Middle East

At least 17 companies linked to illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank hold United Kingdom public-sector contracts worth more than 2.1 billion pounds ($2.85bn), an Al Jazeera investigation reveals.

The findings come as more than 140 UK Labour MPs are calling on the government to ban trade with illegal Israeli settlements, a move Prime Minister Andy Burnham is considering.

Our analysis of procurement records, company filings and corporate disclosures found that businesses named by the United Nations over their involvement in illegal Israeli settlements – and companies those businesses ultimately own or control as subsidiaries – have secured contracts across the British public sector, including in areas such as road maintenance, transport, emergency services and driving licensing.

“Evidence is growing that the UK may be in breach of its international obligations … by continuing to contract with entities identified by the UN as providing assistance of this sort,” Stephen Humphreys, professor of international law at the London School of Economics, told Al Jazeera.

Data compiled by public procurement analysts Tussell, and shared with Al Jazeera, shows the 17 companies and entities hold 125 public-sector contracts with a combined award value of 2.129 billion pounds ($2.89bn).

Companies owned by Motorola Solutions, the United States technology and communications giant, account for more than 1.7 billion pounds ($2.3bn) of the total – the vast majority through its British subsidiary Airwave Solutions. Other contracts we reviewed are held by firms within four other corporate groups including Heidelberg Materials, a German multinational building materials company; the French engineering group Egis; the Spanish train manufacturer CAF and Chinese conglomerate Fosun.

A report by the United Nations Human Rights Office identifies the five corporate groups as involved in business activities related to illegal Israeli settlements.

Heidelberg Materials’ Israeli subsidiary owns a quarry on Palestinian land in the occupied West Bank, while Motorola is embedded in the security infrastructure of illegal settlements. Egis and CAF are involved in Jerusalem’s expanding light-rail network – a project activists say entrenches Israel’s control by integrating settlements into the city while further fragmenting Palestinian neighbourhoods.

Fosun International, whose subsidiary Breas Medical receives UK public money, also owns the controversial Israeli cosmetics manufacturer Ahava, which operates in the Mitzpe Shalem illegal settlement in the occupied West Bank. Civil rights groups, including the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign in the UK, decry Ahava as a firm that is “complicit” in the theft of Palestinian land and livelihoods.

Meanwhile, violence is escalating in the occupied West Bank.

In July 2024, the International Court of Justice found Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory unlawful and said it must end “as rapidly as possible”. The court also placed obligations on other states “not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by Israel’s illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”.

That raises questions over Britain’s continued commercial relationships with the companies identified in Al Jazeera’s investigation, observers said.

‘UK government is propping up apartheid’

Humphreys believes that Britain may also be failing to meet its legal obligations by “failing to launch its own investigation into their activities, with a view to preventing them if necessary”.

The UK has also warned businesses against bidding for construction tenders in illegal settlements.

“Businesses should not consider bidding for construction tenders,” a government statement issued this month said, warning of “legal and reputational consequences” and the risk of involvement in “serious breaches of international law”.

Former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn said Al Jazeera’s findings expose a contradiction between the UK’s stated position and its economic ties.

“Quite simply, the UK government is propping up apartheid,” Corbyn told Al Jazeera. “Every day, the UK deepens its complicity in Israel’s economy of occupation and, in turn, Israel’s economy of genocide.”

The Cabinet Office told Al Jazeera that individual public authorities make decisions to exclude suppliers case-by-case for each contract. It said public procurement in the UK should not be used to boycott suppliers linked to other countries unless formal UK sanctions, embargoes or restrictions are in place.

Here’s what we found about some of the companies involved in settlement trade:

Motorola Solutions: Tech embedded in illegal settlements

The UN identifies Motorola in connection with two settlement-related activities: the “supply of security services, equipment and materials to enterprises operating in settlements” and the “provision of services and utilities supporting the maintenance and existence of settlements, including transport”.

Al Jazeera contacted the Motorola Solutions group for comment but received no response.

It is the largest beneficiary of UK public money that we investigated.

Motorola’s subsidiaries are entrusted with providing communications equipment to the emergency services in the UK. The largest contract identified by Al Jazeera is held by Airwave Solutions, a Motorola subsidiary. The Home Office awarded Airwave an extension worth 1.562 billion pounds ($2.13bn) to provide the secure communications network used by police, fire and ambulance services across England, Scotland and Wales. Motorola Solutions UK separately holds contracts worth 123.9 million pounds ($170m), including a 36.5-million-pound ($49.8m) Ministry of Defence contract for Airwave radios, accessories and airtime.

Five companies now ultimately controlled by Motorola Solutions Inc – Airwave Solutions Ltd, Motorola Solutions UK Ltd, CRFS Ltd, 3TC Software Ltd and Noggin IT Ltd – hold 91 active UK public-sector contracts worth 1.726 billion pounds ($2.3bn), according to the latest Tussell data.

Motorola Solutions Inc and its Israeli subsidiary, Motorola Solutions Israel Ltd, were included when the UN Human Rights Office first published its database of businesses involved in specified settlement-related activities in 2020. Both remain in its latest version.

Official records provide a glimpse of how the company’s technology has been embedded in settlements.

Tenders from Mateh Binyamin Regional Council and the municipal corporation of Ariel, both illegal settlements, show Motorola command-and-control technology being used in security and surveillance infrastructure.

Motorola equipment has also been bought by the Israeli Civil Administration, the military body through which Israel administers civilian affairs in the occupied West Bank.

In 2005, the UN reported that Motorola supplied surveillance systems to settlements including Hebron, Karmei Tzur and Bracha.

Motorola’s relationship with the Israeli authorities continues today. An Israeli government procurement document obtained by Al Jazeera shows Motorola Solutions Israel was awarded a 25.5-million-shekel ($8.7m) contract in May 2026 to maintain approximately 19,000 police radios and provide encryption licences until April 2028.

Heidelberg Materials: A controversial quarry on occupied land

The UN has listed Heidelberg Materials over the commercial use of natural resources in occupied Palestinian territory.

In Britain, five Heidelberg Materials companies hold 25 public-sector contracts worth 184.79 million pounds ($252m). Almost all of that – 179.03 million pounds ($244m) – is held by Hanson Quarry Products Europe Ltd. Its contracts include 60 million pounds ($81.9m) from Westmorland and Furness Council for road surfacing and highway works between 2024 and 2027, and a 50-million-pound ($68.3m) surfacing maintenance contract with Somerset Council.

Its Israeli subsidiary, Hanson Israel, owns the Nahal Raba quarry, south of Qalqilya in the West Bank. The quarry sits on land belonging to the Palestinian villages of az-Zawiya and Rafat, according to Who Profits.

An official Civil Administration planning notice reviewed by Al Jazeera shows a proposal was approved to expand the site.

Who Profits, a group that researches links between the private sector and the economy in the Israeli-occupied territories, said the approval was granted on May 28, 2025.

Heidelberg told Al Jazeera that in 2023, Hanson Israel “ceased all activities at the Nahal Raba quarry and the associated asphalt plant and ready-mix concrete plant”, adding that only security personnel are present on site.

Egis: Selling transport infrastructure that supports settlements

French engineering group Egis provides another type of connection via transport infrastructure linking illegal Israeli settlements in occupied East Jerusalem with the rest of the city.

The UN lists Egis in connection with the “provision of services and utilities supporting the maintenance and existence of settlements, including transport”.

Egis’s own material shows that its involvement in Jerusalem’s expanding light-rail network continues today, with the company website advertising a job for an engineering expert based in Jerusalem on its light-rail projects.

Jerusalem Transportation Master Plan procurement documents from 2017 also identify Egis Rail as its general consultant, responsible for supervising and coordinating planning and design work on the Blue and Green lines.

Jerusalem’s light rail crosses into occupied East Jerusalem and links illegal Israeli settlements there with West Jerusalem. UN reports have described the railway as “additional infrastructure serving the illegal settlement network” and said it further isolates occupied East Jerusalem from the rest of the occupied West Bank.

Egis told Al Jazeera it “formally expressed its disagreement with this inclusion” in the UN database.

In Britain, five companies and entities controlled by Egis hold six public-sector contracts worth 133.60 million pounds ($182.4m). Almost the entire amount comes from a single contract, with the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency awarding Egis Projects UK Ltd a 133.23-million-pound ($181.9m) contract for enforcement services across Britain. Egis businesses also hold UK public contracts, including Galson Sciences, Helios Technology, Egis Transport Solutions and architecture practice WestonWilliamson+Partners.

CAF: Constructing project to continue into 2027

Spanish train manufacturer CAF is also involved in Jerusalem’s light-rail network. The company has disclosed that the 1.8-billion-euro ($2.10bn) Jerusalem project was awarded in 2019 to TransJerusalem J-Net Ltd, a firm owned 50 percent by CAF and 50 percent by Israeli construction business Shapir.

CAF said the project includes construction of the Green Line and extension of the existing Red Line, “which partially run through East Jerusalem”. The construction phase is expected to continue until 2027.

The UN identifies CAF over the “supply of equipment and materials facilitating the construction and the expansion of settlements” and the “use of natural resources, in particular water and land, for business purposes”.

Al Jazeera contacted CAF for comment but received no response.

Meanwhile, CAF has an extensive relationship with Britain’s public sector, including supplying trams for one of the country’s major urban networks. The West Midlands Combined Authority awarded CAF an 83.5-million-pound ($114m) contract for a new generation of trams for the West Midlands Metro. The contract runs until December 2027, according to Tussell data.

Fosun: Owner of a cosmetics company accused of excavating Dead Sea mud in occupied territory

Chinese conglomerate Fosun International is identified by the UN under the category covering the commercial use of natural resources, particularly water and land.

Its connection to the occupied West Bank centres on Israeli cosmetics manufacturer Ahava Dead Sea Laboratories. Fosun itself announced in April 2016 that it had agreed to acquire Ahava for 290 million shekels ($76.8m).

Fosun’s subsequent statutory reporting recorded Ahava as 99.46-percent owned.

A European Commission statement in 2018 said Ahava “does have operations in the settlement Mitzpeh Shalem, located in Occupied Territories”.

According to the Quaker-founded organisation, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), repeated site visits confirmed that Ahava’s former factory in the illegal Mitzpe Shalem settlement remained operational as of 2026.

The group said Dead Sea mud was excavated in the occupied Palestinian territory and initially processed at the site before being transferred to Ein Gedi for further production.

In Britain, Breas Medical, which is ultimately owned through Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical by Fosun International, holds two public-sector contracts worth 1.29 million pounds ($1.76m). Fosun International is the controlling shareholder of Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical.

Al Jazeera contacted Fosun for comment but received no response.

It has been six months since February 28, when the US and Israel shocked the world by launching missile strikes on Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and several senior Iranian officials in Tehran, as well as scores of children in a school in Minab, southern Iran.

US President Donald Trump then claimed the conflict would only last “four to five weeks”.

In the months since, the war has erupted on several other fronts, reaching as far as the Caspian Sea. It has triggered a global oil supply crisis as the US and Iran battle for control of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which more than one-fifth of oil and natural gas cargo transited.

And it has resulted in an estimated 8,000-10,000 deaths, as well as tens of thousands of injuries.

The conflict is also realigning the global order, experts say, as new alliances form and dominant ones show signs of crumbling.

Here’s what we know:

Has the US achieved any of its war objectives?

The US’s goals were not initially clear: officials first claimed the strikes were carried out in preemptive self-defence.

According to demands presented on the eve of the war, and a jumble of sometimes contradictory statements from Trump and senior US defence officials, they include the following:

Iran’s nuclear programme

Despite Trump’s claim that the US had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capabilities when it joined in at the end of Israel’s 12-day war on Iran in June 2025, the US and Israel again claimed in February that Tehran was just weeks away from developing nuclear weapons.

Repeated strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites during the war have likely caused vast damage to the facilities, but it is believed Tehran still possesses 440kg of highly enriched uranium, which could be used to make a weapon.

The Trump administration wanted Iran to hand over this stock to the US and to commit to zero enrichment of uranium going forward. Iran refused to do this, although at one point appeared open to the possibility of handing the stock over to a third country. Iran also insisted on retaining the capacity to develop a nuclear power programme, which requires much lower levels of uranium enrichment.

Later, Trump briefly floated the idea of US troops retrieving the stock by force – a potentially dangerous mission.

In the June 17 memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by both sides, Iran agreed not to pursue a nuclear weapon – something it had always pledged anyway. The MoU unravelled as its vague wording led to disagreements about what it actually stipulated.

Clark Summers, a US military veteran and professor at Belmont Abbey College in North Carolina, said the US “can rightly assert that these ends have been achieved. Although for how long before Iran can rebuild is difficult to assess.”

But Iranian expert and professor at the Australian National University (ANU), Alam Saleh, disagreed, and noted that Iran’s nuclear power programme is still intact. “The US lost even before the war,” he said, adding that the effort also shows that Washington failed in last year’s 12-day war.

Regime change in Iran

On day one of the war – February 28 – the US killed Khamenei alongside several other senior officials. Trump, two days earlier, said regime change is “the best thing that could happen”.

As the US launched missiles, he also called on “Iranian patriots who yearn for freedom to seize this moment to be brave, be bold, be heroic, and take back your country”.

Iran’s political leadership has, however, remained largely the same under the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei – the late ayatollah’s son.

Summers told Al Jazeera that the goal may have been “ad hoc” or improvised rather than well-planned. But “killing leaders does not mean strategic achievements, even if it’s a tactical success,” Saleh said.

Ending support for regional proxy groups

Iran’s “axis of resistance” is an umbrella comprising a number of armed groups around the region that it funds. This includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and several smaller groups in Iraq and Syria.

There are no signs that Tehran’s support for them has ended, and this demand did not appear in the MoU signed by the US.

Hezbollah went to war with Israel in Iran’s defence, and Iran has refused to negotiate an end to the war unless the Lebanon front is included. The Houthis, meanwhile, have launched a blockade on Saudi Arabia in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, partly in support of Iran.

Iran’s ballistic missiles programme

Washington swore it would “raze” Iran’s missile facilities to the ground when it launched the war on February 28. The US also pledged to destroy Iran’s navy.

Trump has since claimed that about 82 percent of Iran’s missiles are gone and the navy is degraded.

In April, he also said that 158 Iranian naval vessels had been hit, while US Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to announce dozens of strikes on command centres of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iran, however, has continued to fire missiles, most recently launching a long-range missile in July that killed three US soldiers in Jordan.

Furthermore, the demand for an end to Iran’s ballistic missiles programme was also absent from the July MoU.

Control of Iranian oil

In June, Trump said the US would seize and control Iran’s Kharg island, the heart of Iranian oil production.

To date, the US does not control any Iranian territory.

What have the US and Iran gained and lost during the war?

Besides the US demands at the start of the war, several other pressure points have emerged during the conflict.

Control of the Strait of Hormuz

Soon after the war began, Iran in effect closed the narrow but critical Strait of Hormuz, which passes through its territorial waters as well as those of Oman. Since then, shipping traffic has slumped from more than 100 ships per day to an average of about five.

To enforce this closure, Iran began striking vessels in the strait, the only route to the open ocean for Gulf oil and gas producers, which had not gained its explicit permission to pass through.

The US responded with its own naval blockade on Iranian ports in and around the strait. This is continuing.

Despite a large number of expletive-laden demands from Trump since then – many of them on social media – that Tehran reopen the strait, Iran has not budged. It is currently negotiating plans for the future of the waterway, through which more than one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas supplies were shipped before the war, with Oman.

As part of these negotiations, Iran announced this week that it has agreed to a shipping route, which it will partially control, with Oman.

While Trump has recently claimed that the US has “full control” of the strait and that it is open to vessels, shipping remains at an all-time low and Iran has continued to fire at any vessels trying to pass without its permission.

Iran sees the strait as its main piece of leverage in the war with the US, which Salah said, Iran views as an “existential threat”.

Economic impact

• Iran: The war’s impact on Iran’s economy has been severe. The Iranian rial has in effect collapsed. Food prices have surged amid the war, and the US blockade and renewed sanctions have hampered Iranian oil exports, with the blockade cutting oil revenue by at least $6bn. Tehran’s economy has long been battered by US sanctions, although the fragile ceasefire provided temporary relief. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said last week that economic pressure is a “rerun we know by heart” and that the country knows how to survive it.
• US: US consumers have also felt the pressure of the war at the petrol pump, making the conflict highly unpopular. A July poll by The Associated Press revealed that two-thirds of Americans are against the conflict. While many tend to forget there’s a war, Summers said, they do remember it acutely when petrol prices rise. In states like California, gasoline prices doubled. That anger will likely translate into a political backlash against Republicans in November’s midterms, experts say.

Relations with allies

• Iran: Iran’s targeting of US military assets as well as both military and nonmilitary infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf states and Jordan has not made it popular regionally, experts note. Iran has hit infrastructure in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. Those states have called this a violation of their sovereignty. However, Iran’s economic and political ties with China have held, as Beijing has managed a delicate dance by advocating against sanctions on Iran while refraining from becoming fully entangled in the conflict. Trade relations with Russia also remain strong.
• US: The US has faced reluctance from its NATO allies to back it up in this war. Despite being asked directly by Trump, they have refused to join the war. Spain and Italy, in particular, have highly criticised the conflict, while Germany, Israel’s strongest ally in Europe, has done the same. France rejected calls to send warships to enforce the blockade. Gulf allies, Pakistan and Turkiye have all similarly refused, while in Asia, Japan, Australia and South Korea all declined to get involved. Gulf allies are also likely weighing the fact that it is the US’s war on Iran which has caused them to become targets.

Military capabilities

• Iran: US experts say that claims Washington has degraded Iran’s military capabilities are correct. Several army bases have been struck while Iran’s ballistic missile stockpiles are down by about 82 percent, according to Trump. However, Iran is still launching missiles and, while nuclear facilities have been damaged, it still has possession of its enriched uranium stockpile. Experts point out that Iran likely has a bigger appetite for an atomic weapon now than before the war began. Tehran has also continued to produce and deploy its mass-produced, cheap Shahed drones. An estimated 1,221 military personnel were killed by April, although the real toll is likely higher.
• US: The US has lost 18 soldiers and more than 750 have been wounded. That’s “quite low”, Summers said. However, US media reports suggest the Pentagon has severely depleted stockpiles of some of its most powerful and most expensive weapons – particularly its Patriot defence missiles – something Washington denies. Those missiles are only produced in the dozens annually and cost millions of dollars each. In August, the US signed a $22.9bn deal with manufacturer Raytheon to boost Tomahawk cruise missile production from 60 to more than 1,000 annually.

Is there an outright ‘victor’?

Observers say there is not.

“Both of them have not achieved anything,” Saleh of ANU said, noting that the US has failed to translate military superiority to actual gains despite being a “superpower” fighting a “middle power”.

China and Russia are likely observing Washington’s weaknesses, making new military calculations in the event of a future conflict with the US, he said. That has implications for Taiwan, especially as the US has now deployed its last aircraft carrier in the Pacific to the Middle East. The shift leaves the US without an aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific, despite Washington’s previous strategic emphasis on the region.

“Iran surviving also does not mean it’s a winner,” however, Saleh said. “This might be a defeat for the US, but it’s not a victory for Iran either.”

The Iran war is settling into attrition, with no regime collapse and Gulf economies facing growing uncertainty

Analysts broadly agree the United States and Israel’s war on Iran will not see regime collapse in Tehran or a definite victory for Washington, but rather a dragged-out affair of stagnation and attrition.

The hope among the US leadership at the start of the war, which began after surprise Israeli and US attacks on February 28, was that mounting economic and military pressure on Iran would force a structural shift in Tehran. Six months on, it is clear this vision will not come about, and instead many are preparing for a protracted war and managed fallout.

Oil-dependent economies are still absorbing supply shocks after traffic in the Strait of Hormuz slowed to a trickle of pre-war levels following Iran’s attacks on shipping and a US blockade on Iranian ports.

The US military is still entrenched in a region that remains its most militarised in years. Although the war’s intensity has lessened since a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed by Washington and Tehran in June, there is no sign it will conclude, leading to continued uncertainty about the future.

Existing tensions, such as those between the Houthi rebels and Saudi Arabia in Yemen, look only set to increase as the war drags on. The influence of rival powers, such as those of India and China, remains stalled rather than stopped, with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative having already established itself within the Middle East and North Africa. All in all, the region remains in flux where formal alliances with outside powers no longer guarantee safety.

The defence agreement between Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia recently signed in Mecca will likely be the first of many such military pacts agreed in the region.

“The war has just accelerated trends, but hasn’t really started anything that wasn’t already under way. The Gulf countries were already diversifying their economies,” Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, told Al Jazeera. “Many were already looking at broadening their defence partnerships beyond existing US security guarantees, as well as increasing their own defence capability.”

Israel, for its part, is still pursuing its regional project of “paramountcy”, HA Hellyer of the Royal United Services Institute said, despite its failure to bring Iran to its knees this year.

“There is no chance of the government in Tehran falling in the next six months,” Hellyer told Al Jazeera. “If everything were to theoretically stay the same … with just increased economic pressure, that could eventually cause a ripple effect that could lead to state collapse in Iran. But we’re talking years, not months, and everything is not likely to stay the same.”

The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and strikes on regional cities have hindered Gulf states’ plans to use oil revenues as an engine to diversify their economies and build on their reputations as a safe haven to encourage investors.

Shipments of oil, derivative products and liquefied natural gas (LNG) have been repeatedly and severely disrupted since the US and Israel launched their attacks on Iran in February.

Transit through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which saw attacks on shipping by the Houthis during Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, became even more hazardous in July, when the Iran-allied Houthis declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia.

“The price of oil has increased broadly in line with the Gulf states’ difficulties in exporting it,” John Sfakianakis, chief economist at the Gulf Research Center, told Al Jazeera. “Is this going to go for six months? Is it going to go on for longer?”

Exacerbating the Gulf states’ difficulties is that, although the price of oil has risen, so has inflation. In addition to the economic difficulties the war has created, there is also growing pressure for Gulf states to invest more in defence.

For now, the majority of the states caught in the middle will look at ways of living with the turmoil and managing the consequences.

An air strike on a fuel market near Chad’s border with Sudan killed 12 and injured seven, according to officials.

An air strike near Chad’s border with Sudan has killed at least 12 people, with Chad accusing the Sudanese army of launching it.

Addressing Thursday’s strike, a Chadian security source said it “targeted a fuel market where the RSF [Rapid Support Forces] refuel. The strike killed 12 people and wounded seven”, AFP news agency reported about the attack on the paramilitary group.

Chad’s accusation comes against the backdrop of a civil war between Sudan’s army and the RSF which has lasted over three years and displaced millions of people.

Previously, Chad said that Sudan was responsible for an air strike that hit a military convoy in its territory last week. Chad’s army said the strikes took place more than 100km (62 miles) inside its territory in the eastern Ennedi region, and that there were no Chadian casualties.

In response to threats posed by drones, Chad had raised its alert level in the area to its highest point, according to a security source. The country deployed about 100 armoured vehicles and signal-jamming trucks near eastern Tine, close to the Sudanese border, a local source told Reuters news agency.

On Thursday, Sudan said it was surprised by the allegations against its army “before any professional and independent investigation into the circumstances of the incident”.

Sudan’s Foreign Ministry said its forces “are carrying out their constitutional duty to protect Sudan’s sovereignty, security and safety and to face any threats it faces, while respecting the sovereignty of its neighbours and without targeting their territory”.

The US embassy in Khartoum also accused the Sudanese army of launching the recent strikes on Chad, condemning them on Thursday.

The Sudanese army has previously accused Chad of being aligned with the RSF. Meanwhile, nearly one million displaced Sudanese people have fled to Chad, where they have been facing a water crisis.

Kurdish leader appointed to the role days after the dissolution of the force he commanded.

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has appointed Mazloum Abdi, leader of the now-dissolved Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as a presidential advisor.

Al-Sharaa issued Decree No 164, appointing Abdi as “as an advisor to the Presidency of the Republic” on Thursday, the Syrian state news agency Sana reported.

The move comes three days after Abdi announced the dissolution of the SDF and the completion of its integration with the Syrian military.

Abdi is the most senior of several Kurdish figures appointed to state posts. Another commander was made assistant defence minister for the eastern region earlier this year.

The advisory role is a lesser position than one offered in January, when al-Sharaa proposed making Abdi deputy defence minister and nominating him as governor of Hasakah province, in order to restore state control over the SDF-controlled provincial capital.

Al-Sharaa and Abdi first agreed to fold the SDF into the central government in March 2025. That deal made little progress before its year-end deadline, spurring state forces to battle into the northeast in January, taking the cities of Raqqa and Deir Az Zor from the SDF.

A ceasefire that ended the fighting placed Raqqa, Deir Az Zor and Hasakah under central government control and committed the SDF to join the defence and interior ministries under a 14-point plan.

One Kurdish-led force has yet to be absorbed. The YPJ, the SDF’s women’s units, asked to join the defence ministry but were told the army’s structure has no units for women.

Alongside the military track, al-Sharaa issued a decree in January recognising Kurdish as a national language and restoring citizenship to Syria Kurds, the first formal recognition of Kurdish rights since Syria’s independence in 1946.

The SDF was the largest force still outside the army, and its dissolution leaves Damascus with formal authority over almost all Syrian territory. Reunifying the country has been al-Sharaa’s central promise since former Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad was overthrown in December 2024.

Violence has eased since the US-Iran MoU and Israel-Lebanon framework, but Beirut still reports attacks and demolitions.

A Lebanese woman has been killed, and several other people injured by Israeli strikes on the town of Arab Salim, in southern Lebanon’s Nabatieh district.

Lebanon’s Ministry of Health said six people were wounded in the attacks on Thursday, including a child, a woman and two elderly people, while the state-run National News Agency (NNA) reported that the woman who died “had been married for 48 hours”.

The newlywed woman’s house was also destroyed in the attack, NNA said.

Lebanese security sources said at least 10 Israeli strikes had been carried out in the wider Nabatieh area. NNA also reported artillery shelling targeting the outskirts of the town of Rashaf in the Bint Jbeil district.

The Israeli military claimed it was targeting Hezbollah after the Iran-backed group struck its soldiers in the south overnight. The army said it struck Hezbollah “weapon storage facilities”.

“Israel targeted the town of Arab Salim in the Nabatieh governorate. It targeted a residential area,” said Al Jazeera’s Zeina Khodr, reporting from Beirut about the deadly strike.

“The Israeli army says it is hitting infrastructure, and that this is in retaliation for Hezbollah launching armed drones at its forces in the Ali al-Taher ridge overnight.

“It’s not the first time the Israeli army accuses Hezbollah of targeting its forces in this area, which overlooks the city of Nabatieh’s strategic high ground, which really remains contested territory. We know that the Israeli army wants Hezbollah to vacate this area, so we’re seeing this increase in military pressure,” she said.

According to Israel, Iran-backed fighters “launched two explosive drones” towards Israeli soldiers operating in the Ali al-Taher ridge, but there were no casualties.

Israel has stepped up its strikes on south Lebanon in recent days, following an August 15 wave of strikes that Lebanon said killed 11 people, including several children. Israel’s military said the raids were retaliation for a Hezbollah attack.

Al Jazeera’s Khodr said that while “there has been a reduction in the violence in recent days, we have also witnessed an escalation by the Israeli army”.

“There is growing concern that the [Israeli] army may broaden this offensive, and it may become even more intense,” she added.

Tensions between Israel and Lebanon have been escalating since Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza began in 2023. Lebanon was dragged into the conflict on March 2, days after the US and Israel launched their war on Iran. Hezbollah struck Israel in support of Tehran. This was followed by massive Israeli air strikes and a ground invasion that Lebanese authorities say have killed more than 4,300 people.

The continued strikes have renewed debate in Beirut over the “framework” agreement Lebanon signed with Israel in June, which envisages a phased Israeli withdrawal in exchange for the deployment of the Lebanese army and the disarmament of armed groups, a reference to Hezbollah.

Farah, Mohammed and Jawad are getting ready for the new school year in Masafer Yatta in the southern occupied West Bank.

The children, aged 17, 8, and 7 respectively, attend Shaab al-Butum school in a village with the same name. But the building they’ll return to will be missing two administrative rooms and a storage room after Israeli forces demolished them on August 4.

According to the United Nations, Israel justified the demolitions by saying that the structures were constructed without Israeli-issued building permits. These are nearly impossible for Palestinians to obtain in the Area C of the occupied West Bank, which is under Israeli administrative and military control.

The rest of the school isn’t safe either – it has also been threatened with demolition, with a court case scheduled for September 15.

The children’s return to education is now uncertain, as they worry about losing the village’s only school completely, and more confrontations with Israeli forces.

Constant fear

The start of the academic year at the beginning of September is supposed to mean a return to learning, but enthusiasm in Shaab al-Butum has now been mixed with anxiety.

Farah explained to Al Jazeera that the school was the only one she had ever attended, and was fearful about what would now happen.

Mohammed echoed that fear and said that he was worried Israeli forces would “return to demolish what remains” of the school. Jawad, meanwhile, spoke of his sadness at seeing the school damaged and said he hoped it could “return as it was”.

For Nidal Younis, the head of the Masafer Yatta local council, those concerns reflect a much wider threat facing education across the area, which has repeatedly been targeted by the Israeli state and settlers over the years. Masafer Yatta was declared part of a closed Israeli military firing zone in the 1980s, which has been used as justification in repeated attempts to force local Palestinians out.

“It is a test renewed with every school year, amidst unprecedented escalation by the occupation authorities,” Younis told Al Jazeera.

“This year comes amid the tightening of the occupation’s policy of demolishing schools, and rampant settler violence that targets everything in these villages,” he added.

That violence, Younis said, follows children throughout their daily lives, targeting “students going to their schools, students while in class, and even inside the home”.

According to Younis, all seven schools in the wider Masafer Yatta area are now threatened with demolition.

“We do not know whether these schools will survive to the end of this academic year, let alone still be standing when the next one begins,” he said, stressing the determination of local Palestinians to stay “despite the pain and [Israeli] barbarism”.

Settler violence

Activist and teacher Tariq Hathaleen said the uncertainty surrounding demolitions, coupled with the continued expansion of settlement outposts, had deepened the sense of insecurity among residents.

“The occupation authorities do not usually tell the residents or the school administration in advance when the bulldozers will arrive,” Hathaleen told Al Jazeera.

Hathaleen added that settlers had stormed Ras Ein al-Auja school in the Jordan Valley the previous academic year, assaulting staff and students.

The attack and the demolition confirmed that schools are “no longer immune from attack”, Hathaleen said.

“[Israel’s actions] do not target merely one aspect, but affects education, housing, freedom of movement and livelihoods,” Hathaleen explained.

Hathaleen described the targeted schools – built by the Palestinian Ministry of Education to serve marginalised areas – as “more than just educational buildings”.

Systematic pattern

Figures from the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission underscore the scale of the threat, with 84 Palestinian schools serving nearly 13,000 students currently facing Israeli demolition or stop-work orders.

Amir Dawoud, a senior official with the commission, said the schools facing the most immediate legal threats were concentrated in the southern Hebron area, particularly Masafer Yatta, as well as at al-Walaja school near Bethlehem, which Israel says lacks a building permit.

“These are not schools that can simply be closed and their students easily transferred elsewhere,” Dawoud told Al Jazeera.

The impact of demolition orders, he said, begins long before any building is actually destroyed, creating uncertainty and disruption for students, teachers, and their families.

“The psychological and educational impact begins before the bulldozer arrives,” he said.

“It is a systematic pattern that transcends individual cases,” Dawoud added, noting that it starts with planning restrictions, accompanied by road restrictions and settler attacks.

“It does not only threaten school buildings,” he said. “It targets the ability of Palestinian communities to survive.”

Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani is due to visit Tehran on Thursday for talks on de-escalating tensions and reviving dialogue between Iran and the United States.

A spokesman for Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the visit in a statement on X on Wednesday.

Majed al-Ansari said Sheikh Mohammed, who is also Qatar’s foreign minister, will meet with “a number of Iranian officials” in Tehran to “discuss ways to de-escalate tensions” and “create the conditions conducive to dialogue”.

“The visit comes in line with the State of Qatar’s firm position that the diplomatic path is the best means of resolving differences & promoting security & stability in the region,” he added.

Iran also confirmed the visit, saying the discussions will cover “the continuation of Qatar’s mediation efforts and initiatives, as well as other regional developments”.

Qatar has served as a back-channel negotiator between Washington and Tehran and helped secure a memorandum of understanding in June that briefly paused hostilities. The agreement collapsed in July, and the conflict is now nearing its sixth month, with fighting largely paused but no diplomatic breakthrough in sight.

The US has, meanwhile, promised to increase economic pressure on Tehran by sanctioning its trade partners.

US President Donald Trump told Al Jazeera on Wednesday that he was in “no hurry” to resume talks with Iran, saying that he believed economic and military action against Tehran were both effective.

“I have no time schedule; whatever it takes,” he said.

‘Economic terrorism’

Iran has continued to denounce the economic pressure campaign.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote to the United Nations on Wednesday calling the new sanctions an “act of state and economic terrorism” and urging member states not to implement them.

“The sanctions deliberately harm civilians by restricting access to food, medicine, medical equipment, energy and other essentials, violating rights including the rights to life, health, food and an adequate standard of living”, he said.

The two sides also remain at odds over the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway that handled one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments before the US-Israel war on Iran began in February.

Iran wants control over the strait, while the US wants it to remain an international waterway that is free for all. That disagreement in part led to the collapse of the memorandum signed in June.

Oil flows through the strait have since fallen to a three-month low, with just 5 million barrels per day (bpd) transiting on Monday. Before the war, the strait carried roughly 20 million bpd of crude oil.

Qatar’s Foreign Ministry said Sheikh Mohammed will also discuss the waterway in his meetings in Tehran on Thursday, focusing on “the need for it to return to the status quo prior to February 28”.

Regional diplomacy

Sheikh Mohammed’s visit comes two days after Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi met his Iranian counterpart, Araghchi, in Tehran.

Following those talks, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, said the two countries had agreed on a new temporary route for shipping in the strait.

But he insisted that the waterway will not reopen until the US fulfils its commitments under the June deal, including the lifting of sanctions and the release of frozen assets.

Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, also visited Tehran earlier in the week in a bid to “end the stalemate” in the conflict, with Islamabad reporting “significant progress” in those talks.

Mostafa Khoshcheshm, a professor at the University of Applied Sciences in Tehran, said that regional countries were pushing for dialogue because “they believe that the situation is moving towards escalation”.

“They know that if war breaks out, it would be a fully-fledged war and the fire would spill over into the entire region and beyond, leaving a detrimental impact on the global economy,” he said. “So there are hectic diplomatic moves on the part of these countries.”

Six people in critical condition as a severe heatwave fuels 154 wildfires across Algeria in a single day.

At least 12 people have been killed and 54 others injured as wildfires ravaged parts of northeastern Algeria, an official said, as authorities evacuated dozens of families from the hardest-hit areas.

Minister of Interior Said Sayoud, speaking to reporters on Wednesday, said the deaths occurred in the provinces of Jijel, Bejaia and Tizi Ouzou.

“Five deaths were recorded in the prefecture of Jijel, four in that of Bejaia and three in that of Tizi Ouzou,” he said.

Sayoud made the remarks during a visit to a hospital in the city of Souk El Thenine in Bejaia to evaluate treatment for victims suffering burn injuries and smoke inhalation.

According to the official Algeria Press Service, Sayoud reported 54 burn cases at the hospital, including six people who were in critical condition.

Sayoud said Civil Protection teams recorded 154 fire outbreaks across the country on Wednesday, including 36 in Bejaia province, 18 of which had been brought under control.

The fires come as a severe heatwave sweeps across Algeria and neighbouring Tunisia.

Sayoud said firefighting teams have managed to contain the blazes in the provinces of Skikda, El Tarf, Bouira, Tizi Ouzou and Tebessa. Operations were still under way in Bejaia, where 18 hotspots remained active, and in Jijel, where fires were burning in 12 municipalities.

He added that dozens of families had been evacuated from areas affected by the fires.

Images broadcast by regional news website Jijel News showed residents seeking refuge in a post office amid thick smoke.

Algeria frequently endures deadly seasonal wildfires during peak summer months.

At least six people were killed last month alone.

In recent years, intense heatwaves and fierce winds have amplified fire risks across the country’s forested Mediterranean coastline, disasters exacerbated by drought and climate change.

The head of the UN agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) has condemned an Israeli seizure of its East Jerusalem training centre, calling the raid part of a campaign designed to weaken the agency and, in turn, eliminate Palestinian rights.

In comments to Al Jazeera, acting Commissioner-General Christian Saunders on Wednesday accused Israel of violating UN premises, but insisted that “might doesn’t win out” in resolving the conflict and that the agency is “not going anywhere”.

Israeli forces raided and seized the Qalandiya Training Centre in the Kafr Aqab neighbourhood on Tuesday, expelling UNRWA employees and ordering them not to return.

Five Palestinians were injured by Israeli gunfire near the site, according to the Jerusalem governorate.

Far-right Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir took part in the raid and said there was “no place for the agency in Jerusalem and Israel”. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the evacuation was lawful and carried out under legislation passed by Israel.

The takeover of the facility deprives hundreds of young Palestinians of education and violates the protections afforded to UN premises under international law, Saunders said.

“Three hundred and forty young people are not going to get the education, not going to get the training they need,” he remarked. He lamented that the students – mostly from disadvantaged families – will now miss out on learning the skills to give them the “opportunity to lead a full and dignified life”.

The Qalandiya centre is part of UNRWA’s wider network of services for Palestinian refugees. It serves about 16,000 refugees from Qalandiya refugee camp and other parts of the occupied West Bank.

The raid followed the closure of the nearby Qalandiya checkpoint and a heavy Israeli military deployment in the area.

Israeli authorities said the property was owned by the Jewish National Fund and has now been allocated to the Jerusalem Municipality for a planned educational and community complex. They also cited Israeli legislation, passed in October 2024, restricting UNRWA’s activities.

UNRWA rejected the claims and maintained that the centre is a United Nations facility protected under international law.

Wider campaign

UNRWA has come under severe pressure amid Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and abuse in the occupied West Bank, with several workers having been killed.

Saunders said the wider campaign against UNRWA is intended to weaken the agency and cut its funding, and links these efforts to the broader question of Palestinian refugee rights.

“If UNRWA is defunded and UNRWA is eliminated then they are hoping that the issue of the refugees, the Palestine refugees, will go away,” Saunders said. “Which means that the right of return, reparations, and compensation would go away, as well.”

The aid group chief pointed out that its mandate comes directly from the United Nations General Assembly and its role is to provide humanitarian and public services while the wider political dispute between Israel and Palestinians remains unresolved.

“We’re a humanitarian organisation; we’re a development organisation. We are given our mandate by the United Nations General Assembly to provide critical services,” Saunders said.

UNRWA will continue doing so “until the General Assembly decides otherwise, or there is a durable solution to the Palestine question,” he declared.

However, Saunders also acknowledged the limits of the UN’s ability to prevent further incursions without collective action from member states.

“I don’t think the United Nations has the power to say: ‘You know, this is not going to continue to happen,’” he said.

“The United Nations is the sum of its member states, and its member states need to have the collective determination to address this issue. And for over seven decades, this has not happened.”

Syria has been in talks on the fate of Khmeimim and Tartous bases, which Russia used to support ousted Assad regime.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa have held discussions, including on the fate of Russia’s military bases in the Middle Eastern country.

During a telephone call on Wednesday, Putin affirmed Moscow’s support for Syria’s territorial integrity and reiterated Russia’s rejection of Israeli attacks and violations of Syrian sovereignty, reports Syrian news agency SANA.

The Kremlin stressed that the discussion also concerned deepening political dialogue and cooperation in trade, among other areas.

The talks were aimed at further development of bilateral relations and strengthened cooperation, SANA noted.

However, the status of the Khmeimim airbase and Tartous naval base, which are highly strategic for Russia, remains the key topic between Damascus and Moscow.

The Kremlin said that Russia-Syria relations will continue through continued contact “at various levels” and that “both sides underscored the importance of the Memorandum of Understanding On the Reorganisation of the Khmeimim Air Base and the Tartus Material-Technical Support Point, signed on August 9”.

Syria announced earlier this month that a deal had been agreed after 18 months of negotiations that will see Khmeimim and Tartous turned into “joint training and capacity-building centres”, with Syria to take control of civilian facilities at both bases.

Russia backed former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad throughout Syria’s 13-year civil war, intervening militarily to keep him in power and expanding the Russian footprint at the Khmeimim air base and Tartous naval base on the Mediterranean coast.

Since al-Sharaa led the ouster of the a;-Assad regime, Putin has worked to build relations with the new Syrian government and to secure the future of the bases, which are key to Russian efforts to maintain influence across the Middle East and Northern Africa.

Israeli forces have raided the Qalandiya Training Centre, operated by the United Nations agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) in occupied East Jerusalem in what officials and analysts describe as a pivotal step towards dismantling international refugee protections and consolidating control over the occupied West Bank.

Tuesday’s storming of the UNRWA facility, led by far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, was justified by Israeli authorities under October 2024 legislation banning the UN agency, prompting sharp condemnation from Qatar, which warned of systematic efforts to strip millions of Palestinians of essential services.

Strategic annexation

Israeli affairs expert Adel Shadid identified broader territorial ambitions behind the raid, carried out on the boundary line between East Jerusalem and the West Bank. He told Al Jazeera the assault serves a larger geopolitical scheme involving a historic airport close to the training centre.

“The institute is directly adjacent to the historic Qalandiya Airport, which was built more than 106 years ago,” Shadid said.

“The occupation aims to gain complete control over the airport adjacent to the institute to establish a massive settlement comprising over 9,000 settlement units in addition to a Jewish heritage centre and to erase the historical and geographical Jordanian landmarks of the airport,” he explained.

“By controlling these two areas and annexing them to the occupation municipality, the pillars of the ‘Greater Jerusalem’ project are completed. This project alone will carve out between 12 to 13 percent of the total area of the West Bank,” he added.

Shadid noted that this expansion would allow the municipality to control an area exceeding 800sq km (310sq miles), essentially destroying Palestinian continuity.

“The ultimate goal of the occupation exceeds preventing the establishment of a future Palestinian state. Rather, it aims explicitly to prevent the establishment of any independent Palestinian entity or presence on this land,” he said.

Echoing this assessment, retired Lebanese Brigadier General and military analyst Elias Hanna pointed to Israel’s tactical encirclement of urban Palestinian hubs.

“The importance of Qalandiya is linked to the broader settlement project in the West Bank, which is based on creating settlement blocs aiming to control geographical continuity between Palestinian areas and isolate them from each other,” Hanna told Al Jazeera.

“The control over the area can affect the movement and connection between the two cities,” he added, referring to Jerusalem and Ramallah.

Targeting refugee rights

Detailing the immediate impact on UNRWA’s institutional mandate, the agency’s media adviser Adnan Abu Hasna outlined the unprecedented nature of the takeover.

“UNRWA was not informed [in advance] of any action by the Israeli government against the UNRWA institute and complex in Qalandiya,” Abu Hasna told Al Jazeera.

“This measure is unprecedented as the UN flag is lowered and this headquarters is taken over in this unusual manner, and it represents a dangerous escalation against international humanitarian law, against UN laws and against the mandate granted to UNRWA by the UN General Assembly,” he said.

Abu Hasna underscored how the raid violated historic bilateral frameworks that long governed UN operations.

“There is an agreement signed between UNRWA and Israel on June 14, 1967, providing for facilitating UNRWA’s operations and protecting its facilities and its employees and headquarters enjoying immunity and privileges, but unfortunately, all of this has ended now under the weight of escalating Israeli measures,” he said.

The agency operates schools and provides healthcare, social services and microfinancing for Palestinians. Compounding the Israeli raids, destructions of its compounds and offices, and restrictions on its operations, the agency is also facing a financial crisis. Abu Hasna cited major political defunding campaigns, particularly by the United States.

“We have a large deficit, especially after the Trump administration and Republican lawmakers cut $360m, which constitutes about 30 percent of UNRWA’s annual budget,” he noted.

Settler-military cooperation

Regarding the operational dynamics on the ground, Israeli affairs specialist Anas Abu Arqoub highlighted the deepening alignment between state forces and armed settlers.

“It is a division of roles accompanied by a state of complete integration,” Abu Arqoub told Al Jazeera.

“The settler phenomenon … [is] in fact armed organisations with a clear leadership hierarchy, a system of regular and reserve fighters called upon when needed, and they possess a military combat doctrine,” he explained.

“A large part of them are elements from within the Israeli army, armed with its weapons, and undergo joint military training,” he added.

Abu Arqoub said Israeli research institutions, such as the Institute for National Security Studies, have recognised the severe implications of this convergence.

“The Institute for National Security Studies recently pointed out that this military force of settlers has become capable, under the cover of ‘loss of control’, of executing complete ethnic cleansing in the West Bank,” he observed.

US green light

Examining the international impunity enabling these actions, Birzeit University political science Professor Ghassan Khatib emphasised Washington’s decisive role.

“The weakness of the United Nations position is one of the two main factors driving Israel to persist and increasingly rebel against international laws and violate the rights of the Palestinian people,” Khatib told Al Jazeera.

“The first and most important factor is the American position, the actual sponsor of this Israeli rebellion,” he stressed, pointing out a “direct correlation between the rising pace of Israeli violations and the reascent of [President Donald] Trump to the leadership of the United States about two years ago”.

“These settler militias have become an integral part of the occupation system, and the danger will inevitably escalate,” Khatib added.

Electoral basis

From the local community’s perspective, Mohammed Saeed – public relations director for the popular committee of the Qalandiya refugee camp, which Israeli forces also raided on Tuesday – framed the raid as both diplomatic defiance and domestic political posturing.

The Israeli incursion, he said, was a clear message of defiance stating: ‘We are the owners of the land, and we decide its fate,’” Saeed told Al Jazeera on Tuesday.

Dutch group Christians for Israel is taking the government to court in the Netherlands over its plans to introduce a ban on importing goods from illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and Golan Heights.

The ban, which was announced in July, is due to take effect on September 22 and will run for three years. It bars importing, buying and selling goods produced in Israeli settlements, as well as intermediary services and any attempt to circumvent the rules.

But the Israel Product Centre (IPC), part of Christians for Israel (CvI), a Dutch evangelical organisation which a recent study found has donated about $300,000 to illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank, has responded by filing summary proceedings against the state, with the hearing due today.

Here’s what we know about this case.

What is the case about?

The IPC has issued summary proceedings against the Dutch state, seeking to block the July decree.

The IPC argues the measure is “one-sided” and that the window it now has to clear its existing stock – some 20,000 bottles of wine – is too short.

It is also arguing that a national ban conflicts with the European Union’s principle of free movement of goods.

A verdict is not expected for about two weeks.

How has this case come about?

EU rules have long required goods from illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank to be labelled by their origin – Palestine – rather than as “product of Israel”, but the bloc has not placed an outright ban on trading with Israeli settlements. That remains up to individual countries.

In February 2020, the Dutch advocacy group DocP urged consumers to file complaints with the Dutch food safety authority, NVWA, if they found wine and Dead Sea cosmetics had been mislabelled.

Following complaints, the IPC changed its labelling to “product uit een Israelisch dorp in Judea & Samaria [product from an Israeli village in Judea and Samaria],” which it argued accurately reflected the exact geographical and administrative reality of the origins of the products without deceiving the buyer. Judea and Samaria is the biblical name used by the Israeli government to refer to the West Bank. DocP argued this fell short of the requirement to label products correctly, and continued its campaign.

In 2021, the NVWA agreed and fined the IPC 2,100 euros (about $2,500) for mislabelling goods.

Then, in July 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion that Israel’s presence in the occupied Palestinian territory is unlawful and must end “as rapidly as possible”.

This shifted the legal argument beyond mere consumer labelling, with the court saying countries should take steps to prevent trade or investment relations which help to maintain the unlawful presence of Israeli settlers in the Palestinian territories.

The lower house of the Dutch parliament acted on that in September 2025, proposing an import ban.

The national decree against importing goods from Israeli settlements was made in July this year.

Does Christians for Israel describe the West Bank as ‘Israel’?

CvI describes the West Bank as a “disputed territory” rather than accepting the international legal description of it as “occupied Palestinian territory”.

It says it believes that Israel has strong claims to sovereignty there and that Jews have a right to live there.

The vocabulary matters in a legal sense, as “disputed territory” is not the same as “annexed territory”, therefore, the legal apparatus which would make settlement trade unlawful doesn’t straightforwardly apply.

The group’s stated reasons for funding projects there, it says on its website, are rooted in the Bible; it cites Ezekiel 47:21-23: “Peace for the Jewish people and resident foreigners inheriting alongside the tribes of Israel.”

However, the ICJ’s July 2024 advisory opinion is clear that the Fourth Geneva Convention’s Article 49(6) and successive Security Council resolutions treat the territories as occupied and the settlements as unlawful.

How have other Christian organisations in the West responded to trade with settlements?

Western churches are split on the issue, with CvI sitting at one end of the spectrum.

Mainline Protestants, including the Presbyterian Church in the United States, have divested shareholdings in Caterpillar, HP and Motorola Solutions as early as 2014, and from Israeli bonds in 2024. The United Methodist Church has opposed Israeli settlements since 1996 and sold its Israeli bond holdings last August.

The World Council of Churches called for sanctions against illegal Israeli settlements in 2025, divestment and an arms embargo.

The Vatican calls settlements an obstacle to peace but has avoided divestment so far.

Christian Zionist bodies, however, including Christians United for Israel (CUFI) and the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem, send funding for settlements and fight against boycotts.

How significant is this ban?

It is significant considering that the Netherlands is one of only four EU countries currently imposing a ban on trade with illegal Israeli settlements.

Trade from illegal settlements to the EU is estimated to be worth up to $400m per year.

The Netherlands is also a big market for the illegal settlements; a recent investigation by legal advocacy group Global Echo, which analysed thousands of shipments from Israeli settlements between 2017 and 2026, shows that within the EU, the Dutch market is the largest importer of goods from illegal settlements, with about 30 percent destined for or passing through the country.

Which European countries have banned products from West Bank settlements?

Spain has banned all imports of products from illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, since September 2025. The decree also enforces an embargo on defence exports and dual-use technology to Israel, bans ships carrying military fuel for Israel from Spanish ports, and restricts advertising for services or goods linked to Israeli settlements.

Ireland’s parliament approved the text of its Israeli Settlements (Prohibition of Importation of Goods) Bill in May and the bill was signed into law in July. It covers all goods produced in Israeli settlements, but excludes services.

Belgium’s federal government approved a draft royal decree in July introducing a specific regime for goods from Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The precise details of the new law will be determined by the government in due course.

Slovenia imposed restrictions on imports from Israeli settlements under its previous government, but the new conservative government reversed them in June 2026.

The EU as a bloc remains deadlocked over whether a ban counts as foreign policy requiring unanimity or trade policy needing only a qualified majority, with ministers not meeting again in a decision-making format until October.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar last year described the push by some European governments to implement the ICJ advisory opinion as “shameful”.

Which European countries still allow trade with West Bank settlements?

Nearly all of them.

Outside the three European Union states which still have bans in place, settlement goods can be sold legally everywhere, including in most of the EU.

At a July 2026 meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels, which addressed trade from Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories, Germany, Austria, Czechia and Hungary were opposed to an EU-wide ban.

Beyond the EU, the United Kingdom does not forbid trade with illegal Israeli settlements, although new Prime Minister Andy Burnham is reportedly considering a ban. In a recent parliamentary briefing, Amnesty International called on the UK government to implement a ban.

It said: “The argument for a UK ban on trade with settlements is clear. The UK government itself accepts it should take stronger action in response to settlement expansion and annexation. The International Court of Justice has directed states not to trade with Israel in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory; and there is precedent in UK law and policy to not trade with illegally occupied lands, ie Crimea and other illegally occupied parts of Ukraine.”

Sudan’s army has had a good summer. Last month, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) recaptured several towns along the strategic Export Road, known locally as Sadirat, which connects the central Nile valley to the country’s west, and pushed the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a defensive crouch across much of the centre of the country.

On the back of these gains, SAF leaders are now speaking more confidently of defeating the RSF entirely, rather than merely containing it.

But look east, to Sudan’s Blue Nile state, and the picture inverts. In mid-August, the RSF and its ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (led by Abdulaziz al-Hilu), retook Kurmuk and seized Geisan within days, in attacks that Sudanese military sources said were launched from across the border in Ethiopia. Drone attacks on multiple army-controlled cities this month also showed that the RSF’s reach extends well beyond Darfur, its main territorial stronghold.

The lesson of the summer, then, is not that the SAF is on the verge of decisive victory. It is that military victory and political resolution are becoming two very different things. Even a full RSF defeat may not end Sudan’s war so much as fracture it into several smaller conflicts.

A look at the coalitions doing the fighting helps explain why. The anti-RSF coalition is coordinated and led by the SAF, but the army also relies on allied armed movements, including Darfuri factions that signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). These include Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Darfur Governor Minni Minnawi. The JPA required their forces to be integrated into Sudan’s military and security services, but they have been reluctant to give up the military autonomy that underpins their political leverage.

Yasser al-Atta, then assistant commander-in-chief and now army chief of staff, announced in March that the army would activate mechanisms to organise and integrate allied irregular groups into the formal military and security services, but little has happened since.

Al-Atta wasn’t even the first to promise to address the problems of the proliferation of weapons and armed groups. Two years earlier, deputy commander-in-chief Shams al-Din Kabbashi told a graduation ceremony for Minni Minnawi’s Sudan Liberation Movement fighters that the army had “begun enacting a law and structures to control the many popular resistance groups”, warning that the array of semi-autonomous militias, tribal coalitions and volunteers backing the SAF’s war efforts, the “popular resistance” as it is called, would “become the next danger if we continue this way”.

More than two years on from Kabbashi’s speech, the underlying problem remains largely unresolved.

Then there is the RSF’s own coalition, which is actively fragmenting. A string of senior figures, al-Nour al-Qubba, al-Savanna, and more recently, the RSF-appointed governor for the Kordofan region, Hamad Khalifa, have defected, amid reports of Saudi financial inducements as well as tribal grievances.

When al-Nour al-Qubba left, he took dozens of combat vehicles and a large contingent of fighters with him. Given that the RSF is a franchise more than a unified fighting force, these defections should worry the SAF as much as they comfort it: defectors often arrive as intact forces loyal to their commanders, not soldiers used to reporting to a chain of command. In a way, the SAF inherits the RSF’s structural weakness with each defection.

Another example is Abu Aqla Keikel, an SAF-trained officer who initially fought on the army’s side after the war erupted in 2023, before defecting to the RSF later that year and then back to the SAF in October 2024. His Sudan Shield Forces remain, in practice, more under his own command than the army’s, even as he appears alongside SAF leadership and Darfuri commanders at recent battlefield-victory photo ops.

Many commanders inside the anti-RSF camp maintain a fairly wide margin of operational independence and consequently their own political calculations. This will become far more apparent once the war ends and there is no longer a common enemy to paper over the differences.

Sudan’s Islamists, meanwhile, occupy a strange position. Brigades like al-Baraa ibn Malik, affiliated with Sudan’s Islamic Movement, which underpinned Omar al-Bashir’s former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), supplied thousands of fighters and were instrumental in retaking Khartoum from the RSF. The United States has sanctioned al-Baraa ibn Malik, while the European Union has sanctioned its leader, al-Misbah Abu Zaid. Amid this international pressure and SAF battlefield gains, some Islamist fighters and leaders have begun pulling back, in what one Sudan Tribune report described as a “tactical withdrawal”. Al-Misbah recently posted that “we have returned to our civilian lives”.

But retreating from the battlefield is not the same as retreating from politics. Ahmed Haroun, chairman of the former ruling NCP, told Reuters news agency last year that the Islamic Movement could support an extended period of army rule, with an eye towards returning to government through “the ballot box”, as Haroun put it.

Indeed, another potential flashpoint for the SAF is that the war has given fighters in Islamist brigades like al-Baraa ibn Malik years of battlefield experience. There is little reason to think fighters who helped recapture the capital will disarm and disband the moment the war is over, at least not without a political settlement that creates a path for demobilisation.

This is the context in which SAF chief and de facto president General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s recently announced national dialogue should be read, less as a comprehensive resolution to the country’s militia problem than as a political process that could convert the army’s wartime alliances into post-war influence.

Burhan has explicitly ruled out the return of RSF leaders to power, promising there would be no “incomplete peace” that allowed Hemedti or other RSF leaders back into government. Given the RSF’s abysmal human rights record during the war, the exclusion is defensible, but the broader armed-group problem remains unresolved: namely, how the RSF’s remaining forces would actually be dismantled or integrated, particularly in Darfur, and how the SAF’s own allied militias would be brought under a single chain of command once the shooting slows down.

Another structural problem that is older than this war reinforces why claims of total victory remain elusive. The Sudanese army has long struggled to project sustained power across the country’s peripheries. Under Omar al-Bashir, the government relied on Janjaweed militias to help the army fight the rebellion in Darfur. In 2013, many Janjaweed fighters were brought into the newly created RSF.

There is little reason to think a hollowed-out, cash-poor SAF, dependent on volunteer recruits, Islamist militias and Juba Peace Agreement signatory forces, can now succeed where the pre-war state repeatedly struggled: in Darfur, a region roughly the size of France, where the RSF continues to use cross-border supply routes.

Even if the RSF is somehow eventually broken, its weapons and its fighters will not simply disappear. They will pass to whichever political entrepreneur is best positioned to pick them up. Meanwhile, in Khartoum, the questions of the day after will pry open conflicts that the war has, for now, kept closed.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

A top Iranian official says Iran and Oman have agreed on a new temporary route for shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, but insisted that the waterway will not reopen until the United States fulfils its commitments under an interim peace deal signed in June.

The remarks by Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, came on Tuesday, after Iran and Oman’s top diplomats held talks in Tehran to finalise the details of a phased framework for managing the strait.

Iran and Oman, both coastal nations on the strait, have been in on-and-off talks for weeks about controlling traffic through the strategic waterway, which handled one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments before the US-Israel war on Tehran began in February.

Most ⁠shipping in the strait has been shut down since then.

Gharibabadi, speaking on state television, said Iran and Oman had agreed the new route’s entry “would be through our territorial waters, and part of the exit route would also be through our territorial waters”.

The transit corridor would be seven miles (11.3km) wide, he said.

“The agreed-upon transit route with Oman is a temporary route,” he added.

Earlier on Tuesday, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with his Omani counterpart, Badr Albusaidi, in Tehran to discuss the temporary navigation corridor as well as a project to clear mines from the strait, according to a joint statement.

Albusaidi said on X he hoped the countries would “soon announce” the corridor, adding that “future management of the strait and a permanent solution will follow in due course.”

Technical talks are planned to develop a long-term arrangement, including mechanisms for information sharing and navigational and security services, according to the statement.

Mines in Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz became a flashpoint after Tehran responded to the US-Israel war by closing the waterway. It then announced a new shipping route through its territorial waters, bypassing the internationally recognised Traffic Separation Scheme adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1968. Tehran said that route had been mined.

Then in June, when Iran and the US signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to end the war, Oman and the IMO announced a new transit corridor in the Strait of Hormuz – backed by the US – that hugged the Omani coast.

Iran said the so-called southern route violated the MoU and launched attacks on ships using the corridor, resulting in the collapse of the interim deal.

Diplomatic efforts towards a broader peace deal have since stalled, and passage through the strait remains dangerous. An oil tanker was disabled by an unidentified projectile on Tuesday near Oman’s Ash Shishah, close to the strait’s entrance, the United Kingdom’s maritime trade watchdog said.

Gharibabadi, in his comments on Tuesday, said Iran would not consider the strait open despite the agreement with Oman.

He also dismissed a claim by US President Donald Trump that all mines had been cleared from the strait’s international waters, saying it was “only aimed at calming the markets”. He warned that US mine-detection vessels would become “very good targets” if they entered the area.

Gharibabadi insisted the US must fulfil its commitments under the MoU – including sanctions relief and the release of frozen Iranian assets – if it wants a return to the diplomatic track.

He also urged countries to resist US pressure over sanctions on Iran.

Trump had announced last week the “most crushing economic operation ever” against Iran, and threatened sanctions against any country that does business with it.

“We are urging countries not to succumb to American pressure regarding the sanctions that Washington wants to impose on us,” Gharibabadi said, adding that Washington was “mistaken about its ability to enforce its sanctions against our neighbours”.

He said an earlier US sanctions campaign under Trump had failed to achieve its goals and predicted new measures would meet the same fate.

“The new American sanctions are doomed to failure, and we have our own methods to counter them,” he added.

Trump says all mines have been cleared from Strait of Hormuz’s international waters and that Tehran received warnings that ships laying new mines will be ‘destroyed’.

Sudan’s war is showing signs of a changing dynamic. Sudanese armed forces (SAF) have made a series of gains in North Kordofan state; the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is facing a new wave of defections; and army chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is opening a political track while insisting the military campaign will continue.

Army advances are putting pressure on RSF supply lines; defections are raising questions about the force’s cohesion; and al-Burhan, who also heads the Transitional Sovereignty Council, is seeking to shape a political process from a position strengthened by developments on the battlefield.

But the wider battlefield remains contested. Together, the military pressure, defections and political outreach point to a potentially important shift: battlefield developments may be starting to affect the political balance.

What has the army gained?

The clearest recent gains have come in North Kordofan, a state in central Sudan that links the capital, Khartoum, with the country’s western regions.

In late July, the army announced that it had retaken Bara, Jabra al-Sheikh and Umm Sayala, along with other positions in the state. Al Jazeera reported that the advances also secured the national Exports Road, a key route linking Khartoum, through Omdurman, with el-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan.

The gains do not amount to control of the wider Kordofan region. But they have significance beyond the territory captured.

The army’s control of the Exports Road has strengthened its position in North Kordofan and added pressure on RSF supply lines. Al Jazeera reported on August 21 that the army was continuing efforts to cut those supply lines as fighting expanded across Kordofan, Darfur and the Blue Nile region.

What do the RSF defections mean?

The battlefield pressure has coincided with a marked increase in defections from the RSF.

On August 20, the army announced that about 318 people, including four officers, had joined its ranks, arriving in Northern state in about 50 combat vehicles before moving to Omdurman. Al Jazeera also reported separate groups from Kordofan and Khartoum, including 270 people, among them 21 field commanders, as well as 45 fighters and commanders from the Bara area who surrendered to the army.

The numbers alone do not tell the story. The timing does.

Al Jazeera’s August 21 analysis links the growing defections to several factors, including battlefield developments, internal problems within the RSF, social and tribal dynamics, and pressure created by the army’s advances and efforts to disrupt RSF supply lines. It also notes that the trend does not by itself mean the RSF is collapsing.

If the trend continues, it could become increasingly significant, particularly if more commanders and fighters conclude that the battlefield balance is shifting against the RSF.

For now, the more cautious conclusion is that battlefield pressure may be affecting the RSF’s cohesion without yet amounting to a broader breakdown of the organisation.

Why is al-Burhan opening a political track?

The SAF chief’s political initiative is unfolding alongside these military developments.

On August 15, he announced that the state would provide temporary immunity and legal, political and security guarantees to participants in a national dialogue managed by an independent national mechanism. Criminal proceedings against participants facing charges would be suspended during their involvement in the dialogue, without removing the rights of those who had filed complaints.

Al-Burhan said the initiative came from a group of Sudanese who had approached him with a proposal for dialogue. He said the group would independently manage the process and that the state would not determine its agenda or outcomes. He also said he had begun engaging with national forces that had supported the state and its institutions, with the aim of involving them in completing state institutions, including a legislative council.

But this is not a move away from the war.

Al-Burhan said he would not accept what he called a “peace without substance” that would bring RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, and his supporters to power. He also said the path to peace begins with the RSF leaving cities and being gathered in designated areas.

On August 21, Al Jazeera reported that al-Burhan said the fighting would continue until what he described as the rebellion was ended, while the army was working to cut RSF supply lines. He also rejected a truce that would allow the RSF to reorganise, while saying he remained open to a just peace and national dialogue that excluded the RSF.

Al-Burhan is therefore not choosing between war and politics. He is pursuing both, maintaining military pressure while opening a political process he says should preserve the state and its institutions.

What does Malik Agar’s position reveal?

Malik Agar, deputy chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, has made the government’s position even clearer.

In an interview with Al Jazeera on August 22, Agar said the current option was military resolution unless serious conditions for negotiations emerged. He said the RSF would have to withdraw from cities and residential areas before negotiations could begin, stressing that the government remained open to initiatives that preserve Sudan’s unity and state institutions.

In a separate Al Jazeera interview published on August 23, Agar said the army would win but that the war would ultimately end through negotiations.

He argued that Sudan’s crisis was rooted in deeper problems, including the weakness of the state and the failure of political elites to manage the country’s ethnic, cultural, religious and geographic diversity.

His position reflects the government’s broader calculation: maintain military pressure while leaving the door open to negotiations from a stronger position on the battlefield.

Can al-Burhan turn battlefield pressure into political leverage?

The army’s gains in North Kordofan have strengthened its position along a strategically important route. The growing defections from the RSF are raising questions about the force’s cohesion. At the same time, the RSF remains active on several fronts, and the wider battlefield remains contested.

That combination gives the recent developments significance beyond individual battles or defections. The changing military balance may now be beginning to shape the terms of Sudan’s next political phase.

For al-Burhan, the potential advantage is not simply territorial. If military pressure continues to produce defections and weaken RSF cohesion, it could give the SAF greater room to shape who participates in a political process and the conditions under which future negotiations take place.

For the RSF, the challenge is therefore not only to hold territory. It is to prevent battlefield pressure from becoming an internal crisis of cohesion.

That has not happened yet. Military setbacks do not automatically translate into political marginalisation.

The army’s recent gains are best understood not as evidence of a decisive victory, but as a shift in the conditions under which the next phase of the war may be fought, and eventually negotiated.

Can the RSF contain the defections and preserve its bargaining position, or will continued military pressure give al-Burhan greater leverage in Sudan’s next political phase?