Middle East

A deal between the US and Iran could be signed within 48 hours, according to US officials. The agreement would reportedly focus on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and could mark a first step towards broader negotiations.

Al Jazeera’s Marah Ryan has the latest.

Egyptian football star Mohamed Salah has been greeted by hundreds of fans upon arriving in Istanbul wearing Trabzonspor’s burgundy-and-blue kit ahead of his expected move to the Turkish Super Lig club.

Ex-Liverpool star Mohamed Salah arrived in Istanbul on Wednesday to complete his move to Turkiye club Trabzonspor.

Mohamed Salah arrived at an Istanbul airport on Wednesday, smiling and wearing Trabzonspor’s burgundy and blue kit before his expected move to ⁠the Turkish top-tier side, as hundreds of fans jostled to get a glimpse of the Egyptian forward.

Trabzonspor announced a day earlier they were in negotiations with Salah, who left Liverpool at the end of last season, and club chairman Ertugrul ⁠Dogan said they expected to sign the 34-year-old on a free transfer at a ceremony in the Black Sea city on Thursday.

“Trabzon, are you ready? I can hear you. See you very soon,” Salah said in a video posted by the club on X.

“Everywhere is Trabzon to us,” he added, referring to the club’s motto while wearing a Trabzonspor ‌kit.

Upon arriving at Ataturk Airport, Salah was met by hundreds of fans. He waved at supporters and initiated a traditional chant with them, before departing for a medical check and a later planned flight east to Trabzon.

Salah spent nine years at Liverpool, scoring 257 goals in 442 appearances and winning the Premier League twice and the Champions League once.

In the 2024-25 season, Salah scored 29 Premier League goals and provided 18 ⁠assists, equalling the league record for most goal involvements in a single ⁠season and setting the record for a 38-game campaign.

He was named Premier League Player of the Season and won the Golden Boot and the Playmaker Award, becoming the first player to take all three in one campaign.

His output waned last season, with ⁠seven goals and seven assists in 27 league matches, and he was left on the bench in Champions League games, leading to a public ⁠spat with Liverpool’s then-manager Arne Slot.

Salah started his career in Europe ⁠at Swiss side Basel in 2012 and later joined Chelsea. He also had brief stints at Fiorentina and AS Roma between 2015 and 2017 before joining Liverpool.

Trabzonspor – generally considered to be the fourth biggest team in Turkiye after Istanbul sides Fenerbahce, Galatasaray, ‌and Besiktas – finished third in the Super Lig last season and will enter the Europa League playoff round. The club’s last league championship was in the 2021-22 season.

Salah had been close to joining Besiktas, ‌but ‌negotiations had stalled over financial and image-rights demands, according to local media.

Details of the contract Salah is expected to sign have not been disclosed yet.

Every Palestinian born in the West Bank before the start of the occupation in 1967 has witnessed the extent to which Israel has transformed the landscape through spatial planning, military closures, and settlement, infrastructure and road construction. Sixty years on, what used to be a straightforward journey from point A to point B within the West Bank has become an arduous and frequently hazardous undertaking.

As a foreigner living in the West Bank in the 1980s and visiting it off and on ever since, this transformation revealed itself in incremental leaps and bounds, on each occasion provoking a shock of recognition mixed with consternation at how things looked the same but different.

I remember driving from Jerusalem to Ramallah in the 1980s, for example. The two cities were linked by a single highway with an Israeli army checkpoint at Qalandia refugee camp. To get to my destination would take me from 20 minutes to half an hour, at most, depending on traffic and the mood of the soldiers that day.

Fast forward to 2000. I had not visited for several years on the day I took my rental car along the old road out of Jerusalem. Ten minutes into my journey and not having taken any turns, I suddenly found myself inside an Israeli settlement, a suburb of occupied East Jerusalem.

Backtracking, I discovered that the way to Ramallah now required leaving the main highway for a lesser road. I proceeded. Yet before another 10 minutes had passed, I ended up at the entrance to another Israeli settlement, this time in the occupied West Bank, having again missed the relevant exit.

Looking back at those days, I now remember such unexpected forced deviations as annoyances that barely consumed additional time. Today, by contrast, travelling from Jerusalem to Ramallah can take an hour, or hours, as the army slows down or holds up traffic at all the available access points to Ramallah at will.

For Palestinians, the experience is 10 times worse. Ever growing in number and impact, Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement have come in various types. One class includes army checkpoints, both stationary and mobile, on West Bank arteries, makeshift earthen embankments blocking roads to villages and refugee camps, and steel gates that the army can close and open via remote control.

A second category involves access to occupied East Jerusalem and Israel, which is possible only by obtaining a permit from the military authorities. This affects Palestinians wishing to visit Islam’s and Christianity’s holy sites as well as those employed inside Israel.

And a third category of restrictions concerns West Bank Palestinians’ ability to travel abroad via the Allenby Bridge border crossing with Jordan.

Movement restrictions intensified after the October 2023 Hamas attacks on southern Israel. Their cumulative impact has been to fragment Palestinian society and the way it functions. They have disrupted the economy, in particular.

A combination of military no-go zones and settler violence has made the 61 percent of the West Bank that constitutes Area C, where most agricultural lands are located, increasingly inaccessible.

Curbs on movement have affected trade, raising the cost of commerce when transport is delayed at checkpoints and perishable goods spoil.

Imports and exports also face impediments, harming a Palestinian economy that is heavily dependent on trade with Israel and the outside world (representing roughly 67 percent of its GDP).

Restricted hours at Allenby and an untransparent, elastic definition of “dual-use” goods cause costly delays for imports, stymying development. Traders’ inability to meet their Israeli counterparts in person forces them to use intermediaries at additional expense.

Movement restrictions have created their own self-perpetuating cat-and-mouse dynamic as Palestinians find ways to circumvent them and the army imposes additional curbs, forcing people to pursue evermore inventive bypass tactics. But their clever manoeuvring may carry additional costs or even risks to their lives.

Take, for example, efforts by Palestinians – desperate to put food on the table – to illegally cross into Israel for work. Some have been shot dead when breaching Israel’s separation barrier while others have been detained.

In the months before October 2023, about 193,000 West Bank and Gaza workers were employed in Israel or Israeli settlements, mainly in construction and agriculture, contributing 20 to 25 percent to the Palestinian GDP.

Israel stopped workers from crossing the Green Line on the heels of the Hamas attack, citing security concerns, even though it has offered no evidence that Palestinian workers employed in Israel in any way played a role in the events of October 2023. Since then, the number of those permitted to go to their Israeli jobs is estimated at a mere 44,000, mostly in skilled professions.

The loss of what may be a family’s primary income has been calamitous, affecting about 750,000 people (based on an average family size of five) in a population of about 3.3 million. Meanwhile, an economic downturn has further swelled the ranks of the West Bank unemployed. Poverty rates have shot up.

Movement restrictions have also disrupted family networks, limiting participation in large gatherings, such as weddings and funerals, as extended families are spread throughout the West Bank. Curbs on movement additionally complicate access to emergency or specialised medical care and even to education. Since October 2023, Palestinian institutions of higher education have reduced in-class teaching as students have faced repeated delays – often of unpredictable length – in coming to school. Online classes can only partially compensate for this disruption.

What purpose do the myriad movement restrictions serve? Palestinians often describe their experience of navigating army checkpoints as a humiliation and a form of harassment, an effort by Israeli soldiers to both show who is boss and make the population’s life difficult. Many Palestinians see in soldiers’ conduct a way of taking revenge for the Hamas attacks.

Yet by increasing the occupation’s severity, checkpoints and other restrictions on Palestinians’ movement could well have the opposite effect of triggering greater violence and thus making Israel and its citizens, including those residing in illegal settlements, not more but less secure.

While the Israeli army might argue that a certain checkpoint at a given location and time is justified on the grounds of maintaining security, in their ubiquity and seeming arbitrariness, these restrictions have, over the years, gone far beyond what could reasonably be termed a security rationale.

A motive other than maintaining security must, therefore, be at play. It is not hard to find one when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has ruled out a two-state solution and champions annexing the occupied West Bank to Israel while some members of his cabinet, like Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, a settler himself, openly espouse policies that would encourage West Bank Palestinians to emigrate.

Whatever the declared policy, the compounding impact of Israel’s movement restrictions has been to break up the West Bank into smaller zones that the Israeli army and intelligence apparatus can more easily penetrate and control. Palestinian politics remains vibrant in these localities (elections to West Bank municipal councils were held most recently this past April) while national politics and governance have eroded, partly as a result of obstacles to movement.

And Israel has been able to suppress, for now, armed resistance to the occupation, which has assumed an increasingly local character. The army made short work of small armed groups like the Lions’ Den, for example. These had emerged five years ago in the northern West Bank, spontaneously and largely uncoordinated between localities.

Yet even as Israel splits Palestinian society into separate enclaves, it has found no effective answer to Palestinians’ enduring aspirations to free themselves from the military occupation. To the contrary, it is sowing the seeds for further resistance through its annexationist agenda and unremittingly punitive actions.

A version of this article appeared first on Al Jazeera Arabic’s website. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Thousands of migrants entered the Spanish city of Ceuta from neighbouring Morocco on July 31, bringing renewed attention to one of Europe’s most unusual borders.

Although Ceuta lies on the northern coast of Africa and is surrounded by Moroccan territory, it is administered by Spain and forms part of the European Union. Together with nearby Melilla, it forms the EU’s only land border with Africa, making both cities recurring flashpoints for migration and diplomatic tensions between Madrid and Rabat.

The latest crossing has once again highlighted border security and irregular migration, but it has also drawn attention to a broader question: why do these small Spanish territories on the African continent continue to generate recurring political crises between Spain and Morocco?

Understanding the latest tensions requires looking at three connected issues: migration pressures, the cities’ legal status, and Morocco’s long-standing claim over their sovereignty.

Why has the crisis resurfaced now?

The latest crossing reflects continued pressure along one of Europe’s most sensitive migration routes. Because Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish territory, entering either city means entering the European Union.

For some migrants travelling through North Africa, the two cities are among the few places where EU territory can be reached by land, making them recurring focal points during periods of increased migration towards Europe.

The timing of the latest surge has also been linked to a recent ruling by Spain’s Supreme Court on the treatment of migrants attempting to reach Ceuta and Melilla by sea. The court ruled that Spain’s “hot return” procedure, which allows certain immediate returns at the border, could not be applied to migrants intercepted at sea while attempting to swim into the enclaves. The judges found that the procedure applies to people who cross physical border barriers, such as fences, rather than those intercepted at sea.

The ruling did not create an automatic right to remain in Spain or legalise irregular entry. However, it was interpreted by some migrants as making immediate return more difficult if they reached Spanish territory by sea. Spanish and Moroccan officials pointed to the ruling as one factor that may have influenced the latest surge, while migration experts also cited broader migration pressures and misinformation circulating among migrants and smuggling networks.

The episode showed how legal decisions affecting border procedures can quickly influence perceptions on one of Europe’s most heavily monitored frontiers.

Migration cooperation has long been closely linked to the wider relationship between Spain and Morocco. Madrid relies heavily on cooperation with Rabat to manage migration routes, while Morocco’s role in controlling movement towards Europe has made border management an important element of its relationship with both Spain and the EU.

That dynamic became particularly clear in 2021, when thousands of migrants entered Ceuta during a period of heightened tensions after Spain allowed Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front, to receive medical treatment in Spain.

The Polisario Front seeks independence for Western Sahara, which Morocco considers part of its territory and which has its final status unresolved under a United Nations-led political process. Rabat viewed Spain’s decision to host Ghali as a diplomatic setback, while Madrid said the decision was based on humanitarian grounds.

Spain accused Morocco of easing border controls during the crisis, while Moroccan officials rejected the suggestion that Morocco should act as Europe’s border guard. The episode demonstrated how migration cooperation can become entangled with broader political disputes between the two countries.

What is the legal status of Ceuta and Melilla?

Under the current international legal framework, Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish territories under Spain’s sovereignty. Spain exercises full administrative and governmental authority over the two cities, and they are represented in Spain’s political system and form part of the EU.

They are not listed by the UN as Non-Self-Governing Territories, a category that applies to territories whose people have not yet exercised the right to self-determination through decolonisation. Because Ceuta and Melilla are not on that list, they are not part of a UN decolonisation process.

There has also been no international court ruling or UN decision determining sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla. The dispute remains a political disagreement between Spain and Morocco rather than a sovereignty dispute currently being adjudicated through an international legal process.

This is one of the key differences between Ceuta and Melilla and Western Sahara. Western Sahara remains on the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories and is the subject of a separate UN-backed political process over its future status, while Ceuta and Melilla are treated internationally as territories under Spanish sovereignty.

This is the basis of Madrid’s position that the sovereignty question is settled. Spain argues that the two cities are not colonial possessions but fully integrated parts of the Spanish state, governed under Spanish law and protected as Spanish territory.

Morocco disputes that interpretation, arguing that the cities’ location on the African continent and their historical connection to North Africa mean they should be viewed differently from other Spanish cities.

Why does Morocco continue to claim the two cities?

The dispute is rooted in the long history of the western Mediterranean.

The Strait of Gibraltar has historically connected Europe and Africa rather than separating them. Armies, merchants, cultures and religions moved across it for centuries.

During the medieval period, Muslim dynasties based in present-day Morocco, including the Almoravids and Almohads, ruled large parts of the Iberian Peninsula. Their influence remains visible today in Spain’s architecture, language and cultural heritage.

Later, Portugal and Spain established footholds along the North African coast as European powers expanded their influence overseas.

Portugal captured Ceuta in 1415. After the Iberian Union between Spain and Portugal ended in 1640, Ceuta remained under Spanish rule. Spain has administered the city ever since.

Melilla has been under Spanish control since 1497.

Spain points to this long history of administration, together with citizenship and constitutional integration, as evidence that the two cities are fully part of Spain.

Morocco views the same history through a different lens, arguing that European-controlled territories on the African mainland remain a historical legacy of European expansion.

Why do the cities matter beyond Spain and Morocco?

The importance of Ceuta and Melilla extends far beyond their size.

For Spain, the cities are sovereign territory and a direct extension of the Spanish state into North Africa.

For the European Union, they represent its only land borders with Africa and are therefore central to debates over migration, border security and cooperation with neighbouring countries.

For Morocco, the cities remain linked to a broader question of territorial sovereignty, even as Rabat maintains close cooperation with Spain on migration, trade and security.

This combination of interests means that developments in Ceuta and Melilla can quickly become issues of regional significance.

Could the dispute be resolved?

There is little indication that either Spain or Morocco is seeking to reopen formal negotiations over sovereignty.

Spain maintains that Ceuta and Melilla are integral parts of the country and that their status is not negotiable.

Morocco continues to maintain its claim, but in recent years has generally prioritised practical cooperation with Spain over direct confrontation on the issue.

As a result, the dispute tends to reappear indirectly during periods of political tension, diplomatic disagreements or increased migration pressure.

What does the latest crossing reveal?

The immediate challenge remains humanitarian: managing migration while protecting the rights and safety of people attempting to reach Europe.

But the events in Ceuta also show why the city repeatedly returns to international headlines. Migration may trigger the immediate crisis, but the response is shaped by border policy, Spain-Morocco relations, legal developments and a sovereignty dispute that continues to influence relations between the two countries.

Ceuta and Melilla remain unusual because they are geographically part of Africa but politically part of Europe. As long as migration pressures and sovereignty disputes persist, they are likely to remain among the Mediterranean’s most sensitive border flashpoints.

Iran says talks with Oman are proceeding ‘positively’ as US officials say a deal could be possible soon.

Charity warns that shrinking humanitarian support could threaten efforts to support communities trying to rebuild lives after 1,200 days of conflict.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has called for greater international support for Sudan, saying humanitarian needs are escalating while funding falls far short.

“Sudan is one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises, yet it is also one of its most overlooked” IFRC Special Envoy for Sudan, Derk Segaar, told reporters in Geneva after returning from the Sudan.

Sudan plunged into all-out war in April 2023 between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese military, leading to the deaths of at least 59,000 people, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, a conflict monitoring group.

Aid groups say the figure is an undercount and the true number could be many times higher.

Segaar said while some aid is trickling into Kordofan and Darfur regions, the whole of Sudan has been devastated by the war, including Khartoum, where millions lack reliable electricity, clean water and healthcare, as cholera, malnutrition and floods pose additional risks.

He said 35 million people require humanitarian assistance, more than 9 million are internally displaced, and fighting has driven 4.5 million people out of Sudan.

Fighting

Speaking before a gathering of soldiers, Sudanese Army Lieutenant-General Yasser al-Atta on Monday said the military is advancing on all fronts with the aim of eliminating the RSF before the end of the year.

The location of the gathering was not specified.

“We are implementing the theory of advancing in all directions, with all fronts moving simultaneously, as happened during the recapture of Khartoum state,” al-Atta said.

“Before the end of this year, there will not be a single Janjaweed fighter,” he said, using a term to refer to the RSF, “or a foreign fighter, and we are determined to achieve that”.

Al-Atta’s remarks came days after the army and allied forces carried out a rapid operation in which they seized Bara, Jabra al-Sheikh, Um Sayala and other positions along a key road connecting Omdurman with el-Obeid in North Kordofan.

Sudan’s three Kordofan states – North, West and South – have witnessed continued fighting between the army and the RSF since October 2025.

Diplomacy

Meanwhile, the United Nations is ramping up efforts to get the stalled political process on track.

The UN says representatives from five international organisations, including the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the European Union and the League of Arab States held talks with Sudanese political parties on Monday.

“Building on exploratory consultations held in Addis Ababa in June, the Quintet engaged Sudanese civilian political leaders in recent days. Discussions continued on proposals and perspectives for advancing the political process, including through the establishment of confidence-building measures,” said UN deputy spokesman Farhan Haq.

The UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Sudan, Pekka Haavisto, is also talking with RSF leader General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo to discuss reducing escalation.

As Israel gears up to hold elections in October, a dramatic surge in settlement activity has heightened concerns that the settler movement is stepping up efforts to cement its grip on the occupied West Bank, in stark defiance of international law.

Last week, the United Nations warned that attacks by Israeli settlers – often carried out alongside Israeli forces – and the creation of illegal settlements and outposts had hit “an all-time high”.

The uptick comes as members of Israel’s hard right seek to ratchet up the political temperature ahead of the crucial polls. It also follows a parliamentary term during which Israel moved to entrench control over the West Bank deeper within the machinery of the state, shifting authority from military administration to civilian institutions, accelerating settlement planning and expanding infrastructure.

However, the Religious Zionist Party of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich – the man widely credited as pushing the settler project to the forefront of Israeli political debate – is suggested by numerous opinion polls to be far from certain to even meet the electoral threshold for the post-election Knesset.

This has prompted what analysts describe as a desperate scramble to promote the settlement mission while consolidating the support of the settler minority that Smotrich grew up within.

Speaking at a meeting of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud Party in late July, Israel’s Defence Minister Israel Katz boasted that, under the governing coalition and Smotrich’s supervision, Israel had approved the establishment of 104 illegal settlements and some 160 settlement farms in the West Bank since coming to power in 2022, according to Israeli media.

In August of last year, Smotrich announced the creation of the E1 settlement project, linking occupied East Jerusalem with the existing settlement of Maale Adumim, located several kilometres to the east – a proposal which, Smotrich bragged, “buries the idea of a Palestinian state”.

The race to settle

Smotrich, who made increased administrative control over the West Bank a condition for supporting Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition in 2022, has undertaken a series of measures to expand the influence of settlers within policymaking.

In 2023, he established his influential Settlements Administration agency within the Ministry of Defence – which oversees the West Bank’s occupation. And last month, he legally embedded the agency within the ministry, making it harder to reverse any of the decisions taken under its watch.

Israeli political analyst Nimrod Flaschenberg said it is “hard to imagine” that Netanyahu “won’t come up with some kind of imaginative ploy to keep him and the far right on the ticket”, referring to Smotrich.

“He has very strong support within the settlements and the ideological far-right,” Flaschenberg added, “but that might not be enough in and of itself to get him securely past the threshold. He’s being squeezed between the populism of [far-right Israeli National Security Minister Itamar] Ben-Gvir and what many people in the lower middle class see as the security of Netanyahu.”

Keeping the hard right

Allied to Smotrich is a prime minister who observers describe as facing not simply an electoral battle, but an existential battle for both his freedom – as a consequence of his long-running corruption trial – and legacy, should the independent inquiry into his failings ahead of the Hamas-led attack of 2023 go ahead.

Given the stakes, some analysts have suggested the incumbent was far from ready to gamble on losing the support of Israel’s hard right and settler movement by condemning the increasing levels of violence in the West Bank.

“We saw him come out on US TV and concede that there may have been a few incidents in the West Bank, but nothing serious,” Chatham House’s Yossi Mekelberg said of Netanyahu’s response to the widespread violence that has swept the West Bank in recent weeks.

“He needs the hard right and settlers’ support, if not for him individually, then at least for his bloc.”

While Netanyahu may feel he has room to manoeuvre over the hugely controversial issue of ultra-Orthodox conscription, no such margin existed within the hard right and settlers. Ultra-Orthodox parties, a key component in the 2022 coalition government, have made the exemption of their constituents from the draft – which almost all Israeli adults are eligible for – a pillar of their political campaigning in recent years.

“Netanyahu knows that the ultra-Orthodox will likely stay with him,” added Mekelberg. “The settlers are more binary. You’re either for them or against,” he said.

Cresting the wave

Irrespective of electoral tactics, the consequences for people living in the occupied West Bank have been catastrophic. In July alone, according to the Palestinian Authority’s Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, there were 2,256 attacks against Palestinians and their property: 1,458 by the Israeli army and 798 by settlers.

After Yair Golan, leader of the opposition Democrats party, offered a rare criticism of the settler “extremism” which triggered the latest round of violence, Katz accused him of spreading a “blood libel”.

According to leaks of the same meeting in Hebrew-language media, other ministers present called for a harsher response to any resistance from Palestinians, and for the military to be given even greater freedom to shoot at them.

“As the election gets closer, we’re seeing an even greater increase in the violence that’s been escalating ever since October 2023,” said Yair Dvir, of the Israeli rights group B’Tselem.

“It’s important to add this isn’t just the scale of the violence, but also its brutality and the participation of the Israeli state – both the soldiers and the political support they’re receiving.”

More than 100 Palestinians whose bodies were trapped beneath rubble for nearly three years have been laid to rest in Gaza City, in one of the largest mass funerals held in the enclave since Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza began.

Thousands of people gathered on Tuesday to bury the remains of 112 members of the Abu Sharia and al-Hasayna families after rescue teams recovered their bodies from the site of a November 2023 Israeli attack in the Sabra neighbourhood.

According to Palestinian officials, the November 22, 2023 attack killed 308 members of the two families, including 40 children, 30 women and seven people with disabilities.

Rescue teams recently recovered more than 100 bodies from the site, allowing families to hold funeral prayers and burials. Palestinian authorities say about 157 people remain missing, either still beneath the rubble or otherwise unaccounted for.

Rows of coffins draped in Palestinian flags were carried through Gaza City as mourners gathered for the funeral. Large banners bearing photographs of the victims were displayed alongside calls for an end to Israel’s war on Gaza that began in October 2023.

‘Exceptional and painful scene’

The Palestinian Civil Defence in Gaza described the funeral as one of the largest held in the territory during the war, with spokesman Mahmoud Basal posting on X that Gaza was “set for an exceptional and painful scene”.

He said the funeral procession reflected the scale of the human losses suffered by Palestinian families who have waited years to bury their relatives.

The funeral also prompted an outpouring of grief from Palestinian researchers, activists and human rights advocates, many of whom said it symbolised the suffering of families still waiting to recover loved ones buried beneath the rubble.

Mustafa Barghouti, secretary-general of the Palestinian National Initiative, described the funeral as potentially being “the largest funeral in Palestinian history”.

Palestinian researcher Mahmoud Hamed al-Aila said Gaza was “extracting the bodies of its children from under the rubble after years of genocide”.

“What heart can bear this pain?” he asked.

Activist Mohammed Haniyah said dozens of other bodies have decomposed or are still missing under the rubble.

Another activist, Ali Abo Rezeq, said the procession turned “massacre statistics into coffins and shrouds”, highlighting that some families searched through the rubble with their bare hands because of the shortages of heavy equipment.

Online bloggers, including Malik Al-Shanbari and Khaled Safi, viewed the funeral not merely as a burial ceremony, but as a “renewed testament to the scale of the tragedy left behind by the war”.

Ramy Abdu, chairman of the Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, said around 200 members of the Abu Sharia family are still believed to be beneath the rubble, and that their remains may have decomposed.

The funeral also highlighted the fate of thousands of other Palestinian families who are still waiting to recover the remains of their relatives believed to be missing beneath the rubble across Gaza.

The funeral was held amid ongoing Israeli violations of a “ceasefire” agreement in October. As of Monday, continued Israeli strikes have killed at least 1,250 Palestinians and injured 4,110 others.

The so-called ceasefire deal was signed after more than two years of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, which has killed at least 73,375 Palestinians and wounded at least 174,220, most of them women and children.

About 90 percent of Gaza’s infrastructure has also been damaged or destroyed during the genocide.

Meanwhile, the Assembly of Palestinian Clans and Families called on the Western-backed Board of Peace to accelerate efforts to recover bodies still trapped beneath the rubble, clear the debris and support the reconstruction of Gaza.

It said the burial of 112 Palestinians may have marked the end of the long wait for some families, but it did not end the search for thousands of others still missing.

Thousands of Palestinians have taken part in a mass funeral in Gaza City for 112 members of the Hassayna and Abu Sharia families, whose remains were recently recovered from beneath the rubble nearly three years after an Israeli air raid.

Mourners gathered on Tuesday as bodies wrapped in Palestinian flags were carried through the streets of the besieged city before burial, in what local media described as one of the largest funerals since Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza began in October 2023.

Gaza’s civil defence said its crews spent two weeks excavating a destroyed residential building in the Sabra neighbourhood, eventually retrieving the remains of 112 people, including at least 40 children.

The families were killed in an Israeli strike in November 2023 that flattened their homes.

Relatives used the funeral to renew accusations that Israel committed war crimes in Gaza and demanded international investigations into the attack and the hundreds of bodies still believed to be buried under rubble across the territory.

Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, Lebanon – Every year on August 4 since 2020, families of the victims of a massive explosion at Beirut port gather outside the site of what was one of the largest non-nuclear blasts in modern history.

They continue to press Lebanese authorities for justice and accountability for the explosion of ammonium nitrate that was unsafely stored with highly inflammable materials.

Yet there has been none, despite a change in leadership that promised to support an independent judiciary into the blast that killed more than 200 people.

This year I couldn’t attend the commemorations because I was covering another tragedy – only the latest to devastate Lebanon.

I was in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh, a small town in southern Lebanon that lies in ruins after weeks of Israeli air attacks, shelling and at times deliberate demolitions of people’s homes amid fighting with the Lebanese group Hezbollah.

Residents are trying to start again – but they can’t.

Israel and Hezbollah have been fighting since October 2023, with different levels of intensity, but the former has twice escalated the conflict – first in September 2024 and then in early March this year, after the start of the US-Israel war on Iran.

People in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh had not recovered from the first escalation before they found themselves escaping bombing and displaced yet again.

The majority of houses in the town are so badly damaged they are uninhabitable.

I watched a man in his 80s cry as he showed me the mountain of concrete that used to be his home. “I feel humiliated,” he said. “I have no choice but to collect the scrap metal from my destroyed home to sell in order to be able to survive.”

In 2019, Lebanon’s economy, local currency and the banking sector all but collapsed, leaving people unable to access their savings. And little if anything has been done by the political class to carry out required financial reforms to bring in much-needed international funds.

The reconstruction bill for the latest escalation is in the billions of dollars. Officials do not have an exact figure but say it could climb to $20bn.

It might be a conservative estimate. I have been visiting villages across southern Lebanon since the reduction in violence a few weeks ago. The devastation is unprecedented. Basic services are no longer available. In some areas, there are no telecommunication networks.

And then there are the dozens of villages that we cannot access because they are occupied by the Israeli military.

There, homes continue to be demolished, water facilities destroyed, and agricultural land and olive groves torched. The deliberate destruction continues regardless of what is supposed to be a ceasefire, a framework agreement with Lebanon and condemnations by Lebanese officials who took the controversial and divisive decision to engage in direct talks with Israel.

Reconstruction as a card

When hostilities escalated in March this year, reconstruction from the previous round of fighting in 2024 had not even begun. Then, the World Bank estimated losses at $11bn – money the nearly bankrupt Lebanese government did not have.

Then, like now, there was no offer to help by international donors. Reconstruction aid was and continues to be used as leverage to force the disarmament of Hezbollah.

It was not just the lack of funds.

During the 15 months following a November 2024 ceasefire and the latest escalation, the Israeli military maintained pressure by systematically targeting all recovery and rebuilding efforts in southern Lebanon.

They bombed heavy machinery and construction equipment, destroyed factories and prefabricated house units, and attacked workers clearing rubble to prevent displaced residents from returning. Nearly 100,000 people were already displaced before this year’s war that forced more than a million people from their homes.

More destruction

On the sixth anniversary of the port blast, Lebanon has had to face more destruction.

I remember writing the same words last year, on the fifth anniversary. Like in 2025, this year’s destruction came from outside the country – from Israel. Areas where Hezbollah has influence remain covered in rubble following Israel’s attacks.

Yet again, there is a need to rebuild. Yet again, many Lebanese have to pick up the pieces of their lives on their own.

While they try, they live in fear. In the front-line town of al-Mansouri, we met the head of the municipality, Haidar Mudayhi, who told us not to approach the hills around the town’s centre.

“The Israelis drop stun grenades every time someone tries to reach those areas … every day there is machinegun fire around the village … the other day there were air strikes in the hills … there is no stability,” he said.

It is a story we hear time and time again in villages north of the occupation zone.

The relative calm is fragile. No agreement exists that guarantees Israel and Hezbollah will not go to war again.

Israel acts as if there is no ceasefire, while the signed agreement between Lebanon and Israel, which the United States has called “historic”, does not include a commitment or a timeline for an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

Just over one month into the war on Iran, US President Donald Trump made an apocalyptic threat that raised the alarm in Washington and Middle Eastern capitals alike, attached to a tight deadline.

If Iran didn’t immediately reopen the critical Strait of Hormuz, Trump warned on April 7, “a whole civilisation will die tonight, never to be brought back again”.

Tehran didn’t blink. And with two hours to the deadline, Trump walked back the threat and instead announced a two-week ceasefire, brokered by Islamabad.

Since then, the US president has repeated this pattern multiple times. It goes like this: Trump ups the ante, shaking up the markets, and then dials it back down at the 11th hour, apparently hoping this strategy will influence negotiations.

On Monday, Trump again insisted that negotiations were close to ending the war – and, yet again, gave “duplicitous” Iran “one last chance” to make a deal or suffer catastrophic strikes.

For its part, Tehran denies any ongoing talks with the US, saying it is only talking to Oman about how to manage the Hormuz strait, the closure of which has caused oil prices to soar amid havoc in energy markets around the world.

The war is now in its 23rd week, with no end to hostilities in sight, and both Washington and Tehran are more entangled than before, with additional variables in the conflict that could determine its direction.

So, how many times has Trump given Iran “one last chance” to make a deal or suffer the consequences, before walking his threat back? And how many times have we heard from the US president that a deal is just around the corner?

The times Trump threatened heavy attacks – before backing down

There have been several times since February 28, when the US and Israel launched their first joint attacks on Iran, that Trump has threatened an attack but did not follow through.

March

Less than a month into the war, Trump threatened Tehran over its closure of the Strait of Hormuz, saying the US would strike Iran’s power plants if the critical waterway was not reopened. Two days later, he postponed the strikes for five days, citing “progress” in talks.

As the delayed deadline neared on March 26, Trump delayed the strikes again, this time for 10 days, claiming that Tehran requested it.

April

Then came the April 7 threat that a whole “civilisation will die”, before Trump called off those strikes and announced a two-week ceasefire, to give Iran a chance to reach a peace deal.

No deal emerged. And then, after threatening to strike Iran “harder”, and in the final hours of the ceasefire, on April 21, Trump announced an indefinite ceasefire, saying Pakistani mediators had asked him to do so.

May

With those talks making no progress, Trump returned to his threats to strike Iran on May 17, saying “nothing will be left” of Iran if Tehran did not make a deal with the US.

But the next day, Trump again told reporters that he had decided to “put it off for a little while, hopefully maybe forever, but possibly for a little while, because we’ve had very big discussions with Iran”.

By May 27, US strikes were back on after negotiations faltered, once again.

June

On June 11, after two days of back-and-forth strikes, Trump threatened the US would take “total control” of Iran’s oil and gas industries. But then, a few hours later, he posted on social media, claiming there had been a breakthrough in negotiations and called off the attacks.

On June 17, the US and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), announcing a ceasefire and a 60-day period to complete negotiations for a lasting peace. Within days, that had fallen apart over the glaring gaps in the two sides’ positions over the contents of the MoU, triggered mainly by who had control of the Strait of Hormuz – and both sides returned to tit-for-tat, widening strikes.

July-August

On July 27, Trump halted the strikes, claiming the “perimeters of a deal” had been agreed to, but noting that Washington “is locked and loaded and ready to go against the Islamic Republic of Iran, at levels of Military Terror, Strength, and Power not seen since World War II”.

On Monday this week, Trump told reporters again that negotiations were close to ending the war and that this was Iran’s “last chance before decapitation”. The US has not followed up on this latest threat yet.

Iran denies it is talking to the US, although it may be holding indirect talks via mediators, analysts say.

The times Trump said Iran peace deal was imminent

Trump has insisted that Iran is “desperate” to cut a deal, or that a deal is imminent, multiple times since the start of the war.

March

Two days after launching the first attacks on Tehran on February 28, which the US initially appeared to believe would be a quick operation, Trump seemingly conceded it might take a bit longer when he said at the White House: “We projected four to five weeks [to end Iran war], but we can go far longer than that.”

The US president changed tack again on March 9, when he told CBS that “the war is very complete, pretty much”, and that the US military operation was “way ahead of schedule”.

Later the same day, he shifted his stance again, saying the war is “both complete and just beginning”. And later that day again, he said: “We’ve already won in many ways, but we haven’t won enough.”

On March 23, Trump told reporters outside Air Force One that “major points of agreement, I would say – almost all points of agreement” had been reached with Iran. Tehran was denying that it was party to negotiations at this point.

Two days after that, Trump repeated that Iran wanted to “make a deal so badly”. The next day, he also told a cabinet meeting that Iran was “begging to make a deal”.

April

On April 7, Trump said, again, that Washington was “very close to a deal” with Iran, before threatening to blow up a “whole civilisation”, but then walked back on that to announce a ceasefire the next day.

Over the following days, throughout April, Trump reiterated that the war was, in fact, pretty much over. But it continued.

Trump repeatedly claimed on separate occasions that Iran had “agreed to everything”, that “I think we will get a deal in the next day or two”, and that “I don’t think there’s too many significant differences” between the US and Iranian positions.

May

On May 23, Trump said the administration was “getting a lot closer” to a deal, which was “largely negotiated, [and] subject to finalisation”.

June

On June 8, Trump called for “total victory” in the next two weeks and claimed Iran was “willing to give us everything”. Still, no peace deal has materialised and the conflict began again in July.

August

On Monday this week, Trump again told reporters that Iran was “desperate” for a deal and warned Tehran it had “one last chance” before “decapitation” to make an agreement. Iran denies it is even holding talks with the US, saying that it is only speaking with Oman about management of the Strait of Hormuz.

Netanyahu and board director Maldenov meet amid tensions over Gaza disarmament roadmap and recent Israeli attacks.

The US-led Board of Peace has said that an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will only take place after the disarmament of Hamas is complete, following a meeting between the body’s director, Nickolay Mladenov, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The meeting on Monday in West Jerusalem came as Israeli politicians signalled their displeasure with the deal, announced by US President Donald Trump last Thursday.

“Contrary to inaccurate reports, we note that the withdrawal of the [Israeli military] beyond the Yellow Line will take place only once decommissioning is complete, as Hamas committed to the mediators,” the Board of Peace, established by Trump in January to oversee the administration of Gaza after Israel’s genocidal war, said. “This applies to light weapons, heavy weapons, and the tunnels alike.”

The “Yellow Line” is the term used to refer to the demarcation line behind which Israeli forces continue to base themselves in Gaza.

“The goal is clear and is not in question: the complete decommissioning of weapons in the Strip and the transition away from rule by the gun to civilian governance,” the Board of Peace added in a social media post after the meeting.

For its part, Hamas has insisted that the deal will not be implemented unless Israel implements its part of the agreement.

During the talks, Mladenov urged Netanyahu to stop attacks on Gaza, two people familiar with the meeting told The Associated Press news agency. Israel has steadfastly refused to do so, despite an October 2025 “ceasefire”, since which it has killed more than 1,200 Palestinians, including more than 36 after the disarmament deal was announced.

Israel has killed more than 73,000 Palestinians in Gaza since its genocidal war began in October 2023.

Before the meeting, Netanyahu’s office said that the version of the agreement made public “does not reflect Israel’s positions”, and that its concerns had been shared with the US.

Members of the Israeli prime minister’s far-right government have already signalled that they want to backtrack on the deal.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said the agreement was “completely different” to the one the Israeli government had approved, and demanded a new vote “immediately”.

Israel has repeatedly flouted agreements and has been accused of being unwilling to make concessions during negotiations. The latest reversal comes despite a push from Trump to secure a deal, but months ahead of an Israeli election in which the government is under pressure from its base to demonstrate it has achieved total victory in Gaza.

Mladenov criticised the strikes over the weekend, without directly naming Israel. “Achieving a lasting peace is hard but achievable if everyone makes their best efforts,” he wrote.

Egypt, Qatar, and Turkiye, which mediated the disarmament deal, issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s targeting of civilians and healthcare facilities as a “flagrant violation of international law”.

Hamas said it and other Palestinian factions remained committed to the completion of the second phase of the ceasefire, and were awaiting a clear, official response from Mladenov and the mediators.

Migrants rushed to receive water and beverages in Ceuta, Spain, where many have spent days on a beach holding signs seeking asylum. Hungry and thirsty, they remain in the tiny Spanish territory as authorities struggle to manage thousands after a mass border rush.

Israelis head to the polls in October for the country’s first election since the war on Gaza began. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces mounting pressure over the October 7 attacks, corruption charges, international isolation, and divisions within his coalition.

Barzani meets Syria’s al-Sharaa in Damascus to discuss Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) integration and Kurdish rights in post-Assad Syria.

Nechirvan Barzani, president of Iraq’s semiautonomous Kurdish region, has held talks with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, in the first visit by a Kurdish leader to Syria since the fall of ousted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

On Monday, Barzani led a high-level delegation to Damascus, where he was received at the People’s Palace. According to Syria’s state news agency SANA, the two sides discussed bilateral relations between Erbil and Damascus, as well as several key regional issues of mutual concern to strengthen cooperation and coordination across various fields.

The visit to Syria’s capital comes after months of diplomatic engagement between the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and Syria’s new administration. Barzani and al-Sharaa previously met twice on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, first on April 11, 2025, and again on April 17, 2026. According to a statement from the Kurdistan Region Presidency, the second meeting covered the development of economic ties and the agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

The integration of the SDF into Syrian state institutions is a central focus of the talks. The SDF, a Kurdish-led force that controls much of northeastern Syria, has been in negotiations with Damascus over its future status. The Syrian government has sought to integrate the force into its military structures, while Kurdish representatives have pressed for guarantees of political and cultural rights.

According to news reports from Al Hadath, Barzani and al-Sharaa discussed mechanisms for entrenching the constitutional rights of Kurds in Syria, particularly language rights and administrative autonomy. Implementation of Decree No. 13, which pertains to Kurdish language rights, was also on the agenda. Syrian officials have expressed interest in benefitting from the Kurdistan Regional Government’s experience in Kurdish-language education, curriculum development and teacher training.

Barzani’s itinerary also includes meetings with Kurdish officials in Syria, including SDF commanders and Kurdish members of the Syrian parliament, according to Kurdish media reports.

The visit follows a series of diplomatic exchanges, including a trip by Syria’s education minister to Erbil and efforts to reopen the Syrian consulate in Iraq’s semiautonomous Kurdish region. Barzani has previously hosted SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and delegations from northeastern Syria in Erbil.

For the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil, which shares a 1,100km (684-mile) border with Syria and hosts tens of thousands of Syrian refugees, the engagement carries vital security imperatives. Ensuring a stable, inclusive Syria reduces the risk of the resurgence of ISIL (ISIS), limits future refugee flows, and enhances Erbil’s diplomatic leverage with both Baghdad and Ankara.

The talks come at a sensitive time, during ongoing clashes between Syrian forces and Kurdish fighters in the northeast.

Spain’s two tiny enclaves on the north coast of Africa have long been a flashpoint in its relationship with Morocco, which the territories border.

The only such European territories on African soil, they include the autonomous city enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as Plazas de Soberanía – a group of rocky islands off the Moroccan coast, which include the Chafarinas Islands, Alhucemas Islands and Penon de Velez de la Gomera.

While Spain says it owns these enclaves, Morocco does not recognise Spain’s sovereignty over them and has been demanding their return since independence from France in 1956.

The territorial dispute has resulted in long-standing political tensions between Spain and Morocco.

Last week, after more than 50,000 migrants surged over the border into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, those tensions between Madrid and Rabat intensified. While most have since returned to Morocco, several thousand remain in Ceuta this week.

So why does Spain have these territories at all and what does their future hold?

Here’s what we know:

Why does Spain have enclaves in North Africa?

The enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, along with a few islets off the coast of Morocco, constitute the last vestiges of the Spanish colonial empire.

Ceuta first came under Portuguese rule in 1415 before becoming part of Spain in 1580, while Melilla was conquered by a Spanish nobleman in 1497. Ceuta remained under Spanish control after Portugal regained independence in 1640 following a long war.

“Spain reached its greatest extent in Latin America, and with the loss of Cuba, Costa Rica and the Philippines in 1898, it shifted its influence to Africa, although most European colonial powers had already divided it among themselves,” explained Yolanda Aixelà Cabré, an anthropologist at IMF-CSIC in Barcelona.

After the decolonisation of Africa in the last century, Ceuta and Melilla remained the only European-held territories on the African mainland. Although geographically in Africa, the enclaves are considered Spanish territory and form part of the EU’s external border.

“For Spain, maintaining these enclaves [on the northern coast of Africa] is fundamental on a symbolic level because they reinforce Spanish grandeur, its imperial past which the State continues to consider a bearer of civilisation in contrast to barbarism, a notion perfectly encapsulated by the repetitive discourse that [Christopher] Columbus, representing the Catholic Monarchs, ‘discovered’ America,” she said.

Why didn’t the enclaves pass to Morocco on independence?

Selim Balouati Lakhloufi is a historian and researcher specialising in the history of North Africa and the Rif mountainous region in northern Morocco, which stretches along the Mediterranean coast from Tangier to the border with Algeria. He said Ceuta and Melilla continue to exist as separate territories because their origins “predate modern Morocco”.

“They are enclaves that have been occupied for centuries,” he told Al Jazeera.

But since gaining independence from France in 1956 – which Spain recognised while retaining its enclaves – Morocco has consistently maintained that the territories of Ceuta and Melilla, which it calls “Sebtah and Melilah”, and the Plazas de Soberanía, are part of its territory and has been demanding their return.

“This has always been used by the Moroccan political class as a point of criticism against Spain,” Lakhloufi said.

Samir Bennis, a Washington, DC-based senior political adviser who is also the co-founder of Morocco World News and an expert on Morocco’s foreign policy, said since independence, Morocco’s territorial claims over Ceuta and Melilla have frequently been at the centre of tricky relations between Spain and Morocco.

“Perhaps this issue would not have had the same detrimental effect on bilateral relations had Moroccan leaders shown greater determination in the early 1960s, during the height of the decolonisation period, to bring the matter before the United Nations and seek recognition of these two cities as colonial territories that should be liberated from any foreign presence,” he said.

He explained that there are, however, two important factors which led the Moroccan authorities to refrain from pursuing this course in their efforts to restore the country’s territorial integrity.

“The first was the sheer scale of the territorial disputes between Spain and Morocco. Given the difficulty Morocco faced in simultaneously contesting Spanish control over several territories, the Moroccan government decided to proceed gradually in its efforts to recover the parts of Moroccan territory that remained under Spanish rule.”

“The second factor that led the Moroccan leadership to postpone addressing the question of Ceuta and Melilla was the willingness shown by the Spanish authorities to resolve their territorial disputes with Morocco progressively. In the end, this strategy proved highly beneficial for safeguarding Spain’s interests in the two cities,” Bennis added.

How strong is Morocco’s claim to these enclaves?

Morocco’s claim to the territories is relatively weak, Bennis said. But “the country can invoke a range of historical, geographical and human arguments that cast doubt on Spain’s position”.

Jamie Trinidad, a fellow and director of studies in law at Wolfson College, Cambridge University, also said that Morocco’s claim to the territories is weak under international law. “It is a political, rather than a legal, claim, similar to Spain’s claim to Gibraltar, which lies across the strait from Ceuta,” he said. Gibraltar is a British Overseas Territory.

“In the 1970s, Morocco asked the UN to include the territories on the list of ‘Non-Self-Governing Territories’ overseen by the UN’s Special Committee on Decolonisation, but the Moroccan request was ignored by the UN,” he added.

What do people living in these enclaves want?

Around 84,000 people live in Ceuta and 86,000 in Melilla.

In Spanish possession since 1580, Ceuta is home to a mixed population of Christian and Muslim, Spanish and Moroccan residents and day workers who live and work in relative harmony.

But after more than 50,000 migrants entered Ceuta illegally last week, divisions and tensions in the enclave have risen.

Hundreds of residents rallied on Sunday – two days after the surge of migrants to Ceuta – to oppose a planned far-right anti-migrant rally, forcing organisers to cancel the event.

“I am half Christian, half Muslim, as many in Ceuta are. We live peacefully together. But the numbers this time were scary,” Ceuta resident Isabel told Al Jazeera over the weekend.

Melilla, which has been in Spanish possession since 1497, is also home to Spanish and Moroccan residents, as well as small Jewish and Sindhi communities, the latter a diaspora of Hindu merchants who arrived following the 1947 partition of India.

The Plazas de Soberania is mainly populated by Spanish military personnel.

Lakhloufi noted that polling shows an overwhelming majority of people living in Ceuta and Melilla wish to remain part of Spain.

“This has been reflected consistently in public opinion and in the absence of any significant political movement advocating a change in sovereignty,” he said. “Even the population with Moroccan origin want to stay as Spanish and European. This is because the social welfare difference between Morocco and the cities it’s really high,” he said.

“At the same time, both cities maintain strong historical, cultural and economic ties with Morocco, making cooperation across the border an important aspect of daily life,” he added.

According to the Spanish government, Ceuta and Melilla are part of the Schengen area, which guarantees freedom of movement within the EU, but are subject to a special Schengen regime. People travelling between the enclaves and mainland Spain undergo separate border checks.

“Schengen checks are carried out on exit by sea or air, the only two routes available. Therefore, no one can travel from Ceuta or Melilla to mainland Spain without being identified by the National Police at the port or the airport. In addition, ferry operators and airlines are required to verify travel documents,” a Spanish government document states.

Will Spain give up these enclaves?

Analysts are divided.

In March 2022, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez wrote to the Moroccan king, confirming Spanish support for Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, which Spain gave up control of in 1975. Sanchez said this was “the most serious, realistic and credible” initiative for resolving the decades-long dispute over the vast African territory and declared “a new stage” in Spain’s strained relations with Morocco.

Cabre said, therefore, that after last week’s overwhelming migrant influx into Ceuta, Spain could ultimately cede sovereignty to Morocco.

“Their [the enclaves] mere presence is an unsustainable historical anomaly at a time when the decolonisation of European states is being promoted at all levels, like European countries returning of items stolen during colonialism and recognising the citizenship rights of their former colonies,” she said.

But Lakhloufi does not expect a fundamental change in Spain’s policy on the enclaves.

“What may change is the way Spain manages its relationship with Morocco, particularly regarding border management, migration and security cooperation. However, tactical adjustments should not be confused with a shift in Spain’s long-standing position on sovereignty. It’s usually Morocco that puts pressure on the borders, not Spain,” he said.

Thousands of displaced Palestinians in Gaza are enduring extreme temperatures amid a heatwave. Families sheltering in makeshift plastic tents are using whatever means they can to cool down amid appalling living conditions.

A magnitude 5.4 earthquake struck Egypt, north of Suez early on Monday, startling a content creator during a livestream. Tremors were felt as far as Gaza, prompting residents to evacuate homes and hotels. No casualties were reported.

The US president says Gulf allies and Tehran urged him to delay planned strikes.

United States President Donald Trump has said that negotiations with Tehran are set to begin on Monday after he decided to hold off on new strikes on Iran in pursuit of a deal.

Trump said on Sunday that a plan was in place for the US to launch “the biggest attack since World War II” against Iran but that he halted it to give diplomacy a chance.

“Obviously, they don’t want to be attacked. They knew the extent of the attack because they saw it forming,” Trump told reporters on board Air Force One on Sunday.

“Now what we’re doing is talking to them in the form of a negotiation. It begins tomorrow afternoon.”

He gave no details about the venue or participants in the talks.

Trump pulled back from threats of an attack on Saturday after saying the “perimeter” of a deal was in place.

In his latest comments, Trump said Iran and US partners Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar had urged him to hold off on the strikes.

“When the allies asked to call it off, you’ve got to sort of say, ‘Well, let’s see.’ And the reason they ask is they think there’s a deal,” he said.

“There’s a deal on [the Strait of] Hormuz, and then there will be a deal on the nuclear, or you might call it the denuclearisation of Iran.”

He said Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had also urged against the strikes, warning of possible unintended consequences.

“I mean, will they be flooded with people pouring into their country and disaster? A lot of bad things can happen,” Trump said.

Regional diplomacy intensifies

Trump’s announcement came hours after Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi held a second phone call with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, joined by Pakistani Army Commander Asim Munir, to discuss recent diplomatic efforts.

The officials exchanged views on the current situation and on “initiatives aimed at maintaining and strengthening security and stability” in West Asia, Araghchi said in a Telegram post. They also stressed the need to use regional cooperation and political solutions, he added.

Earlier on Sunday, Iran’s official news agency IRNA reported that negotiations between Tehran and Oman over the Strait of Hormuz were in their final stages, citing Araghchi.

Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said the negotiations focused on agreeing to a new route through the strait, adding that this had “no link to the Strait of Hormuz being opened or closed. That is a separate discussion”.

The war began on February 28, when the US and Israel launched surprise strikes against Iran, although months of on-and-off diplomacy have led to periods of relative calm.

A previous ceasefire deal, which included the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital conduit for global energy supplies, fell through. Iran has since tightened its control over the waterway as the two countries resumed attacks against each other in recent weeks.

Oil prices fall as escalation fears ease

Oil prices dropped sharply in early trading after Trump abandoned plans for a new military operation against Iran, easing fears of further disruption to Gulf energy supplies.

Brent futures were down $4.08, or 4.64 percent, at $83.85 a barrel on Sunday. West Texas Intermediate lost $4.01, or 4.74 percent, to trade at $80.66, according to the Reuters news agency.

The decline reversed part of last month’s surge, when both benchmarks gained more than 20 percent as renewed US-Iran fighting and attacks on commercial vessels near Oman intensified concerns over shipping through the region.

US President Donald Trump says an agreement with Iran is imminent, with negotiations set to begin on Monday.

Tens of thousands have been killed since April 2023 in the war between RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his former ally, army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

At least 35 people were killed, and several others wounded, when Sudanese army drones struck a traditional court in western Darfur, a rights group has said.

The Emergency Lawyers group, which has documented abuses by both sides of the three-year civil war in Sudan, said the strike on Sunday hit a court in the village of Garra al-Zawaya in North Darfur state at about 1pm local time (11:00 GMT).

It said civilians had “gathered to attend hearings on local cases and disputes” when the attack took place.

The village is under the control of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Tens of thousands of people have been killed since the war began in April 2023 between supporters of RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his former ally, Sudanese army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

The court building, which serves as a traditional institution for resolving local and tribal feuds, was also damaged in the strike, Emergency Lawyers said.

“The court session was being held under a tree with the participation of local community leaders,” a witness from the area told the AFP news agency on condition of anonymity for safety reasons.

Among those killed were “four tribal leaders and two RSF commanders”, the witness added.

Garra al-Zawaya lies near the town of Kabkabiya, about 150km (93 miles) west of el-Fasher, the army’s last stronghold in Darfur, which the RSF captured after a bloody offensive in October last year.

United Nations investigators have said violence linked to the RSF siege and capture of el-Fasher bore “the hallmarks of genocide”.

Following its takeover of the city, the RSF – which emerged from the government-backed militia known as the Janjaweed, accused of atrocities in Darfur in the early 2000s – consolidated control over much of the region.

Since that campaign, both sides have increasingly relied on drone warfare. According to the UN, more than 1,000 civilians were killed in drone strikes during the first five months of this year.

The conflict has also displaced millions and created what the UN describes as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis.