Indonesia

Crude oil and natural gas supplies have been disrupted worldwide by the United States-Israel war on Iran, but one energy sector appears to be cashing in – coal.

This week, South Africa’s thermal coal producer Thungela Resources said it had doubled its half-year profits as the war has forced more countries to buy the fuel.

Although abundant and relatively cheap to produce, coal is considered one of the dirtiest fossil fuels.

Mining it causes water pollution, and burning it releases enormous amounts of carbon into the atmosphere, which contributes to global warming.

In recent months, several countries, especially in Asia, have reversed or delayed promises to scale back on coal production.

Global coal consumption was already rising in 2025 with the Eurasia region and the US using the fuel to power artificial intelligence data centres, according to the World Bank.

Here’s what we know:

Why is more coal being used?

The US-Israel war on Iran has triggered a global energy crisis. Soon after strikes on Tehran began on February 28, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which about one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies were shipped during peacetime.

Negotiations to reopen the strait are ongoing.

Its closure has reduced oil and gas supplies and caused oil prices to soar, prompting many countries to fall back on the most readily available alternative to keep the power on – coal.

While coal prices have also risen, the fuel is still much cheaper than oil – and is more readily available.

No region has been more impacted than Asia, which largely depends on the Gulf for its energy needs. About 82 percent of oil and gas shipments through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asia in 2022, according to the US Energy Information Administration. China, India, Japan and South Korea were the top destinations.

Besides being unable to ship exports through the strait, Gulf countries caught up in the conflict have also been badly impacted by Iranian strikes. Qatar, for example, was forced to declare force majeure on its delivery contracts in March when Iranian drones hit its Ras Laffan oil facility – the world’s largest LNG complex – forcing it offline. Iran’s attacks had knocked out 17 percent of Qatar’s LNG exports by March, state officials said.

Similarly, the United Arab Emirates’s Das Island LNG terminal, Fujairah oil terminal, Ruwais Refinery Complex and other energy sites have been attacked during the conflict. Facilities in Saudi Arabia and Oman have also been hit.

Where has coal use increased?

According to an analysis by the energy data company Ember, coal output will rise globally by 1.8 percent by the end of 2026 compared with 2025 in a “worst-case” scenario.

This represents a notable uptick considering that countries are meant to be transitioning away from coal, experts said.

Since the war began, several Asian countries have announced plans to increase coal-fired electricity generation.

Japan has lifted restrictions on older, high-emission coal plants to cope with the energy shocks while South Korea has delayed the shutdown of coal-powered plants it promised to wind down by 2040.

In Bangladesh, the government at first imposed power cuts, closed universities and rationed fuel sales for vehicles before announcing it had ramped up coal-powered electricity generation.

Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam have also increased coal-powered electricity generation to preserve dwindling gas reserves.

In Pakistan, data from the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority showed that by July, electricity generated from imported coal had risen by 90 percent compared with the same period the previous year.

China and India already consume 70 percent of the world’s coal and are also major producers. In India, where electricity demand is increasing partly due to more intense heatwaves, the government plans to launch several new coal-mining projects that will see global supplies increase by 2.5 billion tonnes a year, according to the Global Energy Monitor.

Germany also said it won’t jeopardise electricity generation because of earlier climate promises it made while Italy has pushed back its coal phase-out plans from late 2025 to 2038.

Who is making a profit from coal?

Indonesia is the top coal exporter by a wide margin, followed by Australia and Russia.

In March, Jakarta reversed previous plans to curb coal production and reduce oversupply in a bid to benefit from the rising prices. Prices were set at $131.85 per tonne in July, compared with $102.20 in the previous year.

South Africa’s Thungela, meanwhile, reported doubled profits from January to June, compared with the same period of 2025, driven largely by higher production from its Ensham mines in Queensland as well as higher demand and higher prices at both Ensham and its South Africa operations.

Production at Ensham rose by 38 percent in the first half of the year – during the peak of the conflict – to 2.2 tonnes, compared with 1.6 tonnes in the previous period.

The company reported 4.80 South African rand ($0.30) in headline earnings per share – or HEPS, a primary metric of profitability used in South Africa. That’s up from 1.92 rand ($0.12) in June last year.

In a statement, Thungela said prices will likely remain high as European and Asian markets prepare for winter.

What does this mean for the drive for clean energy?

In 2021, more than 40 countries, including Indonesia and Vietnam, promised to scale back coal use at the COP26 global climate summit. India and China did not sign up, however. Last year, South Korea joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance, which helps coal-dependent economies transition away from the fuel.

However, the Middle East crisis has upset those plans largely because many countries do not have sufficient renewable energy-generating capacity to fall back on, said Nick Hedley, an energy transition analyst at South Africa-based Zero Carbon Analytics.

“For the likes of Bangladesh, it’s easy to lift coal use when global gas supplies are disrupted because the country invested heavily in coal infrastructure in recent decades, and much of that capacity has been sitting idle,” he said.

“Coal becomes cheaper than imported gas when gas prices surge. Importantly, coal still cannot compete with renewables on cost,” Hedley added.

It’s not all doom, however. Analysts noted that upticks in some places are being offset by long-term declines in coal use in places like Europe.

China’s domestic coal production also fell this year as the government tightened oversight following a deadly explosion in May at the Liushenyu coal mine, where 82 people died. Beijing has also made large investments in renewables.

In addition, the breakdown of global fossil energy supply chains could make clean alternatives more competitive and force more countries to invest in them, Hedley pointed out.

“The lesson here is that Asian countries need to speed up their shift to clean energy and electrification to safeguard themselves against future global crises,” he concluded.

By chaining bilateral naval exercises across a widening circle of partners — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and now Indonesia — Beijing is not assembling an alliance. It is manufacturing the impression that a Chinese warship’s presence near every regional flashpoint, including the waters off Taiwan, is unremarkable.

On July 29th, the Indonesian frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai wrapped up a two-day naval drill with the Russian navy in Vladivostok, part of Exercise Orruda 2026. Two weeks later, on August 12th, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that the same ship, on its way home, would run a “passing exercise” with a Chinese frigate, the Honghe — not in Indonesian waters, not in the South China Sea, but east of Taiwan. Jakarta’s navy described it in the blandest terms available: communications drills, a resupply run, “a universal naval tradition.” Taipei was not reassured. Taiwan’s foreign ministry said it “sternly condemns” the move and complained that Beijing had “unilaterally claimed” Indonesian participation before Jakarta had said a word about where, or why, this was happening.

That gap — between Jakarta’s shrug and Taipei’s alarm — is the story. It is also a useful corrective to how most coverage of Chinese naval activity is currently framed. The default lens is bilateral and confrontational: China versus the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal, China versus Japan around the Senkakus, China versus Taiwan in the Strait. That lens catches real events, but it misses the connective tissue between them — a growing schedule of joint drills with third parties, each one small and individually deniable as “routine,” that collectively do something the confrontational track cannot: they make China’s presence in the surrounding water look normal to everyone except the state it is actually disputing with.

Indonesia and China have their own maritime dispute: Beijing’s nine-dash line overlaps Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands, and Chinese fishing incursions there froze bilateral naval drills between 2015 and 2021. Those “Sharp Knife” exercises resumed in 2021 and have picked up pace since 2024. That history matters, but it is not what explains this month’s drill, because this drill did not happen anywhere near Natuna. It happened off Taiwan — waters Indonesia has no claim to and, until now, no naval presence in alongside China. Indonesia is simply the newest and most sensitive addition to a list that already includes Russia (the mature anchor partnership, most recently “Joint Sea-2026” in July), Malaysia (“Peace and Friendship 2025” in the Strait of Malacca last October), Cambodia (“Golden Dragon” at the newly built Ream Naval Base logistics center last spring), Thailand (“Blue Strike” and “Falcon Strike,” the latter launched again this month), and Vietnam (a Beibu Gulf coast guard and navy patrol series now past its fortieth iteration). All of this sits alongside a separate, unilateral track — a 100-plus-vessel show of force spanning the Yellow Sea to the western Pacific last December, and routine coast guard patrols around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.

The claim of this piece is that these two tracks are not separate stories about Chinese assertiveness. They are one story, working in tandem: the unilateral patrols draw the lines, and the bilateral drills erase them, by training a widening circle of regional navies — and the publics who read about them — to treat a Chinese warship’s presence near contested space as routine bilateral traffic rather than a signal.

The Indonesia case is the clearest evidence yet, because the location was Beijing’s choice, not Jakarta’s. Indonesia had no dispute-driven reason to be operating near Taiwan; its dispute with China sits in the Natuna Sea, hundreds of miles away. What Jakarta had was a frigate already at sea, returning from Russia, and a willingness to let Beijing choose the itinerary’s final leg. Global Times, writing for a domestic Chinese audience, called the drill’s timing “of great significance” — language China’s defense ministry does not use for routine port calls. The exercise also landed in the same week that Elbridge Colby, the U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy, was in Jakarta courting Indonesia’s alignment. Chaining a Chinese passing exercise onto the tail of an Indonesian-Russian one, in waters adjacent to the most dangerous flashpoint in the region, at the exact moment Washington was making its own pitch, is not the profile of a routine bilateral courtesy call.

The strongest objection to this argument comes from analysts of Malaysia’s drills with China, who point out that Kuala Lumpur treats “Peace and Friendship” as a hedging tool it controls, not a concession Beijing extracted — the exercises are deliberately unsophisticated (humanitarian assistance, counter-piracy, no live fire), and Malaysia’s own defense establishment remains wary of Chinese assertiveness even as it participates. That is a fair description of Malaysia’s intent, and it likely holds for Cambodia and Thailand too: these governments are managing great-power competition on their own terms, not capitulating to it. But intent on the partner’s side does not determine the effect on Beijing’s side. Whatever Kuala Lumpur or Phnom Penh tell their own publics, every additional bilateral drill lowers the diplomatic and psychological cost, for Beijing, of being seen operating a warship near water someone else disputes. Indonesia’s case shows why that distinction matters: Jakarta’s intent was almost certainly routine — a frigate coming home. Beijing’s was not. It picked the coordinates.

None of this means China is close to fielding a formal coalition in the NATO sense; nothing here involves interoperability, shared command, or mutual defense. What it means is narrower and, in some ways, more useful to Beijing: a maintenance routine that makes normalization cumulative rather than a single dramatic claim to defend. Each additional partner adds one more government that has, at least once, treated a joint Chinese naval presence near contested water as unremarkable — and one more precedent for the next invitation.

The guest list is also instructive. The one claimant conspicuously absent from it is the Philippines — the country with the loudest ongoing disputes with Beijing, at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, and the one treaty ally the United States has directly on the South China Sea’s rim. Manila gets unilateral coercion, not invitations: coast guard patrols, water-cannon incidents, and jamming, rather than passing exercises. Every partner on the actual list — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia — either has no U.S. mutual defense treaty or, like Thailand, treats its treaty commitments as dormant rather than active. That is not a coincidence; it is a selection criterion. Beijing is not inviting the states most capable of resisting the normalization effect. It is inviting the states most likely to accept it, and saving coercion for the one state structurally immune to the charm offensive.

What happens next

Base case (roughly 55 percent).  The Indonesia relationship deepens but recalibrates location. A higher-tempo revival of the Sharp Knife series continues, concentrated in Indonesian or South China Sea-adjacent waters near Natuna rather than repeated performances off Taiwan. Jakarta absorbs the diplomatic cost of this month’s episode privately — quiet reassurances to Taipei and Washington — while keeping the relationship with Beijing intact. The key assumption: the backlash from Taiwan and the attention from Washington made a second Taiwan-adjacent rerun more costly to Jakarta than its benefit to Beijing.

Downside case.  Beijing repeats the chaining tactic with a second partner within the next twelve months, most plausibly Brunei — the quietest South China Sea claimant, which in February 2025 already agreed to joint oil-and-gas development with Beijing in disputed waters it claims. A first-ever Brunei-China passing exercise, timed to overlap with a Brunei exercise involving another power and staged near a genuinely contested reef rather than international water, would confirm this is a repeatable playbook rather than an Indonesia-specific improvisation — and would be far harder for the U.S. and Japan to counter, since Brunei has never been a vocal claimant to rally around.

Upside case.  Taiwan’s public condemnation, paired with Washington’s trilateral drills with Australia and the Philippines, hardens into an explicit regional habit of naming the chaining tactic itself — not just the individual exercise — making it reputationally costly for the next candidate partner to accept the choreography. The coalition-of-drills strategy stalls not because China stops asking, but because fewer navies say yes.

The takeaway

Beijing did not build a coalition off Taiwan this month; it borrowed one, for two days, from a country with no stake in the fight. That is a cheaper and more durable tool than a formal alliance would be, and it will not show up as a single dramatic escalation — it will show up as a pattern, one passing exercise at a time.

Watch for:  whether Indonesia’s navy does it again, and where. A repeat performance near another sensitive location within the next two quarters would confirm the pattern; a retreat to home waters would suggest Jakarta drew its own line. Watch, too, whether Brunei’s navy — quiet for decades — puts to sea with a Chinese frigate for the first time following its 2025 oil-and-gas pledge in disputed waters.

Thousands of people are waiting for aid in the eastern Indonesia region hit by a powerful earthquake that killed dozens of people, as rescuers combed through collapsed buildings in search of people trapped beneath the rubble.

Late on Monday, the death toll was raised from 54 to 68, said Berton SP Panjaitan, an official at Indonesia’s disaster mitigation agency, adding that more than 200 ⁠have been injured.

Many residents on Flores island in East Nusa Tenggara province spent Monday searching for loved ones and waiting for aid to arrive in communities still cut off by the magnitude 7.7 earthquake.

During Indonesia’s Independence Day ceremony in the capital, Jakarta, President Prabowo Subianto asked participants to pray for people affected by disasters in East Nusa Tenggara and other parts of the country while leading a nationwide moment of silence honouring the nation’s independence heroes.

More than 1,300 homes were damaged when the quake struck East Nusa Tenggara on Saturday. Nearly 250 were destroyed on Flores alone. Dozens of public buildings, including educational and health facilities as well as government offices, were also affected.

The province’s governor declared a 14-day state of emergency on Sunday.

About 12,800 people were unable to return to their homes by Monday morning and were dispersed among temporary shelters in several towns on Flores, Berton Suar Pelita Panjaitan, spokesman for Indonesia’s BNPB national disaster agency, told the AFP news agency.

Thousands of people on Flores camped outside collapsed homes under tarpaulin tents overnight into Monday, sleeping outside because of the danger of more aftershocks.

“Our houses are no longer liveable because many have collapsed and are full of cracks, so we can’t go inside any more,” Mbay resident Junaidin, 32, told AFP outside his self-made tent that was sleeping about 30 people.

For many residents, the disaster revived painful memories of a powerful earthquake and tsunami that struck Flores in 1992, killing about 2,500 people.

“We’re on our own here,” said Junaidin, who like many Indonesians has one name. He expressed frustration with a perceived lag in the arrival of aid.

“As for help from the government, there hasn’t been any – no tents, no medicine, no food, no drinking water, nothing,” Junaidin said.

The Indonesian air force said it was bringing 13 tonnes of emergency aid airlifted in two Hercules transport planes and a Boeing.

It was also deploying helicopters to bring emergency supplies directly to survivors in isolated communities, the Antara state news agency quoted the commander of El Tari airbase in Kupang on Timor island as saying.

The aid included food, clothes, clean water and emergency medical equipment.

The military has deployed personnel to help with distribution in key hubs.

Rescuers were combing the stricken area for victims despite not receiving any reports about missing people, search and rescue official Fathur Rahman told AFP on Monday.

Indonesia will also build an emergency field hospital in several areas to treat the injured, Deputy Health Minister Benjamin Paulus Octavianus said.

Al Jazeera’s Jessica Washington, reporting from Ruteng in East Nusa Tenggara, said medical staff there had to quickly assemble a tent hospital after the hospital was damaged.

While doctors said they have a sufficient supply of medicine, they weren’t able to get to essential equipment that allows them to perform blood tests and X-rays, which means they are “having to treat patients in very difficult conditions”, Washington said.

Many elderly patients “are being exposed to the intense heat of the daytime” and the “rather cold” evening temperatures, which complicates doctors’ ability to treat them, Washington added.

Indonesia experiences frequent earthquakes due to its location along the Pacific “Ring of Fire”, an arc of intense seismic activity stretching from Japan through Southeast Asia and across the Pacific basin.

A magnitude 9.1 tremor in 2004 struck off the coast of Sumatra and triggered a tsunami that killed 220,000 throughout the region, about 170,000 of them in Indonesia.

It was one of the deadliest natural disasters in recorded history.

A powerful earthquake that struck eastern Indonesia has killed at least 51 people and forced about 5,000 people to evacuate, as rescue teams work to clear roads blocked by landslides and reach survivors still trapped under rubble.

The magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck at 5:58am local time on Saturday (21:58 GMT, Friday), with its epicentre about 68km (42 miles) north-northwest of the city of Ende, on Flores Island, East Nusa Tenggara province, according to the US Geological Survey, which put the depth at 10km (6.2 miles).

The earthquake, followed by some 341 aftershocks, is one of Indonesia’s deadliest in years.

A total of 36 people were seriously injured and 77 more suffered minor injuries, Deputy Health Minister Benjamin Paulus Octavianus told a televised meeting on Sunday.

More than 3,300 people in Sikka regency, one of the hard-hit areas, either fled their homes or were left stranded, taking shelter in a sports arena, according to Indonesia’s disaster mitigation agency, BNPB.

“The quake was massive, the shock was so strong, we were resting at home with family,” Nona, a 51-year-old resident of Talibura village, told the Reuters news agency. “There were 13 of us inside the house, and we all ran to save ourselves.”

In the port town of Maumere, some residents camped outside collapsed homes under tarpaulin tents, while others received treatment in a makeshift tent outside a local hospital.

“Almost all of Sikka’s residents didn’t dare stay indoors, so they slept on a porch or a tent outside,” Simon Sabandi, the region’s deputy chief, told news channel KompasTV.

Lieutenant General Suharyanto, the BNPB head, said the earthquake destroyed at least 157 houses and damaged nearly 200 more, forcing about 2,000 villagers in Nagekeo regency, the area closest to the epicentre, into temporary shelters.

He said three helicopters and a rescue vessel had been deployed to support the emergency response in a region where the scattered geography of small islands makes access difficult.

East Nusa Tenggara police chief Rudi Darmoko said the disaster had caused severe damage and building collapses across the province.

Rescue teams have yet to fully reach Nagekeo, where landslides have blocked roads and disrupted communications, said Fathur Rahman, head of the local search and rescue agency in Maumere, adding that a team was attempting to reach the area by ferry.

More than 3,500 military and police personnel have been deployed overall, Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya said. More than 1,300 homes have been damaged, and 20 petrol stations remain shut due to power outages, according to state energy firm Pertamina.

Officials are considering declaring a state of emergency for East Nusa Tenggara, which would unlock further resources and funding.

A tsunami warning issued immediately after the earthquake has since been lifted.

Reporting from Jakarta, Al Jazeera’s Jessica Washington said aftershocks could continue for “several days”, with authorities in the island’s northern areas ordering further evacuations as the true scale of the damage is still “emerging”.

She said several affected areas remain inaccessible to first responders and that local authorities have urged residents to stay away from shorelines and damaged buildings.

The same stretch of coastline was struck by a similarly powerful earthquake in December 1992, when the quake and the tsunami it triggered killed more than 2,500 people on Flores, Indonesia’s geophysics agency said.

Indonesia, a nation of some 290 million people spread across roughly 17,000 islands, sits on the Pacific “Ring of Fire”, making it one of the world’s most seismically active countries.

About 2,000 residents in Nagekeo were evacuated with damage reported to a number of buildings.

Arnold Welianto, who lives in Talibura village, Sikka, East Nusa Tenggara, told the BBC that he was still asleep when he felt the “very strong shaking”.

“I was startled awake and immediately went to my child’s room,” he said.

“Once we were outside, residents in our neighbourhood, which is located close to the shoreline, had already fled their homes and were heading toward the hills and crowding the roads, while some other residents were standing along the roadside because the sea had also receded.”

“The water remained low for quite some time, so everyone panicked and ran – I went around to the community health centre, and the people there had already been evacuated.”

Welianto said many residents were choosing to remain outdoors because of the earthquake, and ongoing aftershocks meant they were afraid to return home.

THE most beautiful beaches in the world have been revealed and good news – you can find a number of them in the UK.

Compiled by Big 7, the top 50 for 2026 are a mix of very well-known spots to some very hidden islands.

The study looks at a number of factors, such as cleanliness, social media mentions and expert knowledge.

You’ll have to hop on a long flight to find the no.1 beach, as that was given to Anse Source d’Argent in the Seychelles.

The website praised it for looking like “it should be on the front of a postcard,” with its calm waters and and shallow lagoons.

In second place was Entalula Beach in the Philippines – which you can only get to by boat – followed by Indonesia’s Pink Beach which yes, has pink sand thanks to the red coral mixed into it.

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Holiday parks from £7.71pp a night with waterparks & beaches – as UK to hit 38C

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Ditch Cornwall for my seaside county – we have better beaches and attractions

When it comes to Europe, the highest ranked beach was Cala Macarella in Menorca, which came in eight place.

The Spanish island beach was praised for being the “quieter and smaller sibling of Majorca and Ibiza” as well as its soft sands and turquoise waters.

But if you don’t want to go too far, then the three in the UK are easy to get to.

Porthcurno Beach in Cornwall came in ninth place, and was the only English beach to make the list.

The website stated: “Porthcurno Beach is easily one of England’s most beautiful.

“With the clear waters and bright sands of Porthcurno Beach, it’s easy to imagine that you’re in the tropics.”

This was closely followed by Luskentyre Beach in Scotland, which just missed out on making the top 10 by being in 11th place.

Also compared to the Caribbean, they stated: “The white sands and turquoise waters make it hard to believe that you’re closer to Norway than Cornwall.”

And then in 31st place was the only Welsh beach to make the list, with Whitesands Beach making the cut.

It states: “Located on Wales’ spectacular Pembrokeshire coast, Whitesands Beach proves that you don’t need tropical weather to enjoy a stunning beach.

“Rolling surf foams onto the golden sands, while the rugged cliffs which provide the backdrop to the beach make Whitesands a favoured spot for families, hikers, and surfers alike.”

Other highly rated European beaches include Ksamil Beach in Albania (19th) which is often called the Maldives of Europe.

There is also Navagio Beach in Zante (21st), Haukland Beach in Norway (25th) and Palombaggia Beach in Corsica (28th).

Beaches in Madeira, Sardinia and Iceland also made the top 50.

World’s 50 Best Beaches

1. Anse Source d’Argent, Seychelles
2. Entalula Beach, Philippines
3. Pink Beach, Indonesia
4. Sandy Lane Beach, Barbados
5. Ee Motu Beach, Cook Islands
6. Whitehaven Beach, Australia
7. Matira Beach, French Polynesia
8. Cala Macarella, Menorca, Spain
9. Porthcurno Beach, UK
10. Mirissa Beach, Sri Lanka
11. Luskentyre Beach, UK
12. Starfish Beach, Vietnam
13. Tortuga Bay, Galápagos Islands
14. Keem Beach, Ireland
15. White Beach, Philippines
16. Unawatuna Beach, Sri Lanka
17. Eagle Beach, Aruba
18. Copacabana Beach, Brazil
19. Ksamil Beach, Albania
20. Boulders Beach, South Africa
21. Navagio Beach, Zakynthos, Greece
22. Dhigura Beach, Maldives
23. Radhanagar Beach, Havelock Island, India
24. Seven Mile Beach, Grand Cayman
25. Haukland Beach, Norway
26. Railay Beach, Thailand
27. Horseshoe Bay, Fiji
28. Palombaggia Beach, France
29. Reynisfjara Beach, Iceland
30. Santa Monica Beach, Cape Verde
31. Whitesands Beach, Wales
32. Chumbe Island, Tanzania
33. Champagne Beach, Vanuatu
34. Le Morne Beach, Mauritius
35. Waikiki Beach, Hawaii, USA
36. Plaua Kenepa Grandi, Curacao
37. Piha Beach, New Zealand
38. Playa Varadero, Cuba
39. Playa Blanca, Colombia
40. Bavaro Beach, Dominican Republic
41. Long Beach, Cambodia
42. Fteri Beach, Greece
43. La Jolla Cove, California, USA
44. Shoal Bay East, Anguilla
45. Playa Akumal, Mexico
46. Sugar Beach, St Lucia
47. La Pelosa Beach, Sardinia, Italy
48. Karon Beach, Thailand
49. Seixal Beach, Madeira
50. Manly Beach, Australia

Aug. 13 (UPI) — The Trump administration’s decision to close the U.S. Consulate in Medan, Indonesia, may save relatively little money. But it risks weakening American influence in one of the Indo-Pacific’s most strategically important regions at a time when Washington says competition with China is its foremost foreign policy priority.

The Medan consulate is small compared with the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta or major diplomatic posts elsewhere in Asia. Yet, its strategic value has long exceeded its size.

Situated on the island of Sumatra, the consulate serves roughly 60 million Indonesians across 10 provinces, supports U.S. commercial interests, advances educational and environmental partnerships and provides Washington with a permanent presence near the Strait of Malacca — one of the world’s busiest maritime corridors.

The proposed closure comes as the United States seeks to deepen its Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy and an increasingly influential G20 member.

Those ambitions sit uneasily alongside a shrinking American diplomatic footprint in one of Indonesia’s most important regions.

For years, U.S. officials have argued that competition with China extends beyond military deployments and naval exercises. It also depends on trade, investment, educational exchanges, environmental cooperation and people-to-people ties.

Those objectives require diplomats on the ground, particularly outside national capitals where many of today’s political and commercial relationships are forged.

“The administration should reconsider closing a strategically located consulate near the Strait of Malacca,” Patrick Cronin, chair for Asia-Pacific Security at the Hudson Institute, told UPI. “Recent tensions around the Strait of Hormuz remind us how indispensable the Strait of Malacca remains to global commerce.”

Sumatra is one of Indonesia’s economic engines, producing energy, palm oil, coffee, rubber and other commodities, while anchoring important shipping and trade routes across the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean.

The island accounts for a large share of Indonesia’s palm oil production, while its provinces are also major exporters of rubber, coal, agricultural products and manufactured goods.

North Sumatra recorded more than $3.5 billion in exports in 2025, while South Sumatra recorded $6.3 billion. American companies operating in energy, agribusiness, manufacturing and logistics therefore have commercial interests that extend well beyond Jakarta, including relationships with provincial governments, suppliers, ports, industrial estates and local business communities.

A diplomatic presence in Medan provides U.S. officials with a base for supporting those relationships, monitoring commercial conditions and helping American companies navigate regulatory and administrative issues in a region central to Indonesia’s trade and resource economy.

“It will reinforce the perception that the United States is shrinking its footprint in Southeast Asia,” Murray Hiebert, head of research at BowerGroupAsia, told UPI. “Closing Medan also removes the only permanent U.S. diplomatic presence near the Strait of Malacca.”

Unlike many countries where political authority is concentrated in one capital, Indonesia’s decentralized system gives provincial governments considerable influence over investment, environmental management and economic development. Relationships built through a regional consulate cannot easily be replicated through periodic visits from embassy officials based in Jakarta.

Indonesia also occupies a distinctive place in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. It is neither a treaty ally nor a strategic adversary, but an independent regional power that has consistently pursued its long-standing “free and active” foreign policy. Jakarta has resisted choosing sides between Washington and Beijing, preferring to cultivate strong ties with both.

Ted Osius, former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, who also served as president and CEO of the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, said Washington has spent years strengthening its partnership with Indonesia as both countries seek closer trade and defense cooperation.

“The annual cost of operating the U.S. Consulate in Medan, staffed by just two American diplomats serving an island of more than 60 million people, is roughly equivalent to one minute of Pentagon spending during the conflict with Iran,” Osius told UPI. “The modest savings from closing the post would come at a disproportionate strategic cost.”

China has long recognized that influence is built through sustained local engagement as much as national diplomacy. Over the past decade, Beijing has expanded its presence across Indonesia through infrastructure projects, mining investments, industrial cooperation and Belt and Road financing.

Chinese companies dominate Indonesia’s rapidly growing nickel-processing industry, while the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway has become Beijing’s flagship infrastructure project in Southeast Asia.

Chinese engagement extends well beyond Jakarta. Provincial governments across the archipelago work directly with Chinese companies, universities and local officials, allowing Beijing to deepen relationships through consistent local engagement rather than high-profile diplomatic initiatives alone.

Against that backdrop, reducing the American presence outside the capital risks reinforcing perceptions that Washington’s commitment is narrowing rather than expanding.

The implications extend beyond geopolitics. Sumatra contains some of the world’s richest tropical forests, including the Leuser Ecosystem, one of the few places where orangutans, elephants, rhinos and tigers still co-exist in the wild. These forests also rank among the world’s most important carbon sinks, making them central to global biodiversity and climate efforts.

“We should not be closing the U.S. Consulate in Medan,” Robert Blake, a former U.S. ambassador and now senior managing director at McLarty Associates, told UPI. “Despite its relatively small operating cost, the consulate punches well above its weight.

“It enables U.S. diplomats to engage with Sumatra’s 60 million people, promotes American business in a region rich in energy, palm oil and coffee, and supports Indonesia’s efforts to protect Sumatra’s unique biodiversity — a globally significant natural heritage and one of the world’s most important carbon sinks.”

That work has included support for conservation partnerships, scientific cooperation, educational exchanges and civil society initiatives. As climate change increasingly intersects with national security and economic policy, environmental diplomacy has become another arena in which countries build long-term influence.

The Medan consulate has served as a regional presence in North Sumatra, providing U.S. diplomats with direct access to local officials, business leaders, universities, civil society organizations and other institutions outside Indonesia’s capital.

Its location also gives Washington a base for monitoring developments across a strategically important part of the country, including trade, investment, maritime activity and regional ties.

Closing or consolidating that presence would shift more of those functions to the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta and other regional posts, potentially changing how frequently American officials engage with counterparts in Sumatra.

Supporters of consolidation argue that modern communications and periodic travel can substitute for permanent regional offices, particularly during a period of fiscal restraint. But diplomacy remains fundamentally relational. Trust develops through sustained interaction, familiarity with local institutions and networks that cannot be built through occasional visits.

Whether the closure ultimately proceeds is less important than what it signals. Throughout the Indo-Pacific, Washington contends that strategic competition with China will be won not only through military strength, but also through sustained economic, diplomatic and societal engagement. That strategy depends on people, institutions and local relationships built over decades — not only on high-level summits or defense agreements.

The annual savings from closing a small consulate in Medan are likely to be modest. The strategic cost may be harder to measure.

James Borton is a non-resident senior fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and the author of Harvesting the Waves: How Blue Parks Shape Policy, Politics, and Peacebuilding in the South China Sea. Borton is the editor-in-chief of the South China Sea NewsWire. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.

The deaths on board the Egyptian-owned Tihamah mark first shipping deaths linked to Houthis since the US-Israel war on Iran began.

Yemen’s internationally recognised government has accused the Houthi rebel group of killing at least six people and wounding 10 others in a double-tap strike on a cargo vessel in the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

The attack on the Egyptian-owned Tihamah on Tuesday marks the first shipping deaths linked to the Iran-aligned Houthis since the United States and Israel launched the war on Iran on February 28.

Yemen’s Transport Ministry said three Pakistani nationals and one Indonesian national were killed after the Houthis fired three ballistic missiles at the commercial ship, sparking a fire and causing “significant damage” to the vessel.

Yemen’s coastguard said in a separate statement that the Houthis fired another missile at the ship as rescue personnel were evacuating the dead and wounded.

“The attack struck the site of the rescue operation and resulted in deaths and injuries among the forces participating in the response operation,” the coastguard said.

At least two troops were killed in the second strike.

Ten people were wounded in total, including seven crew members, it added.

Houthi-Saudi truce unravels

Yemen’s Foreign Ministry condemned the attack and called on the international community “to move from condemnation to effective and decisive action” against the Houthis.

There was no official comment from the Houthis.

But the Houthi-run news agency Saba reported that the ‌group had attacked a Saudi ship carrying military equipment in Bab al-Mandeb. It did not name the ship, and there was no immediate Saudi response to the report.

In a separate incident on Tuesday, the US military said it fired on a ship attempting to break its blockade of Iranian ports in the Gulf of Oman. The US Central Command said a Navy helicopter fired two Hellfire missiles at the Panama-flagged Vela Nova cargo vessel, but did not say if any crew members were wounded.

The escalation in Yemen follows the collapse of a years-long truce in the country’s civil war between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed, internationally recognised government.

The breakdown of the United Nations-backed 2022 truce followed a Saudi air strike on the runway of Sanaa airport on July 13, preventing the landing of an Iranian flight carrying a high-ranking Houthi delegation.

The Houthis then attacked the Abha airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia and announced a blockade on Saudi shipping in the Red Sea. They have also attacked Saudi vessels as well as oil facilities in the kingdom, adding further disruption to the global economy.

The Saudi-led coalition, in turn, has struck Houthi-controlled Hodeidah and Kamaran, Yemen’s largest island in the Red Sea.

The Houthis have also launched attacks on government-held areas in Yemen, including the port city of al-Makha (Mocha) on the Red Sea and the central city of Marib, killing dozens of troops and civilians.

Yemen’s internationally recognised government on Tuesday said the Houthis launched 10 missiles and four drones during a series of further attacks on sites on the country’s western coast.

The Houthis said they had launched ballistic missile and drone attacks “targeting Saudi military buildups, weapons depots and command posts” in al-Makha and the central Marib province.

The UN has called for restraint, saying the renewed hostilities risk “drawing the country into a broader regional confrontation, with devastating consequences for its people”.

I recently travelled to Sorowako, South Sulawesi, for a corporate social responsibility programme supported by Vale Indonesia. I helped local journalists use artificial intelligence ethically and responsibly in investigative reporting: reading documents, identifying inconsistencies and preparing interviews while keeping verification and editorial judgement in human hands.

Yet Sorowako made it difficult to see AI merely as a newsroom tool. The town sits within the industrial landscape powering Indonesia’s nickel ambitions. Materials processed across Sulawesi are entering global battery supply chains, while AI is moving beyond screens into machines, factories, ports and mines. Here, both transformations occupy the same geography.

Indonesia produced roughly three-fifths of the world’s mined nickel in 2024. The boom has attracted smelters, battery-material plants and billions in foreign investment. Yet how much Indonesian technological capability is emerging around it—and how much is taking root in the regions carrying the industrial and ecological burden? US Geological Survey

Responsible AI skills expand local journalists’ agency. The same principle should reach the industrial value chain. Mining regions should participate as producers of knowledge, technology and services, beyond extraction and social compensation.

The Physical-AI Window

Autonomous equipment, machine vision and robots able to act in the real world are bringing AI into factories, warehouses and difficult industrial environments.

The International Federation of Robotics recorded 542,000 industrial robot installations in 2024. Asia absorbed 74 percent; China installed 295,000 units and now operates more than two million. Goldman Sachs estimates the more speculative humanoid segment could reach US$38 billion by 2035. The projection is uncertain, but the physical-AI market is already widening. International Federation of Robotics, Goldman Sachs

China treats this frontier as industrial policy. Indonesia’s credible entry point is more practical. Mines need robotic inspection and safer hauling; their environmental monitoring also needs improvement. These are difficult operating problems—and domestic companies already need them solved. State Council Information Office of China

Nickel is a launching pad, not a guarantee of robotics demand. Many robots use none. Indonesia’s advantage lies in combining its mineral and battery base with industrial sites where new systems can be tested.

Its downstreaming strategy, however, remains highly linear: ore becomes processed nickel, then battery material, batteries and eventually electric vehicles. Horizontal downstreaming would build capabilities that spread sideways from this chain. Industrial AI developed for nickel could later serve copper or geothermal operations. Low-carbon processing and environmental technology could travel even further.

The objective is to convert temporary geological power into capability that outlives the commodity. Progress can be read through a downstreaming capability ladder: enforcement, processing, supplier formation and technological ownership. Indonesia has climbed the first two stages more decisively than many peers. The last two remain unfinished.

Different Positions on the Ladder

Canada illustrates the mature destination. In July 2026, its government backed mining projects using AI, robotics and subsurface imaging, alongside work on ecological restoration. Its mines function as testing grounds for domestic technology and exportable expertise. Government of Canada

Chile offers a more achievable Global South pathway. CORFO and the National Piloting Center help suppliers test technology under real conditions. Expande translates operational problems into industry challenges; its network has involved more than 2,500 suppliers and generated over 180 contracts. Chile has not completed the journey into higher-value manufacturing, which makes its lessons more useful for Indonesia. Expande

The Philippines shows the cost of stopping earlier. The world’s second-largest nickel producer exported 44.97 million wet metric tonnes of ore in 2024 while operating only two processing plants. Its Senate approved a phased ban on unprocessed ore exports in February 2025, but the provision was removed four months later amid concerns over mine closures, financing and insufficient domestic capacity. Argus, Reuters

Thailand shows another route onto the ladder. Without Indonesia’s nickel leverage, it used subsidies and tax incentives tied to local-production obligations. Those policies have attracted more than US$4 billion in EV investment, while Chinese brands now account for over 70 percent of EV sales. Reuters BYD’s Rayong plant—its first in Southeast Asia, opened in July 2024—anchors the emerging production cluster. Reuters Thai suppliers are entering the chain, but the transfer of deeper engineering and intellectual property is less visible. Thailand has shown that scale and supplier participation can be built quickly; technological ownership remains the harder rung.

Indonesia enforced its ore-export ban and built processing scale, although much technology and capital came from abroad. Its next test is whether enforcement produces Indonesian suppliers—and whether those suppliers eventually own technology.

MIND ID and Vale as Ecosystem Builders

MIND ID, Indonesia’s state-owned mining holding and Vale Indonesia’s largest shareholder, could orchestrate the next stage by pooling operational problems across its portfolio and financing the pilots that address them. It could then route proven solutions into procurement, allowing technology tested in nickel to travel into copper or tin. Sorowako is the natural lighthouse site. Vale Indonesia could open bounded challenges in worker safety or land rehabilitation, provide controlled access for testing and give successful suppliers a path into procurement. Vale Indonesia

The investment network is already multi-aligned. The Pomalaa project brings together Vale Indonesia, China’s Huayou and Ford from the United States. Separately, the nearly US$6 billion CATL–Antam–Indonesia Battery Corporation project links North Maluku with battery manufacturing in West Java. Indonesia is hosting production relationships that cross geopolitical blocs. Vale Indonesia, CATL

These relationships can extend from batteries towards battery-powered industrial intelligence. Indonesia’s return should be measured by whether local engineers gain ownership and the ability to sell abroad.

Connecting Sorowako to Rebana—and the World

This transition needs a spatial architecture connecting Indonesia’s nickel-producing east with Java’s manufacturing and logistics base. Sorowako is not starting from zero. Politeknik Sorowako grew from a technical academy into a vocational institution oriented towards local industrial needs. It offers a base for building capability close to the mines. Vale Indonesia

The polytechnic could anchor field engineering and testing. ITB’s Cirebon campus, within West Java’s Rebana corridor, could add advanced research and systems integration. Joint laboratories and supplier incubation would allow knowledge to move in both directions. Institut Teknologi Bandung

Patimban International Port gives Rebana an external gateway. Its container terminal currently has annual capacity of 250,000 twenty-foot equivalent units and is being expanded to 1.65 million. The port’s long-term design targets 7.5 million TEU per year; this is planned capacity, not present throughput. A regular international service launched in July 2026 now connects West Java with Singapore, Thailand and major Chinese ports. ANTARA

The emerging chain is tangible. Field capability developed in Sorowako could be refined in Cirebon, manufactured across Rebana and exported through Patimban.

This is the spatial expression of a multiplex industrial-digital ecosystem. Yet it carries an internal risk. If ecological burdens remain in Sulawesi while intellectual property and high-value firms accumulate in Java, Indonesia will reproduce a double asymmetry within its own borders. Rebana should become a scaling node without monopolising knowledge. Contracts and technical capacity must circulate back towards producing regions.

Vale’s support for Politeknik Sorowako could therefore evolve from conventional CSR into a long-term capability strategy. Skilled work and local suppliers can give communities a stake in the industry’s future, reducing resistance rooted in exclusion. None of this substitutes for environmental performance, land rights or meaningful participation.

Geopolitical Localisation

ASEAN adds a wider market. Its Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026–2030 calls for sustainable investment across the minerals value chain and stronger capacity in mining technology, research and innovation. ASEAN Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026–2030

Equipment proven under Sulawesi’s heat, dust and uneven connectivity could find buyers across the Global South. Indonesia can occupy the critical-mineral and industrial-intelligence layer of ASEAN’s AI economy.

Manufacturing in Indonesia could also help Chinese-linked firms diversify production. Factory location alone does not dissolve geopolitical concerns. US connected-vehicle rules show that governments may scrutinise who owns the software and retains remote access. Europe’s foreign-subsidy regime adds another layer of exposure. US Bureau of Industry and Security, European Commission

The defensible strategy is geopolitical localisation. Foreign production in Indonesia must create substantial domestic value and withstand scrutiny over ownership, supply chains and cybersecurity. Indonesian participation in engineering and intellectual property is central. This would make the country a bridge production node with capabilities of its own, rather than a passport factory for technology routed through its territory.

When I left Sorowako, what stayed with me was the proximity between a community learning to adapt to AI and industrial operations capable of becoming laboratories for it. The same region supplying global industries could help create safer mines and more credible environmental monitoring.

Nickel’s geopolitical leverage will not last. The durable test is what Indonesia can build before that advantage fades.

If firms and technical institutions take root in Sulawesi, then scale across Indonesia, Sorowako will have done more than supply the AI economy. It will have helped Indonesia learn how to compete within it.

Aug. 2 (UPI) — At least five people were killed and 41 remain missing after a ferry carrying hundreds of people caught fire off the coast of Indonesia’s Madura Island on Sunday, officials said.

Thick smoke was seen billowing from the passenger vessel KMP Mutiara Sentosa 2, which was carrying 271 passengers and crew.

The ferry’s captain reported the fire as the vessel traveled from Surabaya to Makassar about 6 a.m. local time.

Indonesia’s National Search and Rescue Agency said survivors were rescued by a number of vessels that had been in the area, the Jakarta Globe reported.

Search and rescue efforts continued throughout the day. The ferry was still smoking by mid-afternoon, the Globe reported.

Victims were taken to three area hospitals for medical evaluation.

“Our main focus is on rescuing the victims and ensuring they receive the best possible care upon their arrival on land,” Sumenepe Police Chief Ariek Indra Sentanu told iNews. “The TNI, Polri, and district government are working together in the field.”

The cause of the fire remains under investigation, officials said.

A mum-of-three who left the UK three years ago and moved her family across the world has said the biggest reason for moving abroad was how expensive things are at home

A mum-of-three has claimed her “life is better” after taking her family across the world to escape the cost-of-living crisis. Many Brits have been feeling the pinch over the past few years, with the cost of everything from food to energy bills and petrol costs skyrocketing and leaving everyone with less money in their pockets.

But while many of us look at ways we can cut our spending by being more frugal with our food shopping or cutting back on family holidays, one mum has taken matters into her own hands – by moving somewhere more affordable. Lucy Richardson shared a video on social media in which she said rising costs were one of the biggest factors in deciding to move her family abroad for a new life.

In a video shared on TikTok, Lucy explained that she, her husband, and their three young children decided to leave the UK in 2023. They now live in Bali, Indonesia, where prices are so low that she can completely fill her moped for just £4 – and the tropical weather and gorgeous views are just a bonus.

She said in her video: “The cost of living in the UK was completely out of control, and that’s why we left. We left nearly three years ago because two full-time working parents were not enough for us to sustain the life that we had in the UK.”

Lucy revealed that she and her husband were working full-time to try and support their family and pay their rent, but were finding that they were barely getting by and described their situation as “surviving” and not “living”.

She continued: “We just felt like we were constantly chasing our tail and constantly paying stuff out. Then we had this tiny little pot left over to actually enjoy ourselves and do things that we wanted to do. Then, because there wasn’t enough money, we would put it on a credit card, and then we were in this massive circle of debt.”

The mum-of-three said she could see her family being in this cycle for years, potentially never being able to live their lives until they were retired, by which point they could be “too ill or too old” to enjoy it.

What’s more, Lucy felt like she was missing out on spending time with her three children, as they were growing up without her while she worked full-time to support them. So, the family made the decision to leave the UK and move to Bali.

She said: “It was a crazy, vicious circle that I didn’t want to be a part of. So we left. We now have a much simpler life.

“Today, we just filled up our moped for £4. The same petrol that you have in the UK, and that’s a full tank that’s going to last me for two weeks. Four quid. It’s absolutely crazy.

“Now, we have a much simpler life. We don’t have to go to a nine-to-five [job], and I get to see my kids’ childhoods. So I know what I would rather pick, and that’s why we left the UK. So many people ask, and it’s the cost of living. It was just too high.”

Many commenters on the post praised the mum for having the courage to take her family across the world for a better life, with many saying they wish they could do the same.

One person said: “Well done, you, for taking that step and leaving the UK to better your lives. We are a family of five and totally understand where you are coming from. We class ourselves as the working poor. Working but have nothing to show for it because everything goes on paying taxes and bills.”

Another added: “Agree totally, Britain is a rip off. You did right in getting out.”

A third posted: “Same here. We left six years ago for Spain and it’s so liberating. Our relatives can’t believe how much less we pay month to month here and can now appreciate why we left.”

An Indonesian court has sentenced Lie Siu Luan to seven years in prison after finding her guilty of leading a 19-member baby trafficking ring operating between Indonesia and Singapore. Prosecutors had sought 10 years and are considering whether to appeal.

The survivors were found clinging to a fish trap and floating debris at sea three days after the boat sank.

Five people have been rescued, including a seven-year-old girl, who were stranded at sea off the Indonesian coast for three days after their boat sank south of Sulawesi. A search is ongoing for at least 20 others.

The five survivors – one man, three women and the girl – were located by a fishing boat before dark on Saturday near Matallang Island off the coast of Sulawesi and taken to a search-and-rescue vessel.

They had stayed afloat by clinging to a fish trap and buoyant debris after the KM Nurul Salsa suffered engine failure and sank on Wednesday with 78 passengers and crew members on board.

“After the ship sank, each of them saved themselves using whatever equipment or makeshift flotation they could find,” local search-and-rescue official Muhammad Arif Anwar said.

“They rigged together jerry cans and pieces of cork tied up with rope, then climbed on top of them.”

They told rescuers they had been part of a group of 25 people, but during their ordeal they were separated from the others by strong winds.

Local media reported 47 people had been rescued the day after the boat sank, and one person is known to have drowned.

Five large ships, a reconnaissance aircraft and a helicopter are being used in ongoing search efforts for those still missing.

The KM Nurul Salsa was en route from Jampea Island to the port of Benteng on Selayar Island in South Sulawesi province. It sank about 43 nautical miles (79km) from the port.

Passenger boats are a common form of transport in Indonesia, an archipelago with more than 17,000 islands. Lax safety standards and problems with overcrowding frequently result in accidents.

Earlier this month, at least six people died and dozens went missing after a ferry carrying 65 people sank off Indonesia’s resort island of Bali.

The jailing of one of Indonesia’s most influential entrepreneurs in a controversial corruption case has raised fears of damage to investor confidence in Southeast Asia’s largest economy.

Nadiem Makarim, the cofounder of the popular super-app Gojek, was last month sentenced to 10 years in prison for allegedly abusing his authority while serving as the country’s education minister.

Makarim was found guilty of giving favourable treatment to Google, an early investor in Gojek, when procuring Chromebook laptops for schoolchildren during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Prosecutors argued that Makarim, who served as former Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s education minister from 2019 to 2024, inflicted state losses of $120m, alleging that he should have been aware the laptops would not work in remote areas with poor internet access.

Critics of the prosecution have argued that the case against Makarim lacks evidence and that the startup founder-turned-politician is the latest victim of a campaign of political retribution being waged by the administration of Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto.

Nicky Fahrizal, a researcher of politics and social change at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, said foreign investors will inevitably think twice before committing capital to Indonesia following the verdict.

“The Nadiem case, along with a string of similar incidents, has served as a warning signal to investors,” Fahrizal told Al Jazeera.

“For them, non-economic factors, such as legal certainty and the quality of the judicial system, are absolute prerequisites.”

Makarim was found guilty by a panel of five judges on June 30, following charges related to the procurement of more than 1 million laptops intended for use in schools in remote and impoverished areas.

At the trial held at the Indonesian Court for Corruption Crimes in Jakarta, prosecutors alleged that Makarim deliberately tailored the tender specifications to favour Google, which invested in Aplikasi Karya Anak Bangsa (AKAB), Gojek’s then-parent company.

Scrutiny of the tender process first arose among the public after it emerged that the Chromebooks often did not work in remote areas, raising questions about how Google was chosen in the first place.

“Choosing a device that relies on an internet connection amid uneven infrastructure… demonstrates a mismatch with needs…” Judge Sunoto said during the sentencing.

Following the verdict, prosecutor Corneles Geeb Paulus hailed the outcome as a victory for “the schoolchildren whose rights were taken away and who were deprived of equitable access to digital education across Indonesia”.

Google has denied providing or offering authorities any inducements to win the tender.

The California-based tech giant, which has a market value of more than $4 trillion, was not indicted in the case.

“From a legal standpoint, authorities seem to have hit a wall in their efforts to secure sufficient evidence and establish the necessary criminal nexus to prosecute the corporation,” the CSIS’s Fahrizal said.

“From a political perspective, Google is a tech giant with immense business influence.”

Taking action against Google could have jeopardised the government’s ongoing digitalisation efforts, Fahrizal added, describing the company as “too big to fail” within the digital sector.

Trissia Wijaya, an Indonesian-born research fellow at the University of Melbourne’s Asia Institute, said Nadiem’s prosecution, coupled with the uncertainty of the business environment under Prabowo, would inevitably erode market confidence.

“Regardless of whether Nadiem is actually guilty or not, he is a symbol of startups and market optimism in Indonesia, especially in the mid-2010s,” Wijaya told Al Jazeera.

“When Gojek started booming and gaining traction, Indonesia was one of the main target countries for global investors, both from the US and China, to invest in the fintech industry,” Wijaya added, describing Indonesia’s business environment as being at a “critical juncture.”

Since taking office in 2024, Prabowo has faced criticism over his handling of the economy, including high levels of spending on public initiatives, such as his signature free lunch programme, which is expected to cost about $15bn this year.

In June, the Indonesian rupiah hit an all-time low against the US dollar, a nadir economic analysts partly attributed to investors’ scepticism about Prabowo’s populist economic policies.

For his part, Prabowo has denied that he is anti-business, while emphasising that Indonesia must uphold the rule of law.

“Some have claimed that I dislike foreign investors and will drive them away, but that is not the case. I have met many investors who are planning to enter the market,” Prabowo told a conference for young entrepreneurs in the city of Lampung last month.

“The government must create a favorable environment for entrepreneurs, including the enforcement of the law. If the law is not enforced, what ensues is the law of the jungle… law based on power, and in the end, that is not good for any of us.”

‘Credibility’ of government policies

Siwage Dharma Negara, a co-coordinator of the Indonesia studies programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, said Indonesia’s reputation as an investment destination had already been in decline before the Makarim verdict.

“Investors are unsure about the credibility of government policies, and they are unsure about the credibility of institutions, whether executive, legislative, or judicial in Indonesia,” Negara told Al Jazeera.

“Nadiem’s case is only one factor that has damaged foreign investor confidence. But there are many other factors that contribute, including government policies that are increasingly less pro-market.”

Teguh Yudo Wicaksono, an economics lecturer at Universitas Islam Indonesia in Yogyakarta, said that although he does not expect the case to have much of an impact on foreign investment, it could deter Indonesian talent based overseas from returning home.

“This could result in a brain drain and Indonesia losing talent,” Wicaksono told Al Jazeera.

Makarim attended Harvard Business School and Brown University in the United States before returning to Indonesia in 2006 and cofounding Gojek four years later.

In 2019, Gojek, which began as a ride-hailing business before evolving into a super-app that also offers food delivery and digital payment services, became the first Indonesian tech company to achieve a valuation of more than $10bn.

Not all observers see the Makarim case as a negative for investor sentiment.

I Gusti Ngurah Bayu Pradana, an expert in business law at the Bali-based Malekat Hukum International Law Firm, said the enforcement of corruption law should be seen as a “positive signal for legal certainty and governance quality in a country, rather than a negative one”.

“Experienced foreign investors generally understand that the greatest risk in investing is not the existence of law enforcement, but rather, legal uncertainty, or a situation in which the rules of the game are unclear, legal processes lack transparency, or enforcement is selective and unpredictable,” Pradana told Al Jazeera.

While Makarim was found guilty of abusing authority and causing state losses, he was acquitted of an additional charge of directly seeking to enrich himself, and he was handed a lower sentence than the 18 years sought by the prosecution.

While reading the verdict, Judge Andi Saputra also presented a dissenting opinion, saying that he found “no evidence of malicious intent or malicious acts” and scant “causal connection or indication between the conflict of interest and the corporate crime”.

The Malekat Hukum law firm’s Pradana pointed to the judge’s dissenting view as evidence of the Indonesian judiciary’s independence and rigorous fact-finding.

“For foreign investors considering Indonesia as an investment destination, the takeaway from this case should not be alarm, but rather confidence that Indonesia’s legal system functions and can hold anyone accountable equally before the law,” Pradana said.

“So long as investment contracts are clearly drafted, business processes are conducted transparently, and implementation complies fully with applicable laws and regulations, investment in Indonesia remains a safe and promising choice.”

Indonesian troops have recovered the body of American pilot Nicholas Goselin from the restive Papua region after he was killed by separatist ‘Bakusip’ rebels last week. The operation involved a 10-member team and three helicopters.

A US pilot has been killed in Indonesia’s Papua region after separatist rebels said they shot him and set his aircraft on fire. The attack highlights the decades-long independence struggle, which has displaced more than 122,000 people since 2022.

June 30 (Asia Today) — South Korean battery materials producer EcoPro Group is expanding its investment in an Indonesian nickel smelter to more than double its access to the critical mineral used in electric vehicle batteries.

EcoPro and its subsidiary EcoPro BM plan to increase their combined stake in the Bahodopi Nickel Smelting Indonesia project to 39%, becoming major shareholders and taking a leading role in its development. The smelter is under construction at the International Green Industrial Park on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi.

The total investment is estimated at about 1.5 trillion won, or $967 million, based on an exchange rate of 1,550.77 won per dollar.

EcoPro completed the first phase of its Indonesian investment over the past four years, securing rights to about 29,000 metric tons of nickel. Once the second phase is completed, the group expects its total nickel supply rights to reach about 65,000 metric tons.

The group also plans to increase the BNSI smelter’s annual production capacity from the originally planned 66,000 metric tons to 90,000 metric tons. EcoPro said that would be enough nickel for batteries used in about 2 million electric vehicles.

The investment is part of EcoPro’s effort to secure raw materials directly and reduce the cost of nickel-rich cathode materials used in nickel-cobalt-manganese batteries.

EcoPro said it intends to establish an integrated supply chain covering nickel, precursors and cathode materials. The company said the structure is designed to meet U.S. requirements limiting reliance on prohibited foreign entities in clean-energy supply chains. U.S. tax rules restrict access to certain clean-energy credits when components or critical minerals receive material assistance from such entities.

EcoPro expects greater control over raw-material procurement to improve its cost competitiveness and strengthen its ability to win orders from global battery-cell manufacturers and automakers.

EcoPro BM will finance the investments through a 1.2 trillion won, or about $774 million, rights offering. Its board approved the issuance of 9,900,990 new common shares Tuesday.

Of the proceeds, 915 billion won, or about $590 million, will be used to acquire the BNSI stake and complete remaining investments in EcoPro BM’s Hungarian subsidiary.

An additional 135 billion won, or about $87 million, will be used as operating capital, including purchases of raw materials. The remaining 150 billion won, or about $97 million, will finance production facilities.

EcoPro, the group’s holding company, plans to subscribe for more than 120% of the shares allocated to it. The company said the decision demonstrated confidence in the Indonesian mineral business and a commitment to minimizing concerns about the dilution of shareholder value.

“This rights offering is a strategic decision to establish an early position in the global nickel market and improve our competitiveness in nickel-cobalt-manganese cathode materials,” EcoPro BM Chief Executive Officer Choi Moon-ho said.

“By combining EcoPro’s high-nickel technology with a decisive cost advantage, we will work to secure leadership in the global market for nickel-based batteries,” Choi said. EcoPro BM’s official English-language materials identify its chief executive as Choi Moon-ho.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260630010010768

Indonesia court finds former education minister guilty of abuse of authority and of causing state losses.

A court in Indonesia has sentenced former Education Minister Nadiem Makarim, co-founder of the Gojek app, to 10 years in prison on corruption charges.

Judges at the Jakarta anti-corruption court on Tuesday found Makarim guilty of corruption related to the procurement of Chromebook laptops for schools during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Chief Judge Purwanto Abdullah, presiding over the ruling at Indonesia’s Corruption Court in Jakarta, said a panel of judges had found Makarim guilty of abuse of authority and of causing state losses. He was found not guilty of directly seeking to enrich himself.

The court said the case caused state losses of approximately $120m. It also ordered Makarim to pay a fine of Rp1 billion ($55,850) and Rp809 billion (more than $45m) in restitution, or face additional prison time.

The verdict marks a sharp fall for the Ivy League-educated entrepreneur once seen as a symbol of Indonesia’s startup sector.

Makarim, 41, co-founded Gojek in 2010, growing it from a call centre with 20 motorcycle drivers into a major ride-hailing and delivery platform.

He became one of Indonesia’s youngest cabinet ministers in 2019 and served as education minister until 2024.

Prosecutors said his decision to purchase Chromebook laptops, which run Google’s ChromeOS, was linked to the US tech giant’s investment in Gojek.

Makarim has consistently denied wrongdoing and vowed to appeal.

“The judges couldn’t even look me in the eye,” he said, adding he could not pay the amount ordered under the ruling.

The former minister has said the procurement saved money and called the case an “investigative error”.

In his defence this month, he said: “Experts and factual witnesses have stated: there is no element of state loss, no element of violation of the law, no element of self-enrichment, enrichment of another person or company, and no malicious intent or bad intentions.”

Prosecutors had sought an 18-year prison sentence and Rp5.68 trillion (about $313m) in restitution. Google was not charged and has denied any wrongdoing.

GoTo Group, formed after Gojek merged with Tokopedia in 2021, said Makarim had not had a decision-making role since resigning in 2019.

Makarim, whose lawyer father once served on the ethics committee of Indonesia’s anti-corruption body, said he joined the government to encourage professionals to enter public service.

Rescuers face heavy rains, equipment failures in search for two people trapped in central Laos cave by flash floods.

Heavy rains have threatened to delay the search for two people who remain missing in a flooded cave in Laos, after five others were rescued after being trapped underground for more than a week.

Finnish diver Mikko Paasi, one of the first international rescuers to arrive at the site, told The Associated Press news agency that rains on Sunday had filled the cave up to the second chamber, preventing divers from entering until pumps can lower the water level.

A drainage pump also broke, making the situation even more difficult, said fellow diver Yoshitaka Isaji of Japan.

Rescue teams from Laos and neighbouring Thailand have been working together over the past week to rescue the trapped villagers, alongside divers from countries including Finland, Malaysia, Japan, Indonesia, France and Australia.

Seven people entered the cave in a remote mountainous area of central Xaysomboun province last week to look for valuable minerals such as gold, before being trapped by a flash flood that blocked their way out, according to local media reports.

One other person escaped and alerted the authorities.

A Laotian rescue group said on Sunday it had received “substantial” information on the cave system from the five men who were rescued earlier this week. “The hope is that today’s mission will locate both remaining victims,” the group wrote on social media.

The rescued men were being treated at a local hospital and were doing well, Malaysian diver Lee Kian Lie, who is taking part in the operation, told AP.

“We interviewed them about how the deeper part of the cave looks like. We will continue to search based on the information we have, and perhaps we will be able to get to the other two,” he said.

Rescuers said they navigated more than 200m (650 feet) into the cave and discovered five chambers in the system. The five people rescued so far were found in the fifth chamber.

Paasi, the Finnish diver, told AP that the survivors reported a narrow crack in the fifth chamber that could be a passage leading to a deeper part of the cave system.

“This was the only place that we haven’t checked in the mine, where the two lost miners could still be,” he said in a video interview.

The five men who were rescued – identified by their first names as Khamla, Mued, Ee, Ing and Laen – were first found last Wednesday.

The first man was safely extracted on Friday, guided through a narrow flooded passage by an expert diver. The remaining four left the cave on Saturday, after the water receded enough for them to walk out on their own, rescuers said.

Videos posted online on Saturday showed emotional moments as the men emerged one by one from the cave. Some collapsed on the ground at the cave’s entrance, and were hugged by a group of workers who cried with joy.

Later moments showed them lying on stretchers, wrapped in foil blankets and fitted with oxygen masks before being transported out.