Israel

Israel believes it is progressing faster than expected in achieving its objectives in the war against Iran, according to Israel’s ambassador to France.

Ambassador Joshua Zarka said the military campaign, which Israel initially predicted would last several weeks, is moving ahead of schedule in meeting its strategic goals.

Speaking to BFM TV, Zarka said Israel’s objectives extend beyond dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme. He said the broader aim is to weaken Iran’s leadership so that it can no longer project power beyond its borders and so that the Iranian population can determine its own political future.

Israel’s Broader Strategic Objectives

According to Zarka, Israel’s campaign is designed not only to limit Iran’s military capabilities but also to significantly weaken the country’s ruling authorities.

The ambassador said that reducing the government’s ability to operate abroad would help prevent attacks against Israel and its allies, while also creating conditions in which Iranians could “take their fate into their own hands.”

His comments reflect a broader strategic message from Israel that the war is intended to reshape Iran’s regional role, rather than simply eliminate specific military programmes.

Zarka, who previously served as Israel’s lead diplomat dealing with Iran, suggested that Israel’s military progress is exceeding initial expectations.

Warning Over New Iranian Leadership

Zarka also commented on the recent appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new supreme leader following the death of his father, Ali Khamenei.

He said that if Mojtaba Khamenei follows the same policies as his predecessor, he could become a potential target for Israel.

The remark underscores the increasingly confrontational rhetoric surrounding the conflict and signals that Israel sees Iran’s leadership itself as central to the confrontation.

Conflict Expands to Lebanon

At the same time, Israel has intensified military operations against Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant group based in Lebanon, after cross-border attacks on Israeli territory.

The Lebanese government has said it would like to hold direct talks with Israel to stop the fighting. However, Zarka dismissed the possibility of negotiations at this stage.

Instead, he argued that the war would end only if Hezbollah is disarmed a step he said depends on decisions taken by the Lebanese government.

Analysis: Israel Signals No Immediate Path to Negotiations

Zarka’s comments suggest Israel believes the current military campaign is producing results and therefore sees little incentive to pursue negotiations in the near term.

By framing the war’s goals around weakening Iran’s leadership and limiting its regional influence, Israeli officials are signalling that the conflict is about more than just nuclear or missile capabilities.

The remarks also highlight Israel’s strategy of confronting Iran’s regional network of allied groups, including Hezbollah, which it views as a key extension of Tehran’s power.

Taken together, the statements indicate that Israel intends to continue military pressure until it believes Iran’s ability to project influence across the region has been significantly reduced.

With information from Reuters.

Motorists around the globe are already feeling the impact of the United States and Israel’s war on Iran, with fuel prices sharply rising since the war began.

In the US, a gallon of regular petrol that averaged $2.94 in February now costs $3.58, marking a 20 percent increase, according to data from AAA Fuel Prices, a retail fuel price tracker from the American Automobile Association (AAA).

While each US state sets its own petrol prices, several states have surpassed $4 per gallon, with California exceeding $5 per gallon, the highest level it has been in more than two years.

Which countries have the sharpest petrol price increases?

According to data analysed from Global Petrol Prices, a data platform that tracks and publishes retail energy prices across approximately 150 countries, at least 85 countries have reported increases in petrol prices following the initial attacks on Iran by the US and Israel on February 28. Some nations announce price changes only at the end of each month, so higher prices are expected for many others in April.

Vietnam recorded the highest petrol price increase of nearly 50 percent, rising from $0.75 per litre of 95-octane on February 23 to $1.13 on March 9. Laos follows with a 33 percent increase, then Cambodia at 19 percent, Australia at 18 percent, and the US at 17 percent.

The table below shows the countries that have increased petrol prices at the pumps.

Asian countries pay the biggest price

Asia is disproportionately dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for the delivery of its oil and gas, which has been effectively closed since the start of the war. The strait joins the Gulf – also referred to as the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Gulf – to the Gulf of Oman and is the only passage for the region’s oil producers to the open ocean.

Japan and South Korea are among the most vulnerable, importing 95 percent and 70 percent of their oil from the Gulf, respectively.

Both East Asian nations have enacted emergency measures to stabilise their energy markets. On March 8, Japan instructed its oil reserve sites to prepare for a potential release of strategic reserves. The next day, South Korea introduced a maximum price cap on petrol and diesel for the first time in 30 years.

In South Asia, the impact of the war is more severe than in East Asia because countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh have much thinner financial buffers and smaller strategic reserves.

In an attempt to conserve energy, Bangladesh‘s government has ordered all public and private universities to close immediately. In Pakistan, government offices will now operate a four-day workweek, while schools have closed, and a 50 percent work-from-home policy has been enacted to save fuel.

In Europe, the Group of Seven finance ministers convened an emergency meeting to discuss rising prices, with French President Emmanuel Macron raising the possibility of releasing 20-30 percent of emergency strategic reserves to ease the pressure on consumers.

How high oil costs drive up the price of food

Oil prices and food prices move in lockstep, with energy prices affecting every stage of the food supply chain, from the fertilisers used in the fields to the trucks that carry food from field to supermarket shelf.

Rising oil prices also directly affect shipping and the cost of transport.

“The lifeblood of the global economy is transport,” economist David McWilliams told Al Jazeera. “It’s getting stuff from A to B – it’s a logistics problem, a supply chain problem, and ultimately transportation is the energy of the global economy.”

Fears of stagflation – increasing inflation and rising unemployment, which major oil shocks have historically summoned – are rising. Economists point to the crises of 1973, 1978 and 2008 as evidence that every significant spike in oil prices has been followed, in some form, by global recession.

In lower-income countries, where populations spend a far greater share of their income on food and import large quantities of grain and fertiliser, rising oil prices could rapidly translate into food shortages.

What products are made from oil and gas?

Oil and gas are used for far more than just fuel. They are raw materials for thousands of everyday products.

Plastics, including water bottles, food packaging, phone casings and medical syringes, are all derived from crude oil.

Crude oil is also the hidden ingredient in synthetic fabrics such as polyester, nylon and acrylic, which are used to make everything from sportswear to carpets. It also underpins the cosmetics industry, as it is used to make products such as petroleum jelly (Vaseline), lipsticks and concealers.

Household items also rely on oil-based ingredients, with laundry detergents, dishwashing liquids, and paints all derived from petroleum products.

The global food supply is essentially built on natural gas in the form of fertilisers, used to enhance crop yields and ensure that food production can meet demand.

Video shared online shows the destruction caused to buildings and vehicles in Iran’s capital after a reported strike near Mehrabad international airport.

A residential building in central Beirut was seen with flames erupting from a hole in its side after what appears to have been another Israeli strike.

A Maronite Catholic priest has been killed by Israeli tank fire after it targeted a home in southern Lebanon. Father Pierre al-Rahi was reportedly killed when an Israeli tank fired on the home of a local couple a second time after several people had rushed there to try to help.

Rescue workers carefully extracted an unexploded missile from a house in Kuhdasht City, following US-Israeli airstrikes on western Iran.

WASHINGTON — Some 140 American service members have been wounded since start of the Iran war, with eight of them “severely injured” and receiving medical care, the Pentagon said Tuesday.

“The vast majority of these injuries have been minor, and 108 service members have already returned to duty,” Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell said in a statement.

The casualty toll adds to the seven American troops killed so far in the war, which entered its 11th day with no clear sign of slowing down as U.S. officials indicated that the military campaign was likely to intensify.

Iran, too, took new actions that could escalate the conflict, reportedly laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz, a potentially devastating development for the global energy market.

President Trump said that if Iran put mines in the strait and did not remove them immediately, the U.S. military would hit Iran “at a level never seen before.”

“If, on the other hand, they remove what may have been placed, it will be a giant step in the right direction!” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

The warning was yet another escalation that came after Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said Tuesday would bring the “most intense day of strikes” inside Iran, a fighting tempo that is at odds with Trump’s own assessment that the war is “very complete” and could end “very soon.”

At a Pentagon news conference, Hegseth said “the most fighters, the most bombers, the most strikes” would be deployed, but declined to say how much longer U.S. forces would be expected to fight in the region. He instead said the president will be the one to “control the throttle.”

“It’s not for me to say whether this is the beginning, the middle, or the end. He will continue to communicate that,” Hegseth told reporters.

That deference places the focus squarely on Trump, who a day earlier delivered mixed signals about the duration of the war, telling reporters at one point that the war is “very much complete” and a later time that it is “the beginning of building a new country.”

At a briefing on Tuesday, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt said the U.S. military was “way ahead of schedule” on reaching its objectives in Iran, but reiterated that the president alone will decide what victory looks like.

“President Trump will determine when Iran is in a place of unconditional surrender and when they no longer pose a credible and direct threat to the United States of America and our allies,” Leavitt said.

The president’s shifting positions on the war’s conclusion have played out as Trump threatens to hit Iran “twenty times harder” if it attempts to halt the flow of oil in the Strait of Hormuz, a key channel for the world’s oil supply — and as Democrats in Congress says they are growing concerned about the possibility of Trump sending U.S. ground troops inside Iran.

“We seem to be on a path toward deploying American troops on the ground in Iran to accomplish any of the potential objectives here,” Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) told reporters after being briefed on the Iran war.

When asked about Democrats’ concerns, Leavitt said Trump “wisely … does not rule options out as commander-in-chief.”

“I would hesitate to confirm anything that a Democrat says right now about the president’s thinking,” she added.

U.S. says Iran’s fire power is diminishing

As Washington plans out its next steps, the war has shown little signs of slowing. U.S. military officials say Iran’s military capabilities are eroding under sustained strikes that have targeted “deeply buried missile launchers” and made “substantial progress toward destroying” Iran’s navy.

Hegseth said “the last 24 hours have seen Iran fire the lowest amount of missiles they have fired yet.”

Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters that Iran’s ballistic missile attacks “continue to trend downward 90%” since the start of the war, and that drone attacks have decreased by 83%.

U.S. forces are also targeting Iran’s “industrial base in order to prevent the regime from being able attack Americans, our interests and our partners for years to come,” Caine said.

Caine said the Iranian military is adapting to the U.S. strategy, but remains confident in Washington’s ability to overpower Tehran. “They are adapting, as are we, of course. We have very entrepreneurial war fighters out there,” he said. “We are watching what they are doing, and we are adapting faster than they are.”

Asked whether Iran had proved to be a stronger adversary than anticipated, Caine said: “They are fighting, and I respect that, but I don’t think they are more formidable than what we thought.”

Iran, meanwhile, has refused to bow down to Trump’s demands and has issued warnings of its own.

Ali Larijani, Iran’s top national security official, called Trump’s threat against their targets on the Strait of Hormuz “hollow” and told him that he should instead focus on taking care of himself so that he is not “eliminated.”

Iran’s parliament speaker, Mohammed Bagher Qalibaf, however, said Iran was determined to keep fighting and was “definitely not looking for a ceasefire.”

“We believe that the aggressor should be punched in the mouth so that he learns a lesson so that he will never think of attacking our beloved Iran again,” Qalibaf said.

New attacks on neighbors

Meanwhile, Iran launched new attacks at Israel and gulf Arab countries. In Bahrain, authorities said an Iranian attack hit a residential building in the capital, Manama, killing a 29-year-old woman and wounding eight people.

Saudi Arabia said it destroyed two drones over its oil-rich eastern region and Kuwait’s National Guard said it shot down six drones. In the United Arab Emirates, firefighters battled a blaze in the industrial city of Ruwais — home to petrochemical plants — after an Iranian drone strike. No injuries were reported.

In Tel Aviv, explosions could be heard as Israel’s defense systems worked to intercept barrages from Iran.

Along with firing missiles and drones at Israel and at American bases in the region, Iran has also targeted energy infrastructure and traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for traded oil, sending oil prices soaring. The attacks appear aimed at generating enough global economic pain to pressure the U.S. and Israel to end their strikes.

Brent crude, the international standard, spiked to nearly $120 on Monday before falling back but was still at around $90 a barrel Tuesday, nearly 24% higher than when the war started on Feb. 28.

“The president and his energy team are closely watching the markets, speaking with industry leaders and the U.S. military is drawing up additional options, following the president’s directive to continue keeping the Strait of Hormuz open,” Leavitt said. “I will not broadcast what those options look like but just know the president is not afraid to use them.”

So far, the president has offered to have the U.S. Navy escort oil tankers.

The White House has insisted that soaring gas prices are temporary, but the shock in the energy markets has already prompted the Trump administration to lift oil-related sanctions on some countries, including Russia.

“We are going to take those sanctions off until this straightens out,” Trump said Monday. “And then who knows, maybe we won’t have to put them on because there will be so much peace.”

The war has created an opportunity for Russia to make gains in Ukraine, as hostilities draw the global spotlight away from Kyiv and its struggle to hold back the bigger Russian army. U.S.-brokered talks between the two adversaries have been sidelined as Washington shifts focus to its war in Iran.

As Russia enjoys economic gains from the war-fueled energy crisis in the Middle East, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been gathering forces for a renewed offensive in eastern Ukraine.

Key air defense systems have already been diverted from Ukraine to the Persian Gulf, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has dispatched drone interceptors to the region and ordered anti-drone experts to pivot from their war with Russia to help Western allies help intercept Iranian attacks.

“At the moment, the partners’ priority and all attention are focused on the situation around Iran,” Zelensky said on X. “We see that the Russians are now trying to manipulate the situation in the Middle East and the gulf region to the benefit of their aggression.”

Times staff writers Gavin J. Quinton and Michael Wilner, in Washington, D.C., contributed to this report, which also includes reporting from the Associated Press.

The World Health Organization has warned that “black rain” caused by Israeli strikes on Iran’s oil facilities could pose health risks, especially for children. Iranian authorities have advised residents stay indoors as fires and thick smoke worsen air quality.

An Israeli air strike has heavily damaged a building in southern Lebanon’s Tyre district as Israeli forces continue to attack across the area. The army says it is targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure and has warned residents south of the Litani river to leave.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) said on Monday that the Israeli military illegally deployed white phosphorus munitions over the southern Lebanese town of Yohmor on March 3, posing severe risks to civilians.

Ramzi Kaiss, HRW’s Lebanon researcher, described the incendiary effects of white phosphorus as capable of causing death or “cruel injuries that result in lifelong suffering.” The group said it had verified eight images and reports from civil defense personnel responding to fires in residential areas.

Legal and Humanitarian Context

White phosphorus can legally be used in warfare to create smoke screens, illuminate battlefields, mark targets, or burn fortified positions. However, HRW emphasized that deploying airburst white phosphorus over populated areas is prohibited under international humanitarian law.

Protocol III of the Convention on the Prohibition of Certain Conventional Weapons classifies white phosphorus as an incendiary weapon and forbids its use against military targets located among civilians. While Israel has not signed the protocol and is not legally bound by it, HRW and other rights groups argue that its use in populated areas constitutes a violation of humanitarian principles.

Previous Patterns and Scale

The report comes amid an intensification of Israeli strikes in Lebanon over the past week. According to the Lebanese National Council for Scientific Research, between October 2023 and July 2024, Israel carried out 175 attacks using white phosphorus in southern Lebanon, sparking fires across more than 600 hectares (1,480 acres) of farmland.

HRW previously accused Israel of using white phosphorus in 2023, a charge the Israeli military denied. Civilian displacement and casualties have been severe: nearly 400 people killed and hundreds of thousands forced to leave their homes as strikes continue.

Israeli Response

The Israeli military told Reuters it was unaware of and could not confirm the use of white phosphorus shells in Yohmor. Officials said they had not reviewed the same videos cited by HRW and declined to comment on the allegations. Lebanese authorities have not issued a statement on the report.

On March 3, the Israeli military ordered residents of Yohmor and 50 other nearby towns to evacuate ahead of strikes, highlighting the heightened risks to civilians in affected areas.

Analysis

The allegations underscore the ongoing humanitarian and legal concerns in southern Lebanon amid Israel’s operations. Even without Israel being formally bound by Protocol III, the use of incendiary munitions in populated areas raises questions about compliance with customary international humanitarian law, which prohibits indiscriminate attacks on civilians.

The repeated accusations of white phosphorus use reflect both the intensity of Israel’s military campaign and the broader risk of civilian harm in the conflict. Beyond immediate casualties and destruction, agricultural damage and displacement threaten long-term social and economic stability in southern Lebanon, particularly for farming communities still recovering from previous conflicts.

The HRW report may intensify international scrutiny on Israel’s conduct in Lebanon, potentially influencing diplomatic and humanitarian responses in the region.

With information from Reuters.

The United States and Israel’s war on Iran has caused the largest energy supply shock in decades.

The Strait of Hormuz is in effect closed, and attacks are being carried out on energy facilities in the Middle East, rattling oil markets.

From Americans filling their tanks at the pump to European factories and Asian economies, the impact is already being felt.

US President Donald Trump says the rise in oil prices is a “very small price to pay” for “safety and peace”. But investors warn that if the conflict drags on, there’s danger of stagflation.

When a state’s political leadership announces a ceasefire and its military keeps firing, the instinct is to reach for deception as the explanation. In Iran’s case, the more unsettling answer may be structural. The gap between what Iranian presidents say and what Iranian forces do reflects not a coordinated lie but a command architecture deliberately engineered to operate without central direction. In a serious conflict, the consequences of that architecture would be felt well beyond Iran’s borders.

A Command Architecture Designed to Survive Decapitation

In September 2008, IRGC Commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari oversaw a sweeping restructuring that divided the force into thirty-one provincial corps, each empowered to conduct military operations within its zone without requiring authorization from the center. As Michael Connell of the Center for Naval Analyses noted in his analysis for the United States Institute of Peace, the intent was to strengthen unit cohesion and ensure operational continuity under degraded command conditions. He flagged explicitly that the decentralization could produce unintended escalation dynamics, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

That warning deserves serious attention. The IRGC’s Mosaic Defense doctrine was not designed to make Iran more responsive to political leadership in a crisis. It was designed to ensure that military operations could continue regardless of what happened to that leadership. A force structured that way does not stop firing because a president gives a speech.

The Apology That Wasn’t

The internal contradiction becomes clearest when traced through a hypothetical cascade. A president announces a ceasefire and attributes the directive to an Interim Leadership Council. A fellow council member publicly declares that heavy strikes will continue. A hardline cleric addresses the president directly, calling his position untenable. By the time the president’s original statement is reposted, the ceasefire language has been quietly removed.

The IRGC’s own posture in this scenario resolves the ambiguity on structural grounds. It endorses the president’s language, then appends a caveat that renders it inoperative: all US and Israeli military bases and interests across the region remain primary targets. Since every GCC state hosts American forces, that framing preserves full operational freedom while allowing the presidency to project restraint. The contradiction is not incidental. It is the doctrine functioning as designed.

The Theological Dimension

Iran is not simply a military organization. It is a theocratic state whose constitutional legitimacy flows from velayat-e faqih, the guardianship of the Islamic jurist, which vests supreme authority in a single clerical figure whose religious and political mandates are inseparable. Remove that figure, and the system’s legitimating architecture is suspended rather than transferred. The Assembly of Experts is constitutionally mandated to elect a successor, but wartime conditions would disrupt that process at precisely the moment its resolution matters most.

A RAND Corporation analysis prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense identified the IRGC as the institution best positioned to shape any post-Khamenei transition, with the organizational reach and economic weight to determine outcomes that civilian institutions cannot contest. The result, in a decapitation scenario, is a theocratic state operating without its theological anchor and a military operating under pre-delegated authority with no one capable of recalling it.

Durability Without Effect

The Mosaic Defense doctrine would prove, above all, durable. A decentralized force can survive catastrophic leadership losses and sustain operations. But durability is not the same as capability, and sustained fire is not the same as strategic effect.

Iran’s theory of regional attrition, the calculation that sustained strikes against Gulf infrastructure and American basing would fracture GCC cohesion and coerce Arab neighbors toward neutrality, has produced no evidence of working. The GCC bloc has held. Individual member states have coordinated their responses rather than fractured under pressure. The country absorbing the sharpest volume of Iranian strike activity, the UAE, has demonstrated air defense performance that has exceeded even optimistic prewar assessments. Publicly available figures suggest UAE systems have defeated upward of ninety percent of inbound threats, a result that reflects years of sustained investment, deep integration with American and Israeli platforms, and an operational tempo that has stress-tested those systems at genuine scale.

The picture that emerges is not one of Iran winning a war of attrition. It is one of an Iran burning through accessible inventory, losing launch infrastructure faster than it can regenerate, and discovering that the regional architecture it spent years attempting to destabilize has proven considerably more resilient than it calculated.

That resilience carries its own strategic meaning. A weakened force operating under pre-delegated authority, without a supreme leader to set limits, remains dangerous in a narrow tactical sense. But it is operating without a coherent end state, and the environment it faces is not the one it anticipated. The GCC’s collective posture and the demonstrated effectiveness of layered air defense across the Gulf have closed off the strategic outcomes Iran’s doctrine was written to achieve.

The scenario is instructive for what it reveals about the limits of decentralized military design. A force built to keep firing regardless of political direction is also a force that cannot be steered toward an exit. But the Gulf states have demonstrated something of equal importance in response: that resilience, properly built and consistently resourced, can outlast a doctrine designed for chaos, and that the regional order Iran sought to unravel has shown itself capable of absorbing the blow.

Modern wars are fought not only with weapons but with assumptions—and the most dangerous assumptions are often invisible to those making them. Donald Rumsfeld’s distinction between known unknowns (questions we recognize but cannot answer) and unknown unknowns (risks we have not even framed as questions) captures something essential about the current confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran.

The Nuclear Material Problem

The June 2025 12-day war struck several of Iran’s nuclear facilities but left the most consequential question unanswered: where is the material? The March 2026 campaign has struck deeper, targeting hardened and dispersed sites that June’s operations left intact. Yet the fundamental uncertainty has not resolved—it has compounded. Iran reportedly retains roughly 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, approaching weapons-grade, and the precise location of that stockpile is now more opaque than before. On March 2, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported the entrance buildings of Iran’s underground Natanz enrichment plant had been bombed, but without inspection access, the agency cannot reconstruct a monitoring baseline.

The strategic paradox is acute. Any Iranian government—this one or a successor—must now confront a nuclear-armed Israel and a United States willing to strike Iranian territory twice in nine months. Under those conditions, nuclear capability looks less like a provocation and more like a rational insurance policy. The war may have permanently entrenched the very incentive it was designed to dismantle. A further risk of escaping conventional arms-control frameworks is if Iranian institutions fragment, specialized nuclear expertise disperses internationally, potentially becoming available to states or non-state actors.

Regime Change and What Follows

The war’s stated objective rests on uncertain ground. Intelligence assessments before the conflict reportedly concluded that even a large-scale assault was unlikely to produce regime collapse—yet the campaign proceeded anyway. The Iranian state has shown remarkable institutional resilience, with no visible defections among senior leadership, a government operating under its constitutional framework, and a regime that has absorbed the Iran-Iraq War, the Green Movement, and decades of sanctions.

War has accelerated the succession question around Ali Khamenei. One trajectory involves Mojtaba Khamenei, whose rise would mean dynastic continuity rather than transformation; another sees the IRGC consolidating power—equally misaligned with Western hopes. The question of what comes after was not answered before the bombs fell.

Retaliation, Major-Power Shadows, and Strategic Incoherence

Iran’s retaliation has demonstrated its asymmetric reach. The IRGC claims attacks on at least 27 bases hosting American troops across the region, alongside Israeli military facilities. Tehran appears to be pacing its response, sustaining an attrition campaign designed to exhaust interceptor stocks rather than overwhelm them in a single strike.

The major power dimensions compound this. Russia has reportedly been providing intelligence on American naval deployments; Chinese-linked entities have allegedly tracked US forces via satellite. Meanwhile, strategic incoherence in Washington compounds every other risk. Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have framed this as a limited campaign against nuclear infrastructure; Trump has simultaneously floated regime change on social media.

The Munitions Race

The deepest structural vulnerability may not lie on the battlefield but in the arithmetic of an industrial system never designed to fight this kind of war. The first 36 hours consumed more than 3,000 precision-guided munitions and interceptors. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Dan Caine had warned that stockpiles were already significantly depleted before the first strike. Secretary Marco Rubio subsequently acknowledged that Iran produces an estimated 100 missiles a month versus roughly six or seven high-end interceptors that American industry can manufacture in the same period.

That deficit has a history. The US likely expended 100 to 150 THAAD interceptors and 80 SM-3s supporting Israel during June’s Twelve-Day War. Those stocks were never fully replenished. The bottlenecks are physical as well as financial. Lockheed Martin’s plan to raise PAC-3 MSE production to 2,000 units per year addresses a six-to-seven-year horizon, not the current emergency.

The drone dimension adds a layer officials have been slow to acknowledge. Hegseth and Caine admitted in a closed-door briefing that Iran’s Shahed drones present a challenge US air defenses cannot fully meet. The Shahed flies low and slow—hard to detect and poorly matched to the high-end interceptors THAAD and SM-3 are optimized to defeat. Intercepting a drone can cost roughly five times what it costs to manufacture one.

This crystallizes the war’s most consequential known unknown: how much of Iran’s arsenal reflects genuine capability, and how much reflects deliberate restraint? The IDF assessed Iran possessed roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles on February 11.

The search for emergency solutions has produced one remarkable geopolitical inversion. The Pentagon has approached Ukraine about purchasing drone interceptors. They are low-cost systems Ukrainian manufacturers developed specifically to hunt Shaheds, built from years of adapting to exactly the threat now confounding American air defenses in the Gulf. The US is buying drone killers from a country it recently all but abandoned! The implications extend to the Indo-Pacific. Every interceptor fired over the Gulf of Bahrain is one fewer available in the Taiwan Strait.

The Energy Shock

The Strait of Hormuz has moved from a textbook chokepoint to a live emergency. Tanker traffic has come to a near standstill. War-risk insurance premiums have made commercial passage unviable even where it remains physically possible. At least five tankers have been struck across the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and nearby waters. Approximately 20 million barrels of oil per day—a fifth of global consumption—normally transit the strait, alongside roughly 20% of global LNG trade. Traders are warning that oil prices could surge past $100 a barrel if the conflict in Iran continues to escalate. Goldman Sachs Research estimates that a full one-month closure would add $15 per barrel, assuming no compensating measures like spare pipeline utilization or releases from strategic petroleum reserves. Bank of America sees tail risk far higher, estimating a prolonged shutdown could add $40–$80 per barrel above current prices.

The LNG dimension may prove more immediately damaging than oil. QatarEnergy has halted production at Ras Laffan, the world’s largest LNG facility, after Iranian drone attacks. This has already caused European natural gas futures to spike. If global LNG tightens, Europe must compete with Asian buyers on price. That competition may, in turn, force Europe back toward Russian gas, quietly reversing one of the most consequential geopolitical achievements of the post-Ukraine sanctions era.

The exposure is global and unevenly distributed. China, India, Japan, and South Korea account for roughly 75% of Hormuz crude exports and 59% of its LNG flows. South Korea has warned it could exhaust LNG reserves within nine days and has announced a 100 trillion won stabilization fund. India is pivoting toward Russian crude. These developments structurally benefit Moscow regardless of the war’s outcome.

The fertilizer dimension compounds the energy shock with a slower fuse. Nitrogen fertilizers are manufactured from natural gas; roughly a third of globally traded urea transits Hormuz. QatarEnergy’s halt removes fertilizer output simultaneously with LNG. Urea prices have already surged $60 to $80 per ton at New Orleans, with the spring planting window closing. The food-price consequences will not appear in grocery stores for months. But they are already locked in.

The Gulf Security Paradox

For decades the Gulf states managed their rivalry with Iran below the threshold of open confrontation, relying on the American security umbrella while avoiding direct entanglement. The war has collapsed that strategy. The Gulf states did not arrive at this crisis as Iran’s adversaries but rather as reluctant bystanders who had invested enormous diplomatic capital in preventing it. They gave ironclad assurances to Tehran, both before the war and up to its eve, that their territories would not serve as launchpads. That Iran responded by striking these same neighbors is a strategic miscalculation of historic proportions and a moral failure that may poison relations for a generation.

This has opened a structural debate now conducted in public. Is American military presence a protective shield or a magnet for retaliation? Citizens and analysts are asking why Gulf states should bear the risk of hosting US forces when Washington appears unable to protect them. Undoubtedly, Tehran understands this dynamic. Drone strikes on UAE-based data centers targeted Gulf publics’ confidence in the connectivity model as much as American commercial interests. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have staked their post-oil futures on projecting stability and attracting mobile capital. Intercepting most of the incoming fire is not sufficient when global firms are deciding where to invest next decade.

The crisis confronts the Gulf Cooperation Council with a strategic fork. One path leads toward deeper collective security, featuring integrated missile defense, expanded intelligence sharing, and coordinated maritime protection that could reduce dependence on any single external patron. The other leads toward renewed fragmentation as internal rivalries re-emerge.

Former Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani warned that the Gulf “must not be dragged into a direct confrontation with Iran,” arguing that such a clash would “deplete the resources of both sides and provide an opportunity for outside forces to control us under the pretext of helping us escape the crisis.” Yet the same crisis that could finally catalyze genuine Gulf collective security could just as easily deepen the divisions that have historically prevented it.

The Mediator’s Dilemma and the Meta-Unknown

The conflict has also damaged the diplomatic architecture that previously helped manage US-Iran tensions. Oman and Qatar built genuine credibility as intermediaries through years of patient back-channel work. Effective mediation requires neutrality. When conflict spreads into the territory of potential mediators, that credibility erodes. Iran’s decision to strike the very states whose neutrality made diplomacy possible may have burned the bridges needed to end the war—which is perhaps the most consequential unknown unknown in the entire conflict, second only to the US twice striking Iran in the span of nine months while negotiations were still ongoing.

At the deepest level lies a question no intelligence assessment can answer: whether the strategic logic of the war is coherent at all. Negotiations failed because each side demanded outcomes the other could not accept. The same incompatibility that made diplomacy impossible may make military victory equally elusive. Iran cannot surrender unconditionally without ceasing to be the Islamic Republic. And the conditions that make nuclear deterrence attractive to any Iranian government—this one or a successor—have not been removed by the strikes; they have been reinforced.

Conclusion

In sum, the US-Israeli campaign against Iran has illuminated the limits of military certainty. Known unknowns—munition shortages, asymmetric retaliation, and energy vulnerabilities—interact with unknown unknowns—nuclear dispersal, regime succession, and Gulf fragmentation—to create a conflict whose trajectory is inherently unpredictable. Rather than eliminating threats, the strikes may have entrenched incentives for nuclear retention, incentivized strategic caution, and stressed regional and global systems. The coherence of the war itself is in question, as military action and diplomacy pull in contradictory directions. Ultimately, the conflict underscores that modern warfare is as much about managing uncertainties as it is about destroying targets.

The reported idea of a special operation to seize Iran’s uranium should alarm anyone who still thinks there is a line between pressure and recklessness. Sending foreign forces into Iranian territory to capture nuclear material would be far beyond coercion. It would be war in plain sight. That risk looks even sharper when it is paired with talk of unconditional surrender and a revived maximum pressure campaign. Officials call that flexibility. In practice, it often creates confusion and a dangerous illusion of control.

Strategic Ambiguity Has Limits

Trump has long preferred threat inflation as a negotiating tool, and his administration’s National Security Presidential Memorandum on Iran makes clear that Washington wants to deny Tehran every path to a bomb. But there is a difference between pressure meant to shape diplomacy and rhetoric that drifts toward occupation logic. A raid assumes the United States can enter a sovereign state, take possession of fissile material, and leave without igniting a larger conflict. That is not strategy. It is a gamble.

A Raid Would Not Stay Small

Iran is not an isolated militia camp. It is a large state with layered security organs, missile capacity, regional partners, and a long memory of external intervention. Any attempt to seize uranium by force would expose American troops, bases, shipping lanes, diplomats, and partners to retaliation across several fronts. Even before talk of a raid, Washington and Tehran had been engaged in indirect nuclear talks in Oman. Replacing diplomacy with a ground mission would not create leverage. It would destroy what remains of a controlled bargaining space.

The Nuclear Picture Is Already Murky

The hardest fact in this debate is that the nuclear picture is already uncertain. In its February 2026 safeguards report, the IAEA said it could not verify the current status of facilities hit in June 2025. Reuters later highlighted that same report’s estimate that Iran had 440.9 kilograms enriched up to 60 percent before the strikes, while the Associated Press noted the wider stockpile had reached 9,874.9 kilograms of enriched uranium in total. Reuters also reported a cat-and-mouse hunt for missing material and confirmed that tunnel entrances at Isfahan were hit. Those facts do not make a commando operation look cleaner. They make it look less knowable.

Force Has Already Damaged Oversight

This is the contradiction hawks avoid. Military action may damage buildings, but it can also damage the inspection system needed to track what survives. The IAEA chief said that returning to Iranian sites was the top priority after the attacks because the agency had lost visibility. Reuters warned even before the war that any new Iran deal would have to address serious watchdog blind spots. Rafael Grossi had already reminded the Security Council that nuclear facilities must never be attacked and later stressed that inspectors must be allowed to do their job. Once oversight is broken, claims about perfect control become less credible.

Pressure Without Diplomacy Can Harden Iran

Advocates of seizure argue that urgency changes the rules. Their point is easy to grasp. If material has been moved, hidden, or split across sites, then delay is dangerous. But urgency cuts both ways. The less certainty there is, the more any raid grows in scope. A supposedly limited mission can quickly expand into repeated searches, broader strikes, and pressure for a longer presence. That trajectory sits uneasily with both the basic ban on the use of force in the UN Charter and the logic of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which depends on verification and compliance, not theatrical confiscation. Reuters has also shown that the damage from earlier strikes was difficult to measure and that U.S. officials later said there was no known intelligence that Iran had moved the uranium. That uncertainty is exactly why fantasies of a clean raid should be treated with suspicion.

Containment Is Less Dramatic, but Safer

There is another reason to reject this path. Public overstatement can create policy traps. Trump has already brushed aside internal caution, including when Reuters reported that he said his own intelligence chief was wrong about Iran’s program. Tehran, for its part, has insisted through officials speaking to Reuters that it will not give up enrichment under pressure. That is not a recipe for surrender. It is a recipe for concealment and hardening. Serious policy should focus on intelligence work, restored IAEA access, sustained diplomatic pressure backed by credible penalties, and a clear effort to prevent a regional war that would leave the uranium question even murkier.

The appeal of seizure is obvious. It sounds decisive and final. But nuclear crises rarely yield to cinematic solutions. They are managed through verification, containment, bargaining, and steady pressure, not through fantasies of absolute control. If this idea is truly being weighed in Washington, it should be rejected before rhetoric turns into mission planning. A ground effort to capture uranium inside Iran would not settle the problem. It could widen the war, shatter what diplomacy still exists, and leave the world with the same material, less oversight, and far more bloodshed.

Itamar Greenberg laughed when asked if he thought he should be afraid. The 19-year-old Israeli antiwar activist had just described being spat on in the street and is the target of an online hate campaign.

“Yes!” he finally responded. “If I thought about it, I probably should be. I just don’t have time.”

Voices like Greenberg’s are rare in Israel at a time when public clamour for war is growing, and genocidal language already familiar to millions of Palestinians is reemerging, but with a different target – Iran.

Officially, 11 Israelis have been killed in Iranian strikes since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28. What the actual number might be, or how many of Iran’s ballistic missiles may have penetrated the country’s Iron Dome defence shield, is unknown.

Speaking at the site of an Iranian missile strike in West Jerusalem, shortly after the start of the US-Israeli attacks on Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu returned to the use of apocalyptic language that has characterised the genocide his country has conducted in Gaza. Comparing Iranians with the Jewish people’s biblical foe, Amalek, who the Jews had been divinely ordered to wipe from the face of the planet, Netanyahu told reporters: “In this week’s Torah portion, we read, “‘Remember what Amalek did to you.’ We remember, and we act.”

So far, Iran claims to have launched strikes across Israel, saying its missiles and drones hit military sites, symbolic infrastructure, and even Netanyahu’s office. Tehran has described the attacks as precise and strategic, rather than indiscriminate and part of a broader regional response. Iran also claims to have targeted locations such as Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion airport and Haifa.

However, Israeli officials have denied many of the specific claims. Netanyahu’s office dismissed Iranian assertions about hitting his office, or affecting his condition, as “fake news”, with stringent reporting restrictions on Iranian strikes within Israel making confirmation either way difficult.

What is clearer is that against the drumbeat of Iranian strikes, the fervour for war appears to be increasing among the public. A poll carried out last week by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) suggested overwhelming public support for the war, with 93 percent of Jewish-Israeli respondents expressing support for the strikes on Iran, and 74 percent expressing support for Netanyahu, the country’s historically divisive prime minister.

“No one’s talking about opposition to the war,” Greenberg said, describing an environment in which figures from across Israel’s media and political landscape – with the exception of the left-wing Hadash party and antiwar organisations such as Greenberg’s Mesarvot – had lined up behind the war. “It’s also getting increasingly violent,” he said.

“We held a protest on Tuesday, where the police were already waiting. They beat and arrested us. I was illegally strip-searched,” he said, describing it as efforts intended to humiliate him.

Greenberg is no stranger to such tactics. Six months ago, after being arrested for protesting the genocide in Gaza, prison guards had threatened to carve a Star of David on his face, a permanent reminder of what they thought his priorities should be.

It’s not just antiwar activists who have faced the brunt of the Israeli security establishment’s force.

“The atmosphere is very violent,“ lawmaker Ofer Cassif of the Hadash party told Al Jazeera. “When I leave the house, I’m more worried by the danger posed by a physical attack by fascists than I am by any missile,” he said.

Hadash and lawmakers like Cassif have been targeted by physical threats and attacks throughout the Gaza war. But criticism of the Netanyahu government’s handling of Israeli captives in Gaza meant that opposition to the Gaza war was – comparatively – more socially acceptable. When it comes to Iran, the current climate is toxic, Cassif said.

“We’re often accused of supporting the regime in Tehran,” Cassif explained of the attempts to delegitimise their opposition to the war.

“We’re unequivocally not. We want to see that regime go, but we’re not going to allow Netanyahu to say he’s doing this for the Iranian people. He isn’t. That’s not just rhetoric, that’s fact. The Israeli leadership was just as supportive of the shah as the US, and he was a murderous dictator no less than the current regime,” Cassif said, referring to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the leader of Iran before the Islamic revolution.

For now, analysts and observers in Israel describe a society that believes it is almost engaged in a holy war.

“They brought an antiwar activist onto one of the light news programmes,” political analyst Ori Goldberg said from near Tel Aviv, “and she was treated like you would a flat-earther. It’s as if it’s inconceivable that anyone would oppose this war.

“Israel has become a society with no middle ground, no capacity for conversation. It’s as if our entire existence is dependent on our ability to do anything we want. And if the world tries to stop that, then the world’s anti-Semitic, and we all burn.”

US-Israeli attacks on Iran continue as Iranians rally in support of new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus says children, the elderly at particular risk after damage to Iranian petroleum facilities.

The head of the World Health Organization has warned that recent Israeli attacks on oil facilities in Iran could have negative effects on public health, with Iranian children and the elderly among the most vulnerable.

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said in a statement on Monday that damage to Iranian petroleum facilities “risks contaminating food, water and air”.

Those hazards “can have severe health impacts especially on children, older people, and people with pre existing medical conditions”, Tedros warned in a post on X. “Rain laden with oil has been reported falling in parts of the country.”

The Iranian authorities said oil facilities in the capital, Tehran, and the nearby province of Alborz were targeted on Saturday in the United States-Israeli war against the country, the Fars news agency reported.

Israel said it struck “a number of fuel storage facilities in Tehran” that were used “to operate military infrastructure”.

The strikes sent massive flames and clouds of thick, black smoke into the sky above Tehran, with Al Jazeera’s Tohid Asadi reporting that black raindrops fell early on Sunday morning.

The attacks on Iran’s energy infrastructure came as the US and Israeli governments had vowed to continue to bombard the country despite mounting international concern over the widening conflict.

Iran has retaliated to the US-Israeli strikes by launching missiles and drones at targets across the Middle East, including energy infrastructure in nearby Arab Gulf states.

Human rights groups have condemned both Iran and the US and Israel for targeting civilian infrastructure.

Agnes Callamard, the head of Amnesty International, said on Monday that “Israel should have taken all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize the risks to civilians when targeting oil refineries” in Iran.

“The incidental harm to civilians, including the release of toxic substance, appears to indicate that too little precautions were taken and that the incidental harm to civilians is disproportionate,” she wrote on X.

“The scenes of catastrophe described by Iranians after Tehran’s oil depots were bombed are yet another demonstration that ultimately, whatever they may say, the US and Israel’s attacks on Iran are harming first and foremost civilians, including children.”

Israeli strikes on fuel depots and petroleum logistic sites in Tehran on Sunday saw apocalyptic images coming out of the Iranian capital, as the spilled oil ignited a river of fire, and thick black smoke blanketed the city of 10 million, leaving streets and vehicles covered with soot.

Israel and the United States claimed they were targeting Iranian military and government sites, but government officials and people say civilian structures such as schools, hospitals and major landmarks are increasingly coming under attack. At least 1,255 people have been killed in the strikes since February 28.

What Israeli and US military planners frame as a calculated degradation of state infrastructure is being described by local officials and environmental experts as an act of total warfare, and collective punishment.

Shina Ansari, head of Iran’s Department of Environment, described the systematic destruction of the oil depots as a blatant act of ecocide.

The attacks systematically targeted four major storage facilities and a distribution centre, including the Tehran refinery in the south and depots in Aghdasieh, Shahran, and Karaj. In the Shahran district, witnesses reported unrefined oil leaking directly into the streets as temperatures hovered around 13C (55F).

Ansari from Iran’s Department of Environment stated that the environment remains the silent victim of the war, noting that the incineration of vast fuel reserves has trapped the capital under a suffocating shroud of pollutants.

The medical and environmental fallout is immediate and severe. The Iranian Red Crescent Society warned that the smoke contains high concentrations of toxic hydrocarbons, sulphur, and nitrogen oxides. The organisation noted that any rainfall passing through these plumes becomes highly acidic, posing risks of skin burns and severe lung damage upon contact or inhalation.

Ali Jafarian, Iran’s deputy health minister, told Al Jazeera that this acid rain is already contaminating the soil and water supply. Jafarian added that the toxic air poses a life-threatening risk to the elderly, children, and those with pre-existing respiratory conditions, prompting authorities to advise residents to remain indoors.

The destruction has also forced the Iranian Ministry of Petroleum to slash daily fuel rations for civilians from 30 litres [8 gallons] to 20 litres [5 gallons]. At least four employees, including two tanker drivers, were killed in the depot strikes.

The strategic bombing myth

Major General Mamoun Abu Nowar, a retired Jordanian military analyst, told Al Jazeera that the primary objective of the strikes is to break the resilience of the Iranian people and paralyse the country’s logistics and economy.

“They are preparing the Iranian environment for an uprising against the regime,” Abu Nowar said, adding that the broader goal is to halt state operations and curb Tehran’s regional influence.

However, Abu Nowar raised urgent concerns about the specific munitions deployed, urging Iranian authorities to investigate the bomb fragments given the unusual density of the smoke and the resulting acid rain.

Some military strategists argue that striking an adversary’s vital infrastructure can paralyse the state from the inside out, bypassing the need to fight its military forces directly.

Modern warfare has increasingly relied on this strategic bombing via precision drones and missiles to destroy morale and incapacitate an adversary’s ability to wage war. For Israel, which is engaged in a genocidal war in Gaza and wider regional conflicts, targeting oil depots is viewed as a way to send a coercive message while avoiding a ground war.

However, Adel Shadid, a researcher in Israeli affairs, told Al Jazeera Arabic that the strategy is designed to make life hell for ordinary Iranians in hopes of sparking an uprising. Shadid noted a glaring contradiction in the rhetoric of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who claims to support the Iranian people while overseeing the destruction of their basic means of survival.

Raphael S Cohen, director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the RAND Corporation, notes that such bombing campaigns consistently fail to achieve their primary goal of breaking a population’s will. Instead, Cohen argues, strategic bombing typically produces a rally-around-the-flag effect, unifying societies against a common foe rather than causing them to capitulate.

Historical echoes and retaliation

The reality of targeting oil infrastructure rarely aligns with sterile military theory, as history shows that such tactics reliably produce devastating, long-term environmental consequences.

During the 1991 Gulf War, the torching of Kuwaiti oil wells created a regional environmental catastrophe. Similarly, during the battle against ISIL (ISIS) in Iraq, the burning of the Qayyarah oil fields created a “Daesh Winter” that blocked out the sun for months.

The fires released vast quantities of toxic residues, including sulphur dioxide and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, causing severe respiratory illnesses, soil acidification, and long-term carcinogenic risks for the local population.

Meanwhile, Mokhtar Haddad, director of the Al-Wefaq newspaper, told Al Jazeera Arabic that the targeting of energy hubs could trigger a global energy war.

According to Al Jazeera’s Sohaib al-Assa, reporting from Tehran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has already retaliated by striking the Haifa oil refinery and targeting a US base in Kuwait, signalling that the conflict is no longer confined to military targets.

On Monday, Bahrain’s state-run oil company Bapco declared force majeure after waves of Iranian strikes targeted its energy installations. Iran has also been accused of also targeting energy facilities in other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

Palestinian journalist Amal Shamali, who worked as a correspondent for Qatar Radio, has been killed in an Israeli air strike on the Nuseirat refugee camp in central Gaza, the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate (PJS) says.

Shamali, who was killed on Monday, also “worked with several Arab and local media outlets and was among the journalists who continued performing their media mission despite the ongoing assault and war on the Gaza Strip”, the PJS said in a statement.

More than 270 journalists and media workers have been killed in Gaza since Israel launched a genocidal war against Palestinians in the territory on October 7, 2023, in response to Hamas-led attacks on southern Israel.

“This represents one of the bloodiest periods for journalists in modern history, reflecting the scale of the deliberate targeting of Palestinian journalism in an attempt to silence the voice of truth and prevent the documentation of the crimes and violations committed against the Palestinian people,” the PJS said.

The PJS also said: “Targeting journalists will not succeed in breaking the will of the Palestinian journalistic community or deterring it from fulfilling its professional and humanitarian mission of conveying the truth and documenting the crimes and aggression faced by the Palestinian people.”

Gaza’s Government Media Office released a statement after Shamali’s killing, saying it “strongly condemns the systematic targeting, killing, and assassination of Palestinian journalists by the Israeli occupation”.

The office also said it “holds the Israeli occupation, the U.S. administration, and the countries participating in the crime of genocide – such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and France – fully responsible for committing these heinous and brutal crimes”.

It called on international and regional media associations, the international community and human rights organisations to condemn “the crimes” committed against Palestinian journalists and media professionals working in Gaza and to work towards holding Israel accountable for its “ongoing crimes” against Palestinian journalists.

Israeli attacks have killed about 13 journalists every month over more than two years of war, according to a tally by Shireen.ps, a monitoring website named after Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, who was shot and killed by Israeli forces in the occupied West Bank in 2022.

Of those journalists, at least 10 of them worked for Al Jazeera, including Al Jazeera Arabic correspondent Anas al-Sharif, who had reported extensively from northern Gaza.

Israel’s war on Gaza has been the single deadliest conflict for journalists.

According to Brown University’s Costs of War project, more journalists have been killed in Gaza since the war began on October 7, 2023, than in the US Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, Vietnam War, the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the post-9/11 war in Afghanistan – combined.

As per a report released early this year by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Palestine was the deadliest place to work as a journalist in 2025.

The IFJ said the Middle East was the most dangerous region for media professionals, accounting for 74 deaths last year – more than half of the 128 journalists and media workers killed.

The Middle East was followed by Africa with 18 deaths, the Asia Pacific (15), the Americas (11) and Europe (10), according to the report.

Since a US- and Qatar-brokered “ceasefire” came into effect in October, 640 Palestinians have been killed and at least 1,700 wounded, according to Gaza’s Ministry of Health. At least 72,123 Palestinians have been killed since October 2023 while 171,805 people have been injured. At least 1,139 people were killed in the Hamas-led attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023.

The ongoing U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran has sent oil prices soaring, rattling global financial markets and prompting governments to implement urgent measures to protect their economies and citizens from energy shortages and rising costs. As the war disrupts critical supply routes through the Strait of Hormuz, countries heavily reliant on oil imports are scrambling to stabilize domestic fuel supplies and mitigate inflationary pressures.

South Korea Caps Fuel Prices

In a historic move, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung announced that the government would cap domestic fuel prices for the first time in nearly 30 years. Authorities are also seeking alternative energy sources beyond shipments through the Strait of Hormuz. To support the measure, a 100 trillion won ($67 billion) market-stabilization program may be expanded if necessary, reflecting the severity of the supply shock.

Japan Prepares Strategic Oil Reserves

Japan has instructed a national oil reserve storage facility to prepare for a possible release of crude oil, according to opposition party lawmaker Akira Nagatsuma. While precise details and timing remain unclear, this measure underscores Japan’s reliance on strategic reserves to manage sudden spikes in global energy prices.

Vietnam Removes Fuel Import Tariffs

Vietnam is temporarily eliminating import tariffs on fuels to ensure continued domestic supply amidst global disruptions. The government expects this measure to remain in effect until the end of April, aiming to reduce cost pressures on both businesses and consumers.

Indonesia Boosts Fuel Subsidies and Biodiesel Plans

Indonesia is increasing budget allocations for fuel subsidies, currently totaling 381.3 trillion rupiah ($22.5 billion), to offset rising energy costs and maintain affordable electricity and fuel prices. The government may also revive plans to expand the B50 biodiesel program, blending 50% palm oil-based biodiesel with conventional diesel, as a longer-term strategy to reduce dependency on imported oil.

China Halts Fuel Exports

China has directed refiners to suspend new fuel export contracts and attempt to cancel previously committed shipments. This policy excludes jet fuel for international flights, bonded bunkering, and supplies to Hong Kong or Macau. The move is designed to secure domestic fuel availability amid soaring global prices.

Bangladesh Closes Universities and Rations Fuel

Bangladesh, which depends on imports for 95% of its energy, has implemented emergency measures including university closures and rationing fuel sales to conserve electricity and fuel. Daily fuel sale limits were imposed after panic buying and stockpiling, highlighting the country’s vulnerability to regional energy disruptions.

Analysis: A Coordinated Global Response

These measures illustrate the unprecedented economic ripple effects of the Middle East conflict. Countries with high import dependency are balancing immediate crisis management such as subsidies, price caps, and rationing with longer-term energy strategies, including strategic reserve releases and alternative fuel initiatives.

The rapid policy responses also underscore the fragility of global energy markets in the face of geopolitical conflicts. Central banks and governments must navigate a complex trade-off: containing inflation while ensuring sufficient energy supply to prevent industrial slowdowns and social unrest.

As the conflict persists, global energy markets remain highly volatile, and governments may need to continue adjusting policy tools to stabilize domestic economies, with potential implications for trade, inflation, and energy security worldwide.

With information from Reuters.

Iran’s military and political leaders pledge allegiance to Mojtaba Khamenei as Saudi Arabia reports two deaths amid Iranian counterattacks.

Tehran has carried out more attacks on Gulf states – despite an apology by the president to Iran’s neighbours.

Civilian targets have been hit, including airports and vital infrastructure.

Who’s in control in Iran – and how will Gulf states react as the attacks continue?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

John Brennan – Former director of the Central Intelligence Agency under the administration of US President Barack Obama

Bader Al-Saif – Professor at Kuwait University and fellow at Chatham House, specialising in Middle East history and politics

Trita Parsi – Executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft