decades.

The J-10CE is a much more capable proposition than many of the older fighters still operated by air forces that have historically relied on Chinese or Soviet-designed equipment, of which Bangladesh is a prime example. Currently, the Bangladesh Air Force’s fighter fleet is made up of different versions of the Chengdu F-7 (an updated Chinese version of the MiG-21 Fishbed) and much smaller numbers of MiG-29 Fulcrums.

Maintaining aging Soviet-designed fleets increasingly presents challenges in terms of airframe life, avionics, spare parts, weapons, and overall readiness. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and accompanying sanctions serve to make Russia an even less reliable source of military aircraft and other arms.

The J-10C is a single-engine multirole fighter equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, modern avionics, electronic warfare capabilities, and the ability to employ a growing range of Chinese precision-guided weapons. The export J-10CE also provides access to weapons such as the much-vaunted PL-15 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile.

The aircraft’s growing reputation has been helped considerably by Pakistan.

Pakistan became the first foreign operator of the J-10CE, and the aircraft received intense international attention during the May 2025 conflict between Pakistan and India. Pakistan said its Chinese-made fighters were involved in shooting down several Indian aircraft, while the precise circumstances, numbers, and tactics involved remain the subject of competing claims and outside analysis.

Nevertheless, the conflict provided the J-10CE with an unusual degree of combat visibility for a Chinese export fighter. Now, Bangladeshi officials have explicitly acknowledged that the aircraft’s reported performance during that conflict has attracted attention in Dhaka.

The J-10CE is also particularly well positioned within China’s emerging fighter-export portfolio.

China is developing more advanced stealth aircraft, including the FC-31/J-35 family, but that program represents a different proposition for prospective customers, coming with greater cost and potential uncertainty attached. The J-10C is a much more mature design already in operational foreign service, giving China an aircraft that can be offered today rather than relying entirely on future capabilities.

That combination of modern systems and an established production line could prove attractive to countries that need to replace aging fighters without taking on the financial, political, or industrial commitments associated with acquiring a Western combat aircraft.

As well as the potential Bangladesh deal, Uzbekistan has been linked to the J-10CE.

For months, Chinese military aviation observers have speculated that Tashkent could become another customer for the fighter. More recently, imagery of an aircraft carrying the serial number 1020 has generated renewed interest, with low-visibility markings on its tailfin appearing to resemble the Uzbek flag.

ATLANTA — Dodgers manager Dave Roberts could see the kind of inning right-hander Tyler Glasnow had to begin his start Tuesday, plagued by soft contact and bad luck, derailing a younger version of him.

“That’s an outing that a couple years ago I think might have gotten away,” Roberts said after the Dodgers’ 4-3 loss to the Braves, ending a six-game winning streak. “And I don’t think he would’ve been as efficient getting through the fifth like he did. But there’s just a lot of growth with Glas. Just can’t wait to see more. Like I told him after the start, it’s just really good to have him back.”

Glasnow’s return was a major step for the Dodgers as they assemble their postseason pitching staff. The next will be two-way superstar Shohei Ohtani’s return to pitching — which could happen as soon as this weekend.

Ohtani is scheduled to throw a bullpen session Thursday or Friday, pitching coach Mark Prior said. Then Ohtani and the Dodgers will finalize next steps. But Roberts didn’t rule out the possibility of Ohtani making a short start Sunday in Detroit.

But let’s not get ahead of ourselves.

Tuesday marked Glasnow’s first start since May 6 in Houston, when back spasms cut his outing short after one inning. He’d been pitching so well to start the year (2.72 ERA in seven starts) that the Dodgers hoped he could avoid the IL, even for precautionary reasons.

Instead, he did have to go on the IL and had to halt his throwing progression multiple times for flare-ups, prolonging his time on it.

Even so, in Glasnow’s last two weeks on the IL, he seemed “at peace” to Roberts. So, the manager was confident that the growth in mindset that the Dodgers had witnessed over the last year would carry through the down time.

“I felt that he just got to a place — and I don’t know if it was last year’s postseason or what — but the game slowed down,” Roberts said. “Nothing spiked him. I think there was just a maturity in how he went about things. Coming out of the [bullpen], something he’s never done … in the postseason, and performing the way he did. And then coming into this spring training, he just seemed like another level of confident, that I just felt it was palpable.

“So that translated into the season. And I was so bummed, like we all were, to see him go down.”

The Dodgers’ rotation weathered the loss of Glasnow and Blake Snell (arthroscopic elbow surgery) admirably. And both are back in time for the stretch run.

“It felt like a long time,” Glasnow said. “I think any time you’re out that long, just doing rehab the whole time, it definitely sucks. So it’s exciting to be able to get back. But I’m glad, too, my body’s in a spot where I felt like I was before.”

His stuff followed suit.

“Even with all the talent that we have on our roster, [Glasnow] might surpass it with his raw stuff, and the ability to shut down any team at any time,” Prior said before the game. “Do we expect that to be Day 1, today, who knows? We’re facing, obviously, one of the best teams in baseball. But it’s really good to have him back because he changes a lot of things with our personnel.”

Though Glasnow gave up four hits and three runs in the first inning, only one of those hits, Drake Baldwin’s leadoff single, was hit hard. The rest were simply hit where the Dodgers’ defense couldn’t field them.

He finally escaped by striking out Braves No. 7 hitter Mike Yastrzemski, with the help of a successful ABS challenge.

In that 35-pitch first inning, Glasnow threw the kitchen sink at the Braves. But that included a lot of first-pitch four-seam fastballs — and six straight fastballs to Baldwin.

“Coming out in the second, I just felt more in rhythm,” Glasnow said, “and slider was working a lot better, and just felt a lot better.”

Shohei Ohtani slides into third for a triple to lead off the ninth inning Tuesday.

(Erik S. Lesser / AP)

Glasnow leaned on that slider, making sure to throw it at different points in the count — “just trying to not be so predictable,” he said — pairing it with his four-seamer and sinker.

It took him just 13 pitches to strike out the side. He retired three straight batters in the third with roughly the same plan of attack.

In the fourth, he started mixing in his knuckle curve again, even ending the inning on that pitch and Austin Riley failed to check his swing on a curve that broke into the dirt, for strike three.

After that first inning, Glasnow gave up only two more hits. And in five innings, he recorded seven strikeouts.

“I thought all night long, he threw the ball fantastic,” Roberts said. “The stuff, the strikeouts, swing and miss, how he navigated that first inning to not let it spiral, reset. He did everything he could to prevent runs tonight.”

Glasnow left with the score tied. The bottom of the Dodgers’ lineup evened the score, with RBI singles from Alek Thomas, Hunter Feduccia and Alex Call.

The score remained knotted until the eighth inning, when Dodgers left-hander Tanner Scott gave up a leadoff double to Matt Olson — the first extra-base hit of the game — and a two-out RBI single to Ozzie Albies to give the Braves the lead.

“We’ve had to lean on our ‘pen, man, the last two months really,” Roberts said. “The last two months we’ve played a lot of one-, two-run ballgames. There’s no margin. I thought we pitched well enough to win tonight. Unfortunately it just didn’t happen.”

To open the ninth inning, Ohtani struck back with a triple off the left-field wall. But the Dodgers stranded him there against Braves closer Raisel Iglesias.

Alek Thomas is used to playing center field at Dodger Stadium.

Over parts of five seasons with the Arizona Diamondbacks, the 26-year-old grew accustomed to being booed in L.A., all while watching baseball’s latest dynasty take shape.

“It’s funny, because they always hated me whenever I came out there in center field,” Thomas said before Saturday’s 4-3 win over the Pittsburgh Pirates. “I was, like, ‘Come on, guys, I’m Mexican too. You don’t have to yell at me; like, we’re on the same side here.’

“But, obviously … it doesn’t matter where you’re from. ‘If you’re not a Dodgers guy, you’re not my guy.’”

Thomas, whom Arizona designated for assignment 28 games into the season before trading him to the Dodgers in May, is, well, a Dodgers guy now.

He was called up from triple-A Oklahoma City on Saturday after center fielder Andy Pages sustained a hand fracture after being hit by a pitch Friday.

“Great buy-in [and] great teammate,” Dodgers manager Dave Roberts said of Thomas before the game. “Really good defender. Had a good chat with him earlier. … he’s happy to be back in the big leagues.”

One could imagine how nice it felt for Thomas to hit an RBI single in the fourth inning, in his first game with the Dodgers and the team’s 12th sellout of the season.

“It’s been a little while,” said Thomas, who has spent 55 games in Oklahoma City this year. “So, I’m super glad to be back, and happy to help the team in any way, shape or form.”

Thomas looked solid in his primary role as a defender.

Dodgers pitcher Tarik Skubal delivers against the Pirates at Dodger Stadium on Saturday.

(Gina Ferazzi / Los Angeles Times)

He also showed some hustle, turning a should-be groundout into a two-bagger in the eighth after an error by Pirates first baseman Rafael Flores Jr.

“Andy’s a great player, and speedy recovery for him,” Thomas said. “But I’m gonna try and play my brand of baseball; that’s why the Dodgers got me. So, yeah, I’m just gonna go out there and be myself.”

Tarik Skubal and the Dodgers were themselves, too, after a rough start.

The left-hander gave up three runs and three hits in the first. But Skubal recovered to earn his first win with the Dodgers (79-51), giving up five hits and striking out 11 over seven innings to earn a standing ovation upon his exit.

Teoscar Hernández, who entered with two RBIs over his past 16 games, put the Dodgers on the board with a run-scoring single in the fourth. Six pitches later, Thomas earned his RBI, shrinking the Pirates’ lead to 3-2.

Starter Jared Jones, a Whittier native, lasted four innings for the Pirates (63-68). He gave up two runs on three hits with five strikeouts. Pirates reliever Yohan Ramirez struggled in his place.

Kyle Tucker ended his 0-for-26 drought at home with a go-ahead, two-run single off Ramirez in the fifth.

Relievers Evan Phillips, Jack Dreyer and Tanner Scott combined for two shutout innings. Dreyer struck out Oneil Cruz looking to end the top of the eighth with a runner on third, fighting off the Pirates’ final gasp.

The Dodgers have now taken the three-game series against Pittsburgh and are victors of five straight games for the first time since late May.

A new Chinese aircraft carrier, commonly referred to as the Type 004, is continuing to take shape, notably now featuring a more complete bow. This is set to be China’s fourth carrier, and there is strong evidence it will be its first nuclear-powered type, bringing an even more significant boost to the country’s naval power projection capabilities.

The ongoing progress on the carrier is plainly visible in satellite imagery taken just yesterday, seen at the top of this story and below, which TWZ obtained from Vantor. The ship has been under construction at Dalian Shipyard, in the city of the same name in China’s northeastern Liaoning province, since at least 2024.

The Type 004 is being constructed in the same dry dock where China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, was completed, and where its second carrier, Shandong, was built. Liaoning was originally laid down as a Kuznetsov class carrier in the Soviet Union (first named Riga and then Varyag). Authorities in post-Soviet Ukraine sold the unfinished vessel to ostensible Chinese businessmen in 1998. It was subsequently brought to Dalian in 2002 and then commissioned into operational service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) a decade later. China’s third carrier, the Fujian, the country’s first catapult takeoff but assisted recovery (CATOBAR) configured type, was built at the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai. Liaoning and Shandong are short takeoff but assisted recovery (STOBAR) carriers with ski jump bows and arresting gear at the stern.

Based on additional satellite imagery from Planet Labs that TWZ reviewed, the current length of the Type 004’s hull now appears to be around 1,050 feet (320 meters). Its maximum width, or beam, is some 151 feet (46 meters). Carriers are typically built with hulls that get progressively longer and wider as they rise from the waterline, meaning these dimensions are all but certain to grow further as the ship gets closer to completion and gains its flight deck.

The Type 004, which is also expected to be a CATOBAR type, is already shaping up to be significantly larger than any of the PLAN’s three existing carriers. Fujian, also known as the Type 003, is currently the largest. It is approximately 994 feet (303 meters) long at the waterline and 1036.75 feet (316 meters) in total length, according to previous analysis from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank. Its beam at the flight deck level is assessed to be just over 249 feet (76 meters). As another point of comparison, the U.S. Navy’s new operational supercarrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, is 1,106 feet (337 meters) long overall and has a beam of 256 feet (78 meters) at the flight deck.

As noted, there is already strong evidence that the Type 004’s will be nuclear-powered. This is based on what looks to be two distinct reactor containment structures that are visible in previous satellite imagery and pictures taken closer to the ground. The designs of these structures are very broadly consistent with what is found on U.S. nuclear-powered carriers. Other, more general evidence of Chinese work in support of future naval nuclear propulsion capabilities has also emerged. There have been various media reports over the years about work on nuclear powerplants for future warships and commercial vessels, as well. However, it has still not been definitively confirmed that the Type 004 will be nuclear-powered.

In general, naval nuclear propulsion does offer important advantages, including functionally unlimited range. It can also provide a valuable boost in onboard power generation for more modern designs packed with advanced weapons, sensors, and other systems. The Fujian already features electromagnetic catapults for launching aircraft, also commonly referred to as an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS). This is a feature that seems likely to carry over to the Type 004, and that would benefit from nuclear power. Any windfalls from nuclear power do come at the price of cost and complexity.

China’s Fujian Aircraft Carrier Showcases Advanced Electromagnetic Catapult System

As an aside, what may turn out to be the world’s largest dedicated naval replenishment vessel is also currently being built in China. As TWZ has previously noted, that ship will be especially important for supporting conventionally-powered PLAN aircraft carriers, their air wings, and their escorts, during long-duration blue water operations far from Chinese shores and friendly ports. A nuclear-powered carrier does also still require a regular flow of conventional fuel and other resupply for its air wing and crew, as well as its conventionally-powered escorts.

Much still remains unknown about the Type 004’s overall design and expected capabilities. What appear to be official renderings and models of next-generation Chinese carriers that have emerged in the past do point to a design broadly in line with the U.S. Ford class and other modern carriers in the works globally. This is also now reflected in the configuration of China’s full-size, land-based aircraft carrier test facility in Wuhan. Key aspects include a more truncated island structure positioned further to the rear of a flight deck optimized for maximum open space. Just this week, TWZ explored the general benefits of this flight deck arrangement in the context of the Ford class design. This followed reports this past weekend that President Donald Trump is now pushing the Navy to move the island on future carriers in that class for aesthetic reasons. Trump is also notably a long-time critic of the EMALS catapults and electromagnetic Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWE) on the Ford. Last week, he publicly ordered the U.S. Navy and the Pentagon to draw up a plan for going back to using steam catapults and hydraulic elevators starting with the fourth ship in the class, currently set to be named USS Doris Miller.

There are also questions still to be answered about the composition of the Type 004’s air wing. The PLAN is already working to significantly expand and improve its fleet of carrier-based aircraft with the addition of the stealthy J-35 fighter and the KJ-600 airborne early warning and control plane. This is on top of the growing J-15 family of multirole combat jets, which now includes an electronic warfare version. Various new drones, including navalized versions of the GJ-11 uncrewed combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), and helicopters, are also likely to be embarked on the Type 004. It is worth noting here that China has also built a huge new big-deck amphibious assault ship, the Sichuan, which features a single electromagnetic catapult and is expected to have a drone-heavy air component.

Chinese PLA Navy’s First Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship “Sichuan” Conducts First Sea Trial

The relative speed with which the Type 004 continues to come together is also reflective of the broader capabilities and capacity of the Chinese naval shipbuilding enterprise. China currently produces a multitude of increasingly modern warships and submarines at an ever-quickening pace. There were reports last year that construction of another conventionally powered carrier might also be underway in China. The Pentagon has previously assessed that the PLAN is aiming for a fleet of nine carriers in total by 2035.

This has all, in turn, created a more and more worrisome disparity with naval shipbuilding in the United States, or lack thereof. The U.S. Navy has continued to face delays and other setbacks with major shipbuilding programs in recent years despite efforts to reverse these trends, including by leveraging foreign shipbuilders.

When the Type 004 will be launched, let alone commissioned into service, remains to be seen. What is clear from the latest satellite imagery of Dalian is that China’s next carrier is increasingly taking shape.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Egypt’s response to Ethiopia’s new Nile dam plans is centred on diplomacy, international pressure and cooperation with Sudan, rather than trying to stop construction outright. However, the experience of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has exposed the limits of Cairo’s influence.

The revival of three proposed Blue Nile hydropower projects – Karadobi, Mandaya and Beko Abo – will test whether Egypt can turn more than a decade of opposition into practical leverage over how Ethiopia develops the river.

The projects have been discussed for years. A 2024 academic study drawing on Nile Basin Initiative-sponsored work listed all three among proposed Blue Nile projects and noted that Karadobi and Beko Abo were considered alternatives in one potential three-dam configuration.

What is new is Ethiopia’s reported move to advance them. In March, the country’s Water and Energy Ministry announced plans for the projects, according to subsequent reporting. Their combined generating potential has been reported at about 5,700 megawatts, although the figures and specifications could change because the projects remain at the planning stage.

The announcement came months after Ethiopia inaugurated the GERD in September 2025, despite years of objections from Egypt.

Why does Ethiopia want more dams?

For Ethiopia, developing the Blue Nile is closely tied to electricity generation, economic growth and energy security. Addis Ababa argues that expanding hydropower is essential for a country where millions of people have historically lacked reliable access to electricity.

The three projects fit into that wider strategy. However, their eventual impact on Egypt and Sudan will depend on what Ethiopia builds and how the facilities are operated.

Ezekiel Gebissa, an Ethiopian professor at Kettering University in the United States, told Al Jazeera that the consequences would depend on the scale and purpose of the projects. “Smaller dams could generate electricity for local communities without significantly reducing the volume of water reaching downstream countries,” he said, while projects linked to large-scale irrigation could have greater implications for Egypt and Sudan.

The impact will depend on various factors, including reservoir size, filling schedules, water releases and operating rules. A dam designed mainly for electricity generation would have different consequences from one linked to large-scale irrigation.

For now, the projects represent a potential new source of tension rather than proof that they will reduce the water reaching Egypt.

Why is Egypt concerned?

For Egypt, the Nile is the country’s main source of freshwater. Any major change upstream is viewed through the lens of national security.

Cairo’s concern is not Ethiopia generating electricity. It is what happens when water is stored and managed upstream, particularly during periods of drought. Egypt has therefore pushed for rules covering dam operations, drought management, water releases and information sharing.

Last September, Egypt again raised the issue at the United Nations Security Council, arguing that Ethiopia’s inauguration and operation of the GERD violated its international obligations and called for a binding agreement. Those were Egypt’s stated legal and political positions, not findings by the council.

The dispute reflects two different priorities. Ethiopia views the Blue Nile as a resource for development, while Egypt seeks guarantees over the water flows on which it depends.

What did the GERD change?

The GERD demonstrated both the reach and the limits of Egypt’s diplomatic strategy.

Ethiopia inaugurated the dam on September 9, 2025, after years of negotiations with Egypt and Sudan failed to produce the binding agreement Cairo wanted. The nearly $5bn project, funded largely by Ethiopia itself, has an installed generating capacity of about 5,150 megawatts and is now a major part of Ethiopia’s electricity system.

For Egypt, the lesson was clear: diplomatic pressure could raise international attention but could not prevent Ethiopia from completing the project.

The focus has therefore shifted. Instead of trying to stop a single dam, Cairo is now seeking a role in how existing and future projects are designed, filled and operated.

Sudan’s role

Sudan remains central to Egypt’s approach because it lies between Ethiopia and Egypt and is directly affected by developments on the Blue Nile.

However, Khartoum is not simply aligned with Cairo.

Sudan could benefit from more predictable river flows and Ethiopian electricity, while also seeking greater transparency, information sharing and safeguards around upstream projects.

Mekki Elmograbi, a Sudanese governance expert, said transparency from Ethiopia was the starting point for cooperation. “Ethiopia must share more information with Sudan and Egypt; transparency is the first step toward cooperation,” he told Al Jazeera. “Who knows whether the new projects are good or bad for Sudan if there is not enough information?”

Elmograbi said Sudan should seek cooperation with both Ethiopia and Egypt to ensure major projects do not harm its interests. But Sudan’s ability to play a larger diplomatic role is constrained by its ongoing war.

While Sudan shares some concerns with Egypt, it also has its own relationship with Ethiopia and its own priorities, including access to electricity and effective management of the river.

What leverage does Egypt have?

Egypt’s strategy has centred on diplomacy, international pressure and cooperation with Sudan, aimed at pushing Ethiopia towards greater transparency and negotiated rules.

The experience of the GERD shows that Cairo’s strongest tools are political and diplomatic rather than coercive. Egypt can raise international attention, seek support from regional partners and push for agreements on issues such as data sharing, drought management and dam operations.

The challenge is that these tools are unlikely to give Egypt the ability to stop Ethiopia from pursuing new hydropower projects or to control decisions made in Addis Ababa.

Horn of Africa analyst, Abdiwahab Sheikh, told Al Jazeera that Egypt has “meaningful but limited leverage” over Ethiopia. He said Cairo’s strongest tools are diplomacy, alliances, international law and coordination with Sudan, while economic pressure is weaker and military coercion carries significant risks.

The three Blue Nile projects will test whether Egypt can convert diplomatic pressure into practical influence. For Sheikh, the path forward lies in negotiated rules rather than confrontation.

“A practical arrangement is possible if Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan accept transparent information exchange, advance notification, adaptive dam-management rules and mechanisms for addressing droughts and downstream impacts.”

A gambling licence may appear like paperwork concerned with the gambling business and lawyers. Its impacts extend far beyond. Licensing rules affect revenue, business investment, consumer confidence, and government control over money flowing through digital platforms.

Online gambling also raises an old issue about economic policy. When regulation is too light, consumers risk more. Make the cost and complexity of playing too high, and players could move to an offshore operator that pays no local taxes and has no local regulator.

The real question is whether a country can build a system that people and businesses have a reason to use.

A Licence Sets the Ground Rules

Licensing decides who may enter a market and what they must prove before accepting customers. Regulators may review an operator’s finances, ownership, technology and responsible gambling controls.

High fees and lengthy applications often favour larger companies, while weaker checks can expose customers to greater risk. Approval is only the beginning.Better case management can help regulators monitor compliance, investigate complaints and act when rules are broken.

Clear licensing rules can also give reputable operators more confidence to invest. When expectations are consistent and decisions are made within a reasonable timeframe, businesses can plan more effectively, hire locally and build services that meet national standards.

Tax Rates Can Change Player Behaviour

Governments pay close attention to gambling tax receipts because the rate can shape the wider market. Higher taxes may increase revenue from each licensed operator, but they can also reduce competition, discourage investment and make offshore sites more attractive.

Lower rates may bring more operators into the regulated market, although they can leave less funding for oversight, public education and treatment services. Licence fees, corporate taxes, gambling duties and enforcement costs all need to be considered together.

Higher rates can also fall short of revenues when they do not provide sufficient incentive to regulate while encouraging activity in other markets.

These decisions are felt throughout the economy. A predictable tax system can help ensure local employment, contracts with local suppliers, and long-term investment; a tax surge could make operators reduce operations or exit the industry.

Enforcement Is Where Regulation Becomes Real

How a customer might feel the strength of enforcement: they will never read the licensing statute. But when there is a delay in withdrawal, an age check fails, or when there is a complaint and no response, then they will feel the strength of enforcement.

Regulators need trained staff, reliable data and clear legal powers to deal with these problems. Readers can also find casino sites regulated in your country to understand which licensing framework may apply before checking the operator against the regulator’s official register.

Oversight becomes more difficult when companies, customers and payments cross several jurisdictions. Regulators may need to trace payment flows, inspect ownership structures and work with banks or technology providers to address money-laundering risks and unlicensed activity.

“Licensed” Means Different Things Across Borders

Anyone researching legal online casinos by country soon finds that a licence issued in one place may carry little legal weight in another.

A casino can be a locally licensed casino in one country and an offshore casino in the neighbouring one. National market rules can be disjointed even in integrated economies, and operators and customers have to deal with varying rules in different jurisdictions.

Players should consult the official register of the relevant player’s regulator and read the laws of their state or province, especially if there are differences between them.

For operators, these differences can raise compliance costs and slow expansion into new markets. Each jurisdiction may require separate applications, technical checks and reporting systems, even when the underlying service remains largely the same.

Cross-Border Markets Need Cooperation

Online operators can get licensed in one country, raise funds in another, and provide customer service in several others. This makes enforcement challenging in situations where it is shared amongst authorities.

A gap can be plugged by providing information about ownership, payment activity, advertising infractions, and non-licensed operators. Explicit cooperation also helps expedite complaints and complicates a company’s ability to avoid accountability by relocating sections of its operations.

Cross-Border Markets Need Shared Oversight

An operator can be registered in one country, have technology in another country, and process payments in a third country. In situations where evidence and responsibility span borders, it can be difficult for national regulators.

Information-sharing can help authorities trace ownership, investigate suspicious payments and respond to unlicensed activity. Modern Diplomacy’s analysis of transparency in digital governance makes a wider point that applies here: disclosed information has value when regulators and consumers can understand it and act on it.

A licensing framework should therefore be judged by what happens in practice. Can customers resolve disputes? Can regulators remove unsuitable operators? Does legal activity stay inside the taxable market?

Those answers reveal far more than the licence badge displayed at the bottom of a website.

18+ Please gamble responsibly.

Ahmet Davutoglu was once one of Turkiye’s most powerful figures: The academic who helped shape the country’s ambitious foreign policy after the turn of the century, served as foreign minister and prime minister, and was chosen by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to lead the governing Justice and Development Party, or AK Party.

But later, he became a critic of the political system he had helped build.

Now, after announcing that his opposition Future Party would cease political activities, Davutoglu is withdrawing from party politics. He described the decision not as surrender but as an effort to distance himself from what he called Turkiye’s “polluted political climate”.

His departure leaves a contested legacy – that of an intellectual who transformed Tukiye’s diplomatic outlook, but struggled to turn his ideas and prominence into an independent political movement.

From professor to foreign minister

Born in 1959 in Taskent, in the central province of Konya, Davutoglu studied economics and political science at Bogazici University before becoming an academic.

He taught in Malaysia and at universities in Turkiye, with students calling him “Hoca”, or the professor – a title that followed him into government.

Davutoglu became widely known for his so-called “strategic depth” doctrine, the argument that Turkiye’s geography, Ottoman history and connections across the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia could make it a central diplomatic power rather than a country confined to Europe’s periphery.

After the AK Party came to power in 2002, he became Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser. He was appointed foreign minister in 2009 and entered parliament in 2011.

His early years in government coincided with an expansion of Turkish influence.

Ankara opened embassies, strengthened its presence in Africa and the Middle East, mediated regional disputes and promoted trade and visa-free travel with neighbouring countries. The approach became known as “zero problems with neighbours”.

Tarik Celenk, a writer and analyst familiar with Turkiye’s conservative intellectual tradition, said Davutoglu altered the country’s diplomatic culture.

“Davutoglu brought a change of mentality to the Foreign Ministry cadres,” Celenk said, crediting him with opening diplomacy to businesses and civil society.

Celenk noted that Davutoglu sought to position Turkiye as a country capable of communicating with otherwise incompatible actors. “Davutoglu was able to have good relations with Hamas, with Russia, and also to have good relations with the US,” he added.

Davutoglu called this intensive and multidirectional engagement “rhythmic diplomacy” – an effort to maintain dialogue across competing regional and global power centres.

But the Arab uprisings, particularly the war in Syria, exposed the limits of that vision, analysts said. Turkiye supported the Syrian opposition and anticipated that President Bashar al-Assad’s government would fall quickly. Instead, the conflict brought mass displacement, security threats and prolonged instability.

“His principal mistake in foreign policy was that he was very emotional, very romantic,” said Celenk, arguing that Davutoglu struggled to establish boundaries between “idealism, romanticism and realism”.

Erdogan’s chosen successor

When Erdogan moved from the prime minister’s office to the presidency in 2014, he selected Davutoglu to succeed him as AK Party leader and prime minister.

The arrangement contained a fundamental contradiction. Under Turkiye’s parliamentary system at the time, Davutoglu formally headed the government. But Erdogan continued to dominate the governing party and exercise authority from the presidency while advocating an executive presidential system.

Davutoglu led the AK Party through two elections in 2015. After losing its parliamentary majority in June, the party regained it in November with nearly half the national vote. Yet the victory did not give Davutoglu an independent power base.

According to Celenk, Davutoglu entered politics imagining a forest without “wolves, foxes, jackals or snakes” – but discovered while prime minister “that this forest did not exist”.

Amid disagreements over appointments, governance and Erdogan’s efforts to expand presidential authority, Davutoglu stepped down in 2016. He remained in the AK Party for another three years before resigning and establishing the Future Party in 2019.

An opposition party without a base

The party sought to attract conservative voters disillusioned with Erdogan while advocating parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and accountable government. It never developed substantial electoral support.

Political scientist Berk Esen said opposition parties face structural disadvantages in Turkiye, where the governing party has extensive access to state resources and much of the media.

But those conditions did not fully explain the failure of Davutoglu’s party, he added. “For one thing, the Future Party was already half stillborn by its very foundation,” argued Esen.

Davutoglu and Ali Babacan, another former senior AK Party figure, established separate opposition parties, dividing an already limited pool of disaffected conservative voters. Both also struggled to confront the records of the governments in which they had served.

In the 2023 elections, Future Party candidates entered parliament on the lists of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, then Turkiye’s main opposition party. The arrangement delivered seats but exposed the party’s dependence on a larger organisation.

Esen said pursuing guaranteed representation prevented the Future Party from fielding its own candidates across Turkiye and building local networks.

“In order to achieve a small success in the short term, they squandered the party’s institutional identity in the medium term,” he said. “And that is already why this party closed.”

Celenk offered a similar assessment: “You could say that the Future Party was never the party of the future. It became stuck in the past.”

Yet he distinguished between Davutoglu, the unsuccessful party leader, and Davutoglu, the intellectual.

“Let us criticise Ahmet Davutoglu the politician together, all the way to the end,” he said.

“But Ahmet Davutoglu’s intellectual production capacity within the conservative community was belittled and not taken seriously,” added Celenk, referring to sections of Turkiye’s conservative political and religious establishment which, according to him, benefited from Davutoglu’s ideas and intellectual framework but did not sufficiently acknowledge his contribution.

Esen said he doubts Davutoglu could exercise significant political influence while Erdogan remains in power. “But I think, in practice, his political career appears to be over,” he said.

Yet the analysts found substance in Davutoglu’s explanation for withdrawing. Celenk said his four-page letter offered a serious diagnosis of “the state the country, its politics and its society have reached”, including the risk that Turkiye was “losing its character as a nation”. Esen agreed that “Turkish politics has become very polluted and authoritarian”, adding that some of Davutoglu’s criticisms were therefore well grounded.

Davutoglu exits party politics without establishing the conservative democratic alternative he promised. But some of the ideas and diplomatic practices he introduced survived his loss of power, ensuring that debate over his legacy will outlast the party he founded.

“At least as Davutoglu leaves politics and withdraws from institutional politics, this must be remembered,” said Celenk.

The Lakers have signed forward Matisse Thybulle to a one-year, $3.3-million contract, people familiar with the deal but not authorized to speak publicly told The Times Monday.

Thybulle, who spent last season playing for the Portland Trail Blazers, made the NBA’s all-defensive team twice over his seven-year career. He is a defensive wing player that the Lakers sought to surround Luka Doncic and Austin Reaves.

Thybulle averaged 5.8 points per game last season and shot 43.3% from the field, 39.8% from three-point range, in 30 games.

The Lakers now have a 16-man roster. They’ll have to either trade or waive a player to be at the league maximum number of 15.

With the ruins of the Gaza Strip lying around him, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz last week renewed his push to set up illegal settlements in the battered territory’s north.

“I intend to establish three Nahal outposts, which is also a military entity, in those places that were in northern Gaza,” Katz told Channel 14, referring to bases that combine farming with an armed presence in a bid to consolidate control over a territory.

The minister said, in his view, establishing these settlements would enhance security – but execution would have to be “in the right way, at the right timing, while coordinating”.

It was not the first time the member of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party has made such remarks. In December, Katz said the Israeli military would “never leave all of Gaza” but “in due course” would establish Nahal posts despite a United States-brokered plan stipulating a full Israeli military withdrawal and barring the re-establishment of Israeli settlements.

His comments also echoed a recent statement by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich that “the groundwork to establish three settlements in the North Gaza area” had been completed. Smotrich, who also holds the portfolio of “settlement administration” in the Ministry of Defence, has repeatedly called for the full occupation of the Gaza Strip.

Such a push has been central to the goals of Israel’s settler movement, which in January 2024 organised a conference attended by government ministers to advocate for the re-establishment of settlements in the Strip.

“This is their ideology. They want the Gazans out of Gaza and they want to settle there like they settle in the West Bank,” former Israeli diplomat Alon Liel told Al Jazeera.

All settlements on Palestinian land are illegal under international law, but settlement expansion and annexation have been a core objective of Netanyahu’s hard-right government. In recent years, it has carried out unprecedented settlement expansion, resulting in the forced displacement of dozens of Palestinian communities and the de facto annexation of land in the occupied West Bank.

Issam Younis, a prominent Palestinian human rights defender and director of the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, said he was not surprised by Katz’s latest comments. “It was very clear from day one in the genocide that the main goal was to make life impossible in Gaza by destroying everything,” he told Al Jazeera. “It’s a race for time – take over land, starve Gaza and deny it any chance at life, then expel the population and build settlements.”

Younis said Israel’s conduct during its genocidal war against Palestinians in Gaza and the “ceasefire” agreed in October under the US plan clearly showed that expelling the population is the main objective of the Israeli government.

“Dehumanising statements by senior Israeli officials reaffirmed this: calling Palestinians in Gaza ‘human animals’, saying that there are no civilians in Gaza, then saying clearly that the objective was to expel the population and create settlements in the Gaza Strip,” Younis added.

Israel made no secret of that objective. In early 2025, the government announced it was setting up an agency to oversee the “voluntary migration” of Palestinians from Gaza as part of a plan proposed by Katz.

The announcement drew widespread international condemnation. Experts warned that such a move would amount to a war crime. Last month, the Israeli government decided to rebrand the agency and replace talk of “voluntary migration” with the “free movement plan” while using “language deemed more acceptable internationally”, according to Israeli media.

The policy enjoys widespread support in Israel. A 2025 poll commissioned by the University of Pennsylvania found that 82 percent of Jewish Israelis support the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza.

Meanwhile, nine months into a “ceasefire”, during which Israeli attacks have killed at least 1,127 Palestinians, conditions in Gaza remain unbearable.

The United Nations says at least 265 children have been killed during the period while hunger persists and the debilitated healthcare system continues to suffer acute medicine shortages.

“Only 20 percent of what Gaza needs has been allowed to enter – things related to water and health and to life in general,” Younis said, referring to Israeli restrictions on aid entering the Strip. “Gaza is being starved and parched for water.” For him, the aim is clear: expulsion, “even if they call it voluntary migration”.

Liel said Israel is doing the minimum on the humanitarian track to avoid upsetting US President Donald Trump, who has set up what he has named the Board of Peace to oversee the administration and reconstruction of the Strip.

“I don’t think that Israel wants Gaza to be reconstructed like Trump is dreaming,” he said.

Palestinians have been increasingly frustrated with the Board of Peace’s failure to pressure Israel or implement the recovery and construction plans outlined in Trump’s “ceasefire” plan, including the entry of critically needed assistance.

“The Board of Peace is complicit until it moves to rebuild Gaza immediately,” Younis said. “Otherwise, it would not be allowing Israel to create the conditions that make life impossible for Palestinians in Gaza, which will result in expulsion.”

Israeli forces have also expanded the “Yellow Line”, demarcating Israeli-controlled areas within Gaza, to encompass 70 percent of the Strip. “We are not retreating from the ‘Yellow Line’, unequivocally, as long as Hamas does not truly disarm, and even after that, we remain inside Gaza,” Katz told Channel 14 during his tour of northern Gaza, saying the destruction of the territory was “the result of a deliberate policy”.

The settlement push comes as Israel is gearing up for elections, which will be held on October 27.

According to Liel, Katz and other ministers are openly talking about building settlements in Gaza because their calculation is that it would boost their electoral chances amid a shift to the right by the electorate.

Many observers expected the weeks leading up to the polls to be accompanied by a serious escalation in Gaza, the West Bank and other Israeli “war fronts” without changing the political situation in Israel.

“The wish of this Israeli government was that as many [Palestinians from Gaza] will leave. Hopefully voluntarily. If not, Israel will help, and this is the reason you don’t want to rebuild Gaza,” Liel said.

In a recent interview with the New York Times, Vice President JD Vance denied that there was an “intense rivalry” between him and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. And yet, reports and speculations about tensions between them continue to emerge, with the Rubio camp allegedly spreading rumours that Vance was thinking about pulling out of the presidential campaign before it even starts

In response, perhaps, during the past two weeks, the vice president has stepped out of his routine public persona that usually avoids controversy to make bold statements critical of Israel. Rubio, on the other hand, has continued to hold the party line of unconditional support for Israel. While Vance has led efforts to negotiate a peace deal with Iran, which have rattled Israel, Rubio has spearheaded efforts to pressure the Lebanese government into an agreement on Israel’s terms.

By becoming the face of Republican scepticism of Israel and clashing with his likely presidential election rival Rubio, Vance appears to be charting his own way to the presidency – one that distances the vice president from what increasingly seem to be unpopular foreign policy positions.

Rubio, until recently, had been on the upswing, assigned ever-more important responsibilities by Trump. He has been a leading voice within the administration for a hawkish approach that has encompassed military action from Venezuela to Iran, outweighing the counsel of the more isolationist Vance.

When it comes to Israel, Rubio has made a point of being as public and proactive as possible in his support for that country and its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, supporting his appeal for the US to enter the war with Iran, and even going so far as to put his name on determinations leveraging claims of national security threats to deport foreign students critical of Israel.

While the bulk of his public statements have been directed at the Netanyahu government, it is hard not to read some of Vance’s recent comments as being directly responsive to Rubio’s actions not only abroad, but at home as well.

As Vance put it, “…pro-Israel people in the United States make two critical mistakes. One, on the one hand, is not delineating between America’s interest and Israeli interests because they’re not the same. But the second is always conflating criticism of a particular government with Jew hatred, because if everything is Jew hatred, then nothing is Jew hatred.”

But, if Vance is creating space between himself and Rubio (including, apparently, by eschewing the increasingly weaponised terminology of “antisemitism”), it must also be the case that there is a political case for his doing so. That case has yet to be tested on the Republican side, where the political elites well beyond Rubio continue to move in lockstep with Israel’s Netanyahu.

But Vance, as ever, is reading the base. The same polls that show an absolute collapse of Democratic grassroots support for Israel also show an unmistakable weakening of that support in the Republican base, with one recent survey finding that 57 percent of Republicans under 50 now hold negative views of Israel.

Despite the inability of Republican elected officials to rally support behind their criticism of Israel (neither of the two most visible examples, Representatives Marjorie Taylor Greene and Thomas Massie will re-enter Congress next year), the demand signal for more frank conversation has propelled right-wing commenters like Tucker Carlson and Candace Owens to ever-greater prominence. Looking into the social media landscape, Republican questioning of the Israel relationship – particularly under the banner question of whether it represents “America First” or “Israel First,” is inescapable.

Which is not to say it will be an easy path. As sitting vice president, Vance must defer to Trump; while the latter is currently frustrated with Netanyahu, there are no guarantees that the relationship will not warm up between now and 2028 – or that if Israel elects a new leader this autumn, that that person would not be able to rebuild much of Israel’s political capital in Washington.

And similarly, if Vance’s stance on Israel helps him capture the “America First” – which is no easy task given the cohesion within that movement of the Christian Zionist camp that remains strongly pro-Israel – he may then have to contend with a Democratic competitor who seizes the Israel-sceptic mantle more credibly.

Or not. It is still early, but the favoured nominee on the Democratic side appears to be California Governor Gavin Newsom, whose few forays into commentary on Palestine and Israel have quickly been walked back to appease the pro-Israel backers of the party establishment. Indeed, the Democrats will have their own complicated, and likely ugly, battle to fight when it comes to Israel.

What does appear certain, however, is that Israel will be a wedge issue in the upcoming election – and in the wake of the failed Iran war and increasingly unpopular attacks on free speech, both greatly driven by the government of Israel or its aligned lobbies, there is an opening here that Vance, given his competition with Rubio, would have been foolish to ignore.

So is Vance’s public criticism of Israel – and pro-Israel voices within his own party genuine, or calculated? As Vance put it in his book Hillbilly Elegy, “I don’t believe in epiphanies. I don’t believe in transformative moments, as transformation is harder than a moment. I’ve seen far too many people awash in a genuine desire to change only to lose their mettle when they realised just how difficult change actually is.”

Until now, little is harder in Republican politics than to go against the prevailing dogma on Israel. And while Vance has long demonstrated what might be termed isolationist tendencies, there is no reason to think that his recent comments represent an epiphany. Rather, like any politician, he is reading the tea leaves, and sensing an opportunity on the back of a change that is filtering across American public opinion.

Vance may not be committed to driving that change. But he may be smart enough to ride it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.

The U.S. military has released new details about the massive Fightertown Recapitalization (FTR) Program at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), in Anchorage, southeastern Alaska. This is a huge effort valued at approximately $7 billion that would effectively create an entirely new fighter hub to support future Air Force operations in the strategically important Arctic and Pacific regions.

The details emerged in a special notice announcing an upcoming virtual industry day, where government officials plan to brief contractors on the scope of the program and gather feedback on construction risks, industry capabilities, and acquisition strategies before moving toward a formal procurement process.

While the notice, from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, is intended primarily as market research, it offers one of the clearest looks yet at the scale and ambition of the Fightertown recapitalization effort.

According to the notice, existing airfield facilities cannot support the program’s requirements, prompting the selection of a new site to expand the current airfield infrastructure. Rather than a collection of isolated projects, the government describes the effort as a “complete campus approach” intended to synchronize facility construction with aircraft procurement, personnel movements, and logistical requirements.

The envisioned campus would include aircraft hangars, squadron operations facilities, corrosion control facilities, maintenance shops, and other aviation support infrastructure. Extensive airfield improvements are also planned, including new taxiways, aprons, shoulders, and specialized aircraft operating surfaces.

Highly likely to be included in the recapitalization efforts will be measures to help reduce vulnerability and ensure critical operations could continue in wartime. After all, in a potential fight against China or Russia, JBER would be high on the list of priority targets in the opening phases of a large-scale conflict. As we have repeatedly outlined in the past, aircraft shelters with varying degrees of hardening are suddenly very much back on the agenda in response to growing drone and missile threats. 

Beyond flight-line infrastructure, the project encompasses a substantial support ecosystem. Plans call for a munitions complex, petroleum operations facilities, warehousing and supply functions, dining facilities, visitor control infrastructure, firefighting facilities, training centers, simulators, and housing for unaccompanied airmen.

The government also notes that the campus design remains flexible and could ultimately involve modifications to, or demolition of, existing facilities as planning progresses.

Rather than relying solely on traditional military construction contracting approaches, the Army Corps of Engineers says the program intends to leverage authorities provided in the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. Those authorities could allow the use of Other Transaction Authority (OTA), Progressive Design-Build (PDB), and other alternative execution methods.

The notice explicitly states that the government intends to capitalize on private-sector innovation while avoiding what it describes as costly and time-consuming federal contracting burdens. It also emphasizes that the execution strategy will encourage industry partners to propose novel technical and construction solutions.

The scale of the investment underscores Alaska’s growing importance as a hub for U.S. airpower. JBER already serves as one of the Air Force’s premier fighter installations and occupies a critical geographic position between North America, the Arctic, a part of the world that has only grown in strategic significance in recent years, and the Indo-Pacific theater, where strategic planning is highly focused on a potential future conflict with China.

Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson hosts the headquarters of the 11th Air Force, the service’s top command in Alaska, and its 3rd Wing, which operates a mix of F-22 Raptor stealth fighters, E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning Control System (AWACS) radar planes, C-17 Globemaster III airlifters, and C-12 light utility aircraft. It is also home to the Alaska Air National Guard’s 176th Wing, which has additional C-17s, as well as HC-130 Combat King rescue aircraft and HH-60 rescue helicopters.

In addition, in 2023, the Air Force announced the creation of the 55th Operations Group, Detachment 1 at the base, as a detachment of the 55th Wing at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska.

“The new detachment will… serve as a strategic launch and recovery point for RC-135V/W Rivet Joint operations and exercises in the region,” according to the Air Force.

The move reflected increased demand for RC-135V/W Rivet Joint spy plane sorties in the Pacific, with JBER being well-positioned for these aircraft to gather intelligence on areas of interest in the northern end of the Pacific and the increasingly strategic Arctic region.

The arrival of the Rivet Joint prompted a previous reconstruction effort at JBER. In what the Air Force described as a “mega-project,” one of the two runways there was extended to help it better support operations involving larger aircraft like these.

In the future, the strategic location of JBER, as well as its current status as one of the few F-22 bases, suggests that it could eventually host the F-47 sixth-generation stealth fighter, the first of which is expected to make its first flight sometime in 2028. The F-47 could therefore well end up as the centerpiece of the Alaskan Fightertown, in keeping with the vision for the jet serving as a critical force multiplier that can bring together other crewed and uncrewed assets. With that in mind, at least some of the Fightertown Recapitalization Program may be specifically tailored to the requirements of the F-47.

Importantly, JBER also serves as the focal point for the Red Flag-Alaska and Northern Edge exercises.

The Red Flag-Alaska exercises can take place up to four times a year and mirror those flown over the Nellis Range Complex in Nevada, with some differences. Namely, the ranges in Alaska, many of which are instrumented, are enormous, and can include a more varied array of assets.

From JBER and other bases in the region, Red Flag-Alaska participants have access to the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex (JPARC). Covering an area of more than 67,000 square miles and providing 77,000 square miles of airspace above, JPARC is the “largest instrumented air, ground and electronic combat training range in the world,” according to the Air Force. It is regularly used to provide a realistic training environment for full-spectrum engagements, ranging from individual skills to large-scale joint engagements.

JPARC’s role could grow further in the coming years as the Air Force pushes large-scale exercises further and further out into the broad expanses of the Pacific. Other range complexes further down along the West Coast are seeing increasing use, as well. Even very large overland ranges, such as the sprawling Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) adjacent to Nellis Air Force Base, are increasingly constrained when attempting to replicate modern scenarios based on ever-growing adversary anti-access and aerial denial (A2/AD) bubbles.

Meanwhile, Northern Edge also occurs in and around Alaska every two years, with these large-scale events being used to test and evaluate new systems and capabilities from across the U.S. military.

In the past, the Air Force has described Northern Edge as a demonstration of “the U.S. commitment to the region by building interoperability, advancing common interests and a commitment to our allies and partners in ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific,” as well as showcasing U.S. ability to defend the homeland from and throughout Alaska.

As planning advances, we will learn more about what this new Alaskan Fightertown will look like. What is already clear is that the Air Force and the Pentagon are preparing for a long-term expansion and modernization effort on a scale rarely seen at an operational fighter base.

More details could emerge during the industry day scheduled for June 30, when government officials will provide a comprehensive update on the program and solicit feedback from industry partners on how to execute one of the Air Force’s biggest military infrastructure projects.

Update: 3:45 PM ET –

“We are deliberately investing in Pacific Air Force’s critical infrastructure by replacing and upgrading operations and maintenance facilities in addition to making repairs to existing buildings and funding mission-ready materiel, storage, and sustainment necessary for homeland defense and Agile Combat Employment operations,” a U.S. Air Force official has now told us in response to our queries for more information about the Fightertown plan. “We are also extending the runway and building a Joint Integrated Test and Training Center at JBER.”

“We are in the design stage now and will have a better idea of timelines once we receive an appropriation,” they added.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The exotic planform configuration concept of Boeing’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) classified demonstrator aircraft that led to the F-47 looks indeed to have been hiding in plain sight on an F-47 Systems Management Office patch. The first actual imagery of this aircraft appears to have leaked this week. Interestingly enough, another exotic stealth demonstrator aircraft that was once also highly classified and directly related to the design of the F-47, Boeing’s Bird of Prey, also featured its planform cryptically on a patch in a very similar manner.

Inside the firebird motif of the F-47 patch, there is an exaggerated planform of what we see in Project Fear’s video of what is very likely Boeing’s NGAD demonstrator shot outside of Area 51. It also aligns with what we can extrapolate from the concept renderings of the F-47 that have been released.

Mainly, the design includes forward canard foreplanes with a tapered central fuselage, rear-set and highly-swept wings, and no traditional tails. The wings have a high dihedral before drooping toward their tips, creating an appearance akin to the Klingon Bird of Prey from the world of Star Trek. That reference isn’t just my own. Boeing’s Bird of Prey from the 1990s clearly shares design similarities, especially in the wing area, as we originally stated after the first official concept art’s release. The Bird of Prey’s patch also cryptically shared its basic planform.

On the Bird of Prey patch, we see a traditional Klingon knife, made famous by Star Trek, with the blade’s hilt making up the Bird of Prey’s planform. In fact, the only detail to throw it off is the t-guard at the bottom of the handle, which appears like canards. Even the cockpit is there. Of course, it isn’t clear at this time when this patch began to circulate in the public domain or if it was after the Bird of Prey was declassified in late 2002. Regardless, in the F-47’s case, the demonstrator’s exact features remain closely guarded secrets, at least officially.

Boeing Bird of Prey Technology Demonstrator

Attempting to decode or draw insights into the military’s notoriously cryptic classified program patches is hardly a new practice. Books like Trevor Paglen’s I Could Tell You but Then You Would Have to Be Destroyed by Me is an excellent example of this and the fascination around this unique blending of art, technology, and national security.

In years of reporting on these topics, I have been told multiple times that there is more in patches than many realize, including hints at designs of classified aircraft. This runs pretty counterintuitive considering the government’s extreme protocol for classification, but vague representations of general design concepts are far from giving up an actual blueprint of a classified aircraft. Nonetheless, it is fascinating to see the practice occur for two highly classified aircraft that are directly related, and it’s something we keep an eye on regularly, as well.

Still, with all this in mind, it may be time to take a look back at some of the most interesting patches floating around to see if an exotic planform of an aircraft could be hiding amongst their stitches.

Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com