Moroccos

Pro-Palestine protests have spread across several Moroccan cities, with demonstrators demanding an end to diplomatic normalisation with Israel as Rabat deepens ties with Tel Aviv.

The latest mobilisation took place on September 27, at the end of three days of action called by the Moroccan Front for Supporting Palestine and Against Normalisation.

They followed a September 16 announcement that Morocco and Israel would elevate their diplomatic missions to full embassies and appoint ambassadors.

On September 25, the Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation’s Causes said it had organised 76 events in 45 cities under the slogan “Friday for Al-Aqsa and against normalisation”.

Moroccan media reported gatherings in cities including Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Tangier, Fez, Agadir, Oujda, Tetouan, Kenitra and Sale. The 76-event figure was the committee’s own count, with no independent national tally of participants.

In Rabat, protesters gathered outside Parliament, while a demonstration in Marrakesh developed into a march through several main streets, according to Lakome. Moroccan media also reported restrictions and arrests in some cities.

Restrictions and arrests

The mobilisation faced restrictions in some cities.

In Tangier, local authorities issued a decision banning a planned demonstration on September 27. Achkayen later reported that security forces dispersed hundreds of participants and that more than 12 people were detained, citing its own sources.

Lakome reported that authorities also prevented demonstrations in M’diq, while security forces surrounded a gathering in Agadir to prevent it from becoming a march.

The Moroccan Committee for Supporting the Nation’s Causes subsequently condemned what it described as bans, restrictions and arrests.

The response underscored another dimension of the dispute: Opposition to the relationship with Israel has remained visible on the streets, even as the government has continued to develop official ties.

A relationship under public pressure

Morocco restored diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2020 as part of the US-brokered Abraham Accords framework, alongside Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

On September 16, Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar met in New York at a trilateral summit hosted by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz.

The three countries confirmed plans to elevate the Moroccan and Israeli diplomatic missions to full embassies and exchange ambassadors.

Morocco and Israel also agreed to conclude agreements on investment protection and avoiding double taxation, expand direct flights and organise high-level reciprocal visits.

The move therefore goes beyond maintaining diplomatic relations established in 2020. It sets out a broader programme of institutional, economic and transport links between the two countries.

For opponents of the relationship, the embassy agreement represents another step in a policy they have rejected since 2020.

Public opinion and state policy

Morocco has maintained diplomatic relations with Israel while continuing to publicly support the Palestinian cause and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

For opponents of normalisation, however, the two positions are incompatible, particularly amid Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

“What has changed is the political context: Normalisation is being consolidated at a time when the war in Gaza has generated unprecedented public anger and intense images of Palestinian suffering,” Kathya K Berrada, senior programmes manager at the Arab Center for Research, told Al Jazeera.

“What we are seeing in Morocco is a growing disconnect between official diplomacy and public sentiment,” Moroccan activist Mouna Rahiani said, citing the latest Arab Opinion Index, which found that 89 percent of Moroccans surveyed opposed their country recognising Israel, while six percent supported it.

“While the state is moving towards deeper and more formal relations with Israel, Moroccans are still taking to the streets to say that Palestine cannot be treated as separate from our political and moral responsibilities,” she said.

The September agreement has brought an existing tension into sharper focus: public mobilisation against normalisation continues while the state pursues closer institutional ties with Israel.

Berrada said there was an important distinction between official policy and popular opinion, arguing that there is not enough reliable public data to establish how many Moroccans support or oppose normalisation.

Western Sahara adds another layer

The timing also matters for Morocco’s Western Sahara policy. The United Nations Security Council is due to consider the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in October. Its current mandate runs until October 31, 2026.

The September 16 trilateral statement came against the backdrop of US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and Israel’s support for Morocco’s position on the territory.

For Rabat, the relationship with Israel sits within a wider foreign-policy framework in which ties with Washington and international support for its position on Western Sahara remain important.

For opponents of normalisation, however, that strategic calculation does not resolve their objection to closer ties with Israel, particularly while the Palestinian issue remains highly salient.

Ahmed, a Moroccan sociologist who asked to be identified by one name, said the September 16 move was “a continuation of the trilateral agreement of December 10, 2020”, but that Morocco should make the relationship “comprehensive, not selective or partial”.

The election changes the political backdrop

The protests came days after Morocco held parliamentary elections on September 23.

The final results gave the Authenticity and Modernity Party 97 of the 395 seats, followed by the National Rally of Independents with 66, the Istiqlal Party with 65 and the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) with 54.

The PJD had won 13 seats in 2021. Turnout was 38.08 percent, compared with 50.86 percent in 2021 and 42.27 percent in 2016, according to Morocco’s Ministry of Interior.

It was the PJD in power when Morocco restored relations with Israel in 2020. Then-Prime Minister Saadeddine el-Othmani signed the Morocco-US-Israel joint declaration that December.

The PJD has maintained that opposition to normalisation was a longstanding party position. The party subsequently reaffirmed its rejection of normalisation and relations with Israel, while el-Othmani defended the 2020 decision as a state-level decision.

On September 17, following the announcement of the planned diplomatic upgrade, the PJD’s general secretariat reiterated its opposition to normalisation and to relations and agreements with Israel.

After the election, the PJD’s national council unanimously decided to remain in parliamentary opposition and not participate in the next government.

The PJD’s position has illustrated the limits of using party politics to measure the effect of opposition to normalisation. The party opposed the policy while in government, yet its prime minister signed the 2020 declaration.

Its larger parliamentary presence in 2026 gives the issue a stronger political platform, but does not by itself alter Morocco’s foreign policy.

It has not been established that the Palestine issue or opposition to normalisation was a decisive factor in voting, and neither do the PJD’s gains demonstrate that its position on Israel directly drove its increased representation.

From the streets to politics?

The September demonstrations show that organisations opposed to normalisation retain the ability to mobilise across a wide geographic area. But their effect on government policy is less clear.

“There is an important distinction between state policy and popular opinion. Normalisation is an official state decision, but there is limited reliable public data allowing us to measure the level of popular support for it,” Berrada said.

“It would therefore be difficult to claim that either a majority or a minority of Moroccans endorse the policy.”

That distinction is important when assessing the significance of the protests. Demonstrations can show the strength and persistence of organised opposition, but they do not by themselves establish the views of the wider population or show that government policy will change.

The PJD now has a larger parliamentary presence than it did after the 2021 election, but it remains in opposition. It will be able to voice its opposition to normalisation in Parliament, but will not have a place in government.

At the same time, the September 16 agreement remains part of a broader Moroccan foreign-policy framework involving the United States, Israel and Western Sahara. The Security Council’s consideration of MINURSO in October will provide another diplomatic setting in which Morocco’s position on the territory is under discussion.

For now, the protests demonstrate that opposition to normalisation remains capable of sustained mobilisation, while the government continues to deepen the relationship. Whether that public opposition translates into sustained political pressure remains less clear.

Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD) went from a decade of being the main political beneficiary of the country’s post-2011 reforms to suffering a dramatic electoral defeat in 2021.

The party won 107 of the 395 seats in Parliament in the November 2011 election, after protests that year called for political reform, greater accountability and a more responsive government. Its leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, became head of government.

Morocco’s 2011 constitutional changes expanded the formal powers of Parliament and government while retaining significant authority for the monarchy. The king appoints the head of government from the party that comes first in the House of Representatives, while he chairs the Council of Ministers, where strategic orientations of state policy are considered.

In the 2016 election, the PJD increased its seats to 125, but Benkirane spent months unable to form a governing coalition. In March 2017, King Mohammed VI ended his mandate and appointed Saadeddine Othmani to replace him. The PJD remained in government until its electoral collapse four years later.

In the September 2021 election, the party fell from 125 seats to just 13, losing 112. The National Rally of Independents (RNI) won 102 seats and became the largest party.

How much of the comeback rests on Benkirane?

Benkirane’s return raises another question: How much of the PJD’s comeback is being built around him?

A recent Al Jazeera Studies analysis describes Benkirane as a political “brand” whose long public career, media presence and direct communication style have created a personal profile that can function as electoral capital for the party.

It examines whether his visibility and personal appeal can help the PJD rebuild after its 2021 collapse.

Benkirane remains one of Morocco’s most recognisable political figures. But his return does not by itself show that the PJD has rebuilt its support.

The party lost 112 seats in 2021; its task now is to turn the attention generated by its leader into support for the party itself.

A broader programme

The PJD’s 2026 programme contains 467 measures across five broad areas: identity and family; political and institutional reform; public services and social protection; the economy and employment; and foreign policy.

It calls for greater transparency in public procurement, rules addressing conflicts of interest and illicit enrichment, and improvements to public services. It also highlights housing, social protection, food, water and energy sovereignty.

Its programme foregrounds practical issues such as prices, jobs, schools, hospitals and corruption.

Saad al-Sabahi, 38, who works with the PJD’s regional secretariat in Casablanca-Settat, said the programme was developed through studies, consultation meetings and proposals submitted through an online platform.

“These commitments cover a range of sectors and areas affecting the lives of the Moroccan people,” he told Al Jazeera, pointing to political participation, fighting corruption, public education, healthcare, employment and economic sovereignty.

“These commitments, among others, form the basis of the agreement between the party and voters. We will work to fulfil and implement them with integrity and competence,” al-Sabahi said.

What changed after 2021?

The PJD says one of its main lessons from the 2021 defeat has been the need to reorganise internally and examine more critically its years in government.

“The party was able to overcome its crisis following its extraordinary and regular congresses, and after Secretary-General Abdelilah Benkirane took over the leadership,” al-Sabahi said. “The party also reorganised its internal affairs through communication and the renewal of its structures.”

The party’s own assessment of the 2021 defeat includes criticism of its political and organisational choices. It has also accused unnamed actors of undermining democratic choice and pointed to what it describes as electoral corruption and disinformation.

Those are the PJD’s explanations for the result, rather than independently established findings. But the scale of its losses forced the party to confront how far its record in government had separated it from parts of its former support base.

That matters particularly when it comes to younger voters.

Imane Traifi, 37, of the PJD Youth, said the party needed to create sustained opportunities for young people to take part in political life rather than treating them simply as voters during election campaigns.

“We are keen to ensure that young people move from being recipients to becoming participants, initiators and people who take on responsibility,” she told Al Jazeera.

The ghosts and crocodiles

However, a question for any future PJD government is not only what it would seek to change, but what it could change once in office.

Benkirane repeatedly referred to “ghosts and crocodiles” as a metaphor for powerful or hidden interests that he said had obstructed his government when it was in power.

The clearest example is the party’s position on Israel.

The PJD has campaigned against Morocco’s normalisation with Israel and continues to support the Palestinian cause. Its 2026 programme explicitly calls for opposition to normalisation. Yet Morocco restored diplomatic ties with Israel in 2020 while the PJD was in government and Saadeddine Othmani was head of government.

The PJD opposed the move, while Othmani later defended it as a state decision and said Morocco’s support for the Palestinian cause remained unchanged. The agreement went ahead in December 2020 as part of a US-brokered deal that included Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Six years later, the relationship has moved further. On September 16, Morocco and Israel agreed to elevate their diplomatic missions to embassy level and appoint ambassadors, while also expanding air travel and advancing economic and trade agreements.

The PJD reaffirmed its opposition to normalisation and cooperation with Israel the following day, describing its position as longstanding.

But it also leaves a question for the party’s return: If such forces were powerful enough to constrain the government then, what has changed?

Has the PJD developed a different understanding of the limits of government authority or will it find itself once again beset by “ghosts and crocodiles”?

The limits of government power

The PJD has made clear on several occasions that the change it seeks is from within Morocco’s existing political and constitutional system, rather than a challenge to the monarchy itself.

Benkirane has repeatedly reaffirmed his support for the monarchy while arguing that elected institutions should play their role in governing and improving the country.

That distinction is important to understanding the PJD’s return. Its opposition to policies such as normalisation with Israel sits alongside its acceptance of a constitutional and political framework in which the monarchy retains a central role in strategic state decisions.

Under the constitution, the king chairs the Council of Ministers, which considers the strategic orientations of state policy.

That applies not only to Israel but to other areas where major policy decisions remain closely tied to the monarchy.

For the PJD, rebuilding means more than recovering the seats it lost in 2021. It means showing what it learned from a decade in government, what it can deliver and how it would avoid the political costs of its collapse.

Al-Sabahi said the party wanted to regain what he described as the gains citizens had previously enjoyed.

“We will work to restore the gains that citizens previously enjoyed and to restore their dignity and rights,” he told Al Jazeera.

Yassine Elachiri, a member of the National Bureau of PJD Youth and the party’s National Council, said the relationship with younger Moroccans had to be built over time rather than during campaigns.

“Earning the trust of a new generation of young people cannot be reduced to electoral mobilisation or short-term campaigns in the run-up to voting day,” he said. “Rather, it is a cumulative process built on sustained engagement, guidance, training and creating opportunities for young people to participate actively in public affairs.”

“Our goal is not simply to reach young people at the moment of an election, but to build a lasting relationship with them based on trust, training and active participation,” Elachiri said.