Mali

Trade and security are expected to be on the agenda as delegations and leaders from dozens of African countries gather in Moscow for a two-day summit with Russia.

The third instalment of the Russia-Africa Summit will run through October 28–29 and will be chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the current African Union chair, Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye.

Russia has boosted security and trade cooperation with African nations as it grapples with Western sanctions imposed in response to its war against Ukraine.

So who will be attending and what is at stake?

Here’s what we know.

What is the Russia-Africa Summit?

The Russia-Africa Summit is a two-day diplomatic and economic meeting being held in Moscow on Wednesday and Thursday.

Leaders and delegations from 48 African countries are meeting to discuss bilateral cooperation spanning politics, defence and technology.

This high-profile forum is the third of its kind. The first summit took place in October 2019 in Sochi, marking an unprecedented turn in Russian-African relations.

What’s on the agenda for the summit?

The event’s official theme is Developing Mutually Beneficial Cooperation and “unlocking the potential of every African country”.

More than 40 sessions and about 100 speakers will cover trade, investment, technology transfer, food and energy security, healthcare, education and youth exchange.

There will also be a business programme, culminating in a plenary session.

Who is attending?

Representatives from 48 African countries will participate, as well as 22 heads of state, according to Kremlin presidential aide Yury Ushakov. Heads of state from 17 countries attended the last summit in 2023.

Fewer leaders came to the last two summits, compared with the first gathering in 2019, when 43 took part, a decline which Moscow blamed on Western pressure.

Russian President Putin is scheduled to meet with his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

The guest list includes leaders closely tied to Russia’s growing security role in Africa, including Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traore and Niger’s Abdourahamane Tchiani.

Kenya’s William Ruto, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and Namibia’s Netumbo Nandi-Ndatiwah are also expected, as well as Sudan’s Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed al-Menfi, the chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya.

What is the relationship between Russia and Africa like?

Russia has gained far more influence in Africa through security than trade, according to a report by the African Security Analysis group (ASA), a security consultancy.

Russia’s security presence has risen significantly in the region. In 2023, Russian forces, mostly from the Wagner Group, operated in only a few African countries, but the ASA now counts Russian missions or troops in at least nine countries.

Trade between African countries and Russia has exceeded $28bn. It was estimated to be about $16.8bn in 2019, when the first summit was held. But trade is mainly concentrated in a few countries and overshadowed by that of China and the European Union.

Russia’s strongest ties to the continent are in energy, fertilisers, defence and nuclear power, where the state-owned firm Rosatom has signed a string of agreements.

Russia has been an essential supplier of fertilisers and wheat to many countries in the region.

In 2023, Russia exported 200,000 tonnes of grain to Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Eritrea and Zimbabwe. 

Why does this summit matter?

This is the first summit since 2023, so it will be an indicator of how far the relationship has developed and where it is heading, analysts say.

A final declaration and a Russia-Africa Partnership Forum plan should be adopted by the end of the Summit to cover 2027-2029.

Analysts have said that meetings on the sidelines could be more important than the main event, as talks between African delegations and Russian defence officials can illustrate where Moscow plans to expand its military ties.

The recruitment of Africans to fight in Ukraine could also be a growing problem for Moscow, as it has already caused diplomatic concern in countries such as Kenya.

Amnesty International has used the run-up to the summit to raise the issue of Africans being recruited to fight with Russia.

In an open letter, the directors of Amnesty’s African section urged leaders attending the summit to demand that Moscow end what the group describes as deceptive and coercive recruitment of Africans to fight in its war in Ukraine.

Algeria’s parliament has approved a proposal to deploy troops to neighbouring Niger, in a major shift in the North African nation’s noninterventionist military doctrine.

Algeria’s lower house, the People’s National Assembly, ratified the deployment on Sunday after the upper house, the Council of the Nation, unanimously approved the proposal earlier in the day.

Details about the number of soldiers and when they will be deployed have yet to be made public.

It comes nearly two months after Algeria dispatched four Russian-made Sukhoi Su-30 jets, a transport aircraft and an aerial refuelling aircraft to Niamey, following what Algerian authorities described as an attempt to destabilise Niger’s military-led government.

The step comes amid a thawing of relations between Algiers and Niamey as Niger’s President Abdourahamane Tchiani visited Algeria in February and, months later, his defence minister, Salifou Mody, ⁠⁠travelled to Algiers to discuss security cooperation.

The shooting down of a Malian drone by the Algerian army last April triggered a diplomatic crisis after Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso recalled their ambassadors from Algiers. The condemnation of the 2023 coup in Niger by Algeria had also strained ties.

The troop deployment is reportedly intended to protect oil installations belonging to Algeria’s state-owned energy company, Sonatrach. Troops would be sent “to protect Algeria’s economic and strategic interests, particularly its oil facilities in Niger”, The Associated Press news agency reported, quoting Algerian Senator Belkacem Boulghiti.

It also comes as Algiers seeks to deepen security cooperation in the Sahel, a vast belt of territory stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, including several countries along Algeria’s southern frontier.

Why does this matter?

Algeria has historically been reluctant to deploy its armed forces beyond its borders, reflecting a longstanding foreign policy built around sovereignty, noninterference and opposition to foreign military intervention.

But that does not mean it has never done so.

Algerian forces participated in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, although overseas military deployments have remained exceptionally rare in the decades since.

A constitutional revision in 2020 formalised the conditions under which Algerian troops could be sent abroad.

Under Article 91, the president may authorise such deployments, provided they receive the backing of at least two-thirds of the members of each chamber of parliament.

The constitution also provides for Algerian participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations, the African Union and the Arab League.

The move is particularly significant given Algeria’s military capabilities. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the country spent more than $25bn on its armed forces in 2025, making it Africa’s largest military spender.

But the decision also comes against a backdrop of growing diplomatic tensions and shifting regional alliances.

In September, Algeria severed diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates, accusing Abu Dhabi of repeated “hostile” and “provocative actions” without publicly detailing the incidents behind the decision.

The two countries have long disagreed over several regional issues, including Western Sahara and the UAE’s alleged interference in North African and Sahelian affairs.

Taken together, these developments suggest that Algeria is becoming increasingly willing to assert its security interests beyond its borders, even as it continues to emphasise the principles of sovereignty and noninterference.

Why the Sahel?

For Algeria, instability in the Sahel is not a distant security concern.

The country shares thousands of kilometres of borders with Mali, Niger and Libya, making developments in its southern neighbourhood particularly consequential.

The roots of the current security crisis can be traced, in part, to the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s government in Libya in 2011.

At the height of the Arab Spring uprisings, Algeria took a firm stance against foreign military intervention and warned that the disintegration of the Libyan state could destabilise neighbouring countries.

Those concerns were not unfounded.

Following Gaddafi’s overthrow, weapons and armed fighters, including Tuareg who had served in Libya, spread into neighbouring countries.

Their return helped fuel a rebellion in northern Mali in 2012, contributing to a security crisis that preceded the military overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Toure that March.

Over the following decade, armed rebellion expanded across parts of the Sahel, particularly Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

Since 2012, those three countries alone have experienced six military coups: three in Mali, two in Burkina Faso and one in Niger.

Many of the coups unfolded against a backdrop of deteriorating security, with military leaders accusing civilian governments of failing to contain increasingly powerful armed groups.

But insecurity was not the only factor. Political grievances, governance failures and rivalries within armed forces also contributed to the coups.

Who else is operating in the Sahel?

Another factor shaping Algeria’s calculations is the changing presence of foreign military forces across the region.

For more than a decade, France was a central player in counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, deploying thousands of troops to combat armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS).

But that military presence has largely unravelled.

Following successive coups and deteriorating diplomatic relations, France withdrew its troops from Mali in August 2022, Burkina Faso in February 2023 and Niger in December 2023.

The withdrawals were accompanied by growing anti-French sentiment and demands from military governments for greater control over their security policies.

Niger demanded the departure of approximately 1,500 French soldiers following its July 2023 coup.

Just months later, in April 2024, approximately 100 Russian military personnel arrived in Niamey, bringing equipment and providing training to Nigerien forces.

The personnel were associated with Africa Corps, a Russian paramilitary group close to the Kremlin.

Moscow has also expanded its military cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, where Russian personnel have undertaken training, advisory and security roles, including combat support in Mali.

The United States has also seen its military footprint shrink.

In 2024, Washington withdrew approximately 1,000 soldiers from Niger after the military government terminated their security cooperation agreement. The withdrawal included personnel stationed at an important US drone base near Agadez.

The result has been a significant realignment of the Sahel’s security partnerships, with Western military forces departing and Russia assuming a more prominent role.

What does Algeria stand to gain?

For Algiers, the proposed deployment to Niger carries immediate security and wider strategic implications.

At the most practical level, protecting Algerian energy investments would help safeguard the country’s economic interests in a region affected by armed rebellions and political instability, including the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP), which would transport Nigerian gas to Europe and traverse Niger and Algeria.

It could also deepen cooperation with Niger, whose military government has sought new security partners since taking power in 2023.

More broadly, the move would allow Algeria to establish a direct military presence in a neighbouring country at a time when the Sahel’s security architecture is being reshaped.

“We are not sending our soldiers to wage war in Niger, but for a mission to secure economic infrastructure,” Senator Boulghiti told reporters after the vote. “It is simply an adaptation of our doctrine to evolving circumstances so we can rise to the new challenges imposed by the situation in the Sahel region.”