relations

Authors: Marin Mae Ekstrom and Wilder Alejandro Sánchez*

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) recently held a summit focused on “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” While the May 15 meeting itself did not offer any groundbreaking resolutions, all five heads of the OTS member states participated and reaffirmed their commitment to greater cooperation and integration. This summit was just one example in a series of events that demonstrate growing unity and collaboration among the Turkic states.

How far integration will go between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and Uzbekistan is debatable. There are several regional initiatives that are bringing these countries, as well as other states across the Caucasus and Central Asia, together, including connectivity projects such as the Middle Corridor and the Uzbek-Kyrgyz-Chinese railway, as well as agencies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union.

However, to secure the success of most multilateral initiatives, bilateral relations between participating members must be consolidated. When ties between two countries are stabilized and routinely strengthened, a bilateral friendship serves as a building block for expanding to additional actors and ensuring constant, reliable dialogue and collaboration among all involved players.

Türkiye, the leader of the Turkic world in terms of population, economic strength, and growing global geopolitical influence, is leveraging shared Turkic heritage to deepen and cement engagement with other OTS members. Uzbekistan is a natural and important partner: as the most populous Central Asian state, it is the second-largest majority-Turkic state in terms of both language and population. The landlocked nation has the third-largest economy in the Turkic world and is rapidly developing economically and expanding its membership in international initiatives.

This commentary will thus provide an analysis of Ankara-Tashkent relations. However, while statements by presidents & joint economic and investment projects are important parts of this geopolitical puzzle, the true sign of integration between two nations often occurs at the cultural level.

BILATERAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Bilateral relations between Türkiye and Uzbekistan are particularly dynamic. It is noteworthy that high-level meetings occur quite regularly: Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Türkiye and Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan met in Ankara on January 29, as part of the 4th meeting of the Joint Strategic Planning Group (JSPG). The two leaders signed several agreements, including the “Decision on Cooperation Mechanisms for Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Relations between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Uzbekistan,” an agreement on health cooperation, a memorandum of understanding for the development of international transport corridors, and a memorandum of understanding for promoting cooperation in mining.

The two countries celebrated 34 years of diplomatic relations, and the Turkish state-run news agency Anadolu marked the occasion with a March op-ed; the essay described bilateral relations as evolving into a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” The Uzbek presidency has utilized the same wording to describe the current level of bilateral relations.

Trade between Türkiye and Uzbekistan has nearly tripled over the past decade, rising from USD$1.2 billion in 2016 to over USD$3 billion in 2025. Short and long-term trade targets amount to USD$5 billion and USD$10 billion, respectively. Türkiye is the fourth-largest trading partner of Uzbekistan, accounting for 3.7% of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade. Uzbekistan is not as high a trade priority for Turkiye: even in Central Asia, which is not Turkiye’s primary trade area, Kazakhstan is a larger overall partner. Although neither country is pursuing top trading status with the other, trade and engagement remain high priorities for both Ankara and Tashkent. The evidence clearly displayed that both nations have taken major strides to consolidate both political and economic engagement.

THE CULTURAL FACTOR

From a cultural standpoint, Türkiye has swiftly gained soft power traction in Uzbekistan. Turkish TV series and movies enjoy immense popularity in Uzbekistan: the appeal of Turkish media, coupled with expanded transit options between the two countries, has inspired a tourism boom to Türkiye. From January to October 2025, over 230 thousand Uzbek nationals traveled to Türkiye for various reasons, a 16.3% increase compared to the same period in 2024.

Conversely, Uzbek influence in Türkiye is also increasing. Turkish tourism to Uzbekistan is also rising: between January and April 2025, around 49,400 Turkish citizens visited Uzbekistan for tourism, a 57.4% increase compared to the same time period in 2024. Turkish businesses are also investing in Uzbekistan’s tourism sector: Turkish partners support 12 hotels and over 100 joint restaurants, and in 2025-2026, Turkish investors pledged to help finance 11 additional hotel projects.

Language is another area of soft power, as Turkish is one of the top five most popular foreign languages to learn in Uzbekistan. Factors, including the popularity of Turkish media, academic study, and career opportunities, have bolstered its appeal. Although the study of Uzbek in Türkiye is not as widespread, the linguistic overlap between the two makes it relatively easy for a native Turkish speaker to learn Uzbek and vice versa, making it a less daunting endeavor than the study of other languages.

Cultural relations and people-to-people diplomacy are sometimes overlooked in grand analyses of international relations, as analysts and scholars often focus on presidential summits, trade agreements, investment, or joint military initiatives. However, people-to-people relations, as well as cultural and public diplomacy, are important tools in a country’s toolkit for strengthening grassroots ties.

Generally speaking, the OTS and its member governments support initiatives to promote people-to-people relations and to continue developing a common Turkic identity. During the recent OTS summit, the five leaders reaffirmed their determination to deepen cooperation in digital transformation, innovation, artificial intelligence, connectivity, and sustainable economic development. More broadly, they highlighted their shared commitment to further deepening solidarity, mutual trust, and strategic cooperation within the Turkic World in line with the objectives of the “Turkic World Vision-2040.”

Specifically, the heads of state “laid a time capsule to officially launch the construction of the Center of the Turkic Civilization.” This Center has been described by regional officials as “a groundbreaking architectural complex that will utilize AI, VR, and holography to immerse visitors in the rich philosophy and history of the Turkic World.” Moreover, during the January meeting between Erdoğan and Mirziyoyev, the two heads of state signed a Cultural Cooperation Plan for 2026-2027. Thus, a key strategy for encouraging Turkish-Uzbek bilateral ties is to highlight their commonalities within the wider Turkic cultural and linguistic sphere.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS

Tashkent-Ankara relations are generally strong, but additional factors complicate their full level of engagement. Although Ankara is very much interested in increasing connectivity with Central Asia via the Middle Corridor and engaging with the Turkic world, those are not its primary objectives. Issues like the Russo-Ukrainian War & the Black Sea; the recent conflict between Iran against the United States and Israel, as well as the related spillover across neighboring Lebanon and Syria; and even the upcoming elections in Armenia, are all arguably higher priorities for Ankara. Domestically, Türkiye is facing its own obstacles, as Erdoğan maintains a tight grip on power while the Turkish economy remains plagued by rising inflation and currency depreciation.

Similarly, Tashkent wants to improve connectivity with Türkiye via the Middle Corridor, but it also wants to increase trade and investment with China and attract investment and partnerships from the Gulf States and India. A good example of this diversification of partnerships is Tashkent’s new airport, to be built via investments and partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea. Meanwhile, Moscow remains committed to maintaining its historical influence across Eurasia (President Mirziyoyev visited Moscow for the May celebrations of the Great Patriotic War, one of the few leaders to do so), while the current US administration is focused on transactional diplomacy to secure access to critical minerals and rare earth elements that Uzbekistan has in abundance.

Ankara’s engagement in recent years with Central Asia via the OTS, the Middle Corridor, and bilateral interactions has attracted widespread academic and scholarly interest. However, there is a predictable focus on diplomatic, security, and trade & investment analyses; for example, a 2024 analysis on Tashkent-Ankara relations published by the Central Asia Caucasus Institute did not mention tourism, cultural diplomacy, or education (apart from military education).

That said, the frequently overlooked factors of cultural and public diplomacy will likely be critical to promoting long-term, successful cooperation between Türkiye and Uzbekistan: Turkish pop culture has had a strong influence in Uzbekistan, tourism is growing, and Turkish language study is increasingly popular there. population to learn Turkish. While Uzbekistan’s cultural and language appeal does not hold the same sway in Türkiye, the country is nonetheless growing in terms of global soft power appeal indicators. Uzbekistan’s rebranding as a globally-oriented and dynamic society steeped in rich Islamic and historical heritage -for example, by leveraging the legacy of legendary cities such as Bukhara, Samarqand, and Khiva- echoes the Kemalist model of a Türkiye embracing both modernity and its Ottoman historical legacy. Thus, framing the contemporary Uzbek national narrative as parallel to the Turkish one could help bolster its appeal in Türkiye and strengthen the sense of collective identity in the broader Turkic cultural space.

*Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He is also a non-resident fellow at Cfive, a think tank headquartered in Astana, Kazakhstan.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views or policies of any organizations with which the authors are affiliated.

RIVERSIDE — It would not have been an easy reelection bid in any case for freshman Rep. Ken Calvert (R-Riverside), who barely made it to Congress two years ago.

But now Calvert’s biggest reelection hurdle may be his own indiscretions, which also could pose a problem in surviving even his own party’s June primary.

The reason: After months of denying it, Calvert, 40, has admitted having sex in his car one night last November with a woman who police say is a known prostitute.

Initially, Calvert–a member of a prominent Riverside County family–said he was doing nothing wrong with the woman when police saw them together on a Corona street.

Corona police said simply that the congressman was spotted sitting in his car with a female, that there was no criminal activity and that after a few words the congressman drove off.

But the Riverside Press-Enterprise newspaper went to court to press Corona for release of confidential police reports that had been prepared by officers who were sensitive to the fact that they had a street-level encounter with their local congressman.

The city was ordered to release the report, which indicated that there had been evidence of a sex act under way, and an embarrassed Calvert responded with a prepared statement.

“My conduct that evening was inappropriate,” he said–not because it was illegal, but because “it violated the values of the person I strive to be.” He admitted that he was caught in “an extremely embarrassing situation.”

He said he did not pay for the sex. He said he “panicked and tried to drive away” when the officers confronted him, but “came to my senses” and cooperated with them.

Corona Police Capt. John Dalzell said Calvert was not detained or arrested because “while the officer saw certain things, he didn’t see everything necessary to support a finding that a crime was committed.” Dalzell said there was no witness to an exchange of money for services, and neither party claimed to be a victim.

Dalzell said Calvert did not try to exert influence to avoid arrest. He said the officer’s decision not to pursue the matter “wasn’t a close call. He didn’t even call for a supervisor.”

In his explanation for his conduct that night, Calvert said he had come back from a rough week in Washington and was reeling from his father’s suicide a year earlier, as well as his wife’s request for a divorce, which had been granted just a few weeks before.

“I was feeling intensely lonely,” he said. “I realize now that this, or a similar incident, was probably inevitable.”

Calvert, who worked in commercial real estate before his election to Congress in 1992, was expected to coast to his party’s nomination this year to represent western Riverside County in Washington. His opponent in the primary, conservative Joe Khoury, 47, a professor of finance at UC Riverside, ran second behind Calvert in the primary two years ago but thinks he can prevail this time.

“I thought he was vulnerable, even before this incident,” Khoury said. “Riverside is conservative, and voters’ reaction to this is not pleasant. It plays differently here than it would in, say, Los Angeles.”

Calvert’s campaign manager, Ed Slevin, agreed that Calvert will have his hands full winning the primary because of the Corona incident. “I assume he’s more vulnerable in June among conservative Republicans than he’ll be in November,” he said. “I think that, by then, it’ll be considered old news.”

If Calvert wins the primary, his Democratic challenger is expected to be Mark Takano, a high school history and English teacher and trustee of the Riverside Community College District. Takano lost to Calvert by a little more than 500 votes in 1992, and is expected to handily win his party’s nomination in June against a single challenger.

Takano scolded Calvert for not coming clean earlier about the Corona incident. “Mr. Calvert has only himself to blame for his becoming a bigger issue than putting people back to work, fighting crime and improving our schools,” Takano said.

Democratic Party strategists said that, even before Calvert’s encounter with the woman in Corona, the 43rd Congressional District seat had been targeted for turnover because of what they characterized as Calvert’s lackluster performance in Washington during his first stint there and his vulnerability back home.

Published on 20/05/2026 – 2:31 GMT+2•Updated
2:36

Diplomats and MEPs reached an agreement late on Tuesday to implement the contentious EU-US agreement, which eliminates duties on most US industrial goods imported into Europe.

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The negotiations concluded two weeks after US President Donald Trump threatened to impose 25% tariffs on EU cars if Europeans did not implement the agreement — clinched by Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Turnberry, Scotland, last summer — by 4 July.

The so-called “Turnberry Agreement,” criticised by MEPs as unbalanced, raises US tariffs on EU goods to as much as 15%.

“The EU and the United States share the world’s largest and most integrated economic relationship. Maintaining a stable, predictable and balanced transatlantic partnership is in the interest of both sides,” Cyprus trade Minister Michael Damianos said, adding: “Today, the European Union delivers on its commitments.”

MEPs had kept the deal frozen for several weeks following Trump’s threats over Greenland earlier this year. They also suspended it after the US adopted new tariffs following a Supreme Court ruling that declared illegal the tariffs imposed by the White House since Trump’s return to power.

Demanding clarity from the Americans, EU lawmakers finally agreed to enter into negotiations with the EU Cyprus presidency — representing EU member states — after the Commission assured them that the US would honour its side of the agreement and cap its tariffs at 15%, as agreed.

Fragile EU-US relations

However, EU-US relations remain fragile and there is concern in Brussels that the US administration could still use tariffs to put political pressure on the EU if the bloc does not comply with the White House’s demands on other issues.

Trump’s threats over EU cars two weeks ago also targeted Germany, whose Chancellor Friedrich Merz has criticised the war in Iran launched by the Americans alongside Israel.

Trump has repeatedly called on European countries to deploy ships to help secure the Strait of Hormuz, a move Europeans have been reluctant to make.

Many disagreements also continue to strain EU–US relations over Ukraine — including the recent US extension of a sanctions waiver allowing purchases of Russian oil — and over NATO, which Trump has repeatedly threatened to leave.

On Tuesday night, MEPs tried to secure the deal by attaching conditions, risking US anger with additional provisions to which Washington had not agreed.

Under the Turnberry Agreement, the EU also committed to investing $600 billion across strategic sectors in the United States through 2028 and to purchasing $750 billion worth of US energy.

China has intensified its diplomatic rhetoric against Santiago Peña following his recent visit to Taiwan, reflecting Beijing’s growing efforts to isolate Taipei internationally and weaken the remaining countries that maintain formal diplomatic ties with the island.

Paraguay is one of only 12 states that officially recognize Taiwan instead of the People’s Republic of China. During his visit, Peña reaffirmed support for Taiwan and described relations with Taipei as rooted in shared democratic values and political freedom.

Beijing responded sharply, accusing Paraguayan politicians of serving as “pawns” of Taiwanese separatist forces and suggesting that leaders supporting Taiwan may have “ulterior motives.” The unusually aggressive language highlights how sensitive the Taiwan issue has become within China’s broader foreign policy strategy.

Why Paraguay Matters to China and Taiwan

Although Paraguay is not a major global power, its diplomatic recognition carries significant symbolic and strategic importance for both China and Taiwan.

For Taiwan, maintaining formal diplomatic allies is essential to preserving international legitimacy and resisting Beijing’s efforts to diplomatically isolate the island. Each country that continues to recognize Taiwan represents political resistance against China’s One China principle.

For China, reducing Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic partnerships is part of a long term strategy aimed at reinforcing Beijing’s claim that Taiwan lacks the status of an independent state. Over the past decade, several countries have switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing after economic and political engagement with China.

Paraguay therefore represents one of Taiwan’s most important remaining diplomatic footholds in South America.

Economic Pressure Shapes the Debate

The controversy surrounding Paraguay’s Taiwan relationship is increasingly driven by economic considerations. Some Paraguayan politicians, agricultural exporters, and business groups argue that maintaining ties with Taiwan limits access to Chinese markets and investment opportunities.

China is the world’s second largest economy and a major importer of agricultural products, making diplomatic recognition economically attractive for many developing states.

Supporters of relations with Beijing argue that Paraguay could gain greater trade access, infrastructure investment, and financial opportunities if it abandoned Taiwan.

However, Peña and supporters of Taiwan emphasize ideological and political considerations, framing the relationship as a partnership based on democratic governance and political sovereignty rather than purely economic interests.

This reflects a broader global trend where smaller states increasingly face pressure to balance economic incentives against political alignment and strategic values.

China’s Diplomatic Messaging Is Becoming More Aggressive

The sharp rhetoric from China’s foreign ministry demonstrates Beijing’s increasingly confrontational diplomatic approach on issues related to Taiwan.

By describing Paraguayan leaders as “pawns” and questioning their motivations, China is signaling that support for Taiwan will be treated not merely as a diplomatic disagreement but as active opposition to Chinese national interests.

This language also serves multiple audiences simultaneously.

Internationally, Beijing seeks to discourage other governments from strengthening ties with Taiwan.

Domestically, strong rhetoric reinforces nationalist narratives surrounding territorial sovereignty and reunification.

Regionally, China is attempting to increase pressure on Paraguay by suggesting that continued support for Taiwan contradicts public opinion and economic interests.

The emphasis on opinion polls claiming support for relations with Beijing also reflects China’s strategy of portraying diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as politically unsustainable.

Taiwan’s Shrinking Diplomatic Space

The dispute illustrates Taiwan’s increasingly difficult international position as China expands its diplomatic, military, and economic influence globally.

Under President Lai Ching-te, Taiwan has continued emphasizing democracy, sovereignty, and international partnerships. However, Beijing views Lai as supporting separatist policies and has intensified political and military pressure against Taipei.

Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies have steadily declined over recent decades as China has used economic incentives and geopolitical influence to persuade states to switch recognition.

As a result, every remaining ally now carries outsized symbolic importance for Taipei’s international visibility and diplomatic legitimacy.

Analysis

China’s reaction to Peña’s Taiwan visit demonstrates how the Taiwan issue has evolved into one of the most emotionally and strategically sensitive dimensions of Chinese foreign policy.

Beijing no longer views diplomatic recognition of Taiwan as a minor symbolic issue. Instead, it increasingly interprets international engagement with Taipei as a challenge to China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and geopolitical authority.

The pressure on Paraguay also reflects the broader transformation of global diplomacy under growing United States China rivalry. Smaller countries are increasingly caught between competing geopolitical and economic pressures, particularly when balancing relations with democratic partners against the economic power of China.

For Paraguay, the debate is ultimately about strategic identity as much as economics. Maintaining relations with Taiwan offers political alignment with democratic values and preserves diplomatic independence from Beijing’s influence. Switching recognition to China could deliver economic benefits but may also reduce Paraguay’s foreign policy autonomy.

For Taiwan, retaining Paraguay is important not only diplomatically but psychologically. Every diplomatic loss strengthens Beijing’s narrative that international recognition of Taiwan is disappearing and that eventual reunification is inevitable.

The dispute therefore reflects a much larger geopolitical contest over legitimacy, influence, and the future international status of Taiwan. As competition between China and Taiwan intensifies, diplomatic battles involving even relatively small states are likely to become increasingly significant within global geopolitics.

With information from Reuters.