Mali

Bamako, Mali – An unprecedented battlefield partnership between a separatist movement and an al-Qaeda affiliate has transformed the conflict in northern Mali, shifting the military balance and deepening divisions over how, if at all, the war can end.

When the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) launched a joint offensive on April 25, 2026, the conflict entered a phase unlike any before.

A war that had long pitted the Malian state against multiple armed groups gave way to a coordinated campaign stretching from Kidal and Anefis to Tilemsi, Gao and Sevare, posing the most serious challenge to the Malian army in years and to Russia’s Africa Corps, the Kremlin-backed force that replaced the Wagner Group in Mali.

Since then, the fighting has been marked by simultaneous assaults, ambushes, drone strikes and attacks on military convoys, with all sides claiming significant battlefield gains.

Bamako says it is working to restore state authority and dismantle what it calls a “terrorist alliance” between the FLA and JNIM.

The FLA says it remains committed to independence for Azawad, the name separatists use for northern Mali, while JNIM portrays the war as part of a campaign to “liberate” Mali and overthrow the government, which it accuses of relying on Russian forces.

More significant than the offensive itself, however, is the unprecedented military cooperation between a nationalist separatist movement and an al-Qaeda affiliate.

Their political ambitions remain fundamentally different, yet their cooperation has already reshaped the conflict and could have far-reaching implications for security across the Sahel.

The partnership emerged after the collapse of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, which sought to end years of fighting between Bamako and northern armed groups through greater decentralisation and political representation, but whose implementation repeatedly faltered.

Successive military coups after 2020 reshaped Mali’s political leadership and security strategy. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Mali and imposed sanctions, while Russia deepened its military role by deploying the Wagner Group in late 2021.

After Russia folded the Wagner Group’s operations into the state-controlled Africa Corps, renewed fighting left neither the government nor northern armed groups able to impose a lasting settlement.

How the alliance took shape

On paper, cooperation between the FLA and JNIM appears unlikely. The FLA traces its roots to northern separatist movements that declared the independence of Azawad during the 2012 rebellion, a claim never recognised by the Malian state or the international community.

It presents itself as a secular nationalist movement seeking independence for Azawad, while JNIM seeks to overthrow governments it considers illegitimate and establish governance based on its interpretation of Islamic law.

Yet senior officials from both groups told Al Jazeera those ideological differences have been set aside to confront a common enemy.

Colonel Mohamed Issa, a senior FLA officer, said the movement remained committed to an independent Azawad, arguing that previous peace agreements repeatedly collapsed because successive governments in Bamako failed to honour them.

Negotiations, he said, would only be acceptable if they recognised Azawad’s right to separate.

Issa rejected suggestions of an ideological alliance, describing the relationship as a battlefield arrangement against a common enemy.

He said the JNIM-affiliated fighters operating alongside the FLA were exclusively Azawadis rather than members of the group’s wider regional network, arguing they were motivated primarily by defending their communities against the Malian army and what he described as Russian “mercenaries”.

Suleiman, a senior JNIM field commander who requested that only his first name be used for security reasons, described the relationship in broader terms.

He said the group approved operational coordination with the FLA after internal consultations because fighters on both sides largely came from “one people” caught up in the same conflict and because their liberation goals had become “relatively unified”.

He also claimed the FLA had accepted Islamic legal arbitration by local religious scholars, one of JNIM’s core objectives, a point the FLA itself did not raise. Bamako, meanwhile, has described the relationship as a “JNIM/FLA terrorist alliance” that threatens Mali’s sovereignty.

The differing accounts illustrate both the strength and the fragility of the arrangement. For now, shared battlefield interests appear to outweigh ideological differences. Whether that remains true as the conflict evolves is far less certain.

A shifting balance of power

The partnership has altered not only the battlefield but the way the war is fought.

FLA officials say working alongside JNIM has enabled both groups to divide responsibilities and pool expertise in attacks on military bases and supply convoys.

Bamako disputes casualty figures released by the armed groups and insists its forces retain the initiative. Even so, the conflict has become markedly more sophisticated, with simultaneous attacks across distant locations, engagements lasting several days and ambushes targeting reinforcements before they reach the front lines.

Drones have assumed an increasingly prominent role, serving not only as reconnaissance platforms but increasingly as strike weapons against vehicles and military positions. Malian forces, backed by Russia’s Africa Corps, continue to rely heavily on air power, yet months of sustained fighting suggest neither side has secured a decisive advantage.

The war economy

Long-established financing and trafficking networks continue to sustain both sides.

JNIM sources describe a funding model built on regional commercial networks, organised zakat collections and resources accumulated over years, including proceeds linked to earlier al-Qaeda kidnapping-for-ransom operations.

The FLA says it relies primarily on donations organised by tribal leaders, traders and community associations.

Officials from both groups also acknowledged that individuals linked to the movements participate in illicit economies, including trafficking across the Sahara, although the extent to which those activities finance the war remains difficult to verify.

Weapons have proved as important as funding. Arms have flowed across the Sahel since the collapse of Libya in 2011, providing armed groups with a steady source of equipment.

The latest fighting has opened another supply channel: weapons and military vehicles captured from Malian forces now form an increasingly important part of both groups’ arsenals.

Can either side win?

There is little to suggest the conflict is nearing an end.

The Malian army retains a clear advantage in air power, backed by Russia’s Africa Corps. Yet the FLA and JNIM continue to mount coordinated operations across much of northern Mali.

The military standoff reflects a wider political deadlock. Bamako remains committed to preserving Mali’s territorial integrity, the FLA insists on independence for Azawad and JNIM continues to seek the overthrow of the government.

None has shifted position since the latest fighting began, and nothing on the battlefield has yet forced any of them to do so.

Those competing objectives also cast doubt on how long the two groups can continue fighting together. Their partnership rests on a common enemy rather than a shared political vision, making its future uncertain.

A war without an endgame

Three months into the latest offensive, northern Mali remains locked in a conflict with no obvious end in sight. The partnership between the FLA and JNIM has reshaped the military landscape, while Bamako continues to reject any outcome that could weaken Mali’s territorial integrity.

What began as a confrontation between the state and separate armed movements has evolved into a conflict shaped by competing visions of sovereignty, separatism, rule by al-Qaeda-linked armed groups and the involvement of external powers.

Unless those competing ambitions – territorial unity, independence and regime change – are addressed alongside the fighting, a negotiated settlement is likely to remain elusive.

Whatever happens next, the partnership forged in April 2026 has already changed the course of the war in northern Mali. Whether it endures or fractures under the weight of its competing ambitions, it has created a new military and political reality whose consequences are likely to extend well beyond Mali’s borders.

Bamako, Mali – The ambush that killed at least 50 Malian soldiers and struck a joint convoy of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Russia’s Africa Corps near the northern town of Anefis on July 18 was more than another battlefield setback.

It underscored how Mali’s armed groups are becoming increasingly coordinated, exposing the limits of the military government’s security strategy, despite growing Russian military support.

The Malian military confirmed the assault and said it had launched counter-operations, while Africa Corps later released footage it said showed drone strikes targeting fighters involved in the ambush.

The attack is the latest in a series of coordinated operations across northern Mali since April, raising questions about why armed groups are increasingly cooperating, whether Bamako’s security strategy is working, whether Russia’s military role has – and has not – changed, and what the conflict could mean for the wider Sahel.

Why are separatist and Islamic armed groups fighting together?

The July 18 ambush was jointly claimed by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a coalition of predominantly Tuareg separatist groups, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel.

Until recently, such cooperation would have seemed unlikely as they have different longterm political aims. The FLA seeks greater autonomy or independence for northern Mali, while JNIM aims to establish governance based on its interpretation of Islamic law across the region.

For Héni Nsaibia, a senior West Africa analyst at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) monitor, the answer lies in a shared battlefield enemy rather than a shared ideology.

“The Tuareg-led separatists and JNIM are currently fighting together because they share a common enemy in the Malian armed forces and their Russian partners from the Africa Corps,” Nsaibia told Al Jazeera.

“In doing so, they act as force multipliers for one another, allowing them to pool resources and mutualise their efforts to confront their adversaries more effectively. These groups also share kinship ties despite their ideological differences and regard one another as sons of the land, defending their ancestral territory against invading forces.”

For Mali’s military, that cooperation makes attacks harder to anticipate and more difficult to repel, allowing armed groups to combine local knowledge, manpower and operational experience while pursuing separate objectives.

The military government’s decision to abandon the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, request the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and deepen military cooperation with Russia reshaped the conflict. The collapse of the peace framework removed one of the few mechanisms managing relations between Bamako and northern armed groups, while the military’s increasingly confrontational approach encouraged former rivals to coordinate against a common adversary.

The shift became increasingly visible during coordinated attacks launched across several parts of the country in April, stretching Malian and Russian forces across multiple fronts. More recently, fighting around Anefis has shown that the alliance is capable not only of launching simultaneous operations but also of sustaining pressure on strategically important military positions.

With negotiations abandoned and military confrontation becoming the dominant strategy, armed groups that once competed with one another have found greater incentives to cooperate on the battlefield.

Has Russia changed the course of Mali’s war?

Since replacing the Wagner Group as Moscow’s principal military presence in Mali, Africa Corps has become an increasingly important partner for the Malian army.

Its personnel have provided combat support alongside Malian forces, while Russian drones and aircraft have expanded the military’s surveillance and strike capabilities. Those capabilities have strengthened the army’s ability to respond to attacks and defend key positions.

“Russia has helped strengthen Mali’s military, which was at risk of being overrun, and has given it more support on the battlefield,” Nimi Princewill, a regional analyst specialising in West Africa and the Sahel, told Al Jazeera.

“But this attack, as well as the earlier seizure of Kidal, suggests the Kremlin’s military support has not changed the overall picture. The conflict remains deeply rooted, with geographical and ideological dimensions that are proving difficult for the junta to tackle.” The army seized Kidal, a key town in the country’s north that the Tuareg rebels held for nearly a decade, in November 2023, but Tuareg and allied fighters retook the town in April this year.

Rather than transforming the conflict, Moscow’s military backing appears to have strengthened the army’s battlefield capabilities without addressing the political, governance and security conditions that continue to fuel the violence.

Recent operations reinforce that assessment. Convoys travelling through northern Mali continue to face frequent ambushes, particularly along routes linking Gao, Anefis and other military positions, exposing the continued vulnerability of military supply lines despite increased Russian support.

The shift away from Western security partners also changed the type of assistance available. While Africa Corps has strengthened Mali’s combat capabilities, the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) ended an international presence that provided logistics, monitoring and intelligence support across much of northern Mali.

The result is a military that has become more effective in direct combat but continues to struggle to secure vast, remote territory against increasingly adaptable armed groups.

Has Bamako’s strategy paid off?

The limitations of Bamako’s security strategy raise broader questions about whether it is translating battlefield gains into lasting security.

Since seizing power in 2020, Mali’s military government has centred its strategy on military force, ending longstanding cooperation with Western partners while strengthening defence ties with Russia.

But the repeated ambushes around Anefis and along northern supply routes suggest the measurable gains of this approach on the battlefield have yet to translate into lasting strategic control.

More fundamentally, the growing cooperation between armed groups with different objectives suggests that Bamako’s strategy has not prevented them from adapting and reshaping the conflict.

What could this mean for the wider Sahel?

The implications of the Anefis ambush extend well beyond Mali.

JNIM, the al-Qaeda affiliate, already operates across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while fighting continues to spread across the central Sahel.

The evolving battlefield also presents a challenge for the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), whose members all face persistent armed violence despite expanding military cooperation. The alliance was created to strengthen collective security, but increasingly coordinated attacks suggest that cooperation among governments is being matched by equally adaptable cooperation among armed groups.

At the same time, Mali’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has reduced opportunities for regional coordination with neighbouring countries confronting many of the same security threats.

If the FLA-JNIM partnership proves durable, it could encourage similar tactical cooperation elsewhere in the Sahel, further complicating efforts to contain armed groups whose operations already span national borders.

“The AES was supposed to mean that our security was finally our own business. But when Mali bleeds, Niger bleeds with it, because the armed groups attacking those convoys do not recognise the Alliance of Sahel States any more than they recognised ECOWAS. We traded one set of partners we did not trust for another, and the war is still coming south,” a Niger-based security expert, who requested anonymity because he feared potential repercussions, told Al Jazeera.

Whether the tactical partnership between the FLA and JNIM proves durable remains uncertain. But the Anefis ambush suggests that as Mali’s security strategy shifts, armed groups are adapting in response, with consequences that could extend far beyond Mali’s borders.

Relations begin to thaw as both countries reinstate ambassadors and reopen airspace closed to each other since April 2025.

More than a year after a diplomatic fallout, relations between Algeria and Mali are beginning to thaw, with both countries reinstating their ambassadors and reopening their airspace to one another.

Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune announced on Saturday that the country’s ambassador would return to Mali, a day after Algiers fully reopened its airspace to civilian and military aircraft travelling to and from its southern neighbour.

Issa Ousmane Coulibaly, spokesperson for Mali’s military government, confirmed in a statement that Bamako had taken reciprocal measures.

Relations between the two African nations deteriorated in April last year after Algeria said it had shot down a Malian surveillance drone for violating its airspace. Bamako disputes this, saying the drone was downed within its own borders.

The fallout between Algeria and Mali has jeopardised security in the Sahel region. Mali is a member of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), along with Burkina Faso and Niger. Both Ouagadougou and Niamey also withdrew their ambassadors to Algeria in April last year in solidarity with their ally.

The AES has experienced a surge in attacks by armed groups linked to the ISIL (ISIS) group and al-Qaeda in recent years. Many analysts argue that such groups were able to establish a foothold in the Sahel partly because of the NATO-backed overthrow of longtime Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

The ousting of Gaddafi left a power vacuum that has been exploited by armed groups. Vast stockpiles of weapons belonging to forces loyal to him were looted and are believed to have been used by those groups.

Algeria has previously mediated peace talks between the Malian government and Tuareg separatist rebels waging an armed rebellion there.

However, last year’s diplomatic fallout led Algiers to step back from its role as mediator, raising concerns about Mali’s security and territorial integrity while also posing a threat to Algeria’s own internal security.

This April, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf reaffirmed Algiers’s support for Mali’s territorial integrity, rejecting what he described as all forms of “terrorism”.

Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque reports from West Africa where the Russian navy is carrying a shipment of weapons to help Mali’s government hold off a rebel advance. Al-Qaeda-linked militants and Tuareg separatists are laying siege to areas of Mali’s north, with Russian-backed forces stepping in to keep Mali’s military junta from collapsing.

Tuareg fighters in Mali have released footage claiming to show a Russian Africa Corps Mi-24 helicopter crashing after it was reportedly shot down. The incident comes amid escalating clashes between Malian forces, their Russian allies and armed groups.

Armed groups in military-run Mali have launched renewed coordinated attacks in several towns across the country.

The assaults on Saturday targeted army positions, including a base used by its troops and Russian forces.

A separatist Tuareg-led group and a regional al-Qaeda affiliate claimed responsibility for the attacks, which took place more than two months after the capital, Bamako, and several other locations were targeted in a coordinated ⁠assault by the same groups.

Here’s what to know:

Where did the attacks take place?

In an initial statement, the Malian army confirmed attacks on five positions: in Aguelhok, Anefis and Gao in the north; Sevare in central Mali; and Kenieroba in the south.

The army later said the situation was “totally under control”, adding that 20 “terrorists” were killed in Sevare and six in Gao. One pro-government fighter was killed in Gao and four others were wounded, it said.

In a separate statement later on Saturday, the army said it had also repelled attacks in the central towns of Konna and Somadougou with the help of Africa Corps, a Russian-backed paramilitary group.

Videos posted on the Africa Corps’ Telegram channel on Sunday purported to show a drone attack targeting a rebel position in Anefis and a Russian soldier on top of a building at a base in Aguelhok. The footage could not be independently verified.

In Kenieroba, a major prison complex where members of Mali’s political opposition are held reportedly came under attack.

Who was behind the attacks?

A spokesperson for the ⁠Tuareg-dominated rebel group, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), told the Reuters news agency it was involved in the attacks.

The al-Qaeda-linked group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) also claimed responsibility, saying in a statement it had attacked and taken control of at least seven positions held by the army or pro-government fighters. The claims could not be independently verified.

Who are these groups?

JNIM was formed in 2017 as a coalition between the Saharan branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Malian armed groups Ansar Dine, Katina Macina and al-Mourabitoun.

It is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, who founded Ansar Dine in 2012, and has fighters across the border areas of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

JNIM’s main goal is to capture and control territory and to expel Western influences in its region of control. Some analysts suggested that JNIM may be seeking to control major cities and, ultimately, to govern the country as a whole.

The FLA was formed in 2024 from a coalition of separatist forces in northern Mali. Led by Alghabass Ag Intalla, it is engaging in the latest in a series of rebellions by the Tuareg fighting for self-determination and independence.

While often at odds, fighters from the two groups or their predecessors have also partnered on occasion to fight common enemies, namely Mali’s government and its allies.

In late April, they were behind a series of coordinated attacks that targeted locations across Mali and killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

What is Mali’s security situation?

Since gaining independence in 1960, Mali has experienced alternating cycles of political stability and instability, punctuated by rebellions, financial woes and military coups.

In 2012, ethnic Tuareg separatists, allied with fighters from an al-Qaeda offshoot, launched a rebellion that took control of the country’s north.

But the al-Qaeda-linked fighters swiftly pushed out the Tuareg rebels and seized key northern cities, triggering French military intervention in early 2013 at the request of the government.

In September 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected as Mali’s president. Under his government, the United Nations brokered a peace deal between the government and northern Tuareg groups fighting for an independent Azawad in 2015.

Keita was deposed in a military coup in August 2020 after months of mass protests over severe economic woes and the poor security situation.

In September that year, retired colonel and former Defence Minister Bah Ndaw was sworn in as interim president and coup leader Assimi Goita as vice president to lead a transitional government.

In May 2021, Goita seized power in a second coup and pledged to restore security. His government cut ties with Mali’s former colonial ruler, France, and expelled French forces and UN peacekeepers.

In December 2021, Goita invited the Russian mercenary group Wagner to support the military government in its fight against armed groups.

In June last year, Wagner said it would withdraw from Mali after more than three and a half years deployed there, but Russian mercenaries have remained in the country under the banner of the Africa Corps.

Alex Vines, the Africa programme director at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Al Jazeera the recent attacks have squeezed the control of Malian authorities into “securitised enclaves and corridors”.

“This has not improved overall security,” he said, noting that armed groups in the country have been coordinating their military action rather than competing with each other.

“In this context, foreign military support has limited success,” he added.

Tuareg-led armed ⁠group says it attacked northern town where Malian troops and Russian fighters are based.

Armed fighters have launched ⁠attacks in five ⁠locations across Mali, more than two months after gunmen attacked the capital and other parts of the country.

The attacks took place on Saturday in areas including ‌a northern town where government forces and Russian fighters are ⁠based, and ⁠a town south of ⁠the capital, ⁠Bamako, Mali’s military and security sources said.

The army said the attacks targeted Aguelhok, Anefis, Gao, Sevare and Kenieroba.

The AFP news agency said a prison in Kenieroba was attacked, citing residents and security sources.

It reported that the fighting in different locations started at about 5am local time (05:00 GMT).

A Tuareg-led armed ⁠group confirmed that it had attacked a northern Malian town early on Saturday.

Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, a spokesperson for the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), told the Reuters news agency that fighters from the group ⁠attacked the town of Anefis ⁠in the northeastern Kidal region.

Government and Russian troops deployed in Anefis in the wake of attacks on April 25 and 26, in which the FLA and the regional al-Qaeda ⁠affiliate seized control of Kidal town.

Ramadane also told AFP that “several positions have fallen, but fighting is still underway inside the city” of Anefis.

An Anefis resident contacted by AFP said “armed groups are in the town, but the army is still putting up resistance. The camp [there] has not yet fallen”.

Anefis and Aguelhok, both in the north, are the last remaining locations where Mali’s army maintains a presence in the Kidal region, following the April attacks.

Meanwhile, in ⁠the central city of Gao, a local official told Reuters that gunfire and rockets had been launched at a military ‌camp since before dawn. It was not immediately clear which fighters were responsible.

In Sevare, another central town, “explosions rang out … around 5am, though their origin is not yet known. Shortly thereafter, several aircraft were spotted flying over the area”, a security source told AFP.

In Kenieroba, the major prison complex was also under attack, a prisoner in the facility told AFP.

Saturday’s assault was the latest threat to the military-led government in the landlocked Sahel country where rebels staged high-profile attacks in ‌April, hitting the airport in the capital, Bamako, killing the defence minister and seizing a string of army bases in the north.

Casablanca court delivers landmark verdict in ‘Escobar of the Sahara’ case: up to 12 years for top figures.

A Moroccan court has handed prison sentences of up to 12 years to 29 individuals – including prominent politicians and sports figures – concluding a major international drug trafficking and corruption trial.

The verdicts, delivered late on Thursday in Casablanca following a two-year trial, mark one of the largest anti-corruption operations in Morocco’s history.

Among those convicted were Abdennebi Bioui, a construction tycoon and former regional council president, Said Naciri, former president of Casablanca’s Wydad AC football and sports club and former MP Belkacem Mir – all senior members of the governing PAM party. Naciri received 10 years, Bioui 12 and Mir 10.

Besides the three main defendants, sentences for the remaining ranged from two to nine years, depending on their individual role in the network.

The wide-ranging case was triggered by courtroom testimony from El Hadj Ahmed Ben Brahim, a notorious Malian drug trafficker nicknamed the “Pablo Escobar of the Sahara”.

Currently serving a 10-year sentence in Morocco, Ben Brahim told judicial investigators that his former Moroccan political and business associates had betrayed him, seizing millions of dollars worth of his luxury real estate and vehicles following his arrest in 2019.

The trial involved more than 20 defendants, 18 witnesses and two civil parties which centred on a sophisticated network that transported tonnes of Moroccan cannabis resin across North Africa to Europe, alongside Latin American cocaine shipments.

Defendants were convicted on charges including drug and gold trafficking, corruption, forgery and money laundering.

The court also ordered the seizure of assets and levied hundreds of millions of dollars in customs and exchange fines against the principal ringleaders.

Moroccan media reported that families of the convicted, present without legal representation due to a lawyers’ strike, were left in shock, with some collapsing in the courthouse.

The scandal reached the highest levels of state, prompting King Mohammed VI to demand a legally binding code of ethics aimed at “moralising” parliamentary life.

It has been almost nine months since rebel groups imposed a fuel blockade on Mali’s capital Bamako. In late April, the conflict escalated further. The Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), along with members of Tuareg separatist movements, launched a coordinated attack on the Malian army and its Russian allies, the African Corps (formerly Wagner), which killed the Malian Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

The rebels seized control of military camps, recaptured the largest northern city of Kidal, and tightened the blockade on Bamako. This latest offensive is part of a long series of rebellions in what the Tuareg call Azawad, an area comprising the regions of Timbuktu, Taoudenit, Kidal, and Gao, which is predominantly populated by Tuareg communities.

The present crisis is compounded by the weakening of the Malian state following the 2021 coup and foreign intervention. In the absence of any serious effort to address it, instability could spill over across the whole Sahel region.

Ever since the country announced independence from France in 1960, Mali’s north has seen repeated upheaval as local Tuareg communities have demanded self-determination. Fourteen years ago, Tuareg groups allied with groups affiliated with al-Qaeda launched yet another rebellion. They managed to seize several cities in northern Mali, and had it not been for a French military intervention in 2013, they could have marched on Bamako.

Two French operations resulted in the weakening of the Tuareg movements and groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. This helped persuade them to participate in negotiations with the government, which ultimately ended with the signing of the Algiers Accords in 2015.

One of the most prominent clauses of this agreement was decentralisation in the Azawad region, which gave local leaders more power. Through this agreement, the Malian government secured the country’s territorial integrity in return for promises like the enhancement of development in the Azawad region, the integration of separatist fighters into the army, and the appointment of their leaders to political positions.

These accords helped maintain relative stability in Mali and the Sahel region by containing the sources of tension and secessionist calls. However, peace did not last long. Several challenges emerged, the most important of which was the failure of the government to honour its commitments to implement development projects in the north.

The situation got worse after the 2021 military coup led by General Assimi Goita. France, Algeria, and members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) refused to recognise the new authorities in Bamako. As a result, in 2022, the military government expelled French troops, and in 2024, abolished the Algiers Agreement. Thereafter, instead of diplomacy and dialogue, it adopted a militarised approach to controlling the restive north.

These steps strained Mali’s relations with Mauritania, Algeria, and France, with Bamako accusing them of providing logistical support to the rebels and interfering in its internal affairs. Consequently, the Malian state was weakened militarily and economically, as military coordination and trade with neighbours declined.

JNIM and the separatist movements exploited the situation. They sought to choke the capital by attacking key transport arteries where most imports and exports are routed. They disrupted supplies of gasoline and diesel coming from Senegal and the Ivory Coast, and began attacking Moroccan trucks carrying food supplies via Mauritania.

Like in 2012, the alliance between the Tuareg movements and al-Qaeda affiliates has proven successful. It has routed the Malian military, capturing more territory and operating freely close to Bamako.

This time, foreign forces have not been able to help the Malian army, as its Russian allies were forced to withdraw following the attack in late April. Meanwhile, Turkiye has seen its involvement in Mali grow amid growing instability. In early May, following the attacks on the Malian military, Ankara signed several defence agreements with the Malian military government.

The danger here is that the Malian crisis may not be contained only within the political crisis between the government and the separatist movements. It could also invite more foreign intervention as regional and global rivalries transfer onto Malian territory.

There is also the issue of the alliance between Azawadi movements and al-Qaeda affiliates, which could prove to be a ticking time bomb. There are clear contradictions within this relationship, as the two sides have no common ground except the agreement to overthrow the military regime in Bamako. This is why a future war in the north between the Azawadi movements and the Islamist groups is quite likely.

The Malian crisis inevitably has regional repercussions. The ongoing humanitarian crisis could trigger a major migration wave towards Europe and North America. Continuing instability in the north could open more space for the growth of extremist movements, which can expand their attacks across the region. Consequently, the Malian crisis can become a direct security threat to neighbouring countries, the region, and the world.

As the situation stands now, no warring side is able to achieve a decisive military victory. Therefore, a resolution of the conflict can only be achieved through dialogue and negotiation. Bamako needs to seriously consider the grievances of Tuareg communities in the north and their demands.

It is in the collective interest of neighbouring countries and regional powers to bring the parties to the negotiating table and seek peaceful solutions to this crisis. Under the threat of a regional spillover, there is no time to waste.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Niger’s military government has banned many local and foreign reporters since seizing power in 2023.

Media watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has condemned Niger’s suspension of nine French media publications as the military government continues to crack down on journalists.

Niger announced the suspension on Friday, citing “repeated dissemination of content likely to seriously jeopardise public order, national unity, social cohesion, and the stability of the institutions of the Republic”.

The suspended organisations are France 24, RFI (Radio France Internationale), France Afrique Media, LSI Africa, AFP (Agence France-Presse), TV5 Monde, TF1 Info, Jeune Afrique and Mediapart, according to a TV statement from the National Communication Observatory (ONC).

It added that the decision was “immediate” and it included “satellite packages, cable networks, digital platforms, websites and mobile applications”.

RSF described the decision as “abusive”.

“RSF condemns a coordinated strategy to repress press freedom within the AES [Alliance of Sahel States] and calls for the immediate reversal of this abusive decision,” said a statement posted on X, referring to Niger and allies Mali and Burkina Faso, all ruled by military governments.

Niger’s military seized power in July 2023, toppling the democratically elected government of President Mohamed Bazoum and detaining him.

The government has since targeted local and foreign media outlets, particularly those critical of its policies, by issuing bans or suspensions.

RFI and France 24 were suspended a few days after the coup, and the BBC from Britain was suspended in December 2024.

The targeting of French and other foreign media comes as Niger’s military government has largely severed ties with its former colonial power, France, and turned away from Western allies.

In late 2023, Niger asked leaders in Paris to withdraw thousands of troops involved in missions against armed groups operating in Niger, neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso.

The three AES states have since secured defence partnerships with other countries, notably Russia.

All three have regularly denounced France’s “imperialism”, saying they want to assert their “sovereignty”. French media and other foreign outlets have similarly been suspended or banned by the governments in Bamako and Ouagadougou.

Local journalists have also been affected. Two Nigerien journalists, Gazali Abdou, a correspondent for German broadcaster Deutsche Welle, and Hassane Zada, a regional newspaper editor, were released this week after being detained for months.

In 2024, leaders in the capital Niamey strengthened a law that criminalises the digital dissemination of “data likely to disturb public order”.

The United Nations said in November that 13 journalists were arrested in Niger and urged the government to release them. Local media organisations say six journalists are detained for allegedly “undermining national defence” and for “conspiracy against the authority of the state”.

According to AFP, Niger suspended nearly 3,000 local and foreign NGOs in 2025, accusing them of lacking transparency and supporting “terrorists” and armed groups.

Niger dropped 37 places in this year’s RSF World Press Freedom Index and now ranks 120th out of 180 countries. RSF and Amnesty International have repeatedly voiced concerns about the “decline” in press freedom in Niger.