Middle East

From deadly floods in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, to antigovernment protests in the Philippines and demonstrations in Italy to show solidarity with Gaza, here is a look at the week in photos.

Israeli army carried out attacks east of Rafah city, demolitions east of Khan Younis; arrests reported during Israeli raid in occupied West Bank.

Kurdish authorities say one killed, several wounded in riots in Erbil’s Gwer, as authorities try to restore power after attack on Khor Mor.

A group of “rioters” have opened fire at fuel tanker trucks in the northern Iraqi governorate of Erbil, killing at least one person and wounding several others, Kurdish authorities said, days after a rocket attack on the region’s Khor Mor gas field.

In a statement carried by the Iraqi News Agency late on Saturday, the Ministry of Interior of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) linked the shooting to the Khor Mor attack.

The rocket attack hit a storage tank at the gas field, which is one of the region’s largest facilities, late on Wednesday, leading to production shutdown and extensive power cuts.

The ministry said the KRG sent liquid fuel to supply power plants following the Khor Mor attack, but that “a group of rioters blocked the road used by fuel tankers and civilians in Gwer, opening fire on passersby and travellers”.

The shooting “resulted in the death of one citizen and injuries to several others”, it said.

The ministry pledged action against the “riots”, saying “we will put an end to these acts of sabotage”.

The ministry statement followed an earlier report by the Iraqi News Agency in which it said there had been armed clashes between the Harkiya tribe and security forces in Erbil, near the village of Lajan on the Erbil-Gwer road.

The agency cited security forces as saying that the clashes, adjacent to the Lanaz Company refinery, had “resulted in fatalities and injuries”.

Meanwhile, Iraqi Kurdish Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has announced that the KRG has agreed with the company operating the Khor Mor gas field to restart production within hours to restore electricity.

The attack on Thursday on Khor Mor was the most significant violence since a series of drone attacks in July that cut production by about 150,000 barrels per day.

“I have spoken with the company’s [Dana Gas] leadership to thank them and their workforce for their extraordinary resilience and determination amid eleven attacks on the Khor Mor field,” Barzani said in a statement posted in English.

“I have urged [Iraqi] Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to hold the perpetrators of this attack accountable to the full extent of the law, whoever they may be and wherever they are,” Barzani added.

There has been no claim of responsibility for the attack on Khor Mor, and authorities have not said who was behind the attack.

Abdulkhaliq Talaat, a military expert and former official from the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, however, told the Rudaw news channel that the drone attack on the Khor Mor gas field was launched from an area under the control of Iraqi forces.

The storage tank at Khor Mor is part of new facilities partially financed by the US and built by a US contractor, an industry source told the Reuters news agency earlier this week.

The KRG exercises autonomy in parts of northern Iraq, where US companies have significant investments in energy.

Did the Biden administration help cover up the killing of Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh by Israeli forces?

This week on UpFront, Marc Lamont Hill speaks to Steve Gabavics, a colonel-turned-whistleblower who was sent by the United States Department of State to investigate Abu Akleh’s killing in 2022.

Gabavics found that Israel intentionally killed Abu Akleh, who was fired at 16 times while wearing a blue vest marked “press”, but the State Department labelled her killing “accidental” to avoid angering the Israeli government.

Gabavics claimed that Abu Akleh is among several American citizens killed by the Israeli military for whom the US has taken no action to hold Israel accountable.

Arrest comes after appeals court handed jail terms to opposition leaders, businessmen and lawyers on charges of conspiracy to overthrow President Kais Saied.

Tunisian police have arrested prominent opposition figure Chaima Issa at a protest in the capital Tunis on Saturday, lawyers said.

The protest came after an appeals court on Friday handed jail terms of up to 45 years to opposition leaders, businessmen and lawyers on charges of conspiracy to overthrow President Kais Saied. Issa was handed a 20-year sentence during the trial.

“They will arrest me shortly,” Issa had told the Reuters news agency moments before her arrest.

“I say to the Tunisians, continue to protest and reject tyranny. We are sacrificing our freedom for you”.

She described the charges as unjust and politically motivated.

Police are also widely expected to arrest Najib Chebbi, the head of the opposition National Salvation Front, the main opposition coalition challenging Saied.

He received a 12-year prison sentence, and opposition figure Ayachi Hammami received a five-year sentence.

Human Rights Watch on Friday described the trial as a “travesty of justice”, saying it was “political, unfair, and without the slightest evidence” against the defendants.

In a statement to the AFP news agency, the US-based rights group condemned the “shameless instrumentalisation of the judiciary to eliminate Saied’s opponents”.

Meanwhile, UK-based rights group Amnesty International said the ruling was “an appalling indictment of the Tunisian justice system”, condemning “a relentless campaign to erode rights and silence dissent” in Tunisia.

During a sweeping power grab in July 2021, Saied suspended parliament and expanded executive power so he could rule by decree. Since then, the president has jailed many of his critics.

Many of the powers that Saied had taken for himself were later enshrined in a new constitution, ratified in a widely boycotted 2022 referendum, while media figures and lawyers critical of Saied have been prosecuted and detained under a “fake news” law enacted that same year.

Saied says his actions are legal and aimed at ending years of chaos and rampant corruption.

The pope is visiting Turkiye until Sunday on his first overseas trip as pontiff, which also includes a visit to Lebanon.

Pope Leo XIV has visited Istanbul’s famed Blue Mosque on the third day of his trip to Turkiye, his first known visit as leader of the Catholic Church to a Muslim place of worship.

The first US pope bowed slightly before entering the mosque early on Saturday and was led on a tour of the expansive complex, able to hold 10,000 worshippers, by its imam and the mufti of Istanbul.

Leo, walking in white socks, smiled during the 20-minute visit and joked with one of his guides, the mosque’s lead muezzin – the official who leads the daily calls to prayer.

“He wanted to see the mosque, he wanted to feel the atmosphere of the mosque, and he was very pleased,” Askin Tunca, the Blue Mosque’s muezzin who calls the faithful to prayer, told reporters.

Tunca said after the mosque visit that he asked Leo during the tour if he wished to pray for a moment, but the pope said he preferred to just visit the mosque.

The Vatican said in a statement immediately after the visit that Leo undertook the tour “in a spirit of reflection and listening, with deep respect for the place and for the faith of those who gather there in prayer”.

While Leo did not appear to pray during the tour, he did joke with Tunca. As the group was leaving the building, the pope noticed he was being guided out a door that is usually an entryway, where a sign says: “No exit.”

“It says no exit,” Leo said, smiling. Tunca responded: “You don’t have to go out, you can stay here.”

The pope is visiting Turkiye until Sunday on his first overseas trip as pontiff, which also includes a visit to Lebanon.

Leo, a relative unknown on the world stage before becoming pope in May, is being closely watched as he makes his first speeches overseas and interacts for the first time with people outside mainly Catholic Italy.

The Blue Mosque is officially named for Sultan Ahmed I, leader of the Ottoman Empire from 1603 to 1617, who oversaw its construction. It is decorated with thousands of blue ceramic tiles, the basis of its popular name.

Unlike his predecessors, Leo did not visit the nearby Hagia Sophia, the legendary sixth-century basilica built during the Byzantine Empire, which was converted into a mosque under the Ottoman Empire, then became a museum under Turkiye’s newly established republic.

But in 2020, the UNESCO World Heritage site was converted back into a mosque in a move that drew international condemnation, including from the late Pope Francis who said he was “very saddened”.

Istanbul, Turkiye – Pope Leo XIV has chosen Turkiye for his first foreign trip as the head of the Roman Catholic Church, a deeply symbolic move that minority community representatives say is taking place at a time of renewed openness in the Muslim-majority country.

During his visit this week, the pontiff held talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, met religious leaders and visited places of worship in the country where Christianity’s deep roots sit alongside a long and influential Islamic tradition.

Today, Turkiye’s population of more than 80 million people is at least 99 percent Muslim, yet the country remains home to centuries-old Greek, Armenian, Syriac and Latin Christian communities that have long been part of its social fabric.

After decades shaped by political tensions, demographic change and property disputes, representatives of minority foundations say today’s climate offers greater visibility and confidence than they have experienced in decades. They also see the timing of Pope Leo’s visit as reflective of a period in which historic foundations feel more able to restore properties, organise religious life and engage directly with state bodies.

“This is, first of all, a great honour for Turkiye,” Manolis Kostidis, vice president of the Greek Foundations Association, told Al Jazeera of the pope’s visit.

“It’s also extremely important for the Ecumenical Patriarchate and for the Greek community. Istanbul has hosted empires for centuries, and welcoming such a guest shows the value of the patriarchate – especially with the support the Turkish government has given in recent years,” he said.

In the early decades of the Turkish Republic, Turkiye’s Greek, Armenian and Syriac populations numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Their decline over the 20th century was shaped by a series of political ruptures – from the 1942 Wealth Tax, which disproportionately targeted non-Muslims, to the 1955 Istanbul pogrom that devastated Greek, Armenian and Jewish neighbourhoods, and the 1964 deportation of more than 12,000 Greek citizens amid tensions over Cyprus.

Other administrative restrictions and legal rulings followed in subsequent decades, gradually accelerating emigration. Today, the remaining communities are far smaller, yet their representatives stress resilience, continuity and a deep sense of belonging to the country they have lived in for centuries.

“If Turkiye’s population is 85 million, we are about 85,000 – one in a thousand,” Can Ustabası, head of the Minority Foundations Representative Office, told Al Jazeera.

“Communities that were once in the millions are now tiny. We’re citizens of this country, but history brought us to this point.”

While the pressures affecting minority groups through the 20th century are widely documented, community representatives agree that the atmosphere of the past two decades stands in sharp contrast.

From the 2000s onward, minority foundations benefitted from a number of legal changes.

The Foundations Law, first drafted in the Ottoman era and later adapted by the Republic, governs how non-Muslim charitable foundations own, manage and inherit property. A series of European Union-driven harmonisation packages between 2003 and 2008 expanded their ability to register assets, reclaim properties seized under earlier rulings, and receive donations and inheritances again.

This culminated in a 2011 government decree instructing the return – or compensation – of properties that had been taken from foundations under the 1974 Court of Cassation ruling and earlier administrative practices.

“Erdogan’s instruction to ‘return what rightfully belongs to them’ changed the attitude of every state body. Previously, getting permission to paint a church took years. Now, doors open easily,” Ustabasi said.

‘One of most comfortable periods’

Lawyer Kezban Hatemi, who has advised minority foundations for decades, agreed that this has been “a major reform” but noted that more needed to be done. “Some cases are still ongoing – this kind of historical process never ends quickly,” Hatemi told Al Jazeera.

According to Hatemi, the earlier reluctance of state institutions was rooted in a decades-old mentality shaped by security fears and restrictive legal interpretations. She said minority foundations faced layers of bureaucratic obstacles for years, with even basic repairs or property registrations blocked. This only began to shift when EU harmonisation reforms created a new legal framework and political resolve emerged to act on it.

“The EU process gave real momentum – but it also took political will,” she said, noting that “a major blockage was removed” even as old fears loom for some.

“People abroad still say: ‘Don’t buy property in Istanbul, you never know what could happen.’ The memory from the 40s to the 70s is still very strong.”

Ustabasi noted that while the process has not always been straightforward, some 1,250 properties “were returned through EU harmonisation reforms and changes to the Foundations Law” between 2003 and 2018.

Kostidis said the impact of the return of the properties has not only been material. “It makes us feel like full citizens,” he said, noting that “minorities have lived one of their most comfortable periods” since Erdogan came to power in 2003.

One of the clearest signs of renewed confidence is among Syriacs, particularly in Tur Abdin – the historic heartland of Syriac Christianity in southeastern Turkiye that stretches across Midyat and the wider Mardin region. In these villages, return migration has slowly begun to reverse.

“People who emigrated to Europe are building homes again in Midyat and its villages,” Ustabasi said. “The roads are better than Istanbul, security is solid, and some are even preparing to live there long term.”

He linked the shift directly to improved security conditions in the southeast, a region that for decades was affected by clashes between the Turkish state and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, making travel and daily life unpredictable. “A Turkiye without terrorism opens many doors. People feel safe travelling, restoring homes, returning to their villages,” he said.

Kostidis said returns to Turkiye’s largest city of Istanbul are also possible – but require practical fixes.

“Large-scale returns are unlikely. But yes, some will come back if residency issues are fixed,” he said, calling for “a special regulation” for Greeks from Istanbul with Greek citizenship.

“All communities – Muslim, Jewish, Armenian, Syriac, Greek – should live in this city. Istanbul’s strength has always been its plurality.”

‘Powerful message’

Despite significant progress, several legal and administrative issues remain unresolved, with the representatives citing foundation board elections, legal ambiguity around autonomy and longstanding cases in some properties’ handover.

Ustabasi called for changes in the legal framework, while Hatemi noted the state “still intervenes in foundation governance in ways it never does with Muslim foundations. This mentality hasn’t fully changed – but I’m hopeful.”

Turkish-Armenian journalist and writer Etyen Mahcupyan said the pace of reform shifted after a failed coup attempt in 2016, when state bureaucracy regained influence over politics and decision-making.

He believes restitution slowed as a result, but said momentum could return if Turkiye “brings EU membership back to the forefront”. Turkiye started talks to join the bloc in 2005, but the accession bid has effectively been frozen.

Mahcupyan views Pope Leo’s visit as carrying political and symbolic resonance, given that the pope is seen not only as a religious figure but also as a political actor.

“Considering Turkiye’s foreign policy ambitions, this visit offers positive contributions. Ankara wants to shape a Turkiye that is accepted in global politics – and the world seems ready for it.”

Mahcupyan noted the pope’s “clear position” on Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza “aligns closely with Turkiye’s own line. This kind of convergence is important. It prevents Turkiye from turning inward, helps the world look at Turkiye more gently – and softens attitudes towards non-Muslims.”

He also said the visit helps ensure minority communities “are not forgotten”.

Kostidis agreed.

“A Muslim-majority country hosting the leaders of the Christian world – you can’t give a more powerful message than this,” he said.

‘I am a terrorist’

A UK activist group has released a video of protesters who were arrested by police for supporting Palestine Action, as part of a campaign calling on the government to lift the ‘disproportionate’ ban. A major legal challenge is currently underway on whether the ban was lawful.

The Head of the Catholic Church, Pope Leo, visited Istanbul’s Blue Mosque as part of his four-day trip to Turkiye. Officially called the Sultanahmet Mosque, it was built in the sixth century and has great significance to both Christians and Muslims.

Major Israeli offensive has also destroyed roads, water networks and private property.

Israeli forces have wounded more than 200 Palestinians in raids on the West Bank governorate of Tubas, as a major offensive on northern parts of the occupied territory that began on Wednesday continues to inflict widespread destruction.

The Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) told Al Jazeera that 78 of the people wounded in Israeli attacks on Tubas since Wednesday required treatment in hospital.

After withdrawing from Tammun and Far’a refugee camp on Friday, Israeli soldiers have shifted the focus of raids to the city of Tubas, as well as the nearby villages of Aqqaba and Tayaseer.

Local officials said Israeli forces have detained nearly 200 Palestinians in the past four days. Most were interrogated on site and let go, but at least eight people were arrested and taken to Israeli military jails.

At least nine Palestinians were detained in other military raids in Qalqilya, Jenin and Nablus. The Wafa news agency quoted local sources as saying on Saturday that two children and a woman were among five arrested at dawn in Qalqilya.

Violent raids by Israeli soldiers and attacks by armed settlers have escalated since October 2023, with 47 army incursions taking place on average every day across the occupied West Bank in November.

The mayor of Tammun told Al Jazeera that while the town in the Tubas governorate was subject to dozens of raids in the past couple of years, the ones this week were the worst in terms of scale, destruction and violence.

He said that more than 1.5km (one mile) of roads have been torn up, water networks destroyed, private property vandalised and people severely beaten, repeating the pattern of other major Israeli military attacks across the occupied West Bank.

In the Jenin refugee camp, where Israeli soldiers have been advancing in a major offensive launched in January, Israeli bulldozers are making way for the demolition of at least 23 more Palestinian homes.

This comes several days after they issued notices claiming that the demolitions were necessary to ensure “freedom of movement” for the Israeli forces within the camp – even though the area remains largely empty as most families have been displaced.

The condemned buildings were home to 340 Palestinians. Only 47 of them, mostly women, were allowed to retrieve their belongings on Thursday.

A member of the Jenin Refugee Camp Services Committee told Al Jazeera that residents were given two hours to collect possessions, and some could not even recognise their homes due to the level of destruction after the Israeli assault.

The armed wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad said on Friday its fighters carried out a series of attacks on Israeli soldiers during raids in Jenin and Tubas.

The group said its fighters in Tubas targeted an Israeli foot patrol with an antipersonnel explosive device in the Wadi al-Tayaseer area. Fighters detonated explosives against Israeli military vehicles in the al-Ziyoud and al-Bir areas of the town of Silat al-Harithiya in Jenin, it added.

Since October 2023, Israeli soldiers have killed at least 1,086 Palestinians across the occupied West Bank, including 223 children. At least 251 were killed in 2025.

At least 10,662 Palestinians have also been wounded since the start of Israel’s war on Gaza, with more than 20,500 rounded up. As of the beginning of November, there were 9,204 Palestinians in Israeli jails, 3,368 of whom are detained without charges.

Palestinian deaths have also surged in the custody of both the Israeli army and the Israel Prison Service, with at least 94 deaths documented since October 2023.

The Arab world’s biggest football competition kicks off on Monday, as 16 teams from across the region face off in Qatar.

Here’s everything you need to know about the tournament, which occurs every four years:

What are the key dates?

The FIFA Arab Cup 2025 will begin on Monday, with Tunisia facing Syria in the tournament opener.

The final will be played on December 18, marking the conclusion of the 32-match tournament.

• Group stage: December 1 to 9
• Quarterfinals: December 11 and 12
• Semifinals: December 15
• Third-place playoff: December 18
• Final: December 18

Where is the tournament being held?

Qatar is staging the Arab Cup for the third time; it hosted the 1998 and 2021 tournaments. It is also the second successive FIFA tournament hosted by the Gulf nation after the recently concluded FIFA U-17 World Cup.

Six venues have been chosen to host the regional showpiece, each of which was used during the FIFA World Cup three years ago.

As was the case during Qatar 2022, Al Bayt Stadium, in the northern city of Al Khor, will host the tournament opener, while the magnificent Lusail Stadium will host the final.

The 2025 Arab Cup will be the second edition under FIFA’s jurisdiction, with editions before 2021 organised by the Union of Arab Football Associations (UAFA).

Here are the host cities and stadiums:

⚽ Lusail City: Lusail Stadium (capacity: 88,966)
⚽ Al Rayyan: Ahmad bin Ali Stadium (capacity: 45,032)
⚽ Al Khor: Al Bayt Stadium (capacity: 68,895)
⚽ Doha: Stadium 974 (capacity: 44,089)
⚽ Education City: Education City Stadium (capacity: 44,667)
⚽ Doha: Khalifa International Stadium (capacity: 45,857)

How many teams are taking part?

Sixteen nations, drawn from both the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) and the Confederation of African Football (CAF), will play in the tournament.

Hosts Qatar and defending champions Algeria, along with the seven highest-ranked nations at the time of the draw in May, all qualified automatically.

The remaining seven slots were filled through a series of single-leg qualification matches held in Qatar this week.

The participating nations have been divided into four groups, as follows:

⚽ Group A: Tunisia, Syria, Qatar, Palestine

⚽ Group B: Morocco, Comoros, Saudi Arabia, Oman

⚽ Group C: Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, United Arab Emirates

⚽ Group D: Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Bahrain

How did Palestine qualify for Arab Cup?

Palestine edged Libya 4-3 on penalties on Tuesday to secure their place in the Arab Cup, bringing joy to Palestinians in the wake of Israel’s war on Gaza.

The playoff in Doha ended 0-0 after 90 minutes before Palestine held their nerve in the shootout to reach the 16-team tournament.

“This was the toughest playoff match,” coach Ihab Abu Jazar told Al Kass TV. “Libya are strong. Our circumstances and absences made it harder, but we are proud. Football is one of the few things that can bring happiness to Palestinians.

“We are different from other teams. They play to compete, but we play for two goals: to send messages through football and to develop Palestinian football. Our team has become a big name in Asia and was close to reaching the World Cup playoff.

“We play for more than trophies – we play to send a message and bring joy to our people,” he added.

What is the prize money for the Arab Cup?

The 2025 edition will have a record prize money of more than $36.5m, joining the ranks of the world’s major international football tournaments.

The last competition, in 2021, had a reported prize purse of $25.5m.

What is the tournament format?

The top two teams in each group will qualify for the knockout stage, which features the quarterfinals, semifinals and the final. There is also a third-place playoff between the two losing semifinalists.

In the knockout stages, if a match is level at the end of normal playing time, it will go to 30 minutes of extra time and, if required, penalties.

Who are the previous champions?

Iraq are the most successful team in the Arab Cup with four titles. Saudi Arabia are the second-most successful nation with two titles, while Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria have all won once each.

Algeria are the defending champions, having beaten Tunisia 2-0 in extra time at the 2021 final.

Historically, nations from the Asian Football Confederation (six titles) have won more than the Confederation of African Football teams (four titles).

Why is the Arab Cup important?

Featuring some of the strongest teams, the Arab Cup will give fans a taste of what to expect from Arab nations at next year’s FIFA World Cup.

Seven Arab Cup participants – Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Algeria – will also compete at the FIFA World Cup 2026, co-hosted by the United States, Mexico and Canada.

“The tournament plays an important role in showcasing Arab and Islamic culture to the world,” Algeria striker Baghdad Bounedjah said. “It’s a celebration of our identity and an opportunity to showcase our shared passion for the beautiful game on such a global scale.”

With the revamped World Cup set to feature an expanded 48-team pool, the Arab Cup could be a proving ground for teams aiming to make a deep run on football’s biggest stage.

Who are the favourites to win?

Based on their recent performance in the 2026 World Cup qualification phase, as many as five teams could be considered frontrunners for the title.

Up there is Tunisia, who gathered the most points (28 from a possible 30) among all CAF nations during the World Cup qualifiers, winning nine of the 10 matches to finish top of their group.

Fellow North African neighbours Algeria and Morocco are strong contenders after both qualified for the World Cup by finishing top of their groups. Record seven-time African champions Egypt are also among the favourites.

Jordan, who qualified for the World Cup for the first time, are an underdog pick to win it all.

Who are the top players to watch?

Jordan’s Ali Olwan, the third-highest scorer in the AFC World Cup qualifying with nine goals, will be one to watch in the tournament. Joining him on the list of forwards expected to pose a serious threat is Iraq’s Aymen Hussein, who was tied for fourth-highest goals, with eight.

Fans should also keep an eye on Tunisia’s reliable goalkeeper Aymen Dahmen, who kept six clean sheets as his side went unbeaten without conceding in all 10 of their qualifying fixtures.

Forward Akram Afif, whose name has become synonymous with Qatar’s footballing success in the past decade, is a key player for the host nation, while Saudi Arabia captain Salem Al-Dawsari has been in decent form of late, sitting joint-fourth in the Saudi Pro League’s top assist men.

Where to buy tickets and watch the tournament?

Tickets for the FIFA Arab Cup went on sale on the official ticketing platform at the end of September. Fans can buy tickets for individual matches across three pricing categories, starting at $7.

The tournament also had an option of team-specific packs, which offered three group games of each nation, starting at about $20. However, those are now unavailable.

Tickets for the final, starting at $14, have sold out.

In the Middle East and North Africa, you can watch the entire tournament from December 1 through December 18, exclusively in Arabic and only on beIN SPORTS PPV.

Israel has carried out its deadliest incursion into southern Syria since the fall of President Bashar al-Assad. At least 13 people were killed in Beit Jinn. Al Jazeera’s Osama Bin Javaid reports Syrian officials reject Israel’s narrative and accuse it of violating international law.

Video shows funeral processions in Syria’s Beit Jinn, after Israeli raids and missile strikes killed at least 13 people. Violent clashes erupted after Israel claimed it entered the village to arrest members of the Jama’a Islamiya militant group.

Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are pushing hard to take Kordofan. In the sights of the paramilitary force – accused of committing grave human rights abuses during Sudan’s war – are the cities and towns of the vast central region, such as Babnusa and el-Obeid.

The momentum is currently with the RSF, which defeated their Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) opponents in el-Fasher, in the western region of Darfur, last month, unleashing a tidal wave of violence where they killed at least 1,500 people and forced thousands more to flee.

SAF soldiers are still able to repel RSF fighters in West Kordofan’s Babnusa, a major transport junction connecting several parts of the country. But continuing to hold the city will be difficult for the SAF, and if it does fall, then the RSF will likely press forward towards North Kordofan’s el-Obeid, and a vital gateway towards the capital Khartoum.

The RSF were forced out of Khartoum in March, a time when the SAF seemed to be on the ascendancy in the more-than-two-year war.

But now the tables have turned, and having lost Darfur completely with the fall of el-Fasher, the SAF now risks losing Kordofan, too.

“The RSF has momentum, which they will carry on through with,” said Dallia Abdelmoniem, a Sudanese political analyst, who pointed out that an RSF ally, the SPLM-N, already controls the Nuba Mountains region of South Kordofan.

“Hemedti was never going to be satisfied with just controlling the Darfur region – he wants the whole country,” she said, using a nickname for Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the head of the RSF.

With the SAF overstretched and cut off from reliable arms procurement, Abdelmoniem believes that the balance of power is shifting. “The SAF is weakened unless they miraculously get their hands on weaponry equal, if not better, to what the RSF has.”

Ceasefire talks

It is notable that the RSF advances have taken place despite ongoing mediation efforts from the so-called “Quad” – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States – aimed at reaching an end to the fighting.

The head of the SAF, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, last Sunday rejected a ceasefire agreement proposed by the Quad, saying that the deal benefitted the RSF. He also criticised the UAE’s involvement in the Quad, accusing it of supporting the RSF, a claim Abu Dhabi has long denied.

For its part, the RSF announced on Monday an apparently unilateral three-month ceasefire. However, since the announcement, the RSF has continued to attack Babnusa.

The Quad mediation efforts, which have included a push from US President Donald Trump, may perplexingly be the reason for the recent escalation in fighting.

“The pressure for a ceasefire coming from the Quad, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, is pushing the SAF and the RSF to gain a territorial advantage as quickly as possible in case something shifts during the mediation,” said Kholood Khair, the founding director of Confluence Advisory. “Each side will always try to maximise its position before the talks.”

Khair points out that both sides had been amassing weapons over the summer rainy season, when conditions were more difficult for fighting. Now that conditions are dry, the weapons are being “put to use”, particularly as the RSF is emboldened following its victory in el-Fasher.

The strategic importance of Kordofan makes it an important prize, particularly if any ceasefire deal freezes the areas under the control of each side.

“[Kordofan’s] location makes it important to control due to its agricultural, livestock, and petroleum resources,” said Retired Lieutenant Colonel Omar Arbab. “The battle for Kordofan is not merely territorial – it is about controlling Sudan’s economic backbone.”

Arbab added that there is a military logic to the RSF’s push towards Babnusa, as it is the gateway linking their forces in Darfur to el-Obeid. “If the RSF controls it, they could pose a threat to el-Obeid – and certainly will attempt to besiege it.”

“They’ve been shelling it consistently for weeks. If they take it, then they will redeploy some of those troops toward el-Obeid,” said Khair. Should the city fall, she warned, the political shockwave will be enormous. “It’s a huge mercantile centre, a regional capital, and a major economic win. It also brings the RSF several steps closer to Khartoum.”

Potential partition

Beyond the battlefield, analysts warn that Kordofan’s escalation is intensifying the fault lines fragmenting Sudan’s political and ethnic map.

Khair pointed out that the fall of el-Fasher had cemented the territorial fragmentation of western Sudan, but added that there were also “dozens of armed groups”, either aligned to the SAF, the RSF, or independent, that each controlled their own fiefdoms.

For Khair, the real driver of Sudan’s disintegration is not territory but identity. “This war has become extremely ethnicised, by both the SAF and the RSF, so they can mobilise troops. Because of that, you now have a split of communities who believe their ethnic interests are served by the SAF, by the RSF, or by other groups.”

This ethnic competition, she said, is now steering the trajectory of the war more than military strategy. “There’s no singular Sudanese project right now – not intellectually, militarily, politically, or economically – and that is catalysing fragmentation.”

Abdelmoniem, however, warns that some within the SAF may be willing to accept fragmentation. “Undoubtedly, there are elements within the SAF who would be more than happy for further fragmentation of the country so they can continue to rule over the Arab Sudanese side,” she said. “Losing Darfur is not an issue, and they’re willing to forgo the alliance with the joint forces over it,” she added, referring to former rebel groups largely based in Darfur and allied to the SAF.

Many Sudanese in Darfur are non-Arab, and have been targeted in particular by RSF attacks.

But any approach that abandons Darfur, Abdelmoniem believes, is unsustainable. “Without the joint forces and other groups under their political-military umbrella, they cannot win. And how do you contend with public opinion when the Sudanese people will view the SAF as the entity that lost or broke up the country?”

Arbab takes a more cautious view. While he acknowledges the reality of de facto breakage, he believes formal partition is unlikely. “Division is not currently on the table,” Arbab said, “because the structure of alliances on both sides requires a political project encompassing all of Sudan. Social complexities and the diversity of actors make such an option extremely difficult.”

Humanitarian fallout

As the front lines expand, Korodofan now faces the prospect of a humanitarian disaster on the scale seen in Darfur. Abdelmoniem drew a direct parallel to the warnings issued before the fall of el-Fasher. “The atrocities committed will be on a different scale,” she cautioned. “We might not get the video uploads like before, but the crimes will be committed.”

Abdemoniem said international inaction has emboldened all armed actors. “That sense of impunity prevails and will only increase the longer the international community is content with releasing statements and not doing much else.”

Arbab echoed that concern. Global attention, he said, was focused on el-Fasher because the violence there contained “elements of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. But Kordofan’s dynamics differ. In Babnusa, SAF and RSF forces come from the same overlapping tribal and ethnic communities, making the violence distinct from Darfur’s ethnic massacres. Yet the risks remain profound: reprisal killings, sieges, and mass displacement.

Khair warned that humanitarian access to Kordofan is already near impossible. “I don’t see SAF granting access, and I don’t see the RSF granting access into areas they control,” she said. Unlike Darfur, Kordofan lacks open borders where aid could be routed. “Access issues become even more heightened when you’re away from an international border.”