Latin

Until not so long ago Latin America had been considered a quiet region, located far from the world’s superpower main strategic confrontations, with sporadic but crucial moments that helped to shape the international order as we know it today. The Cuban Missile Crisis is the clearest example: it became the starting point for a series of agreements and treaties on nuclear and strategic security, involving both the US and the Soviet Union at first, and later extending to other actors of the international community, from Europe, Asia and Latin America, which became the first region free from nuclear weapons after the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, 5 years after the crisis. After this episode, the region’s relevance seemed to fade, and Latin American countries appeared condemned to a destiny of surfing between weak political cohesion internally and relatively stable economies, even as most of its governments remained closely aligned with Washington on foreign policy matters.

It was precisely during this period of perceived irrelevance that China began building its presence in the region, very gradually and over the course of a little more than two decades. Washington largely ignored this process, even as it became clear that the Asian giant was becoming the largest trading partner for several South American countries, such as Peru and Brazil, and in many cases also the main investor in their economies. This neglect was not born of ignorance: it reflected, instead, a confidence that local governments would remain compliant regardless of who was investing in them. President Trump’s first term illustrates this well. Despite isolated clashes with the governments of Mexico and Venezuela, these episodes looked minor when compared to the “tariff wars” waged against the EU and China. In fact, the only time Trump ever set foot in the region during his entire first term was in November 2018 when he attended the G20 Forum in Buenos Aires. Significantly, there was a planned short visit in Colombia after this event, but I was cancelled. This was widely read at the time as a confirmation that Latin America remained a low priority for Washington’s foreign policy agenda, more due to the expectable compliance of local governments than ignorance of the importance of the region as a resource base capable of fueling US power projection in other regions.

It was only during Trump’s second term that American foreign policy has shifted towards the Western Hemisphere, attributing strategic importance to the region and setting the objective to maintain a near-absolute dominant presence, involving both economic and military dimensions, as is stated in the latest National Security Strategy of 2025.

By the time this shift was formalized, China’s footprint in the region was already deep and country-specific. In Brazil, China had been the largest trading partner since 2009; bilateral trade hit a record $171 billion in 2025, with China accounting for 27.2% of Brazil’s total foreign trade, besides, EV plants and a still planned bi-oceanic railway linking Brazil to Peru’s Pacific coast were being negotiated as part of the Chinese investment strategy in both countries. In Argentina, China became the primary supplier of mobile network infrastructure, part of a broader Chinese push into Latin American 5G and data-center markets. And in Peru, China invested around $1.3 billion in the strategic port of Chancay, a deepwater facility that entered full operation stage in November 2024, and set a new phase for trade between China and South America, bypassing the traditional deepwater ports located in the US, like the ports of Oakland and Stockton. Reinforcing this, China pledged in May 2025, at the CELAC forum ministerial meeting in Beijing, to ramp up its regional engagement even further. These were not isolated transactions but a structural presence, one that the 2025 National Security Strategy now identifies strictly as the rival foothold it intends to dislodge.

Now, within this context in 2026 the declared shift of interests proved it wasn’t merely rhetorical. The year started with the launching of Operation Resolve, when a group of American special military forces conducted a military raid and captured President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in Caracas, transporting them to New York to face narcoterrorism charges. Trump declared that the US was now “in charge” of Venezuela until a transition takes place. This meant in practice that the US would hold control over the country’s oil exports, which during the first four months after Maduro’s capture were estimated at $8 billion, but the data on how much oil has been sold, the revenue from it and the use given to those funds remains secret. The main importers of Venezuelan oil during this period were the United States (43 percent), India (26 percent, part of the strategy to reduce Indian import of Russian oil), and Spain (8 percent). This episode, condemned by critics as a return to the old days of imperialism, set the tone for the rest of the year: a hemisphere where Washington would use military force, tariffs, and other mechanics for pressuring countries to sign economic deals where American core interests prevail.

An example of this is the new and controversial Trade and Investment agreement signed by the United States and Argentina in February of this year. According to the text, Argentina shall adapt the regulatory framework to implement US trade standards and prioritize American direct investment in the country, while the counterpart shall “try to review its tariffs” and “consider supporting investment financing”. Milei’s government has justified this as the price for ideological loyalty and continued financial support after the $20 billion credit line that helped to stabilize the local currency (peso) last year.

On the other hand, Brazil took the opposite path: rather than just seeking accommodation to this policy, the government of Lula da Silva accelerated diversification, finalizing the long-delayed EU-Mercosur agreement in January, deepening trade with China and signing a memorandum of understanding with aims for further strategic partnership with Russia. Notably, the US has implemented another mechanism of pressure here, condemning the imprisonment of former president Jair Bolsonaro and holding a meeting with his son Flavio Bolsonaro, who will participate in the presidential elections this October. This gives clear signs of indirect support for this far-right candidate, following the regional trend with Milei in Argentina and Keiko Fujimori in Peru.

Peru, meanwhile, illustrates a third pattern and an interesting case, because alignment here is imposed less by negotiation than by sheer state fragility. Amid a presidency turning over for the ninth time in a decade, the US State Department warned in February that China’s control over the Chancay megaport threatens Peru’s sovereignty, following a Peruvian court ruling that exempted the port from national oversight. Peru’s case pictures a scenario where both counterparts keep pushing for concessions and more privileges. Under the government of José María Balcázar, the ninth president in 10 years, the country has been involved in the controversial purchase of 12 F-16 jetfighters with a cost of around $3.5 billion. On April he postponed the official ceremony where this deal was supposed to be signed arguing that it would have to be the responsibility of a new president, the decision was met with pushback, both internally, with declarations from the Ministry of Defense and in the US Embassy, with ambassador Bernardo Navarro declaring “If you deal with the U.S. in bad faith and undermine U.S. interests, rest assured, I, on behalf of [President] Trump and his administration, will use every available tool to protect and promote the prosperity and security of the United States and our region.” After this, with both internal and diplomatic pressure, the deal was signed on the 17th of April.

Taken together, these cases suggest the current US approach to Latin America is not fueled by a single ideological logic, but by transactional calculations that value compliance and heavily punishes resistance, exploiting weaknesses here and there and aiming to these policy goal indifferently to whether the country in question is led by a right, left or ideologically undefined government. What seems quite clear is that the decades of quietness in Latin America have ended, not necessarily because the region has changed, many of the deep challenges for development are still present, but because the rivalry that once defined the Cuban Missile Crisis has returned, this time fought over trade tariffs, infrastructure and technology access rather than missiles.

As 2026 reaches its halfway point, the editors of De Los are eager to talk about Latin artists to watch — and share their hottest music takes. Over the years, award-winning music journalist Suzy Exposito and Director of Latino Initiatives Fidel Martinez have documented the rise of genres like reggaeton and música Mexicana in mainstream culture.

In her work for Vogue, The Times and Rolling Stone, Exposito has interviewed influential artists like Shakira, Cardi B and Bad Bunny (the last of which made history as the first Rolling Stone cover story written by a Latina journalist).

Martinez has an impressive roster of his own, having interviewed many stars in the Mexican and Chicano music scenes, from Fuerza Regida to Natalia Lafourcade.

Reflecting on a landmark year for Latin music

On this week’s episode of “The De Los Podcast,” they weigh in on the explosive impact of 2025 on the genre: between Bad Bunny‘s Super Bowl halftime show and Karol G‘s Coachella headlining performance, last year was nothing short of a groundbreaking for Latin music.

“Being there, you could feel barriers coming down,” Martinez, who reported live from the Super Bowl in February, said. “It wasn’t Bad Bunny trying to validate us in front of others. It was him saying, ‘This is who we are, and we are proud of who we are.’”

According to the RIAA, 2025 was the first year that Latin music sales in the U.S. reached $1 billion, in its 10th consecutive year of growth. In 2016, American Latin music sales were at just below $150 million.

“It highlights how quickly and with what speed the genre has been taking off,” Martinez said.

However, as Exposito notes, at times, it came at the cost of originality.

A Latin music trend that De Los is leaving behind this year

“Our generation is too married to the past,” Exposito said. “How can we evolve musically if we keep trying to re-create our grandparents’ music?”

Nostalgia, De Los editors note, has driven the wide-ranging popularity of last year’s most successful Latin projects. As Exposito says, the artists “mine the past in their own ways.”

In Bad Bunny’s “DtMF” and Karol G’s “Tropicoqueta,” classic genres like salsa, plena and cumbia took center stage. “DtMF” samples El Gran Combo de Puerto Rico while in Fuerza Regida samples Mexican classics like Vicente Fernández.

While comforting and educational for younger generations, Martinez argues that artists relying on nostalgia could turn that effort into becoming more experimental with their sound.

Some artists, however, are resisting the nostalgia trend, making De Los’ best albums list of 2026 … so far.

De Los’ 2026 Latin albums you need to hear

Suzy’s picks:

Alvaro Díaz, “Omakase”

“He’s experimental … and taking bold swings, with producers like Tainy,” Exposito said.

“Omakase,” which the Puerto Rican star released in May, blends Latin trap elements with electronic, R&B and in one track, cumbia, for a diverse, thoughtful album that Diaz equates in his De Los story to the Japanese dish omakase, or a platter decided by the chef.

RaiNao, “Marcría”

With a worldplay title that blends the words “malcriada” (badly raised woman) and “cria por el mar” (born in the sea), RaiNao’s project promises earthly, intimate lyricism with experimental musicianship.

“The way she melds jazz with reggaeton and folkloric elements, I really enjoy,” Exposito said. “I really appreciate people (like RaiNao) who can remix but also introduce seemingly disparate elements, like saxophone and Caribbean music.”

Other picks include Ibeyi’s “Offering” and Diles Que No Me Maten’s “Escrito en Agua.”

Fidel’s picks:

Julieta Venegas, “Norteña”

Venegas, who De Los interviewed last month, wrote a memoir alongside this album, which delves into her Tijuana heritage with Mexican collaborators like Bronco, is what Martinez calls “a chef’s kiss.”

“She’s such a fascinating character because she started as an indie rocker,” Martinez said. “This album is a love letter to Tijuana. It’s just the perfect fusion of tradition and pop.”

Hermanos Espinoza, “Linaje”

Two brothers from the Rio Grande Valley, Hermanos Espinoza performed at De Los’ SXSW showcase and blew the audience away with their live energy and accordion work.

“Their project talks about lineage. This album certainly has a point of view,” Martinez said. “With this album, they said, música Mexicana can be like rock and roll.”

Also on the list are Tito Doble P’s “Acomodo” and Trio Asesino’s self-titled.

To hear more about 2026’s emerging artists and De Los’ music hot takes, check out “The De Los Podcast.”

June 24 (UPI) — Investment from the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean fell 11% in 2025, although the country remained the region’s leading source of foreign direct investment, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, or ECLAC, reported.

The organization presented its annual report, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2026: Navigating the New Global Context, in Santiago, Chile, on Tuesday. The report showed that the region received $194.233 billion in foreign direct investment in 2025, up 1.7% from the previous year.

ECLAC attributed the modest growth to an international environment marked by geopolitical tensions, technological rivalry among major powers and changes in U.S. trade policy.

The United States accounted for 35% of foreign investment with an identifiable origin entering the region, while Europe represented 32%.

ECLAC said the decline in U.S. investment flows and the increase in European investment significantly narrowed the gap between the two players.

The organization warned that recent changes in U.S. tariff policy could affect Latin American countries unevenly depending on their productive structures and their level of integration into regional value chains.

“In the current global context of weaponized interdependence, it is essential to understand the relationship between trade and foreign direct investment in order to design policies that allow us to advance toward more productive, inclusive and sustainable development,” ECLAC Executive Secretary José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs said.

During the presentation of the report, Salazar-Xirinachs also said the world had moved from a period in which economic interdependence was viewed as a source of efficiency and even a guarantee of peace to one in which it is increasingly perceived as a source of vulnerability, according to statements reported by Xinhua.

Brazil remained the region’s leading destination for foreign investment, attracting $77.676 billion, equivalent to 40% of the regional total. Mexico received $43.221 billion, or 22% of the total, although it recorded a year-over-year decline. Together, the two countries accounted for 62% of all foreign investment received by Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025, according to ECLAC.

They were followed by Chile with 7% of regional flows, Peru and Colombia with 6% each, Guyana with 5%, and Costa Rica and Dominican Republic with 3%.

The sectoral composition also showed changes. Services attracted 53% of foreign investment received by the region and increased 19.5% from the previous year. Natural resources rose 7% and accounted for 16% of the total, while manufacturing declined 17.2% and represented 31% of investment flows.

The report also showed signs of caution among investors. During 2025, 1,326 new investment projects were announced with a combined value of $114.1 billion, a decline of 10.2% in the number of projects and 34.3% in value compared with 2024.

In response to this scenario, ECLAC recommended diversifying export markets and sources of investment, strengthening coordination between trade and investment policies, and expanding regional cooperation to reduce dependence on individual markets and increase economic resilience.

WASHINGTON — Colombian presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella has vowed to crush criminal groups and slash government programs. He promises to bomb “narco-terrorist” camps and build sprawling mega prisons if he wins Sunday’s runoff election.

De la Espriella’s views have earned him the vociferous backing of President Trump, who has broken with White House tradition by publicly seeking to tip the scales in foreign elections — particularly in Latin America.

After Trump gave his “complete and total endorsement” to De la Espriella, whom he referred to by his nickname, “El Tigre,” the candidate posted an AI-generated image of a bald eagle and a tiger, with American and Colombian flags waving side by side.

“You have paved the way for the people to defeat the entrenched powers that have long held sway,” he wrote to Trump. “In Colombia, we have now begun to follow the same path.”

De la Espriella, a political newcomer who built his campaign around gym workout videos and vows to “disembowel” the left, is part of a new wave of far-right, MAGA-aligned politicians in Latin America openly borrowing from Trump’s playbook, presenting themselves as outsiders who will trim the government, curtail immigration and militarize law enforcement.

In a region that remains plagued by high crime and inequality after a decades-long period of leftist domination known as the “Pink Tide,” the playbook appears working.

More Latin Americans now identify with the right than at any time over the last two decades, according to polling firm Latinobarómetro. A series of conservatives have won presidential elections in recent years, giving Trump a slate of willing partners as he seeks to expand U.S. power in the region, combat drug cartels and counter growing Chinese influence.

President Trump meets with El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele, in the Oval Office of the White House on April 14, 2025.

(Brendan Smialowski / AFP via Getty Images)

Among Trump’s many allies are Argentina’s Javier Milei, a libertarian firebrand whose dramatic cuts to state services were a blueprint for Elon Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency, known as DOGE; and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, a mano dura autocrat who housed U.S. deportees in his notorious prisons to assist Trump’s immigration crackdown.

Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa has welcomed U.S. Special Forces, who are attacking drug traffickers in his country, and Chile’s José Antonio Kast has pledged a border wall along his country’s frontier with Peru and Bolivia in his quest to “make Chile great again.”

Trump might soon gain another ideological bedfellow in Peru with the election of Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of late autocrat Alberto Fujimori. With ballots still being counted, Fujimori was on track for a narrow victory

In a sea of nations led by conservatives, the left now retains power in just three key countries: Mexico, Colombia and Brazil.

It faces serious challenges in two of them.

Ahead of October’s presidential election in Brazil, incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a leftist stalwart and one of the last vestiges of the Pink Tide, has been polling even with Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro, a Trump ally convicted of convening a Jan. 6-style insurrection.

Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro, right, with President Trump during a dinner at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate in Palm Beach, Fla., on March 7, 2020.

(Alan Santos / Associated Press)

And then there’s Colombia, where De la Espriella, a criminal defense attorney, surged ahead in the first round of voting and this weekend faces off against Sen. Iván Cepeda, an ally of leftist President Gustavo Petro.

Petro drew Trump’s ire by denouncing the U.S. military campaign to oust leftist President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela and a spate of lethal U.S. attacks on alleged drug boats.

Petro slammed Trump’s endorsement of De la Espriella, calling on Colombians to “vote freely and not allow ourselves to become either slaves or anyone’s colony.”

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum also accused Trump of electoral interference after the U.S. announced drug trafficking charges against several members of her ruling Morena party and The Times revealed that two more sitting governors are under investigation.

“Is it truly a legitimate interest to combat organized crime?” Sheinbaum asked of the U.S. investigations. “Or are we perhaps witnessing how sectors of the American far right … intend to influence the 2027 election in our country?”

President Trump meets with Argentine President Javier Milei during the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 23, 2025, in New York.

(Evan Vucci / Associated Press)

The White House has declined to comment on Sheinbaum’s criticism. But Trump earlier this month warned Mexico that his administration is “focused on coming in by land” to deter drug trafficking.

“President Trump has been clear that Mexico must do more to combat the drug cartels running rampant in their country,” a White House official told The Times when asked whether Trump is planning a military operation there.

Trump, who publicly backed Kast and President Nasry Asfura of Honduras, as well as Milei’s political party ahead of Argentina’s midterm elections last fall, has openly mused that he should charge money for endorsement of leaders in foreign countries.

Guillaume Long, who served as foreign minister in Ecuador under leftist President Rafael Correa and who is now a fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, criticized Trump’s “unprecedented, unabashed interventionism in Latin American politics.”

“There are a number of taboos that have been broken,” he said.

Long added that Latin America is mirroring the United States in its political divisions. “I think we’re likely to see in the coming decades a very polarized politics,” he said. “And that doesn’t bode very well for political stability.”

Much of Trump’s activity in the region, including the deposing of Maduro, has been presented as part of a war on drug cartels, which the White House has formally declared terrorist organizations. Long described that rationale as a “pretext” for expanding U.S. political and economic influence in the region.

Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, are escorted by federal agents as they make their way to an armored car for a trip to a federal courthouse in Manhattan on Jan. 5.

(XNY/Star Max/GC Images)

He said he believed that focus on cartels had pushed some Latin American politicians to the right “because they think being security hawks will make them popular with the Trump administration.”

But James Bosworth, the founder of Hxagon, a company that provides political risk analysis in Latin America, said many leaders in the region have come to tough-on-crime policies on their own.

“I think that some of the hemisphere is willing to play along with it because the hemisphere has issues, including security issues, where the U.S. can be of assistance,” Bosworth said. “Many Latin Americans do want a greater military focus, so there’s certain alignment that’s occurred.”

Conversely, Mexican journalist Alex González Ormerod said he believes Trump has been influenced by Latin American leaders, including Bukele, who suspended civil liberties and began locking up alleged gang members en masse in 2021.

“I think there’s a lot of cross-pollination going on,” he said, crediting groups like the Conservative Political Action Conference, a gathering of right-wing activists and elected officials that has hosted events in Brazil and Argentina.

Many analysts cautioned that Latin America operates on a pendulum, swinging every few years between right and left.

“There’s a lot of evidence that voters are just unhappy and voting for the opposition, and then losing patience very quickly with whoever is in office,” said Benjamin Gedan, director of the Latin America Program at the Stimson Center.

Voters dissatisfied with the status quo so often vote out incumbents there is a phrase for it: voto castigo, or “the punishment vote.”

Ceballos reported from Washington and Linthicum from Mexico City.

The Recording Academy announced significant changes for the 2027 Grammys, introducing several new genre categories and updating eligibility rules for two of its top awards.

The rule changes will most prominently affect the new artist and album categories.

A change to allow for four submissions for new artist instead of three “establishes more specific language surrounding prominence,” the academy said in a statement. The change updates the famously confusing criteria for new artist, in which acts familiar to some fans for years can suddenly break through and earn new consideration for the category.

It’s likely to benefit an artist such as Ella Langley, who had previously submitted several times for new artist but finally had a commercial and critical breakthrough with her single “Choosin’ Texas” and LP “Dandelion.”

“We’ve heard from the music community that the way artists are being developed is changing, and the time it’s taking to find success or recognition can take longer than it once did. Artists are often releasing more music before they actually break through the consciousness of consumers or of our voters, and that evolution directly impacts this Category,” Recording Academy Chief Executive Harvey Mason Jr. said in a statement announcing the changes. The changes “reflect the reality that artist development looks different than it did even a few years ago.”

In the album category, new rules state that “the threshold of new recordings required on an eligible album is lowered from 75% to 66% to reduce the exclusion of entries that are widely recognized throughout the music industry as new albums.” Given the fast streaming-centric release cycle of new singles, remixes and live cuts, the rule changes reflect that a new album may have a significant amount material released earlier.

Additionally, the academy announced five new genre categories, most significantly a dedicated award for Asian pop — a late but welcome acknowledgment of the commercial reach, artistic accomplishments and deep fan culture of K-pop and other scenes in Japan, the Philippines and China.

Other new categories include Latin song, a songwriting-specific award for Latin music in an era when Bad Bunny and Karol G make some of pop’s most salient political and creative statements; distinct awards for R&B collaboration or duo/group performance and R&B solo performance; a new traditional pop vocal performance award; and the replacement of folk album with categories for contemporary folk album and traditional folk album.

Additionally, a new “ballot plus” option will allow for voting members working across genres to vote in more categories, and songwriting contributors to winning albums in most genre categories will receive Grammy statuettes and achievement certificates, as producers and engineers currently receive.

“These changes and expansions give even more people a place for their music to be respected, heard and evaluated. With more Categories, we can represent more music creators, artists, writers, and producers, and it gives us a great opportunity to be more inclusive,” Mason said in his statement. “Now more than ever, we have to keep pace because things are changing and evolving so quickly. These changes are a reflection of that fast-paced evolution.”

BUENOS AIRES, June 5 (UPI) — Argentine retirees have become one of the groups hardest hit by President Javier Milei’s fiscal austerity measures, which have pushed a growing number of older adults back into the workforce to supplement incomes that no longer cover the cost of living.

Over the past two years, the number of employed Argentines age 65 and older increased 12.7%, sociologist Candelaria Rueda, a researcher at the Argentina Grande Institute, told UPI.

The trend has had a particularly strong impact on women. Labor force participation among people older than 65 increased 14.5% for women, nearly four percentage points higher than the 10.8% increase recorded among men, according to a report by the think tank based on official data from the National Institute of Statistics and Census, known as INDEC.

One of those women is Patricia Guscione, 63. She worked as a teacher for decades and retired in 2021 at age 60, the legal retirement age for women in Argentina.

But rising living costs gradually eroded the value of her pension, leaving her unable to cover household expenses. When a call for retired teachers was issued in 2024, she applied. Today, she is back teaching in public schools.

“I lived on my pension for three years, but the reality is that it lost so much value that there came a point when I could no longer make it to the end of the month. I still have two teenage children who depend on me,” she told UPI.

Rueda said inflation remains a defining factor in Argentina’s economy and “causes incomes to lose value at an unusually rapid pace.”

“In addition, there has been a clear political decision to deregulate prices, which has led private health insurance premiums to rise 400% over the past two years,” she said.

At the center of the issue is Argentina’s minimum pension, the basic benefit received by more than half of the country’s retirees. It currently totals 450,300 Argentine pesos per month, or about $320. That includes a government assistance bonus that has remained frozen since early 2024.

Because the supplement has not been adjusted, the purchasing power of the minimum pension has fallen by nearly 10% compared with late 2023.

At the same time, food prices have continued to rise sharply, further reducing retirees’ spending power. Economic pressures have also intensified following cuts to free prescription drug coverage provided through the Comprehensive Medical Care Program, known as PAMI, Argentina’s main public healthcare system for retirees and pensioners.

Mario Perelli, 70, spent most of his career as an accountant, but now drives for ride-shareing platforms to supplement his income.

“I had never seen an economic situation like the one we are living through now. It keeps getting harder. I thought I had completed my working years and that retirement would allow me to enjoy life, travel and rest. Instead, I ended up driving for an app because I need to help support my household,” he said.

Juan Gómez, 76, faces a similar reality. After years working at an accounting firm, he now work for Uber and drives a taxi.

“I lived through different economic periods, and there were difficult moments under other governments, but this is terrible. I see it in retail stores, butcher shops, auto parts stores and oil-change businesses. There are hardly any customers. I hope things can be resolved and that we can move forward,” he said.

Gala Díaz Langou, executive director of the International Panel on Social Progress, linked the crisis to public spending cuts implemented by the current administration.

“In 2024, which was the year of the deepest adjustment, 19% of fiscal spending cuts were applied to the pension system,” she told UPI.

She also pointed to the continued freeze on the bonus supplement for lower pensions and the end of a program that allowed workers who had not completed the legally required 30 years of contributions to qualify for retirement benefits.

The trend of older adults extending their working lives is not limited to Argentina. It has become a regional phenomenon as Latin America faces a rapid demographic transition, lower levels of economic development and weaker social protection systems.

According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, employment among older adults is increasing across much of the region because pensions are insufficient to cover basic living expenses.

“As a result, employment among retirees functions as a refuge from the shortcomings of the system rather than a choice. When someone who contributed for decades ends up cleaning houses at age 82 or selling goods on the street, what that reflects is a protection system that failed to sustain the old age it helped create,” the commission said.

Carlos Román, executive director of SeniorLab UC, an aging innovation laboratory at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, told UPI that 1 in 4 older adults in Latin America was part of the labor force in 2024.

He said the trend is particularly visible in Chile among older age groups, where a significant share of people who have already reached retirement age continue working.

For Román, the phenomenon raises two key questions: Under what conditions do older adults work and what drives them to remain economically active?

Regarding working conditions, he warned that labor informality rises sharply with age.

“Labor informality does not decline over time. It accelerates, rising from 27.7% among people ages 60 to 64 to nearly 48% in the next age group and exceeding 60% among those older than 70,” he said.

He added that the impact is uneven across social groups.

“Among the poorest women ages 65 to 69, nearly 9 out of 10 work without a contract or pension coverage. About half of older adults working informally are self-employed workers without access to social protection,” he said.

While some older adults continue working because they are living longer and want to remain active, Román said “the evidence shows that, in most cases, the primary reason is economic necessity.”

He contended that the trend reflects a deeper structural problem that goes beyond national circumstances.

“Aging arrived in Latin America before the region built the economic model and social protection system capable of supporting it,” he said. “Economists often summarize this reality with a phrase that has become common in regional discussions: We will grow old before we grow rich.”

He said the region’s long-term challenge is to ensure that longer life expectancy does not translate into more years of economic insecurity and precarious living conditions.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa signed on Friday a revamped trade deal with Mexico as part of the EU’s efforts to expand its influence in Latin America, shortly after the Mercosur pact entered into force.

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The deal was signed at an EU–Mexico summit in Mexico, with von der Leyen and Costa joined by the country’s President Claudia Sheinbaum, amid rising geopolitical tensions and shifting global alliances following the return of US president to the White House.

The economic partnership between the two medium-sized powers reflects efforts on both sides to reduce their dependence on the US — the EU’s and Mexico’s largest trading partner—and on China, for which Mexico has become a hub for electric vehicle production.

“The EU and Mexico are committed to a close strategic partnership,” von der Leyen said, adding: “Today’s modernised Agreements set out our shared vision of the future and will deliver many benefits for both sides.”

The EU–Mexico trade deal strengthens the EU’s diversification strategy by updating a 20-year-old agreement that had already eliminated tariff barriers on bilateral trade.

Under the new deal, the EU will access new markets for products, such as agri-food (pork, dairy, cereals, fruit and pasta), pharmaceuticals and machinery.

EU tightens trade ties in Latin America

Mexico is the EU’s second-largest trading partner in Latin America and the EU is Mexico’s second-largest export market. Trade between both sides reached €86.8 billion in goods in 2025, alongside €29.7 billion in services in 2024.

The figures remain far smaller than Mexico’s trade with its neighbour, the US, which exceeded $900 billion in goods and services in 2024. But the deal comes as Mexico faces mounting pressure from a more protectionist White House.

For its part, the EU has been grappling with repeated tariff threats from Trump despite a trade deal clinched in 2025.

“At a time of growing global uncertainty, the EU and Mexico are choosing openness, partnership and ambition,” EU trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič, who was also in Mexico City, said. He pointed out that more than 43,000 European companies export to Mexico, while over 11,000 EU companies operate in the country.

On agriculture, the pact will open up new markets for Mexican products such as coffee, fruit, chocolate and agave syrup.

A total of 568 European and 26 Mexican geographical indications will also be protected, alongside the opening of public procurement markets, according to the Commission.

With this new deal, the EU also wants to signal its strengthened presence in Latin America, where China has expanded its influence.

“97% of the GDP of Latin America and the Caribbean will be covered by sophisticated preferential agreements with the European Union,” a senior EU official said, adding: “There is no other region in the world that has such a dense and connected network of agreements.”

The EU has already built new trade ties with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay through the Mercosur trade agreement, which provisionally entered into force on 1 May and liberalises trade flows between the EU and those countries.

However, its signing has faced strong opposition from EU farmers, who fear unfair competition from Latin American imports, and ratification was suspended after MEPs challenged the agreement before the EU Court of Justice.

Brussels argues the Mexico agreement should avoid the backlash faced by Mercosur because sensitive agricultural imports remain capped through tariff quotas.

DAKAR, Senegal — It’s an existence that Congo’s president has described as “living the Congolese dream.” For the 15 Latin Americans deported to the African nation under the Trump administration’s widely criticized crackdown on migrants, it feels more like a nightmare.

The Associated Press spoke with one, a 29-year old Colombian woman who confirmed what people deported to other African nations have described: A shackled deportation despite a U.S. immigration judge’s protection order. Confinement in a hotel with supervised outings.

And an impossible choice: Return to a home country with the risk of persecution or stay in Congo, a country the Colombian woman had never heard of before she arrived.

“They treat us like we’re children,” she said as their three-month Congolese visas near an end, with no plan in sight.

“What would one do in a completely unknown place, without a place to live and without knowing what to do?” she added, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals.

It was not immediately clear what a new U.S. court ruling, saying the U.S. likely broke the law by deporting a fellow Colombian to Congo, will mean for her.

A United Nations-affiliated group plays a central role

In her interview from the hotel in Congo’s capital, Kinshasa, where she and other deportees are held, the woman gave new details about the central role that a United Nations-affiliated body, the International Organization for Migration, is playing.

She said deportees are allowed to leave the hotel about once a week and only accompanied by IOM staff. When they shop at a supermarket or withdraw money they are quickly ushered back to their vehicle, with IOM staff never out of sight.

“They choose where we go and what we buy,” she said.

At the hotel, she said, IOM staff have organized activities like painting, music and volleyball but many deportees have stopped participating, bored with the routine. She goes for meals and remains in her room otherwise, making late-night calls to her 10-year-old daughter in Colombia and worrying when she will see her again.

Most striking is the role IOM staff are playing in presenting deportees with their possible fates.

They have offered the woman two paths: Return to Colombia, where a U.S. judge has ruled she cannot safely be sent back, while receiving IOM “protection and assistance,” or remain in Congo with no support.

“They are given impossible choices,” said Alma David, the woman’s U.S.-based attorney. “By deporting them to a third country with no opportunity to contest being sent there, the U.S. not only violated their due process rights but our own immigration laws and our obligations under international treaties.”

Congo is one of at least eight African countries that have made deals with the Trump administration to facilitate deportations of third-country nationals, which legal experts say are effectively a legal loophole for the U.S. Most deportees had received legal orders of protection from U.S. judges shielding them against being returned to their home countries, lawyers said.

The AP has interviewed others sent to African nations who were forced to make risky decisions, such as a gay Moroccan asylum-seeker deported to Cameroon, a country where homosexuality is illegal.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security did not respond to questions about the Colombian woman’s case, but it has asserted that third-country deportation agreements “ensure due process under the U.S. Constitution.” The Trump administration says the agreements are needed to “remove criminal illegal aliens” whose country of origin will not take them back.

Details of Congo’s deal with U.S. are unclear

The details of Congo’s deal with the Trump administration are not clear. Other countries have received millions of dollars to participate.

Earlier this month, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi called the agreement an “act of goodwill between partners,” with no financial compensation. It comes as Washington has ramped up pressure on neighboring Rwanda over its support for the M23 rebel group that has seized cities in eastern Congo — a dynamic some analysts say may explain Kinshasa’s willingness to take deportees.

“We agreed to do so as a friendly gesture, simply because it was what the Americans wanted,” Tshisekedi said, adding that the migrants are free to leave Congo at any time.

“We understand that psychologically they must be unsettled because, at first, they dreamed of living the American dream, and now they are living the Congolese dream — in a country they probably did not know and may never even have noticed on a map of the world,” Tshisekedi said.

Congolese human rights groups have called it a violation of international refugee law. The Congo-based Institute for Human Rights Research described the situation as “arbitrary detention by proxy for the United States.”

The current U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement policy says if a government has made blanket diplomatic assurances that it won’t persecute people who are deported, no further process is required for deportation, not even giving deportees notice where they are being sent, said David, the attorney.

“When they told me they were going to deport me, I almost fainted,” the Colombian woman said. She was told about Congo the day before the flight.

She was detained at a routine check-in with ICE

She said she left Colombia in 2024, following threats from armed groups and abuse by a former partner who worked for the government.

She went to Mexico, where she waited for a border appointment booked with the U.S. government. When she presented herself at an Arizona port of entry in September 2024, immigration officials determined she had a credible fear of persecution, clearing her to apply for asylum, but kept her in ICE detention.

“You spend a year and a half locked up, living the same day over and over again. You see fights, punishments where people are locked in cells for many hours. You lose your privacy even to use the bathroom,” she said.

Some officers made racist remarks. “They made derogatory comments toward us as migrants, shouted at us all the time and sometimes denied basic things like showers as punishment,” she said.

In May 2025, a federal judge granted her protection under the U.N. Convention Against Torture, ruling she could not be safely returned to Colombia, according to court documents seen by the AP.

She filed a habeas corpus petition and won her release in February. She moved to Texas and was required to wear a GPS monitoring device, but at her first check-in appointment with ICE, she was detained again.

“All they told me was that I was under detention, as they had found a third country for me,” she said.

Less than three weeks later, she was put on a plane to Congo. She and the other deportees arrived on April 17 after a nearly 24-hour charter flight during which their hands and feet were restrained.

She doesn’t feel safe in Congo

Now they stay at a hotel near Kinshasa’s airport, in tidy white bungalows. Congo’s government covers the cost, the IOM said. It was not clear whether that would last after the deportees’ visas run out.

The hotel gates are locked according to one of the deportees lawyers. The Colombian woman also said security personnel do not let them leave on their own.

They were told they could apply for asylum, an option no one has chosen. “I don’t feel safe in Congo,” the woman said.

An IOM spokesperson said the organization has provided her with humanitarian assistance based on an assessment of her vulnerability. It includes “protection interventions, referrals, rights safeguarding and promotion of migrants’ overall well-being,” with no details.

The IOM also may offer “assisted voluntary return” — covering documents, flights, transit and temporary housing on arrival — with migrants’ consent.

The IOM said it plays no role in determining who is deported and reserves the right to withdraw its assistance for deportees if “minimum protection standards” aren’t met.

The Colombian woman remains in limbo, anxious. She said the food “has made us very sick,” with stomach ailments ongoing.

Local languages, like French and Lingala, are as foreign as her surroundings.

“The worst part is having to go through all of that without having committed any crime, simply for going to another country to ask for safety and protection.”

Banchereau writes for the Associated Press.

In this episode of Reframe, Varsha Gandikota-Nellutla, general coordinator of Progressive International, speaks with former Colombian Environment Minister Susana Muhamad about how Latin America should respond to the age of United States President Donald Trump. Muhamad argues that challenging a long history of imperial dominance begins with reclaiming sovereignty, particularly over natural resources like minerals and oil.

Muhamad is a Colombian politician and environmentalist who served as the minister of environment and sustainable development from 2022 to 2025.

China has detained nearly 70 Panamanian-flagged ships after a Supreme Court ruling on the Panama Canal, US officials say.

Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United States have released a joint statement in support of Panama, while criticising Chinese economic retaliation, after a Hong Kong-based conglomerate lost a legal dispute over the management of ports on the Panama Canal.

Panama’s Supreme Court in late January annulled contracts that had allowed a subsidiary of Hong Kong’s CK Hutchison to administer the Balboa and Cristobal port terminals on the Panama Canal after deeming the decades-old agreements unconstitutional.

In their joint statement on Tuesday, the six countries claimed that following the court ruling, China has retaliated against Panama with “targeted economic pressure” on Panamanian-flagged ships.

China detained nearly 70 Panamanian-flagged ships in March, according to the US Federal Maritime Commission, a number “far exceeding historical norms”.

“These actions – following the decision of Panama’s independent Supreme Court regarding the Balboa and Cristobal terminals – are a blatant attempt to politicise maritime trade and infringe on the sovereignty of the nations of our hemisphere,” the signatories said.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said separately on X that Washington was “deeply concerned” by China’s economic pressure on Panama.

“We stand in solidarity with Panama. Any attempts to undermine Panama’s sovereignty are a threat to us all,” he said.

China has previously accused the US of “bullying” and trying to smear its reputation in Latin America, while it described the Panamanian Supreme Court ruling as “absurd” and “shameful”.

US Federal Maritime Commission head Laura DiBella said last month that Beijing’s detention of Panamanian ships had repercussions for both Panama and the US.

“These intensified inspections were carried out under informal directives and appear intended to punish Panama after the transfer of Hutchison’s port assets,” DiBella said.

“Given that Panama‑flagged ships carry a meaningful share of US containerised trade, these actions could result in significant commercial and strategic consequences to US shipping,” she said.

‘States know how vulnerable shipping is’

Panama’s decision to invalidate the contracts held by CK Hutchison’s subsidiary Panama Ports Company was made at a time of heightened media attention around the Panama Canal amid threats by US President Donald Trump to seize the strategic waterway.

Trump had made the approximately 80km (49-mile) waterway a focus of his second administration, alleging in his inaugural address in January 2025 that China was “operating” the canal and pledging that the US would “take back” control.

US officials allege that, in addition to targeting Panama and its interests, China has also retaliated against shipping giants Maersk and the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), whose subsidiaries were granted 18-month contracts to administer the Balboa and Cristobal terminals after CK Hutchison was removed.

Representatives of Maersk and MSC were both summoned by China’s Ministry of Transport for “high-level discussions”, the Federal Maritime Commission said in March, while Chinese shipping giant COSCO has suspended operations at the Balboa terminal.

CK Hutchison, through its Panama Ports Company subsidiary, is separately pursuing international arbitration against the government of Panama and seeking more than $2bn in damages.

David Smith, an associate professor at the University of Sydney’s US Studies Centre, said that the Panama Canal dispute and China’s retaliation were the latest example of how shipping has become a political target, from Latin America to the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea in the Middle East.

“We have taken for granted that the world runs on container ships just freely sailing around the world,” he told Al Jazeera.

“What we’re seeing now is that states know how vulnerable shipping is. They know they can cut shipping lanes off if necessary. It should not surprise us from now on if ships and shipping in general become pawns in international politics.”

KINSHASA, Congo — Around 15 people deported from the United States landed in Congo’s capital Kinshasa early Friday, one of their lawyers told the Associated Press.

It was the latest example of the Trump administration using agreements with African countries to accelerate migrant removals that have raised questions about respect for the migrants’ rights.

An official at the Congolese migration agency confirmed the arrivals but didn’t provide details.

The deportees are all from Latin America and the Congolese government plans to keep them in the country for a short period, said U.S. attorney Alma David, who represents one of the deportees. She has been speaking with her client since arriving in Kinshasa.

All the deportees are believed to have legal protection from U.S. judges shielding them against being returned to their home countries, David said. The deportees are believed to be staying at a hotel in Kinshasa.

The International Organization for Migration, a United Nations-affiliated agency, will be involved to offer “assisted voluntary return,” David told AP.

“The fact that the focus is on offering them ‘voluntary’ return to their home country when they spent months in immigration detention in the U.S. fighting hard to not have to go home is very alarming,” she said.

An International Organization for Migration spokesperson said the organization was providing humanitarian assistance to the deportees at the request of the Congolese government. It said it may also offer assisted voluntary return, which is “strictly voluntary and based on free, prior and informed consent.”

Congo’s Ministry of Communications said in a statement earlier this month that it will receive some migrants as part of a new deal under the Trump administration’s third-country program.

It described the arrangement as a “temporary” one that reflects Congo’s “commitment to human dignity and international solidarity.” It would come with zero costs to the government with the U.S. covering the needed logistics, it said.

The statement said no automatic transfer of the deportees is planned, adding: “Each situation will be subject to individual review in accordance with the laws of the Republic and national security requirements.”

The U.S. has struck such third-country deportation deals with at least seven other African nations, many of them among countries hit hardest by the Trump administration’s policies restricting trade, aid and migration.

The Trump administration has spent at least $40 million to deport about 300 migrants to countries other than their own, according to a report released recently by the Democratic staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Lawyers and activists have raised questions over the nature of the deals with countries in Africa and elsewhere. Several of the African nations that have signed such deals have notoriously repressive governments and poor human rights records — including Eswatini, South Sudan and Equatorial Guinea.

Kamale and Banchereau write for the Associated Press. Banchereau reported from Dakar, Senegal. AP writer Saleh Mwanamilongo in Bonn, Germany contributed to this report.