Hungary

Béla Guttmann may be the most consequential soccer coach you’ve never heard of. But if it weren’t for Guttmann, you may never have heard of Pelé.

And Brazil may never have become the greatest soccer-playing country on Earth.

That’s because Guttmann changed the shape of modern Brazilian soccer — and changed the sport forever — when he imported the revolutionary 4-2-4 system from Hungary to Sao Paulo in 1957. A year later, Brazil won the first of five World Cups and the joga bonito was born.

But what Guttmann brought to Brazil isn’t nearly as interesting as how he got it there. That’s just one of the fascinating stories in “The Beautiful Game … The Untold Story,” the exhibit that will open the Holocaust Museum LA on Sunday at the Goldrich Cultural Center, a $70-million expansion that will double the size of the Pan Pacific Park museum’s campus to 70,000 square feet.

A soccer ball from the holocaust is among the items on display in the exhibit “The Beautiful Game … The Untold Story” at the Holocaust Museum LA.

(Eric Thayer/Los Angeles Times)

The exhibit was unveiled during a private reception on Saturday followed by a free preview day open to the public from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. The grand public opening will take place in August.

The show’s launch coincides with eight local World Cup matches, which kicked off with the United States’ 4-1 win over Paraguay on Friday at SoFi Stadium, and it shines a light on the important but largely overlooked relationship between Jewish life and the global game, as well as how Jewish innovators like Guttmann shaped the modern rhythm, style and culture of the sport.

“It was in the same intellectual level as jazz, as art and everything modern and progressive,” journalist Allon Sander, who helped curate the exhibit, said of Jewish participation in European soccer in the years before World War II.

“The origin of the game and how it intersects with Jews and the Holocaust and the impact that these Jewish footballers and coaches had to shape the game and help popularize the sport is so fascinating,” added Beth Kean, the museum’s CEO. “And it’s an unknown history.”

Much of that story can be told through Guttmann, who was born in Budapest in the final year of the 19th century and developed into one of the sport’s first Jewish stars, representing Hungary in the 1924 Olympics and playing for nine teams in two countries before retiring to become a coach.

But none of that success mattered when the Hungarian government began introducing anti-Jewish laws in 1938, costing Guttmann his job and nearly his life when he was sent to a Nazi forced-labor camp, where he was tortured. Just days before he believed he would be shipped to Auschwitz, which meant certain death, he escaped alongside Erno Erbstein, another Jewish coach.

Erbstein revolutionized soccer in Italy before dying in 1949, along with the entire Torino team, when their plane crashed into a hilltop outside Turin. Four years ago, he was inducted into the Italian soccer hall of fame. Guttmann, meanwhile, who lost much of his family in the Nazi death camps, would go on to coach for 42 years in 14 countries, winning championships in six of them yet only staying in a single place for more than two years just once.

“He’s running away from his demons,” said Ronen Dorfan, a journalist and sports historian based in Budapest whose research was instrumental in putting the exhibit together. “His father was murdered, his sister was murdered. You never know how you survived in Budapest during the war so he had guilt feelings.”

A jersey worn by player Max Wozniak and a jersey from the 1930s are displayed in an exhibit called “The Beautiful Game … The Untold Story.”

(Eric Thayer/Los Angeles Times)

The exhibit was designed in three sections, the first devoted to the years before World War II, the second is about the Holocaust and the third is the postwar years. And while it details Jewish participation in, and influence on, global soccer, it also challenges the cliché that Jews were intellectuals, artists and laborers but not athletes.

“We are always trying to challenge stereotypes. Stereotypes that we might have about ourselves and even stereotypes that we believe about others,” said Jordanna Gessler, the museum’s vice president of education and exhibits who helped curate the show. “It’s crucial to help people find their place and their voice and really see the unity, the similarities between people.

“This is a story that was lost in time and we’re really bringing it out,” Gessler added. “To really have this conversation and encourage people to explore stories that they might not know.”

One thing people might not know is that in the 1920s and ‘30s, Europe’s best teams weren’t in England, Germany or France, but in Austria and Hungary, where they were led by Jewish players and coaches such as Hugo Meisl, Jozsef Braun, Arpad Weisz, Marton Bukovi, Gusztav Sebes and Gyula Mandi. Weisz and Braun were both killed by the Nazis.

A soccer ball from the 1974 World Cup is displayed at an exhibit called “The Beautiful Game … The Untold Story.”

(Eric Thayer/Los Angeles Times)

The surge of antisemitism and fascism in Germany, Italy and Eastern Europe helped spread the influence of those revolutionary players and coaches around the world.

“With the rise of the Reich and the Holocaust, the coaches ran away,” Dorfan said. “And they ran to every corner of the world, to Brazil, to Argentina, to Portugal [and] provided coaches to Real Madrid, to Barcelona, to Benfica, to Flamengo.

“There isn’t one of these clubs that doesn’t owe its tactical development in the ‘40s and ‘50s to the Jewish coaches, which came primarily from Hungary.”

The primary tactical development was the shift from the popular but rigid 2-3-5 formation, which required immense physical endurance and tactical discipline, to the fluid 4-2-4, which spread the wingers to the touch line and allowed for improvisation and creativity on the attacking end, a formation pioneered in Budapest in the 1920s.

“They developed a more refined game of passing the ball, keeping it on the carpet rather than the English kick and run, and really put thought into tactical thinking,” Dorfan said.

Guttmann, who played or coached for more than two dozen teams in his career — including one, in Romania, that paid him in vegetables during the postwar period — brought the Hungarian approach to Brazil in 1957 when he coached Sao Paulo to a championship. After Vicente Feola, the manager Guttmann replaced at Sao Paulo, took over the national team a year later, he brought the formation with him, popularizing many of the tactics still used in modern soccer, such as fluid defensive wingers, overlapping full backs, the use of a withdrawn striker and an attacking midfield.

The soccer team at the Theresienstadt concentration camp’s flag is displayed in a Holocaust Museum LA exhibit called “The Beautiful Game … The Untold Story.”

(Eric Thayer/Los Angeles Times)

“He is the whole exhibition in one man,” Dorfan said of Guttmann.

“Obviously if we wouldn’t have had the Holocaust, those [coaches] wouldn’t be kept out of Europe, Europe would be much stronger, much more developed. [And] then the development of Brazil or the success of Brazil would be coming much later,” Sander said.

Dorfan spent the better part of two years tracking down many of the more than 100 trophies, uniforms, photos and trinkets that make up “The Beautiful Game” exhibit, a search that required determination, perseverance and more than a little luck. Many of the items, because of their ties to Jewish athletes and teams, were hidden during the war and presumed lost. Others resurfaced only through detective work that sent Dorfan following leads that spanned decades and crossed more than a dozen borders.

That also cost money. So Alan Rothenberg, the man who, as president of the U.S. Soccer Federation, first brought the World Cup to Los Angeles 32 years ago, stepped up to lead an effort that raised more than $1 million to fund the exhibit.

“The story really needs to be told, particularly with what’s going on right now with respect to antisemitism,” Rothenberg said. “It’s really important for people to realize what can happen. And soccer is a great vehicle to draw them in. The one main thing in the museum is bringing schoolkids in.”

The Nazis and their collaborators failed in their attempt to erase the history of Jewish soccer pioneers; in fact, they inadvertently popularized both the men — and women — and their ideas. But the sport also helped other Jews survive a dark period and Kean said that may be the most beautiful and uplifting part of “The Beautiful Game.”

“The main reason we decided to do this exhibition in the first place is because for years so many survivors, when they talk about their life before the war, so many of them talk about soccer. So many of them were passionate and fond of the sport,” she said.

“We knew the exhibit opening was going to coincide with the World Cup. L.A. is going to be on the world stage. This is a great opportunity for the museum to get these stories out.”

The last 100 years have seen a boom in trade, prosperity and wealth across the world, at unprecedented rates in human history. As a species, we are now more wealthy, healthy, and less likely to be killed in conflict than ever before, despite the many horrors we see in the daily news cycle.

This golden age we live in has run in tandem with an ever-expanding population; in the 1920s, there were only two billion people on the planet. A century later, that number has skyrocketed up to eight billion. Yet the increase of prosperity and people has come at a devastating price – global warming, the melting of the ice caps, an epidemic of plastic pollution and the mass destruction of the planet’s biodiversity are all intrinsically connected to population growth. More recently, however, the trend has been bucking. The watchful eyes of demographers have been drawn to data that reveal a world of ageing societies, plummeting birth rates, and dwindling populations. Surely this must be a good thing for the planet and therefore humanity … right? Armed with a file full of “population bomb” headlines – the explosion will happen mid-century, when humans will peak around 8.5 – 9 billion people, followed by drastic falls – we embark on a worldwide exploration with a very unique purpose. What truths and human stories can we discover behind the red flag statistics? What are the population tipping points of fertility, birth and death rates? And how, among the other culprits of climate change, conflict, global health and over consumption, might they make or break the future of our life on earth?

Episode 1: Baby Doomers

Hungary’s political landscape has undergone a major shift following the electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party after 16 years in power. The new governing Tisza party, led by Prime Minister Péter Magyar, is now reversing several institutions created under the previous administration, including the controversial Sovereignty Protection Office.

The office was established in 2023 under former Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to monitor what the government described as foreign political interference in domestic affairs.

What Happened

The Tisza party has submitted a bill to parliament proposing the abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO), arguing that it has no genuine public function and was used for political purposes.

According to the bill, the agency was designed to pressure opposition figures, journalists, civil society organizations, and media outlets by labeling them as serving “foreign interests.”

The SPO did not immediately respond to requests for comment. During its operation, it published studies aligned with the former government’s positions on issues such as migration, Ukraine, and relations with the European Union.

Why the Office Is Controversial

Critics have long argued that the Sovereignty Protection Office functioned as a political tool rather than an independent watchdog. It was frequently accused of targeting government critics and reinforcing narratives favorable to the ruling party at the time.

The European Commission had also launched infringement proceedings against Hungary over the law that created the agency, raising concerns about its compatibility with EU standards on media freedom and democratic oversight.

Opponents compared the SPO to similar legislation in other countries that restrict foreign-funded organizations, warning that it risked undermining press freedom and civil society independence.

Political Shift After the Election

The proposed abolition comes after a major political transition in Hungary, where the Tisza party defeated Orbán’s Fidesz in parliamentary elections, ending more than a decade of uninterrupted rule.

The new government has signaled a broader effort to dismantle institutions seen as politically aligned with the previous administration and restore institutional neutrality in governance.

What Comes Next

The bill will now be debated in parliament, where the Tisza party holds a governing majority. If passed, it would formally dissolve the Sovereignty Protection Office and potentially roll back other measures introduced under Orbán’s leadership.

The move is likely to deepen political divisions in Hungary, where debates over media freedom, foreign influence, and relations with the European Union remain highly contentious.

With information from Reuters.

Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar said he expects to finalize a political agreement with Ursula von der Leyen over the release of billions of euros in frozen European Union funds during talks in Brussels.

The negotiations focus on unlocking financial support that had been suspended under the previous government led by former Prime Minister Viktor Orban due to long standing EU concerns regarding corruption, rule of law standards, and judicial independence.

Hungary is seeking access to approximately 6.5 billion euros in EU recovery grants and 3.9 billion euros in low interest loans before a critical August deadline. Additional structural funds worth around 7 billion euros also remain frozen.

The talks come at a crucial moment for Hungary’s economy, which has struggled with weak growth, fiscal pressure, and budgetary strain over the past three years.

Why It Matters

The potential agreement carries major economic and political significance for both Hungary and the European Union.

For Hungary, securing the release of EU funds is essential to stabilizing public finances, supporting economic growth, and restoring investor confidence. The country’s economy has experienced prolonged stagnation, while high spending pressures and limited fiscal flexibility have increased urgency around external financing.

For the European Union, the negotiations represent an important test of how Brussels balances financial support with enforcement of democratic and governance standards among member states.

The dispute over frozen funds has become one of the most prominent examples of tensions between the EU and governments accused of weakening judicial independence or failing to address corruption concerns.

A successful agreement could signal improving relations between Brussels and Hungary after years of political friction under Orban’s leadership.

Key Stakeholders

Hungary’s Government

Prime Minister Peter Magyar is under pressure to secure financial relief while also demonstrating willingness to meet EU governance expectations.

European Commission

The European Commission must balance political compromise with maintaining credibility on rule of law enforcement and anti corruption standards across the bloc.

Hungarian Economy

Businesses, investors, and public institutions in Hungary are closely watching the outcome because EU funding plays a major role in infrastructure, development, and economic stability.

European Union Member States

Other EU governments are monitoring the negotiations as they could shape future disputes involving rule of law conditions and access to EU financial support.

Analysis

The negotiations reflect a broader shift in Hungary’s relationship with the European Union following the political transition away from Viktor Orban’s administration.

Under Orban, disputes with Brussels became increasingly confrontational, particularly over democratic governance, judicial reforms, media freedoms, and corruption allegations. Peter Magyar appears to be pursuing a more pragmatic approach focused on rebuilding trust with EU institutions while securing urgently needed economic support.

However, the remaining disagreements over anti corruption measures suggest Brussels still wants stronger guarantees before fully releasing funds. This highlights the EU’s growing willingness to use financial leverage as a tool for enforcing governance standards within member states.

For Hungary, the pressure is primarily economic. Frozen EU funds have limited the government’s financial flexibility at a time when growth remains weak and fiscal conditions are strained. Unlocking the money would provide both immediate economic relief and an important political victory for Magyar’s government.

At the same time, the negotiations also carry symbolic importance for the EU itself. Brussels will want to demonstrate that compromise does not come at the expense of accountability, especially after years of criticism over democratic backsliding within the bloc.

Future Outlook

If a political agreement is finalized, Hungary could begin unlocking critical EU funding in the coming months, easing fiscal pressure and improving economic confidence.

However, implementation will remain important. Brussels is likely to continue closely monitoring Hungary’s anti corruption reforms and governance commitments before fully releasing all frozen funds.

A successful deal may also help normalize Hungary’s relationship with the European Union after years of tension, potentially opening the door for broader cooperation on economic and political issues.

At the same time, the outcome could influence future EU disputes involving rule of law conditions and financial oversight, particularly as Brussels increasingly links access to funding with governance standards.

For Hungary, the immediate priority remains economic stabilization. But politically, the negotiations may also determine whether Peter Magyar can establish a more cooperative and sustainable relationship with Europe while distancing his administration from the confrontational legacy of the Orban era.

With information from Reuters.

From popular beach resorts to bustling European cities, language experts reveal the holiday destinations that British tourists commonly mispronounce — plus how to say them correctly

Brits are passionate about their overseas holidays. One advantage of living in the UK is having Europe right on our doorstep – yet many people may be completely unaware of how to pronounce their chosen destination correctly.

Linguistic specialists at the learning app Preply have compiled a list of locations Brits most frequently mispronounce. If you’re arranging a trip to any of these spots, verify your pronunciation using Preply’s handy guide (below). Mastering the correct pronunciation of your dream destination could help you avoid embarrassment while you’re there, reports the Express.

Cannes, France

The pronunciation of this glamorous French resort continues to catch people out. Many Brits naturally pronounce the final “s” or insert an additional syllable, but it’s actually a quick single syllable “kan”.

Phuket, Thailand

This stunning island getaway is incredibly popular among British holidaymakers but remains consistently mispronounced. The spelling can be deceptive, but the proper pronunciation is much simpler, beginning with a soft “p” to create “poo-ket”.

Cinque Terre, Italy

Renowned for its pastel-coloured buildings and picturesque harbours, this beautiful Italian coastal stretch welcomes millions of visitors annually, and countless people are getting it wrong.

Don’t rely on English pronunciation rules; instead, follow Italian conventions, starting with “cheen-kweh” and finishing with a rolled “teh-rreh”.

Kraków, Poland

This Polish city is regularly mispronounced. The main error is overemphasising the “ow” ending, when it ought to be a gentler “kov”.

Ibiza, Spain

It may be among the UK’s most beloved party destinations, but that hasn’t protected it from mispronunciation. Numerous people continue to overpronounce the “z” when it should actually be a gentle “th” sound.

Lagos, Portugal

This Algarve holiday favourite is frequently mispronounced by visitors. English speakers tend to pronounce it phonetically, whereas in Portuguese, the ending features a gentler “sh” sound, creating “lah-gosh”.

Budapest, Hungary

Common mispronunciation: “Buda-pest”

Hungary’s capital presents difficulties due to its misleading spelling. The proper pronunciation replaces the hard “pest” with a gentler “pesht”.

Barcelona, Spain

Despite Barcelona being an exceptionally popular tourist destination, many continue to anglicise the name. In Spanish, the “c” is pronounced “th”.

Marylebone, London

Despite being on British home turf, many people still struggle to pronounce certain locations. Marylebone is among these places. Instead of pronouncing it phonetically, it’s shortened to “Mar-li-bone”.

Edinburgh, Scotland

Scotland’s capital represents a classic stumbling block for tourists, who frequently over-enunciate every letter while attempting to get it correct. In practice, locals adopt a considerably more casual approach, dropping the ending completely and keeping it brief and low-key: “Edin-bruh.”

Hungary’s newly elected leader, Peter Magyar, stormed to power last weekend after campaigning to, among other things, take a step back from Russia.

Instead, Magyar has promised voters he will steer Hungary back towards the European Union, following the 16-year rule of far-right Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who went to great lengths to deepen ties with Russia.

Under Orban, Hungary opposed most of the European Union’s stances against Russia and  blocked sanctions and obstructed military aid for Ukraine.

Above all, he and his Fidesz party entrenched Hungary’s reliance on Russian oil.

Now, following a massive electoral turnout and a landslide victory, Magyar – once a devotee of Orban and now leader of the centre-right Tisza party – has promised to end Russian oil imports by 2035. But how realistic a goal is that? And can he achieve it?

How much does Hungary depend on Russia for energy?

Hungary has been central to keeping Russian oil and gas flowing into the EU, even as Europe and the US banned some imports and imposed sanctions on anyone paying more than $60 a barrel for Russian oil.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU banned seaborne imports of Russian oil but kept land flows legal. That allowed Hungary to continue importing most of its crude by pipeline via Ukraine.

The EU first announced plans to phase out Russian energy imports in May 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In December 2025, a binding agreement was made for member nations to completely phase out Russian oil and gas imports by late 2027. But, instead of diversifying from Moscow, Hungary increased its dependency.

According to a 2026 report by the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), Hungary had expanded its reliance on Russian crude from 61 percent in 2021 to 93 percent by 2025.

Much of the crude oil Hungary imports from Russia comes via the Druzhba pipeline. It is one of the key pipelines that ensures the continued flow of Russian crude to both Hungary and Slovakia. At 5,500 km (3,420 miles) long, it begins in Almetyevsk in western Russia and runs into Belarus. It splits at Mozyr, with one branch going to Poland and Germany and the southern branch goes through Ukraine into Slovakia, Hungary and Czechia.

In January, the section of the pipeline running through Ukraine suffered significant damage. Ukraine blamed a Russian airstrike – Moscow denies that.

Hungary and Slovakia have complained that Ukraine has been deliberately slow to repair the damage. As a result, in March, Orban vetoed a 90 billion euro ($106bn) loan from the EU to Ukraine until the pipeline reopens.

On Tuesday this week, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said oil will flow again through the conduit by the end of April as he expects the new Hungarian leadership to lift its veto on the loan by then.

As for gas, Hungary remains one of the most dependent EU member states on Russian natural gas, accounting for roughly three-quarters of its annual imports, the CSD report shows.

Since the start of Russia’s invasion, Hungary has imported an estimated 15.6 billion euros ($18.4bn) worth of Russian gas. Long-term contracts with Russia’s state-owned Gazprom, the continued reliance on TurkStream – a natural gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkiye – and “the weak use of alternative interconnectors have locked the country into Russia’s reconfigured gas export system”, the CSD report states.

Nuclear energy dependency is yet another issue. Hungary granted Rosatom, the Russian state nuclear energy corporation, the construction contract for the expansion of its Paks atomic plant, 100km (62 miles) southwest of Budapest on the Danube River. Russia, in turn, provided Hungary with a state loan to finance most of the development of new reactors. The European Commission approved the plan in 2017 and construction started in February.

Now, Magyar says he intends to reassess the project’s financing. But the Paks plant provides 40 to 50 percent of all electricity generated in Hungary. The expansion plans will increase that to between 60 and 70 percent, which would cut reliance on imported energy, but keep Hungary tied to Russia. 

According to a 2025 joint research paper by the Center for the Study of Democracy and the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Hungary could potentially diversify its energy supply by importing non-Russian oil via alternative sources such as the Adria pipeline. It transports crude from the Adriatic Sea to refineries in Croatia, Serbia, Hungary and Slovakia. Their refiners, which are controlled by Hungarian oil and gas company MOL, are capable of processing non-Russian crude, the research paper said.

Russian oil has been coming in at a discounted rate as a result of Western sanctions, so any diversification will likely be more expensive.

Can Hungary wean itself off its dependence on Russian oil?

It won’t be easy, and Magyar knows it. “The geographical position of neither Russia nor Hungary will change. Our energy exposure will also be here for a while,” he said before last weekend’s election. And in an interview with the Financial Times, Magyar insisted that Russian imports should remain an option. “This does not mean that by ending dependence on someone you no longer continue to buy from them,” he said.

Magyar will seek to strike a balance between respecting current contracts with Moscow to ensure Hungary’s energy security, while establishing political distance, said Pawel Zerka, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

“I would expect this government not to be pro-Russia in the sense of going to Moscow and keeping ties with the Russian government, but they don’t have easy options to replace Russian fuel with something else, especially considering the international situation with the Middle East,” Zerka said, referring to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the Gulf which has blocked the shipping of 20 percent of the world’s oil and LNG supplies.

Zerka added that the newly elected leader will not have political room to be particularly cordial with Russian President Vladimir Putin, considering the disapproval of Russia by his electoral base. A recent poll by the European Council on Foreign Relations shows that a majority of Tisza’s voters see Russia as an adversary or rival to compete with.

“It will be interesting to see how he combines this with energy needs,” Zerka said.

How does the EU view Hungary’s energy ties to Russia?

The strong energy ties between Russia and Hungary have long caused friction with the EU. Following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European bloc has worked to cut imports of Russian oil and gas. Budapest has done the opposite.

In January, the EU passed legislation to completely phase out Russian gas and LNG imports by late 2027.

Orban’s government had called for all restrictions on Russian oil to be lifted as a result of the global energy crisis triggered by the war in the Middle East. While Trump has made some concessions on Russian oil already loaded on tankers at sea – causing several heading for China to head to India instead – EU leaders have maintained they will hold firm on sanctions.

In the lead-up to last weekend’s election, Magyar’s manifesto called the dependence on Russian energy a “systemic risk” and he would wean Hungary off its reliance by 2035. But whether he can do that in time to beat the EU’s 2027 deadline is likely to provoke discussion in Brussels.

The election victory of Hungary’s Tisza party on April 12 marks the end of the 16 year rule of Viktor Orbán, a figure who has long defined Hungary’s contentious relationship with the European Union. His tenure reshaped Hungary’s domestic institutions and repeatedly placed the country at odds with EU norms, laws, and political consensus.

The incoming leadership under Péter Magyar now inherits not only a domestic mandate for change but also the complex task of rebuilding trust with the EU after years of institutional confrontation.

A fractured relationship with Brussels

Under Orbán, Hungary frequently clashed with EU institutions over rule of law, judicial independence, media freedom, and migration policy. One of the most controversial measures was the lowering of the retirement age for judges and prosecutors, which critics argued enabled political reshaping of the judiciary.

Tensions escalated further after 2022, when Hungary’s stance on sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine created repeated deadlocks within EU decision making processes.

Financial pressure also became a key tool of EU leverage. The European Commission suspended billions of euros in funding to Hungary, citing concerns over corruption and democratic backsliding, deepening the political divide.

Allegations and escalating mistrust

Relations deteriorated further following leaked reports alleging that senior Hungarian officials coordinated with Russian counterparts during sensitive EU discussions. These claims intensified accusations within parts of the EU that Hungary had undermined collective decision making during a period of heightened geopolitical tension.

While Budapest has rejected many of these allegations, they contributed to a climate of mistrust that severely weakened Hungary’s position within the bloc.

A new government with a reform mandate

The Tisza party’s victory signals a clear domestic demand for change, particularly around governance and corruption. The new administration has strong incentives to restore relations with the EU, not least because of the approximately 17 billion euros in suspended funding that could be unlocked if conditions are met.

EU leaders, however, have made it clear that financial normalization will depend on compliance with a wide set of governance and legal reforms. These include anti corruption measures, judicial independence safeguards, and adjustments to policies affecting migration and minority rights.

Structural constraints on reform

Despite political momentum for rapprochement, significant obstacles remain. Hungarian society remains more socially conservative and more sceptical of the EU than many of its Western counterparts. This limits the political space for rapid liberal reforms, particularly in sensitive areas such as LGBTQ+ rights and asylum policy.

Economic pressures further complicate the situation. The new government will inherit fiscal strain linked to years of disputed EU funding and broader geopolitical uncertainty, including the economic effects of the ongoing war involving Iran, which has disrupted global energy markets and increased financial volatility.

Ukraine and the Russia question

One of the most sensitive areas in Hungary’s future EU relationship will be its position on Ukraine. While Péter Magyar has signaled a willingness to improve relations with Ukraine and align more closely with NATO and EU policy, key ambiguities remain.

His stated openness to continuing Russian energy imports for the foreseeable future, combined with proposals for a referendum on Ukrainian EU membership, suggests that strategic continuity with aspects of the previous government may persist.

Given public scepticism toward Ukraine within Hungary, any referendum could significantly complicate EU enlargement plans.

Analysis

The end of Orbán’s long tenure represents a clear political inflection point in EU Hungary relations. It removes a persistent source of institutional confrontation and opens the possibility of renewed cooperation with Brussels.

However, the assumption that relations will automatically normalize is overly optimistic. The structural sources of tension between Hungary and the EU extend beyond one leader. They include divergent political cultures, competing interpretations of sovereignty, and deep disagreements over migration, rule of law, and foreign policy alignment.

The new government’s dependence on EU funds gives Brussels significant leverage, but also creates domestic political risk if reforms are perceived as externally imposed. This creates a delicate balancing act between compliance and legitimacy.

On foreign policy, Hungary’s position on Russia and Ukraine will remain the most consequential test. Even partial continuity with previous policies could reintroduce friction at a time when EU unity is under pressure from multiple geopolitical crises.

Ultimately, Orbán’s departure may mark the end of one chapter, but it does not resolve the underlying tensions that have defined Hungary’s relationship with the European project. The reset, while possible, will be gradual, conditional, and politically contested.

With information from Reuters.

On Sunday night, tens of thousands of Hungarians packed the banks of the Danube waving flags, crying of joy, popping bottles. Celebrating something that political analysts had spent years telling them was almost impossible: the electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán, the autocrat whose ploys and manipulations made him a uniquely disturbing force in the European Union. After 16 years in power, Hungary’s self-proclaimed architect of “illiberal democracy” conceded defeat within hours of the polls closing.

His rival, Péter Magyar (the equivalent of Pedro Veneco), had won 137 seats in a 199-seat parliament, a two-thirds supermajority that gave him not just a government, but the ability to rewrite the very constitution Orbán had rigged to protect himself. This appears to be the plan.

Venezuelans watching from afar could be forgiven for feeling two things at once: genuine joy, and a familiar, creeping doubt. 

Sure, but that’s Hungary.

The doubt is understandable. It’s also, at this particular moment in Venezuelan history, worth interrogating.

To understand whether Hungary provides a useful lesson, we need to venture farther than our diasporic links, like La Danubio, Catherine Fulop and Shirley Varnagy. You first need a category distinction that political scientists call the difference between a closed authoritarian regime and a competitive one. A closed autocracy doesn’t bother with the pretense of real elections. Or when it does, it simply invents the results. Especially after July 2024, Venezuela had become exactly this: we all know what happened. Politically, there was no game to play unless you played by the regime’s rules. The game was a charade. 

Orbán’s Hungary was something different, more insidious. Similar to what Chávez did to the institutions in the 2000s, while using hyper-ideological and reactionary rhetoric. The European Parliament had classified it as a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy.” Orbán bent every institution he could reach: the judiciary, the media, the electoral rules themselves.

The scene on the Danube on Sunday night was a piece of great news in a political era that doesn’t offer many of them. The scenes in Budapest matter to us. But it shouldn’t be mistaken for a mirror.

He gerrymandered the system to favor the largest single party, confident that party would always be his. But he never quite crossed the line into fabricating vote counts, à la Maduro or Lukashenko. The game was still real, even if the playing field was tilted.

That distinction is now relevant because Venezuela’s political reality has shifted in ways that were unimaginable five months ago. The current regime Delcy Rodríguez leads is not identical to that of 2024 and 2025. Under US pressure, a few hundred political prisoners have been released and an amnesty law was approved in February. albeit with mixed results (more than 500 political prisoners are still behind bars, and amnesty has been formally denied to high-profile politicians and NGO leaders like Javier Tarazona). Overall, we see gestures that try to transmit magnanimity, but are moves meant to look like compliance while chavismo waits for Washington’s attention to wander.

But here’s the thing: even performative openings create real cracks, and the cracks are showing. In February alone, Venezuela has recorded dozens of protests, an exponential increase compared to the same month in 2025. Workers and students have taken to the streets of Caracas four times this year demanding salary increases, openly calling on the Rodríguez siblings to answer for their pleas. Last weekend in Valencia, in a football game between Carabobo and Universidad Central (a game which has enough backdrop to make a book about it), football fans directed chants against the son of Alexander Granko Arteaga (who plays for UCV): “¡Dónde están que no se ven, los enchufados de la UCV,” loud enough so it could be hear transmission (that would translate roughly to “nowhere to be seen, the UCV cronies are nowhere to be seen”). In 2025, that chant would have landed them in jail. That was exactly the outcome in the last domestic football final.

Waiting for the opportunity

Venezuela is still not a democracy. But the differences remain significant: a regime slowly, reluctantly slipping out of its authoritarian fortress, coming to terms with the fact that it will eventually have to face a reckoning at the ballot box. That’s what happened to Orbán. He controlled the courts, the media, the electoral geometry, and still got swept out because of the accumulated weight of economic failure, corruption, and sheer exhaustion that eventually overwhelmed the machinery he had built.

The lesson is not that rigged systems are beatable through optimism. It is that rigged systems have structural limits, and that opposition alliances which survive long enough, and build broad enough coalitions, tend to be standing when those limits are reached. In our case, we’ve seen all possible iterations of what an opposition can be. In 2024, the Maria Corina-led movement became the most formidable electoral force the country has seen in a while. That should have been our Orbán down moment. Nonetheless, the inertia we have seen since the beginning of the year is too good to let it slip away.

Political scientist Yascha Mounk, writing about Magyar’s victory, made an interesting observation that some might believe applies to Venezuelan democratic forces: the Hungarian opposition ousted Orbán on its fourth try, after years of humiliation, internal divisions and strategic errors. Patience, he argues, is its own form of political discipline.

This is Mounk’s post-populist dilemma, live, and a miniature preview of what a potential democratic government in Caracas would have in front of itself.

Again, the Venezuelan opposition doesn’t need that lesson. It already learned it, the hard way, and on a harder playing field. In 2015, it won a supermajority in the Asamblea and watched its powers get neutered one by one. In July 2024, it beat Maduro overwhelmingly and proved its victory with the official tally sheets. Edmundo González Urrutia did not become president because the movement backing him lacked organization, or coalition-building, or the kind of credible leadership that Magyar built from scratch since leaving Orban’s party two years ago. González Urrutia failed to take power because the regime decided that electoral results were optional.

The question was never whether the Venezuelan opposition could win an election. They already did in a way that should clarify the terrain for future opportunities. The actas and the popular support are powerful symbols that should endure. The question is whether they can repeat that performance, seizing the minimal opening they have in front of them whatever the broader circumstances. Then yes, the patience Mounk mentions is relevant.

The post-autocracy trap

Mounk is right to poop the party a little bit with a warning he calls the “post-populist dilemma.” Even with his supermajority, Magyar inherits a State that Orbán hollowed out and refilled with loyalists. He has two options: either fire them and bring about an anti-Fidesz purge; or leave them in place and be sabotaged from within. In his first week in power, Magyar is showing he wants to go for the first option. He has already called for the resignation of several key ministers of the Orban regime.

Venezuela would face this dilemma on steroids. Chavismo has had 27 years to embed itself across nearly everything. Rodríguez herself operates within a questionable agency on security forces (a certain someone remains interior minister and vice president for security). Any future Venezuelan government elected under competitive conditions would inherit an institutional landscape far more captured and complex than anything Magyar faces in Budapest.

This is not a reason for despair, but it does require confronting an uncomfortable asymmetry. When Magyar navigated Hungary’s post-populist transition, he did so with the EU at his back, a bloc that had spent years dangling billions in frozen funds as an incentive for democratic reform, and whose membership gave Hungarian voters a concrete, tangible alternative to Orbán’s model. Venezuela’s external anchor is the Trump administration, which has been explicit about its priorities: oil first, stability second, elections somewhere further down the list. Rubio’s three-phase roadmap (stabilization, economic recovery, reconciliation and transition) is not an explicit democratic transition plan. It is a business plan with democracy on the side.

Preparation, then, means the opposition must be the one holding the democratic line demanding verifiable electoral conditions, refusing to let institutional reform become a performance to please DC, and cementing a coalition broad enough that can translate the popular inertia and mood towards a margin so big it can’t be tweaked. The EU didn’t save Hungary. Hungarians did. The lesson travels.

Magyar won because Hungarians were organized, patient and ready when the moment arrived. Venezuelans have already proven they can do the same.

Magyar isn’t waiting. Within 72 hours of his victory, he demanded that Hungary’s president resign immediately, and sent the same message to the heads of the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office and the media authority calling them “puppets who have been in power for the past 16 years.” On Wednesday morning, in his first radio interview in over a year and a half, he told the State broadcaster its news operation would be shut down and relaunched as a true public service. Some are already calling it a witch hunt. Others call it the bare minimum required to transform the country.

This is Mounk’s post-populist dilemma, live, and a miniature preview of what a potential democratic government in Caracas would have in front of itself. If Magyar, armed with a two-thirds supermajority and the EU at his back, is already navigating accusations of overreach on day three, imagine what a Venezuelan opposition government would face trying to dismantle 27 years of institutional occupation in the police, intelligence agencies, the military, the public media, the judiciary. The task ahead is massive, and solving the dilemma probably requires an orderly phase-out agreed before the next presidential vote.

The scene on the Danube on Sunday night was a piece of great news in a political era that doesn’t offer many of them. The scenes in Budapest matter to us. But it shouldn’t be mistaken for a mirror.

Venezuela is not Hungary. Delcy is not Orbán, she is arguably more pragmatic, but also more constrained. Orbán was a standalone autocrat who built his system around his own political survival. Rodríguez governs by a permanent balancing act: between Washington’s demands, the military high command, the hardline faction and other peripheral actors. The competitive opening, if it comes, will be narrower, more fragile and more dangerous than anything Magyar navigated.

These are reasons to take the Hungarian lesson seriously without taking it literally. Magyar won because Hungarians were organized, patient and ready when the moment arrived. Venezuelans have already proven they can do the same. The question now is simpler, and harder: when the moment comes again, can the popular will (and not just the results) be allowed to stand?

The rise of Péter Magyar marks one of the most significant political shifts in Hungary’s modern history. His victory over Viktor Orbán ends a 16 year era defined by centralized power and strained relations with the European Union.

What makes Magyar’s ascent particularly striking is that he did not emerge from outside the system, but from within it.

From insider to challenger

Magyar was once closely associated with Orbán’s ruling Fidesz party and initially echoed many of its political themes, including nationalism and scepticism toward liberal European norms.

His turning point came in 2024, when he publicly broke with the government and sharply criticised corruption and the concentration of power. This positioned him as a credible reformist with insider knowledge of how the system operated.

Dismantling an illiberal model

Orbán’s “illiberal democracy” was built on gradually consolidating control over key state institutions, including the judiciary and media. Over time, checks and balances weakened, allowing the ruling party to dominate political life.

Magyar’s understanding of this structure allowed him to directly challenge its foundations, particularly by focusing on corruption and institutional accountability, issues that resonated with voters.

Building a broad coalition

Over two years of campaigning, Magyar evolved politically. He travelled extensively, engaging with voters across the country and broadening his appeal beyond a narrow ideological base.

According to Zsolt Enyedi, Magyar became a unifying figure for pro democracy forces, offering a platform that different groups could rally around. This ability to bridge divides proved crucial in defeating a deeply entrenched political machine.

A more pragmatic approach to Europe

Magyar is not an uncritical supporter of the European Union, but he is expected to take a more constructive approach than his predecessor. Economic realities, particularly the need to unlock suspended EU funds, will push his government toward cooperation with Brussels.

This creates a pragmatic dynamic where reform is driven not only by political vision but also by financial necessity.

A difficult transition ahead

The transition of power is likely to be complex. Magyar has already expressed concern about actions taken by elements of the outgoing administration, suggesting resistance within the system he now seeks to reform.

Rebuilding institutions, restoring trust, and dismantling entrenched networks will take time and political capital.

Analysis

Péter Magyar’s victory highlights a key dynamic in political change within entrenched systems: transformation often comes from insiders who understand the machinery of power.

However, electoral success is only the first step. The deeper challenge lies in restructuring institutions that have been shaped over more than a decade. This process is inherently slow and politically sensitive.

Magyar must navigate competing pressures. Domestically, he faces a conservative and somewhat eurosceptic electorate. Internationally, he is expected to repair relations with the European Union and align more closely with its standards.

This balancing act will define his leadership. While his victory opens the door to democratic renewal, the outcome will depend on whether he can convert political momentum into lasting institutional change.

With information from Reuters.