front

Fighting is continuing along Yemen’s western front, with government forces reporting strikes against Houthi positions in areas stretching from Taiz toward the Red Sea coast.

The government said on Monday that its forces targeted Houthi personnel, equipment and positions in Dhu Bab in Taiz governorate and Khokha in neighboring Hodeidah governorate.

The areas are strategically important because they lie along Yemen’s western coastline near the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandab Strait, one of the world’s key maritime chokepoints connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and wider Indian Ocean.

Dhu Bab is close to Bab Al-Mandab, while Khokha lies further north along the Red Sea coast. The fighting is taking place along territory that links the front lines around Taiz with Yemen’s strategically important western coastline.

Yemen’s armed forces spokesman, Col. Majid Al-Nazili, said government forces targeted Houthi equipment, personnel and positions in the two areas.

Military commanders also visited several front lines around Taiz, including areas near Bani Omar, Jardad and Al-Wazi’iyah, to assess combat readiness.

Maj. Gen. Abu Bakr Al-Jubouli, commander of the Tor Al-Baha axis, said government forces had inflicted heavy losses on the Houthis during recent clashes.

After appearing last year on a contentious political panel discussion in Washington, D.C., Jessica Tarlov, co-host of the the popular Fox News show “The Five,” was approached by a transgender woman from Alabama.

Tarlov had said that Democratic candidates in tough races might have to concede that transgender collegiate swimmer Lia Thomas should not be competing against women assigned female at birth. But the matter never came up. Instead, the Alabama woman thanked Tarlov for making the case for Democrats against four conservatives on “The Five,” the most watched program in cable news and a favorite of family members who no longer speak to her.

“If more people talked like you, I might get my family back,” the woman said. “I’m just happy my parents can hear someone like you.”

Tarlov describes the encounter in her new book “I Disagree: Winning Arguments Without Losing Friends,” out Sept. 15. The part how-to book and part personal memoir is aimed at helping readers navigate the harsh political divisiveness in the culture. Her role on “The Five” has made her an advocate of going into not-so-friendly territory to debate issues rather than staying in comfort zones where views are unchallenged.

“I’m trying to show that a Democratic voice like mine can exist there, without an apology,” she writes of her Fox News position. “And that a person with strong liberal beliefs can bring that same perspective to a host of outlets and places.”

During a recent conversation at Fox News headquarters in Manhattan, Tarlov said the kind words of the fan from Alabama align with what she’s heard from children and grandchildren of the network’s loyal viewers. They are grateful their Fox News-loving families are exposed to a voice from outside the conservative media ecosystem.

Fox News co-host Jessica Tarlov is the author of “I Disagree.”

(Penguin Random House)

Tarlov, 42, has been a sturdy liberal counterweight at “The Five,” which averages 3.5 million viewers daily, according to Nielsen. She comes to the panel’s table highly prepared with data-based talking points, forcing her often intractable co-hosts to engage and listen. She often does it while deflecting the mocking remarks of rambunctious colleagues Jesse Watters and Greg Gutfeld, who try to throw off her arguments.

“Interruptions are an indication that you’re winning,” said Tarlov, evoking the pithy chapter summaries in “I Disagree.”

Tarlov games out numerous scenarios with recommendations on how to deploy statistics and when to lighten up. She also explains the necessity of allowing the other side to blow off steam as she did when “The Five” co-hosts became emotional and overwrought over the shooting of right wing activist Charlie Kirk.

Tarlov believes the key to the success of “The Five” is the camaraderie the panel has off-camera. While the co-hosts will battle it out on set over President Trump’s policies or the excesses of the socialist wing of the Democratic Party, they are supportive of each other once the show is over (three of them are represented by the same CAA agent).

“We don’t talk politics outside of work,” Tarlov said.

Tarlov has been an accepted part of the Fox News family, recently signing a three-year contract despite Trump’s suggestion that “The Five” would be better off without her.

But it has taken time for Tarlov to gain credibility among like-minded pundits and thought leaders on the political left. Most are dismissive of the network as its most popular hosts are unwavering Trump loyalists. Tarlov also resists being in lockstep with every Democratic position and trend. (She voted for Andrew Cuomo over New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani, citing the former governor’s experience.)

“Even in the last year I’ve been at big liberal gatherings, very clearly hosts on other big podcasts or show were not interested in talking to me,” said Tarlov, who has had many conversations that start with the question “Why are you on that network?”

But with younger news consumers getting their news and information through social media platforms, Fox News clips of Tarlov scoring points for the Democrats are gaining attention. Tarlov said she has felt more welcome in left-leaning circles since the 2024 presidential campaign when the digital accounts of Joe Biden and then Kamala Harris put her commentary in heavy rotation. (Scott Galloway, the author and social critic, partnered with Tarlov on a podcast, “Raging Moderates,” after seeing her come up repeatedly in his feeds and then meeting her on the set of “Real Time With Bill Maher”).

Tarlov didn’t start out seeking a career as a TV personality, although her family background likely helped her understand media and communication. Her parents were attorneys who met while working on the Warner Bros. lot in New York, and raised their two daughters in the hip lower Manhattan neighborhood of Tribeca.

Her father, Mark Tarlov, was a onetime speechwriter for Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger who went on to produce two of John Waters’ films and direct projects of his own. Tarlov and her sister Molly, an actor who co-starred in the MTV sitcom “Awkward,” traveled the world with their father to shooting locations. (Tarlov pays tribute to her father, who died in 2021 of 9/11-related cancer, by wearing his nerd-chic Oliver Peoples eyeglass frames made of buffalo horn).

A graduate of Bryn Mawr College and the London School of Economics, Tarlov worked as a strategist on the London mayoral campaign of Boris Johnson. She talked Democratic pollster Doug Schoen into giving her a job. Schoen hired her and brought her to the attention of Fox News, which started using her as a guest on Sean Hannity’s program in 2016.

The ability to effectively volley with conservatives led Democratic Party leaders to approach Tarlov about running for Congress in the district representing Staten Island. (She has no desire to seek political office.)

Tarlov was named co-host on “The Five” in 2022. She and husband Brian McKenna, who works in finance, welcomed their first daughter in 2021, the other in 2024. She remains awed that the show’s viewers — most of whom don’t agree with her politics — have acknowledged her personal milestones with warm greetings and homemade gifts.

She is aware that she’s had a rarefied career. But in “I Disagree,” she goes beyond her impressive resume to reveal her insecurities — unusual in the ego driven TV news business — and tells readers how she’s tried to resolve them.

“I have a good amount of shyness to me,” she said. “I have a lot of imposter syndrome. I’m constantly in wonder that I ended up getting to do this and that hopefully, am the right person to do it.”

Long self-conscious about her raspy voice, which Trump once described as “grating and irritating,” she shares how a 2016 meeting with former Chief Executive Roger Ailes made her relax about it. He told her viewer criticisms were more aimed at her positions, at not how she sounded. “No matter what room the television is in, you want to make sure the person listening in the next room knows you’re on it,” he told her. “Don’t try to smooth your voice out. They may hate what you stand for and what you’re saying, but you want them to know it’s you on TV.”

Tarlov met with Ailes just months before he was ousted over sexual harassment allegations. While Tarlov was grateful for his advice, her book praises current Fox News Chief Executive Suzanne Scott for creating a workplace culture that is much more hospitable to women. Scott promoted Tarlov to co-host right before she was due to give birth to her first child.

“The knowledge that I’m supported allows me to take big swings and not be intimidated,” Tarlov writes. She knows that’s not the situation for all women; in her signature style, she presents the data and the narrative to back it up.

With ownership of the team still in limbo, the Lakers announced two front office additions Friday, hiring former Miami Heat executive Eric Amsler as assistant general manager, player personnel, while bolstering their sports performance staff with Keith D’Amelio as director of integrated performance systems.

Boosting the team’s behind-the-scenes infrastructure was one of Mark Walter’s major initiatives when the Dodgers’ owner bought the Lakers in 2025. After the season, Lakers president and general manager Rob Pelinka said Walter and the ownership group were working to create two assistant GM positions and upgrade treatment, physical therapy and sports science facilities to mirror the success of the Dodgers.

But the status of such investments came into question when Walter unexpectedly sold his majority stake in the Lakers to Bob Iger and Joshua Kushner last month. The transaction that valued the Lakers at a record $12.5 billion still needs to be approved by the NBA board of governors, which next meets Sept. 14-15, according to ESPN, but approval for the Lakers ownership change will likely not be on the docket.

“Continuing to invest in and strengthen our basketball operations group is a top priority as we build for the long-term success of our team and players,” Pelinka said in a statement. “Eric and Keith bring a wealth of experience that will add valuable expertise across our organization.”

Amsler spent the previous 22 seasons with the Heat, most recently serving as vice president of player personnel and the general manager of G League affiliate Sioux Falls Skyforce. He oversaw the Heat’s scouting department and evaluation of draft, professional and G League prospects.

Amsler joins former New Orleans Pelicans executive Rohan Ramadas as assistant general managers hired this offseason. While Ramadas, who joined the team in May, will be involved in managing the salary cap, analytics and data for the Lakers, Amsler’s responsibilities will mirror the scouting and player development responsibilities he held in Miami.

D’Amelio most recently served as chief innovation officer for the New York Liberty, where he worked across basketball operations, health and performance, analytics and applied sciences. His previous NBA experience includes stints with the Toronto Raptors and Boston Celtics. He also worked with Stanford men’s basketball and Nike.

Sanaa, Yemen – The United Nations-recognised Yemeni government and the Houthi group have been using warplanes, missiles, drones and other weapons as they engage in intense fighting on multiple fronts in the country’s north, west and central regions.

At least 194 people have been killed and 880 others wounded in the past two weeks of fighting in parts of Taiz, the western coast, al-Jawf, Marib and Dhalea, according to aid agencies.

Iran-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah (supporters of God), have intensified attacks on the coastal district of al-Makha (Mocha) located on the western coast, among others, to gain a foothold in the Red Sea – a vital shipping lane.

On the other hand, government forces have been battling to expand in Taiz and boost their control of Marib, an oil-producing region in the north.

Fighting has also been raging in the al-Jawf governorate bordering Saudi Arabia and Dhalea, which connects the Houthi-controlled north to the country’s south under the internationally recognised government.

Experts say gains or losses on any of these strategically important fronts could have significant consequences for either side.

Taiz and western coast fronts

“The hills and mountainous areas of Taiz and the western coast are key targets for the Houthis, who have repeatedly attempted to advance there,” Yazeed al-Jeddawy, the research manager at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, said.

“The Houthis are trying to seize commanding terrains, cut supply routes between the coastal Mocha district and Taiz, and prevent government troops on the western coast from linking up with the Taiz Military Axis,” said al-Jeddawy.

In Taiz and along the western coast, al-Jeddawy says, the immediate contest is over the heights and roads connecting Taiz to al-Makha.

Situated roughly 60km (37 miles) from the Bab al-Mandeb strait, al-Makha enjoys a highly strategic position on the Red Sea. For a month now, the Houthis have launched missile and drone attacks on the city, causing massive damage to its port facilities and killing and injuring several civilians.

Recently, the group has also attempted to extend its ground operations towards al-Makha city.

“The Houthis seem intent on tightening their hold around [al-Makha] and moving closer to the Dhubab–Bab al-Mandeb area. A substantial advance would strengthen their position near the southern entrance to the Red Sea and give them greater leverage over international shipping,” he added.

Fuad Mussed, a Yemeni political analyst and author, told Al Jazeera that the strategic importance of the western coast and Taiz fronts stems from their proximity to Bab al-Mandeb, a chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and one of the world’s most important shipping routes.

“The Houthis seek to move closer to this vital waterway to threaten maritime traffic. Such a move aims to keep the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb under the influence of Iran and use them as leverage against regional and international powers. This is a strategy Tehran has been pursuing for years,” Mussed said.

Iran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz, a global oil chokepoint, to use it as leverage in the war against the United States. It has also warned that its allies could shut shipping via Bab al-Mandeb. Iran also attacked Saudi Arabia’s pipeline used to export oil from the Red Sea.

In July, the Houthis declared a blockade against Saudi vessels transiting through the Red Sea – an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.

Marib and al-Jawf fronts

Over the past few weeks, pro-government forces have attacked Houthi-held territories in Marib and al-Jawf, facing further retaliation from the Houthis.

Saddam al-Huraibi, a Yemeni political commentator, said the Marib front is fateful for both sides.

“Marib is a government stronghold in north Yemen. So, a Houthi expansion in Marib would threaten government presence and weaken its leverage in the north. That is why pro-government troops are ready to fight tooth and nail on this front line,” al-Huraibi told Al Jazeera.

For the Houthis, the takeover of Marib will deepen the group’s authority and step towards controlling the oil and gas infrastructure. The Iran-backed group captured vast swaths of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa, in 2014, but Marib has remained in government hands since.

“Dominating Marib’s oil and gas resources has been a Houthi goal for over a decade. Without facing a crushing defeat in Marib, they would keep fighting to achieve that goal,” al-Huraibi said.

Adjacent to Marib, al-Jawf is also a hub of tense fighting between the Houthis and government forces. A government gain there would lay the groundwork for further advances, while a strong Houthi defence could undermine government forces’ morale and prompt them to retreat.

“Government-aligned forces have lately focused much of their offensive effort on al-Jawf. Government gains in al-Jawf would ease the threat to Marib while requiring the Houthis to defend a much broader area,” al-Huraibi said.

Al-Jeddawy said government gains could open routes towards the north – Saada, Amran or Houthi positions north of Marib.

The Houthis have carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia, including energy facilities in the country’s south. They have also accused Saudi Arabia of launching multiple attacks in al-Jawf, al-Bayda, Marib and Taiz provinces in support of government forces.

The Dhalea front

Fighting on the Dhalea front, a strategic gateway between Houthi-held territory and the southern governorates, has intensified in recent weeks.

Fighting there did not fully stop during the relative calm, which began in April 2022 following the UN-brokered ceasefire.

A Houthi advance there could open a route for their fighters to reach other southern territories. On the other hand, a Houthi setback would encourage government forces to push towards Ibb, controlled by the group.

“[Houthi] advances in Dhalea could expose the southern hinterland, while [government advances] could threaten Houthi positions and supply routes towards Ibb, al-Bayda and, farther north, Sanaa,” al-Jeddawy noted.

With the escalating fighting, the Houthis face pressure on several fronts, but the group has been readying for a range of scenarios, Khaled Ghorab, a pro-Houthi general, said.

“The [Houthi] Yemeni armed forces were never caught off guard by the prospect of escalation; rather, they worked to build and develop their own military capabilities based on tactical combat plans designed to counter a comprehensive, sustained attack launched simultaneously from land, sea and air,” he said.

Ghorab noted that this state of readiness enables the Houthi forces to carry out a direct response to sources of the threat – whether deep within enemy territory or at sea – targeting military bases or aircraft carriers as far as the Horn of Africa.

While the warring parties compete to seize strategic positions on several front lines, the latest escalation is also closely related to the wider regional confrontation.

“Iran has an interest in keeping Yemen and the Red Sea active as sources of leverage, while parts of the government camp believe the Houthis are under growing strain and that this is an opportunity to weaken them,” al-Jeddawy, the Sanaa-based researcher, said.

“The escalation still reflects domestic military and political aims, but its timing and direction cannot be separated from the regional war,” he told Al Jazeera.

China is buying ninety percent of Iran’s oil exports, settling transactions in renminbi, and hiding the rest beneath layers of shell companies. This is not defiance. It is a demonstration, conducted in plain sight, of exactly how far American economic reach actually extends.

Scott Bessent promised, when he launched Operation Economic Outcast last week, that no one would be above the reach of US sanctions. China’s foreign ministry responded by saying Beijing would do everything necessary to safeguard its own rights and interests. That exchange, watched by the rest of the world, is not really about Iran. It is about whether the threat of American secondary sanctions can force a country that has already fought several trade wars with Washington to a standstill into changing its economic behaviour. The answer, which China has been demonstrating methodically for months, is no.

How China Made Itself Immune to US Secondary Sanctions

The architecture of Chinese-Iranian trade has been specifically designed to sit outside dollar-system jurisdiction. Chinese banks and companies that buy Iranian oil settle transactions in renminbi or through barter arrangements, making them effectively immune to American extraterritorial authority. The handful of Chinese entities that still touch dollar-denominated transactions do so through shell companies that can be discarded and replaced faster than Washington can identify and sanction them. The result is the regulatory whack-a-mole problem that American Treasury officials privately acknowledge, eliminate one entity, and three more appear in its place, each more obscured than the last.

Washington could escalate by sanctioning major Chinese banks and companies that have no Iran ties at all, using them as leverage to pressure Beijing to rein in those that do. That option exists on paper. In practice, it would constitute a declaration of economic war against China’s financial system at a moment when the US economy is already strained by six months of conflict with Iran, oil prices are elevated, and midterm elections are eight weeks away. The Trump administration knows this, which is why Bessent’s ultimatum came with no major Chinese institution on the sanctions list. The threat was real. The enforcement mechanism was not.

What a US Victory in Iran Would Cost Beijing

China sources roughly forty percent of its oil imports from the Gulf, with Iran accounting for ten percent of that total. If the US wins this war convincingly, meaning Iran’s government collapses or capitulates and Washington reinstalls itself as the dominant security guarantor across the Gulf, the energy architecture that China has spent two decades building becomes dependent on American goodwill. Every barrel of Gulf oil that China buys would effectively pass through a security framework Washington controls.

The regional knock-on effects compound that problem. The Mecca pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, the SCO’s deepening trade and financial architecture, the China-brokered Saudi-Iran normalisation of 2023: all of these represent years of Chinese diplomatic investment in a Middle East that is gradually reducing its security dependence on the United States. An Iranian defeat that pushes regional states back under the American umbrella undoes that investment at a stroke. From Beijing’s perspective, the cost of buying Iranian oil at a discount and absorbing American secondary sanctions is considerably lower than the cost of losing the regional influence that Iran’s survival helps sustain.

Neither Ally Nor Bystander

The SCO summit in Bishkek last week illustrated Beijing’s position with more precision than any official statement. Xi met Putin and Modi bilaterally. Iran’s President Pezeshkian attended the summit and held consultations at foreign minister level. He was not invited to Beijing. He did not get a Xi bilateral. That calibrated distance is deliberate, and it reflects a Chinese calculation that is more sophisticated than either alliance or abandonment.

Beijing does not want Iran to lose. It also does not want Iran to win so completely that Tehran’s regional hegemony destabilises the Gulf relationships China has been cultivating. The Chinese position, buying Iranian oil, refusing to arm Iran, keeping diplomatic engagement at arm’s length, is designed to keep Iran functional without making China responsible for Iranian behaviour. It is the foreign policy equivalent of keeping a fire burning without touching it.

Xi’s scheduled visit to Washington later this month, coming directly after the Bishkek summit, reinforces this reading. Beijing is simultaneously demonstrating to Iran that it has economic backing and demonstrating to Washington that it has strategic restraint. Both demonstrations serve Chinese interests. Neither requires China to choose a side.

Five Things Worth Watching

• Whether Xi’s Washington visit produces any concrete understanding on Iran-related secondary sanctions. If the two sides agree on a framework that gives China cover to quietly reduce Iranian oil purchases over time, the sanctions architecture gains traction it currently lacks. If the summit produces only standard language about constructive competition, Operation Economic Outcast’s China problem remains unresolved.
• The SCO Development Bank’s progress toward implementation. If the bank moves from agreement to operational institution in the coming months, it creates dollar-independent financing infrastructure that makes secondary sanctions significantly less effective not just for China-Iran trade but for the broader Eurasian trade network the SCO is building.
• Whether any Chinese entity on the August sanctions list is large enough that its designation produces real disruption rather than being absorbed and routed around. The signal from August’s first wave was that Washington sanctioned deliberately small targets. The size and visibility of the next wave’s targets will tell you how seriously Washington is willing to press China.
• India’s position on renminbi settlement for its own Iranian oil purchases. If Delhi follows Beijing’s approach and expands non-dollar settlement for energy trade, the secondary sanctions architecture faces a second major exemption that Washington is even less able to address given how carefully it has been courting India.
• Iran’s currency trajectory. The rial has hit record lows despite Chinese oil purchases continuing. If the currency continues to deteriorate even with Chinese demand stable, it suggests Operation Economic Outcast is landing on Iran’s non-oil economy in ways that the Chinese lifeline cannot fully offset which changes the pressure calculus regardless of whether Beijing complies.

The Bottom Line

Washington designed Operation Economic Outcast to isolate Iran. What it has demonstrated is the outer boundary of American economic jurisdiction in a world where China has spent a decade building the infrastructure to sit outside it. Renminbi settlement, dark fleet shipping, teapot refineries, shell company networks, these are not improvised workarounds. They are a parallel financial architecture, constructed precisely for this contingency, and it works well enough to keep Iranian oil flowing at volumes Washington cannot stop.

The deeper problem for the Trump administration is not that China is defying its sanctions. It is that China is proving, transaction by transaction, that the sanctions cannot be enforced against a country of sufficient size and sufficient preparation. That demonstration has an audience well beyond Beijing and Tehran. Every country currently watching whether to comply with American secondary sanctions is learning the same lesson: the reach of US economic power has a ceiling, and China has found it.

THE HOOK

Late Monday, Donald Trump signaled the ceasefire with Iran was effectively over, threatening fresh strikes and casting doubt on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Brent crude jumped past $90 a barrel. By Wednesday morning, the US Dollar Index had climbed to 99.73 — its highest in nearly three weeks — and the 10-year Treasury yield touched 4.81%, just shy of a 52-week high. The reason: traders now put the odds of a September Fed rate hike near 65–70%, not a cut.

THE MECHANISM

The chain runs cleanly enough to name. Iran’s conflict with the US raises the odds of a shipping disruption through Hormuz, which carries roughly a fifth of global oil supply; oil-price risk feeds straight into headline inflation; and a Fed under Chair Kevin Warsh — already fighting credibility questions after an ambiguous hold in July — cannot afford to look soft on prices while a war pushes them up. That is why futures markets have swung from pricing no move in 2026 to pricing a hike at the September 15–16 meeting.

Higher US rates make dollar assets pay more relative to everywhere else, which is the direct channel behind both the stronger DXY and the 4.81% ten-year. The winners are near-term and narrow: holders of short-dated Treasury bills, whose yields rise with the policy rate; US money-market funds; and, oddly, the stablecoin issuers whose reserves sit almost entirely in T-bills and now earn more for holding them. The losers are broader and slower-moving: emerging markets carrying dollar-denominated debt face a double bill, since a stronger dollar raises the local-currency cost of repayment at the same moment their own borrowing costs rise in sympathy with Washington’s. Oil-importing economies — India, Turkey, Japan, the eurozone — take a second hit, paying more for crude in a currency that is simultaneously getting more expensive to buy. Gold, meanwhile, is caught between two forces: safe-haven demand from the war pulls it up, rate-hike expectations pull it down, which is why it sits near $4,304, off its recent peak but still up 21% over the year.

WHY IT MATTERS

The apparent contradiction — dollar strong this week, dollar weaker for the decade — is really two different clocks running at once. Reserve managers make multi-year diversification bets; traders react to a war in hours. The IMF’s COFER data put the dollar at 57.13% of allocated reserves in the first quarter of 2026, down from 72% in 2000, and a recent survey of reserve managers found roughly three-quarters expect that share to keep falling over the next five years. None of that is undone by one hawkish week from Kevin Warsh.

What is new is where the dollar’s reach is actually growing: not in central bank vaults but in stablecoins. The GENIUS Act framework — now the subject of a Treasury rulemaking comment period that closes in October — has pushed issuers to back their tokens almost entirely with short-dated Treasuries, and forecasts from Standard Chartered and Senator Bill Hagerty put potential T-bill demand from stablecoins as high as $2–2.3 trillion. That is dollarization happening retail-first, in emerging-market wallets and crypto exchanges, invisible to COFER. For Washington, a Fed hike timed to a war raises borrowing costs precisely when the deficit needs cheap financing, and when the countries least able to absorb dearer dollars — many of them US partners, not adversaries — get hit hardest. That is a form of collateral leverage no sanctions list ever names.

WATCH FOR

The September 15–16 FOMC meeting is the date that resolves this. A 25-basis-point hike would confirm markets are right to treat this as an inflation fight, not a growth scare, and would likely push the dollar and yields higher still. A hold — especially if Hormuz tensions ease and oil retreats from $90 — would suggest Warsh blinked, and could send gold back toward its highs faster than the dollar can catch up. Either way, watch the Fed funds futures curve shift in the two weeks before the meeting.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney supports a new global defense bank called the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB), which aims to help allied countries rearm. The bank is looking to raise around €100 billion ($116 billion) to provide low-cost loans to governments and defense contractors for military projects. It will also guarantee loans for smaller, riskier firms. So far, Canada, along with Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine, has expressed support for the initiative.

As of August, the DSRB had secured about €5 billion in commitments but aims for €20 billion in paid-in capital and an additional €80 billion available when necessary. However, major economies like Germany and Britain have not yet committed, which raises concerns about the DSRB’s ability to achieve the triple-A credit rating necessary for the lowest funding costs. Experts suggest that the participation of larger governments is essential to impress ratings agencies. Some potential members are hesitant about whether the DSRB can offer better financing terms than national governments, given their own budget limitations and existing commitments in similar initiatives.

Canada is actively engaging other countries ahead of the charter signing planned for autumn. DSRB founder Rob Murray emphasized the need for rearmament to address increasing security threats. He noted that many European nations are raising defense spending but are not close to meeting NATO’s targets. Carney has called for cooperation among middle powers to respond to what he sees as a changing world order.

The DSRB aims to provide funding for defense investments separate from current national debts but needs further backing to be impactful. Major European countries already have access to cheap borrowing but joining the DSRB would allow their domestic contractors to benefit from its funding. Some officials have raised concerns about overlap with existing financing programs like the EU’s SAFE program and Britain’s proposed Multilateral Defence Mechanism. There are worries about the upfront capital required for DSRB membership and the selection process for projects, as larger countries might need to contribute around €1 billion.

Murray highlighted that contributions could be spread over three years, and the DSRB could provide a more stable financing avenue for defense than existing programs. He stressed that increasing defense spending could lead to technology improvements, job creation, and economic growth while enhancing deterrence.

Canada hopes that under new Prime Minister Andy Burnham, Britain might reconsider its initial rejection of the DSRB, which was based on concerns over value for money. Burnham’s defense minister has described the DSRB as an innovative mechanism. If Britain joins, it may influence Germany’s decision to participate as well. Currently, Germany has been observing discussions but has not committed.

Industry groups in Britain and Germany are urging their governments to join the DSRB, fearing exclusion from projects financed by the bank. The DSRB has received about $10 million in support from various banks to help establish itself, and its proponents claim it is on track to achieve a high credit rating. Canada is willing to move forward with the current supporters, leaving room for other countries to join later, which could help secure the desired credit rating. The support of core shareholders is crucial for the creditworthiness of multilateral institutions.

With information from Reuters

The newest battleground in the Los Angeles mayoral race is at your favorite taco stand, as Mayor Karen Bass and her opponent, Councilmember Nithya Raman, spar over how they plan to run the city and treat its street vendors.

The Los Angeles Police Department told Bass’ office it had erroneously issued criminal citations to vendors around MacArthur Park, Bass spokesperson Paige Sterling told The Times on Thursday.

Bass has ordered LAPD to stop issuing criminal citations to vendors and is working to remove any charges issued in error, Sterling said. The mayor’s office also asked LAPD to make sure that these citations aren’t happening citywide.

“The Mayor and her team will continue meeting with street vendors to implement policies and programs based on their needs. Street vending is a quintessential part of L.A.’s world-class food scene and a livelihood for thousands of hardworking Angelenos,” Sterling said in a statement.

The sudden focus on street food comes after Bass faced scrutiny for saying street vendors should not be allowed to set up in front of brick-and-mortar restaurants at a mayoral debate last week at the Sherman Oaks Homeowners Assn.

“Just like you shouldn’t have encampments in front of restaurants or in front of schools, you just should not do that,” Bass said.

Critics, including Raman, said Bass was directly comparing homeless encampments to street vendors.

Raman followed up on negative interpretations of her Sherman Oaks statement with a one-two punch, showing up with supporters and television cameras at the famous Brothers Cousins Tacos stand on Sawtelle Boulevard on Wednesday night to mark the release of a pro-street-vendor policy plan.

“When you come for our street vendors, you’re coming for the heart of L.A.,” Raman said of Bass.

In the plan, Raman hopes to create an Immigrant Economic Opportunity Hub, which would offer permitting support, microloans and legal help. Wednesday night, after a vegetarian quesadilla dinner, she said the city should provide pathways for food stands that make fresh food to get permits and grow their businesses, including potentially working toward a brick-and-mortar location.

Also included is a proposal to create special vending zones in L.A.’s iconic vending corridors, although the plan doesn’t outline where such opt-in zones could be. These corridors would include infrastructure like shared sinks, power, lighting, shade and restrooms.

“What we have in our plan is a plan for street vendor districts that can ensure that vendors and brick-and-mortar businesses are not in conflict with one another; that they’re actually able to share streets,” Raman said.

When asked the same question she faced at the Sherman Oaks Homeowners Assn., whether she would allow food stands to sit in front of a brick-and-mortar restaurant, Raman said Wednesday she believed there were ways to keep food stands and restaurants from intruding upon each other, but didn’t say whether that would be enforced by distance requirements, ticketing or otherwise.

On July 23, Volodymyr Zelensky told Ukrainians that Raytheon wanted to help produce Patriot interceptors on Ukrainian-linked lines. Five days later, Lockheed Martin signed a second license, this one for the PAC-3 MSE — the hit-to-kill missile that has spent three years picking Russian ballistic warheads out of the sky over Kyiv. For a moment it looked like a watershed: the United States handing a country still absorbing nightly missile and drone barrages the blueprint to build its own air defense. Then, within days, the story came apart in public. US Ambassador Matthew Whitaker said Washington would not allow Ukraine to build PAC-3s at all. Donald Trump called the technology transfer “a hard thing to give away.” NATO’s own envoy said no agreement would close before winter. Something had clearly been decided. Nobody could agree on what.

The Patriot system is the closest thing the West has to a proven shield against ballistic missiles, and it is scarce almost everywhere it is needed. Roughly twenty countries now compete for a production line that turns out about 650 PAC-3 MSE interceptors a year worldwide — Lockheed Martin’s entire global output, shared among Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, Gulf states and the US Army’s own depleted stocks. Russia, meanwhile, has been firing 55 to 60 Iskander ballistic missiles a month at Ukraine alone, before counting the nightly Shahed drone waves that push crews to expend scarce interceptors on cheaper threats out of necessity. The Pentagon has spent much of the past two years quietly rationing Patriot allocations across allies, reportedly diverting orders meant for Taiwan and Ukraine to replenish American stockpiles. Against that backdrop, “Ukraine will build its own Patriots” is not primarily a sovereignty story. It is a story about whether the system that makes Patriots for everyone else can keep up at all.

What the deal actually requires

Start with what was actually signed, because the headlines overstate it. Raytheon’s license covers the PAC-2 GEM-T, an older blast-fragmentation interceptor effective against aircraft and cruise missiles. Lockheed Martin’s covers the PAC-3 MSE, the missile that actually stops Iskanders and Kinzhals. Neither license includes the radar, the fire-control system or the launchers; those still come from existing Patriot batteries. And neither company has committed to building these missiles on Ukrainian soil in the near term. Reporting from Reuters and Ukrainian officials both point to Germany, which already runs its own PAC-2 line, as the likely first production site, with capacity shifting to Ukraine only “after the war ends.” What was announced in July, in other words, is not a factory. It is paperwork that keeps a door open.

Even so, the paperwork matters, because of what it concedes. Every PAC-3 MSE round carries a 24-month production lead time for the missile itself and 30 months for its solid rocket motor. Boeing manufactures every active radar seeker that guides it from a single facility in Alabama, capped at 650 to 700 units a year — a bottleneck no amount of Ukrainian factory floor changes. Aerojet Rocketdyne is the sole source for the motor. These are not obstacles a co-production agreement dissolves; they are structural limits on how fast the United States can arm anyone, Ukraine included. A government does not open its most tightly export-controlled missile program to a country still under nightly bombardment unless it has concluded that the existing pipeline, working alone, cannot meet demand. That is the admission buried in the announcement: not that Ukraine’s industrial base is ready, but that Lockheed’s and Raytheon’s are strained, and Washington needs help from a country it would ordinarily be supplying, not licensing.

The contradictions among American officials sharpen the point rather than undermine it. Whitaker’s flat denial that Ukraine would ever build PAC-3s, arriving days after Zelensky announced the license, is not really about Ukraine’s trustworthiness. A Republican congressional official close to the process gave the more candid version: the manufacturers are less worried about Ukraine leaking American technology to Moscow than about Ukraine improving on it and producing it “at scale, faster and for much less money.” That fear has a track record behind it. Fire Point’s Flamingo cruise missile, built in Ukraine during the war, reportedly costs around $600,000 — roughly a sixth of a Tomahawk and a fraction of a $2 million PAC-3 ACE round — while Ukraine’s home-grown Freyja interceptor is priced at roughly a fifth of the Patriot missile it is meant to substitute for. A country that has spent three years learning to manufacture air defense under fire, at a fraction of Western unit costs, is not the industrial partner a legacy prime wants loose inside its own supply chain. The reluctance is commercial before it is strategic.

The strongest objection to this reading is that Kyiv already produces a large share of its own weapons, so extending that into Patriots is a natural next step rather than a crisis signal. Zelensky puts the domestically produced share of Ukraine’s frontline weapons at close to 60 percent, up from roughly 40 percent a year earlier — drones, the Bohdana howitzer, the Neptune and Flamingo missiles. That is true, and it matters. But those are systems Ukraine designed and built from scratch under wartime pressure, with no legacy export-control regime standing in the way. Patriot is different: it is Washington’s most sensitive interceptor program, run by companies that have spent decades keeping production onshore for precisely the security reasons Whitaker cited. Handing over any piece of it, even nominally, to a country under active bombardment breaks with everything the export-control system was built to prevent. That the United States is doing it anyway — however slowly, however contested internally — says less about confidence in Ukraine than about how thin the interceptor pipeline has become.

Three ways this goes

What happens next depends on which of the deal’s obstacles proves harder to move: engineering or politics.

Base case (our estimate: roughly 55 percent probability). The license survives, but production stays offshore. Germany’s existing PAC-2 line absorbs the first Ukrainian-linked output sometime in 2027; Lockheed and Raytheon leave the seeker and motor bottlenecks unresolved; and Zelensky’s own target of “production capability by the end of 2026” slips the way most Patriot-related deadlines have slipped since 2022. The deal functions mainly as a signal — to Moscow, to Congress, to the manufacturers themselves — that the West is willing to widen its supplier base, without actually widening it before the war’s most dangerous phase has passed.

Downside case. Export-control friction, not battlefield risk, kills momentum outright. Boeing declines to license seeker technology, Congress balks at formally notifying an ITAR transfer into an active conflict zone, and the agreement quietly becomes what several earlier Patriot-adjacent announcements already have: a signed memorandum with no factory behind it. Unable to close its ballistic-missile gap through licensed production, Ukraine leans harder into Flamingo and Freyja — cheap and available, but not full substitutes for hit-to-kill interception. Iskander and Kinzhal strikes on Ukrainian cities continue at close to current tempo through 2027.

Upside case. Ukraine’s wartime manufacturing culture forces the restructuring the primes have been resisting. Facing a credible cheaper competitor, Lockheed and Raytheon accelerate second-sourcing of seekers and motors — the actual chokepoints — to defend market share rather than out of goodwill toward Kyiv. Patriot output rises for every operator, not only Ukraine, and Kyiv becomes the proving ground for a lower-cost interceptor variant that outlives the war. This is the scenario in which an admission of scarcity turns into a fix for it — plausible, but it requires the manufacturers to treat competition, not politics, as the threat that finally moves them.

The takeaway

So: is licensing Patriot production to a country under bombardment an admission? Yes — but not the one the announcements were built to convey. It does not say Ukraine’s industrial base has arrived. It says the American one has not kept pace with a war of attrition it did not plan for, and that Washington is now willing to test its most sensitive export controls against the same scarcity that has Israel, Taiwan and its own Army competing for the same missiles.

Watch for: whether groundbreaking on a German or Polish production line actually begins before the end of 2026 — Zelensky’s own deadline for “technical capability.” If it hasn’t started by then, treat every subsequent announcement as the political theatre this one increasingly resembles: a scarcity confession dressed up as an industrial handshake.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) is repositioning one of its AH-64 Apache squadrons from Ramon Air Base in the Negev to Ramat David Air Base in northern Israel, bringing a portion of the service’s attack helicopter force significantly closer to the Lebanese and Syrian fronts. The AH-64 has been of central importance in recent IAF operations, and the shift makes the relatively small Apache fleet better positioned for rapid-response missions, including greater persistence over the northern battlefield.

The IAF announced today that 190 “Magic Touch” Squadron would be transferring its aircraft from Ramon to Ramat David, the northernmost IAF base. This would involve increased aircraft activity in the country’s skies, but that there was no security concern. The unit currently operates the older AH-64A, known locally as Peten (python), which the IAF began to receive in 1990.

The IAF began to establish an attack helicopter force in response to the lessons of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, particularly the need to counter large-scale enemy armored formations. Over the following decades, its role evolved from that of a dedicated tank-hunting force into a precision-strike capability able to engage a much broader range of threats, including irregular and guerrilla forces operating among civilian populations.

In the past, the IAF attack helicopter force comprised three frontline squadrons: 160 “First Attack Helicopter” Squadron, operating the AH-1, was at Palmachim, near Tel Aviv, while Ramon hosted the “Magic Touch” Squadron and 113 “Hornet” Squadron operating the newer AH-64D Saraf (serpent), which arrived in 2005.

When it arrived in Israel, the AH-64D (sometimes designated AH-64D-I) was one of the most advanced attack helicopters in the world. It combined the mission system of the U.S. Army AH-64D Apache Longbow, including its mast-mounted AN/APG-78 Longbow radar, with Israeli avionics. Among these are a Rafael voice communications and data suite (RAVNET 300) and Elta 1891 satellite communications (with prominent bulbous antennas carried on the outer parts of the stub wings). The locally developed mission management system is the Elbit HELICOM suite which provides a real-time overview of the battlefield. Finally, the Elisra Seraph self-protection suite includes an SPS-65 missile warning receiver and an SPJ-40 radar jammer as well as Elbit Rokar countermeasures dispensers.

After the Saraf entered IAF service, the fleet was subsequently expanded through the conversion of older AH-64A airframes to a similar standard.

The AH-64A upgrade also added an optional under-fuselage avionics pod, something that you can read about in more detail here.

Located near Haifa, Ramat David Air Base is one of the most historic in Israel. It was formerly operated by the U.K. Royal Air Force and was involved in combat from the very beginning of Israeli independence. Flying a succession of different fighters and fighter-bombers, units operating from the base were active in every major conflict that followed, including the Sinai campaign, the June 1967 Six-Day War, and the October 1973 War, when its squadrons fought over the Syrian and Lebanese fronts. Due to its proximity to Lebanon, Ramat David has played a major role in different campaigns fought in that country, starting in 1982.

Before the arrival of the “Magic Touch” Squadron, Ramat David was primarily an F-16 hub, with three squadrons flying the F-16C/D. These units have played a central role in Israeli air operations on the northern front, including operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza.

As for Ramon Air Base in the south, its history dates back to the early 1980s, when it was established in the Negev as part of the reorganization of IAF infrastructure following the withdrawal from Sinai under the peace treaty with Egypt. Ramon has been home to fighters and attack jets, including F-16s and A-4s.

Since the 2000s, Ramon has been a principal base for some of the most advanced IAF combat aircraft. As well as the AH-64D, it is home to three of the four F-16I Sufa squadrons. It is also understood to be the home of the secretive Israeli drone, referred to as RA-01 and used for covert missions. You can read more about that here.

Moving an AH-64 squadron from Ramon to Ramat David reflects a shift in the IAF’s priorities toward the northern front. Ramat David places the helicopters significantly closer to Lebanon and Syria, reducing transit times and allowing more of their limited endurance to be spent over the battlefield. This is particularly valuable for rapid-response missions and close air support, where the Apache’s sensors and precision weapons can provide immediate support to ground forces.

As detailed in our deep dive on the IDF’s air defenses, Israeli AH-64s have also been extensively used in counter-drone operations. Their flexibility and ability to operate at low speeds make them well suited to engaging certain types of unmanned aircraft, while their Hellfire missiles can be employed in an unconventional air-to-air role for this mission. Bearing in mind the threat posed by drones launched from Lebanon and Syria, this factor may also have played into the relocation.

An IDF video purportedly showing an Israeli AH-64 intercepting an Iranian UAV that crossed into Israeli territory:

Iranian UAV Intercepted by an Israeli Helicopter

In fact, there is a historical precedent for the move. Ahead of the June 1982 Lebanon War, the “Magic Touch” Squadron was transferred from Ramon to Ramat David to reduce the distance to its principal operational theater along the Lebanese border. Once again, between 1990 and 1995, the same squadron again flew its MD500 Defenders from Ramat David.

The new relocation also disperses the IAF’s relatively small Apache fleet between its northern and southern fronts, improving readiness at the cost of concentrating fewer helicopters at Ramon. It is worth noting that, at the time of the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, only four Israeli AH-64s were actually on standby across the entire country. Two of these were on so-called short standby for potential deployment to the northern border within minutes, with the other two on long standby for the same area, meaning they would take longer to get into action. In total, the IAF has a fleet of around 48 AH-64s of both versions.

As of now, Israeli forces are no longer involved in a full-scale ground offensive on the northern front. However, they maintain a very active forward-defense posture, still hold positions in southern Lebanon, and limited ground operations continue. So, too, do airtrikes against Hezbollah infrastructure.

Separately, Israel maintains positions in Syria, in the former UN buffer zone and parts of Quneitra and western Daraa, while continuing raids and airstrikes in southern Syria. Only today, Israel reportedly struck Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase in the northwest, reportedly damaging the runway and storage facilities.

Time will tell how the long-term IAF Apache force looks. In January of this year, the U.S. State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to Israel of 30 of the latest AH-64E Apaches and related equipment for an estimated cost of $3.8 billion. Israel might not take up all of those aircraft, but the Apache is currently central to its future plans.

Even before October 7, the IAF had been pushing to acquire another 40 of the AH-64E versions, after apparently concluding that an earlier plan to bolster its attack fleet by replacing the older AH-64As with armed drones was not feasible. This is a notably interesting development at a time in which other AH-64 customers are rethinking the value of the attack helicopter in general, due to questions about their survivability on the modern battlefield.

The transfer of an AH-64 squadron to Ramat David underscores the IAF’s growing emphasis on the northern front and the Apache’s expanding role beyond traditional anti-armor missions. By positioning the helicopters closer to Lebanon and Syria, the move should improve their responsiveness and endurance over the battlefield while giving the IAF greater flexibility in addressing a wider range of emerging threats.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

By chaining bilateral naval exercises across a widening circle of partners — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and now Indonesia — Beijing is not assembling an alliance. It is manufacturing the impression that a Chinese warship’s presence near every regional flashpoint, including the waters off Taiwan, is unremarkable.

On July 29th, the Indonesian frigate KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai wrapped up a two-day naval drill with the Russian navy in Vladivostok, part of Exercise Orruda 2026. Two weeks later, on August 12th, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that the same ship, on its way home, would run a “passing exercise” with a Chinese frigate, the Honghe — not in Indonesian waters, not in the South China Sea, but east of Taiwan. Jakarta’s navy described it in the blandest terms available: communications drills, a resupply run, “a universal naval tradition.” Taipei was not reassured. Taiwan’s foreign ministry said it “sternly condemns” the move and complained that Beijing had “unilaterally claimed” Indonesian participation before Jakarta had said a word about where, or why, this was happening.

That gap — between Jakarta’s shrug and Taipei’s alarm — is the story. It is also a useful corrective to how most coverage of Chinese naval activity is currently framed. The default lens is bilateral and confrontational: China versus the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal, China versus Japan around the Senkakus, China versus Taiwan in the Strait. That lens catches real events, but it misses the connective tissue between them — a growing schedule of joint drills with third parties, each one small and individually deniable as “routine,” that collectively do something the confrontational track cannot: they make China’s presence in the surrounding water look normal to everyone except the state it is actually disputing with.

Indonesia and China have their own maritime dispute: Beijing’s nine-dash line overlaps Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone around the Natuna Islands, and Chinese fishing incursions there froze bilateral naval drills between 2015 and 2021. Those “Sharp Knife” exercises resumed in 2021 and have picked up pace since 2024. That history matters, but it is not what explains this month’s drill, because this drill did not happen anywhere near Natuna. It happened off Taiwan — waters Indonesia has no claim to and, until now, no naval presence in alongside China. Indonesia is simply the newest and most sensitive addition to a list that already includes Russia (the mature anchor partnership, most recently “Joint Sea-2026” in July), Malaysia (“Peace and Friendship 2025” in the Strait of Malacca last October), Cambodia (“Golden Dragon” at the newly built Ream Naval Base logistics center last spring), Thailand (“Blue Strike” and “Falcon Strike,” the latter launched again this month), and Vietnam (a Beibu Gulf coast guard and navy patrol series now past its fortieth iteration). All of this sits alongside a separate, unilateral track — a 100-plus-vessel show of force spanning the Yellow Sea to the western Pacific last December, and routine coast guard patrols around Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.

The claim of this piece is that these two tracks are not separate stories about Chinese assertiveness. They are one story, working in tandem: the unilateral patrols draw the lines, and the bilateral drills erase them, by training a widening circle of regional navies — and the publics who read about them — to treat a Chinese warship’s presence near contested space as routine bilateral traffic rather than a signal.

The Indonesia case is the clearest evidence yet, because the location was Beijing’s choice, not Jakarta’s. Indonesia had no dispute-driven reason to be operating near Taiwan; its dispute with China sits in the Natuna Sea, hundreds of miles away. What Jakarta had was a frigate already at sea, returning from Russia, and a willingness to let Beijing choose the itinerary’s final leg. Global Times, writing for a domestic Chinese audience, called the drill’s timing “of great significance” — language China’s defense ministry does not use for routine port calls. The exercise also landed in the same week that Elbridge Colby, the U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy, was in Jakarta courting Indonesia’s alignment. Chaining a Chinese passing exercise onto the tail of an Indonesian-Russian one, in waters adjacent to the most dangerous flashpoint in the region, at the exact moment Washington was making its own pitch, is not the profile of a routine bilateral courtesy call.

The strongest objection to this argument comes from analysts of Malaysia’s drills with China, who point out that Kuala Lumpur treats “Peace and Friendship” as a hedging tool it controls, not a concession Beijing extracted — the exercises are deliberately unsophisticated (humanitarian assistance, counter-piracy, no live fire), and Malaysia’s own defense establishment remains wary of Chinese assertiveness even as it participates. That is a fair description of Malaysia’s intent, and it likely holds for Cambodia and Thailand too: these governments are managing great-power competition on their own terms, not capitulating to it. But intent on the partner’s side does not determine the effect on Beijing’s side. Whatever Kuala Lumpur or Phnom Penh tell their own publics, every additional bilateral drill lowers the diplomatic and psychological cost, for Beijing, of being seen operating a warship near water someone else disputes. Indonesia’s case shows why that distinction matters: Jakarta’s intent was almost certainly routine — a frigate coming home. Beijing’s was not. It picked the coordinates.

None of this means China is close to fielding a formal coalition in the NATO sense; nothing here involves interoperability, shared command, or mutual defense. What it means is narrower and, in some ways, more useful to Beijing: a maintenance routine that makes normalization cumulative rather than a single dramatic claim to defend. Each additional partner adds one more government that has, at least once, treated a joint Chinese naval presence near contested water as unremarkable — and one more precedent for the next invitation.

The guest list is also instructive. The one claimant conspicuously absent from it is the Philippines — the country with the loudest ongoing disputes with Beijing, at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, and the one treaty ally the United States has directly on the South China Sea’s rim. Manila gets unilateral coercion, not invitations: coast guard patrols, water-cannon incidents, and jamming, rather than passing exercises. Every partner on the actual list — Russia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia — either has no U.S. mutual defense treaty or, like Thailand, treats its treaty commitments as dormant rather than active. That is not a coincidence; it is a selection criterion. Beijing is not inviting the states most capable of resisting the normalization effect. It is inviting the states most likely to accept it, and saving coercion for the one state structurally immune to the charm offensive.

What happens next

Base case (roughly 55 percent).  The Indonesia relationship deepens but recalibrates location. A higher-tempo revival of the Sharp Knife series continues, concentrated in Indonesian or South China Sea-adjacent waters near Natuna rather than repeated performances off Taiwan. Jakarta absorbs the diplomatic cost of this month’s episode privately — quiet reassurances to Taipei and Washington — while keeping the relationship with Beijing intact. The key assumption: the backlash from Taiwan and the attention from Washington made a second Taiwan-adjacent rerun more costly to Jakarta than its benefit to Beijing.

Downside case.  Beijing repeats the chaining tactic with a second partner within the next twelve months, most plausibly Brunei — the quietest South China Sea claimant, which in February 2025 already agreed to joint oil-and-gas development with Beijing in disputed waters it claims. A first-ever Brunei-China passing exercise, timed to overlap with a Brunei exercise involving another power and staged near a genuinely contested reef rather than international water, would confirm this is a repeatable playbook rather than an Indonesia-specific improvisation — and would be far harder for the U.S. and Japan to counter, since Brunei has never been a vocal claimant to rally around.

Upside case.  Taiwan’s public condemnation, paired with Washington’s trilateral drills with Australia and the Philippines, hardens into an explicit regional habit of naming the chaining tactic itself — not just the individual exercise — making it reputationally costly for the next candidate partner to accept the choreography. The coalition-of-drills strategy stalls not because China stops asking, but because fewer navies say yes.

The takeaway

Beijing did not build a coalition off Taiwan this month; it borrowed one, for two days, from a country with no stake in the fight. That is a cheaper and more durable tool than a formal alliance would be, and it will not show up as a single dramatic escalation — it will show up as a pattern, one passing exercise at a time.

Watch for:  whether Indonesia’s navy does it again, and where. A repeat performance near another sensitive location within the next two quarters would confirm the pattern; a retreat to home waters would suggest Jakarta drew its own line. Watch, too, whether Brunei’s navy — quiet for decades — puts to sea with a Chinese frigate for the first time following its 2025 oil-and-gas pledge in disputed waters.