Iran

Yemen’s more than a decade-long civil war has flared up once again after the Houthi rebel group launched an offensive in several locations against Saudi Arabian-backed government forces. The conflict has already spilled over beyond the country’s borders with the Houthis launching an attack on southern Saudi Arabia, targeting oil facilities and wounding dozens of people this week.

The renewed hostilities are the most serious since a United Nations-brokered truce halted large-scale fighting in 2022, after eight years of a full-blown conflict that killed tens of thousands of people in one of the world’s poorest countries.

So who is involved in this conflict? Here’s a look at the main actors:

The Houthis

The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), are an armed group controlling most parts of Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, and some of the western and northern areas close to Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis emerged in the 1990s but rose to international prominence in 2014, when the group rebelled against Yemen’s government, forcing it to step down and causing a crippling humanitarian crisis.

The group then spent years, with Iran’s backing, fighting a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The two warring sides have also repeatedly tried to hold peace talks.

Seen as part of a regional alliance known as the “axis of resistance” backed by Iran, the Shia Zaidi group nevertheless has its own base, its own interests – and its own ambitions.

The Houthis have demonstrated their missile and drone capabilities during the Yemen war in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, targeting oil installations and vital infrastructure. They have also proven resilient, defying more than 10 years of bombing by the Saudi-led coalition, as well as US and British strikes in recent years.

The group has gained international prominence for its attacks on Israel and shipping in the Red Sea since the start of Israel’s genocide in Gaza in October 2023.

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh entered the Yemen war when it led a military coalition against the Houthis in March 2015, seeking to restore the government of then-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Back then, Saudi Arabia and Iran were at the peak of a regional competition, both deeply distrusting each other. An Iran-supported group expanding control at the kingdom’s southern border was unacceptable, hence the military action.

This was before a China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 marked the beginning of a more practical and less confrontational relationship.

Presidential Leadership Council

The PLC was established in 2022 when the former president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, formally transferred his powers to the new eight-member body.

It represents the internationally recognised government of Yemen, with a mandate to manage the country’s political, security and military affairs, and to steer negotiations towards a permanent ceasefire. It is chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, an adviser to Hadi and former interior minister with the government of the late president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Its membership is drawn from a mix of northern and southern politicians and military-linked leaders in a bid to unite major anti-Houthi forces under one roof.

The PLC is backed by Saudi Arabia and the alliance that Riyadh leads.

Islah party

The Yemeni Congregation for Reform, better known as Islah, is a Sunni Islamist movement with historic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a faction within the recognised PLC-led government but has long had an independent identity. Its major stronghold has long been Marib, the country’s sole gas-producing region with one of its largest oilfields.

National Resistance Forces

The National Resistance Forces is a government-aligned military faction led by Tareq Saleh, nephew of the late former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The force has maintained ties to Saudi Arabia and, like the Islah party, is part of the PLC. It aims for a unified Yemen, positioning itself as a counterweight to both the Houthis and southern secessionists.

The Strait of Hormuz has become the central pressure point in the escalating confrontation between the United States and Iran. Before the conflict, roughly 20 million barrels of oil moved through the narrow waterway each day, equivalent to about one fifth of global oil consumption. For years, traders could therefore rely on relatively consistent estimates of the volumes passing through one of the world’s most important energy corridors.

That certainty has now disappeared.

The use of “dark crossings,” in which tankers switch off their identification and navigation systems, has made vessel movements increasingly difficult to monitor. Satellite imagery, port records, tanker drafts, loading schedules and shipping data are being used to reconstruct movements, but the information remains incomplete. Recent estimates of Hormuz flows have differed dramatically, leaving traders and governments uncertain about the true scale of oil moving through the waterway.

The uncertainty comes as Brent crude has moved above the $100 a barrel threshold for the first time since July, driven by renewed military escalation and concerns over Middle Eastern oil supplies.

The Hormuz Information Gap

The most unusual feature of the current oil crisis is not simply that supplies may have fallen. It is that markets cannot confidently determine how much oil is actually moving.

U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said more than 17 million barrels crossed the strait on August 31 under U.S. Navy supervision. Shipping intelligence firm Kpler, however, estimated that only around 6 million barrels crossed that day. Kpler put average August flows at approximately 4.3 million barrels per day, with flows rising to nearly 5 million barrels per day during the first days of September.

The difference could partly reflect different methodologies, including whether shipments using alternative routes outside Hormuz are included. Tankers that remain invisible to tracking systems for days or even weeks make the picture even harder to reconstruct.

This means that traders are attempting to price global oil supplies without reliable visibility over one of the world’s most important supply arteries.

Why the Strait of Hormuz Matters

Hormuz is strategically important because of the enormous concentration of energy exports that normally pass through it. Any sustained disruption can affect crude supplies, tanker availability, insurance costs and shipping times, eventually feeding into fuel prices and broader inflation.

The current situation is different from a straightforward blockade. The strait has not necessarily become completely impassable. Instead, its reliability has been severely compromised.

That distinction matters because a tanker does not have to be physically prevented from crossing for markets to react. The possibility that vessels may be delayed, attacked or unable to cross safely is enough to increase the cost of transporting oil.

As a result, the market is responding not only to actual supply losses but also to the risk of future disruption.

Iran’s Strategic Leverage

Iran’s ability to disrupt maritime traffic remains an important source of leverage despite indications that its military capabilities around Hormuz have been weakened.

U.S. demining operations and a growing U.S.-protected shipping corridor along Oman’s coast have allowed more vessels to enter and leave the Gulf. At the same time, Iran-linked forces continue to threaten commercial shipping, meaning Tehran retains the ability to create uncertainty even if it cannot completely shut down the waterway.

This gives Iran a form of asymmetric leverage. Tehran does not necessarily need to close Hormuz completely to impose economic costs. Sporadic attacks, warnings or restrictions can increase insurance premiums, delay shipments and encourage traders to price in a greater possibility of supply disruption.

The renewed attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure have added another layer of risk by threatening alternative routes that have become increasingly important as traffic through Hormuz has declined.

Impact on Global Oil Markets

The immediate consequence is a higher geopolitical risk premium on crude.

Oil prices normally respond to measurable fundamentals such as production, consumption, inventories and transportation. But when the market cannot establish how much oil is moving through Hormuz, uncertainty itself becomes part of the fundamental picture.

This can keep prices elevated even if actual physical supply losses are smaller than feared.

Brent has already moved above $100 a barrel, while analysts and major financial institutions have raised their oil price forecasts as concerns about prolonged disruption increase.

For oil-importing countries, sustained high crude prices could translate into higher fuel and transportation costs, increased inflationary pressure and greater economic uncertainty. Airlines, manufacturers and businesses dependent on energy-intensive supply chains would also face higher operating costs.

Economic and Geopolitical Implications

The crisis demonstrates how vulnerable the global energy system remains to a single strategic chokepoint.

For the United States, maintaining freedom of navigation through Hormuz is not simply a military objective. It is also essential to preventing a regional conflict from becoming a wider global energy crisis.

For Gulf producers, the challenge is equally significant. Even countries with substantial production capacity cannot fully compensate for disrupted shipping if export routes remain vulnerable.

For major Asian importers, the risks are particularly serious because much of the energy normally passing through Hormuz is destined for Asian markets. A prolonged disruption could therefore create significant pressure on import bills, currencies and inflation across energy-dependent economies.

The crisis also highlights the limits of alternative routes. Pipelines and routes outside Hormuz can reduce some of the pressure, but they cannot immediately replace the enormous volumes that normally pass through the waterway.

What’s Next?

The key variable is whether the confrontation between Washington and Tehran moves toward negotiations or further escalation.

A diplomatic breakthrough could rapidly reduce the geopolitical risk premium by restoring confidence in shipping and improving visibility over oil flows. A further escalation, however, could produce additional attacks on tankers, restrictions around the Gulf or renewed pressure on alternative shipping routes.

The oil market will therefore be watching tanker movements as closely as military developments.

If shipping activity becomes more visible and flows recover, some of the current premium could disappear. If the information blackout continues, traders may continue pricing the possibility of a much larger supply disruption.

Analysis

The deeper significance of the Hormuz crisis is that information itself has become a strategic commodity.

Modern energy markets have traditionally depended on the ability to monitor ships, cargoes and supply chains with increasing precision. Satellite imagery, tracking systems and port data created an assumption that physical oil flows could be observed and measured with reasonable accuracy.

That assumption is now being challenged.

The result is a market where perception can influence prices almost as powerfully as physical shortages. If traders believe Hormuz is becoming less reliable, they will pay more for crude today even without definitive evidence of a catastrophic supply loss.

This gives Iran an important form of strategic leverage. The threat of disruption can generate economic consequences even when actual disruption remains limited.

At the same time, Washington faces a difficult calculation. Greater military protection may help keep shipping moving, but prolonged confrontation can also increase the geopolitical risk premium that the United States is trying to contain.

The central question, therefore, is no longer simply how much oil is passing through the Strait of Hormuz. It is how long the global market can function without knowing the answer.

If that uncertainty persists, the oil market could continue carrying a substantial security premium even if physical supplies prove higher than current estimates suggest. The longer the uncertainty lasts, the more deeply it can become embedded in prices, inflation expectations and global economic planning.

With information from Reuters.

The U.S. Navy has lost an advanced uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV), and it is now in Iranian hands. Here’s what we know about the Dive-LD drone and its apparent seizure, and its implications.

Authorities in Iran said earlier today that they had retrieved a U.S. Dive-LD uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) largely intact near the Strait of Hormuz. The regime in Tehran subsequently released pictures and video clips of the UUV being lifted out of the water, seen at various points below. This looks to be the first known instance of an operational deployment of the Dive-LD. This is still a relatively new capability for the U.S. Navy that only began entering service a little more than a year and a half ago. American officials have previously confirmed the use of UUVs, in general, to help keep the Strait of Hormuz free of Iranian naval mines, one of many threats that have dramatically slowed maritime traffic through this critical waterway.

İran, ele geçirdiği ABD’ye ait insansız denizaltının görüntülerini yayınladı

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) “captured one of the most modern, unmanned, and smart submarines … at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz in a complex intelligence and operational action at dawn today,” according to a statement shared earlier today via Iranian state media. The exact circumstances surrounding the seizure remain unconfirmed.

“An underwater drone operated by U.S. forces malfunctioned more than a day ago,” a U.S. official said in response to our queries about the Iranian claims. “It was surveying regional waters in support of ongoing operations. The defective drone was an older model that neither collected sensitive data nor carried any classified sonar or radar equipment. U.S. operations in area waters continue.”

The official did not confirm or deny the type of UUV in question, or that Iran had retrieved it. They also did not elaborate on the nature of the malfunction. TWZ also reached out to Anduril, which initially deferred any questions to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). However, they subsequently confirmed the loss of a Dive-LD operating in the region.

“Dive-LD is an attritable autonomous system, meaning it is designed from the outset to operate in dangerous environments where loss of the vehicle is an expected possibility. Its purpose is to keep warfighters out of the most dangerous parts of the undersea mission,” an Anduril spokesperson told us in a statement. “This vehicle had already delivered significant value operating thousands of hours in months-long operations in CENTCOM.”

Categorized as a large UUV, the Dive-LD is 19 feet (approximately 5.8 meters) long, four feet (around 1.2 meters) in diameter, and has a gross weight of close to three tons. The design features a 3D-printed exterior, but is said to be capable of diving down to depths of some 19,685 feet (3.7 miles or 6,000 meters). The UUVs can also remain at sea for around 10 days at a time, depending on their exact configuration, and do so with a high degree of autonomy. Dive-LD was originally developed by U.S.-based Dive Technologies, which was founded in 2018 and then acquired by Anduril in 2022.

Anduril Welcomes Dive Technologies

Anduril announced the delivery of the first Dive-LD to the U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Group One (UUVGRU-1) in April 2025. The Navy had already released a picture of personnel training with one of these UUVs five months earlier. How many Dive-LDs are now in U.S. service is unclear.

The Dive-LD has a highly modular design. Anduril’s website says that the UUV can be configured for various military missions, including so-called intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE); general intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); mine warfare; and precision placement of objects underwater. IPOE refers to the collection of various types of intelligence on a specific area as part of planning for upcoming operations.

As mentioned, U.S. officials have previously stated that UUVs have been supporting mine-clearance operations in and around the Strait of Hormuz. Broadly speaking, uncrewed underwater platforms offer a way to find and record the location of naval mines using sonars, cameras, and other sensors, while helping keep friendly forces further away from potential threats. Afterward, depending on the type of mines that are found, various methods can be employed to neutralize them. Mine sweeping is time-consuming and dangerous, even in permissive environments, let alone when conducted under the threat of enemy attack.

This past weekend, the Financial Times newspaper in the United Kingdom published a story saying U.S. forces have been using UUVs in exactly this way to help clear Iranian mines, citing “people familiar with the operation.”

“Mostly at night, it [the U.S. military] sent Navy Seal [sic SEAL] divers, robot boats and specialised underwater craft into the perilous strait for a four-month mine-clearance mission,” according to FT‘s report. “U.S. Navy divers worked in small teams using inflatable-hulled craft. They located Iranian mines with the help of robot boats and submersibles – such as the U.S. Navy’s Common Uncrewed Surface Vessel – operating towed sonar arrays.”

The Common Uncrewed Surface Vessel (CUSV) is a speedboat-sized drone boat that has been in Navy inventory since the early 2020s, explicitly for counter-mine operations. FT‘s story does not say where any USVs, UUVs, and/or boats full of divers were launched from as part of these operations in and around the Strait of Hormuz, but it posited that the Navy’s Expeditionary Sea Base ship USS Miguel Keith could have been involved.

CUSV®

A trio of Independence class Littoral Combat Ships specifically configured for mine-sweeping duties, including using CUSVs, had been forward deployed in Bahrain before the start of the conflict with Iran in February. At least two of those ships, USS Santa Fe and USS Tulsa, emerged thousands of miles away in Southeast Asia in March, something TWZ was the first to report on. At the time of writing, those ships currently appear to be in Singapore. The exact disposition of the third of these LCSs, the USS Canberra, is unclear, but USNI News reported today that it is sailing in the South China Sea.

The Navy has a host of other warships in the Middle East that could support counter-mine missions. With a 10-day endurance, Dive-LDs, specifically, could potentially have been launched from locations away from the Strait of Hormuz, including friendly ports.

Dive-LDs could also be used for other missions beyond mine clearance in the region. As mentioned, the U.S. official told TWZ the UUV had malfunctioned while “surveying regional waters.” While this would be a relevant task in the context of a larger mine-sweeping operation, underwater surveys would be valuable for other purposes, too. For months now, U.S. forces have been facilitating the movement of ships in and out of the Persian Gulf via a route that hugs the Omani coastline, keeping them as far from Iranian threats as possible. Having up-to-date and highly accurate maps of the seafloor in these areas would be critical to ensuring they are deep enough for large commercial vessels to pass through safely.

IPOE and general ISR support, above and below the waves, would be part of any current or future U.S. activities in the region. This includes a new campaign of strikes targeting Iranian tanker ships that began last month and monitoring general port activity in Iran as part of the ongoing blockade.

Employing Dive-LDs in operations against Iran also provides a valuable real-world opportunity to prove out new UUV capabilities and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures, which could prove critical in a future high-end fight against a peer opponent like China. Dive-LD has been feeding into Anduril’s development of an even more capable large UUV called Ghost Shark, the first customer for which is the Royal Australian Navy. Ghost Shark is a militarized version of a design called the Dive-XL that followed the Dive-LD. In March, Anduril announced it was among those selected for the Combat Autonomous Maritime Platform Project (CAMP), an extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle rapid prototyping effort being run by the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the Navy. Anduril did not say what platform it would be supplying for that project, but used a picture of Ghost Shark to illustrate the announcement.

Introducing: Dive-XL

The U.S. military is already known to have taken advantage of the ongoing conflict with Iran to demonstrate new weapon systems and other capabilities, including uncrewed maritime systems. In June, a Saronic Corsair drone boat conducted a first-of-its-kind at-sea rescue of the crew of a U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter that had gone down in the Gulf of Oman. The following month, U.S. forces launched their first known kamikaze USV attack on Iran’s Bandar Abbas Naval Base using explosive-laden Corsairs.

With all this in mind, it is worth noting that the apparent loss of a Dive-LD intact to Iran is still significant, even if the core design is not brand new and if it does not have any especially sensitive mission systems onboard. It is not necessarily ‘exquisite,’ bleeding-edge technology as it is designed to be optionally attritable, but is still an advanced modern system in operational U.S. service now. Insights into its capabilities and limitations would certainly be of interest to Iran and others. What attempts the U.S. military made to recover the Dive-LD are also unknown. However, the fact that it was not destroyed before or while the Iranians were retrieving it points to American forces having completely lost any sense of its location beforehand.

For its part, Iran has long been a collector of foreign military hardware, primarily U.S. and Israeli, including drones of all types. The capture of a largely intact RQ-170 Sentinel in 2011 is the most famous (or infamous) example. The regime in Tehran also regularly works to reverse engineer what it recovers to varying degrees, and has promised to do the same with the Dive-LD. It could also share its latest prize with its own international partners, including Russia and China, for further analysis and exploitation. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) notably has its own very active UUV programs.

On top of all this, the seizure offers propaganda benefits for the Iranian government, which is already making heavy use of the information space to push back against U.S. military and economic pressure.

Countries seizing foreign USVs and UUVs is certainly not new at this point, even in ostensible peacetime periods. TWZ pointed out that this was only likely to become commonplace, and that steps would need to be taken to address these risks, after a pair of incidents involving Iran in 2022. On August 29 of that year, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attempted to capture a U.S. Navy Saildrone USV in the Persian Gulf. Just days later, the IRGC briefly commandeered a pair of American Saildrones in the Red Sea.

Iran tries to seize U.S. sail drone

The current conflict with Iran has only further underscored the important roles that uncrewed maritime platforms are playing in U.S. operations now, which are only set to keep growing as time goes on. As those same operations expand, so will the risks of capture and other losses.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

US military says it struck the five Iranian tankers after IRGC targeted a US warship twice in two days.

The United States has claimed attacks on five Iranian oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman and near Kharg Island after accusing Iran of launching ballistic missiles at a US warship twice in two days.

Iran responded to the attacks on Tuesday by firing missiles at US forces stationed at the Al Azraq base in Jordan. Amman said its air defences intercepted and destroyed 18 of 20 Iranian missiles, while the rest fell in open areas.

The exchange of fire comes amid escalating tensions in the Gulf, six months into the US and Israel’s war on Iran, with Tehran maintaining the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Washington imposing a naval blockade on Iranian ports.

The hostilities briefly drove oil prices to $99.46 earlier on Tuesday.

In a statement, the US Central Command said Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had targeted a US warship twice over the past two days. The warship “successfully evaded the attempted Iranian attacks” and “no American personnel were harmed”, it said.

The Central Command said it retaliated by destroying the Iranian oil carriers, M/T Kaviz, M/T Charminar, M/T Horizon 1, and M/T Riesco in the Gulf of Oman as well as M/T Derya near Kharg Island.

“American forces directed the crews to abandon ship before the vessels were struck and rendered inoperable,” the Central Command added.

Iran’s IRIB state broadcaster confirmed the attack near Kharg Island in the Gulf, which handled some 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports before the war. It reported that the crew was evacuated and said a second tanker was hit near the southern port of Jask on the Gulf of Oman.

The IRGC also said “several” Iranian commercial ships were hit, and said it retaliated by subjecting Al Azraq base in Jordan to “fierce missile strikes”. It claimed hangars used by US fighter jets were destroyed in the ballistic missile attacks.

It went on to claim ballistic missile attacks on the US Navy DDG-119 and DDG-53 destroyers, saying “significant damage was caused to these vessels”.

The IRGC also threatened to target oil tankers in Kuwaiti and Bahraini ports, warning crews there to evacuate immediately.

“We warn all the crews of oil tankers in the Kuwaiti and Bahraini ports… to immediately abandon their vessels, whether at anchor or at the ports, because they will be targeted,” it said.

Jordan’s Armed Forces, meanwhile, said its air defences engaged 20 ballistic missiles, “successfully intercepting and destroying 18 of them”. Two missiles “fell in unpopulated areas,” it said in a statement.

The attacks did not cause any casualties and specialised teams “have begun securing the locations where debris and shrapnel fell,” it added.

Earlier, the chief of staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, Ali Abdollahi, had warned that Tehran would strike US military installations across the region if Iranian tankers were targeted.

“The US aggressor army has given Iranian oil tankers an evacuation warning to hit them, so I announce that any attack on Iranian oil tankers will result in the targeting of US bases in the region by the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Abdollahi said on state TV.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, however, said Washington would continue to strike Iranian ships.

“Iran continues to try to hit US naval ships, and for every time they do that or try to do that, they’re going to lose tankers,” Rubio told reporters on a visit to Colombia.

AMMAN: Jordan’s army said Wednesday it shot down 18 missiles from Iran targeting the US-allied kingdom.

“Jordan’s air defense systems engaged 20 ballistic missiles launched toward Jordanian territory, successfully intercepting and destroying 18 of them, while two missiles fell in unpopulated areas,” the army said in a statement, adding that they came from Iran.

Tehran has threatened “serious consequences” for South Korea if it interferes in the US-Israel war on Iran.

The warning comes amid reports that Seoul is mulling contributing to the US naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz passage, which has hampered Iran’s oil exports.

In a statement posted on X on Monday, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said Iran and South Korea had more than 64 years of diplomatic relations based on mutual respect and that Tehran values that friendship.

However, if South Korea joins the United States in its military actions against Iran at a time when the country is defending itself from what he called US aggression and “war crimes against women and children”, then there will be consequences, he warned.

Baghaei threatened that Iran would regard any military presence or participation in operations by another country in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz “would inevitably be regarded as direct support for the aggressor and would have serious consequences”.

“No sovereign and responsible country should succumb to US pressure and intimidation and become complicit in acts of aggression and horrific crimes against the great Iranian nation,” he added.

Seoul did not respond directly, but a Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on Monday said it is communicating with the international community over the situation in the passageway.

Here’s what we know about how South Korea is getting roped in:

Why is South Korea involved?

Seoul, a close ally of Washington, has been under pressure from US President Donald Trump.

The issues began in mid-August, when Trump revealed in an interview, and later online, that he had spoken to South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and asked that Seoul give “a little hand” in the war on Iran.

According to media reports, the two leaders had spoken over the phone on May 17.

Seoul said, “No, thanks!”, according to Trump’s message on social media.

However, as South Korea now knows, saying no to Trump has repercussions.

On August 16, Trump announced that the US would significantly scale back joint military drills it holds annually with South Korea – the evening before they were scheduled to begin.

The Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercises are meant to sharpen Seoul’s readiness in case of a North Korean attack. They usually last for more than 11 days but were reduced to five.

In a post on his Truth Social site, Trump claimed the drills were “costly” and that they send a “hostile” signal to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with whom he is trying to build a relationship. South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun said in parliament there was no warning from the US.

Trump also questioned why South Korea would refuse his request when thousands of US soldiers are stationed on the Korean Peninsula.

The US also cancelled another military exercise scheduled for September, although South Korea’s military revealed it received a notification much earlier in June, with Washington citing constraints due to the war on Iran.

How has South Korea responded?

President Lee, a liberal who pushes for a dialled-down defence posture, has opted to negotiate. His office earlier released statements saying it hopes for “meaningful dialogue” with Trump.

South Korea’s Yonhap news agency reported on Monday that Washington has, however, “ratcheted up pressure” on Seoul.

On Friday, a South Korean presidential official told Yonhap that Seoul could consider a military contribution to international measures seeking to free up navigation in the passageway as long as it does not affect the country’s defence readiness.

South Korea is looking at various options, the official said, including possible cooperation with France, the United Kingdom and other allies on sending noncombat and search-and-rescue forces.

The South Korean military has also started reviewing assets and troops that could be deployed, including maritime patrol aircraft, explosive ordnance disposal teams and unmanned mine detection and clearing systems, he added.

Such a move would be unpopular. The opposition has spoken out against a possible deployment, as have some within Lee’s ruling Democratic Party. Many South Koreans have also protested against the US-Israel war on Iran.

What is the history of US-South Korea relations?

South Korea became one of the US’s closest allies after Washington backed Seoul against Pyongyang in the Korean War of 1950.

The US supported Seoul’s economic and military growth in the years after. Under a treaty, some 29,000 US soldiers have been stationed permanently on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the war. Seoul has also relied on US defence might to deter nuclear-armed North Korea.

In return, South Korea supported several US wars, including the Iraq War, and is designated an important non-NATO ally.

In 2025, however, Washington imposed a 25 percent tariff on the country, testing relations. Seoul opted to negotiate rather than retaliate, leading the US to lower tariffs to 15 percent.

Many South Koreans were also alarmed after hundreds of South Koreans were arrested in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids on a Hyundai plant in Georgia in September 2025.

Last October, Trump travelled to Seoul in a historic state visit, and earlier this year, President Lee visited the US. Lee is also trying to resume dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang.

How is South Korea being affected by the US-Israel war on Iran?

South Korea is facing an economic crisis. The country relies on the Gulf supplies via the Strait of Hormuz for 60 to 70 percent of crude imports, meaning supply is being severely hit. The war has led to soaring inflation, causing the Korean won to fall to a 17-year low.

Seoul therefore has an interest in freeing up the strait. However, under Korean law, the government will require parliament’s approval before a military deployment, although some governing party members could oppose it.

New fuel pricing targets consumption above 110 litres monthly, doubling costs to 100,000 riyals per litre.

Iran has raised petrol prices for motorists again as the government struggles to manage declining revenues and sustain a costly subsidy regime.

The price of petrol will remain the same for the first 60 litres (16 gallons), state media reported, but there will be a higher price bracket for the next 50 litres (13 gallons). Prices will double from 50,000 riyals to 100,000 riyals ($0.07) per litre (0.3 gallons) for motorists who consume more than 110 litres (29 gallons) a month.

Iran has some of the lowest petrol prices in the world, but due to ongoing economic difficulties amid the war with the US, including punishing sanctions and a siege on Iranian ports by US forces, Iranian officials have for months considered adjusting fuel subsidies to make up for lost revenues.

“If we consume it properly, we can manage with the amount of gasoline we produce in the country,” Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of the Iranian parliament, said in a TV address earlier this month. “What is clear is that we need to save gasoline in our consumption. Of course, part of the responsibility for this high consumption does not lie with our people; it lies with our industry.”

Iran depends on oil exports for about 90 per cent of its budget, but these have declined from about 4 million barrels per day (bpd) to about 2.2 million bpd in August. The country is also consuming more oil than it produces domestically.

In a sign of the energy crisis, videos circulating on social media reportedly show long queues at petrol stations in Tehran.

It is the second time petrol prices have increased since December, with concerns about further increases prompting unrest.

Huge antigovernment protests in 2019 started after anger over fuel price increases. Iranians are already feeling the impact of a downturn in economic activity, high inflation, and a drop in the value of the rial.

Oil prices are rising to nearly a six-week high amid a wave of strikes between the United States and Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply travels during peacetime.

On Monday, Brent oil futures, the global benchmark, rose to hover around $97 a barrel — up 9 percent over the last five days and 19 percent over the last month. Monday’s market moves are approaching the highest point since July 24th, when prices topped $97.93.

US West Texas Intermediate crude similarly rose to $92.27 a barrel, up 79 cents, also a near six-week high.

In recent days, strikes escalated in the Strait of Hormuz. The US hit three Iranian oil tankers on Saturday, while Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it had struck three tankers and three US-linked vessels in other areas.

“This is a reflection of continued conflict and exchange of fire. The supply deficits globally are persisting, and there is little end to these shortages,” Rachel Ziemba, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), told Al Jazeera.

On Monday, Saudi Aramco’s Jizan facilities were struck for the second time in the last month, according to reporting from the Financial Times that cited two people familiar with the matter.

“The fact that a Saudi refinery in Jizan was hit, possibly delaying its return to production, didn’t help,” Ziemba added.

Amid increased strikes, there’s less traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, with an average of 10 commodity ships crossing the vital chokepoint each day over the last 10 days, according to Kpler, a data analytics platform.

“Crude went back down to what the pre-war level was in early July. Then it increased again, and then it reduced again, and now it’s increasing again on this weekend’s exchange plus the Aramco attack,” Arif Gasilov, a partner at the Gasilov Group, an energy advisory firm, told Al Jazeera.

“I would say that you might eventually see an inflection point, depending on how long this keeps going on, where a ceasefire doesn’t move the market at all, maybe by just a dollar or two.”

US consumers pinched

US consumers are feeling the impact of heightened oil prices at the petrol pump. The average price for a gallon (3.78 litres) of petrol has jumped 7 cents over the course of a week, reaching $4.15 nationally on Monday, up from $4.08 this time a week ago, according to the American Automobile Association (AAA), which tracks daily petrol prices.

That’s up from $4.04 this time a month ago and $2.98 from February 28th, when the US and Israel first struck Iran, marking a 39 percent increase since the war began.

Last week, diesel prices hit all-time highs at $5.85 per gallon.

“US diesel prices have never been this high, and now the countdown starts for the trickle-down to everything consumers buy… record diesel will start funnelling down into the economy,” Patrick De Haan, head of petroleum analysis at GasBuddy, said in a post on the social media platform X.

Prices have continued to climb since, with average prices on Monday topping $5.90 per gallon.

“Markets are pricing in longer disruptions. It continues to be in product markets where the biggest disruptions lie, though, including diesel,” Ziemba added.

Those price gains are weighing on Americans, who have spent an average of $764.59 per household on fuel since the war began. That’s $418.82 more than usual, according to Brown University’s Watson School of International and Public Affairs.

Ahead of the US’s September 5-7 Labor Day weekend, the unofficial end of summer and a popular time for US travel, AAA forecasts showed a 20 percent increase in flight costs compared to the same weekend last year.

Ahead of the midterm elections, the economy is emerging as a key issue for US voters — and a potential warning sign for Republicans. Polls show voters souring on President Donald Trump’s handling of the economy, with his economic approval rating falling to a new low in a recent Financial Times poll. Just 17 percent of Americans approve of his handling of the economy.

An Economist/YouGov poll similarly found that 39 percent of Americans believe Democrats are doing a better job handling the economy, compared with 32 percent who said Republicans are.

China pressures

Southeast and East Asian markets rely more heavily on imports travelling through the Strait of Hormuz directly than the US, but Beijing has moved to insulate itself from the disruption by turning to domestic sources, including its strategic petroleum reserve (SPR).

“China has been managing this situation successfully since the beginning of the war. We know that China has many domestic resources, despite rising oil prices,” John Gong, an economics professor at the University of International Business and Economics, told Al Jazeera.

“China has been conserving its oil and gas consumption for quite some time now. China was prepared for these challenges,” Gong said.

He also stressed that China’s close relations with Russia give Beijing another source of supply, with Moscow able to provide nearly half of China’s daily oil needs.

China has also begun tapping into its SPR while reducing its reliance on imports, as Beijing accelerates a broader shift towards alternative energy sources and vehicles that require little or no oil to operate.

“We have national strategies focused on transitioning to clean energies like solar and green power,” Gong said. “When we look at the vehicles purchased in China, more than 50 percent of cars sold on the Chinese market are electric.”

WASHINGTON — A sporadic global trade war led by President Trump is fueling inflation across the U.S. economy, elevating prices on everyday goods, as the war with Iran sends the price of gas on a roller coaster.

Aggressive tax cuts have pushed the national debt past $40 trillion, driving a growing crisis in the bond market. And an unprecedented immigration crackdown is disrupting the labor supply in agriculture, construction, hospitality and food processing, raising prices even further.

Approaching the halfway point of Trump’s second term, a president who won reelection based on a promise to turn the economy around now faces a reckoning in the midterm elections centered largely on his economic record.

Trump’s economic agenda has emerged as an increasingly awkward liability for Republicans heading into the November elections, leaving lawmakers to defend policies that have delivered political pain at home, even as the White House argues they will pay off in the long run.

Polling on Trump’s handling of the economy has remained in precariously low territory throughout the summer, entering Labor Day weekend with less than a third of Americans supporting his job performance on their most pressing concerns. One recent poll, from the University of Massachusetts Amherst, found that only 22% perceive the economy in a good or fair state.

Shoppers at Lincoln Heights Certified Farmers Market in Los Angeles on Wednesday.

(Jason Armond / Los Angeles Times)

And Americans’ confidence in the economy is unlikely to improve much ahead of election day, Nov. 3, in part because bad economic news has shown to sink confidence fast. Good news takes much longer to win people back, experts said.

“Voters’ opinion of the economy has mostly hardened,” said Aaron Klein, chair of economic studies at the Brookings Institution. “People vote the economy of the spring and summer, not November.”

Good news has been harder to come by.

Heading into the holiday weekend, Trump dismissed communities opposed to data-center construction as “backwards and poor.” A rapidly escalating trade dispute with Canada threatens Republican gains in battlegrounds along the northern border that could determine control of the Senate.

Sean Zabriskie, center, helps his son Connor, 7, try on hockey pants at The Ice Box Hockey shop in Harbor City. The trade war between the U.S. and Canada is affecting products like hockey gear, most of which is made in Canada and imported to the U.S.

(Genaro Molina / Los Angeles Times)

And fresh polling found that more than 90% of Americans believe corruption is rampant in Trump’s government, even as the president spends hundreds of millions of dollars on vanity projects across the capital.

Susan Collins, the incumbent Republican senator from Maine seeking another term in a strategically critical race, chastised the Trump administration for its latest trade spat with Ottawa as “making the job harder” of securing reelection.

“There’s just nothing good you can say about them,” Collins said of the tariffs.

Trump has pushed back on criticisms of his record, declaring the country has “the greatest economy we’ve ever had” and touting what he calls a manufacturing boom, all while distancing himself from potential midterm losses.

“I’m not affected by the election,” Trump told reporters last week. “I’m not running. But my party’s running, and I’m going to help my party.”

But Rep. Mike Johnson, a Louisiana Republican and speaker of the House, said last week that the midterms would serve as a referendum on Trump’s presidency.

Rep. Aisha Wahab (D-Hayward) and Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-La. ) arrive for a ceremonial swearing-in at the Capitol in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 2.

(Andrew Harnik / Getty Images)

“Even though his name isn’t in the midterm, his legacy is,” Johnson said. “The America First priorities and principles are. His administration is.”

Several embattled incumbents fear that’s the case and are distancing themselves from the president. Several Republican lawmakers — including Reps. Tom Barrett of Michigan and Zach Nunn of Iowa — plan on skipping a midterm GOP convention called by Trump for this week in Texas.

Joanne Hsu, director of the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers, said that gas prices were a chief frustration among Americans, and found that consumer sentiment soured rapidly once it became clear the conflict in Iran would not be short-lived.

“Consumers are absolutely not feeling great about the economy right now, and the factors that are underpinning their frustrations with the economy at this time are factors that are pretty tough to turn around on short notice,” Hsu said.

Even if the Iran conflict reached a resolution, confidence in the economy is likely to change only when the prices are reflected at the gas station, she said.

“When it comes to the views of the economy, it’s really about what’s happening to my wallet,” Hsu said.

During a White House press media briefing on Thursday,Vice President JD Vance acknowledged the Iran war has led gas prices to rise and that he does not know when Americans can expect those prices to go down.

Vice President JD Vance talks to reporters during a news briefing at the White House on Sept. 3.

(Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images)

“The reason gas prices are so high now is because the Iranians are shooting at commercial shipping,” Vance said. “Gas, frankly, could have been much, much higher were it not for our efforts. But I am not going to make a promise about when it is going to return to $3.”

The day after Vance spoke, diesel hit a record all-time high of $5.85 a gallon. In California, it sold for as much as $7.71.

Yet Trump has tried to downplay the economic pressure the war in Iran is placing on Americans, in particular as the Strait of Hormuz — a vital shipping corridor for oil and gas — remains under threat by Iranian troops.

Diesel prices over $7 a gallon are displayed at a gas station in Los Angeles on Aug. 21.

(Justin Sullivan / Getty Images)

“We have the Strait of Hormuz in extremely good shape,” Trump said, adding that the U.S. Navy has escorted ships through the channel. “A lot of oil is coming out. That’s why you haven’t seen the price of oil going the way they thought it might have to go.”

Trump on Monday also touted an agreement with the Venezuelan government to develop a vast amount of the South American country’s oil reserves. Asked how he sees the deal affecting American consumers, Trump said: “Ultimately prices are going to come down.”

One of the Arts of War statues, newly covered in gold leaf, is visible at Arlington Memorial Bridge near the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.

(Andrew Harnik / Getty Images)

“Now, will it happen before the election? I can’t tell you that. But I think people are very smart,” he said.

For some Americans, the economic pressures are a key driver ahead of the midterm elections.

Monica Escalante, a home care provider who is a member of the United Domestic Workers union, said she started feeling the pinch on her wallet after Trump imposed sweeping tariffs on a number of products she buys at the grocery store. Gas, she noticed, became harder to cover after the Iran war started.

Escalante, who lives in Bakersfield, said she also has to drive her client to the grocery store, and that mileage reimbursements are not enough to cover her costs.

“It’s really hard when I don’t have the money for gas, and she doesn’t have the money for gas. Then it is like: What do we do?” she said. “It is either she’s borrowing or I’m trying to figure out how I can get gas in my tank.”

TEHRAN: Iran said Sunday that its forces attacked a US naval drone trying to enter the Strait of Hormuz, hours after targeting ships in retaliation for American strikes on three oil tankers.

The latest round of clashes, which began with US raids last week, comes amid a deadlock in their six-month war.

Iran has maintained its stranglehold on the strategic Strait of Hormuz while Washington continues a counter-blockade of Iranian ports.

Washington is also seeking to choke Iran’s economy, rolling out sanctions on entities with financial links to the Islamic republic in a bid to force it into submission.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the ideological arm of Iran’s military, said Sunday it “attacked an American military unmanned surface vessel” attempting to enter the strait, according to a statement carried by state television.

Hours earlier, the IRGC said its naval forces “targeted three oil tankers on the unauthorised route of the Strait of Hormuz and three vessels affiliated with the child-killing America in other areas”.

Iran’s top negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf threatened on Sunday to launch swifter and more forceful responses to US attacks.

“The Americans must have understood that the era of proportionate responses has come to an end,” said Ghalibaf in a speech carried by state media, adding that “any aggression against Iran’s interests and security will receive a faster, more intense and more painful response”.

It warned ships not to attempt to transit by unapproved routes.

On Saturday, US Central Command (CENTCOM), which oversees American military operations in the region, said it struck tankers linked to the Iranian Guards, accusing the most powerful arm of the Iranian military of unsuccessfully firing at American warships.

“Following Iran’s failed attacks, CENTCOM permanently disabled the IRGC crude oil carriers M/T Downy off the coast of Kharg Island and M/T Stark 1 near Jask,” it said.

“American forces also completely destroyed the unladen crude oil carrier M/T Kylo… in the Gulf of Oman, striking the vessel in multiple critical locations to render it inoperable after the crew was directed to abandon ship.”

Video posted by CENTCOM showed large fireballs and billowing flames after projectiles slammed into the ships.

The three vessels were “part of a multibillion-dollar shadow network that funds the IRGC and its regional proxies”, it said.

‘Higher economic cost’

The Guards meanwhile claimed the two American warships they targeted had been “forced to retreat” after “suffering damage”, but CENTCOM said those ships successfully evaded Iranian attacks.

CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper said after the operation: “If you shoot at two of our ships, we will impose an even higher economic cost — taking out three of yours.”

The Iranian foreign ministry hit out at Washington over the strikes on oil tankers, calling them “illegal and aggressive actions”.

A correspondent for Iranian state TV in Jask in the southern province of Hormozgan said one of the tankers was empty and the second was carrying oil. The crews were transported to shore on lifeboats, they said.

Another state TV correspondent on Kharg Island said the attack there caused no casualties.

Iran’s Khatam-al Anbiya central military command warned that if the US continued its attacks, then Tehran’s retaliation against US warships would be “more severe than before, and there is a possibility of their expansion”.

The administration of US President Donald Trump has tried to downplay the significance of the six-month conflict, which has proven increasingly unpopular at home as midterm elections near.

US Vice President JD Vance went so far as to say that he “wouldn’t call it a war”.

Trump reiterated that view on Friday, calling the war “small potatoes” for Washington.

Iran’s Security Chief Mohsen Rezaei warned this week that the Islamic republic had adopted a “new strategy” against Washington that “will shatter your foundations”.

The US has been trying to step up pressure on Tehran in a bid to wrestle control of the Hormuz strait, through which one-fifth of world oil supplies previously flowed.

A fragile ceasefire between the two sides collapsed in July after attacks on commercial ships in the strategic waterway.

Trump has in recent weeks repeatedly threatened to claim sovereignty over the strait, even posting a map showing it as “new US territory”.

Vance has insisted the US will not reopen talks with Iran until it ends attacks on commercial shipping in Hormuz.

Manila defence chief says Washington gave ‘definite assurances’ that its commitments to the Philippines remain.

Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro has warned that Beijing could view recent cuts to the joint US-South Korea military drills as an opportunity to reassert itself in the Asia Pacific.

Speaking on the sidelines of the Seoul Defense Dialogue, an annual multilateral security forum, Teodoro said that “China is very quick to exploit gaps”, when asked on Monday whether Beijing could seize on the move.

He added that Washington had given Manila “definite assurances” that the US commitments to the Philippines remained unchanged.

He also accused China of exploiting democratic systems to spread “distortive narratives”.

South Korea and the US shortened the duration of their annual joint military drills and scaled back field training exercises last month after US President Donald Trump ordered a “substantial reduction” in the annual war games.

The US-led Ulchi Freedom Shield war games ended six days earlier than originally planned.

Trump cited his “very good relationship” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and linked the decision to Seoul’s refusal to join the US and Israel’s war on Iran at the time.

Last week, South Korea’s presidential office said it was mulling “contributions” to the US’s freedom of navigation ⁠in the Strait of Hormuz. The presidential office later clarified that nothing has been decided, as any military deployment by South Korea requires a decision by the country’s National Security Council, a resolution at a cabinet meeting, and consent from the National Assembly.

Trump said he planned to meet with Kim later this year. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, later released a statement denying any ongoing communication between the US president and her brother and maintained that Washington continues to engage in a “hostile” policy towards her country, despite the warm relationship between the two leaders.

US, South Korea and Japan hold trilateral military drills

The US, South Korea and Japan are due to hold five days of military drills in waters east and south of South Korea’s Jeju Island starting on Monday.

South Korea’s military said in a statement that the Freedom Edge exercise is defensive in nature and meant to respond to North Korean nuclear and missile threats as well as promote regional peace and stability.

North Korea has previously slammed the trilateral drill as a “reckless show of strength” that proved its adversaries’ confrontational stance. Pyongyang has also said the drill contained a US intention to lay siege to China and exert pressure on Russia.

TEHRAN: A fuel tanker exploded in western Iran, killing 11 people and injuring seven others, state media said.

IRNA reported late Saturday that the tanker hit other cars before bursting into flames near a traffic police station close to the Kurdish city of Sanandaj, some 400 kilometers (248 miles) west of the capital, Tehran. The report cited a faulty brake system.

The injured were transferred to hospitals.

In 2018, a similar road accident between a fuel tanker and an intercity passenger bus near Sanandaj killed 15 people and injured four.

Road and traffic accidents annually leave more than 17,000 dead in Iran. Experts blame the high fatality rate on unsafe vehicles, disregard for traffic rules, and inadequate emergency services.

Tehran: Iranian authorities have arrested a number of people accused of appearing in a rare video waving the flag of an outlawed opposition group, state television said Sunday.

Videos circulating online in recent days showed individuals riding motorbikes on empty streets in Iran while waving the white-and-red banner of the banned People’s Mujahedin Organisation of Iran (MEK).

On Sunday, state television said authorities had identified and arrested “all the individuals who appeared in this clip” and that they were “associated” with MEK, without specifying how many.

It said the motorcade had been travelling near the city of Karaj, west of Tehran, but it was not clear when the footage was recorded.

Founded in the 1960s in opposition to Iran’s then Western-backed shah, the MEK was outlawed after the 1979 Islamic revolution and later fought alongside Saddam Hussein’s forces during the Iran-Iraq war.

The group has for decades advocated regime change in Iran from abroad, while Tehran has accused its members of cooperating with its arch-enemy, Israel.

Iran has been at war with the United States since February 28, when US-Israeli strikes killed the Islamic republic’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei along with senior military officials.

Iran retaliated with attacks across the region as the conflict spread.

The statistics are sobering — so sobering that Defense Department officials refuse to confirm, deny or discuss them.

From Feb. 28 through July, the first five months of the war with Iraq, U.S. forces burned through almost 60% of the nation’s advanced defensive missiles — the Patriot and THAAD interceptors that protect American troops.

When the war began, the Pentagon had almost 2,800 Patriot and THAAD missiles in its worldwide inventory, according to a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, an independent think tank. By the end of July, that number had dropped to about 1,100, CSIS reported. Almost two-thirds of the Patriots and almost 40% of the longer-range THAAD were gone.

“This is a generational annihilation of our theater missile defense capability,” said Tom Karako, director of CSIS’s Missile Defense Project. “There’s no way you can look at this and not see it’s a setback.”

The White House and the Pentagon have not challenged the CSIS figures, although they have issued sweeping denials that any shortage exists.

“We have far more munitions than anyone in the world, and far more than we need,” President Trump said in July.

That’s true, but misleading. The U.S. military still holds vast inventories of short-range offensive missiles. But the sophisticated defensive missiles that protect U.S. troops no longer are abundant — as even Trump has acknowledged.

“We have certain types of munitions [of which] we have unlimited, virtual unlimited supply,” he said last month. “We have others where it’s a little bit tighter.”

The result is a squeeze that has prompted U.S. commanders to husband Patriot and THAAD interceptors as scarce assets.

For much of August, when a frayed de facto ceasefire was in effect, U.S. forces did not respond with high-end missiles when Iran attacked oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz.

But when Iran launched rockets against U.S. bases in Jordan last week, Patriots reportedly were used to knock the incoming missiles down. (The Pentagon has declined to confirm or deny those reports.)

The U.S. weapons arsenal “no longer has the capacity to deter a Chinese attack against Taiwan,” the Council on Foreign Relations warned in a report last month. Defense planners share the same concern over a potential Russian assault on the Baltic states.

The conservative Heritage Foundation has forecast that the Pentagon’s inventory of missiles would run out “within the first week of a Taiwan conflict.”

In Europe, a U.S. defense official told the Associated Press last month that the shortfall was “beyond critical.” If Russia attacked a NATO country, the official said, U.S. forces in the area would “take punch after punch in the mouth.”

The core question is whether the United States has so few missiles that it cannot credibly deter China or Russia from attacking their neighbors.

“You’ve got to be strong enough to send a clear message that our enemies should not try anything because we’re a credible force,” said Leon Panetta, President Obama’s former defense secretary. “Now we’re losing a lot of that credibility — and that’s dangerous.”

Knowing that U.S. forces have been left without thousands of weapons needed to deter conflict, Karako said, could in itself be provocative. “It could tempt an aggressor to do something, knowing that we have fewer [missiles] to thwart them.”

The obvious remedy is to build more interceptors — a process Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered even before the war began. But ramping up missile production won’t immediately replenish the stockpile.

Before the Iran war, defense contractors were producing only about 620 Patriots and 96 THAAD each year — fewer than half the number expended during a few weeks this spring.

At current production rates, it will take at least three years to return the Patriot inventory to its prewar level, and at least four years for THAAD, CSIS reported.

Defense experts warn that the stocks need to be even larger than they were before the war to credibly deter China or Russia.

Mark Cancian, a retired Marine colonel and principal author of the CSIS estimates, says most analysts believe it will take years after replenishing the stocks expended in the Persian Gulf to build a credible deterrent against China.

The Pentagon has enough munitions, both offensive and defensive, to continue fighting the campaign against Iran, he added — but some of those less-sophisticated weapons can be used only at shorter ranges, which means placing more troops in harm’s way.

Cancian said the CSIS figures were based on publicly available Pentagon budget and acquisition documents, updated in some cases from recent press reports — but not from leaks of classified information.

The roots of the missile shortage began long before the war with Iran. Trump and Hegseth are not the only ones to blame, although their belief that Iran would quickly capitulate appears to have been a major factor.

Nor did former President Biden cause the shortage, as Trump has claimed Biden gave several hundred Patriots to Ukraine, but the shortfall is far larger than that.

The underlying problem, defense experts say, is that the United States designed its missile defense programs for a world in which only a few major powers like China and Russia posed serious threats.

But the landscape of military technology has changed. Missiles and drones have become cheaper and easier to acquire, and countries like Iran can strike targets at great distances without making a huge investment in weaponry.

That’s a transformational change — and the Pentagon has been behind the curve, argues Michael C. Horowitz, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “This is the kind of situation in which great-power militaries like the United States struggle,” he said.

So the Trump administration faces several challenges. It needs to replenish its depleted stores of advanced defensive missiles — a process that has only just begun, and which Congress has not yet funded. Meanwhile, Horowitz and others argue, it also needs to build less expensive missile and drone systems to fill the multiyear gap before Patriot and THAAD inventories can be restored.

The Pentagon has begun that process, deploying several relatively inexpensive anti-drone missile systems.

Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act last year included $7.7 billion for low-cost missile and drone programs, but 13 months later, more than 90% of the money remains unspent, Horowitz said.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek this week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian received precisely the kind of political support he had hoped for. The SCO condemned the military attacks against Iran, described them as violations of international law and the UN Charter, reaffirmed Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

But the organisation did not offer to defend Iran. That distinction between political solidarity and collective defence is important. It tells us something not only about the Iranian experience with the SCO, but about the international order that is emerging around it.

For years, discussions about multipolarity have often suggested that the US-led international system would gradually be challenged by an alternative bloc centred around China, Russia and organisations such as BRICS and the SCO. From the perspective of middle powers, joining both institutions seemed to fit neatly into this transformation. Integration into non-Western organisations was supposed to make them less vulnerable to Western isolation and pressure.

The US-Israeli war on Iran has made clear that none of these alternative relationships can produce a security guarantee comparable to those provided by formal military alliances. The lesson is not that multipolarity has failed middle powers. It is that the emerging multipolar order may work differently from what many expected.

Rather than replacing one alliance system with another, it is producing an increasingly dense network of overlapping partnerships in which states gain diplomatic and economic options without necessarily acquiring new security guarantees.

For middle powers, this may be one of the defining characteristics of the emerging order: more room for manoeuvre, but less certainty about who will stand beside them when their security is threatened.

Turkiye provides a particularly revealing example. It has been a member of NATO for more than seven decades and remains embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet Ankara has increasingly demonstrated that alliance membership does not require automatic political alignment with Washington. Turkiye has maintained relations with Russia despite the war in Ukraine, expanded its engagement with China and participated in the SCO as a dialogue partner. At the same time, its differences with the US and Israel over the future regional order in the Middle East have become increasingly visible.

This does not mean Turkiye is abandoning NATO or moving into a Chinese- or Russian-led bloc. Quite the opposite. Ankara’s strategy depends precisely on avoiding such a binary choice. Its NATO membership provides security benefits that the SCO could not replicate. Its relationships with Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf states and other regional actors, meanwhile, expand its diplomatic and economic options.

Brazil represents another good example. Unlike Turkiye, Brazil is not bound to the US through a formal military alliance. But it has traditionally operated within a US-dominated hemisphere where Washington has expected considerable political alignment from regional governments.

Brazil’s refusal to join the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), together with its positions on the Iran war and other recent international crises, reflects its reluctance to accept that regional proximity should translate into automatic strategic alignment.

Yet Brazil is not simply switching sides. Its participation in BRICS, its extensive economic relationship with China and its calls for reform of the international system coexist with important political and economic relations with the US and Europe. Brasília’s objective is not to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing, but to preserve the ability to cooperate with both, and disagree with either.

This may be one of the most consequential opportunities that multipolarity offers middle powers. The rise of alternative centres of economic and political influence reduces the cost of saying no. For decades, weaker states often confronted a difficult choice when facing pressure from a dominant power: comply, resist and risk isolation, or seek protection from a rival bloc.

The proliferation of partners and institutions complicates that calculation. A government that disagrees with Washington may deepen relations with Beijing without becoming a Chinese ally. A state dependent on China economically may strengthen security ties with the US without fully aligning with Washington. Membership in BRICS does not prevent cooperation with Western institutions, just as membership in a US-led security framework does not necessarily preclude engagement with China or Russia.

India has made this logic almost an organising principle of its foreign policy. New Delhi participates in the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia while simultaneously belonging to both BRICS and the SCO. At Bishkek, India supported the SCO declaration defending Iranian sovereignty while Prime Minister Narendra Modi also stressed to Pezeshkian the importance of preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Gulf Cooperation Council member states are pursuing their own version of this diversification. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, for example, continue to depend heavily on their relationships with the US for security, while simultaneously expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, India and other Asian powers and participating in new regional and international arrangements.

None appears eager to replace Washington with Beijing. They want relationships with both. This suggests that the most significant consequence of multipolarity for middle and smaller powers may not be the emergence of a new bloc to which they can attach themselves. It may be the declining necessity of attaching themselves exclusively to any bloc at all.

But greater autonomy comes with a cost. The same flexible arrangements that allow states to avoid choosing sides also provide fewer guarantees when crises become existential. BRICS does not have an Article 5. Neither does the SCO, which explicitly defines itself as a non-military organisation.

Strategic partnerships can provide weapons, investment, diplomatic backing and political support without obligating partners to go to war for one another.

The emerging international system is therefore unlikely to resemble a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, or even a confrontation between two clearly defined blocs. The older alliance system is not disappearing.

NATO remains central to European and Turkish security, while US security relationships remain indispensable across much of Asia and the Gulf. What is emerging alongside it is another layer, a more fluid landscape of overlapping institutions, selective partnerships and transactional relationships.

Multipolarity, in other words, may not require states to choose a new camp. That gives middle and smaller powers greater agency. But it also places greater responsibility for their own security upon them. The world they are entering may offer more partners, more bargaining power and more freedom to say no. What it may offer less frequently is certainty about who will say yes when they ask for protection.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Yemen’s internationally recognised government has launched a series of air attacks against Houthi positions in the country, marking a significant escalation in the conflict, with some of the country’s heaviest fighting since a fragile truce in 2022.

Government warplanes carried out at least 15 strikes on Friday against Houthi positions, gatherings and vehicles in the western provinces of Taiz and Hodeidah, according to the Yemeni military.

The air assault against Houthi positions provided support to government forces fighting a major Houthi offensive towards the Red Sea coast and the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

These are not the first air attacks by government aircraft since Yemen’s fragile truce began to unravel in July. On July 25, government aircraft struck Houthi missile and drone launch sites and weapons depots in Marib and al-Jawf, according to Yemeni military officials cited by the Reuters news agency.

And less than two weeks earlier, on July 13, Yemen’s internationally recognised government said its forces had struck the runway at the Houthi-held Sanaa International Airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft from landing.

However, the latest attacks mark a significant step up in the government’s use of its own air power against the Houthis, after Saudi-led coalition aircraft provided much of the aerial firepower supporting anti-Houthi forces during the most intense years of Yemen’s war.

Friday’s air campaign comes as the Iran-backed Houthis, who have been vying for control of Yemen for years, attempt to advance through western Taiz and southern Hodeidah towards al-Makha (Mocha), and territory overlooking the critical Bab al-Mandeb Strait at the opening to the Red Sea.

Control of the area could strengthen the Houthis’ position along the Red Sea, where the group has previously attacked commercial and military vessels, while threatening a key government supply route.

The fighting unfolds against a backdrop of the wider regional conflict, with the Houthis recently declaring a Red Sea maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia, while disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz during the US-Israel war with Iran has raised the strategic importance of alternative routes through the Red Sea. This means any expansion of Houthi influence around Bab al-Mandeb could have consequences for shipping far beyond Yemen.

Here’s what we know.

What has happened?

Fighting erupted on Thursday as Houthi forces launched a major offensive along front lines in western Taiz and southern Hodeidah, using ballistic missiles, drones and artillery as ground forces attempted to advance towards government-held territory along the Red Sea coast.

The fighting has centred on areas west of Taiz and around al-Makha, a government-held port near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

A Yemeni official in Aden told the AFP news agency that the Houthis were seeking to capture hills overlooking Bab al-Mandeb and al-Makha before pushing towards the coast.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry, reporting from Sanaa, said Houthi forces had made gains in western Taiz.

“According to military officials from the internationally recognised government, the Houthis have been able to take some of those territories,” Mawry said. “In western Taiz, they’ve managed to take over a strategic military base, which is settled on top of a strategic mountain and gives the Houthis an overview of the entire area.”

Mawry said there had been particularly heavy fighting around al-Barah and Maqbanah, where a main road is used to resupply government forces stationed in Taiz and al-Makha.

More than 120 fighters have been killed since the Houthi offensive began, according to an AFP tally, making the clashes among Yemen’s deadliest in years.

Several civilians were also reported killed and others injured after a ballistic missile hit a restaurant in the al-Makha area, according to government-run Saba TV.

On Saturday, at least four civilians were killed and nine others injured in a Houthi missile strike on a crowded road in southwestern Yemen, according to Saba news agency.

The attack by the Iran-backed group on Saturday targeted a gathering of civilians along the strategic Heijah al-Abd Road, south of Taiz city, Saba said, citing local and medical sources.

What is behind the latest tensions?

The Houthis seized Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in September 2014 and subsequently took control of much of northern and western Yemen, prompting a Saudi-led coalition of Arab countries to intervene in support of the internationally recognised government in March 2015.

A United Nations-brokered truce in April 2022 sharply reduced fighting. Although the agreement formally expired six months later, large-scale hostilities between the Houthis and Saudi-backed government forces remained relatively limited and Saudi Arabia pursued negotiations with the group.

No comprehensive peace agreement followed, however, leaving front lines largely frozen rather than ending the conflict.

That fragile status quo came under increasing pressure after the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on February 28, but tensions escalated further in July with the government air force strike on the Houthi-held Sanaa International Airport, preventing an Iranian aircraft from landing.

What do we know about Yemen’s air force?

The modern Yemeni Air Force was created after North and South Yemen unified in 1990, bringing together two militaries equipped with both Soviet and Western aircraft.

Its fleet subsequently included MiG-21 and MiG-29 fighters, Su-22 fighter-bombers, US-made F-5 fighters and a range of helicopters and transport aircraft.

But Yemen’s armed forces fractured when the Houthis seized Sanaa and the political crisis descended into war in 2014 and 2015.

When Saudi Arabia intervened soon after, its coalition targeted airbases, air-defence systems and combat aircraft in a bid to prevent the Houthis from making use of Yemen’s air force.

That left the Saudi-led coalition – rather than the Yemeni government’s own depleted air force – providing much of the air power supporting government forces during the subsequent war.

Saudi-led coalition aircraft conducted tens of thousands of air raids between March 2015 and the 2022 truce, striking Houthi military positions and providing air support during major government ground offensives. The campaign also caused extensive civilian casualties and became one of the most controversial aspects of the war.

Between 2014 and 2022, Human Rights Watch documented dozens of apparently unlawful coalition air attacks on homes, markets, hospitals, schools, detention centres and other civilian sites.

In 2024, the US and the United Kingdom launched a new round of air attacks against Houthi positions in Yemen following strikes on Israel-linked shipping in the Red Sea. Earlier this year, the US Pentagon disclosed that US military attacks against Yemen’s Houthis killed 153 civilians in 2025 and wounded another 243. The US had previously denied its attacks had caused civilian deaths.

The conflict in Yemen has caused a huge humanitarian crisis. In 2021, the UN estimated that 377,000 people had died in Yemen since 2014, with 60 percent the result of food shortages and lack of accessible health services.

Why is the Yemeni government using its own air power now?

Previously relying on Saudi-led coalition air force power, the government’s decision to deploy its own warplanes now comes as it tries to blunt a Houthi offensive that initially made gains across several fronts in western Taiz and threatened the main road linking Taiz with the Red Sea port of al-Makha.

Mohammed al-Basha, a Yemeni American analyst and former spokesperson for Yemen’s embassy in Washington, told Al Jazeera that the Houthis had achieved “some initial gains during a surprise, multi-axis offensive across western Taiz” this week, temporarily capturing positions and threatening areas overlooking the Taiz-al-Makha corridor.

But those advances did not produce the wider breakthrough the group appears to have sought, he said.

“The front did not collapse, the Taiz-al-Makha corridor was not severed, and attempts to expand the offensive towards other strategically important positions were stopped,” al-Basha added.

Government and allied forces recovered much of the territory lost during the first day of fighting, according to al-Basha, while Houthi advances on several other axes were contained or repelled.

The government has since sent reinforcements, and the use of aircraft gives those forces another means of attacking Houthi positions and concentrations as they try to retake high ground and prevent the group from cutting the Taiz-al-Makha road.

Why have the Houthis launched this offensive now – and what happens next?

Al-Basha said Jabal Numan, overlooking the Taiz-al-Makha road, is one of the most important remaining contested areas, while a Houthi attempt to capture Jabal Dhu Ba’s, north of Hays, was repelled by National Resistance forces.

Taking such high ground could allow the Houthis to observe and threaten government supply routes, while losing it could make further advances towards al-Makha substantially more difficult.

“The first day therefore ended with a mixed battlefield picture,” he said. “The Houthis gained ground through the initial surprise and speed of their multi-axis assault, but much of that ground was subsequently recovered.”

The arrival of new government-aligned forces, coupled with air support, could make it harder for the Houthis to repeat their initial breakthrough.

“The next phase is likely to be more difficult,” al-Basha said. “Both sides are reinforcing, several positions remain contested, and control of Jabal Numan remains a key immediate objective.

“The coming hours will likely centre on attempts by anti-Houthi forces to recover the mountain, consolidate their lines and prevent another Houthi push towards the Taiz-al-Macha corridor.”

US sanctions Turkish bank over alleged IRGC ties, accusing it of facilitating millions in transactions for Iran.

The United States Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on a Turkish bank and its subsidiaries over alleged ties to Iran, as Washington seeks to economically isolate Tehran.

The Treasury Department accused Golden Global Yatirim Bankasi Anonim Sirketi (Golden Global Bank) on Friday of facilitating “tens of millions of dollars’ worth of transactions for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force” and providing the Iranian government with banking access to move its funds internationally.

Washington alleged the bank “was established for the purpose of enabling Iran’s rahbar network [shadow banking system] to transfer oil revenues from China to Turkey” using gold and cash.

Golden Global Bank responded on Friday, saying it fulfilled all local and international banking compliance rules and would take legal action against the US-imposed sanctions.

There are no transactions conducted by Golden Global Bank that could substantiate the claims made by the US, the bank said in a news release.

“We will exercise all our rights of objection and legal recourse in the most effective manner and will take the necessary actions at the earliest against these allegations and the decision,” the Turkish bank added.

“Financial institutions continue to find out the hard way that we are serious about Operation Economic Outcast,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in a statement published by the department on Friday.

The sanctions place the bank and its two subsidiaries on the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)’s Specially Designated Nationals list, cutting off access to the US financial system.

The bank said individuals and entities named in the OFAC decision “have never been and are not currently customers” of Golden Global.

US Ambassador to Turkiye Tom Barrack said on Saturday that it would be a mistake for Turkish officials “to read [the US’s] narrow measure as a judgement upon Turkiye”.

“The health of the Turkish financial system is not in question; the conduct of one institution was,” Barrack said on X.

Last week, the US took steps towards severing the UAE operations of Egypt’s second-largest bank from financial access after accusing it of processing transactions for companies linked to Iran’s shadow-banking system.

Bessent said on Tuesday on the sidelines of a G20 summit that Washington would likely announce a bank sanction this week and another next week, as it ramps up its economic campaign against Tehran.

WASHINGTON — The widow of an airman killed on a combat mission in the Middle East said it took a viral social media post to get resolution from the Pentagon on issues related to her husband’s benefits and basic pay months after his death.

Maj. Alex Klinner, 33, was one of six crew members of a KC-135 refueling aircraft that crashed in western Iraq in March while supporting operations against Iran. He’s one of 18 U.S. service members killed, along with 790 wounded, since the war began more than six months ago.

The Air Force reached out to his widow, Libby Klinner, this week to clarify that his final paycheck would include hazard pay and combat-related tax breaks. This occurred after she voiced frustration on social media at being told by a military officer assigned to support her after her husband’s death that he was ineligible for those benefits because “we were not at war.”

“My husband lost his life because we’re in a war, and then I was told that because it’s not technically a war, we lose out on something,” Klinner told the Associated Press. “It all comes down to principle.”

Trump administration is rejecting the ‘war’ label for current Iran operations

Her post, made over the weekend, gained national attention. Vice President JD Vance promised to look into her case after being asked about it during a White House briefing on Thursday.

“We want to be as helpful as we can and ensure she gets everything that she is entitled to,” Vance said. “My message to her would be, ‘We love ya, we’re grateful for the sacrifice and we very much take very seriously our commitment to get you what you need to get.’”

In response to a separate question, Vance rejected the use of the word “war” to characterize U.S. fighting in Iran, saying that “there is no active shooting.” The military has launched strikes against targets in Iran twice this week, and Iran has retaliated by firing on U.S. allies in the Gulf.

On Friday, President Trump called U.S. strikes “intermittent” and defended Vance’s comments.

“I call it a military conflict because it’s small potatoes for us,” Trump told reporters in the Oval Office.

In late July, the Trump administration created a new, separate category in the Pentagon’s casualty count system for those killed and wounded in renewed U.S.-Iran fighting. Pentagon officials said the change was necessary because “Operation Epic Fury,” the original name for combat operations against Tehran, had ended. Since July 7, all U.S. casualties in the Middle East have been tallied under “Overseas Operations.”

Widow says the Air Force has clarified the issues about her husband’s pay

Libby Klinner said Air Force officials contacted her this week to say they were initiating a review of her husband’s pay. The Air Force acknowledged to her Thursday that it had initially provided inaccurate information and clarified that she was receiving the full pay and benefits her husband was owed, she said.

She said she was told that her husband’s paycheck had already included but incorrectly itemized the combat-related hazard pay and tax breaks.

The pay incentives commonly known as “combat pay” are $225 per month and are conditioned not on a formal war declaration, but on the service member being in an area where there is “grave danger of physical injury” or of being “killed, injured, or wounded by a hostile fire event,” according to a military website.

Alex Klinner’s final paycheck would have included half that amount since troops are paid twice per month. It is difficult to calculate how much in federal tax breaks Klinner would have been receiving without more information.

Klinner declined to specify the amount of money she was initially told her husband, an eight-year Air Force veteran from Birmingham, Ala., would be ineligible to receive.

The Air Force says it’s committed to offering information and support

The Air Force said officials spoke with Klinner this week to “ensure all her questions are fully addressed” and confirmed that “all eligible combat theater benefits were included” in her husband’s pay.

“We remain committed to providing clear information and continued support to Mrs. Klinner, as well as all the families of the Airmen who died in the KC-135 crash,” the Air Force added.

Broadly, errors in pay in the military are very common because service members can often gain or lose eligibility for a variety of payments depending on their deployment status, duty location or even family factors. As a result, unlike their civilian counterparts, some troops can see their paychecks change many times a year, depending on many factors — something that also increases the likelihood of errors.

A GoFundMe for Libby Klinner and her three young children, launched in the days after her husband’s death, has raised more than $1.5 million.

Klinner said she hoped that by speaking out, she could ensure other grieving families receive clear information from the outset.

“I am very fortunate to have a significant support system around us and a platform to advocate for myself and for my kids. Other families may not have those resources,” she said. “If I can do anything to make this awful situation a little bit easier for someone else to navigate, then I am more than willing to do so.”

Brook and Toropin write for the Associated Press. Brook reported from New Orleans.

Sept. 4 (UPI) — President Donald Trump on Friday said the Iran war was “small potatoes” and “not a big thing.”

Trump was responding to questions about comments by Vice President J.D. Vance, who had said a day earlier that the conflict wasn’t a war.

“A lot of people don’t call it a war,” Trump told reporters. “I call it a military conflict because it’s small potatoes for us.

“It’s not a big thing. We did Venezuela, and we did this.”

Trump described the war as intermittent and a flare-up, USA Today reported.

Hours earlier, on his Truth Social platform, Trump explicitly called the conflict “the War in Iran.”

“The Radical Left Lunatics, Dumocrats, and Communists would rather have us LOSE the War in Iran, than have President Donald J. Trump WIN the War for America,” he wrote early Friday afternoon.

A day earlier, Vance told reporters there had been “no active shooting” and downplayed the severity of the war.

“I wouldn’t call it a war,” Vance told reporters at the White House.

Trump agreed with his vice president.

“I would say it’s a military conflict, if you want,” Trump said on Friday. “I don’t think it matters what you call it.

“What matters is the fact that we have had tremendous success.”