Israel

Washington, DC – After a commanding performance in the United States midterm elections, advocates say Democrats are uniquely positioned to strip a controversial measure from a Pentagon funding bill that would codify integration of the US and Israeli military industries.

Earlier this year, Democratic leadership had already opposed the Fiscal Year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), a sprawling $1.15 trillion package that, along with supplemental bills, includes funding for much of President Donald Trump’s military wishlist, including the “Golden Dome” missile shield and his so-called “Trump-class” battleship plan.

Top party officials, including Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, had attached their opposition to the Trump administration’s war with Iran and wider affordability issues facing US citizens. Advocates say the leadership must also send the message that the US-Israeli defence production integration is a non-starter.

The current Senate version of the bill, under Section 219, calls for the creation of a so-called “United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative” that would “expand and accelerate bilateral defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation, coordination, and industrial cooperation”.

Cavan Kharrazian, senior policy adviser at Demand Progress, told Al Jazeera that “Democrats need to make it clear right now that their votes for the NDAA depend on substantial changes, including US-Israeli military integration and Iran war prohibition”.

Opposition to Pentagon funding has historically been politically fraught, with lawmakers wary of appearing to not support the US military. But while a version of the funding package passed the Republican-controlled House of Representatives in May, Democrats delayed the Senate version via a procedural vote in July.

They now face a December 11 deadline when current stopgap funding ends, meaning they would need to pass another stopgap measure or the full NDAA to maintain Pentagon funding.

Because the NDAA requires 60 votes to pass, Democrats can exercise outsized leverage in the remaining days of this congressional session, Kharrazian explained. Republicans, meanwhile, face a ticking clock before Democrats take control of both chambers of Congress in January.

“[Democrats] have the leverage to filibuster the NDAA until these provisions are stripped out and they need to commit to blocking NDAA consideration until those changes are secured,” Kharrazian said.

“An amendment vote alone is insufficient if Democrats then let the bill advance with the provisions intact.”

‘Assert full leverage’

To be sure, Democrats, eager to show they are delivering on voter affordability concerns, have signalled they will seek some overhaul to the current NDAA and related supplemental bills. Defence industry analysts have predicted a major constriction in Pentagon funding, which also includes a stalled $360bn supplemental package.

However, it has been unclear if that would extend to the US-Israeli military development initiative.

“We must push for the development of a more realistic and sustainable approach to our national security – one that does not require a defense budget in excess of $1 trillion or one paid for with draconian cuts to critical domestic programs,” Representative Adam Smith, currently the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, said in a statement shortly after the November 3 election results rolled in.

He echoed Schumer, who wrote in a July “dear colleague” letter that Republicans were seeking a Pentagon funding bill “that would dump billions more into the defense industry while long overdue investments in American communities wait”.

Smith had initially supported, but later opposed, the provision to integrate US-Israeli military development. But Schumer and House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, who are both seeking to retain their leadership positions in their respective chambers, have not publicly stated their positions.

Critics have long warned that the initiative would establish an opaque new avenue for the Pentagon to provide US tax-funded support to Israel via joint development ventures, while dodging congressional oversight. It would also make future policy pivots more difficult, entrenching Israeli-developed technology into US military programmes.

Some have characterised the initiative as the next phase of Washington’s decades-long military support for Israel, with both US and Israeli officials acknowledging direct military aid has become increasingly politically fraught.

“The whole point of Section 219, let’s understand, is to move the US-Israel aid relationship … further outside the purview of Congress, which is to say to sort of inoculate it from democracy,” said Matthew Duss, the executive vice president at the progressive Center for International Policy think tank. “I think Democrats and others who are opposing this measure in the NDAA are on firm ground to hold a hard line.”

“But I think it’ll be tough, especially with this leadership that remains very strongly pro-Israel,” he told Al Jazeera. “I think both Schumer and Jeffries have shown signs they recognise that their respective caucuses are in a very different place ideologically than they are on this issue.”

Growing opposition

A growing number of senators have publicly opposed the measure. In July, Senator Chris Van Hollen joined six colleagues in rejecting the provision.

A total of 12 senators have since signed on (PDF) to a new letter released earlier this week, including progressive stalwarts like Bernie Sanders and more centrist figures like Ron Wyden and Tammy Duckworth.

Hamid Bendaas, the communications director for the Institute for Middle East Understanding (IMEU) Policy Project, said the senators represent “a broader range of the Democratic Caucus”.

“So I think that’s a good sign that a good amount of Democrats are ready to really stand against those provisions in the NDAA,” he told Al Jazeera.

Bendaas also pointed to public opinion polls suggesting widespread opposition to US military support for Israel, fuelled by the genocide in Gaza. Both President Trump and Vice President JD Vance have acknowledged that the current state of the US-Israel relationship has become politically fraught.

“I wouldn’t want to be a Democrat or a Republican who votes yes on the text that we’ve seen,” Bendaas said. “For one of the first major bills to pass post-midterms to be a bill that directs the Pentagon to send taxpayer funds to Israel, or, I should say, Israeli companies, some of which are government-owned companies … I think that’s about the worst thing that they could possibly do right now.”

In their letter, the senators wrote the provision would “expand and accelerate the US-Israel defense relationship, including technology sharing, co-production of weapons systems, and bilateral research and development across multiple domains of warfare such as biotechnology, quantum, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, and others”, surpassing integration even with some US NATO allies.

That could, in turn, “threaten US national security interests by handing Israel leverage over American weapons systems and military technology” and “create long-term dependencies by embedding Israeli technology into the US defense industrial base that could make future policy changes costly or difficult to implement”.

“To do so in this instance would be unwise,” the lawmakers wrote. “Especially as the Government of Israel continues to pursue policies in Gaza, the West Bank and other parts of the region that are inconsistent with US interests and values.”

On November 10, Gulf defence ministers approved the establishment of a forward command in Kuwait under the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Unified Military Command, with forces to be allocated to it. The decision marks another step towards Gulf states taking greater collective responsibility for their security.

One day earlier, after meeting Qatar’s prime minister, US President Donald Trump had said: “Iran militarily is effectively over.” He also said the US blockade would continue and left open further military action. His remarks fell short of announcing an agreed end to the war.

Any opening for diplomacy deserves support. But even a lasting agreement would leave the Gulf’s underlying security problems unresolved. The Kuwait command’s value will depend on implementation and on how it connects with the region’s other security partnerships.

The answer requires abandoning the expectation that one grand security arrangement can resolve every threat facing the region. That expectation assumes a degree of agreement about enemies, priorities and acceptable risks that does not exist.

Iran’s attacks on Gulf states during this war, together with Israel’s September 2025 strike on Qatar, demonstrate the breadth of the challenge. A security architecture designed around only one adversary will leave serious gaps. Armed militias and terrorist groups add other risks, alongside cyberattacks, maritime disruption and the consequences of state failure in the neighbourhood. The erosion of international restraints on the use of force makes all of these problems harder to manage.

The most credible response to this complex set of threats is a security architecture that is both layered and networked. Gulf states are already moving in this direction. The task now is to make those arrangements work together and sustain the effort when the immediate pressure of war recedes.

Layering starts with the recognition that different partnerships do different jobs. National capabilities and cooperation within the Gulf Cooperation Council provide the foundation. The relationship with the United States remains central, while additional arrangements address needs that a single partner cannot meet.

Cooperation with US Central Command supplies an operational layer. The air and missile defence coordination cell opened at Al Udeid in January, for example, was designed to improve regional coordination, share threat warnings and prepare for contingencies.

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, signed in August by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, adds a collective defence commitment among its members. The Badr memorandum, signed in October by Qatar, Turkiye, Pakistan and Indonesia, sets out cooperation in defence manufacturing, research and technical training.

These arrangements should be judged by the gaps they fill. Collective defence, operational coordination and industrial capacity reinforce one another, but none can substitute for the others. Buying an interceptor, producing its components and deciding who will use it in a crisis are separate problems.

The next step is to connect these layers so that capabilities developed through one partnership strengthen what countries can do through another. This is what makes the architecture networked.

Qatar offers a useful example. It shares GCC membership with Saudi Arabia and participates in Badr alongside Turkiye and Pakistan. It therefore connects to all three Mecca signatories through other arrangements, despite not being a party to Mecca itself.

Those connections create opportunities. Stronger production capacity or better coordination among shared partners could improve the capabilities available to Qatar through its own relationships. A more effective deterrent against attacks on a neighbour could also improve the wider security environment.

Such benefits depend on deliberate cooperation. Qatar acquires no automatic Mecca guarantee through association. Information, equipment and expertise travel through a network only when governments agree to make that possible. The connections need as much attention as the agreements themselves.

This is also where the Gulf’s interests converge with those of a wider group of countries. European states, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia and Pakistan all have reasons to resist a world in which force routinely overrides sovereignty and access to trade depends on political coercion.

Energy exporters and importers face different consequences when shipping is disrupted, but both need these routes to remain open. Countries need not share a political system or an identical relationship with Washington to recognise the costs of an international order becoming less predictable.

There is already a diplomatic basis for cooperation. The EU and GCC have jointly defended freedom of navigation through Hormuz. ASEAN and GCC ministers have reaffirmed sovereignty, the protection of civilian infrastructure and the need for diplomacy.

These states should become more active defenders of the basic rules on which their prosperity depends. They have an opportunity to shape the emerging international order collectively. Their combined economic, technological and diplomatic resources can give weight to rules that individual states struggle to defend alone. The same networks that help protect infrastructure can support coordinated diplomacy when those rules are violated.

Credibility will require consistency. Sovereignty must matter when the aggressor is a partner as well as an adversary. Civilian protection must apply in Palestine, Ukraine and the Gulf. Mediation must remain possible even when the parties at the table are politically inconvenient.

At the operational level, the immediate task is to connect existing security arrangements. Gulf governments and their partners should agree on how warnings can be shared across arrangements, which capabilities can be made available, and who has authority to request assistance. Joint exercises should test those connections under pressure, including when one partner cannot participate.

The next priority is protecting the systems that allow societies to function. Energy and water facilities, ports and communications networks deserve sustained cooperation on protection and repair. A partnership that can restore an essential service quickly contributes directly to security, even if it has no mutual defence clause.

Diplomacy to prevent escalation must form a layer of its own. Channels with Iran, arrangements to prevent incidents at sea and mechanisms for managing escalation remain necessary alongside stronger defences. Gulf states should use any opening created by the current talks to pursue reciprocal, verifiable restraint.

This wider security architecture would give Gulf, European and Asian partners practical work around which to organise. Some can contribute defence technology, others maritime expertise, industrial production, financing or diplomatic access. Cooperation should allow states to contribute where they have both the capacity and the political willingness to act.

The difficulty is that every participant remains sovereign. Gulf states themselves do not have identical interests. Their external partners face different constitutional requirements, domestic pressures and relationships with other powers. Some constraints are enduring; others reflect political choices that can change.

A government willing to provide intelligence may be unwilling to deploy forces. Another may support maritime protection but oppose an operation on land. Those limits should be understood before a crisis, when there is still time to plan around them.

Overlapping partnerships also carry risks. They can duplicate effort, create false expectations or draw countries into disputes they intended to avoid. Clear responsibilities and consultation procedures are essential. Adding agreements without clarifying what they deliver would produce more complexity without more security.

Nor should we promise that such an architecture will deliver a long peace. The rivalries and political grievances shaping this region will not disappear because its governments cooperate more closely.

A more attainable objective is relative peace and security: fewer opportunities for coercion, crises contained before they widen, and civilian life less exposed to each new confrontation. That means reducing the frequency and consequences of violence while continuing to work towards durable settlements. Permanent emergency cannot become an acceptable destination.

Gulf states should use this moment to connect their partnerships, strengthen their own capabilities and establish clearer limits on escalation. The aim is a region with more partners able to act together, and fewer crises capable of dragging everyone into war.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Speaking at the White House, Trump says Gulf countries asked him to hold off on further attacks against Iran.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for a national unity government – at least among Jewish Israelis – during the swearing-in of Israel’s new parliament, or Knesset, on Tuesday, hoping to cling to power. The opposition to him, which now has a majority of seats but has yet to form a government, reacted with heckles, catcalls, and walkouts.

Citing supposed internal and external threats, Netanyahu called for unity with the opposition bloc that has been tasked with forming a government to replace him. Netanyahu pointed to the threat posed by Iran and the increased number of democratically elected lawmakers who are Palestinian citizens of Israel, whom he accused, without evidence, of seeking Israel’s destruction.

“We must do one thing – set aside every other consideration and form a national unity government. Only such a government will be able to meet challenges of this magnitude. It is impossible to handle them with a narrow government,” he said of the potential for a minority government that many analysts consider likely after coalition negotiations are complete.

“I say this because here in this parliament they are seriously talking about forming a narrow government like this, a government that includes within it terror supporters, haters of Israel, or that would be dependent on them,” he said, referring to the parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Even by the standards of Israeli politics, where analysts say personality has long overshadowed party and policy, Tuesday’s session was unusually contentious.

Former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett heckled Netanyahu while trading barbs with the latter’s wife, Sara, and his hard-right ally Itamar Ben-Gvir, while many of the Palestinian lawmakers attacked by the prime minister during his speech walked out in protest.

Gadi Eisenkot, who has been given the first chance to form a new government, subsequently cancelled previously scheduled coalition talks with Netanyahu and declared him “unfit for office”.

Personality politics

Netanyahu has long played an outsized role in Israeli politics, helping transform the political system into one that is highly based on personalities, with voters typically identifying a leader they like first, and then focusing on policy discussions. Nevertheless, despite having contributed more to that change than any other politician, Netanyahu now finds himself fighting for his political life.

If Eisenkot is able to form a viable new government – which still hangs in the balance – Netanyahu faces being frozen out of power, and a future in which his corruption trial continues without the protection of the prime minister’s office. There will also likely be an inquiry into his and his government’s failings in the run-up to the Hamas-led attack of October 7, 2023.

His potential downfall, however, does not mean an end to personality politics in Israel. Instead, it may be one of the most lasting parts of his legacy, said Roi Zur, an Israeli specialist in voting behaviour and election strategies at the University of Essex.

“Netanyahu Americanised the party system in Israel and made Likud a populist party,” he said of the influences the country’s longest-serving prime minister has had on Israel and his own party.

“It is a clear case in Israel that the person at the head of the list or the head of the party is very important, and politics evolve around the head of the party,” Zur said. “We see it in how people think about political parties or voting in general in Israel. When you ask people, ‘Who are you voting for?’, they say, ‘I vote for Netanyahu, I vote for Bennett, I vote for Eisenkot,’ whilst in the past it was ‘I vote for Likud, I vote for Labor,’ and so on.”

Toxic populism

Dahlia Schneidlin, an American-Israeli pollster, noted that Israeli political campaigns had become more personalised in the past few decades even though elections in the country are almost all based on voting for a party slate, and not individuals.

That had led to many cases where voters focus on the personality rather than the party, and vote accordingly.

However, the Israeli electoral system almost always leads to coalition governments. And bringing other parties into a coalition often needs leaders to demonstrate “political neogitiating and bargaining skills”, Schneidlin said, as they try to encourage others to join them.

Eisenkot, Schneidlin said, will have to demonstrate those skills if he is to form a government, rather than simply being focused on his own personality.

But the emphasis on differences in political personality over policy positions has fuelled a culture where personal differences, such as those between Netanyahu and opposition stalwart Avigdor Lieberman – whose shared animosity is well known but whose right-wing political positions are in some ways very close – contribute to a populist politics easily understood by a public eager to see itself as politically engaged.

“The stress on the personal makes everything so much worse,” Yossi Mekelberg, a senior fellow at Chatham House, said. “With party structures so centralised, leaders can become almost dictatorial and get to act without constraint. This is how it becomes possible for a prime minister to accuse 19 elected members of the Knesset of being terrorist sympathisers and nobody thinks it’s extraordinary. It’s become toxic,” he said.

Caracas, November 11, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The acting Delcy Rodríguez government and ExxonMobil signed a memorandum of understanding on Monday as the oil giant prepares to return to Venezuela nearly two decades after having its assets nationalized.

“We welcome [ExxonMobil] back, hoping that synergy will develop and produce benefits for Venezuela and the United States,” she said in a televised broadcast.

Rodríguez stated that the “very important” agreement followed “months of negotiations.”

“This return takes place under very favorable conditions, in a context of legal guarantees for foreign investments,” she added. The acting president also saluted US Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett, who attended the ceremony

For his part, Dan Ammann, president of ExxonMobil Upstream Company, expressed confidence that the firm’s “unique capabilities” and Venezuela’s “extraordinary results” would yield “significant benefits for all parties involved.”

ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods had previously called Venezuela “uninvestable” and demanded industry reforms before the talks leading to the company’s imminent return.

ExxonMobil left Venezuela in the late 2000s after refusing to comply with reforms introduced by the Hugo Chávez government to assert state sovereignty over the oil industry. The Texas-based multinational refused compensation offers and pursued international arbitration after its assets were nationalized. The company received a US $908 million arbitration award from the International Chamber of Commerce, significantly below its demands. It is likewise attempting to enforce a separate $985 million award.

Caracas had likewise denounced ExxonMobil after it spearheaded offshore drilling projects in the territorial waters of the disputed Essequibo Strip.

The Venezuelan government and ExxonMobil have not disclosed the projects under consideration. But reports suggest the company will take over its former projects, light and medium-crude La Ceiba in the Maracaibo Lake Basin and extra-heavy-crude Cerro Negro in the Orinoco Oil Belt, later relaunched as Petromonagas. The oil giant is also linked to Carabobo block oilfields adjacent to the latter. 

According to Petroguía, ExxonMobil is eyeing concession-type “Productive Participation Contracts” and has engaged in negotiations with Russian state-owned company Roszarubezhneft to acquire its 40 percent stake in the Petromonagas joint venture.

Since the January 3 US attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, Venezuelan authorities have enacted a pro-business overhaul of the energy industry in consultation with Washington, while signing dozens of agreements with Western corporations. Chevron, Repsol, and Shell are among the companies to have struck new deals or renegotiated old ones to expand their foothold in the country.

Rodríguez has also radically shifted Caracas’ foreign policy, including reestablishing ties with Israel.

Recent reports have revealed that NewMed Energy, a subsidiary of the multi-billion Delek Group conglomerate and one of Israel’s largest energy firms, is negotiating a 60 per stake in an unnamed Venezuelan “oil-producing company.”

NewMed has an exclusivity window to negotiate with the Venezuelan counterpart until January 1, 2027. The undisclosed firm is said to hold “onshore oil rights” as well as additional “onshore and offshore oil and gas assets.”

Venezuelan legislation imposes a state-owned majority in any joint ventures. However, the recent reforms allow foreign corporations to take over operations and sales in concession-type agreements despite being minority shareholders.

Notwithstanding the opening of the industry to foreign capital under exceedingly favorable conditions, Venezuela’s oil output has stagnated in recent months. The latest monthly OPEC report placed October’s production at 1.158 million barrels per day (bpd) according to secondary sources. The figure is on a par with the previous month’s 1.147 million bpd output.

Venezuelan authorities had pledged to reach 1.3 million bpd before the end of the year.

In addition to overseeing legislative changes and mediating oil agreements, the US has taken control of Venezuela’s export revenues, with Trump officials deciding when and how much of the funds to return to Caracas.

A New York Times article published on Tuesday claimed that, according to a report from auditing firm KPMG, the Trump administration has managed $12 billion of Venezuelan export revenues through the end of September, with nearly all the funds returned to Caracas to be supplied to the private sector via commercial banks.

Traders Vitol and Trafigura, which secure Venezuelan crude below market price before reselling it, have been the biggest depositors into the US Treasury account at Citibank.

However, the total figure contradicts a previous Financial Times investigation that estimated $13 billion of US-controlled Venezuelan funds in the first half of the year alone. Additionally, Venezuelan government advisor Luigi Pisella stated that the Trump administration deducted around $4.7 billion from the revenues to cover the costs of its January 3 military operation.

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Philadelphia, USA.

Israel has reportedly ordered its military to step up readiness for possible strikes on Iran as Tehran warned it would expand the war beyond the region if attacked.

Israel’s security cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has ordered the military to step up preparations for an attack on Iran, Israeli media reported on Wednesday evening.

“The directives issued by the security cabinet to the Israeli military could lead it to carry out activities that could trigger a war,” public broadcaster KAN reported.

KAN said the directives were made public after Israeli opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot issued a statement telling Netanyahu – who is serving as prime minister in a caretaker capacity – not to deploy the military “without a direct and immediate threat” until the next government is formed.

Eisenkot was offered the chance to form a new government by Israeli President Isaac Herzog over the weekend after Netanyahu’s ruling coalition lost its parliamentary majority in the October elections.

Netanyahu, who is on the cusp of losing power if the opposition succeeds in forming a government, has been adamant that the war on Iran will continue until the collapse of the government in Tehran.

‘From West Asia to Europe’

Reports of Israeli preparations to attack Iran come at a time of intense diplomatic efforts to avert further conflict and reach a diplomatic solution.

US President Donald Trump has said that he is prepared to return to waging war if a diplomatic track offered by Qatar fails to facilitate a deal between Washington and Tehran.

Iran’s security chief Mohsen Rezaei said in a social media post, “If the US launches another war against Iran, every military base involved in the aggression, from West Asia to Europe, will be a legitimate target for Iran’s lethal strikes.”

“No safe distance. No safe haven. No immunity,” he added.

Al Jazeera’s Resul Serdar Atas, reporting from Tehran, said the Iranian leadership has been discussing whether or not to appoint the hawkish Rezaei as Iran’s new chief negotiator.

“In Tehran, there have been voices saying that if this status quo goes on for quite a long period of time, Iran will not wait and might take pre-emptive action,” Atas said, adding that the current lead negotiator, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, has commented on Iran’s determination to move beyond this state of “no war, no peace” through “sustainable deterrence” if negotiations fail.

Ghalibaf told Al Jazeera in an exclusive interview published on Wednesday that the Strait of Hormuz will “never return” to its status prior to the US-Israel war on Iran and that “the ball is now in the American court”.

“What stands in the way of an agreement is our lack of trust in the United States,” he said.

‘Position to declare victory’

In Washington, DC, Al Jazeera’s Alan Fisher said Trump is still justifying why he went to war with Iran and saying that it would end soon.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has also said the Trump administration’s economic pressure campaign against Iran is proving so effective that a resumption of large-scale military operations is unnecessary.

“Over the last few days, both the president and Marco Rubio have said, effectively, that large-scale military engagement is over. They do not see the need to restart it unless Iran crosses red lines,” Fisher said, adding that the “key issue for this White House is always to be in a position where Trump can declare victory”.

“But it is clear there is some movement behind the scenes as far as negotiating a settlement,” he said.

Despite the push for peace, US forces “continue to work around the clock” in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open for commercial shipping, strictly enforcing the “ironclad” naval blockade against Iran, according to the US Central Command.

Meanwhile, oil prices rose about 1 percent on Wednesday after Tehran rejected a US proposal to transfer its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium to a third country.

Brent futures settled $1.27, or 1.39 percent, higher at $92.76, while US West Texas Intermediate crude gained 49 cents, or 0.57 percent, to $86.53.

In the previous session, oil prices had initially fallen by more than $3 a barrel after US officials played down the need for further military strikes against Iran.

Prices later pared some losses when an Iranian official said no talks were taking place between the two sides.

Republic of Ireland defender Dara O’Shea said he is “proud” of how he and his team-mates came through a trying October international window.

During a four-game Nations League schedule, Heimir Hallgrimsson’s side lost away to Kosovo and drew at home to Austria – who they are preparing to face in return fixtures – but it was two games against Israel which tested their resolve.

O’Shea stepped in as captain in the absence of injured skipper Nathan Collins and the 27-year-old acknowledged it “was a tough situation to be in” as they faced Israel in two games on neutral territory.

The first of those resulted in a 3-0 victory for the Irish in Hungary, a game that looked in doubt the previous day when training was delayed as players took a vote on whether to play – amid protests over the Israel-Gaza war – with goalkeeper Gavin Bazunu making himself unavailable for selection.

The sides drew 1-1 in the second meeting in Serbia and, while the saga proved a challenge for all within the Republic of Ireland squad, O’Shea – who missed the second game for personal reasons – paid tribute to his team-mates for the support he received as stand-in skipper.

“I think I was quite lucky, I am really proud to be part of the group, with some great people in it,” said the Ipswich Town captain.

“Even the players playing now as well, they are great leaders themselves. I never felt I was fully alone in having to do anything

“There were always people around me. I always keep level-headed, I don’t get too high with the highs or too low with the lows.”

He added: “Of course it was a difficult time, it was a time that I had to learn stuff about myself, how I was going to react to things. But I think as a group we did excellently.

“It was a tough situation to be in, but we overcame it as best we could. And I am really proud of the group and the staff.”

Israel orders military to step up preparations for a possible attack on Iran, as Tehran says will retaliate if attacked.

UN warns hunger crisis affecting almost quarter of Lebanon’s population could escalate without ‘urgent action’.

Nearly a quarter of Lebanon’s population, or more than one million people, is facing acute food shortages due to two consecutive conflicts in less than two years and a dire economic situation, according to the United Nations.

The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Food Programme (WFP) and Lebanon’s Ministry of Agriculture warned in a joint statement published on Wednesday that the number is expected to rise to 1.15 million by the middle of next year.

“Employment opportunities remain limited, savings have been depleted, and debt remains high, while the cost of food, fuel and other essentials continues to strain household budgets,” the joint statement said.

“Some households can still draw on savings, borrow, cut expenses or find other ways to put food on the table. For others, those options are being exhausted. When families have nothing left to fall back on, even a small additional shock can push them deeper into crisis,” Allison Oman Lawi, WFP representative and country director in Lebanon, said.

Lebanon’s Agriculture Minister Nizar Hani said: “These findings call for a coordinated national response that addresses urgent food needs while protecting livelihoods and restoring productive capacity.”

Lebanon’s authorities estimate that the cost of two wars between Israel and the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah since October 2023 amounts to about $27bn.

The last war, launched in March, displaced more than one million people in Lebanon. That number has fallen to about 300,000 since violence subsided in June.

Despite a United States-brokered framework deal signed between Israel and Lebanon’s government in June to bring fighting to an end, Israel is still occupying land in Lebanon.

Under the terms, Israeli forces were to withdraw, and Lebanon’s army was to take up positions in vacated territory.

Lebanon was meant to disarm Hezbollah, which is not a party to the agreement.

The fighting broke out as Lebanon struggled to recover from its worst-ever economic crisis, which began in 2019.

Beirut has been seeking a bailout from the International Monetary Fund but has yet to implement reforms demanded by the institution to release the aid.

Israel’s war on Lebanon has damaged the country’s wheat production and harmed the lives of farmers, experts told Al Jazeera.

For the last three years, Israel has been waging a war on Lebanon, where it has occupied large parts of the south and destroyed homes and infrastructure, in what some experts have said is a deliberate effort to make the land uninhabitable.

Repeated Israeli attacks have created havoc on the country’s wheat production, particularly in the south and in eastern Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, where lands abandoned due to the impacts of war have increased to around 24 percent.

“They’re disrupting entire ecosystems,” Munira Khayyat, author of A Landscape of War: Ecologies of Resistance and Survival in South Lebanon, told Al Jazeera. “[Israel is] advancing the possibilities of drought and desertification, basically weakening the capacity of this land to hold life.”

Farmlands damaged

Since 2023, Israel has been attacking large swaths of southern Lebanon, including using chemicals like white phosphorus, in what analysts and locals said was an effort to make the ground sterile or uninhabitable. A ceasefire was brokered in 2024 by France and the United States, but Israel never stopped attacking targets in Lebanon.

On March 2, Israel escalated its war on Lebanon for the second time in under two years. Hezbollah had attacked Israel following Israel’s assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei two days earlier. The group also said it was in response to near-daily ceasefire violations by Israel.

Since then, Israel has reinvaded southern Lebanon, taking land up to 10 kilometres (6.2 miles) inside the country. Beirut and Tel Aviv signed a US-brokered framework agreement in June, which was supposed to put into motion so-called “pilot zones”. Under these pilot zones, Israeli troops would withdraw to be replaced by the Lebanese Armed Forces, who would also work to disarm Hezbollah.

Instead, Israeli troops have continued to level destruction in southern Lebanon, detonating homes and crucial infrastructure, including farmland.

“The South [of Lebanon] experienced the highest average losses [in wheat-growing areas], reaching 47 percent in 2023-2024 and 61 percent in 2024-2025,” Mariam Ibrahim, a researcher with Lebanon’s National Council for Scientific Research [CNRS-L] and author of a recent paper called “Wheat in Crisis” that tracked Lebanon’s wheat struggles from 2017 to 2025, told Al Jazeera. “The Bekaa plain, which accounts for approximately 64 percent of Lebanon’s national wheat production, was also significantly affected, losing around 43 percent and 57 percent of its wheat area during the two respective seasons.”

In areas like the border town Bint Jbeil, 100 percent of cropland was destroyed, while in the Baalbeck district to the east, the study says approximately 32 percent of cropland was destroyed.

Wheat price influences

Ibrahim said the Russian-Ukrainian war led to an increase in bread prices and incentivised some domestic Lebanese production.

“The depreciation of the Lebanese pound meant that farmers could potentially generate higher revenues and profits in local currency when selling their wheat, as wheat prices were increasingly influenced by international market prices,” she said. “This provided an additional economic incentive to expand wheat cultivation, and our results showed that Lebanon’s wheat cultivation area reached its peak [during] the 2022-2023 season.”

However, experts said that since 2023, Israel’s war on Lebanon led to the proportion of land that had been used to grow wheat that was now left fallow increasing from 9 percent to 24 percent, mostly in the south and the Bekaa Valley.

Elias Ghadban, a food security expert with the independent Beirut-based consultancy firm AgriDev, told Al Jazeera that the destruction of land used to farm wheat has not made a “significant difference” at the national level, but it has had a damaging effect on southern wheat farmers who “lost their livelihoods”.

Ghadban also pointed to the fact that the cost of living has increased in Lebanon while salaries have failed to match that increase. “The expenditure on basic needs went up,” he said.

The economic crisis, followed by three years of war, has devastated many farmers, particularly as much of southern Lebanon’s farmland is largely unindustrialised. Experts warn that the destruction caused by Israel’s war could prevent many farmers from rebuilding their livelihoods, even after the fighting ends.

“All those small farmers who have made southern Lebanon what it is today and have been able to hold that land through their attachment to it, through their farming of it, through their existential need to be on that land in order to make their lives viable, that’s going to be broken,” Khayyat said.

In the last few days, in marked contrast to an election campaign defined by its bitterness and the closeness of its personal attacks, Israel’s current prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has spoken of national unity and coming together with the opposition bloc that edged out his ruling coalition in October’s election.

On Saturday, the same day that Israeli President Isaac Herzog tasked former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot with forming a government capable of commanding the Knesset, Netanyahu published a video on his social media account claiming Israel to be facing the genuine risk of civil war if a government were established with the support of Arab parties which he accused of wanting to “eliminate the State of Israel”.

Two days later, Netanyahu returned to the theme of existential threat in a further video, calling upon the leaders of the more successful bloc to recognise the “needs of the hour” and join, under his leadership, a single unified government that would also include the ultra-Orthodox parties, at least one of which is understood to be in talks with Eisenkot, as well as the prime minister’s controversial allies on the far right, Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.

“It’s all a game at the moment. It’s leverage, it’s one-upmanship, it’s psyops, it’s spin, it’s counter-spin,” former Israeli government adviser Daniel Levy said of the invariably long and complex negotiations that take place ahead of establishing a government,

Currently, with the new Knesset being sworn in on Tuesday, speculation is focussing on the role of the Ultra Orthodox, or haredim, parties, which have traditionally offered support to Netanyahu in return for measures shielding their young male yeshiva students from the military draft in defiance off a Super Court ruling of June 2024.

Strategy

Nevertheless, irrespective of the past political cover offered to their members by Netanyahu, there are suggestions that one of the Ultra Orthodox parties United Torah Judaism (UTJ) – which refused to endorse Netanyahu’s selection to build a government by the President – is preparing to throw in behind Eisenkot, with the objections of one of the opposition’s principal figures Avigdor Lieberman said to be quieted in the face of either partnering with one of the Arab parties or the continued rule of Lieberman’s nemesis, Netanyahu and the prospect of further elections.

“‘It’s political strategy, that’s all,” Netanyahu’s former aide, Israeli pollster Mitchell Barak said from Jerusalem. ‘But he’s negotiating from a weakened position. With the UTJ, Eisenkot’s got 67 seats,’ he said of the numbers needed to gain a working majority in the 120 seat Knesset, “so, of course, Netanyahu’s going to do all he can to reinforce his bloc; Barak said of negotiations regarded by many as critical to Netanyahu’s personal future.

Netanyahu faces a number of challenges that speak directly to both his political legacy and personal freedom that he will lose all influence over should Eisenkot succeed him.

Foremost are like to be the multiple corruption charges that is is presently on trial for and, despite his claims of innocence that he has already preemptively petitioned the country’s President and his former political rival, Isaac Herzog for. Secondly, and more pressingly is the question of his and his government’s culpability for the alleged failings ahead of the October 7 Hamas led attack that triggered the genocide unleashed upon Gaza by Israel and the multiple strikes and attacks launched by Israel non regional neighbors in the years since.

New Knesset, new danger

Many of the new MKs being sworn in on Tuesday, including bereaved family members, reservists, advocates for the 250 or so Israelis taken captive that day and Eisenkot himself, who lost a son and two nephews in the genocide that followed, are all tied directly to October 7 and the wars that followed together creating a chamber where feelings over the October 7 attack and where culpability for its lies are said to run close to the surface.

In particular, attention is likely to focus sharply on Netanyahu himself, whose supposed miscalculations ahead of the attack, stories of numerous missed warnings and who was subsequently accused of dragging out the war, or sacrificing the welfare off the captives for his own political ends. Key among the opposition’s aims for the first day of parliamentary business is set to be the installation of Matan Kahana, a member of Eisenkot’s Yashar (“straight”) party and a keen advocate of a state inquiry into Netanyahu and the government’s failings ahead of the Hamas led attack.

“Having so many people connected so directly to October 7 is going to increase the temperature, but it’s become so politicized that a win for one side automatically becomes a loss for the other, so the bereaved family on the right can say we need to increase our militarism in honor of my son, and the bereaved family in the center says we need to enlist more people.

“Netanyahu can try to influence that but for the first time in a long time, he seems a bit lost,” Israeli political analyst Nimrod Flaschenberg said.

However, how lost Netanyahu may be, or how grounded his claims of pending civil war or destruction at the hands of regional adversaries may be, ultimately, his political and potentially personal fate now lies with an opposition that outstrips his own numerically and a volatile Knesset eager to comb over the mistakes of the past.

“There’s no appetite on the other side to go in with Netanyahu for a unity government,” Levy said,

“The only real circumstances under which that happen is if he can create a security emergency,” he said following a weekend where the UK press had reported daily phone calls from Netanyahu to the Trump administration urging renewed war on Iran.

Despite bipartisan opposition to the war, efforts to impeach Hegseth were squashed as Iran denies US, Tehran talks

UNIFIL said on Tuesday that ‘about a dozen rounds’ were fired at one of its patrols, without identifying the assailants.

A United Nations peacekeeping force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol has come under fire in southern Lebanon, the force said.

UNIFIL said on Tuesday that “about a dozen rounds” were fired at one of its patrols near Wadi Jilu, in Lebanon’s Tyre district, without specifying the entity behind the shooting.

The patrol returned fire, after which the shooting stopped. UNIFIL reported no casualties and called for an investigation.

“We reiterate the obligation under international law for all actors to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel and property at all times. Deliberate attacks on peacekeepers are violations of Security Council resolution 1701 and international humanitarian law,” UNIFIL said.

Security limbo

UNIFIL is a peacekeeping mission established by the UN Security Council in March 1978, days after Israel invaded Lebanon.

The force has acted as a buffer between Israel and Lebanon ever since, but its presence has been unable to prevent several rounds of conflict, including the latest between Israel and Hezbollah.

Israel continues to occupy swaths of southern Lebanon, despite a so-called ceasefire and a US-brokered framework agreement through which the Israeli military would withdraw from those areas and the Lebanese army would move in to disarm Hezbollah.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said on Tuesday that the G7 foreign ministers agreed on “the need to avoid a security void” in Lebanon after the UNIFIL mandate expires at the end of 2026.

The foreign ministers backed “the need to move quickly toward a new security architecture”, Barrot said after the group met in Paris.

However, the French foreign minister acknowledged that there had been no breakthrough regarding replacing UNIFIL, which comprises some 7,500 personnel from nearly 50 countries.

The UN Security Council last year voted, under US pressure, to end UNIFIL’s mandate on December 31, 2026. Lebanese officials have called for the mandate to be extended.

Herzog calls for an inquiry into the October 7 attacks during a Knesset session amid political gridlock following elections.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog has urged lawmakers to “leave no stone unturned” and launch an investigation into the October 7 attacks by Hamas in a speech opening the new parliamentary session, after the election left Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc short of a majority.

Herzog called on party leaders to “make concessions” and do “everything possible to avoid a repeat election” at the swearing-in of newly elected members in the 26th Knesset on Tuesday.

The Israeli president tasked opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot with forming the country’s next government on Sunday, starting the clock for him to cobble together a coalition within 28 days, with a possible 14-day extension.

While also short of a parliamentary majority, Eisenkot and his allies hope to use their newfound legislative power to move rapidly to establish an independent inquiry into the October 7 attacks.

“I am committed in this complex situation to form a national emergency government as quickly as possible,” Eisenkot said, ahead of the Knesset session.

Netanyahu has previously refused to form a commission to investigate the attacks, arguing that a panel appointed by the Israeli Supreme Court would be biased against the government.

On Iran, Herzog said in his speech that Tehran “does not stop even for a moment in its plots and threats, whether directly or through its partners”, repeating the notion from his speech officially delegating Eisenkot to form the new government.

The president said Israel “must fortify the alliance” with the United States amid increasing disapproval of Israel among the US public due to the genocidal war on Gaza and the US-Israel war on Iran.

“Alongside the stubborn and determined war against those who seek to harm us, we must build a stable political horizon in the region with our neighbours,” he said, adding that Israel must “strengthen and even add to the peace agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain”.

Political gridlock

The speaker of the Knesset, a member of Netanyahu’s Likud Party, will remain in the caretaker position until a new vote is held.

“Yashar, Eisenkot’s party, has already submitted 61 signatures of new parliamentarians demanding that the vote take place as soon as possible,” said Al Jazeera’s Nour Odeh, reporting from the occupied West Bank.

Netanyahu and his bloc continue to protest the result of the October 27 elections, claiming foreign interference after Palestinian-Israeli parties secured a 19-seat bloc.

“Those protests have gone unanswered because the results have been certified and every relevant authority has dismissed the allegations that there were widespread violations,” Odeh said.

Eisenkot has yet to strike deals with parties that could bring him to the 61-seat majority needed to form a government. If neither Eisenkot nor Netanyahu forms a coalition, another round of elections could follow.

United States President Donald Trump has said the US plans to seek compensation from countries it “protected” during its war on Iran.

In an interview with CBS News correspondent Ross Douthat that aired Sunday, Trump said such countries would “pay us any and all costs we had for the war”.

“We’re going to get all that money back,” Trump said. “They’re going to do it, 100 percent. Because without us, they wouldn’t exist.”

For the first time, Trump also explicitly spoke of compensation from Israel, which he said “wouldn’t exist” without US military intervention.

The reimbursement demand comes after Trump and his Republican party took a drubbing in midterm elections, which the president has conceded was partly due to public discontent over the Iran war.

The US president has since declared the war “effectively over” militarily, while defending his decision to start the conflict as “a very good decision”.

Here’s what to know about Trump’s demand for repayment, and what it could mean for the US and its allies:

Which countries does Trump want compensation from?

Trump — for the first time — singled out Israel, which was a direct participant in the war against Iran from the outset.

“We decapitated their [Iran’s] nuclear arsenal,” he said. “If I didn’t do that, there would be no Israel right now. Israel would be gone.”

Previously, Trump has said he would seek repayment from Gulf countries that benefit from the US military presence around the embattled Strait of Hormuz, where US forces have been escorting vessels.

“We’re protecting a very rich portion of the world, we’re spending money, and so what we’ve done is we’re going to be reimbursed for protection,” Trump said during a press briefing in July.

He named Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait as countries that should pay.

But while Israel jointly launched the war on Iran with the US, Gulf countries have said that they were not even informed about Washington’s plans, and have since borne the brunt of Iran’s retaliatory attacks. As members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), they have called for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

How much has the Iran war cost the US?

$47.1bn as of mid-October, according to the US military.

But the full cost is likely to be even higher, as that figure excludes the cost of repairing damage to US military bases across the Middle East.

The Congressional Budget Office in September estimated the conflict would carry an additional cost of $2bn-$3bn for each month it continues.

Will Trump actually seek repayment from allies?

Probably not directly, analysts say.

Neil Quilliam, an associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera that Trump’s comments are “best understood as political signalling rather than a serious policy proposal.”

Gulf states in particular are likely to take Trump’s comments “with a grain of salt,” added Bader al-Saif, an assistant professor of history at Kuwait University and associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa programme.

“I think what [Trump] stated on an American news channel was for domestic consumption, and I think that’s how most of the Gulf states will take it,” said al-Saif.

Stefan Lukas, an analyst specialising in Middle East and North Africa security and foreign policy, also pointed to Trump’s domestic political considerations, saying the US president has been “looking for someone to blame … and has been doing everything in his power to divert attention from the midterm election results”.

Lukas told Al Jazeera it is unlikely that Washington’s Arab allies in the region will face large compensation payments “or anything similar”.

However, he suggested that Trump could be more serious about seeking economic concessions from Israel, particularly after announcing that the country would no longer receive US aid after the end of this year.

That is partly because, from Trump’s perspective, “Israel pushed him into a disastrous war with Iran”, Lukas said.

What would compensation look like?

Al-Saif said Trump could be “very innovative” in defining what constitutes repayment for the war, potentially pointing to existing trade agreements or investment from the Gulf.

“There’s many agreements for him to go back to and to claim,” said Al-Saif. “There have been a lot of [Gulf] pledges for investment in the US.”

Farid Boussaid, an assistant professor in Middle East politics at the University of Amsterdam, said Washington could push for further Gulf investment and present it as compensation.

“This will most likely be indirect and take the form of commercial investments in the US, buying of US weapons systems – on top of what has already been ordered – and investments into close associates of Trump’s financial dealings,” said Boussaid.

Trump has repeatedly made misleading claims about foreign investment and trade agreements in the past, portraying them as payments or gifts to the US.

After a July 2025 trade deal with the European Union, Trump claimed the bloc had given the US a $600bn “gift” that could be invested in “anything we want”. However, the framework agreement referred only to an expectation that European companies would invest $600bn across strategic sectors in the US through 2028.

The same month, Trump described a $550bn investment pledge from Japan, under a new US-Japan trade agreement, as being “like a signing bonus that a baseball player would get”.

During Trump’s first term, he repeatedly claimed that Mexico would pay for a border wall – which was never completed and which Mexico did not pay for. Trump later qualified his claim to say that Mexico would reimburse the US for the wall or pay for a “piece” of it, which also never happened. Trump at one point claimed that the benefits of a trade pact he negotiated with Mexico would cover the cost of the wall.

How will US allies react to Trump’s demands?

Having already suffered extensive financial losses during the war, the US’s Gulf allies will not take well to being asked to pay more for a war they did not start, say analysts.

Quilliam said Gulf leaders would likely respond to any demand for direct repayment with “quiet resistance”, arguing that they “already contribute significantly to the cost of regional security through defence cooperation, investment and economic partnerships with the US”.

Gulf states also pay for the maintenance of several large bases that the US uses for military operations in the region.

Boussaid said Gulf states will be particularly averse to such a demand as “the US-Israeli war led to considerable damage to their [civilian] and military infrastructure when Iran struck back”.

Al-Saif added that Trump’s “condescending language does not bode well for partners long invested in the relationship with the US”.

As for Israel, it looks unlikely to “reverse its longstanding role as a recipient rather than a provider of support in its relationship with the US”, according to Marzieh Kouhi Esfahani, assistant professor of politics and international relations of the Middle East at Durham University.

“While Israel and the United States continue to share intelligence and coordinate on regional security issues, any request for Israel to shoulder a meaningful share of the financial burden would run against established practice and Israel’s present resource constraints,” she said.

US President made the remarks following a meeting with the Qatari PM in Washington, DC.