Iran

The attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis on Saudi Arabia have pushed the war in Yemen to a new level. The targeting of civilian infrastructure, including airports, which has killed at least a dozen people and injured hundreds, has left no room to maintain the “red lines” that previously outlined the limits of escalation.

This is a reckless gamble by the Houthis which is not in their interest. They are aware that the retaliation will be fierce, yet they continue to attack Saudi Arabia to fulfil Iran’s agenda that seeks heightened tensions before the United States midterms.

Given the motivation to escalate, the present situation has the potential to develop into two scenarios: A major region-wide operation against the Houthis or a war of attrition.

Scenario one: A united front against the Houthis

In response to the Houthi escalation, Saudi Arabia is striving to garner maximum international support while deepening its regional and international alliances. The aim is to come up with a united front capable of taking on what has become a regional threat.

Riyadh is certainly looking to its Gulf neighbours who, themselves, are impacted by the continuing conflict in the region. There is a collective realisation that everyone is in grave danger, not just Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, Gulf states – perhaps with the exception of Oman – will support Riyadh both directly and indirectly in the fighting in Yemen.

Pakistan and Turkiye are also likely to join the front, having signed with Saudi Arabia a defence agreement known as the Mecca Pact. The pact is to be ratified by the Turkish parliament in the next few days, opening the way for Turkish military deployment in support of Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, indirect involvement by Turkiye and Pakistan, along with logistical and intelligence support, appears to be already well under way.

A US intervention is also possible, although it seems unlikely before the US midterms, as military engagements in the Middle East remain unpopular among US voters.

A region-wide coalition can help support the counteroffensive of the forces loyal to the internationally recognised Yemeni government already under way. This could give the necessary push to retake the western coastal region, including areas beyond Bab al-Mandeb and Dhubab.

Such gains could ease pressure on Red Sea shipping and potentially shift the military balance in favour of the government. The opening of additional fronts across other Yemeni cities and governorates could stretch Houthi forces, disperse their resources, and increase the likelihood of further government advances.

Retaking Sanaa could also be on the horizon. The primary obstacle delaying the Yemeni government’s recapture of the city is internal discord among the various factions within the government itself, compounded by negative external interference that exacerbates these rifts and weakens the collective effort to confront the Houthis.

Recent measures taken by the government, specifically efforts to unify its decision-making and consolidate its military operations command, have yielded noticeable progress on the ground. However, achieving the ultimate objective of retaking Sanaa requires sustained effort and focused determination.

If government forces make substantial gains, that could force the Houthis to offer concessions in exchange for a pause in fighting. They have done that before. Their purpose would not be to seek peace but to get enough breathing room to regroup and eventually go back to fighting. Negotiators should keep that in mind when approaching talks with the Houthis.

Scenario two: A war of attrition

If the Saudi-led coalition and the Yemeni government succumb to internal divisions and disagreements, this may slow progress against the Houthis. This would allow the Houthi fighters to hold on to their positions while increasing their pressure on the strategic town of Taiz and maintaining the campaign against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia.

Such a development could further complicate the conflict, increase civilian casualties and displacement, and prolong the war without producing a decisive military outcome.

This will have a significant economic impact on Saudi Arabia and complicate the implementation of its development goals, as it would have to prioritise defence spending.

The rest of the Gulf economies will also be negatively impacted because Saudi Arabia plays such a central role in the region. What is more, losing ground to the Houthis would mean that the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz would also continue, disrupting energy exports from the region.

In this scenario, there will be “no victor, no vanquished” deadlock in Yemen, but Iran would emerge as winner. A war of attrition along the Red Sea coast would provide Tehran with significant breathing room, allowing it to alleviate pressure on its own war efforts.

This would enable Iran to use the Houthi card as leverage in the intermittent negotiations it conducts with the international community, emboldening it to raise the bar regarding its conditions and demands during those talks.

This means that the only way to resolve the crisis in Yemen is decisive military action led by the Yemeni government and supported by a region-wide coalition. For that to happen, the government has to get its internal affairs and its relations with allies in order.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

US President Donald Trump has accused Houthi rebels of targeting Saudi infrastructure to inflate energy prices before the US midterm elections.

Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani says Qatar has demonstrated its strength and cohesion.

Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani has told the Shura Council that the region has faced “exceptional events”, following months of instability amid the United States-Israeli war on Iran.

Speaking in the Qatari capital, Doha, on Tuesday morning, Sheikh Tamim said the events had demonstrated the strength and cohesion of the country’s state institutions.

“Our country and the region have faced exceptional events that have once again proven the cohesion of state institutions,” the Emir said.

Qatar has found itself caught up in the war, which began on February 28 and has triggered a global energy crisis. The Gulf state has been directly attacked by Iran on several occasions, including in March, when Tehran struck Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas facility, the world’s largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) production site.

Sheikh Tamim said Qatar had been able to absorb the consequences of the regional instability due to policies implemented before the war, stressing that Doha’s preference was to resolve conflicts through peaceful means and dialogue. However, the Emir maintained that the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) security was non-negotiable.

“The security of the Gulf Cooperation Council states and the preservation of their sovereignty is a matter that cannot be compromised on,” he said.

The war on Iran has disrupted global supply routes, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran has effectively blocked since the start of the conflict.

Sheikh Tamim said efforts to safeguard maritime routes must be increased.

“Efforts must be doubled to secure navigation in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and to protect energy facilities and civilian infrastructure.”

Saudi-led coalition spokesperson Turki al-Maliki says forces intercepted and destroyed two Houthi ballistic missiles targeting Khamis Mushait airbase.

As the United States maintains a naval blockade of Iran’s ports and imposes more sanctions on its oil exports, Tehran is confronting another problem: billions of dollars in revenue from previous oil sales that it says have gone missing.

A spokesperson for Iran’s judiciary said in September that a network of oil intermediaries known as “trustees” owed the Iranian government between 10 billion euros ($11bn) and 11 billion euros ($12bn). That figure was equivalent to half of the total oil revenue projected in Iran’s government budget for the current fiscal year.

US officials, including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, have tied Iran’s struggles to access oil revenues as evidence that its economic pressure campaign is having an effect. In August, Bessent said that “Iran’s shadow banking system was buckling” under pressure from the US campaign against the country, which has been ramped up as Washington seeks a way to force Tehran to capitulate in the war between the two countries, launched by the US and Israel in late February.

So who are the oil intermediaries, why does Iran depend on them, and what has happened to the billions of dollars they owe? Let’s take a closer look.

The debt, and the crisis it has created for the Iranian government, both stem from an oil-sales arrangement Tehran adopted in 2012 in response to US sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports.

American and European sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales and revenue collection began in 2012. The stated rationale behind both sets of measures was that revenue from oil sales helped finance Iran’s nuclear programme and that restricting Iranian oil exports could prevent the programme from advancing.

In response, the Iranian government devised a way to circumvent international sanctions on its oil sales. Unable to sell oil through the Oil Ministry and receive the proceeds through the Central Bank, it began selling oil to domestic buyers or using it to settle outstanding obligations to institutions and organisations owed money by the state.

This arrangement gave rise to a network of oil intermediaries often referred to in Iran as the “trustee network”. Rather than selling all its oil through official government channels, the state entrusted crude oil to institutions, individuals and companies to sell on its behalf. The proceeds were supposed to be transferred to the government’s treasury, with the sellers or recipient institutions subsequently recovering their agreed costs and outstanding claims. Some institutions sold the oil themselves, while others contracted private trading companies to handle the sales.

The Oil Industry Pension Fund, established for retired Oil Ministry employees familiar with the oil-sales process, was among the first institutions to receive crude oil for sale. Other recipients included Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Base, a major hub for large-scale infrastructure projects. Even the municipal police received payments owed to them by the government in the form of crude oil.

Effect of the nuclear deal

Even in those early experiments, discrepancies emerged between the revenue expected from oil sales and the amounts sellers actually deposited into the government’s treasury. These discrepancies eventually gave rise to some of Iran’s largest economic corruption cases.

The accounting discrepancies and the government’s inability to recover money from private sellers entrusted with Iranian oil persisted until 2016, when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal was signed and when sanctions on Iranian oil sales were lifted. The government was subsequently able to regain control over oil sales.

Individuals who had sold Iranian oil but failed to return the proceeds were imprisoned. With the ability to sell oil again through legal and transparent channels, the government was able, for a time, to manage its oil revenues and spending with greater control.

How did money from oil sales go unreturned?

After US President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in 2018 during his first presidential term, the Iranian government once again had to rely on private oil traders to sell its oil. But the problems associated with selling oil through intermediaries rather than official state channels, including delays in returning revenues, accounting discrepancies, debts owed by oil sellers to the government, and the occasional seizure of Iranian oil shipments at sea, once again constrained the government’s ability to manage its oil revenues.

Moreover, the US expanded its sanctions beyond Iranian government institutions and interests, adding bank accounts involved in transactions with the Iranian government, currency-exchange offices, companies, and individuals to its sanctions lists. As a result, the time between individuals participating in Iran’s oil-trading network and being sanctioned themselves, along with their assets and companies, and having their accounts blocked or frozen grew progressively shorter.

This contributed to an accumulation of debts owed by sanctioned oil traders – no longer able to access their accounts – to the government. It also left Iran with little choice but to expand its private oil-sales network. That meant increasing the number of people involved in trading Iranian oil, reducing the volume of oil allocated to each individual or company and, ultimately, increasing the risk that the proceeds would not be returned.

Iranian officials have also accused trustees of exploiting the sanctions workarounds to enrich themselves.

The billions of dollars owed by private oil sellers to the Iranian government are a combination of outstanding payments, disputed financial obligations and allegations of corruption. Iran’s judiciary chief recently addressed the issue, warning that oil sellers who refuse to return the proceeds from oil sales will face legal action. But such warnings do not change the sanctions environment or remove the obstacles that prevent some oil sellers from returning the money.

Tehran, Iran – Iranian authorities have signalled they intend to disrupt an Arab-operated and United States-assisted shuttle system that has enabled more energy exports through the Strait of Hormuz during the US-Israel war on Iran.

With the US naval blockade of Iran’s southern ports in place and sanctions tightening, Tehran has said it will pursue military and diplomatic efforts to put pressure on Washington to submit to its demands regarding reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

This strategic waterway, through which roughly a fifth of global oil and gas flowed before the war, has been largely closed to shipping following Iranian attacks since the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28.

But the US Navy has reportedly opened up a route so Gulf states can export oil and other commodities amid an energy crisis.

Iran’s security chief Mohsen Rezaei responded on Sunday night, saying the shuttle system is now an explicit target for Tehran.

Rezaei claimed that the US Central Command, with the assistance of the United Arab Emirates military, was using smaller vessels to transfer oil to larger tankers. He claimed Iran had been striking five or six participating vessels nightly for weeks.

“You are smuggling, but the strait is under Iran’s control, and we manage it,” he asserted.

This appeared to be a taunt aimed at US President Donald Trump, who has hailed energy exports at times reaching pre-war levels over recent weeks.

Rezaei appeared to give the impression that Iran wants to have lasting authority over Hormuz, and promised a harsh response if Iran’s energy and civilian infrastructure were attacked again.

His threats appeared aimed at Arab regional states, with a warning that digital infrastructure could be targeted. Rezaei threatened US-linked cables, data centres and artificial intelligence facilities in the UAE and around the Strait of Hormuz.

Rezaei also accused Saudi Arabia of helping the US move oil around Iran’s restrictions. But he did not threaten a direct attack against Riyadh – which is currently being targeted by Yemen’s Tehran-aligned Houthis.

In early September, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) threatened tankers at ports and anchorages in Kuwait and Bahrain, citing US attacks on Iranian tankers. It accused both countries of complicity through hosting US armed forces.

Iran has claimed the US accepted some of Tehran’s seven conditions for the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and ending the war. But Tehran insists that a deal will only materialise when all its demands are met.

Hamidreza Azizi, a senior Iran analyst at the Crisis Group, said this reflects Tehran’s apparent assessment that it is under no immediate pressure to reach an agreement with the US since its pressure in the Hormuz has a global impact.

“The question, however, is whether Tehran is overestimating its ability to sustain this pressure, given the growing economic costs of the confrontation for Iran itself,” Azizi wrote on X.

Transfer system

The system involves very large crude carriers (VLCCs) and smaller vessels coordinating with the US military to load crude oil at Arab ports and use southern corridors near the coast of Oman to exit the strait.

Vessels often switch off their transponders and travel at night to minimise the risk of being targeted by the Iranians. After ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman, some of the shuttles come back to load more.

Multiple vessels were targeted overnight Sunday to Monday, including two outbound tankers and one in anchorage near Oman’s port city of Sohar, where ship-to-ship transfers are allegedly being conducted.

Other vessels were targeted by projectiles last week, indicating that attacks have extended beyond the Strait of Hormuz to target the shuttle system.

The IRGC has also increasingly driven a narrative that naval mines, believed to have been planted across the Strait of Hormuz since the start of the war, pose a serious threat to vessels attempting to navigate the waterway without coordinating with Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority.

The IRGC said three tankers suffered major damage over the weekend after being struck by mines. It also released footage of one ship ablaze that is said to have been struck by a mine, although the footage did not appear to show a mine going off.

‘Cascading impact’

The shuttle system has provided Arab national oil companies with a way out of Hormuz via the southern corridor near Oman.

Michelle Wiese Bockmann, a London-based senior maritime intelligence analyst at Windward, said this system has proven highly effective.

“Under international maritime law, which underpins 11 billion tonnes of seaborne trade annually, vessels have what’s called the right of transit passage,” Bockmann told Al Jazeera. “So, what Oman has done is allow vessels to go through under international maritime law, but they have had US military assistance.”

Tehran says shipping will be disrupted so long as the US continues its choking naval blockade against Iran, which has also stepped up its efforts to counter efforts by Arab states to export oil. At least 15 ships are believed to have been targeted in October so far, according to Winward.

“The more effective the route has become in facilitating the transport of oil and gas, the less leverage Iran has over Hormuz, and more attacks we are seeing on vessels that are using that southern corridor,” Bockmann said.

Windward’s data shows 31 ships transited the Strait of Hormuz daily in the final week of September. This was considerably lower than the 138 before the war.

Eighty-seven percent of the 45 ships targeted by Iran during the third quarter of 2026 were tankers.

Around 47 percent belonged to Gulf Arab energy companies’ national shipping fleets, Windward noted, and 93 percent of the strikes took place in the Strait of Hormuz. Most attacks targeted vessels transiting the southern corridor with their transponders turned off.

These attacks have contributed to a massive increase in freight costs. Freight represented 25-30 percent of Gulf crude’s cost, versus just 1 to 3 percent before the war, according to Windward. National oil companies have resorted to offering discounts of up to $35 per barrel below official selling prices.

The main reason for the rise is a shortage of tankers willing to make the dangerous crossing. Between 15 and 20 percent of very large crude carriers (VLCCs) are tied up with an inefficient logistics system that relies on shuttle transfers, complicated by escalating attacks and exposure at loading ports and anchorages.

“This is having cascading impacts for all vessel classes on freight and values across the world,” Bockmann said.

Iran has offered to facilitate talks between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthi group after a series of deadly attacks on the kingdom, raising questions about Tehran’s diplomatic calculations as fighting intensifies across the region.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi spoke with his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, on Sunday, in their first publicly reported contact since the Iran-aligned Houthis stepped up attacks on Saudi Arabia.

The diplomatic outreach comes after strikes on Riyadh’s international airport over the weekend killed 14 people and wounded hundreds, while Saudi-backed forces continued their offensive against the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, in Yemen.

The talks also come against the backdrop of the wider US-Israel war on Iran, with Tehran potentially seeking to avoid being dragged into another confrontation.

“Tehran is an ally of Ansar Allah and has influence with the movement, although it does not control its decisions,” Negar Mortazavi, senior fellow at the Washington, DC-based Center for International Policy, told Al Jazeera.

“By offering to facilitate talks with Riyadh, Iran is positioning itself as an indispensable party to a broader regional settlement.”

So what discussions are happening between Riyadh and Tehran, and why is Iran offering to facilitate talks?

What did Iran and Saudi Arabia talk about?

According to the Saudi state news agency, the two foreign ministers discussed the recent escalation in the region and efforts to reduce tensions. Iran’s Foreign Ministry also confirmed the development.

Following the discussions, Araghchi on Sunday warned against pursuing a military solution to the conflict and offered Tehran’s assistance in facilitating dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

“Insisting on a military approach and disregarding a political solution would only further complicate the situation,” Araghchi said, according to Iran’s Foreign Ministry.

On Monday, ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei reiterated Tehran’s willingness to mediate, saying Iran was deeply concerned about developments in the Arabian Peninsula.

“We absolutely do not want hostilities and war to continue between two Islamic countries,” Baghaei said, urging dialogue to resolve the conflict.

What is Iran’s stance on the war in Yemen?

Iran has repeatedly called for a diplomatic settlement to Yemen’s conflict and says it supports a political solution rather than continued military action.

Tehran backs the Houthis, who control Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and other parts of the country.

The armed group forms part of the Iran-aligned “axis of resistance”, which also includes Lebanon’s Hezbollah and armed groups in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has led a military coalition supporting Yemen’s internationally recognised government since 2015.

Baghaei said on Monday that the conflict served Israeli interests, framing a negotiated settlement as preferable to further fighting.

What is the latest in the Yemen fighting?

Fighting has intensified in Yemen, after the internationally recognised government’s forces announced Operation Dawn of Yemen on October 4 to reverse recent Houthi territorial gains, including the capital, Sanaa.

Government forces, backed by Riyadh, have reported advances near the strategic Bab al-Mandeb strait, a vital international shipping route. However, competing battlefield claims remain difficult to independently verify.

The Houthis have responded with missile and drone attacks on Saudi airports, energy infrastructure and other targets.

Two strikes on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport on Saturday and Sunday killed 14 people and wounded more than 300. The casualties included foreign nationals from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Palestine.

The escalating violence has also disrupted commercial flights, businesses and schools in Riyadh, underlining the growing economic and civilian consequences of the conflict.

UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg warned on Friday that Yemen had returned to “full-scale war”, with civilians bearing the brunt of the attacks.

Why is Iran willing to facilitate talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis?

Iran’s offer to facilitate talks between Riyadh and the Houthis could be an attempt to strengthen Tehran’s diplomatic position and secure a wider regional agreement that extends beyond Yemen.

“I think Iran is trying to turn Yemen from a military liability into a diplomatic asset,” Andreas Krieg, a Middle East security analyst at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera.

He said Tehran recognises that Saudi Arabia is struggling to reverse Houthi territorial gains, particularly around Taiz and Bab al-Mandeb, despite intensifying its military campaign.

“Araghchi’s offer is an attempt to position Iran as part of the solution to a crisis in which it has also helped sustain the problem,” Krieg said.

Analyst Mortazavi, meanwhile, said Iran’s diplomatic outreach is part of a broader effort to link the conflicts unfolding across the region.

“The larger political objective is an informal non-aggression arrangement between Iran and its allies on one side and the United States and its regional partners on the other,” she said.

Such an agreement, she argued, would require an end to hostilities across multiple fronts, including Yemen and Lebanon, rather than a settlement confined to the US-Iran conflict.

Moreover, academic Krieg said there was also an important “Saudi dimension” to the discussions.

“Riyadh is increasingly uncomfortable with its dependence on Washington, frustrated by the limited American willingness to intervene in Yemen and reluctant to become dependent on the UAE again,” he said.

“Iran sees an opportunity to demonstrate that engagement with Tehran can deliver something Saudi Arabia’s traditional security partnerships have struggled to provide.”

There are also economic considerations, the analysts noted. Iran is under significant pressure from the US blockade, while Gulf countries are gradually recovering their energy exports to pre-war levels despite Iranian disruptions.

“Offering Riyadh a way out of Yemen potentially gives Iran leverage well beyond the Yemeni theatre, particularly in negotiations over Hormuz, sanctions relief and the wider regional security architecture,” Krieg said.

However, Krieg cautioned against overstating Iran’s influence over the Houthis, who have their own political ambitions and demands.

“Ansar Allah is not simply an Iranian proxy awaiting instructions,” Krieg said. “Its leadership has its own political ambitions, increasingly sees itself as a regional military actor and believes its recent territorial gains have strengthened its negotiating position. Iran can facilitate talks and potentially influence the intensity of escalation, but it cannot simply order the Houthis to surrender their gains around Mocha or Bab al-Mandeb.”

For Mortazavi, the broader message is that regional security cannot be addressed in isolation.

“Ultimately, Tehran’s message is that regional security cannot be divided,” she said. “Saudi Arabia cannot obtain security from attacks, while Iran and its allies remain under military and economic pressure.”

Sunday’s strike on King Khalid International airport kills a Pakistani national.

A projectile has struck Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid International airport, killing one person and injuring 11, according to the country’s civil aviation authority.

The General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA) identified the deceased in Sunday’s attack as a Pakistani resident and said the injured were transferred to several hospitals for medical care.

The strike on terminals 3 and 4, which serve domestic flights, occurred a day after a Houthi missile hit the airport, killing 12 people and wounding more than 300, according to the Saudi-led coalition fighting Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

India’s embassy in Saudi Arabia said one of its citizens died on Sunday of injuries sustained in Saturday’s attack, which would bring the toll to 13.

Following Sunday’s attack, GACA said damage assessments and safety inspections of the airport were under way.

A witness on board a taxiing aircraft at the airport told the Reuters news agency that a projectile struck the tarmac next to several parked planes at about 8:30pm (17:30 GMT) on Sunday, causing a fire.

The witness said the aircraft returned to the gate, where the passengers disembarked and were told to leave.

The Riyadh airport has been struck four times in the past five days. Houthi attacks on King Khalid airport on Thursday killed at least three Saudi citizens, including a pilot, according to GACA.

The airport has been closed since Saturday’s attack, which was the deadliest in the country since the US-Israel war on Iran began in late February.

The Houthis claimed responsibility for the strikes before Sunday’s.

The airport attacks have escalated the war in Yemen and threaten to draw in the US military. US President Donald Trump says he is weighing whether to join the fight against the Houthis.

The escalation puts further pressure on global oil supplies and prices, as well as on commercial shipping through the Bab al-Mandeb strait off the Yemeni coast, a crucial alternative waterway to the Strait of Hormuz.

Trump had said he intends to speak with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is seeking help against the Houthis, but there were no signs on Sunday that the US president had followed up on his claim.

There are fears that US intervention could prompt the Houthis to halt shipping through Bab al-Mandeb, further restricting the flow of oil out of the Gulf.

The rebels seized key areas along the strait last month. The Saudi-led coalition, backing forces loyal to Yemen’s internationally recognised government, has been trying to seize them back.

Iran says US has accepted some of its peace terms but calls the response ‘inadequate’, as one person is killed in a new attack on Riyadh airport.

US military jet strikes stern of commercial cargo ship in the Gulf of Oman ‘without harming the crew’, CENTCOM says.

United States forces have disabled a commercial cargo vessel in the Gulf of Oman after its crew “ignored repeated warnings and attempted to run the ongoing naval blockade against Iran”, according to US Central Command (CENTCOM).

A US military fighter jet struck the stern of the Panama-flagged M/V Ocean Molica, also known as the Arika Sun, with a precision munition on Saturday, “fully disabling the ship’s propulsion without harming the crew”, CENTCOM said in a statement. The vessel was attempting to transit regional waters after “having previously departed an Iranian port”.

CENTCOM said its forces resumed their blockade against all ships “entering or departing Iranian ports on July 14”, disabling four commercial vessels and turning around 135 ships during “three months of strict enforcement”.

US forces also destroyed 10 tankers linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC’s) “multibillion-dollar shadow network” over the same period, CENTCOM said.

Meanwhile, Iran’s IRGC said it struck a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz for attempting to take an “illegal route”, as Tehran seeks to enforce its own blockade on the vital waterway.

In a statement carried by official Iranian media, the IRGC claimed Iranian forces “have taken control of the administration of the strait”.

“In carrying out this mission, a few hours ago, a giant LPG carrier named NV Sunshine, owned by NatWit, which was attempting to transit via the illegal route south of the Strait of Hormuz, was struck,” the statement said.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) agency said on Sunday that an outbound tanker in the strait was struck on the port side by an unknown projectile, causing a fire on board. The UK agency said crew members were reported safe, while the damage and environmental impact remained unknown at the time of the report.

Tehran has attempted to enforce control over the Strait of Hormuz during the US-Israel war on Iran, insisting that ships obtain permission to cross via its preferred routes. However, vessels have increasingly risked taking an alternative route hugging the strait’s southern coast.

The UKMTO said on Thursday that a vessel sailing 94km (58 miles) north of Madinat ash Shamal, off the north coast of Qatar, was struck by multiple projectiles, resulting in a number of casualties.

The agency did not specify the origin of the ship or the number of people killed or injured, adding that authorities were investigating the incident amid a recent rise in attacks on vessels near the Strait of Hormuz.

Ships in the Gulf attempting to cross the strait, which is the sole maritime route in or out of the oil-rich region, have faced repeated attacks since the US and Israel began the war in late February.

The Strait of Hormuz remains vital to the global economy, with about a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passing through the passage before the war began.