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The “brrrt” of the GAU-8 Gatling gun in action, the whistle of the TF34 engines as A-10 Warthogs fly at low level, the hurried calls of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers needing support from above – welcome to the first episode in our opening season of “Special Access” on TWZ’s YouTube channel, a series where we take you up close to the latest military technology and inside the wire at elite military units.

In this episode, Jamie Hunter visits the U.S. Air Force A-10 Weapons Instructor Course that has been the center of excellence for the Warthog and its missions for nearly 50 years, but is now closing down as this close air support master nears retirement. Jamie had the rare opportunity to fly with the 66th Weapons Squadron’s A-10 team at Nellis Air Force Base, in Nevada, as they supported a capstone exercise one last time during the Weapons School’s final graduation events for new Weapon Instructors before they gain their prestigious graduate patches.

“The fundamentals of combat search and rescue, close air support, forward air control, even counter-maritime mission sets, as well, that starts the minute you walk in the door. The beauty of the weapons school is that it truly teaches you how to be an expert in your aircraft. It also teaches you, more importantly, how to be an expert in integration,” says Maj. Alex “Trippin” Boules, one of the last A-10 weapons instructor pilots at the 66th Weapons Squadron.

The final Weapons Instructor Course, or WIC, concluded in December 2025 as the last pair of students graduated from the six-month course, which has been run by the USAF Weapons School since 1977. Many graduates of the 66th Weapons Squadron have taken part in significant combat operations since that time, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the recent Operation Epic Fury in Iran. The latter saw A-10s taking on a critical role watching over combat search and rescue operations in partnership with special operations teams to recover downed U.S. aircrews.

Despite repeated calls for the A-10 to be retained in service, the Warthog is ultimately nearing retirement. Three squadrons have been granted a reprieve to continue operations until 2030, but the writing is on the wall for the Warthog as increasing numbers arrive at the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG) boneyard in Arizona for storage.

So get ready for one last blast of A-10 action from Nellis as the 66th Weapons Squadron winds down the Warthog Weapons School.

The Last Days Of The A-10 Warthog Weapons School

Contact the presenter: jamie.hunter@teamrecurrent.io

Suspected Irish crime boss Daniel Kinahan has appeared before a Dublin court after being extradited from Dubai. The 49-year-old, who is one of the world’s most wanted men, was charged with directing a criminal organisation after being extradited from Dubai.

Much of the country will feel some relief from the heat early in the week before temperatures spike again.

On Monday, the air will feel a little fresher compared to the weekend with maximum temperatures in northern areas of the UK around 18 to 24C.

Further south, while cooler than Sunday, it will still be a very warm day with temperatures between 22 to 27C.

By Tuesday, warmer air will start to move back in across the UK with the highest temperatures across central southern England, the Midlands and east Wales.

Yellow heat-health alerts remain in force for much of England until 21:00 BST on Tuesday, though they are likely to be extended or upgraded as the heatwave nears.

Highs are likely to be around 27 to 30C.

Wednesday will see temperatures widely across England and Wales head into the high twenties and low thirties.

The peak of the extreme heat is set to arrive on Thursday, with temperatures reaching 36C (97F) in south-east England, and up to 35C likely across central and eastern England.

This would mark the fourth consecutive month where 35C has been reached in the UK – a new record.

Many locations will exceed their heatwave threshold of 25 to 28C – dependent on location – for the first day.

Some of the warmth will spread further north into northern England, Scotland and Northern Ireland with temperatures into the low to mid-20s Celsius.

As heat builds throughout the week, overnight temperatures will stay relatively high bringing some uncomfortable nights for sleeping.

Minimum temperatures may not go lower than 16 to 18C across England and Wales.

There’s also a possibility of a ‘tropical night’ – where temperatures remain above 20C all night – in south-east England.

Trump says US will wait for economic pressure to mount on Iran, as Israel formally rejects 15-point Gaza peace plan.

The latest Houthi attacks come less than 24 hours after an earlier barrage struck al-Makha (Mocha) and its commercial port.

Yemen’s Houthis have launched a new wave of missile and drone attacks on the Red Sea port city of al-Makha (Mocha), extending an assault on government-held areas along Yemen’s western coast and killing at least 11 people.

The latest attacks came on Sunday evening, less than 24 hours after an earlier barrage struck al-Makha and its commercial port. Yemeni government forces said air defences intercepted six drones during the renewed assault, while two ballistic missiles fell into the sea without hitting their targets.

Footage broadcast by the Houthi-affiliated Al Masirah TV showed several ballistic missiles and drones being launched. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said the operation targeted Saudi troop concentrations and weapon depots in the area, according to the Reuters news agency.

At least 11 killed

Earlier on Sunday, Attacks on al-Makha killed at least 11 people, including eight military personnel and three civilians, and wounded 32 others, according to the latest toll cited by the AFP news agency.

The strikes also caused extensive damage at al-Makha’s port. Government authorities said buildings and commercial facilities were hit, while The Associated Press reported damage to port infrastructure, commercial goods and food supplies.

Government forces also said they intercepted and destroyed an unmanned explosive boat approaching the commercial port.

During the renewed attacks later on Sunday, the National Resistance Forces, which are aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognised government, urged residents of al-Makha to remain indoors, accusing the Houthis of carrying out indiscriminate shelling.

Houthis say Saudi military buildup prompted attack

The Houthis said the operation involved a large number of ballistic missiles and drones and was launched in response to an alleged continued Saudi military buildup, including the reinforcement of allied forces with weapons and equipment along Yemen’s western coast and in Taiz province.

Houthi political council member Hizam al-Assad separately claimed that continuing explosions, fires and columns of smoke from the port were caused by large quantities of weapons and military equipment stored there.

Attacks extend to al-Khokha

The escalation was not limited to al-Makha, but also targeted the al-Khokha district, south of the coastal city of Hodeidah.

Al-Jumhuriya television, which is affiliated with the National Resistance Forces led by Presidential Leadership Council member Tareq Saleh, said the government-appointed governor of Hodeidah, al-Hassan Taher, survived an assassination attempt on Sunday after a Houthi ballistic missile struck his residence in the district.

The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) says F-16 fighter jets intercepted two civilian aircraft that entered restricted airspace over Bedminster, New Jersey, where US President Donald Trump was watching a tournament at his golf course.

Tehran, Iran – Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have expanded their mutual defence pact to add Turkiye, raising questions about the emergence of a new security architecture at a time when the United States and Iran have yet to reach a final deal to end their war.

Under the agreement signed in Mecca on Friday, any external armed attack on either of the three countries will now be considered an attack on all.

The trilateral pact was announced more than five months after the US and Israel launched a bombing campaign against Iran, triggering a conflict that quickly spread to the Gulf and disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, however, have been careful not to antagonise any regional or international actors while finalising what they said was the result of years of hard work and negotiations. They have stressed the pact, which does not identify a specific threat, is not targeted against any country – particularly Iran – and does not abrogate or replace any existing agreements with others.

In Tehran, the reaction has largely been subdued, with officials mostly focusing on aspects of regional and Muslim cooperation and what they perceive as a declining role for the US.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Friday that when Muslims stand together, “we can face every challenge by malicious outsiders head-on”.

“Time to rely only on ourselves and embrace true brotherhood,” he wrote on X, without directly mentioning the trilateral agreement signed hours earlier.

But Iran certainly sees some reasons to be concerned in the long run, according to Hamidreza Azizi, a researcher and analyst on Iran and Middle Eastern geopolitical dynamics.

The associate at Clingendael Institute told Al Jazeera that the timing is important, since the agreement comes after months of a war in which Saudi Arabia has faced attacks from the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen and armed groups in neighbouring Iraq.

“From Tehran’s perspective, the concern is therefore not only that the pact could strengthen Saudi deterrence, but that it could eventually facilitate coordinated pressure on Iran in Yemen, Iraq, and even economically through Turkiye and Pakistan,” he said.

On Sunday, the Houthis claimed another successful drone strike on the Saudi Aramco refinery in Jizan. Saudi Arabia confirmed a fire was extinguished without inflicting casualties, but did not mention the cause.

Separately in Yemen, Houthi missiles and drones struck the Saudi-backed and internationally recognised government’s Red Sea port of al-Makha, with officials reporting at least seven people killed, 15 wounded and severe infrastructure damage. The Yemeni group, which has also been hitting or turning back Saudi-linked ships in the Red Sea over recent weeks, said it targeted weapons depots.

‘A strong bloc’

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not released a formal statement about the Pakistan-Saudi-Turkiye deal, but a senior official outlined Tehran’s diplomatic thinking in an interview with local media on Saturday.

Hossein Noushabadi, a director general for parliamentary and legal affairs, told the state-linked ISNA news service that the ministry predominantly regards the agreement within the context of a diminishing direct US presence in the region.

The pact “is being viewed as the beginning of the collapse of US security hegemony in West Asia and the Persian Gulf”, said Noushabadi.

“It appears that, in the not-too-distant future, a new regional security order based on cooperation among regional states will replace the power structures imposed by extra-regional actors, heralding the end of the prevailing security and geopolitical paradigm and West Asia’s departure from the sphere of vital US interests,” added the official, who is a former Iranian envoy to Oman.

Political scientist Vali Nasr said he does not believe the pact is currently a threat to Tehran.

“For now, these are all elements of a post-American security order in the Middle East,” the professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University told Al Jazeera.

“This is also as much a balance to the Abraham Accords as a direct challenge to Tehran,” he added, in reference to the US-pushed regional normalisation effort with Israel, which US President Donald Trump last month tied with a civil nuclear deal sought by Saudi Arabia.

Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government at Georgetown University of Qatar, also agreed that decision-makers in Iran do not immediately feel threatened by the pact, especially since they have maintained cordial relations with both Pakistan and Turkiye even under trying circumstances.

“Ultimately, this pact is not that new, nor is it something that, at present at least, has a great deal of substance beyond its symbolic significance. For example, neither Turkiye nor Pakistan would be willing to get involved in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen despite recent Houthi attacks on the kingdom,” Kamrava told Al Jazeera.

Not all inside Iran are content with the pact, however, with some hardline lawmakers and media arguing that it could ultimately be directed against the “resistance front” of Tehran-backed armed forces across the region, and degrade Pakistan’s credibility as a main mediator between Iran and the US and others.

“It’s clear that Arab states finally understand security cannot be imported; it must be built within the region. However, a roadmap is still missing,” Ebrahim Azizi, a member of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said in a more hawkish viewing of the pact.

“Warning: Miscalculation is a historical mistake. Iran has proven that every error comes at a cost. Balance is the only way forward,” he wrote on X.

Ebrahim Rezaei, another member of the commission, also wrote on X that “a paper agreement with Turkiye and Pakistan” will not bring Saudi Arabia security, “just as years of one-sided dependence on the Americans did not bring them security”.

Is Iran missing out?

Clingendael Institute’s Azizi said Tehran’s priority will likely be to avoid turning the pact into an explicitly anti-Iranian coalition amid a war with regional repercussions, and that would mean preserving individual relations with each of the three countries.

He said Tehran can also continue to emphasise its long-standing argument that regional security should ultimately be organised by regional states rather than external powers.

“If those states come to see the pact as providing meaningful protection against Iran or Iran-aligned groups, that would make Iranian membership even more difficult,” said Azizi. “Over the longer term, however, if the arrangement evolves from a balancing coalition into a broader regional security architecture, the question of Iranian participation could look quite different.”

Experts also said it could be a possibility that Iran itself would be seeking potential membership in the pact in a distant future, but that would mean a sustainable end to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and across the region, while expansion to other regional Arab states seems more plausible in the near term. Egypt has already been floated as a candidate, but that could be a complex decision for Cairo to make.

Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North African Programme at Chatham House, said the trilateral pact reflects both short- and long-term security concerns and opportunities for Riyadh, Islamabad and Ankara.

“They are driven together to forge greater diplomatic and defence cooperation in reaction to US unreliability, Israeli revisionism and Iranian retaliation,” she told Al Jazeera.

The Telegraph’s Dominic Cavendish wrote, external: “At almost four hours, it’s a long evening, sometimes too dense with detail, and it lacks the grit and gore (not to mention the nudity) of the TV series.

“Still, it capably serves newbies and devotees, and speaks in a timely fashion to our age of unruly leaders.”

He added: “It’s not up there, yet, with the Harry Potter or Stranger Things prequels but, on balance, the Game of Thrones franchise has yet another worthwhile and lucrative spin-off on its hands.”

The Times’ critic Clive Davis, external had greater reservations, writing that while the play “gives hardcore GoT fans a chance to go hunting for ‘Easter eggs’, it seldom comes close to matching the grim aura of the TV series”.

“Duncan Macmillan’s script is sorely lacking in poetry. Events plod forward, one after the other, and although Michael Shaeffer is a thoroughly compelling presence as the cruel and chronically unstable monarch Aerys, other performances seem nuance-free. Too many lines are simply shouted. You expect better of the RSC.”

Davis concluded: “It goes without saying that there are more than enough GoT devotees to keep the box office ticking over for the rest of eternity, but only the most dedicated of them will have the energy for this marathon.”

Espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks, and covert operations are a ‘constant reality’, says Germany’s interior minister.

Germany is facing daily “hybrid warfare” attacks from abroad, an official has said, days after an explosive-laden drone was discovered at Leipzig/Halle Airport.

Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt told the local newspaper Bild am Sonntag on Sunday that foreign powers wanted to subdue Germany politically and socially by stirring up fear.

“We’re not at war, but we are the daily target of hybrid warfare,” Dobrindt said.

“Espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks, or covert operations by foreign powers aimed at destabilising Germany or inflicting direct harm are a constant reality.”

He did not identify any countries behind the alleged attacks.

The minister’s comments come after a drone loaded ‌with explosives was discovered at the Leipzig/Halle Airport in eastern Germany on Tuesday.

Some German lawmakers pointed the finger at Russia, which has been at war with Ukraine since its full-scale invasion of the country in 2022.

The Russian embassy in Berlin on Friday dismissed the Leipzig event as a “fabricated provocation”, saying it was another example of unsubstantiated accusations against Moscow.

Germany plans to boost anti-drone capacity

Germany is planning to strengthen its ability to counter drones amid concerns over the threat, Bild reported, citing government sources.

The newspaper said Dobrindt’s ministry wanted to double the federal government’s team of anti-drone experts from 150 to 300 and increase its network of related bases from four to eight.

Germany’s armed forces said on Saturday that two drones were spotted late on Thursday over a German military base site in Mechernich, in the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia.

Separately, a drone exploded on Saturday in Bulgaria near the Trans-Balkan gas pipeline.

Bulgaria’s defence ministry said there was no reason to suspect the incident was intentional. Ukraine said it was working with Bulgarian authorities to clarify the circumstances.

The drone incidents across Europe have renewed concerns that Russia’s war in Ukraine could increasingly affect neighbouring NATO states.

NATO and European Union officials have blamed Russia for previous drone sightings. Russia has rejected all the allegations.

‘We’re going backwards.’ Palestinians in Gaza say Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rejection of the US-backed 15-point plan has deepened uncertainty over an end to the war. Hamas says it remains committed to the agreement.

Kuwait has since the beginning of the Iran War in February been targeted by Iranian drones and missiles 1,400 times. Why has this state—smaller than the US state of New Jersey—been targeted more than any of its larger neighbors including Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates?

A military node

This question takes us all the way back to 1991 when the US intervenes when Iraq under Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait. In return, Kuwait has since hosted one of the the largest US armies in the Middle East of 13,000 troops, and has the fourth biggest deployment of the US military globally. Furthermore, Kuwait is one of five U.S. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) sites across the world— a cornerstone of the US’ global military strategy as it allows for rapid deployment and display of influence. And not only does Kuwait not charge the US for its land use, or restrict US troop movements on its territory—unlike most other host countries—but indeed pays the US for its troop presence, and subsidies energy and water costs for the military bases.

A geostrategic asset  

In exchange, Kuwait’s geostrategic location on the Arabian peninsula and along the air corridor between Asia and Europe makes the country an important location for the US to secure its interests and exert influence in the region and beyond. Indeed, the US has designated Kuwait as a Major Non-Nato Ally since 2004, and has located its biggest air logistics facility in the Middle East in conjunction with Kuwait international airport. Thus, Kuwait has proven a key logistical hub for US military operations in the region including against the Islamic State and during the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

Furthermore, Kuwait holds 7% of the world’s oil reserves, reinforcing its importance for the US and other oil consuming countries, while also making it strategically vulnerable to Iranian attacks on energy plants in late July, as this adds to the ongoing energy insecurity created by the closure of the key oil trade route through the Strait of Hormuz.

The end of diplomatic balancing?

Despite these far-reaching strategic links with the US, Kuwait has long maintained a diplomatic balancing act, refusing to normalise relations with Israel while simultaneously refraining from condemning the Iranian regime. Moreover, Kuwait has often assumed the role of neutral mediator in the Middle East. For example, Kuwait mediated the 2021 rapprochement between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, and has contributed to peace efforts in Yemen. In addition, Kuwait has been much more cautious in its statements concerning the Iranian regime, unlike its vocally critical, yet less targeted neighbors such as the United Arab Emirates, and has even refused to allow the US to use military bases in Kuwait for launching attacks on Iran.

Geographic liabilities

Even so, Kuwait has fallen prey to its geography. For one, its geographical proximity to Iran makes Kuwait a comparatively cheap and easy target for Iranian missiles, while its lack of naturally occurring fresh water and consequent reliance on desalination provides Teheran an additional pressure point, as illustrated by Iranian attacks on desalination plants in late July. Furthermore, its proximity to Iraq has exposed it to attacks by Iraqi Shia militias, allied with Teheran.

And the risk of further attacks in the future is high. On 1 August, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared that it would react ”decisively” against any US strikes, and warned Gulf states against permitting the US and Israel to use bases on their territories to launch attacks against Iran. Similarly, Iraq announced that its military forces stood ready to ‘thwart any attempts at targeting neighbouring countries within our regional sphere.’ Thus, recent developments suggest that Kuwait might no longer be able to remain an independent diplomatically oriented actor that can stay out of the conflicts in the Middle East.

Ideology

While Iran’s official rationale for the attacks has been to target US military targets and assets, the attacks on energy and desalination plants are neither; these are civilian infrastructures. Hence it is Kuwaiti civilians—not the US military capacity—that bear the brunt of the attacks. This suggests that Iranian attacks have not only immediate military objectives in context of the current war, but also underlying psychological and ideological motives, as these attacks can be seen as a way of scaring countries that go against Iran’s exhortations—reiterated since 1979–to its Gulf neighbors to cut ties with the US. In addition, the attacks expose the limitations of US security guarantee, and undermine the credibility of the US promises of stability and protection to its allies.

A change of strategy

Consequently, Kuwait may pivot toward building up more national military defence capabilities, as the deterrence guarantee that the well-accommodated US presence was supposed to provide has ostensibly failed, while Kuwait’s lack of domestic military resources to retaliate further enticed Iranian attacks.

Hence, it appears that the security order in the Middle East is set to become even more fragile, with the US increasingly proving incapable or unwilling to ensure what has long been considered a stabilising presence, and with regional actors increasingly divided and polarized, making neutral mediation harder.

Stalled for months, the peace process in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo appears to be gaining momentum.

The Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group has accepted 15 prisoners released by the government in Kinshasa. The handover is part of a framework agreement signed last year, after talks mediated by Qatar.

It may be a small step, but it could pave the way to ending the fighting in the eastern DRC. Previous attempts have failed to bring peace to the region.

Could this mechanism address the core issues of the long-running conflict?

Presenter: Per Nyberg

Guests:
Kambale Musavuli – Analyst at the Center for Research on the Congo-Kinshasa

Felix Ndahinda – Researcher on the Great Lakes region, specialising in conflict resolution, peace and transitional justice

Abdulla Al Etaibi – Assistant Professor in International Affairs at Qatar University

Wildfires have spread near Albania’s capital and in parts of southern Spain, prompting hundreds to evacuate. As firefighting teams attempt to contain the blaze in both countries.

Ahmed al-Jubouri and a close associate were arrested on charges of misusing contract funds in Saladin province.

The former governor of Iraq’s Saladin province, Ahmed al-Jubouri, also known as Abu Mazen, has been arrested on corruption charges, Iraqi media say.

Al-Jubouri was arrested in Baghdad on Saturday after allegedly embezzling funds from Saladin province contracts, a senior government source told the Iraqi News Agency said. The news was widely confirmed by other Iraqi media.

The politician served as governor of Saladin from 2013 to 2014, followed by a tenure as minister of state for provincial affairs between 2014 and 2015. He is currently secretary general of the National Masses Party, which holds three seats in Iraq’s parliament and is part of the ruling coalition.

Businessman Mohammed al-Hajaf, who has been described as al-Jubouri’s close associate, was arrested in Saladin province under the same charges.

The source did not reveal the amount of money that had been taken. Al-Jubouri and al-Hajaf have not publicly commented on the allegations.

The National Masses Party posted a photo of al-Jubouri on Facebook, captioned: “You can take pride in what you have done for sick and poor people.”

Both arrests come days after the State Administration Coalition, which consists of parties that form and support the government, reaffirmed the need to continue the anti-graft campaign and to support the prime minister’s efforts.

Earlier this year, new Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi assumed office amid growing United States pressure on Baghdad to tackle corruption and disarm Iran-backed armed groups that have targeted US facilities in Iraq.

Security forces arrested 47 prominent Iraqi politicians, lawmakers and officials in June, leading to the seizure of tens of millions of dollars and bringing renewed attention to the decades-long issue of corruption.

Al-Jubouri was previously arrested in November 2019 after his parliamentary immunity was revoked over alleged criminal activity related to the construction of student dormitories at Tikrit University. According to local media, he was later released on bail.

Number one ranked player in men’s tennis will miss the tournament due to a knee issue, he says via organisers.

World number one Jannik Sinner has pulled out of the Cincinnati Open due to a right knee injury, the Italian has announced.

“After consulting with my doctors and my team, I have to announce that I need to withdraw from the Masters 1000 tournament in Cincinnati,” he said in a statement posted on the ATP website on Sunday.

“My right knee has been bothering me and even though we have been working hard with my medical team, I have to accept that I’m not ready to compete yet.”

The tournament begins on Thursday, the same day as the end of the Masters event in Montreal, which Sinner also missed.

The five-time Grand Slam winner had been on a six-tournament winning streak at 1000 level heading into the North American hard-court swing, before skipping the event in Canada.

The 24-year-old said then that the decision was taken to “prioritise my health”.

Sinner’s subsequent withdrawal from Cincinnati follows that of world number two Carlos Alcaraz as the Spaniard continues to battle a wrist injury.

The Cincinnati Open and Montreal Masters are the two principal warm-up events ahead of the final Grand Slam of the season, the US Open, which starts in New York on 30 August.

Iran says the Strait of Hormuz will remain restricted unless the US meets a series of demands. The UAE accuses Tehran of targeting an oil tanker, while Yemen’s Houthis claim an attack on a Saudi refinery. Al Jazeera’s Nour Hegazy reports.

Central Gaza – Sahar al-Bardini prepares breakfast for her three children in a tent at the al-Zawaida camp in central Gaza. She watches them eat but is already worried about finding their next meal.

The 35-year-old is the sole breadwinner for six-year-old Omar, four-year-old Sama and Mahmoud aged three since her husband was killed in Israeli shelling of northern Gaza three years ago.

Like many families in Gaza, they are struggling with soaring food prices, largely due to Israel’s long-running siege, with concerns that the population could be plunged into famine again.

During last year’s famine, the whole family – Omar and Sama in particular – suffered from a lack of food and vital nutrients. Eggs and vegetables were difficult to find in markets and when available, almost impossible to afford.

Even though the family can eat more regularly today, they still only have one meal a day. Omar and Sama’s bodies are still counting the cost of the months of famine between August and December 2025.

“Omar and Sama became very weak during the famine and lost a lot of weight. Even after food became more available, it took them around six months to gradually regain their health and weight,” she told Al Jazeera.

“My biggest fear is that my children will become weak again. I want to see them healthy, but the food they need isn’t easy for me to provide every day.”

Their plight comes as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned last week that Gaza faces a severe food emergency that could develop into another famine.

Justin Brady, head of OCHA in Palestine, warned that 67 percent of Gaza’s population was suffering from food insecurity. More than 200,000 people – around 10 percent of Gaza’s population – were living in conditions that usually precede a formal famine declaration by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification.

In the area where Sahar lives, community kitchens have become the main source of food for many families. The meals they serve – mostly rice and other basic ingredients, but very rarely meat – are enough to stave off starvation, but children still lack essential nutrients and protein that are essential for growth.

“The meal fills their stomachs, but it doesn’t contain everything a child’s body needs to be properly nourished and regain strength,” Sahar said. “The children need a more varied diet – they need eggs, vegetables, fruit, meat and other things. I try to provide whatever I can but my means are limited.”

With little money, Sahar makes the most of any food vouchers or assistance she receives, but it is never enough. That means prioritising the family’s most urgent needs which begin with food, followed by clothes, medicine and then other basic necessities for the youngsters.

“When I receive food vouchers, I try to make the most of them. Everything is expensive, and I’m carrying the responsibility of three children on my own,” she said.

Shimaa, 25, was unable to find enough milk for her two-year-old daughter, Selina, during the last famine, so was forced to find any alternative to fill her stomach.

“I tried to feed her whatever I had. Sometimes I gave her lentils instead of milk because I didn’t have milk to give her,” she told Al Jazeera. “I work day and night so I can provide her with food and everything she needs – everything I do is so I can see her in better health.”

Still, the family struggle to afford enough money for food and so Selina remains weak and severely malnourished.

“Even after the famine eased, its effects didn’t go away for my daughter,” Shimaa said. “I’m worried about her and I’m trying to do everything I can to help her get better.”

Nutrition specialist, Dr Ghada Jibril, said the current food crisis has forced parents to rely on rice and lentils to feed their infants. While they contain some nutrients, it means a gap in kid’s diets, particularly for those who starved during the famine.

“A child who has experienced severe malnutrition needs a period of regular nutrition and follow-up care to regain their weight and resume healthy growth,” Jibril said.

“The end of acute hunger does not mean that the effects of malnutrition disappear immediately. Children need a varied diet, not simply enough food to fill their stomachs – protein, iron, vitamins and minerals are essential for growth, brain development and a strong immune system. Recovering from malnutrition takes time, appropriate food and follow-up care.”

Sudan’s prolonged war is creating risks that extend well beyond its borders. The growing role of Islamist armed groups, including the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, could further complicate the country’s political and security landscape while creating new challenges for China’s economic and strategic interests in the Red Sea, East Africa and the Horn of Africa.

The Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade, an Islamist militia associated with the Sudanese Islamic Movement, has been one of the armed formations supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during the conflict. In September 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the brigade over its involvement in Sudan’s civil war and alleged connections to Iran. In March 2026, Washington designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, also known as the Sudanese Islamic Movement, as a terrorist organization and updated the brigade’s designation accordingly.

These measures have increased the international pressure on Sudanese Islamist networks and could complicate their future role within the country’s political and security institutions. For China, however, the issue is less about the ideological orientation of these groups than about the possibility that their growing influence could contribute to a broader fragmentation of Sudan’s security environment.

A security vacuum with regional consequences

The continuing conflict has already weakened Sudanese state institutions and created space for armed groups to expand their influence. The danger for Beijing is that prolonged fragmentation could transform Sudan into an environment in which local, regional and external actors compete through armed proxies.

Such a development would have consequences beyond Sudan itself. The country occupies a strategically important position on the Red Sea, while its internal conflict is increasingly interconnected with developments in neighboring states and wider regional security dynamics.

China has consistently called for a ceasefire, protection of civilians and a political settlement in Sudan. Following attacks on Port Sudan in May 2025, Beijing called for the protection of civilian facilities and civilians and urged all parties to work toward an early ceasefire and the restoration of peace and stability.

This approach reflects a broader Chinese preference for protecting its economic and diplomatic interests without becoming directly involved in Sudan’s internal conflict.

For Beijing, therefore, the emergence of increasingly autonomous armed formations represents a potential strategic problem. The greater the fragmentation of Sudan’s security institutions, the more difficult it becomes to protect infrastructure, commercial interests and Chinese nationals while maintaining a policy of non-interference.

Why the Red Sea matters to Beijing

Sudan’s Red Sea coastline gives the conflict a significance that extends far beyond the country itself.

The Red Sea is a critical maritime corridor linking Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Any deterioration in security along Sudan’s coast could add to the risks already affecting commercial navigation in the wider Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb area.

For China, the issue is particularly important because the country is heavily dependent on secure maritime trade routes. Instability along the Red Sea can increase shipping costs, disrupt supply chains and complicate the movement of Chinese goods between Asia, Europe and Africa.

The risks are therefore not limited to projects formally identified with the Belt and Road Initiative. They extend to China’s wider commercial, energy and logistical interests across the region.

Sudan’s instability could also affect Chinese companies operating in infrastructure, energy, mining and other sectors. The safety of Chinese workers and businesses becomes increasingly difficult to guarantee when state authority is fragmented and armed groups operate with greater autonomy.

The South Sudan connection

One of the most important dimensions of Sudan’s instability for China is its potential impact on South Sudan.

South Sudan’s economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports, while much of the country’s oil reaches international markets through infrastructure crossing Sudan. Any prolonged disruption to Sudanese territory, oil infrastructure or export facilities could therefore have consequences for South Sudan’s production and revenues.

This matters to China because Beijing has significant economic and diplomatic interests in South Sudan. China and South Sudan established a strategic partnership in 2024, and China remains one of South Sudan’s major trading partners, with crude oil constituting a major component of bilateral trade.

Consequently, instability in Sudan could create an indirect risk to China’s interests in South Sudan even without any direct Chinese involvement in the Sudanese conflict.

The relationship between the two countries also demonstrates why Beijing is unlikely to view Sudan solely through the lens of the Sudanese civil war. Developments in Sudan can affect neighboring states, energy flows, infrastructure networks and regional trade routes in which China has invested for decades.

China’s limited but expanding security footprint

China has sought to protect its interests in the region while avoiding direct military involvement in Sudan’s war.

Its military presence in Djibouti provides Beijing with an established logistical and security position around the western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. At the same time, China’s broader commercial presence in Djibouti has continued to expand, reinforcing the country’s importance as a regional trade and logistics hub.

This does not mean that China is preparing to intervene militarily in Sudan. Rather, the existence of a Chinese military and commercial presence in the wider region gives Beijing additional capabilities for protecting its nationals, supporting maritime security and responding to emergencies if regional instability intensifies.

China’s activities in South Sudan also demonstrate a gradual expansion from purely economic engagement toward broader cooperation in areas such as security and public-sector capacity. In June 2026, for example, China handed over a Chinese-aided digital forensic laboratory to South Sudanese authorities, describing improved public-security management as important to national stability.

Beijing is therefore building relationships and capabilities that can help it protect its interests without becoming a direct party to regional conflicts.

The Islamist factor

The future role of Sudanese Islamist organizations remains an important variable.

The international designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade could make it more difficult for these networks to operate openly through political or institutional channels. At the same time, pressure on an armed or ideological movement does not necessarily eliminate its influence. It can instead encourage the movement to adapt, fragment or seek alternative forms of political and social organization.

For China, this creates an additional layer of uncertainty.

Beijing has little incentive to become involved in Sudan’s ideological disputes. Its primary concern is whether political fragmentation and the proliferation of armed groups will threaten the stability required for trade, investment, energy flows and the safety of Chinese citizens.

The more Sudan’s conflict develops into a competition involving multiple armed and externally supported actors, the more difficult it becomes for China to maintain its preferred strategy of pragmatic engagement with all sides.

What China is likely to do

China’s response is likely to remain cautious and pragmatic.

Beijing is unlikely to seek a direct military role in Sudan unless its citizens, facilities or broader maritime interests face a severe and immediate threat. Instead, China is likely to continue supporting diplomatic efforts, calling for dialogue and a political settlement while maintaining relations with Sudanese institutions and neighboring countries.

China’s recent diplomatic position toward Sudan and South Sudan reinforces this approach. At the United Nations, Beijing has continued to emphasize political solutions and stability in the region, while maintaining engagement with both Sudan and South Sudan. In May 2026, China’s permanent representative to the UN warned that the continuing conflict in Sudan and instability in South Sudan were delaying the Abyei political process and called for greater attention to the security situation.

This suggests that Beijing sees the Sudanese conflict increasingly as part of a wider regional security problem rather than an isolated domestic crisis.

The central challenge for China is therefore not simply the rise of one Islamist militia. It is the possibility that Sudan’s institutional fragmentation will produce a durable security vacuum connecting the country’s internal conflict with instability in South Sudan, threats to Red Sea navigation and competition among regional and international powers.

If that happens, Sudan could become a much more serious strategic problem for Beijing.

China’s interests in the region depend on stability without requiring China itself to become responsible for providing it. The longer Sudan’s war continues, the harder that balance becomes to maintain.

Turkiye wants to expand its newly formed defence pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to include more countries, says Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, citing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

“Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan told state news agency Anadolu, according to a report published on Saturday.

Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on Friday signed the Mecca Joint Deterrence Agreement, in what analysts say could be a step towards a new security architecture in the region.

So who could join the pact next, and what would an expanded alliance mean for regional security?

What does the pact do?

The Mecca defence pact builds on a previous agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan a year ago.

Regional officials have suggested that the pact could eventually expand to include other countries, strengthening its role as a mechanism for collective security and deterrence.

The pact’s central feature is a NATO-like stipulation that an attack on any one of the three states would be treated as an attack on all of them although the details have yet to be fleshed out.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said the allies will decide through consultations what degree, form and format of support they would ask for in the event of an attack but no country would be considered a threat as long as a member state is not attacked.

Turkish and Saudi officials have stressed that the pact is not meant to supplant any other strategic alliances or relationships while Turkiye, which is a member of NATO, has said the agreement does not target any country, including Iran.

Which countries could join next?

Egypt is the only country whose potential membership has been publicly raised by an official from one of the pact’s signatory countries.

Fidan described Egypt as a “natural partner” and said he expects Cairo to formally join once “technical issues” are ironed out.

“I believe that at the next stage, Egypt will also be among us in the alliance,” Fidan said. “We already act towards one another as if we were alliance members.”

Ali Bakir, professor of international relations, security and defence at Qatar University, said Egypt’s inclusion would “significantly increase the pact’s political weight, regional influence and operational effectiveness” if it materialises.

What might stand in the way of Egypt’s membership?

Egypt already has a solid working relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye, with which it is part of a group called the R4, which consults on regional issues. Egypt has also recently developed stronger military ties with Turkiye despite previous tensions over the Egyptian military’s 2013 overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, the conflict in Libya and the discovery of gasfields in the Eastern Mediterranean.

But analysts said Cairo may be wary of the potential military obligations that could come with a binding defence treaty with states whose interests do not always align with its own as well as the implications for its existing peace treaties.

“Egypt may join only if the language protects its aid relationship with Washington, doesn’t undermine existing alliances and peace treaties, and maintains its own freedom to decide when and where it fights,” Karim Elgendy, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera.

“If the pact stays a political framework with room to calibrate each response, Cairo can live with it and may eventually sign. If it hardens into an obligation that could pull Egyptian forces into someone else’s war, the answer is likely to be negative,” Elgendy said.

Technical issues holding Egypt back could be both “legal and operational”, Elgendy added. “On the legal side, Egypt needs to know exactly what it is committing to defend, and it will want assurances so that a signature never reads as a commitment against Israel or as taking Ankara’s side in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean,” he said.

For Bakir, Cairo’s decision will come down to how it weighs the benefits of membership against the diplomatic complications.  Egypt’s decision on whether to join the pact will hinge on the level of “strategic value” it believes it brings as well as its ability to “manage relations with countries whose interests” contrast with or even “actively oppose” the alliance, he said.

Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera that while Egypt broadly shares the trilateral pact’s security concerns, it “does not share its underpinning threat perception” and may be resistant to “security commitments”.

“Cairo’s preference is to be part of overlapping regional security arrangements that are narrow in scope and are issue-related … rather than being entangled in defence commitments with elevated risks/cost,” Aboudouh said.

He added that Egypt may still opt to join the pact in the future but it would be a “complex decision”.

Which other countries could join?

Several officials have suggested other Gulf countries could eventually join the alliance.

In a post on X, former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani expressed hope that all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would “take the initiative to join” the pact. In addition to Saudi Arabia, the GCC includes Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

Fidan also spoke about the alliance bringing in more regional countries, saying some nations, which he did not name, had already expressed interest. “Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan said.

Among the Gulf states, Elgendy said, “the names to watch first are Qatar and Kuwait.”

Both countries are “close to all three signatories” and “have the strongest motive to buy extra insurance” after feeling “exposed” during the United States-Israel war on Iran and by Israel’s strike on Doha in September, he said.

Bakir similarly identified Qatar as the “most natural” Gulf state to opt in with Kuwait another possible candidate. He also said Azerbaijan, Syria and Jordan could also join “relatively quickly”.

Elgendy expressed scepticism about the pact transforming into a broader bloc. “This looks like a coalition of the willing that will grow on a case-by-case basis, shaped by each capital’s own risk calculus,” he said.

Taiwan’s newest M1A2T Abrams main battle tanks have deployed to Taoyuan International Airport, the main hub serving Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, for the first time. The deployment is part of the ongoing Han Kuang 42 exercise and reflects a growing emphasis on denying critical infrastructure to an invading force from the Chinese mainland.

The airport defense drill simulated an attempt by enemy airborne forces to seize Taiwan’s largest international airport and establish it as an airbridge for follow-on troops and logistics. Alongside M1A2T tanks, Republic of China Army (ROCA) Clouded Leopard 8×8 infantry fighting vehicles occupied defensive positions around the airfield while engineers erected obstacles across key approach routes.

During the exercise, armored vehicles from the ROCA’s 584th Armored Brigade, including four M1A2Ts and six Clouded Leopard vehicles in three different variants, established firing positions while engineering units emplaced temporary obstacles intended to prevent the landing of enemy aircraft, airborne troops, and special operations forces.

Combat engineers assembled steel “hedgehog” anti-vehicle obstacles in three-man teams, creating a defensive barrier along the airfield. Additional obstacles were constructed using cargo containers and airport vehicles provided by airport authorities, demonstrating how civilian infrastructure is incorporated into wartime defensive planning.

The scenario focused on preventing an airborne assault from establishing control of Taoyuan Airport, a long-recognized strategic objective in China’s People’s Liberation Army invasion planning because of its proximity to Taipei. Taiwanese military planners assess that if an attacking force secured the airport intact, it could serve as a hub for reinforcements, logistics, and the rapid advance of mechanized forces toward the capital.

The exercise also rehearsed casualty treatment and evacuation under combat conditions, with medical personnel conducting battlefield trauma procedures before evacuating simulated wounded. Meanwhile, Taoyuan Airport Fire Department firefighting vehicles participated by spraying water across parts of the training area to simulate decontamination and firefighting operations following chemical incidents or attacks.

Military officials said the drill was designed to validate joint military-civilian coordination during wartime while ensuring normal airport operations continued uninterrupted. Commercial flights continued to arrive and depart throughout the exercise.

The airport defense scenario also included a final escalation phase. Should defending forces prove unable to hold the airfield, other ROCA units would coordinate with the 53rd Engineer Group and airport authorities to demolish runways and other critical infrastructure, denying their use to an occupying force.

For a deeper look at how Taiwan plans to counter a Chinese invasion, you can read our detailed analysis here.

Suffice it to say, the Han Kuang 42 scenario echoes the battle for Hostomel Airport during the opening phase of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russian airborne forces succeeded in capturing the airport after an initial helicopter assault, but the airfield was heavily contested and damaged in the ensuing fighting, preventing it from functioning as the airbridge Moscow had envisioned for rapidly flying in large numbers of reinforcements and heavy equipment. Ukrainian counterattacks ultimately forced Russian troops to abandon Hostomel as they withdrew from the Kyiv region weeks later.

Returning to Taiwan, the ROCA has received all 108 of the M1A2T tanks it ordered as part of the modernization of its armed forces, which face an expanding military threat from Beijing. Generally speaking, the M1A2T is equivalent to the M1A2 SEPv3 version — or System Enhancement Package version 3 — which you can read more about here.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) confirmed today that the first shipment of M1A2T tanks had arrived from the United States in December 2024, as we reported here. The final examples were reportedly delivered in April of this year.

U.S. M1A2T Abrams Tanks Arrive in Taiwan | TaiwanPlus News

The M1A2T procurement led to some questions about how suitable the big and heavy Abrams is for Taiwan’s very particular defensive requirements.

The Abrams is arguably not ideal for the kinds of urban warfare that the ROCA might have to engage in if it meets a PLA invasion — something that it already regularly trains for in these kinds of settings. Scenarios like this also pose a particular challenge for main battle tanks.

However, the drill at Taoyuan Airport reflects the reality that, were it to face a PLA invasion, Taiwan could not afford to leave any armored vehicle on the sidelines. Beijing continues to claim the self-governed island as its own and has repeatedly threatened to seize it by force if necessary, compelling Taiwan to keep even aging armored vehicles in service.

Despite questions about the utility of heavy armor in potential conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, the ROCA is clearly looking at how the M1A2T and other armored vehicles could help defend key objectives in urban areas.

It’s also worth noting that the M1A2Ts are only one element of Taiwan’s layered defense. The ROCA also fields AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, long-range artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, coastal anti-ship missile batteries, and air defenses intended to disrupt and attrit an invasion force well before it can land troops and armored vehicles on the island. Increasingly, drones, too, are part of this defensive equation.

Should the ROCA have to fight the PLA in its cities, this is another area in which specialist tactics are regularly trained.

We have reported in the past how Taiwan has demonstrated the extraordinary measures it is prepared to take to keep its armored forces alive in a conflict with China. During combat readiness drills, the ROCA conceals tanks and other armored vehicles throughout urban areas using improvised camouflage, disguising them as piles of scrap or civilian construction equipment in an effort to complicate PLA targeting.

Taiwan’s military has also begun incorporating Taipei’s subway system into its wartime planning. During exercises last year, troops — including teams armed with Stinger shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles — used the Taipei Metro to move around the capital in what appeared to be the first public demonstration of the concept. In a conflict with China, the underground network could provide a comparatively protected route for shifting troops, air defense teams, and supplies between key sectors while roads and other infrastructure above ground come under attack.

Military, civil forces team up in Taipei Metro drill

At the same time, it is clear that the PLA, too, would expect to take on Taiwanese forces in urban settings, and there is plenty of evidence of its units training accordingly.

The Han Kuang exercise has increasingly emphasized defending Taiwan’s critical infrastructure against airborne and special operations attacks. The appearance of the M1A2T at Taoyuan Airport marks the first time Taiwan’s newest and most capable tanks have participated in this high-profile airport defense mission, highlighting their growing operational role beyond conventional armored warfare.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Statement comes after Infantino denies claims that UEFA paid off his alleged lover while he was the body’s general secretary.

FIFA warns against what ‌it calls a “concerted and ongoing effort” to undermine President Gianni Infantino, saying attempts to challenge his ⁠leadership must follow the ⁠governing body’s statutes and democratic procedures.

The statement on Saturday came amid an increasingly bitter standoff over Infantino’s leadership following the collapse of his proposal to raise about $4.2bn by selling a stake ⁠in the commercial rights of the World Cup and other tournaments.

The plan triggered criticism from UEFA, national associations and senior FIFA officials; led to calls for Infantino to resign; and prompted a crisis meeting in Morocco ⁠this past week, at which FIFA’s leadership reaffirmed its support for the president.

FIFA did not identify those it said were seeking to undermine Infantino or specify which reports or allegations it was referring to.

The statement followed reports by The Daily Telegraph about payments made by UEFA to a former employee with whom the newspaper said Infantino was having an intimate relationship during his time as the European governing body’s ‌general secretary.

He has denied those allegations, and FIFA has rejected them as unfounded.

When contacted by the AFP news agency, UEFA acknowledged that “a departure payment was made to the individual in question” at that time, “coupled with the payment of fees for an MBA course at a local business school”.

FIFA said recent reporting has included “unsubstantiated assertions and demonstrably false claims” concerning FIFA and its president, adding that it would challenge inaccurate or misleading reports “directly and vigorously”.

FIFA added it would not support, facilitate or tolerate any process concerning the election of its president ⁠that was inconsistent with its statutes, democratic procedures and governance framework.

“The FIFA president ⁠was democratically elected by FIFA’s member associations and continues to serve with their mandate,” it said.

“Those who do not have the support of FIFA’s Member Associations should not seek to achieve through allegation, insinuation or misinformation what they cannot achieve through FIFA’s established democratic processes,” FIFA said.

FIFA split over Infantino

After the crisis meeting in Morocco on Wednesday, FIFA apologised to its 211 member associations for mistakes in the handling of the proposed World Cup spinoff and said its leadership had ⁠reaffirmed its full support for Infantino.

The fallout has cast a shadow over Infantino’s bid for a fourth term at the FIFA Congress in Morocco in March. ⁠No clear candidate to challenge him has yet emerged.

UEFA has said it no longer has confidence in Infantino while Norwegian Football Federation President Lise Klaveness called on Friday for him to resign, saying he no longer had the institutional trust required to govern FIFA.

But Infantino continues to enjoy substantial support among FIFA’s 211 ‌members. The Confederation of African Football (CAF) unanimously backed his leadership on Thursday while South America’s CONMEBOL rejected any attempt to oust him that did not involve a vote of all FIFA members.

Mexico’s football federation (FMF) also backed ‌Infantino ‌despite its regional confederation, CONCACAF, having called for a “comprehensive reckoning” with his presidency.

“The FMF will neither recognise nor approve any process convened outside of that institutional framework,” the Mexican federation said.

Umm al-Khair, Occupied West Bank — There were weddings in Umm al-Khair this week, but almost no one danced. The small Bedouin village, located in Masafer Yatta, was marrying off two of its sons. Cauldrons of slow-cooked lamb meat for mansaf – a large platter of traditional Arabic food – fed the whole community. But there was no dahiyya, the line dance and chant that normally opens a Bedouin wedding.

Residents said it did not feel right coming so soon after the first anniversary of the killing of Umm al-Khair activist and community leader Awdah Hathaleen, allegedly by Israeli settler Yinon Levi. The community continues to endure daily settler attacks, arrests and incursions by Israeli soldiers, and the threat of further demolitions by Israeli authorities looms.

During celebrations, families spread out in different areas rather than gathering in one place, wary of drawing any attention that, in the past, has brought soldiers to disrupt the celebrations.

“There is a wedding, but they are not letting us celebrate quietly,” said Tariq Hathaleen, an English teacher and community leader in Umm al-Khair.

On Thursday, the first day of the wedding, Shimon Atiya – the Israeli settler behind the illegal outpost of Havat Shorashim, established roughly 800 metres from the village in 2022, and who has been under a restraining order since July 2025 for harassing Umm al-Khair families — crashed the wedding in the only style he knows. He brought his livestock to graze in a resident’s vegetable garden, escorted by Israeli soldiers who stood by as it happened.

When villagers told the soldiers that the plot is recognised as Umm al-Khair land, they were told the maps had changed; when they asked to see the new maps, they were refused. That night, the outpost’s fence towards the village homes was torn down – a prelude to pushing the boundary further in, residents believe.

Hathaleen says the settlers’ timing was a reaction to Levi’s indictment days earlier — one of the few times an Israeli has been charged with the killing of a Palestinian in the occupied West Bank since October 2023.

Just a couple of days before, on Thursday, Hathaleen watched as buildings and vehicles in the nearby Palestinian community of Khirbet Tuba were set ablaze by settler arsonists.

“The occupation always tried very hard to erase the Palestinian Indigenous people and their history, their legacy, their heritage,” Tariq said. “This really reminds me of the Nakba, and how the Israelis destroyed Palestinian cities and villages”, he noted, even planting cactus over the ruins to bury the evidence. “Back then it wasn’t documented. Nowadays, it’s happening, but it is documented.”

Sunday marks the United Nations’ International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples. In Umm al-Khair, the wedding felt symbolic of the threats to Indigenous Palestinians’ way of life and their basic presence on their own land.

‘They try to imitate us’

According to local Palestinians and watchdog NGOs, the threats facing Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip include detentions, killings, demolitions, restrictions on movement and evictions.

Since October 2023, Israel has killed 1,100 Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, including 242 minors, according to the Israeli NGO B’Tselem. Israel has also demolished more than 3,000 Palestinian homes since October 2023, the vast majority due to a lack of Israeli-issued permits that Palestinians in Area C are routinely denied.

According to the latest figures from the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), demolitions and settler violence displaced an average of 17 people a day this year, double the rate of the previous three years.

A June report by the West Bank Protection Consortium, which includes the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and monitors more than 200 communities it judges at risk of forcible transfer, said 96 percent of those who had been forcibly displaced were previously dependent on farming or herding. They have mostly lost access to these lands or pastures.

However, residents and watchdogs say such dispossession takes place within a system of Israeli permits, demolition orders and land policies controlled by the state alongside hundreds of millions of dollars in public funding for settlements and outposts. Israeli NGO Peace Now counts 146 illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and 390 unauthorised outposts and farms.

In 2024, the International Court of Justice found Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory unlawful.

Amid dispossession of their traditional grazing lands, 13 structures in Umm al-Khair were issued demolition notices last October, following demolitions in 2024 that left a third of the village homeless. The restraining order against Atiya, residents say, has done little to stop him.

Tariq argues the erasure is not only physical, but cultural also, and that it comes paired with an attempt by settlers to claim the very Palestinian identity they are displacing.

“The settlers nowadays try to imitate that lifestyle, building tents that they probably stole from Palestinians somewhere, using tractors to bring water from far away,” he said.

Young men from the hilltop outposts can be seen grazing camels, goats and sheep. All the while, Tariq observes them wearing Palestinian scarves and even attempting the Bedouin dialect when leading their own flocks.

“They know the Indigenous people of this land are the Bedouins and other Palestinians. So, they try to imitate that – to show to themselves and to the world that they are the Indigenous people of this land,” he added. “[But] this land doesn’t relate to them, because only the Indigenous people of this land know how to live in this land.”

‘We are the Indigenous people of this land’

Many outpost settlers serve as military reservists while living on the farms themselves, Tariq noted – a status that comes with state-issued weapons.

He recalled Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich publicly distributing all-terrain vehicles to South Hebron Hills outpost settlers. He also remembers the day Awdah was killed, when soldiers let Levi point out five community members for arrest.

“This is not only settler terrorism backed up by the state,” Tariq said. “It is the state’s plan, carried out by the settlers, well planned in rooms where officials sit around a table and tell them what to do.”

Yair Dvir, spokesperson for B’Tselem, said: “Israel is carrying out ethnic cleansing in the West Bank and an all-out assault on the Palestinian people. We see it on many levels: military violence and repression, home demolitions, and the funding and backing of settler militias.”

Shaina Low, a spokesperson for the NRC, described the same pattern as a coordinated strategy across the Israeli-occupied territories.

“For nearly 80 years, we’ve seen Israeli efforts to drive Palestinians from their land play out, starting with the Nakba and continuing to the present day,” she said. Low cited an acceleration of these actions since October 2023, when the genocidal war on Gaza began, that has seen expanding settlement infrastructure, rising West Bank demolitions alongside East Jerusalem evictions in neighbourhoods like Silwan. There has been an “astronomical increase” in settler violence documented, Low added.

Gaza shows the same agenda but taken to the extreme. Since the October 2025 “ceasefire”, more than 1,200 people have been killed in Gaza, on top of a cumulative death toll that has climbed past 73,000 since October 2023, according to Gaza’s Ministry of Health.

According to UN satellite analysis, roughly 81 percent of all structures in Gaza have been damaged. Even with the “ceasefire”, OCHA reports that some 59 percent of Gaza’s population faced crisis-level food shortages or worse between April and June, a share it projects will rise again by year’s end as aid funding shrinks.

Following successive campaigns of expansionism, the Israeli military now controls at least 64.9 percent of Gaza. “These policies are all working together,” Low said. “They may be different tactics, but it’s all part of the same agenda to force Palestinians from their land and increase Israeli control over the territory and expand Israeli presence.”

Still, on the eve of a day meant to mark the world’s Indigenous peoples, Tariq was resolute.

“They will try a million ways to erase the Palestinian Indigenous people, but they will fail because this land doesn’t speak their language, it doesn’t carry their colour, it doesn’t go by their ideologies,” he said.

“This is our land, and we have always been living here in harmony – with nature, the desert, the mountains, the valleys of Palestine – because we are the Indigenous people of this land, and we always will be. Their attempts are failing, and will fail. One day, we will get our freedom.”