Japan

Amid heightened Japan-China tensions, US President Donald Trump spoke by telephone with Chinese President Xi Jinping. While Trump termed it a positive development, stating he would visit China in April 2026, China claimed that it categorically made it clear that “Taiwan’s return to China was an ‘integral part of the postwar international order.” While it has been reported that Trump requested a phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, the details of the conversation between the two haven’t been made public yet.

Trump’s claim of “extremely strong” US-China relations has once again seized global attention. Earlier, last month, just ahead of his highly anticipated meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, Trump boldly announced on Truth Social, “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!”

Unsurprisingly, the statement sparked widespread discussion, directly invoking China and seemingly reviving the long-dormant G2 concept, an idea previously floated by former President Barack Obama.

This apparent attempt to resurrect the “G2” notion, which envisions shared global leadership between the US and China, marks a notable rhetorical shift and is surprising given that Trump has been hawkish on China even during his first term as the president. By invoking it, Washington has brought back a concept dismissed as a faulty trade-off, given the persistent and often adversarial nature of US-China relations. Media analyses suggest that this move reflects a growing recognition within the US of China’s rising power and an uneasy acknowledgement of its near-equal status on the world stage. The renewed attention signals an implicit acceptance within American policy circles of China’s expanding international influence and the shifting balance of global power.

For China, however, the idea holds little appeal. First, China continues to present itself as a developing country, aspiring to lead the Global South and, eventually, to achieve broader global influence. Unlike the West, China sees strategic value in retaining the support of developing nations to bolster its legitimacy. While it aims to surpass the US militarily, economically, and technologically, it is unlikely to embrace a bilateral framework implying formalized co-governance of the world. Second, the ideological, strategic, and global ambitions gap between China and the US remains vast, limiting the feasibility of any institutionalized G2 arrangement. Third, if such a framework were ever to exist, it would likely involve broader coalitions of nations with differing ideologies, capacities, and priorities, rather than a US-China duopoly. In this light, the G2 concept appears even less plausible for China in 2025 than it did in the 2000s.

While much commentary has focused on how this discourse may be interpreted in China, the implications extend far beyond the bilateral relationship. Washington’s allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific are closely observing these developments. For many in the region, stability in US-China relations is desirable, as it would help mitigate the risks of confrontation, economic disruption, regional instability, and global upheavals. Yet Trump’s rhetoric has also generated unease among America’s regional partners regarding Washington’s long-term strategic intentions.

Concerns are growing that a return to the G2 framework could signal a weakening of US commitment to the Indo-Pacific, particularly in terms of security and regional order. While sustained engagement with China is widely accepted as necessary, framing the relationship as one of shared global governance may alarm America’s allies and partners, especially the Quad countries, the Philippines, and Taiwan. For these countries, any suggestion of a US-China condominium raises doubts about the credibility of the US’s status as a security guarantor and its assurances of collective defense and regional stability.

From the US perspective, reviving the G2 discourse may appear advantageous to smooth the way for a rare earth materials deal with China or to ease bilateral tensions. But fundamental differences and rivalry cannot be erased: China’s ultimate goal is to overtake the US. In all likelihood, China will view G2 rhetoric skeptically, interpreting it as a sign of US weakness and declining influence in the Indo-Pacific.

The Xi-Trump phone call and China’s reiteration of the Taiwan claim put pressure on Trump’s G2 plan. How Trump would manage ties with Japan and Taiwan while building relations with China is an issue worthy of international attention.

Trump’s episodic and erratic approach to China and the region risks eroding the trust the US has painstakingly built with its partners. There is little chance that countries such as India, Japan, or the Philippines would accept a bipolar world dominated solely by the US and China. Rather than serving as a stabilizer, the G2 concept is more likely to be seen as an attempt to divide the world into two poles once again, or worse, as a signal that the US is content with a bipolar world rather than a genuinely multipolar order.

Even if the G2 never materializes, the rhetoric has already strengthened China’s position while placing the US in a strategic bind. In effect, it is a win-win for China but a lose-lose for America. There are limitations to America First not only for the region but also for America itself and its foreign policy. The Trump administration’s path would do well to seriously consider the perspectives of its allies and partners, rather than advancing a strategy that ultimately benefits China.

Japan and China are in their most dangerous diplomatic crisis in years as escalating tensions over Taiwan have cancelled earlier hopes of post-pandemic improvement. After COVID-19 restrictions were mostly lifted by 2023, relations between Beijing and Tokyo seemed to slowly improve. However, by late 2025 a series of disputes especially over the so-called “Taiwan Question” have severely deteriorated into their lowest point in years.

The high-stakes diplomatic visit at the October 2025 APEC summit, where Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi immediately followed a stable-ties agreement with President Xi Jinping by meeting Taiwanese officials, only escalated tensions.

Escalation Through Diplomatic and Military Incidents

Sanae Takaichi, declared on November 7, 2025 during a cabinet meeting, that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could justify Japan using military force in the area. China quickly reacted. China’s U.N. ambassador Fu Cong accused Japan of violating international law warning the country of its “self-defense”. Raising such an issue all the way to the United Nations is a rare move we don’t often see in global geopolitics.

In mid-November 2025 China’s coast guard sailed through waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (islands which are administered by Japan but claimed by China) on patrol and Japanese Coast Guard vessels sent in response. Japan also sent out fighter jets, and even announced plans to deploy Japanese missiles on Yonaguni island (just 110 km from Taiwan) as a deterring measure.

China also announced travel advisories urging its citizens to avoid Japan, with large numbers of airlines offering ticket refunds. Meanwhile, Japanese officials warned their nationals in China to be cautious amid a rise in hostilities. Chinese authorities abruptly canceled planned concerts by Japanese bands, and state media halted screening of new Japanese films.

The Roots of Tensions: History, the U.S. and Taiwan

The island of Taiwan is an indispensably strategic asset for both countries: for China, Taiwan is the core of its national unity; for Japan the security of a separate and democratic Taiwan is now explicitly seen in Tokyo as linked to Japan’s own defense.

Japan’s long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan Question, similar to the one upheld by the United States, has been abandoned by P.M. Takaichi. Authorities in Taipei have publicly supported Japan, urging China to show restraint and highlighting how an invasion would draw in allies including Japan and the U.S. .

Invoking Japan’s World War II era atrocities, China claims moral high ground or justify its own territorial aims. For example, Chinese official statements have reminded audiences of Tokyo’s past warcrimes in the region when attacking Japanese policies in the present. Japanese politicians (especially ones from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party) have grown hawkish to these types of statements, any incident easily tying into nationalist sentiment on both sides.

Rapidly expanding its defense capabilities the Japanese 2025 Defense White Paper explicitly names China as its “greatest strategic challenge” and commits to raising defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2026. New submarine fleets and the potential deployment of medium-range missiles on islands like Yonaguni, have developed into a broader security problem. This means that any Chinese blockade or attack on Taiwan would encircle Japan’s supply lines. Therefore to Japan’s leaders, Taiwan’s fate is inseparable from their own national survival. China in turn, claims an eventual military approach to Taiwan as inevitable by 2027.

Economic Dimensions in East Asia

China and Japan remain among each other’s largest economic partners even amid the confrontation. In 2024 China was still Japan’s second-biggest export market (after the US), with roughly $125 billion of Japanese goods sent there, mainly machinery and automobiles. This has been leveraged as a geopolitical tool. China’s Commerce Ministry now warns that Takaichi’s comments have “fundamentally undermined” the political foundation of economic ties.

After the Fukushima nuclear wastewater release in 2023, China imposed a blanket ban on all Japanese seafood imports. (Japan has pointed out that the UN’s nuclear agency found the discharge safe.) In mid-November 2025 China reinstated these seafood bans.

In another economic sector, Chinese tourists make up about a fourth of all visitors to Japan. Japanese travel agencies organising group tours told Reuters they lost ~80% of their remaining bookings for 2025.

U.S. Security and International Alliance Dynamics

U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass offered guarantees for its ally if China will militarily intervene and The State Department similarly declared its full support for Japan, explicitly opposing any unilateral attempts to alter the status-quo in the Taiwan Strait or East China Sea. U.S. President Donald Trump has so far avoided endorsing Takaichi’s statements, at least publicly.

China often accuses Japan of following the U.S. strategy of containment and have opposed Japan’s involvement in The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and its new defense pacts, such as with Australia, and more recently the Philippines. In contrast, Indonesia, Malaysia and others aim for neutrality.

Analysts suggest that China unusually strong criticism may reflect a strategic calculation, a hope that Prime Minister Takaichi’s term will be short-lived, just as the short tenures of other post-Abe premiers. For China, such a political victory could be a great geopolitical win in promoting its view on the Taiwan Question.

With information from Reuters, The Diplomat and South China Morning Post.

Takaichi’s suggestion earlier this month that Tokyo could intervene militarily if Taiwan is attacked has enraged Beijing.

Japan has denied a report that said United States President Donald Trump had advised Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi not to provoke China over Taiwan’s sovereignty.

In a news briefing on Thursday, Japan’s top government spokesperson Minoru Kihara said “there is no such fact” about an article published in The Wall Street Journal claiming that Trump had made such a remark to the Japanese leader.

He declined to comment further on the details of the “diplomatic exchange”.

The row between Asia’s two biggest economies began after Takaichi had suggested earlier this month that Tokyo could intervene militarily in any attack on self-ruled Taiwan, which China claims as part of its territory.

Takaichi’s remark ignited anger in Beijing.

After the incident, Beijing’s Foreign Ministry said that Chinese leader Xi Jinping pressed the issue in a phone call with Trump on Monday, saying Taiwan’s return was an “integral part of the post-war international order”.

The WSJ reported on Thursday that, shortly after that phone call between the US and Chinese leaders, “Trump set up a call with Takaichi and advised her not to provoke Beijing on the question of the island’s sovereignty”. The report quoted unidentified Japanese officials and an American briefed on the call.

Takaichi said in her reporting of the call with Trump that they discussed the US president’s conversation with Xi, as well as bilateral relations.

“President Trump said we are very close friends, and he offered that I should feel free to call him anytime,” she said.

Beijing, which has threatened to use force to take control of the self-ruled island, also took other punitive steps to register its anger over Takaichi’s initial remarks in parliament on November 7.

It summoned Tokyo’s ambassador and advised Chinese citizens against travelling to Japan.

As the diplomatic row escalated, the Chinese embassy in Tokyo issued a new warning to its citizens on Wednesday, saying there had been a surge in crime in Japan, and that Chinese citizens had reported “being insulted, beaten and injured for no reason”.

Japan’s Foreign Ministry denied any increase in crime, citing figures from the National Police Agency in response that showed the number of murders from January to October had halved compared with the same period in 2024.

Last week, Japanese media reported that China will again ban all imports of Japanese seafood as the diplomatic dispute between the two countries escalated.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun reiterated on Thursday a call for Japan to officially retract Takaichi’s comments.

“The Japanese side’s attempt to downplay, dodge, and cover up Prime Minister Takaichi’s seriously erroneous remarks by not raising them again is self-deception,” Guo told a regular news briefing.

“China will never accept this.”

Meanwhile, Trump’s public silence on Japan’s escalating dispute with China has further frayed nerves in Tokyo.

Some officials worry that Trump may be prepared to soften support for Taiwan in pursuit of a trade accord with China, a move they fear will embolden Beijing and cause conflict in an increasingly militarised East Asia.

“For Trump, what matters most is US-China relations,” said Kazuhiro Maejima, a professor of US politics at Sophia University.

“Japan has always been treated as a tool or a card to manage that relationship,” Maejima told Reuters news agency.

Washington’s envoy to Tokyo has said the US supports Japan in the face of China’s “coercion”, but two senior ruling party lawmakers said they had hoped for more full-throated support from their top security ally in Washington, DC.

A major airline is offering free flights for UK passengers to encourage travellers to explore lesser-known regions away from overcrowded hotspots and help reduce overtourism

Travelling isn’t always cheap, especially when jetting off abroad when the expense of flights are thrown into the mix.

Yet, in a new initiative from a major airline, British and European travellers can bag free flights, but there’s a catch if you’re looking to book.

In a bid to help reduce overtourism in popular destinations, Japan’s largest airline, All Nippon Airways (ANA), has partnered with the Japan National Tourism Organisation (JNTO) to offer free domestic flights this winter. This will allow passengers to take advantage of two complimentary internal flights with any inbound international booking.

The hope is that this will encourage travellers to explore some of the country’s lesser-known regions, from its diverse landscapes to its stunning coastlines, rather than the touristy hotspots, such as Tokyo and Kyoto. This is the ideal opportunity to immerse yourself in the culture and experience another side of Japan, while avoiding the crowds altogether.

READ MORE: EasyJet launches new £40 flights to ‘unspoiled’ Greek town with beautiful beachesREAD MORE: UK Foreign Office’s ‘danger to life’ travel warning for one of world’s safest countries

ANA flies to more than 40 locations across Japan, all of which are included in the deal, so there are plenty of breathtaking places to choose from, including Fukuoka, Hokkaido and Nagasaki. You could also venture to the Okinawa Islands, which have often been described as the ‘Maldives of Japan’ due to their pristine sugar-white sand and crystal clear, turquoise waters.

However, there are a few conditions that must be met to take advantage of the free domestic flights. Firstly, it only applies to travellers arriving from the UK or Europe, and you will have to pay for your own international flight into Japan with ANA.

The cheapest time to book a flight from London to Tokyo is in January, with prices starting from £821. This coincides perfectly with the initiative, as it will run from November 24 to January 31, 2026, with flights still able to take place outside of this time frame.

Passengers will be given standard class flights only with the scheme, and may have to pay tax and visa fees depending on their chosen location. However, domestic flights do not have to start and finish at the same airport, allowing for more flexibility to explore the country.

The airline notes that it hopes this limited-time offer will “make regional exploration… easier and genuinely affordable”, along with encouraging “deeper, more sustainable engagement with Japan’s culturally diverse regions”.

You can visit the ANA website for more details and to book your flights. ANA has also shared itinerary examples with a stay in Tokyo before venturing to the hidden gems to help make booking the trip even easier.

Do you have a travel story to share? Email [email protected]

Nine of the top 10 mega-cities are in Asia, with Bangladesh’s Dhaka projected to be the world’s largest city by 2050.

A new United Nations report has found that Indonesia’s capital Jakarta is the world’s largest city with 41.9 million people living there, followed by Dhaka in Bangladesh, which is home to 36.6 million.

A low-lying coastal city located in the west of the densely populated island of Java, Jakarta rose from second place to replace Tokyo, which had been named the world’s largest city in the UN’s most recent assessment published back in 2000.

The Japanese capital’s relatively steady population of 33.4 million saw it fall to third place behind Bangladesh’s densely populated capital, Dhaka, which jumped to second place from ninth and is now projected to become the world’s largest city by 2050.

The World Urbanization Prospects 2025 report from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs also found that the number of megacities – urban areas with more than 10 million inhabitants – has increased to 33, four times more than the eight megacities that existed worldwide in 1975.

Asia is home to 19 of the world’s 33 megacities, and nine out of the top 10. In addition to Jakarta, Dhaka and Tokyo, the other Asian cities in the top 10 are: New Delhi, India (30.2 million); Shanghai, China (29.6 million); Guangzhou, China (27.6 million); Manila, Philippines (24.7 million); Kolkata, India (22.5 million); and Seoul, South Korea (22.5 million).

With a population of 32 million people, Egypt’s Cairo is the only city in the top 10 that is outside Asia, according to the UN.

Sao Paulo in Brazil, with 18.9 million people, is the largest city in the Americas, while Lagos in Nigeria also grew rapidly, making it the largest city in sub-Saharan Africa.

Still growing

Dhaka’s rapid growth has partly been driven by people from rural areas moving to the capital, searching for opportunities or fleeing hometowns due to problems including flooding and rising sea levels, made worse by climate change.

Jakarta is also facing problems due to rising sea levels. It is estimated that up to one quarter of the city could be under water by 2050.

The problem is so serious that Indonesia’s government is building a new purpose-built capital city in Nusantara in Borneo island’s East Kalimantan province. Yet while the city’s officials and parliamentary buildings will have a new home, the UN estimates that 10 million more people will be living in Jakarta by 2050.

The city’s growing population will also have to contend with concerns over inequality and affordability, which saw thousands of people take to the streets of the Indonesian city earlier this year, reflecting rising anger over the conditions of low-income workers, including app-based motorcycle ride-share and delivery riders.

Meanwhile, according to the UN report, Iran’s capital Tehran, which is facing water rations because it is close to running out of water, currently has a population of nine million people.

The new assessment also saw changes as the UN adopted new measures to try to address inconsistencies in how different countries defined urbanisation.

The UN also said that in most cases its report reflected the size of individual cities, rather than two cities that have grown together, with a small number of exceptions.

The new definition defined a city as a “contiguous agglomeration” of one-kilometre-square grid cells with a density of at least 1,500 inhabitants per square kilometre and a total population of at least 50,000.

Shohei Ohtani will once again represent Team Japan in next year’s World Baseball Classic.

Whether or not he pitches in the international tournament, however, remains unclear.

On Monday, Ohtani announced on Instagram he is planning to participate in the WBC for the second time in his career.

In the 2023 WBC, he won tournament MVP with a .435 batting average and 1.86 pitching ERA, helping Japan to that year’s title. He punctuated the event with his memorable strikeout of Mike Trout for the final out in the championship game.

“I’m happy to play again representing Japan,” Ohtani wrote in Japanese on Monday.

The question now is whether Ohtani will pitch in the event, which takes place in March, just five months removed from his heavy postseason workload during the Dodgers’ run to a second-consecutive World Series title.

At this point, no decision on that front has seemingly been made.

After spending the first half of the 2025 season limited only to designated hitting duties while completing his recovery from a 2023 Tommy John procedure, the 31-year-old Ohtani resumed his two-way role over the second half, making 14 pitching starts for the Dodgers from June to September while increasing his workload one inning at a time.

By the postseason, he was fully built up for full-length starts, and went on to throw 20⅓ innings over four playoff outings — including a 2⅓ inning appearance on shortened three days’ rest in Game 7 of the World Series.

Oftentimes, pitchers who are that heavily taxed during a deep playoff run will consider sitting out a WBC the following year because of the early ramp-up required to throw in the tournament takes place during spring training.

However, the WBC is of supreme importance in the Japanese baseball community; more significant even than the World Series. And Ohtani is the face of the county’s iconic Samurai Japan national team, which will be trying to win its fourth WBC title.

Shohei Ohtani celebrates with his teammates after striking out Mike Trout to secure Japan’s World Baseball Classic championship win over the United States in 2023.

(Wilfredo Lee / Associated Press)

Ohtani is expected to hit in the event, coming off a career-high 55-homer season that helped him earn a third-consecutive MVP Award and the fourth of his MLB career.

But there remains no indication about whether he will pitch, nor if such a decision has been made between him and the Dodgers (who can’t block Ohtani from participating in the event, but could request he either not pitch or follow strict usage rules given he missed the first half of last season on the mound).

It is unlikely that decision will be made until closer to the tournament.

The Dodgers’ two other Japanese pitchers, Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Roki Sasaki, face a similar dynamic leading into next year’s WBC.

Yamamoto made 30 starts in the 2025 regular season, the most of his MLB or Japanese career, then threw 37⅓ more innings in six outings during the playoffs — including his heroic back-to-back victories in Games 6 and 7 of the World Series.

Sasaki missed most of his rookie MLB season with a shoulder injury, but returned late in the year and became the team’s de facto closer in the playoffs. Next year, he is slated to return to the starting rotation.

Like Ohtani, they are both key cogs in the Dodgers’ 2026 pitching plans, which, as manager Dave Roberts alluded to during a promotional tour in Japan last week, could make the WBC something of a potential complication.

“We’ll support them,” Roberts told the Japanese media. “But I do think that the pitching, it’s a lot on the body, the arm. The rest will be beneficial for next year, for our season. But we understand how important the WBC is for these individual players and for the country of Japan.”

The Dodgers could choose to block Sasaki’s participation in the WBC, since he spent much of last year on the 60-day injured list, but have not yet given any indication about whether they would do so.

The club can’t do the same with Yamamoto, but could still try advocating for him to be used more conservatively in the tournament coming off his especially burdensome October performance.

For now, at least, what is known is that Ohtani will participate in some capacity.

But whether he, or his Japanese Dodgers teammates, will pitch in the tournament will remain a subplot as the offseason progresses.

In November 2025 a public disagreement between Beijing and Tokyo over Taiwan exposed how the island’s fate now reaches far beyond Taipei, shaping trade, military planning and regional alliances across East Asia and further beyond.

The Taiwan question has recently re-emerged as a tension point between China and Japan. This raises broader questions about East Asian security. Beijing affirms its “One China policy”, treating Taiwan as a breakaway province to be “reunified” by force if necessary and reacts sharply to any foreign involvement. Avoiding rhetoric that might provoke its eastern neighbor until now, the consensus in Tokyo is shifting as many senior Japanese officials say a Chinese assault on Taiwan that threatens Japan’s survival could justify a military response. None of this is new, but the tone is.

China’s Firm Position on Taipei

Beijing’s stance remains absolute: it is Chinese territory, and any formal push or support from foreign actors for its independence is intolerable. Officials frame reunification as inevitable and non-negotiable, part of what state discourse calls the “national rejuvenation” of China. In recent months this posture has been accompanied by more visible coercion: maritime patrols in the South China Sea, large-scale exercises around the island and targeted economic measures against partners perceived to have crossed this line.

Any country that appears to undercut China’s claim through military cooperation with Taipei, public statements of support, or strengthened security ties risks a Chinese response. From Beijing’s point of view, fully controlling the region would extend China’s reach beyond its coast by securing sea lanes and projection space for the People’s Liberation Army. Politically, it would close a chapter Beijing sees as a Cold War remnant after a century of perceived humiliation.

Japan’s Stakes in Taiwan

Tokyo’s formal policy remains rooted in the One China framework as it does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state and officially supports a peaceful cross-Strait resolution. Security considerations and proximity to Taiwan have forced Japanese leaders into increasing their attention to the island in recent years. Hard-line conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s public remarks this month, that a Chinese assault on Taiwan which threatens Japanese survival could trigger a full military response, marked a break with decades of deliberate ambiguity.

It is likely that pending targets have been moved forward and planning for collective self-defence has become more explicit, while defence cooperation with partners particularly the United States under U.S. President Donald Trump has grown more visible. Taipei sits near Japan’s western islands; Yonaguni, the closest island of the Okinawa prefecture is roughly 100 km from Taiwan’s eastern coast and the sea lanes that run here carry a large share of Japan’s energy imports. The presence of substantial U.S. forces in Japan ties Tokyo’s security to Washington’s responses, making it politically and militarily difficult for Tokyo to ignore developments in the Strait.

Reactions, Responses and Confrontation

Responding with strong diplomatic protests and a suite of retaliatory measures to Prime Minister Takaichi’s parliamentary remarks on November 7, Chinese commerce authorities re-imposed bans on Japanese seafood and warned consumers against Japanese products urging its citizens to avoid travel to Japan. Diplomatically, China demanded a retraction and summoned Japan’s ambassador in Beijing to issue a formal protest. This was widely seen as an unusually public move given the recent history of cautious diplomacy in the area.

Japan has issued strong protests over the consul’s remarks and dispatched a senior envoy to Beijing to calm the situation but the talks produced little immediate de-escalation. Japanese fighters were set on high alert after a surveillance drone was detected between Taiwan and Yonaguni, underlining how geographically close this theatre is to Japanese territory. Such moves are not isolated acts but are part of a larger pattern meant to act as a “show of strength” while stopping short of starting a full-scale war.

Why This Small Island is Significant to Both Countries

For Beijing, the island is a core territorial claim bolstered by narratives about sovereignty and historical rectification. Losing the island, or allowing it to consolidate international backing as a separate political entity, would be depicted by Chinese leaders as an unacceptable erosion of national integrity. Its location is also a matter of strategy: full control over the island would make it harder for outside powers to operate in China’s seas.

For Tokyo, the calculus is concrete and immediate. Taiwan’s proximity means that military operations in the straits could quickly affect Japanese airspace and waters. Japanese industry is also deeply integrated with Taiwanese firms notably in fields such as semiconductors and electronics, so instability would hit the stock markets and raise costs for manufacturers.

Possible Future Scenarios and Regional Impact

The stand-off could begin a prolonged period of low-level confrontation. Both Beijing and Tokyo could double down: China sustaining pressure through patrols and economic sanctions, Japan strengthening its military capabilities and aligning more tightly with the United States and other western partners.

This doesn’t mean that there is no time for pragmatic de-escalation from both sides.  Recognising the mutual costs of prolonged hostility, Tokyo could clarify that its statements were contextual and not a call to aggressive action, while Beijing could temper sanctions once its political point has been made. Diplomacy behind closed doors might restore exchanges and trade, though the underlying policy differences between the two countries would remain unresolved. Therefore, such an outcome would buy more time but not resolve the underlying causes of these issues.

A third way would be one where a deeper realignment could take place. Japan might accelerate defence modernisation and legal reforms to make collective defence more actionable. On its part, China could respond by heavily investing and intensifying military presence in its south or seeking closer security ties with partners that counterbalance U.S. influence.

In the worst case, simple miscalculations could lead to direct clashes for example between Chinese forces operating near Taiwan and Japanese ships or aircraft which could rapidly draw in the United States given treaty commitments and strategic interests.

While full-scale war remains unlikely for now, we can never be 100% sure as the simple probability increases more and more with these incidents that have developed recently.

Implications for the Rest of The World

No matter if the situation escalates further or not, the United States will undoubtebly remain a central factor to any such issue. Washington’s alliance with Tokyo and its historically ambiguous but substantial support for Taipei mean that any serious incident will have trans-Pacific repercussions.

Neighbouring states like South Korea, ASEAN members, Australia, India, etc. would be forced into a difficult diplomatic calculation, by balancing economic ties with Beijing against security concerns and relations with Washington and Tokyo. Economically, prolonged instability would disrupt semiconductor production, shipping routes and regional investment, with global consequences.

Most analysts agree that this issue has shifted from a regional diplomatic concern to a great security risk for the larger world. In the near term, careful diplomacy from both sides may limit the damage, but the issues at hand suggest this will most likely be a long term gap in East Asian security. How both sides manage politics and deterrence will determine whether the next phase is a steady containment or a dangerous step toward direct military confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

Because of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statements in the Diet regarding the Taiwan issue, the already fragile China–Japan relationship has deteriorated rapidly. China has issued travel and study-abroad warnings for Japan, effectively halted imports of Japanese seafood, sent coast guard vessels into the “territorial waters” of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and had three warships transit the Osumi Strait in southern Japan.

At the same time, Beijing took the unusual step of announcing in advance that Premier Li Qiang would not meet the Japanese prime minister at the G20 summit. In just ten days, China launched a strong, multi-domain counterattack—political, diplomatic, economic, and military—with no signs of de-escalation.

If Prime Minister Takaichi does not retract her remarks, Beijing is likely to escalate even further and drag the United States into the dispute.

What actually happened? Is China overreacting? How far will Beijing take this confrontation?

Let us revisit the origin of the incident. In response to questioning in the Diet, Prime Minister Takaichi stated, “If China blockades Taiwan using warships and employing force, then no matter how you look at it, this could become a survival-threatening crisis for Japan.”

Pressed by the opposition, she added, “If China imposes a maritime blockade on Taiwan and U.S. forces intervening in that blockade come under armed attack, a crisis could arise.”

International media paid no attention to Takaichi’s clarification and focused only on the headline question: Will Japan send troops if military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait? Accordingly, France’s Le Monde, Britain’s The Guardian, and the Associated Press all ran titles implying that Japan would dispatch forces if Taiwan were subjected to military action.

Japanese scholars have since written articles in U.S. media explaining that “Japanese military intervention in a Taiwan contingency” presupposes that U.S. forces have already intervened, and only then could Japan exercise the right of collective self-defense. Yet the Japanese government has not actively clarified this prerequisite on the international stage, drawing sharp criticism from well-known Japanese commentator Hiroyuki Nishimura for dereliction of duty.

Nishimura’s criticism exposes a widespread misunderstanding: even if the United States militarily intervenes in the Taiwan Strait, as long as Japanese territory is not under armed threat, Tokyo is legally barred from exercising collective self-defense. In other words, under the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, the United States is obligated to defend Japan, but Japan has no treaty obligation to send troops to support U.S. forces in a war that does not concern Japan.

Therefore, the mitigating explanations offered by Japanese scholars on Takaichi’s behalf do not hold water. The Japanese government’s failure to clarify the issue in international media is naturally out of fear of offending Washington. It remains unclear whether President Trump fully understands the “asymmetric” nature of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, and Tokyo has no desire to remind this shrewd deal-making president that when American soldiers are dying on the battlefield, Japan actually has no treaty obligation to send troops.

Unless, of course, the reason for U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait is explicitly “to protect Japan.” Political rhetoric is one thing; the law is another. The fact remains that neither the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty nor Japan’s domestic legislation imposes any legal obligation on Japan to exercise collective self-defense when its ally, the United States, comes under attack.

Another fact: the Philippines is in exactly the same position as Japan. Unless U.S. forces become involved in order to protect the Philippines or Philippine territory is affected by the war, Manila has no obligation to send combat troops to assist the U.S.—it can only provide logistical and base support.

Of course, if the United States does intervene militarily in the Taiwan Strait, it will inevitably claim it is to protect Japan (and the Philippines). But the authority to make that determination lies with Tokyo and Manila, both of which retain a certain right to stay out of the fight. This is precisely why U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby earlier this year demanded that Japan and Australia state clearly what actions they would take to support the United States in the event of a Taiwan contingency. That demand makes it crystal clear that America’s mutual defense treaties do not obligate allies to unconditionally fight alongside U.S. forces.

In short: when their own security is at stake, allies will send troops; otherwise, they will at most offer logistics and bases—no allied soldiers will go to the front lines.

This explains Beijing’s fierce reaction. Even if Takaichi did not mean Japan would intervene unilaterally in the Taiwan Strait, her remarks effectively expanded the “applicability scenarios” of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. If such moves are not checked, they will only encourage the Philippines, Australia, and other anti-China neighbors to follow suit—using the same logic to blackmail or bleed China.

This is not an overreaction, nor is it making a mountain out of a molehill. Beyond realpolitik necessity, the Chinese people have not forgotten Japan’s history of invading China—especially in this 80th anniversary year of the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. If Beijing were to let the matter slide, it would face intense domestic backlash.

Therefore, unless Takaichi retracts her remarks, China–Japan relations will continue to worsen, eventually leading to a situation where “Taiwan is fine, but Japan is in crisis.”

Takaichi may well have intentionally provoked Beijing in order to shore up LDP support, rally Japanese nationalism, loosen the “three non-nuclear principles,” and expand conventional military capabilities. But the backlash has likely been far greater than she anticipated. The key still lies in America’s attitude.

Although the U.S. ambassador to Japan publicly expressed support for Tokyo and criticized Beijing, Washington’s overall response has been relatively muted—Trump has zero interest in letting Japan torpedo his scheduled China trip next April.

On the other hand, Beijing may well conclude that Washington is deliberately allowing Japan to interfere in China’s internal affairs in order to gain negotiating leverage. That would only reduce China’s inhibitions about sanctioning Japan and could lead it to directly challenge the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, pushing the situation to the brink of losing control and forcing the U.S. to rein in Japan.

China has many tools to test the treaty—economic and trade measures, cultural exchanges, diplomacy, and even military options are all on the table. The disputed uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Ryukyu Islands, whose sovereignty remains unresolved, are both historical issues left over from World War II. Although both fall within the scope of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, Washington has never recognized Japanese sovereignty over them.

Regarding the Ryukyus, Beijing can wage a protracted legal battle, continually emphasizing that the Potsdam Declaration never returned the islands to Japan. Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu, Beijing could move directly to military control—land on the islands, demolish Japanese facilities, raise the Chinese flag, and expel foreign vessels—forcing the United States to get involved.

If Beijing is pushed to the point of letting the situation spiral, its price to Washington will be high: it may include, but is not limited to, demanding that the U.S. block Japan from abandoning the three non-nuclear principles, block Japan’s “normalization” (turning the Self-Defense Forces into a full-fledged military), force Japan to pay tangible and intangible reparations for its invasion of China, or even force Takaichi to step down.

Would Trump risk a second Chinese rare-earth embargo over an uninhabited island whose sovereignty does not belong to Japan? The answer is obvious.

Beijing’s current Taiwan strategy has shifted from “opposing independence” to “advancing unification.” Part of that strategy is to make neighboring countries acknowledge—through actual state behavior, not just words—that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair. Japan is the poster child for neighboring hypocrisy—talking peace while acting otherwise. It will be shown no mercy for breaking the promises of diplomatic normalization; Beijing is determined to make a chicken of Japan to scare the monkey.

From this perspective, Prime Minister Takaichi may have thought she could achieve a classic boomerang effect (using the Taiwan issue for domestic political gain by first exporting strong rhetoric abroad). Instead, Beijing has been handed a rare opportunity to use Japan as a target and demonstrate to the world how it will reduce obstacles to unification.

The United States wants to avoid direct confrontation with China and prefers to let proxies stand on the front line so it can reap the benefits while remaining in the rear. On the surface this creates trouble for Beijing, but in reality it also creates endless headaches for Washington—because China will not limit itself to dealing with the proxies; it will drag the United States into the fight.

This is the new tactical phase in U.S.–China competition following the Busan meeting, testing the one-year truce both sides agreed to. Whether proxies are an advantage or a liability for Washington depends entirely on how Beijing chooses to handle the dispute—and Tokyo makes the ideal canary in the coal mine.

China on Friday took its feud with Tokyo over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Taikachi’s recent comments on Taiwan to the United Nations, as tensions between the East Asian neighbours deepened and ties plunged to their lowest since 2023.

“If Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression,” China’s permanent representative to the UN, Fu Cong, wrote in a letter on Friday to the global body’s Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, referring to the strait that separates mainland China from self-governing Taiwan, which Beijing insists belongs to China. Beijing has not ruled out the possibility of forcibly taking Taiwan.

The diplomatic spat began earlier in November when Taikachi, who took office only in October, made remarks about how Japan would respond to a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan. Those remarks angered Beijing, which has demanded retractions, although the Japanese PM has not made one.

However, the spat has now rapidly escalated into a trade war involving businesses on both sides, and has deepened security tensions over a contested territory that has long been a flashpoint for the two countries.

Here’s what we know about the dispute:

What did Japan’s PM say about Taiwan?

While speaking to parliament on November 7, Taikachi, a longtime Taiwan supporter, said a Chinese naval blockade or other action against Taiwan could prompt a Japanese military response. The response was not typical, and Taikachi appeared to go several steps further than her predecessors, who had only in the past expressed concern about the Chinese threat to Taiwan, but had never mentioned a response.

“If it involves the use of warships and military actions, it could by all means become a survival-threatening situation,” Taikachi told parliament, responding to an opposition politician’s queries in her first parliamentary grilling.

That statement immediately raised protests from China’s foreign and defence ministries, which demanded retractions. China’s consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, a day after, criticised the comments and appeared to make threats in a now deleted post on X, saying: “We have no choice but to cut off that dirty neck that has been lunged at us without hesitation. Are you ready?”

That post by Xue also raised anger in Japan, and some officials began calling for the diplomat’s expulsion. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara protested to Beijing over Xue’s X message, saying it was “extremely inappropriate,” while urging China to explain. Japan’s Foreign Ministry also demanded the post be deleted. Chinese officials, meanwhile, defended the comments as coming from a personal standpoint.

On November 14, China’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Japanese ambassador and warned of a “crushing defeat” if Japan interfered with Taiwan. The following day, Japan’s Foreign Ministry also summoned the Chinese ambassador to complain about the consul’s post.

Although Taikachi told parliament three days after her controversial statement that she would avoid talking about specific scenarios going forward, she has refused to retract her comments.

How have tensions increased since?

The matter has deteriorated into a trade war of sorts. On November 14, China issued a no-travel advisory for Japan, an apparent attempt to target the country’s tourism sector, which welcomed some 7.5 million Chinese tourists between January and September this year. On November 15, three Chinese airlines offered refunds or free changes for flights planned on Japan-bound routes.

The Chinese Education Ministry also took aim at Japan’s education sector, warning Chinese students there or those planning to study in Japan about recent crimes against Chinese. Both China and Japan have recorded attacks against each other’s nationals in recent months that have prompted fears of xenophobia, but it is unclear if the attacks are linked.

Tensions are also rising around territorial disputes. Last Sunday, the Chinese coastguard announced it was patrolling areas in the East China Sea, in the waters around a group of uninhabited islands that both countries claim. Japan calls the islands the Senkaku Islands, while Beijing calls them the Diaoyu Islands. Japan, in response, condemned the brief “violation” of Japanese territorial waters by a fleet of four Chinese coastguard ships.

Over the last week, Chinese authorities have suspended the screening of at least two Japanese films and banned Japanese seafood.

Then, on Thursday, China postponed a three-way meeting with culture ministers from Japan and South Korea that was scheduled to be held in late November.

‘Symbol of defiance’

On November 18, diplomats from both sides met in Beijing for talks where the grievances were aired.

Senior Chinese official Liu Jinsong chose to wear a five-buttoned collarless suit associated with the rebellion of Chinese students against Japanese imperialism in 1919.

Japanese media have called the choice of the suit a “symbol of defiance.” They also point to videos and images from the meeting showing Liu with his hands in his pockets after the talks, saying the gesture is typically viewed as disrespectful in formal settings.

The Beijing meeting did not appear to ease the tensions, and there seems to be no sign of the impasse breaking: Chinese representatives asked for a retraction, but Japanese diplomats said Taikachi’s remarks were in line with Japan’s stance.

What is the history of Sino-Japanese tensions?

It’s a long and – especially for China – painful story. Imperial Japan occupied significant portions of China after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), when it gained control of Taiwan and forcefully annexed Korea. In 1937, Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Amid strong Chinese resistance, Japan occupied parts of eastern and southern China, where it created and controlled puppet governments. The Japanese Empire’s defeat in World War II in 1945 ended its expansion bid.

The Chinese Communist Party emerged victorious in 1949 in the civil war that followed with the Kuomintang, which, along with the leader Chiang Kai-shek, fled to Taiwan to set up a parallel government. But until 1972, Japan formally recognised Taiwan as “China”.

In 1972, it finally recognised the People’s Republic of China and agreed to the “one China principle”, in effect severing formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. However, Japan has maintained firm unofficial ties with Taiwan, including through trade.

Japan has also maintained a policy of so-called “strategic ambiguity” over how Tokyo would respond if China were to attack Taiwan — a policy of deliberate ambivalence, aimed at leaving Beijing and the rest of the world guessing over whether it would intervene militarily. The stance is similar to that of the United States, Taiwan’s most powerful ally.

How important is trade between China and Japan?

He Yongqian, a spokesperson for China’s commerce ministry, said at a regular news conference this week that trade relations between the two countries had been “severely damaged” by PM Takaichi’s comments.

China is Japan’s second-largest export market after the US, with Tokyo selling mainly industrial equipment, semiconductors and automobiles to Beijing. In 2024, China bought about $125bn worth of Japanese goods, according to the United Nations’ Comtrade database. South Korea, Japan’s third-largest export market, bought goods worth $46bn in 2024.

China is also a major buyer of Japan’s sea cucumbers and its top scallop buyer. Japanese firms, particularly seafood exporters, are worried about the effects of the spat on their businesses, according to reporting by Reuters.

Beijing is not as reliant on Japan’s economy, but Tokyo is China’s third-largest trading partner. China mainly exports electrical equipment, machinery, apparel and vehicles to Japan. Tokyo bought $152bn worth of goods from China in 2024, according to financial data website Trading Economics.

It’s not the first time Beijing has retaliated with trade. In 2023, China imposed a ban on all Japanese food imports after Tokyo released radioactive water from the Fukushima nuclear plant into the Pacific. Beijing was against the move, although the UN atomic energy agency had deemed the discharge safe. That ban was lifted just on November 7, the same day Taikachi made the controversial comments.

In 2010, China also halted the exports of rare earth minerals to Japan for seven weeks after a Chinese fishing captain was detained near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Diplomatic dispute deepens between Tokyo and Beijing over Taiwan remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

China will again ban all imports of Japanese seafood as a diplomatic dispute between the two countries escalates, Japanese media report.

Japanese public broadcaster NHK and Kyodo News agency said on Wednesday that the seafood ban follows after China earlier this month lifted import restrictions on Japanese marine products, which were imposed by Beijing in 2023 after the release of treated radioactive water from Japan’s crippled Fukushima nuclear plant into the sea.

Kyodo News, referencing sources with knowledge of the matter, said China has told Japan that the reimposition of the ban was due to the need for further monitoring of the water from Fukushima released into the Pacific Ocean.

But the ban comes amid a deepening crisis in relations between Beijing and Tokyo over remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. The premier told parliament on November 7 that a Chinese attack on Taiwan, which threatened Japan’s survival, was one of the few cases that could trigger a military response from Tokyo.

Takaichi’s comments were met with a wave of criticism by Chinese officials and state media, prompting Japan to warn its citizens in China to take safety precautions and avoid crowded places.

In a post on X following Takaichi’s comments, the Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, threatened to “cut off that dirty neck”, apparently referring to the Japanese prime minister. Tokyo said it had summoned the Chinese ambassador over the now-deleted social media post.

Beijing has also advised Chinese citizens to avoid travelling to Japan and demanded that Takaichi retract her remarks, though Tokyo said they were in line with the government’s position.

Seeking to defuse the row, Masaaki Kanai, Japan’s top official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Asia Pacific region, held talks on Tuesday in Beijing with his Chinese counterpart, Liu Jinsong.

“During the consultations, China once again lodged a strong protest with Japan” over “Takaichi’s erroneous remarks”, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Mao Ning said.

“Takaichi’s fallacies seriously violate international law and the basic norms governing international relations”, Mao said, adding the Japanese premier’s comments “fundamentally damage the political foundation of China-Japan relations”.

‘Very dissatisfied’

Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu, reporting from Beijing, said the visit by Kanai to Beijing was seen as an effort by Tokyo to de-escalate tensions and communicate to China that Japan’s stance on independently-ruled Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its own territory, has not changed despite Takaichi’s remarks.

“It seems there were no concrete outcomes, but what we have seen, though, is some footage following the meeting of these two diplomats parting ways, and I think it really speaks for itself. We have very cold body language from both of these diplomats,” Yu said.

“Liu Jinsong had his hands in his pockets, refusing to shake hands with the Japanese senior diplomat,” Yu said, adding that the Chinese official said afterwards that he was “very dissatisfied” with the meeting.

Liu Jinsong, director-general of the Department of Asian Affairs of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, met with Masaaki Kanai, director-general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, on Tuesday.

Following the meeting, Masaaki Kanai has left the Chinese… pic.twitter.com/rdAy2YJruQ

— China News 中国新闻网 (@Echinanews) November 18, 2025

Before the most recent seafood ban, China accounted for more than one-fifth of Japan’s seafood exports, according to official data.

The dispute has also engulfed other areas of China-Japan relations, with China Film News, which is supervised by the state-backed China Film Administration, announcing that the release of two imported Japanese movies would be postponed amid the dispute.

The two movies were originally expected to be released on December 6 and November 22, respectively, according to review site Douban.

Chinese state media says distributors made ‘prudent’ decision to postpone releases due to audience sentiment.

Chinese film distributors have suspended the release of two Japanese anime films amid an escalating diplomatic row over Taiwan.

Crayon Shin-chan the Movie: Super Hot! The Spicy Kasukabe Dancers and Cells at Work! will not be screened in mainland China as originally scheduled, Chinese state-run broadcaster CCTV said on Tuesday.

The move comes as relations between Tokyo and Beijing are at their lowest ebb in years following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s suggestion that Tokyo could intervene militarily if China attempted to take control of Taiwan.

CCTV said distributors made the “prudent” decision to postpone the releases in view of the overall market performance of Japanese films and “Chinese audience sentiment”.

Film distributors reported that Takaichi’s “provocative remarks” would inevitably affect Chinese audience perceptions of Japanese cinema, CCTV said, adding that the companies would follow “market principles and respect audience preferences” by delaying the releases.

Naoise McDonagh, an expert in economic coercion at Edith Cowan University in Western Australia, said the postponements followed a well-worn playbook in Chinese statecraft.

“China is usually careful to target trade that is non-essential for China, but which will impact Japanese firms, creating both financial costs and symbolic pressure,” McDonagh told Al Jazeera.

Such incidents allow Beijing to signal that parties who act against its interests will face costs, “providing China some degree of influence on other governmental decision-making processes that impact China’s red line,” McDonagh said.

The delayed film releases follow a series of retaliatory moves by Beijing in response to Takaichi’s comments, including an advisory warning its citizens against travel to Japan and the deployment of warships to waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands.

Japan on Monday issued its own travel advisory for China, warning its citizens to respect local customs, avoid crowded places and exercise caution in their interactions with Chinese people.

Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara on Tuesday told a regular media briefing that its advisories were based on “the social situations” of various countries and its latest statement reflected recent reports on the Tokyo-Beijing tensions.

Kihara also said that Tokyo had an “open stance” on dialogue with China after Beijing said that Chinese Premier Li Qiang had no plans to meet Takaichi on the sidelines of this weekend’s G20 summit in South Africa.

Kihara made the comments as Japan’s top official for Asia Pacific affairs, Masaaki Kanai, met his Chinese counterpart, Liu Jinsong, in Beijing on Tuesday in a bid to calm tensions between the sides.

China considers self-ruled Taiwan part of its territory and has pledged to “reunify” the island with the Chinese mainland, by force if necessary.

Japan views China’s stance on Taiwan with concern due to the island’s close proximity to Japanese territory and its location in waters that carry large volumes of trade.

China insists that countries, in order to have diplomatic ties with Beijing, must not officially recognise Taiwan. Most countries follow China’s demand, but many maintain economic and semiofficial diplomatic ties with Taipei.

Relations between Tokyo and Beijing have plummeted over Japanese leader’s recent remarks on Taiwan.

Japanese shares linked to the tourism industry have nosedived following China’s warning to its citizens against travelling to Japan.

Relations between Tokyo and Beijing have plummeted since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested earlier this month that Japan’s military could intervene to stop China from taking control of Taiwan.

In a sharp escalation of the dispute on Friday, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised citizens to avoid travel to the East Asian country, claiming that Takaichi’s comments had increased risks to their “personal safety and lives”.

The issue continued to reverberate as Japan’s stock market reopened on Monday after the weekend break, with shares of airlines and retail outlets taking sharp falls.

Department store group Isetan Mitsukoshi fell more than 11 percent in afternoon trading, while its rival Takashimaya tumbled about 5 percent.

Japan Airlines fell about 4 percent, while Uniqlo owner Fast Retailing dipped about 5 percent. Cosmetics company Shiseido plunged about 9.5 percent.

China is Japan’s biggest source of foreign tourists, accounting for almost one-quarter of the 31.65 million arrivals in the first nine months of this year, according to the Japan National Tourism Organization.

Ryota Abe, an economist at Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, said Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) could shrink by about 0.5 percent in the event of a total collapse in Chinese arrivals and by about 0.1-0.2 percent if arrivals decreased by about one-third.

“Even if the number of visitors decreases 30 percent because of the heightened tensions, the negative impact will be around 0.1-0.2 percent,” Abe told Al Jazeera.

Japan’s economy shrank by 0.4 percent in the three months to September, official data released on Monday showed, the first contraction in six quarters.

Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga told a regular news briefing on Monday that Beijing’s travel warning was inconsistent with mutually beneficial ties and that Tokyo had requested “appropriate steps” from the Chinese side.

Japan’s top official for Asia Pacific affairs, Masaaki Kanai, departed for China on Monday for talks aimed at lowering tensions between the sides, Japanese media reported.

Masaaki Kanai will meet his Chinese counterpart, Liu Jinsong, in Beijing, where he is expected to clarify that Tokyo has made no change to its security policy despite Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan, the reports said.

Japan has long viewed China’s threats to take control of Taiwan with concern due to the self-ruled island’s close proximity to Japanese territory and its location in waters that carry large volumes of trade.

China considers Taiwan part of its territory and has pledged to “reunify” the island with the Chinese mainland, by force if necessary.

Taiwan is not officially recognised by most countries but has many characteristics of a de facto independent state, including its own military and passport, and a democratically elected president and legislature.

Nov. 15 (UPI) — Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent comments about Taiwan have prompted the Chinese government on Friday to advise its citizens against traveling to Japan.

While the advisory does not prohibit China’s citizens from going to Japan, the warning is the most serious rebuke of the Japanese prime minister’s comments so far, according to CNN.

Hong Kong’s Security Bureau on Saturday issued a similar notice to its residents.

Seven Chinese airlines also told passengers who are scheduled to fly to Japan that they will refund ticket prices or allow ticketholders to change their flight routes through the end of the year.

The travel warnings came after Takaichi last week told lawmakers Japan could use its military to intervene in any conflict that might occur in the Taiwan Strait that separates Taiwan from mainland China.

She said any military action against Taiwan by China would create a self-defense situation that could trigger a military response from Japan.

Chinese officials have demanded the prime minister retract her comments, including one official who referred to her as an “evil witch” and another who mentioned cutting off a “dirty neck” that stuck itself into Chinese matters, NBC News reported.

Takaichi so far has refused to retract her comments, though, according to China Daily.

China has laid claim to Taiwan and has hinted at using military force, if necessary, to assert its territorial claim to the self-ruling island nation that became the refuge of Chinese nationalists after communist forces took control of the mainland in 1949.

The prime minister’s comments also drew a rebuke from former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.

Ishiba, during a radio interview on Thursday, said Takaichi’s comments were “very close to claiming that a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency.”

Other national leaders had avoided saying how the Japanese government might respond to matters in Taiwan under certain situations, he added.

US Senate vote to end shutdown delivers reprieve to investors worried about AI valuations and weakness in US economy.

Stocks from the United States to Japan have risen sharply amid hopes that an end to the longest US government shutdown in history is imminent.

US lawmakers on Sunday moved to end a five-week impasse over government funding, a boost for investors unnerved by signs of growing weakness in the US economy and the sky-high evaluations of firms involved in artificial intelligence.

After a group of Democrats broke with the party leadership to join Republicans, the US Senate voted 60-40 to advance a bill that would fund government operations through the end of January.

The funding package still needs to win final approval in the Senate and then pass the US House of Representatives, after which it would go to US President Donald Trump for his signature – a process expected to take days.

Stock markets in the Asia Pacific made large gains on Monday, while futures in the US also rose in advance of stock exchanges reopening.

South Korea’s benchmark KOSPI led the gains, rising about 3 percent as of 4pm local time (07:00 GMT).

Japan’s Nikkei 225 and Hong Kong’s Hang Seng also rose sharply, advancing about 1.3 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively.

Taiwan’s Taiex rose about 0.8 percent, while Australia’s ASX 200 gained about 0.75 percent.

Futures for the US’s benchmark S&P 500 and tech-heavy Nasdaq-100, which are traded outside of regular market hours, were up about 0.75 and 1.3 percent, respectively.

The reprieve comes as investors are concerned that AI-linked stocks may be wildly overvalued and that Trump’s sweeping tariffs could be doing more damage to the US economy than has been captured in headline data so far.

Nvidia, whose graphics processing units are integral to the development of AI, last month became the first company in history to reach a market valuation of $5 trillion, a day after tech giant Apple surpassed $4 trillion in market value.

While the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ official jobs report has been suspended since August due to the government shutdown, several other analyses have pointed to a rise in layoffs in October.

Challenger, Gray & Christmas, an executive outplacement firm, said in a report last week that layoffs surged 183 percent last month, making it the worst October for jobs since 2003.

A separate analysis by Revelio Labs, a workforce analytics company, estimated that the economy shed 9,100 jobs during the month.

Evans held a 13-point lead over both Ogier and Rovanpera going into the Toyota City-based event.

However, the Finn’s hopes took an early blow, dropping more than five minutes on Friday after damaging his rear suspension in a collision with a barrier.

Evans began slowly, placing sixth on the opening stage, but put together back-to-back stage wins on Friday and a strong Saturday morning sequence to rise up to second just 1.4secs behind leader Ogier.

The Frenchman responded with a dominant performance on Saturday afternoon, which continued as he was also the quickest driver across the final day’s six stages – including adding a further additional five points with victory in the final bonus power stage.

“It’s obviously a perfect result,” said Ogier, who is looking to equal Sebastien Loeb’s record nine world titles.

“It’s been a challenging weekend because after the rain today nothing was certain, it was the start of a new rally this morning.

“Now, let’s go to the next one. This was a perfect weekend for us to come back so close [to Evans] and let’s hope the last one is not a lottery.”

Toyota Gazoo Racing have already secured their fifth consecutive WRC manufacturers’ title and are now guaranteed to take the top three places in the drivers’ championship.

Rovanpera, though, looks destined to finish third in his final rally season before switching to a career in circuit racing.

“Definitely not the weekend we wanted to have but sometimes it’s like this,” said the 25-year-old Finn.

“Just a bit too inconsistent with results this year.”

Ireland hooker Ronan Kelleher says players must fulfil their individual responsibilities better if the squad is to bounce back in their three home autumn internationals after losing to New Zealand in Chicago.

The All Blacks secured a 26-13 comeback win over Andy Farrell’s side at Soldier Field, with the Irish now set to face Japan on Saturday at the Aviva Stadium in Dublin, then Australia and South Africa at the same venue.

Tadhg Beirne had his initial yellow card after three minutes of the contest with New Zealand upgraded to a 20-minute red and although Ireland led 13-7 early in the second half, a flurry of three tries in the space of 15 minutes in the final quarter of the game saw their opponents avenge their loss at the same venue nine years previously.

Beirne’s sanction was subsequently rescinded on appeal.

“Obviously it wasn’t what we wanted. We went there with a plan, but we obviously didn’t execute it,” said Kelleher.

“It was more us not doing our jobs to the best of our ability really and on the day, we weren’t good enough.

“I think it just came down to our execution on the day. We just got it wrong at times.”

Kelleher, who was called up to the British and Irish Lions squad in July, added that it was “particularly disappointing” to concede those three late tries after he had come on as a replacement for fellow Leinster player Dan Sheehan just after the hour mark.

“I came off the bench but it was difficult out there, we just didn’t get our dead stops. We didn’t manage to do what we said we were going to do, which was get two-man shots, slow up their breakdown with dominant collisions and we didn’t manage to do that.

“Then when they managed to get a bit of momentum on us, they managed to keep the foot on the throat and we couldn’t wrestle that momentum back.

“I think ultimately we have to take the learnings from the game and make sure we improve from here on in. We weren’t good enough for large parts, so I think it’s just back to the drawing board really.

“It’s up to each player individually to make sure that they’re doing the bit of extras, whatever needs to be done.”

China has frequently accused the Philippines of acting as a ‘troublemaker’ and ‘saboteur of regional stability’.

The Philippines and Canada have signed a defence pact to expand joint military drills and deepen security cooperation in a move widely seen as a response to China’s growing assertiveness in the region, most notably in the disputed South China Sea.

Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr and Canadian Defence Minister David McGuinty inked the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) on Sunday after a closed-door meeting in Manila.

McGuinty said the deal would strengthen joint training, information sharing, and coordination during humanitarian crises and natural disasters.

Teodoro described the pact as vital for upholding what he called a rules-based international order in the Asia-Pacific, where he accused China of expansionism. “Who is hegemonic? Who wants to expand their territory in the world? China,” he told reporters.

The agreement provides the legal framework for Canadian troops to take part in military exercises in the Philippines and vice versa. It mirrors similar accords Manila has signed with the United States, Australia, Japan and New Zealand.

China has not yet commented on the deal, but it has frequently accused the Philippines of being a “troublemaker” and “saboteur of regional stability” after joint patrols and military exercises with its Western allies in the South China Sea.

Beijing claims almost the entire waterway, a vital global shipping lane, thereby ignoring a 2016 international tribunal ruling that dismissed its territorial claims as unlawful. Chinese coastguard vessels have repeatedly used water cannon and blocking tactics against Philippine ships, leading to collisions and injuries.

Teodoro used a regional defence ministers meeting in Malaysia over the weekend to condemn China’s declaration of a “nature reserve” around the contested Scarborough Shoal, which Manila also claims.

“This, to us, is a veiled attempt to wield military might and the threat of force, undermining the rights of smaller countries and their citizens who rely on the bounty of these waters,” he said.

Talks are under way by the Philippines for similar defence agreements with France, Singapore, Britain, Germany and India as Manila continues to fortify its defence partnerships amid rising tensions with Beijing.