Opinions

In the past few months, the geopolitical chessboard has tilted dramatically, setting the stage for a highly anticipated yet asymmetrical summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, now officially confirmed for May 13-15 following statements from both the White House and China’s Foreign Ministry. Washington has repeatedly signalled the importance it attaches to the meeting, while Beijing has approached it in its characteristically measured fashion, framing the summit less as a breakthrough than as part of the broader need for “communication” and “strategic guidance” between major powers.

This subtle diplomatic choreography speaks volumes about the shifting global balance of power. For the first time in decades, it is the United States that finds itself in a position of profound vulnerability, increasingly dependent on China’s cooperation to extricate itself from a self-inflicted disaster.

The source of this American predicament is the failure of its recent military adventurism in the Middle East. Having launched an illegal, unprovoked war against Iran alongside Israel, the US military has found itself trapped in a costly and protracted deadlock. In retaliation, Tehran has effectively choked off the Strait of Hormuz, with over a dozen US warships now enforcing a blockade that has rerouted dozens of vessels, sending shockwaves through global energy markets and raising fears of a worldwide economic meltdown. Washington now finds itself scrambling for an exit.

In a striking reversal of their usual hawkish rhetoric, top US officials — including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent—have been making increasingly desperate public appeals for China to intervene. They are urging Beijing to use its considerable influence to convince Iran to reopen the vital waterway.

What makes this dynamic particularly striking is the contradiction at the heart of US policy. Even as Trump and Rubio appeal for China’s help on the Hormuz crisis, the broader US posture remains confrontational, with ongoing disputes over technology restrictions and other issues continuing to shadow the relationship. The contradiction exposes an administration increasingly driven by desperation.

Washington’s narrative conveniently frames China as the party most desperate for a resolution, citing Beijing’s heavy reliance on Middle Eastern energy imports. However, this assessment drastically miscalculates China’s strategic preparedness. Far from being paralysed by the disruption, Beijing has already demonstrated remarkable resilience. Through meticulous stockpiling, diversified supply chains, and robust domestic production, China has coped with the closure exceptionally well, avoiding the kind of immediate economic shock Washington appeared to expect.

Consequently, Beijing views the Hormuz standoff as a pivotal stress test it has already passed. Knowing the stakes, China is in no rush to bail out a belligerent Washington. Recent diplomatic engagements have made this increasingly clear. China has maintained close communication with Iran throughout the crisis, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosting his Iranian counterpart for talks on the situation. Rather than simply pressuring Iran to reopen Hormuz, Beijing is positioning itself to demand a comprehensive “grand bargain.” Why settle for a minor concession when you can force the US to cease its hostilities against Iran, lift its crippling sanctions, and accept a new multipolar security architecture in the Middle East?

Iran has submitted a response to a US proposal to end the war, focused on ceasing hostilities and addressing Strait security, which Trump promptly rejected as “completely unacceptable,” highlighting the continued deadlock Washington hopes Beijing can break.

China did not start this fire, but it is now the indispensable power capable of extinguishing it, and strictly on its own terms. Beyond the immediate crisis, Beijing’s ultimate strategic focus remains unwavering: the core issue of Taiwan. This broader assertiveness will undoubtedly carry over into the Trump-Xi summit. While Trump is desperate for tangible deliverables and a successful photo-op to distract from domestic turmoil, Xi can afford to play the long game.

Unlike previous administrations that settled for vague diplomatic pleasantries, Beijing is expected to intensify the pressure significantly. China will likely demand that the US explicitly oppose Taiwan independence, moving decisively beyond the current, tepid commitment to merely “not support” secessionist forces.

Recognising Trump’s eagerness for a win, the US president may attempt to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip. He could offer concessions on the issue in exchange for Chinese cooperation on reopening the Strait of Hormuz, massive purchases of American agricultural and energy products, or even help brokering peace in other conflicts.

However, Beijing is far too disciplined to fall for such short-term traps. Taiwan is a non-negotiable core interest, and any temporary trade-off would be strategically foolish.

While Trump may lavish praise on his personal relationship with Xi Jinping and project an image of amicable deal-making, Beijing harbours no illusions about the man across the table. China’s leadership understands that Trump cannot be trusted; any agreement reached today could be discarded tomorrow based on his whims or domestic political calculations. Even as Beijing entertains the prospect of a “grand bargain” and maintains a cordial facade, it refuses to structurally rely on Trump’s commitments.

By stabilising its bilateral relationship with the US over the coming months — especially with several high-level meetings scheduled between the two leaders throughout the year — China aims to secure a predictable external environment conducive to its long-term rise.

For Beijing, however, the stakes extend far beyond Taiwan alone. A key priority for China will also be securing firm guarantees regarding the trajectory of Japan’s remilitarisation. As Tokyo rapidly expands its military capabilities and grows increasingly vocal about its willingness to intervene in a Taiwan contingency, China will demand that Washington strictly curtail its ally’s ambitions.

On a broader geopolitical scale, Beijing is positioning itself as a responsible and stabilising great power, repeatedly calling on the international community to de-escalate the Hormuz crisis and prevent wider economic disruption. In doing so, China is drawing a stark contrast with a United States that is openly launching illegal wars, engaging in what critics describe as state terrorism, including the extrajudicial kidnapping and killing of foreign leaders and their family members.

Ultimately, the coming days are critical not only for the future of US-China relations, but for the resolution of the US-Israel war on Iran and the broader structure of the international order. The era of US unilateralism is gasping for air in the Gulf. Armed with strategic patience and increasingly strong leverage over the crisis, China enters the Trump-Xi summit in a commanding position.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

The annual ritual that is the Victory Day Parade in Moscow serves a dual purpose. It reminds Russia’s citizenry and the Kremlin’s audience across the former Soviet Union of the glorious past. The muscle flexing on May 9 each year benchmarks Russia’s geopolitical fortunes.

Last year on the 80th anniversary of the Soviet triumph over Nazi Germany, Russian President Vladimir Putin was flanked by foreign dignitaries from far and wide: Chinese President Xi Jinping, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, Serbia’s Aleksandar Vucic, Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt and Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the Palestinian Authority.

This year, the lineup was much less impressive. Leaders from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Laos, Malaysia and Uzbekistan attended – with Republika Srpska, Abkhazia and South Ossetia for some added flavour – but no heavy hitters like India or China.

The talk of Russia as a linchpin of a new multipolar world order rings a tad hollow today, not least because no heavy equipment was marched through during the parade out of fear of Ukrainian drone strikes. On top of it, United States President Donald Trump claimed credit for a three-day ceasefire between Moscow and Kyiv.

The relatively dull affair that was this year’s parade speaks volumes about Russia’s current state. On paper, everything is going just fine. Trump has not wholly abandoned the idea of a deal to freeze the war in Ukraine, even at the cost of major concessions by Kyiv. The current US National Security Strategy calls for “strategic stability” with Russia while blasting Europe’s “woke” policies.

The inconclusive war against Iran, meanwhile, has exposed the limits of US military might. Oil prices have jumped, filling Russia’s coffers and improving its fiscal balance. On top of it, Trump has removed sanctions on some Russian oil to increase the global supply. Meanwhile, the Europeans are signalling they want to talk to Moscow.

In reality, the mood is gloomy. The Russian war effort in Ukraine continues to be stalled no matter how much money, materiel and human lives the Kremlin throws into the meat grinder that is the so-called special military operation (SVO). Ukrainian drones have hit deep inside the Russian homeland with even Red Square apparently not being immune to aerial attack.

Trump has lost interest in wooing Putin. With Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban gone, the European Union has consolidated ranks. In Russia itself, economic growth has plummeted from 4 percent in 2024 to a projection of just over 1 percent this year.

The prospects for long-term development, productivity growth and technological innovation are lacklustre. There are modest signs of discontent within the Russian elite. Even Putin’s sky-high popularity ratings are slightly down, according to pollsters.

The stifling of the mobile internet in Moscow and other big cities has been met with dismay. Russians could be excused for puzzling over how the SVO, sold as a glorious repeat of the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War, has gone on longer than the latter with no end in sight. It is no wonder Putin felt compelled to say on Saturday that “the matter” is coming to an end.

While its resources are focused on Ukraine, Russia is on the back foot in what it still calls its “near abroad” too. The past week showed that Europe is gaining momentum there.

On Monday, Armenia hosted the annual summit of the European Political Community (EPC), where European leaders gathered. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was in attendance too. Once Moscow’s loyal client and member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and Eurasian Economic Union, Yerevan is now strengthening ties with the West.

Even if the EPC is dismissed as a pan-European talking shop – or maybe a transatlantic one, given that Mark Carney, the Canadian prime minister, came as well – observers cannot ignore the fact that it was followed by the first EU-Armenia summit.  The high-profile meeting signalled in no ambiguous terms that Yerevan sees its future in the EU. Strategically, it is looking at joining the trio of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

The EU is reciprocating: The summit discussed up to 2.5 billion euros ($2.95bn) in investment in Armenia; cooperation on energy, transport and digital infrastructure; and visa liberalisation.

In parallel, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are courting the Trump administration. The two countries have welcomed the US as a peacebroker as they move closer to normalising ties. In August at the White House, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a joint declaration pledging to seek peace.

In February, JD Vance became the first sitting US vice president to visit Yerevan and then hopped over to Baku. Armenians and Azeris are negotiating the opening of the Zangezur corridor running between Azerbaijan proper and its exclave Nakhchivan (from where the Aliyev family hails). The project has a name – Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.

In short, the US has scored a couple of points in Russia’s back yard with the help of Pashinyan and Aliyev. Moscow is watching from the sidelines as a former satellite drifts away from its embrace. And the EU but also Turkiye are to benefit because Armenia’s opening and interconnection with its neighbours favours their pro-integration agenda.

Of course, this does not mean that Armenia could simply jump ship from Russia to the West. Moscow retains stakes in the Armenian economy and, therefore, political leverage.

This will be put on display in the June general election, which will pit Pashinyan’s Civil Contract against the Armenia Alliance of former President Robert Kocharyan and Strong Armenia associated with the Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. Both Kocharyan and Karapetyan have strong connections to Moscow.

Public opinion is in favour of diversifying relations but not a complete break-up. That is a pragmatic position shared by Pashinyan too despite his focus on deepening ties with the West.

Russia failed to – or was reluctant to – support Armenia against Azerbaijan and prevent the loss of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and Armenians are right to look for alliances elsewhere. But without a peace treaty with Azerbaijan and without full normalisation with Turkiye, one has to tread carefully and not burn bridges.

The Armenian leadership has to also factor in neighbouring Iran, with whom it enjoys positive ties. An escalation of the US-Israel war on Iran could threaten cross-border energy trade.

Putin would have loved to see Armenia and Azerbaijan attending Saturday’s parade. Ditto for Moldova, where pro-EU forces prevailed in the 2025 parliamentary elections. Or Georgia, which still has no diplomatic relations with Russia despite the rule of the authoritarian-minded Georgian Dream, a party viewed positively in the Kremlin.

The chances of those countries turning up next year are slim too. Even Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will probably not confirm until the last minute, as they have been doing for years.

These days, Russia’s near abroad is much more abroad than near.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.