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Egypt has moved from rhetorical backing of Sudan’s army to active enabler of its war effort, with a covert drone hub on Egyptian soil symbolising how Cairo has tied its regional strategy to the survival of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Since fighting erupted between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, Egypt has framed its stance as defence of Sudan’s “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” and of its “national institutions, particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces.” Officially, President Abdel Fattah al‑Sisi repeats pledges of “non‑interference,” presenting Egypt’s role as limited to mediation, humanitarian aid and hosting Sudanese refugees.

In practice, that line has steadily eroded. Years of joint drills, intelligence sharing and arms ties since 2019 created deep interoperability between the two militaries, well before the civil war began. Egyptian troops captured by the RSF at Merowe airbase in April 2023 were explained away as being on pre‑scheduled exercises, a narrative few regional observers accepted.

The New York Times investigation into East Oweinat in Egypt’s Western Desert crystallises this shift from backstage support to direct operational involvement. Satellite imagery, flight records and videos show a once‑civil agricultural airstrip expanded since 2018 with a second runway, new hangars and satellite links, and by 2025 hosting Turkish Akinci combat drones.

According to U.S. and European officials cited in that reporting, those drones have for at least six months flown strike missions into Sudan, hitting RSF targets up to hundreds of miles inside the country, including convoys on supply routes from Libya and Chad. The drones and their munitions match Turkish systems, but are based on Egyptian territory and shield Sudan’s military assets from RSF retaliation, blurring whether Cairo is merely hosting or also directing the campaign.

For Cairo, East Oweinat offers plausible deniability: operations are embedded in a desert reclamation project far from public scrutiny, yet close enough to Sudan’s border to project sustained air power. For Sudan’s army, it is a lifeline in a war where the RSF has excelled at capturing bases and shooting down drones; at least several Akinci units have reportedly been lost to RSF fire in recent months.

RSF statements and battlefield evidence further illuminate the depth of Egyptian support. In January 2026 the RSF published what it called “irrefutable” proof of Egypt’s direct role, citing captured Egyptian‑made ammunition, armoured vehicles and testimonies from detained SAF‑aligned commanders who described arms, training and medical support routed from Egypt.

Egypt’s wager on the SAF is rooted in hard security and regime‑survival logic. Egyptian strategists see Sudan’s collapse as an existential threat, evoking fears of refugee flows and arms smuggling on a porous southern frontier. Control of the Nile is still more fundamental: since the 2019 fall of Omar al‑Bashir, Cairo has tightened security and military coordination with Khartoum to present a united front against Ethiopia’s GERD and protect its historic water share.

There is also an ideological affinity. General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan is a career officer with long‑standing ties to Egyptian commanders, and his military rule mirrors Sisi’s own path from barracks to presidency. Backing the SAF fits a long‑standing Egyptian instinct to side with Sudan’s regular army “whoever is in charge of it,” and more broadly to prefer strong central militaries over unruly civilian transitions in the Arab world. The SAF’s reliance upon Muslim Brotherhood–aligned militias and ideologues, including the glorification of early militant figures such as Bara Bin Malik, against the backdrop of Washington’s formal designation of key Muslim Brotherhood chapters as terrorist organisations, should be unsettling to Cairo.

Yet by 2026, Egypt’s bet looks increasingly brittle. The war has killed tens of thousands, displaced more than 14 million and pushed parts of Sudan close to famine, while neither side has secured decisive control. Burhan’s legitimacy is deeply disputed: he led the 2021 coup that derailed a fragile civilian‑military transition, and many of the forces that drove the 2018–19 uprising see him as the continuation of military dominance, not a route to elections.

Cairo’s categorical rejection of “parallel entities” and alternative governments in exile is presented as a defence of Sudanese unity, but in effect delegitimises broad civilian coalitions trying to organise outside the SAF–RSF binary. By equating Sudan’s “national institutions” with the current military leadership, Egypt narrows the field of acceptable interlocutors to a junta whose territorial control and popular backing are both eroding.

At the same time, Egypt seeks recognition as a mediator, through formats like the Quad and by hosting conferences of Sudanese civil and political actors in Cairo. That posture sits uneasily with explicit promises not to be “lax or late in supporting the legitimate Sudanese government” under Burhan, and with mounting evidence of Egyptian‑based air operations in the conflict. The covert base in the desert, and the drones that rise from its runways toward Sudanese skies, have become emblematic of a policy that claims non‑interference while in practice helping to lock Sudan into a devastating, externalised war.

The Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military think tanks are closely monitoring the movements of the current Egyptian Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, and tracking the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. PLA websites are officially monitoring the activities and movements of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, particularly the important air event for China: the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition (EIAS 2026), especially as the Egyptian Air Force and Ministry of Defense prepare to launch the second edition of the exhibition (EIAS 2026) at El Alamein International Airport from September 8 to 10, 2026.

As an Egyptian expert specializing primarily in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can deconstruct, analyze, and evaluate the perspective of Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles regarding the role and actions of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense and its minister, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, as follows:

– First: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its affiliated military research and analysis centers are closely monitoring and analyzing the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in hosting the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition.

This event is considered regionally significant for China, serving as a platform to connect defense and space organizations in Africa and the Middle East. This edition has garnered considerable international and Chinese interest, particularly from leading figures in the Chinese arms and defense industries, who are showcasing their latest aircraft and drones.  China’s interest in the inaugural El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition in 2024 was marked by significant historical participation: the Chinese Air Force performed spectacular air displays, their first official air show outside of China. This first-ever air show featured Chinese aircraft performing unique aerobatic maneuvers in the skies above El Alamein, a first for China. Furthermore, the exhibition served to strengthen Chinese-Egyptian military cooperation. China’s interest in the Egyptian air show reflected the strength of bilateral military relations and the two countries’ desire to bolster their aviation and defense sectors. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its affiliated military research and analysis centers focused on evaluating and analyzing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s activities in hosting the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition. The Egyptian Air Force also announced the launch of the second edition of the exhibition, aiming to explore avenues for joint military cooperation and advanced military technologies between Egypt and China.

–             Second: The Role of the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security in Monitoring the Activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to Secure Chinese Belt and Road Initiative Projects and Protect Chinese Strategic Interests

The Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (the Counter-Espionage and Infiltration Bureau) is concerned with the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in securing Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects and protecting China’s growing strategic interests in the region from foreign intelligence penetrations. The dimensions of Chinese security and intelligence interest are focused on protecting vital waterways, particularly securing navigation in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, which are essential maritime arteries for China’s Maritime and Military Silk Road. Furthermore, the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security seeks to secure major Chinese investments through intelligence oversight of joint Chinese logistical and economic projects, such as the Suez Canal Economic Zone and the TEDA projects. With close monitoring by Chinese intelligence circles, specifically the role of the Chinese Ninth Bureau in countering external threats, the activities of rival intelligence agencies targeting Chinese military technologies or economic presence in North Africa are being tracked and neutralized.

Therefore, think tanks affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been paying close attention to the Egyptian defense minister’s foreign trips aimed at strengthening Egyptian military partnerships with countries around the world. This is of profound significance and military importance to China and the PLA, given its connection to China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the military cover for trade. Beijing relies on developing military coordination with Cairo and advanced arms deals, such as air defense systems, to ensure a stable regional environment that protects its long-term investments. This is achieved through a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, transforming their cooperation from traditional trade to security and defense integration, thus guaranteeing the safe flow of global trade through Egypt. Therefore, the Chinese military has shown keen interest in tracking the movements of Egyptian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher around the world, particularly his important official visit to Turkey in July 2026 and his meeting with the Turkish Defense Minister to sign a letter of intent for defense cooperation and the expansion of joint exercises. This is in addition to his on-site monitoring of the development and training of personnel at the Military Academy and other educational institutions affiliated with the Armed Forces, which intelligence and military circles in Beijing are keen to monitor closely.

– Third: The interest of Chinese military platforms and websites in covering news and activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense through official and semi-official military and news portals affiliated with the Chinese government that focus on defense and Middle Eastern affairs

In this context, several Chinese military platforms and websites specialize exclusively in covering news about the Egyptian Ministry of Defense or Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher individually. However, his strategic movements are also followed through official and semi-official Chinese government military and news outlets that focus on defense and Middle Eastern affairs. The most prominent of these Chinese websites and platforms include the China People’s Liberation Army Online (cn/China.81 Military Online). This is the official website of the Chinese armed forces, focusing on official meetings and joint cooperation. Also included is the website of the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, which is known as mod.gov.cn. This covers military diplomacy and protocols between Egypt and China. Additionally, there is (Xinhua Military). This is the official news arm that translates and publishes extensive reports on the restructuring of military leadership and the strategic moves of the Egyptian Minister of Defense, Ashraf Salem Zaher. And the Guancha Platform, which is militarily known as Guancha.cn. This is a leading Chinese analytical website that focuses on international military and geopolitical affairs. It analyzes Egyptian arms deals and military cooperation with regional and international powers, particularly China. Chinese media coverage of news from the Egyptian army and the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition in Egypt demonstrates broad strategic interest through Chinese military platforms such as the People’s Liberation Army Online (China Military Online) and the website of the Chinese Ministry of Defense. This coverage focuses on joint military cooperation, modern Egyptian military technologies, and potential areas of military cooperation between Egypt and China during the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition. This is especially significant given the participation of major Chinese military companies in the second edition of the exhibition, companies operating in the fields of defense, armaments, space technology, and commercial aviation. Therefore, specialized Chinese military platforms and agencies highlight displays of modern aircraft and drones, trends in military technological development in Egypt, and areas of mutual military benefit between Egypt and China.

Here, Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles, represented by the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security and all the aforementioned Chinese military sites, are monitoring all Egyptian military and field movements and activities. This includes, most notably, the movements of Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production (who assumed his position in February 2026). His recent intensive activities and initiatives aimed at enhancing combat readiness and strengthening Egyptian-international military cooperation, particularly with China and the People’s Liberation Army, are of particular interest. Among the most prominent movements and activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, which have been the focus of analysis and evaluation by Chinese military circles, are the Egyptian defense minister’s field and diplomatic activities, including his official visit to Turkey in July 2026 at the head of a high-level Egyptian military delegation to discuss joint defense cooperation with the Turkish side. In addition to the interest, analysis, and evaluation by Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles of the significance of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s invitation and reception of African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s headquarters and their analysis of its connection to maintaining the security and stability of Chinese investments and opening new footholds and ports, especially in the Horn of Africa region, which is sensitive to Chinese logistical interests, relevant circles in Beijing are also monitoring the Egyptian side’s reception of the deputy prime minister and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Congo to discuss regional conditions and security in Africa, linking this to Chinese interests from a Chinese perspective.

– Fourth: The interest of intelligence, military, and security circles in Beijing in the recent Egyptian military activity in Africa and the significance of inviting and receiving African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s headquarters, from a precise geopolitical perspective as a strategic pillar serving vital Chinese interests

Intelligence, military, and security circles in Beijing view Egypt’s recent military activity in Africa as a strategic pillar directly serving vital Chinese interests. Beijing analyzes the invitation and reception of African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense headquarters, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, from a precise geopolitical perspective that links regional security to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This analysis considers the connection between Egyptian activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa and Chinese logistics efforts to secure vital maritime routes for China’s interests. Beijing believes that strengthening Egyptian military influence in the sensitive Horn of Africa region acts as a safeguard for maritime traffic in the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal, the main artery of China’s Maritime Silk Road, in addition to its importance for protecting China’s ports. Here, Chinese defense circles welcome any efforts to stabilize the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, thus protecting Beijing’s logistics base in Djibouti and opening up prospects for securing new Chinese ports and investments. These investments depend on the stability that Cairo, as a regional power center, can contribute to establishing.

– Fifth: Beijing’s interpretation of the reception of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s defense minister in Egypt to promote calm and stability in the Great Lakes and Nile Basin region, which is crucial to Chinese logistical interests.

Beijing’s interpretation of the reception of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s defense minister in Egypt is that relevant circles in Beijing followed with great interest the Egyptian side’s reception of the deputy prime minister and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guy Kabombo Mwadiyamvita, to discuss regional security conditions. Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles analyze this in order to secure Chinese mining investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, given that China has massive investments worth billions of dollars in the minerals and cobalt sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Beijing believes that security and stability in Congo, which Egypt supports through African Union institutions and bilateral cooperation, protects vital supply chains for Chinese technology industries from the risks posed by rebel groups. Furthermore, the Chinese Ninth Bureau and Chinese think tanks and military intelligence affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that strategic coordination in the Nile Basin region is essential for China’s interests and investments. Beijing considers the Egyptian-Congolese consensus to enhance calm and stability in the Great Lakes region and the Nile Basin, thus reducing the likelihood of armed conflicts that could threaten construction and infrastructure projects implemented by Chinese companies in those countries.

– Sixth: Chinese military circles are closely monitoring Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meetings with leaders of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to secure the Chinese Maritime and Military Silk Road.

In addition to closely monitoring Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meetings with the leaders of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, Chinese military circles are following the security situation and developments in the armed forces’ modernization plans, given the particular importance of these matters to China in safeguarding its interests. Chinese military and strategic circles are keen to follow these meetings due to Egypt’s pivotal role in the stability of the Middle East and its crucial importance to China’s economic interests and investments in the Maritime and Military Silk Road. The dimensions of Chinese interest in President al-Sisi’s role lie in his coordination with the Egyptian military establishment to protect Chinese investments and secure major infrastructure projects and the Chinese economic zone northwest of the Suez Canal. This strengthens the Chinese military partnership with Egypt, paving the way for further defense cooperation agreements, increased military partnership and joint exercises, and the diversification of Chinese arms sources for Cairo. This serves to maintain China’s regional security and to monitor the security situation and its impact on global trade and maritime navigation routes.

– Seventh: Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises and the Badr 2026 tactical project.

Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises. They pay particular attention to the final stage of the nighttime missile-firing exercise conducted by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces, attended by the Chief of Staff and commanders of the main branches. Chinese officials also observe the Egyptian Military Science Day, the activities of the Military Technical College’s Science Day, and the conclusion of its scientific and engineering competitions. Furthermore, Chinese circles evaluate the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s Badr 2026 tactical project, especially the main phase of the Badr tactical exercise, which involved live ammunition and was conducted by (units of the Egyptian Third Field Army). This evaluation assesses the Egyptian army’s strength in defending the security and stability of vital waterways and axes of importance to China. Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises, and they pay particular attention to the final stage of the nighttime missile firing exercise conducted by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces, attended by the Chief of Staff and commanders of the main branches. With the Chinese interest in the Egyptian Military Science Day, the activities of the Military Technical College’s Science Day, and the conclusion of its scientific and engineering competitions, Chinese circles are also evaluating the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s tactical project (Badr 2026), particularly the main phase of the Badr tactical project, which involved live-fire exercises conducted by units of the Egyptian Third Field Army. This evaluation aims to assess the Egyptian army’s strength in defending the security and stability of vital corridors and axes of importance to China. Chinese military circles and analysts are closely following the training and educational activities of the Egyptian Armed Forces, specifically the Badr 2026 tactical project with live ammunition conducted by the Egyptian Third Field Army, night air defense firing exercises, and the scientific activities of the Military Technical College. This is all part of assessing the Egyptian army’s readiness to protect vital axes. Furthermore, relevant circles in Beijing are keen to conduct further monitoring and evaluation of Egyptian military field training activities within the framework of the Badr 2026 tactical project to accurately assess the main phase with live ammunition conducted by units of the Third Field Army in support of the Air Force and to penetrate defenses.  With the interest of Chinese military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army in the (nighttime missile firing) exercises in Egypt, they observed the efficiency and capabilities of the Egyptian air defense forces in operating effectively at night under cover of defense and in the presence of Egyptian military leaders.

With the Chinese military circles monitoring the graduation ceremony of the Egyptian Military Academy and the graduation ceremonies of new classes of students from the Military Academy for Postgraduate and Strategic Studies and understanding and studying the impact of these events on China through the desire of Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles to develop military curricula in Egypt and Africa. This reflects the Chinese interest in Egyptian military education and scientific research and the Egyptian Military Science Day through the monitoring of the activities of the Egyptian Military Technical College’s Science Day and engineering competitions, and following the conclusion of the scientific and engineering competitions and linking them to the technological development of the combat capabilities of Egyptian military academies and institutions, and understanding what is lacking in these activities in order to fill it in the future through military educational partnerships with Egypt and its Ministry of Defense.

With close monitoring by Chinese defense and security circles of the joint Golden Eagle exercises between Egypt and Turkey, given their importance to China’s military and maritime Silk Road and to protecting Chinese interests in maintaining the security of the region and its vital waterways necessary for global supply chains. The focus and attention of think tanks affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army have also been on Egypt. The With You initiative is primarily an Egyptian military initiative concerned with coordinating the Martyrs’ Recognition Fund of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to disburse the first phase of the presidential initiative to care for the children of martyrs and wounded veterans. Chinese circles are interested in this Egyptian presidential initiative to understand its implementation mechanism, in coordination with the Egyptian Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Social Solidarity, and in cooperation with the Central Bank of Egypt and Misr Life Insurance Company. China is seeking to understand the Egyptian system and its operational and implementation mechanisms regarding all presidential initiatives.

– Eighth: Chinese military bodies and departments are monitoring the mechanisms for developing military education in Egypt, understanding and analyzing the system for preparing and qualifying students at the Egyptian Military Academy, in order to assess Egyptian military and elite human resources and build an accurate Chinese database to understand the size and number of elites with military and technological backgrounds in Egypt.

Furthermore, Chinese military bodies and departments are monitoring the mechanisms for developing military education in Egypt and understanding and analyzing the system for preparing and qualifying students at the Egyptian Military Academy in order to share their expertise with the Egyptian military. They are also monitoring announcements of new admissions to the Military Academy and graduates of technological colleges to understand the total number of individuals with military backgrounds in Egypt, reflecting China’s future desire to transfer its expertise in military education curricula and leadership and elite training to Egypt and its military academies. An analytical reading of China’s monitoring of the Egyptian military education system reveals profound strategic dimensions that extend beyond mere routine observation for the Chinese. This Chinese interest in the Egyptian military education system can be broken down as Beijing’s focus on monitoring Egyptian military and elite human resources. By monitoring the admission requirements and announcements for the Egyptian Military Academy and Egyptian military technology colleges, Beijing aims to build a precise database and understand the size and number of elites with military and technological backgrounds in Egypt. This contributes to anticipating the future leadership structure of the Egyptian state and helps Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles assess the combat and administrative efficiency of Egyptian military elites. Here, the Chinese side seeks to analyze the preparation and qualification curricula for students in Egyptian military academies to determine the development of Egyptian training doctrine and its adaptation to modern warfare and smart systems. This facilitates the evaluation of the most prominent military partner in the Middle East and Africa region. This can be considered a gateway for transferring Chinese military-diplomatic expertise to Egypt, reflecting China’s future desire to introduce its leadership and elite training methodologies. This is part of China’s persistent effort to enhance its strategic influence (soft power) in Egypt and build long-term ideological and tactical alignment between the Egyptian and Chinese militaries through sharing its advanced military doctrine.

    Accordingly, we understand the extent of Beijing’s interest in the role of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense within its strategy to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. This includes securing vital economic interests and maritime routes for China, such as the Suez Canal, and developing mutual military and arms cooperation with Cairo. This stems from China’s keenness to coordinate with Cairo, given its central position in global trade and regional security. This helps diversify Chinese military partnerships with the Egyptian military establishment and its Ministry of Defense, as Beijing presents itself as a reliable strategic military alternative in the Middle East.

In celebration of the 99th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), established in August 1927, the PLA commemorates its founding on August 1st each year (remembering the Nanchang Uprising of 1927). This anniversary is marked amidst ongoing efforts to modernize its defense capabilities, alongside diplomatic and military endeavors to strengthen dialogue, partnerships, and the exchange of experiences with European, Asian, and international militaries. The PLA is considered the cornerstone of China’s national defense, and Chinese military leaders at all embassies and consulates worldwide organize numerous official events to mark its founding on August 1st each year. Chinese embassies and military attachés around the world, such as the Chinese Embassy in Belgium and other European countries, host official receptions to highlight the PLA’s role in maintaining global peace and stability, as well as its development capabilities and readiness. The PLA is focused on transforming into a modern, integrated military force encompassing land, sea, and air.

China’s military relations with European militaries reflect the logic of military diplomacy, as China seeks to deepen military ties with its European allies and partners within its strategy of mutual military engagement, cooperation, and learning opportunities. Here, Chinese military channels with European countries serve as avenues for dialogue and the exchange of views on regional and international security to achieve balance and stability. Beijing, through its diplomatic activities, emphasizes the importance of balanced partnerships with the European Union and its member states to provide stability and certainty to the world. In this context, Beijing’s relationship with European militaries takes on a dual character of strategic competition and mutual caution, especially given Washington’s efforts to utilize NATO to contain Chinese power. Consequently, tension has arisen between the Chinese military and NATO due to China’s rejection of NATO’s Asian expansion into its regional sphere. Beijing views NATO’s attempts to broaden its security engagement with Asia-Pacific countries as a threat to stability and incompatible with the multipolar world order, while China rejects the logic of military hegemony. The Chinese military, in its strategic literature, emphasizes its opposition to American power and hegemonic policies implemented through the NATO military alliance. China and the People’s Liberation Army also strongly reject NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs, viewing it as interference that threatens regional and global stability and leads to confrontations between military blocs.

Herein lies the official Chinese military stance on the NATO military alliance, describing it as a relic of the Cold War that extends beyond its original geographical scope. China explicitly accuses NATO of instigating tensions and provoking confrontations in Asia. Furthermore, China warns against the militarization of the region through NATO partnerships with countries such as Japan and Australia. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains that China’s defense policy aims to protect national sovereignty and regional security, viewing Western actions as attempts to contain Chinese influence and impose American hegemony. Therefore, Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles reject the logic of linking Euro-Atlantic security to issues in the Indo-Pacific region.

The most significant dynamics of the Chinese military relationship with European armies are characterized by the maintenance of strategic autonomy. Some European capitals seek to avoid full involvement in the US-China conflict, preferring to preserve commercial interests and pursue self-sufficiency. This is further complicated by technological and industrial competition between European armies and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. NATO closely monitors the development of the Chinese military’s cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence, viewing them as strategic challenges impacting global supply chains. Meanwhile, China perceives NATO’s policies as subservient to US interests at the expense of European national security. NATO’s ongoing monitoring of Chinese cyber capabilities and the escalating technological competition between China, Europe, and the United States for leadership in the digital and economic future are noteworthy. These tensions manifest in mutual concerns regarding cybersecurity and global supply chains, which raise serious concerns for NATO due to the numerous strategic challenges and cyber threats they pose. Here, NATO monitors digital operations and hybrid attacks linked to Beijing-affiliated actors targeting critical infrastructure and technological security, according to NATO’s military perspective. NATO’s military strategies focus on protecting technological superiority in artificial intelligence and semiconductors to prevent any potential disruption to global supply chains.

For this reason, China’s stance toward NATO is characterized by accusations of American political dominance. Beijing believes that NATO’s expanding policies and transatlantic orientation serve the US strategic agenda at its expense and in confrontation with China, which, from the Chinese perspective, affects European security itself. China considers NATO’s increasing involvement in Asia-Pacific issues and technological confrontation not to serve Europe’s own security interests but rather to threaten international stability as a whole. Thus, China’s position on NATO is based on the accusation that it serves American hegemony and threatens security and stability in Asia and Europe. Beijing views NATO as a tool for implementing America’s strategic plans, aiming to mobilize member states of the military alliance to pursue a policy of Asian expansion in the face of China. China and the People’s Liberation Army reject NATO’s involvement in Asia-Pacific issues, arguing that NATO’s policies harm Europe’s economic and technological security. From a Chinese perspective, the alliance’s technological confrontation poses a threat to international stability and European security, with China believing that NATO’s policies ultimately undermine Europe’s own security.

Tehran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen have fired missiles and drones at two of Saudi Arabia’s most strategically important oil facilities on the Red Sea, in a major escalation of the latest simmering regional conflict to be reignited by the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran.

But the skies over the country at the epicentre of the widening war were quiet for a second successive night, with no new US attacks on Iran reported by Sunday morning.

Iran had been pounded by 13 consecutive waves of overnight US air strikes since July 11, after the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attacked tankers trying to transit the Strait of Hormuz. As hostilities escalated, both sides declared that an interim peace agreement signed in June was dead, and a second phase of talks to finalise a comprehensive peace deal appeared doomed.

But there have been no US air strikes since Friday, and tentative signs are emerging that Washington and Tehran are still talking via mediators and might return to more meaningful discussions.

Even if another fragile truce is agreed, however, the cascade of consequences unleashed by the war is still stoking conflict and confrontation elsewhere.

Iran’s attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz have put a stranglehold on exports of oil and raw materials for fertiliser, sending energy prices soaring and raising the risk of a food security crisis in some of the world’s most vulnerable countries.

In March, in response to attacks on Iran, the Tehran-backed Hezbollah movement in Lebanon resumed missile attacks on Israel, which then launched a devastating invasion of southern Lebanon that has displaced 1.2 million people.

Now, another smouldering regional conflict has erupted again, between US-allied Saudi Arabia and the Houthi movement which controls most of northern and western Yemen, including the capital, Sanaa. Saudi Arabia and its regional allies joined a brutal civil war against the Houthis in 2015, until a truce was agreed in 2022.

Risk of global crisis

The truce collapsed this month after an attack on Sanaa airport to stop an Iranian plane landing provoked the Houthis to fire ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia. Last Monday, the Houthis declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, and late on Friday the Saudis launched air strikes on the Houthi-held city of Hodeidah.

In retaliation, Houthi forces launched Sunday’s attacks on facilities belonging to Saudi state oil giant Aramco in the coastal cities of Jizan and Yanbu, Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said.

There has been no comment from Saudi Arabia on the extent of any damage to Aramco’s refinery in Jizan, but a large column of smoke was seen rising after the attack.

In Yanbu, Saudi Arabia’s principal west coast export gateway, two ballistic missiles aimed at oil installations were intercepted by a Patriot battery operated in Saudi Arabia by the Greek military under an agreement ‌with Riyadh.

The escalating conflict has raised fears that the Houthis could block the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. If both the Bab al-Mandeb and Hormuz straits were blocked, the resulting supply chain crisis would cause major economic damage across the world.

Entangled wars

Besides spreading to the Red Sea, the US-Iran war has become entangled with the deadliest active conflict in the world – Russia’s attempted conquest of Ukraine.

A long-range strike on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea on Saturday caused an explosion that killed one sailor and wounded another, according to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which blamed the attack on Ukraine and summoned Kyiv’s charge d’affaires in Tehran to convey its condemnation of the “hostile and criminal” act.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a post on X that Kyiv had achieved “very strong results” with long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea, hitting “vessels used in military cargo shipments involving Iran, as well as a warship”.

Zelenskyy claimed in further comments on X on Saturday that since the start of July, Kyiv had detected “active Russian satellite ⁠surveillance of the Gulf states and US military facilities located there”. He said the satellite images were passed to Tehran to help the IRGC identify targets for ballistic missile and drone attacks.

US President Donald Trump has not given a reason for the sudden cessation in air strikes on Iran, but a senior administration official told the Reuters news agency that Trump “has always been clear that his preference is diplomacy, but he has shown Iran what will happen if they fail to come to the table in a serious way”.

Trump said on Friday that there was still some communication with Iran.

“They are talking to us right now; they’d love to make a deal,” he said. “I don’t think they’re ready to … but I’m willing to listen.”

Al Jazeera’s Resul Serdar, reporting from Tehran, said Iranian officials had confirmed the two sides were exchanging messages.

“There have been proposals conveyed by the mediators, and Tehran is still reviewing them,” Serdar said, adding there was “not much progress yet” due to “fundamental differences” in their positions and deep mistrust.

Taiz, Yemen – Um Yousef knew that living on the front line in Taiz was dangerous. The area had been quieter for the past few years thanks to a general de-escalation of the war in Yemen, but it still lay between territory controlled by Yemeni government forces and Houthi rebels.

Destroyed buildings mark the city’s front line areas, evidence of the brutal fighting that has lasted for more than a decade.

But Um Yousef felt that she didn’t have a choice. A single mother of four children in her 40s, she couldn’t afford the typical market rate of about $130 for a three-bedroom house in the central Yemeni city. Her husband died years ago while working abroad, so she was the sole breadwinner for the family in a country where poverty has increased sharply since the war began more than a decade ago.

“There is a huge demand for houses, and all my efforts failed while I was living in a single room with my children,” recalled Um Yousef, who asked to use a pseudonym for security reasons. “It was very difficult to stay in that one room.”

After eight months of moving from one area to another, and even searching on the outskirts of Taiz, she ultimately decided that her only option was a home near the front line. Yes, it was dangerous, but with little money coming in, the home she found for about $13 a month couldn’t be ignored.

In January 2025, the family made the move. Two months later, her 11-year-old son came into the house from playing outside with blood pouring out of his mouth – he’d been shot.

Sniper danger

“I couldn’t understand what happened – I didn’t hear any gunfire,” Um Yousef said.

She still doesn’t know the exact cause of the shooting, but many of the casualties near Yemen’s front lines are the result of sniper fire.

Taiz is particularly dangerous in this regard. The front line going through the city is one of the few in the country in an urban area. The city’s geography, hilly and with a mountain overlooking it, offers numerous vantage points for snipers.

A United Nations monitoring project found that 66 percent of all civilian casualties from sniper shootings in Yemen last year were in Taiz. Of the 21 cases recorded, nine were children.

Thankfully, Um Yousef’s son’s injuries were not as serious as first feared. After being immediately taken to hospital, he received medical treatment and was discharged the next day.

The incident woke Um Yousef up to the reality of where she had brought her children to. But she still can’t afford to move. Instead, she has had no choice but to stay and learn ways to reduce the risk.

“Residents here take precautions I wasn’t aware of, like turning off lights at night in rooms visible from a distance, and keeping children from playing in open areas,” she explained. “They have to play behind the houses instead. I’m aware of these things now and follow them to keep my children safe.”

Damaged homes

Taiz governorate is the most populous in Yemen, with a population of almost 4.5 million and more than 400,000 internally displaced people, according to Khalid Alwan, director of the local statistics office.

“More than 10,000 houses were completely or partially damaged by the conflict in Taiz, and there are many more we couldn’t reach to count,” Alwan told Al Jazeera. “Reconstruction is expensive, and most residents cannot afford to repair their homes even if they are in safe areas. This further worsens the housing crisis in the city.”

He noted that while some humanitarian organisations have repaired partially damaged homes in safe areas, these efforts are a drop in the ocean compared with the sheer number of affected properties.

The Nahda Makers Organisation (NMO) is one such group rehabilitating homes in several Yemeni governorates. To date, NMO has repaired 2,389 houses in Taiz, Lahj, Hodeidah, Aden and Abyan governorates – the vast majority of them in Taiz.

While this initiative has helped some families return to safe areas, the overall need remains overwhelming, with an estimated 4.8 million displaced people across the country still unable to return.

Housesitting

Mohammed Saeed has been living in the al-Thawrah neighbourhood of Taiz near the front line since 2023. He believes the war has taken a heavy toll on society, with soaring rents being one of its worst consequences.

“I’m not happy living here as we frequently hear the sounds of gunfire at night. Even if we aren’t targeted, just hearing it is enough to terrify us,” the 53-year-old told Al Jazeera. “In the beginning, my children couldn’t sleep when they heard the shooting, but now they’ve adapted. Adapted to what? Adapted to living in a dangerous area.”

Mohammed, who is unemployed and cannot afford rent, lives in a house for free in exchange for guarding it. Because the neighbourhood is near the front lines, many residents here do not pay rent.

“Nowadays it is calm, but if there is any escalation, we will be trapped in the crossfire,” Mohammed said. “I hope I can find a job that enables me to rent a house in a safe place and leave this one.”

Khalid Abdulhadi, 46, is one of the people who could afford to leave. He was born in the al-Kamb neighbourhood of Taiz city and owns a house there. However, he fled during the heavy fighting in 2018 and has not returned, as the proximity to the front line makes it far too unsafe.

“It is not the right decision to return and live in a dangerous area,” he told Al Jazeera. “Even though I am paying rent while owning my own home, going back could cost me my life.”

Khalid, who works as an accountant for a local company, said some of his neighbours did return and one of them lost their son, shot dead by a sniper.

He has allowed a family he knows to live in his house free of charge, knowing that they are impoverished and willing to guard the property. But he has decided to stay far away.

“I would prefer to live in a safe camp for displaced families rather than a dangerous house,” he said.

“We lost everything during this war; our lives are all we have left, so we must protect them.”

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently launched a public attack on the International Criminal Court (ICC), vowing to “dismantle the ICC—brick by brick.” Washington’s position is that the ICC has no authority to try officials from non-member states—such as the US itself—or their allies, and that it will not accept any international court exercising jurisdiction over American citizens without US consent. Washington therefore intends to use diplomatic pressure and sanctions to counter the Court.

If one still believes in the international community’s definition of war crimes, this looks like a political move to absolve the United States and Israel of war crimes committed in the Middle East. To that end, Washington is pressuring allies — including states that are parties to the Rome Statute — to withdraw from the ICC.

“Trump said in January, ‘I don’t need international law’ to highlight his ‘America First’ policy. He is now keeping that promise, and the ICC is just one example.”

The day before Rubio announced his intent to dismantle the ICC, fourteen countries, including the United States, publicly reaffirmed their support for the ten-year-old ruling in the South China Sea Arbitration—a decision handed down by another international arbitration body: an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Ironically, of the fourteen countries, only the Philippines—the actual party to the case—has a direct stake in South China Sea rights. The other five countries with genuine interests in the South China Sea did not join this “cheerleading squad”: Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and Indonesia. Of these, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei are, like the Philippines, “principal claimant states.”

Aside from the US and the Philippines, every other country among the fourteen marking the tenth anniversary of the ruling is an ICC member state: Australia, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.

These 12 ICC member states have no stake whatsoever in South China Sea affairs, yet they support an international arbitration body — and are now being pressured by the United States to boycott another international arbitration body they themselves belong to. Fourteen countries are happy to use international law to pressure China, but when international law becomes inconvenient for the US and Israel, is that suddenly a different matter?

The Philippines finds itself in the most awkward position of all. Manila withdrew from the ICC in 2019, yet after Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took office as president, it allowed Interpol and Philippine airport authorities to arrest former president Rodrigo Duterte in 2025 and hand him directly over to the ICC for trial.

The real story behind this episode is domestic political rivalry within the Philippines, combined with Washington’s long-standing displeasure with Duterte. International institutions have played the role of “witch-hunt enforcer,” helping the US and Manila nail a political opponent to the cross.

In the past, the international community could invoke Rome Statute standards to brand Duterte’s “war on drugs” a crime against humanity. But what now?

The ICC cannot prosecute non-member states, but it can prosecute individuals—such as Benjamin Netanyahu. Moreover, under the Rome Statute’s territoriality principle, the Court has jurisdiction if the alleged crime occurred on the territory of a member state. In the Middle East case, Palestine is a state party. In the Philippine case, although Manila withdrew from the ICC in 2019, crimes committed before that withdrawal remain within the Court’s reach.

The reason the US can attack the ICC so freely is that other international arbitration bodies do not follow this same “detour through territoriality” to claim jurisdiction over non-member states, nor do they try individuals—they adjudicate sovereign states (or transnational corporate entities). As such, they strictly adhere to the most fundamental principle of international law: the principle of state consent.

Interestingly, the tribunal that presided over the South China Sea arbitration itself violated the principle of state consent by ruling on a case brought against China, which refused to participate. This is precisely why China has never recognized the ruling as having any legal basis. Yet the fourteen countries that support the ruling seem untroubled by this violation of a core principle of international law.

In other words, both the ICC and the ad hoc tribunal behind the South China Sea arbitration suffer from the same flaw: overreach. The ICC has been accused of an “idealism” that oversteps state sovereignty, while the South China Sea tribunal has been criticized for “procedural overreach”—under UNCLOS, an ad hoc tribunal has no authority whatsoever over land territorial sovereignty, yet the tribunal accepted the Philippines’ framing that “downgraded” what were really sovereignty and maritime-delimitation questions into a simple matter of “the legal status of islands and reefs” and used that framing to assert jurisdiction for itself.

Taiwan was an innocent bystander caught in the crossfire of the South China Sea arbitration. Itu Aba (Taiping Island), which is under the actual control of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and has both fresh water and the capacity to sustain human habitation, was nonetheless ruled to be a mere “”rock”—stripping it of any 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone.

Given that both international arbitration bodies suffer from the same problem of overreach, if one follows the US in opposing the ICC, shouldn’t one logically also oppose the South China Sea ruling? This month, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs launched an “urgent assessment” to awkwardly grapple with exactly this dilemma, since Manila has skin in both games—the Duterte case and the South China Sea ruling.

If Manila agrees to help dismantle the ICC, what happens to Duterte, still awaiting trial in The Hague? And if China then uses that same logic to reject the South China Sea ruling, what then? The other twelve member states that joined this “witch hunt” find themselves in an equally awkward spot.

Second only to the Philippines in embarrassment is Japan. Tokyo is the ICC’s largest financial backer; the Court’s current president, Tomoko Akane, is Japanese; and Japan has long been one of the ICC’s staunchest supporters. Is Tokyo now expected to help the US dismantle the ICC or to withdraw from it altogether?

Japan also finds itself in a glaring contradiction over the South China Sea ruling. If Taiwan-controlled Taiping Island—with an area of 510,000 square meters (roughly the size of 71 standard football pitches), fresh water, and the capacity to sustain habitation)—was ruled a mere “rock,” then how can Okinotorishima, an outcrop Japan claims sovereignty over that covers just 9.44 square meters (about the size of a double bed), possibly qualify as an “island”?

By that logic, Tokyo’s support for the South China Sea ruling effectively concedes that Okinotorishima has no exclusive economic zone at all — a self-inflicted contradiction that China has been quick to mock.

One could, therefore, say all fourteen countries backing the South China Sea ruling are applying a double standard, and that thirteen of them have no connection to the South China Sea whatsoever. Aside from the Philippines, the only country with any real claim to South China Sea interests is the United States — and the US holds international law in contempt, going so far as to vow to destroy an international arbitration institution outright.

This episode symbolizes the unraveling of the international order—a world reverting to the law of the jungle. The United States is dismantling the very international order it built, and the ones hurt most are precisely its own allies.

The Philippines and Japan have been given the responsibility of encircling China on the front line by the United States, but the footholds of the two countries are also being dismantled by the United States. In front of them, there is only the risk of opposing China and the weakening guarantee.

Above all, the United States has proven, by its own actions, that the so-called international order was never fair and never operated on a fixed standard — it was merely a temporary tool for an empire to rule the world. And when the tool stops being useful, it gets discarded, leaving its followers staring, embarrassed, at the tool still in their hands.

The greatest geopolitical and economic challenge facing the United States today is the proliferation of international Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs.) While the United States has the “sweet geopolitical spot in the world’s geography and topographic landmass,” its economic dominance is being challenged by the proliferation of international SWFs. It is true, at present, that the United States has the largest reserve of oil and mineral wealth in the world, yet with SWFs gaining traction in the world economy, the oil reserves and mineral wealth may not matter.

Those countries that have initiated SWFs as part of their economic and geopolitical life are on an upward trajectory. The United States, on the other hand, is on a downward path by not marshalling its vast mineral wealth in a comprehensive and dynamic SWF. If things continue on their present course, those countries utilizing their mineral wealth and excess cash surplus will eventually catch up and overtake the size of the US economy. This is an evolving threat to the national security of the United States and to its very polity.

The most immediate threat to the United States is the race to develop mining facilities on the Moon to harvest and transport the critical element of Helium-3 (He-3.)    He-3 is a critical element for the increasing economic demands of a modern world economy. Whoever can establish mining dominance for this critical element will become the world’s leading economic power in the world, regardless of that nation’s mineral wealth on Earth.

However, with its present economic and political strength, the United States has the means to reverse that trend if its two major political organizations can compromise on the very nature of the framework that establishes a United States SWF; this challenge is not easily dealt with.

This article discusses the legislative gridlock surrounding the creation of a United States SWF and the accelerating international competition that challenges the current United States dominance in space technology.

Commonwealth Fusion Systems (CFS) is currently constructing the SPARC at Devens, Massachusetts. CFS is constructing the SPARC to demonstrate to the world that it has solved the fusion problem. Despite some technological setbacks, CFS is on schedule to make the SPARC operational by the end of 2026, or early 2027. At the same time, CFS is currently constructing a fusion reactor (called a tokamak) in Virginia, which is scheduled to go online in the early 2030s. Critical to the ARC’s development is a shortage of the element He-3. He-3 is ignited by radio frequency and is the sparkplug that begins the plasma process, which is fusion energy, in the ARC tokamak.

The Commercial Landscape: U.S. Private Frontrunners

Terrestrial Helium-3 supply—derived primarily from nuclear stockpile maintenance—is severely capped at 22,000 to 30,000 liters annually. With surging demand for ultra-low-term quantum computer cooling, private aerospace firms are leading the transition to lunar harvesting:

• Interlune: Founded by former Blue Origin executives, the company unveiled a full-scale prototype harvester developed with Vermeer to process one hundred metric tons of regolith per hour. Backed by a $6.9 million NASA contract for its Prospect Moon payload, Interlune secured a historic $300M+ supply agreement with Finnish quantum firm Bluefors. Its first mapping payload is scheduled for an upcoming commercial lunar launch.
• Lunar Helium-3 Mining (LH3M): This firm holds five U.S. patents on a non-invasive, gas-separation architecture designed to extract solar wind volatile gases while bypassing traditional, high-wear mechanical regolith excavation.

The U.S. Sovereign Wealth Fund Gridlock

While Helium-3 is valued at roughly $20 million per kilogram, the asset cannot currently be utilized to seed an American Sovereign Wealth Fund due to severe political domestic gridlock:

• The Legislative Catch-22: The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act explicitly protects private enterprise, granting corporations exclusive ownership over extracted space resources. To capture this value, Congress would need to enact “space-severance taxes” or equity-for-infrastructure deals—both of which face massive ideological pushbacks in a deeply divided legislature.  It should be noted that American taxpayers have invested some $1.9 trillion (adjusted for inflation) in technology developed by NASA. Since the American people invested this money, they should be entitled to a return on investment.
• The Deficit vs. Surplus Dilemma: Traditional SWFs rely on state-managed resource surpluses (e.g., Norway’s oil). The U.S. operates at a massive structural deficit. Republicans propose seeding a fund via tariffs or fossil-fuel extraction, while Democrats demand funding via corporate wealth taxes or clean-energy equity. These disputes, combined with immediate 2026 midterm election priorities, have stalled the SWF framework completely.

Global Geopolitical Competitors: State-Driven Alternatives

While the U.S. model depends heavily on the private market, international adversaries are leveraging unified state power to establish dominance over lunar resources:

• China (CNSA): China’s Chang’e lunar exploration program is systematically mapping Helium-3 concentrations. Unlike the U.S. focus on near-term quantum cooling, Beijing explicitly views lunar He-3 as a long-term strategic energy priority to fuel Earth-based Deuterium-Helium-3 nuclear fusion reactors.
• The China-Russia Coalition: Beijing and Moscow have formalized a binding industrial partnership to construct an automated nuclear reactor on the Moon’s South Pole by 2035–2036. This autonomous reactor is designed to resolve the “Lunar Night” problem, providing continuous power to massive, automated mining rovers and scientific labs under the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) framework.
• Japan (ispace): In the allied sector, Japanese lunar robotics firm ispace has partnered with European mining tech developers to pioneer its own automated, energy-efficient recovery models for lunar Helium-3.

·        Conclusion

·        The race for Helium-3 represents a critical shift from symbolic space exploration to deep-space industrial supply chains. While U.S. commercial tech is moving quickly, domestic policy gridlock risks ceding permanent, state-backed infrastructure dominance to the China-Russia ILRS coalition.

·        While the concept of using outer space resources to build national wealth is actively discussed by think tanks, Congress has separate, targeted pieces of legislation addressing artificial intelligence revenue, foreign transparency, and space resource exploration rules.

·         

·        The primary draft bills and legislative vehicles currently stalled in committee reveal how Congress is attempting to navigate these frameworks:

The American A.I. Sovereign Wealth Fund Act (S. 4825)

Introduced in June 2026 by Senate Finance Committee member Bernie Sanders (I-VT), this is the most direct legislative attempt to create a federal wealth fund.

• The Mechanism: The bill proposes imposing a specialized excise tax on systemically critical artificial intelligence models and automation infrastructure. The revenue would seed a citizen-owned national wealth fund.
• Why It’s Stalled: It is currently deadlocked in the Senate Finance Committee. The bill faces severe pushback from lawmakers who argue that taxing emerging domestic tech sectors will cause the U.S. to lose the AI race to China, preferring instead to seed a potential fund via tariffs or natural resources.

2. The Sovereign Wealth Fund Transparency Act (S. 1488)

Introduced by Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), this bill tackles the national security and foreign policy side of state-owned investment vehicles.

• The Mechanism: Rather than creating a U.S. fund, this bill forces heavy disclosure requirements, financial auditing, and security screening on foreign sovereign wealth funds operating within U.S. critical infrastructure, high-tech, and aerospace sectors.

Why It’s Stalled: Referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it has remained stagnant due to concerns that over-regulating allied sovereign wealth funds (such as those from Gulf state allies or Singapore) could chill necessary foreign direct investment into U.S. tech startups.

3. Space Resource Extraction & Regulatory Frameworks (CRS / Commerce Committee Review)

There is currently no singular active bill trying to place federal royalties on lunar Helium-3 mining. Instead, the debate is gridlocked during budget reconciliation and agency authorizations within the House and Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committees.

• The Conflict: Congressional research reports on space resource extraction outline a widening gap in regulatory authority. NASA’s Artemis framework pushes heavily for in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) via public-private partnerships. However, some factions in Congress are pushing for strict government-owned procurement models to prevent private monopolies over lunar sites, effectively freezing long-term policy development
• Midterm Postponements: Broad commercial space bills have been repeatedly delayed because committee attention is entirely consumed by urgent federal budget reconciliation battles and defense appropriations.development.

Summary of Bill Statuses

Conclusion

Until the two major political organizations can begin to compromise for the good of the American people, the United States will eventually revert to a second-class power.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to penetrate Chinese society, particularly after the Arab Spring uprisings, stems from the Chinese Communist Party’s tight security grip, China’s policies of localizing religions, and the Chinese public’s rejection of transnational political ideologies. Despite the Brotherhood’s historical and organizational attempts to build ties with Muslim minorities in China, the rigid nature of the Chinese system and society has formed an impenetrable barrier to any infiltration. The fundamental contradiction between ideologies in China, such as Chinese communism as the ruling doctrine and political Islam as a totalitarian movement from which the Muslim Brotherhood emerged and China’s strict security policies aimed at integrating minorities, has led to the failure of these political ideological currents. Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood have failed to gain a foothold in China for several structural and political reasons. The most prominent of these is the strict nature of the Chinese communist system, which prohibits any political or religious activity outside the state’s control. This is compounded by the Sinicization policies that impose absolute loyalty to Chinese culture and the Communist Party. Furthermore, the internationalist ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam clashes with Chinese nationalism. Additionally, there is a lack of popular support for such projects among Muslim minorities who follow religious traditions different from those in Arab and Islamic countries and around the world. Despite the existence of an Islamic religious group in China called Yihewani, whose name literally means brotherhood, it is a reformist movement within the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence. It originated locally in China in the 20th century, specifically in the 1930s, but it is a completely independent, traditional Hanafi school of thought with no organizational or ideological ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East.

On the other hand, China harbored apprehensions about the political Islam and Muslim Brotherhood model following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. Research centers and decision-making bodies in Beijing closely monitored the outcomes of these uprisings, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt and Tunisia. China viewed the Brotherhood’s ascent to power in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, followed by their subsequent failures and the descent of some into civil war, as evidence that political Islam harbors a project to destabilize nations. This understanding led Beijing to adopt a firm, principled stance rejecting this model of political Islam entirely in order to protect its own stable development model. Consequently, China adopted a policy of strategic alliance with Egypt under President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and other Arab nationalist regimes following the events of the June 30, 2013, revolution in Egypt and the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood and its president, Mohamed Morsi. China strengthened its strategic and economic partnerships with current Arab governments, such as those in Egypt and the Gulf states. Here, China rejects interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Similarly, Arab states support the One China policy and its actions in Xinjiang. This high-level diplomatic coordination between China, Egypt, and other Arab states, following the Muslim Brotherhood’s failed rule, has led to a crackdown on any attempts to finance or subtly infiltrate the banned group through economic or educational channels within China.

Here, the Chinese state pursues a policy of institutional rejection of political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. Chinese authorities classify any political activity with a religious basis as a direct threat to national security and territorial integrity. This has led to the banning and dismantling of any cells or attempts to establish branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, Muslim ethnic minorities in regions like Xinjiang (East Turkestan) face strict security and surveillance measures that prevent the formation of any opposing Islamic religious movements within China. Beijing also imposes the forced assimilation of Muslim minorities into Chinese culture and criminalizes any transnational organizational manifestations or affiliations.  With an emphasis on the dominance of communist ideology, the ruling Chinese Communist Party rejects any religious or political activity or movements that seek to assert identity above loyalty to the state and the party. This is coupled with strict Chinese security measures to combat foreign infiltration of religions, organizations, movements, and Islamic political currents within China, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Beijing maintains one of the world’s most stringent surveillance systems for monitoring religious and political activities. Following the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, Chinese security agencies raised their alert levels to ensure that the contagion of color revolutions or ideological movements did not spread within its borders. China considers any foreign organization, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a direct threat to national security and social stability. Therefore, any cells or committees attempting to engage with Chinese Muslims are banned and dismantled.

Political Islam movements have failed to penetrate Chinese society and bring about political or social changes as they have in other countries. This is due to several historical, political, cultural, and social factors imposed by the Chinese state. The most prominent of these factors are the tight security and political grip and the nature of the Chinese communist political system. China imposes a highly centralized system in which the state and the Communist Party completely control the public sphere and institutions. No independent political or ideological organization is permitted outside the umbrella of the Communist Party. Chinese authorities impose strict censorship and implement proactive security policies that prevent any political, religious, or opposition organizations or movements from existing or expanding. Furthermore, the primacy of nationalism over religion in China, where Chinese identity is primarily based on belonging to the nation and the nationality, represented by the culture of the majority Han Chinese population, makes loyalty to the state paramount. This renders the transnational ideologies adopted by political Islam movements unacceptable and severely restricted. Here, the government’s policies toward religions in China become clear. China pursues a policy of Sinicization of religions, meaning that the practice of any religious rituals must conform entirely to Chinese culture and socialism. The Chinese state follows policies of Sinicization on religions, with Chinese authorities implementing strict policies to subordinate religions to Chinese socialist culture and values. This has included systematic campaigns to prevent foreign or Middle Eastern influences on mosque style, clothing, and religious practices. China also adopts strict policies to contain any influence of political Islam and subjects religious bodies to state supervision. Beijing aims to Sinicize religions and requires their integration with the culture of the Han majority and the values ​​of the Communist Party, placing loyalty to the nation above all other affiliations.

This occurs while the Chinese state officially manages and oversees Islamic institutions, such as the Islamic Association of China, thus preventing the emergence of independent religious leaders or institutions that could adopt or disseminate the ideas of political Islam. Herein lies the role of cultural and historical diversity within China. Muslim minorities in China, such as the Hui ethnic group, have absorbed traditional Chinese culture and integrated it with their beliefs over centuries, making their communities well-integrated into the broader social fabric and resilient against external influences. Muslims have been historically integrated into China, and Islam has been part of the Chinese social fabric for over 13 centuries.  Muslim ethnic groups, such as the Hui, have successfully integrated into Chinese society and adapted to local culture. This integration has made political Islam alien to their environment due to China’s strict security measures. The Chinese government deals harshly with any religious or ethnic movements with a political character, particularly in the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang region of northwest China, under the banner of combating extremism and terrorism. Security policies and measures have been implemented to restrict any religious activity outside the official control of the Chinese state. The state adopts a dual strategy: containing practices acceptable to official state institutions while categorically rejecting any separatist or political tendencies that Beijing considers a threat to the country’s unity and stability.

Beijing manages religious pluralism through the Islamic Association of China and views any ideologies that deviate from loyalty to the state with extreme caution. The relationship between the state and Islam in China is shaped by several pillars, including national diversity. China has 56 officially recognized ethnic, religious, and national groups, with the Han Chinese constituting the vast majority at approximately 92% of the population. Regarding Muslim ethnic groups, there are 10 Muslim-majority groups in China, such as the Hui and Uyghurs, with the total number of Muslims estimated in the tens of millions. China officially adopts a policy of Sinicization, whereby Chinese authorities lead campaigns to eliminate transnational religious expressions, prohibiting religious institutions from having ties with their counterparts abroad. Religious institutions are required to adhere to the Party’s leadership and integrate their doctrines with Chinese cultural traditions. The Chinese government pursues a policy of Sinicization of Islam. The Chinese state adopts a firm strategy based on integrating Islam and its culture into the Chinese national identity (in accordance with socialism with Chinese characteristics). As we mentioned, Muslim affairs are officially managed through the Islamic Association of China, which is under the control of the ruling Communist Party. This closure of the religious sphere has thwarted the Islamic internationalism ideology promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood in Middle Eastern countries, as China confines religious teaching and practice to purely local frameworks, preventing the introduction of the writings of Sayed Qutb or Hassan Al-Banna into Chinese territory.

Therefore, we conclude that attempts by political Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to infiltrate China or penetrate its Muslim communities have failed. Here we observe the cultural and ethnic differences between the Muslim minorities in China and the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in Egypt and the Middle East. The main Muslim population in China is divided into two primary groups that fail to resonate with the Brotherhood’s ideology: the Hui ethnic group, a Chinese Muslim minority. The Hui are Chinese-speaking Muslims fully integrated culturally and socially into the fabric of the Chinese state. Their primary loyalty is to China, and therefore, the Arab political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood finds no echo among them. The second group is the Uyghur ethnic group. Uyghurs reside in the Xinjiang region (East Turkestan) in northwest China. Despite the presence of nationalist and religious tendencies, Beijing has imposed extremely strict security measures (including re-education camps and biometric surveillance, which are security systems within China that use an individual’s biological characteristics, such as fingerprints, facial features, and iris scans, to verify their identity), effectively isolating the region from any activism emanating from the Middle East, particularly from the Muslim Brotherhood.

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened a strike on a very hardened Iranian facility known as Pickaxe Mountain, saying it is ripe for a “nice big fat shot right in the front door.” Trump’s comments underscore the challenges involved in holding this extremely deeply-buried site, which is tied to Iran’s nuclear program, at risk. The installation notably went untouched during the Operation Midnight Hammer strikes on Iran in June 2025, and was not struck in the course of Operation Epic Fury this year, either. So, here is what Pickaxe Mountain is, why it matters, and why it would be so hard to destroy.

Trump spoke about Pickaxe Mountain, also known as Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La, during a phone interview yesterday with Hugh Hewitt on the Salem News Channel network. This came amid renewed fighting between the United States and Iran, which broke out last week and has continued to escalate. The regime in Tehran has now declared the highly strategic Strait of Hormuz closed again to all maritime traffic, while the U.S. military is moving to reimpose a blockade of Iranian ports. This is all despite the signing of a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) last month that included the extension of an already fragile ceasefire. Readers can get caught up on the broader situation in the Middle East with our recent reporting here.

“Before you enter into another deal, will you insist that IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspectors get down into that deep, deep, deep tunnel and find out if they got a doomsday machine down there?” Hewitt asked Trump during their conversation yesterday.

“They don’t have it because we have eyes with Space Force, and everything else. We have a lot of eyes on it [Pickaxe Mountain],” Trump said in response. “But Pickaxe is a possible target for a nice big fat shot right near the front door, and I think that maybe you’ll see that.”

“We see no activity there. They’re not doing well with their nuclear situation. Every time we hear about it, we blow it up. So they don’t like talking about it,” Trump added. “But we’ll probably give Pickaxe a shot relatively soon.”

What is Pickaxe Mountain?

It should be noted here up front that there are actually assessed to be two independent tunnel networks under Pickaxe Mountain. One was built circa 2007, and the construction of the other began around 2020. The entire complex, which is contained within a single large security perimeter, is situated immediately to the southwest of Iran’s nuclear facility at Natanz, as seen in the satellite image we obtained from Vantor below. As an aside, Natanz was one of the facilities that U.S. forces struck during Operation Midnight Hammer. Natanz and Pickaxe Mountain are roughly in the center of Iran.

In the past, Iran has openly discussed plans to produce centrifuges to support its nuclear enrichment efforts at the newer facility at Pickaxe Mountain. It is also estimated to be large enough to house an actual enrichment plant, as well as other nuclear infrastructure, but exactly what is inside remains unconfirmed. Hewitt’s question yesterday reflected the fact that international inspectors have not been given any access to the overall site to date.

In light of strikes on other Iranian nuclear sites since last year, there is also the possibility that Iran may have relocated nuclear assets from other facilities to the more extensively hardened ones under Pickaxe Mountain.

In terms of activity, satellite imagery TWZ has obtained from Vantor, seen below, does show dump trucks and other vehicles moving in and out of one of two entrances to the newer tunnel network on the western side of Pickaxe Mountain on June 21. There are also two other entrances on the eastern side.

Previous satellite imagery had shown Iran taking steps to at least partially block access to the newer facility after the start of U.S. and Israeli strikes on February 28, according to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) think tank. Before the conflict erupted, Iran was also observed to have buried and hardened the entrances to the tunnel network built in 2007, again per ISIS’ assessments.

Last year, TWZ had called attention to efforts to at least partially seal up Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow before Operation Midnight Hammer. Similar activity has been observed in the past year at Natanz, Isfahan (also written Esfahan), and other hardened nuclear sites in Iran. As we have explored in detail in the past, sealing tunnel entrances and other access points creates an important deterrent to ground raids, as well as potentially offering additional hardening against standoff strikes. We will come back to this later on.

“Unlike the situation at both the Fordow and Esfahan tunnel entrances, this material [at the eastern entrances to the newer facility at Pickaxe Mountain] does not provide complete tunnel entrance obscuration at either portal,” ISIS noted in an assessment back in May. “Nonetheless, this material would appear to be sufficient to significantly hinder rapid ingress/egress by vehicles and would require the use of heavy earth moving equipment to gain such access and clear an unobstructed path inside. At present, we do not yet see evidence of such blockage having been undertaken at the two western tunnel portals of the larger complex.”

A shot in the door and not from above?

All of this brings us back to Trump’s comment about the possibility of a “nice big fat shot right in the front door” at Pickaxe Mountain. For years, experts have talked about the likelihood that the main caverns under the mountain are beyond the reach of even the largest known conventional bunker buster bomb in U.S. inventory, the 30,000-pound-class GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). The MOP was developed, at least in part, specifically to hold underground facilities in Iran at risk. Construction at Pickaxe Mountain, especially in the past five years, is a clear response to U.S. threats.

GBU-57 MOP test

MOPs were the centerpiece during the Operation Midnight Hammer strikes, with 12 being dropped on Fordow and another two on Natanz. To get at the actual targets at Fordow, six MOPs were dropped on two specific ventilation shafts, with each successive bomb burrowing deeper down into the complex below. This underscores the challenges that would be involved in attempting a similar operation against Pickaxe Mountain.

The available stockpile of MOPs was also understood to be relatively limited even before Operation Midnight Hammer, and it is unknown how many are currently in inventory. The U.S. Air Force is now in the process of acquiring a successor to MOP, called the GBU-76/B Next Generation Penetrator (NGP), but that is not expected to enter service for some time.

The United States does also have Earth-penetrating B61-11 gravity bombs in its nuclear stockpile, specifically to prosecute extremely deeply buried strategic targets. However, there is next to no chance the U.S. government would initiate the use of nuclear weapons against Iran absent anything approaching a proportionate, imminent threat or attack. Doing so would be a beyond massive escalation with serious worldwide ramifications, and there is no indication that American authorities are at all considering taking that step.

As with the strikes on Fordow, multiple bombs could be dropped on the same impact point to try to penetrate further down into Pickaxe Mountain. Whether there might be similar ventilation shafts or other weak points that could be exploited at Pickaxe Mountain is unknown. Trump’s remarks to Hugh Hewitt would certainly seem to suggest otherwise.

A strike “right in the front door” on the tunnel entrances at Pickaxe Mountain would be another option to at least hamper access to the facility inside for a time. This could be combined with strikes aimed at sections of the tunnel networks that run deeper inside the facility, but that are still close enough to the surface to be reachable by available conventional munitions. For instance, MOPs may not be able to hit the main cavern areas, but they could possibly hit certain tunnels that might lead to them.

Even a combined strike on entrances and shallow tunnels at Pickaxe Mountain could still present certain challenges. Firm intelligence on exactly where the tunnels snake under the mountain could be limited, making it difficult to select the best impact points. This is exactly why the U.S. military has been investing heavily in advanced, void-sensing fuzes for MOP and other bunker buster bombs for decades now. These fuzes detect when a munition has penetrated into a sufficiently large space, such as a room or tunnel in an underground facility, to help maximize damage. Fuzes that can effectively ‘count’ floors also help to ensure the munition has burrowed sufficiently deep before detonating.

It is possible that additional tactics, techniques, and procedures could be brought to bear to increase the effectiveness of any strikes on Pickaxe Mountain and further complicate any efforts to dig out the site afterward. Just last month, TWZ explored in detail the benefits of near-horizontal strikes on fortified targets, as well as of ‘skipping’ munitions into tunnel and cave entrances. The Pentagon’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget proposal had revealed interest in enhancing the capabilities of 2,000-pound-class Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) precision-guided glide bombs in the bunker-busting role, which could further enable these kinds of lateral strikes. If appropriate funding is allocated, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) would be responsible for leading this work. DTRA is a multi-faceted organization focused on responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threats, and notably played a critical role in the development of the MOP.

As noted earlier, the U.S. military could conduct follow-on strikes on the entry points at Pickaxe Mountain to disrupt any attempt to regain access, as well. Trump’s conversation with Hugh Hewitt yesterday indicates that the site is, unsurprisingly, already under heavy surveillance, including by regular spy satellite passes. Currently, this is the tactic being employed at other critical sites, like the similar mountain bunker facility in Isfahan, where it’s thought that much of Iran’s enriched uranium is buried. By striking any equipment or personnel attempting to access the collapsed tunnels, the problem could theoretically be ‘maintenanced’ indefinitely.

Limited access to underground sites for a protracted period of time might have second-order impacts, too. This would depend on whether the equipment or anything else contained therein requires regular maintenance or other attention to remain usable or otherwise prevent degradation.

Other considerations

Mounting a major operation against Pickaxe Mountain of any kind could entail additional complexities and risks. A total of 125 aircraft, including seven B-2 bombers, as well as fighters, tankers, and other supporting platforms, took part in Operation Midnight Hammer. U.S. Navy vessels in the Arabian Sea also conducted Tomahawk cruise missile strikes and otherwise supported the operation. At the same time, Iranian forces, including the country’s air defense capabilities, have been significantly degraded by U.S. and Israeli strikes since then.

Even so, there is still always the possibility of an aircraft going down due to a technical fault or some other issue. Combat search and rescue (CSAR) assets need to be in position, whether they are used or not. CSAR operations are risky and require immense resources themselves. This was put on full display during the race to rescue the crew of an F-15E Strike Eagle that went down in Iran in April, which resulted in the loss of several additional aircraft and helicopters.

On several occasions in the past, TWZ has highlighted the overall limits of conventional standoff strikes against especially deeply buried facilities, including in Iran. This has been a key driver in discussions about the potential for the United States or Israel to conduct ground raids on Iranian nuclear facilities, either to cause more definitive damage inside or to try to extract key assets, like enriched uranium. Any ground operation would pose its own immense challenges and risks, as we have also explored in detail previously.

“Going after the fissile material, I think, is a bigger operation. Again, I think we have the capabilities to do this. Within our Special Operations community, we have people that are trained to do this and have the right relationships and connections and other things to allow us to get in and do that,” retired U.S. Gen. Joseph Votel, who previously served as head of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), told TWZ‘s Howard Altman when asked about this in an interview in March. “So you’d have to be able to project that force onto the ground. This would be going to a place like Natanz or Isfahan – probably one of those locations. Those are well inland – several hundred miles into Iran, a country of the same size as the state of Alaska. So it’s big and it’s diverse. It’s largely in an open plain, so you don’t have a lot of natural terrain protection there. That would have to be taken into consideration.”

Getting into sites where Iran has deliberately sealed entry points would require heavy machinery and skilled operators, as well as time to do that work. That, in turn, has impacts on the force protection requirements for an operation that could be expected to last days, if not weeks. These forces would be well within the reach of Iranian artillery, drones and other weapons, as well as ground forces and direct fires. It is also interesting to consider here that if at least some of the entrances to the facilities underneath Pickaxe Mountain are not currently completely sealed off, the raid package could be lighter and the operation faster. In September 2024, Israeli ground forces were notably able to destroy an underground missile factory in Syria after gathering significant amounts of intelligence in an overnight operation. That being said, one would expect a site as sensitive as Pickaxe Mountain to be better defended on the ground, even if the ‘doors are open.’

100 Shaldag soldiers raid and dismantle Syrian missile factory in secret operation

There is a question here of the relative value of strikes on Pickaxe Mountain, especially depending on what U.S. planners think they could reasonably achieve. As noted earlier, exactly what is under the mountain at this point is not clear.

“It remains unclear when it could be operational, based on assessing satellite imagery,” David Albright, President and Founder of the ISIS think tank, wrote in a post on X just yesterday. “Recently, we were told that the site was not attacked in the two previous wars [the 12-Day War in 2025 and operations this year] because nothing of sufficient value was inside it.”

“Perhaps that assessment has changed,” Albright continued. “But just as likely, Trump does not want to leave Iran with a deeply buried nuclear-related site as the regime appears to be sending signals it is starting to rebuild its nuclear weapons capabilities aimed at making nuclear weapons.”

President Trump’s response yesterday to Hugh Hewitt’s specific mention of Pickaxe Mountain does point to there being some degree of concern about this target within the current administration. Trump being so familiar with the site and its weaponeering challenges is particularly notable.

Still, how soon a U.S. strike on Pickaxe Mountain might actually come, if at all, and what that might entail, remains to be seen. Though destroying the facility would be an extremely tall order, there are still other options to make it hard for Iran to make use of it, at least in the near term.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

When Barack Obama made history as the first African American president, a dichotomy was born: Would Obama showcase his black heritage too much? Or would he, the son of a white mother, prove not to be “black enough”?

The latest speculation comes from Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson, who implied to Politico that he’s more authentically African American than the president.

“He’s an ‘African’ American. He was, you know, raised white. Many of his formative years were spent in Indonesia. So, for him to, you know, claim that, you know, he identifies with the experience of black Americans, I think, is a bit of a stretch.”

Obama has addressed the concept of blackness before.

“The notion that there’s some authentic way of being black, that if you’re going to be black you have to act a certain way and wear a certain kind of clothes, that has to go,” Obama said in 2014.

Conversely, activist Michael Skolnik started #ObamaAndKids this weekend in honor of Black History Month. The hashtag quickly became a top trending conversation on Twitter.

“This would be the last Black History Month celebration at The White House during the presidency of the first African-American in the history of The United States to hold the highest office in the land,” Skolnik wrote in a Medium blog post.

Obama himself has spoken openly about his race in connection with his presidency. Earlier this month, he talked with Los Angeles Times reporter Christi Parsons about his legacy.

“You’ve got a whole generation of kids where the only president they know … is African-American,” Obama said.

On Sunday, the White House released a video of 106-year-old African American Virginia McLauren meeting the president and First Lady Michelle Obama at the White House in a Black History Month celebration.

And last week, the president made a Black History Month joke in reference to black culture.

We’re nine months out from election day and at the start of official retrospection on the 44th presidency. But judging by the past eight years, and even the past month alone, Obama’s race will likely continue to be a topic of debate and conversation even after the torch is passed.

Until not so long ago Latin America had been considered a quiet region, located far from the world’s superpower main strategic confrontations, with sporadic but crucial moments that helped to shape the international order as we know it today. The Cuban Missile Crisis is the clearest example: it became the starting point for a series of agreements and treaties on nuclear and strategic security, involving both the US and the Soviet Union at first, and later extending to other actors of the international community, from Europe, Asia and Latin America, which became the first region free from nuclear weapons after the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, 5 years after the crisis. After this episode, the region’s relevance seemed to fade, and Latin American countries appeared condemned to a destiny of surfing between weak political cohesion internally and relatively stable economies, even as most of its governments remained closely aligned with Washington on foreign policy matters.

It was precisely during this period of perceived irrelevance that China began building its presence in the region, very gradually and over the course of a little more than two decades. Washington largely ignored this process, even as it became clear that the Asian giant was becoming the largest trading partner for several South American countries, such as Peru and Brazil, and in many cases also the main investor in their economies. This neglect was not born of ignorance: it reflected, instead, a confidence that local governments would remain compliant regardless of who was investing in them. President Trump’s first term illustrates this well. Despite isolated clashes with the governments of Mexico and Venezuela, these episodes looked minor when compared to the “tariff wars” waged against the EU and China. In fact, the only time Trump ever set foot in the region during his entire first term was in November 2018 when he attended the G20 Forum in Buenos Aires. Significantly, there was a planned short visit in Colombia after this event, but I was cancelled. This was widely read at the time as a confirmation that Latin America remained a low priority for Washington’s foreign policy agenda, more due to the expectable compliance of local governments than ignorance of the importance of the region as a resource base capable of fueling US power projection in other regions.

It was only during Trump’s second term that American foreign policy has shifted towards the Western Hemisphere, attributing strategic importance to the region and setting the objective to maintain a near-absolute dominant presence, involving both economic and military dimensions, as is stated in the latest National Security Strategy of 2025.

By the time this shift was formalized, China’s footprint in the region was already deep and country-specific. In Brazil, China had been the largest trading partner since 2009; bilateral trade hit a record $171 billion in 2025, with China accounting for 27.2% of Brazil’s total foreign trade, besides, EV plants and a still planned bi-oceanic railway linking Brazil to Peru’s Pacific coast were being negotiated as part of the Chinese investment strategy in both countries. In Argentina, China became the primary supplier of mobile network infrastructure, part of a broader Chinese push into Latin American 5G and data-center markets. And in Peru, China invested around $1.3 billion in the strategic port of Chancay, a deepwater facility that entered full operation stage in November 2024, and set a new phase for trade between China and South America, bypassing the traditional deepwater ports located in the US, like the ports of Oakland and Stockton. Reinforcing this, China pledged in May 2025, at the CELAC forum ministerial meeting in Beijing, to ramp up its regional engagement even further. These were not isolated transactions but a structural presence, one that the 2025 National Security Strategy now identifies strictly as the rival foothold it intends to dislodge.

Now, within this context in 2026 the declared shift of interests proved it wasn’t merely rhetorical. The year started with the launching of Operation Resolve, when a group of American special military forces conducted a military raid and captured President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in Caracas, transporting them to New York to face narcoterrorism charges. Trump declared that the US was now “in charge” of Venezuela until a transition takes place. This meant in practice that the US would hold control over the country’s oil exports, which during the first four months after Maduro’s capture were estimated at $8 billion, but the data on how much oil has been sold, the revenue from it and the use given to those funds remains secret. The main importers of Venezuelan oil during this period were the United States (43 percent), India (26 percent, part of the strategy to reduce Indian import of Russian oil), and Spain (8 percent). This episode, condemned by critics as a return to the old days of imperialism, set the tone for the rest of the year: a hemisphere where Washington would use military force, tariffs, and other mechanics for pressuring countries to sign economic deals where American core interests prevail.

An example of this is the new and controversial Trade and Investment agreement signed by the United States and Argentina in February of this year. According to the text, Argentina shall adapt the regulatory framework to implement US trade standards and prioritize American direct investment in the country, while the counterpart shall “try to review its tariffs” and “consider supporting investment financing”. Milei’s government has justified this as the price for ideological loyalty and continued financial support after the $20 billion credit line that helped to stabilize the local currency (peso) last year.

On the other hand, Brazil took the opposite path: rather than just seeking accommodation to this policy, the government of Lula da Silva accelerated diversification, finalizing the long-delayed EU-Mercosur agreement in January, deepening trade with China and signing a memorandum of understanding with aims for further strategic partnership with Russia. Notably, the US has implemented another mechanism of pressure here, condemning the imprisonment of former president Jair Bolsonaro and holding a meeting with his son Flavio Bolsonaro, who will participate in the presidential elections this October. This gives clear signs of indirect support for this far-right candidate, following the regional trend with Milei in Argentina and Keiko Fujimori in Peru.

Peru, meanwhile, illustrates a third pattern and an interesting case, because alignment here is imposed less by negotiation than by sheer state fragility. Amid a presidency turning over for the ninth time in a decade, the US State Department warned in February that China’s control over the Chancay megaport threatens Peru’s sovereignty, following a Peruvian court ruling that exempted the port from national oversight. Peru’s case pictures a scenario where both counterparts keep pushing for concessions and more privileges. Under the government of José María Balcázar, the ninth president in 10 years, the country has been involved in the controversial purchase of 12 F-16 jetfighters with a cost of around $3.5 billion. On April he postponed the official ceremony where this deal was supposed to be signed arguing that it would have to be the responsibility of a new president, the decision was met with pushback, both internally, with declarations from the Ministry of Defense and in the US Embassy, with ambassador Bernardo Navarro declaring “If you deal with the U.S. in bad faith and undermine U.S. interests, rest assured, I, on behalf of [President] Trump and his administration, will use every available tool to protect and promote the prosperity and security of the United States and our region.” After this, with both internal and diplomatic pressure, the deal was signed on the 17th of April.

Taken together, these cases suggest the current US approach to Latin America is not fueled by a single ideological logic, but by transactional calculations that value compliance and heavily punishes resistance, exploiting weaknesses here and there and aiming to these policy goal indifferently to whether the country in question is led by a right, left or ideologically undefined government. What seems quite clear is that the decades of quietness in Latin America have ended, not necessarily because the region has changed, many of the deep challenges for development are still present, but because the rivalry that once defined the Cuban Missile Crisis has returned, this time fought over trade tariffs, infrastructure and technology access rather than missiles.

When Morocco reached the semi-finals of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the achievement immediately transcended the boundaries of sport. It was the first time an African and Arab national team had reached that stage of the tournament. Yet what drew the greatest attention from international observers was not simply the result itself, but the way it confirmed changes that had already been unfolding elsewhere.

Football rarely exists in isolation. The fortunes of a national team often reflect deeper developments in governance, investment, youth development, and a country’s capacity to pursue long-term objectives. Morocco’s World Cup campaign brought into focus the broader transformation of a nation whose international profile has steadily expanded through diplomacy, infrastructure development, strategic investment, and regional cooperation.

That distinction matters. The World Cup did not create a new geopolitical reality for Morocco; it revealed one that had already taken shape. For several weeks, hundreds of millions of viewers encountered a Morocco that differed from the image long associated with the Kingdom. To many, Morocco had primarily been known as a tourist destination, a close European partner, or a North African state. Qatar 2022 introduced another image: a country capable of competing with football’s traditional powers, rallying a global diaspora, and projecting ambitions that extend well beyond its immediate neighborhood.

The scale of that exposure helps explain why the tournament proved so consequential. The 2022 FIFA World Cup reached an estimated audience of more than five billion people across television and digital platforms, giving Morocco a level of global visibility that few international events could ever provide.

This evolution reflects broader changes in the international system. Throughout much of the twentieth century, a state’s influence was measured primarily through military capabilities, economic strength, and diplomatic reach. While these pillars remain essential, they cannot fully explain how a country’s international image is shaped. In an era shaped by digital communication and instantaneous information flows, the ability to capture global attention, generate narratives, and engage international audiences has become another source of influence.

Football occupies a unique position within that landscape. No other sport crosses cultural, linguistic, and geographic boundaries with comparable ease. A World Cup captures the attention of governments, businesses, media organizations, and public opinion all at once. For several weeks, it places a country under a level of global scrutiny that no public diplomacy campaign could realistically achieve.

Morocco benefited from that exposure in remarkable fashion. Victories over Belgium, Spain, and Portugal naturally attracted worldwide attention. Yet the significance of Morocco’s campaign also lay in what it revealed about the Kingdom’s distinctive position at the intersection of multiple geopolitical spaces. Throughout the tournament, the Atlas Lions received support far beyond their domestic fan base. Celebrations unfolded across cities in Africa, the Arab world, and Europe. Those scenes illustrated something analysts had long observed but rarely witnessed so vividly: Morocco simultaneously belongs to several geopolitical spheres.

The team’s appeal was not built on sporting success alone. It also rested on a moral and ethical capital that substantially strengthened its international standing. Across much of the Global South, Morocco came to embody the possibility that a nation operating outside football’s traditional centers of power could challenge the established hierarchy without abandoning values deeply rooted in its own identity. Images of players embracing their mothers after victories, the importance given to family, and the respect shown toward opponents throughout the tournament resonated in ways that athletic performance alone rarely achieves.

Competitiveness, humility, and attachment to deeply held values combined to create a powerful sense of identification. That helps explain why Morocco inspired support far beyond its own borders.

Looking back, the 2022 World Cup stands out as a genuine turning point. It did not, by itself, redefine Morocco’s place in the world. What it did accomplish was introducing much of international public opinion to a modern Morocco—confident in its identity, proud of its history, and already engaged in a far-reaching process of transformation.

When Performance Becomes an International Language

Morocco’s 1–1 draw with Brazil at the 2026 FIFA World Cup lends itself to a reading that reaches well beyond football. For decades, African national teams were largely viewed through the prism of isolated upsets against the sport’s established powers. Morocco now appears to have moved beyond that perception. Consistent results over several years have established the image of a team capable of competing regularly with the world’s elite.

This evolution reflects a broader pattern often found in international affairs. A country’s status rarely changes because of a single success. It changes when success ceases to be viewed as exceptional. The result against Brazil therefore says less about an unexpected sporting achievement than about Morocco’s growing place within world football’s established hierarchy.

The real shift is not that Morocco earned a result against Brazil. It is that such a result has become part of normal expectations.

The Foundations of Influence

Morocco’s growing stature on the football field is also the product of sustained investment in talent development. The Mohammed VI Football Academy has become one of the clearest expressions of that long-term strategy. With some of Africa’s most advanced training facilities, an integrated sports medicine center, and highly qualified coaching staff, the academy has helped build a generation of players capable of competing in the world’s leading leagues. The objective has never been limited to short-term success. It has been to establish the conditions for Moroccan football to remain competitive over time.

The success of this development model now extends well beyond the senior national team. Morocco won its first FIFA U-20 World Cup by defeating Argentina 2–0 in the final of the 2025 tournament in Chile. This dynamic illustrates the depth of the country’s football structure and suggests that recent achievements are part of a broader trajectory rather than an isolated cycle. The ability to produce successive generations of highly competitive players has become one of the defining features of Moroccan football.

Few countries possess the ability to inspire such diverse audiences. Morocco’s history, geography, and human ties connect it simultaneously to Africa, Europe, the Arab world, the Mediterranean basin, and, increasingly, the Atlantic community. Football has made that distinctive position visible in a way that few other instruments could.

A broader picture also emerges. Morocco’s achievements on the pitch have encouraged many foreign observers to look beyond football and discover a country they previously understood only in part. Behind the national team stands a state investing heavily in modern infrastructure, expanding its international partnerships, and strengthening its role across Africa while deepening its engagement throughout the Mediterranean.

Football has become one of the clearest expressions of that broader trajectory. It has drawn international attention to developments that were already reshaping the country.

It likewise strengthens one of Morocco’s most effective sources of soft power. Without replacing diplomacy, economic policy, or cultural outreach, football helps shape how the Kingdom is perceived abroad. Sporting success, world-class infrastructure, the organization of international competitions, and the presence of Moroccan players in Europe’s leading clubs all enhance the country’s visibility among audiences that may have little direct interest in political or economic affairs. Football has therefore become another instrument through which Morocco projects influence beyond its borders.

In today’s international environment, influence is measured not only by the ability to deter, but also by the capacity to inspire, attract, and unite. A successful national team can sometimes do more to strengthen a country’s international standing than demonstrations of hard power that no one hopes to witness.

Football, however, does not operate in a strategic vacuum. Its impact forms part of a broader national trajectory in which diplomacy, economic policy, institutional reform, and international partnerships reinforce one another.

Morocco’s return to the African Union in 2017, the expansion of its economic engagement across Sub-Saharan Africa, the implementation of major strategic infrastructure projects, and the consolidation of its diplomatic position on several regional issues all reflect a broader transformation whose significance extends far beyond sport.

The same pattern is evident in Morocco’s ability to organize major sporting events. The Africa Cup of Nations confirmed the results of years of investment in stadiums, transportation networks, and supporting infrastructure. Tournament management, logistical coordination, hospitality, and operational efficiency demonstrated capabilities already visible in other sectors of national development. The experience further strengthened Morocco’s credibility within international sporting institutions while reinforcing its reputation as a country capable of hosting events of global significance.

From Recognition to Projection

Against this backdrop, the decision to award the 2030 FIFA World Cup jointly to Morocco, Spain, and Portugal carries particular importance. Beyond its symbolic value, the decision reflects confidence in Morocco’s organizational capacity and in the institutional ecosystem that has been developed over many years.

In addition, the tournament carries a broader civilizational meaning. Its Moroccan, Spanish, and Portuguese framework creates a new narrative connecting Africa, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic. For Morocco, this configuration reinforces the image of a country located at the intersection of these spaces and capable of transforming geography, history, and culture into instruments of dialogue, visibility, and influence.

Hosting one of the world’s most watched events requires more than modern stadiums. It demands political stability, efficient institutions, and the ability to coordinate complex operations over an extended period.

For that reason, the 2030 World Cup represents far more than another sporting milestone.  It will serve as a large-scale test of credibility as well. For several weeks, Morocco will be observed by billions of viewers, thousands of businesses, and hundreds of official delegations. Few international events offer such an opportunity to showcase a country’s transformation before a truly global audience.

Morocco’s experience reflects another broader international trend. An increasing number of states now use major sporting events to support their integration into global political and economic networks. China’s Olympic Games, Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and Saudi Arabia’s expanding sports strategy all illustrate this evolution. Sport has become a platform through which countries project national ambition and shape how they are perceived abroad.

Morocco’s trajectory nevertheless stands apart. Unlike countries whose sporting influence depends primarily on financial resources, Morocco benefits from a combination of history, geography, and culture that allows it to engage multiple regions simultaneously. Few countries occupy such a position. At a time when the international system is increasingly fragmented by geopolitical rivalries, economic competition, and identity politics, that characteristic has acquired growing strategic value.

Football ultimately raises a broader question about the changing nature of power itself. For decades, influence was measured largely through military capabilities, economic resources, and demographic weight. Those factors remain fundamental, yet they cannot fully account for how countries are perceived today. The emerging international landscape increasingly rewards countries able to connect regions, facilitate exchanges, and build relationships across political, economic, and cultural divides.

From that standpoint, Morocco’s evolution may signal the emergence of what could be described as a connective power. Unlike traditional middle powers, a connective power derives its influence less from the resources it controls than from its ability to connect regions, facilitate exchanges, and create strategic interfaces between political, economic, and cultural spaces. Its comparative advantage lies not in domination, but in connectivity.

Football represents only one expression of that broader transformation. Infrastructure development, Atlantic initiatives, expanding African economic partnerships, growing human mobility, and the country’s capacity to host major international events all reinforce the same strategic trajectory. Taken together, they point toward a distinctive role for Morocco within the emerging international order.

Football, then, accompanies a much deeper national transformation. It reflects Morocco’s gradual evolution from a respected regional partner into a country whose initiatives and ambitions increasingly attract attention well beyond its immediate neighborhood. The Kingdom’s Atlantic vision, its expanding role across Africa, continuing investment in infrastructure, and ability to host major international gatherings all belong to the same strategic narrative.

The geopolitical importance of football lies precisely in its ability to make visible changes that often develop far from public attention. Sporting achievements can reveal broader shifts in economic development, diplomatic influence, and a country’s strategic positioning.

For Morocco, football has become one of the clearest mirrors of a broader national ambition. It is neither the source nor the principal driver of the Kingdom’s rise. Rather, it provides one of its most visible expressions. As Morocco strengthens its position between Africa, Europe, and the Atlantic, football continues to reflect changes that extend well beyond the sporting arena.

Behind the achievements of the Atlas Lions lies a Royal Vision that places human development at the center of national progress while pursuing a broader ambition: establishing Morocco as a connective power capable of linking Africa, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic.

Football did not transform Morocco’s place in the world. It simply made that transformation impossible to ignore.

Stephanie Shih, “梅國 (Still life with chamoy and Dirty T Tamarindo),” 2025/2026. Archival pigment print on wood panel, varnish, glue, acrylic, frame. 38.25×48.25×3.75.

(From the artist)

Much has been written about the experience of aimlessness in the new David Geffen Galleries at LACMA, but it is another thing to experience it firsthand. The meandering floor plan, with its rooms of various sizes and orientations alongside their resulting passageways and corners, demands that you wander, not map, your perusal of the galleries. As a result, a visitor can easily feel disoriented, or in my case, a touch deconstructed. A little depersonalized, if you will.

Fortuitously, I was there to meet with multidisciplinary artist Stephanie Shih, whose photo-based compositions have the opposite effect, grounding the viewer in their personhood and experience. Her still lifes are made both beautiful and meaningful through their intentional arrangement of specific food, florals and ephemera, touching on diasporic understandings of self, Western and European appropriations of the “exotic” and the juxtaposition of the natural with the fabricated. In other words, to view a Shih piece is to collaborate with the artist on reconstructing or, in some cases, reclaiming an understanding of place and self.

We were talking about, and in front of, Shih’s new piece, “梅國 (Still life with chamoy and Dirty T Tamarindo),” which was not only commissioned by LACMA, but created in a temporary studio Shih constructed within the gallery itself over the course of two weeks late last year. The image features two ceramic vessels, one slightly in front of the other, within a traditional still life scene. The background jar stands alone, while the piece in the foreground overflows with a rainbow of plants, flowers, fruit, chamoy candies, gummies and a single real butterfly. To get to the small but sunny corridor that houses the work, one might make a few indirect turns and cross the gallery containing Andreas Gursky’s “Ocean” series. Flanked by four wall-size photographs of vast, overhead perspectives of the deep blue Indian Ocean, it’s easy to feel small among the giant panels. Luckily, when I met Shih at LACMA, she intercepted me outside and led us confidently up the Geffen’s dramatic exterior staircase and to “The Global Appeal of Blue-and-White Ceramics” installation — no crossing of oceans necessary.

After our conversation, I stayed to wander the galleries for a few more hours. I am a completist and I wanted, no, needed to see everything. Without the prescribed navigation I was accustomed to in a museum, this became a fool’s errand. I got physically lost and a bit lost to myself. Had I already seen that statue or did it just look like another visage also rendered in marble a few galleries back? I was pretty sure I had already taken these two rights and then a left before, but what if I hadn’t and would then miss a whole other room? The 360-degree curved glass walls encasing the galleries offered many glimpses of a face that belonged to me but somehow wasn’t mine. Who was I? I felt like I would never see everything on display, but also maybe never again exist beyond the funhouse of the Geffen Galleries. In my confusion, I passed by “梅國 (Still life with chamoy and Dirty T Tamarindo)” more than once and was reminded of Shih’s ability to articulate complex reconstructions of self through her exquisite, serene compositions. It was enough to reassure me that I could find myself again, if only I slowed down and considered my context with curiosity instead of fear.

This curiosity led me to “Shaping Dutch Identity: The Mr. and Mrs. Edward Carter Collection.” It was a serendipitous encounter for two reasons: One, the visual and symbolic correlation between Shih’s painterly use of shadow in her food- and floral-centered compositions, and the still life masterpieces of the 17th century Dutch. And two, because much like her work itself, our interview included layered discussion of constructing and shaping identities. Take the new Peter Zumthor-designed building in which we found (and in my case, lost) ourselves, which builds upon the existing galleries of LACMA while redefining the museum’s identity. Or Shih’s in-situ studio, which was created for creation’s sake, then taken down with only a photo of its contents remaining — contents which were constructed by the artist, too.

There was also the progression across cultures and continents of blue-and-white ceramics, which mirrors the evolution of chamoy, a pickled fruit condiment in Mexican cuisine that, along with a blue-and-white Talavera jar, is at the center of Shih’s piece. Both the ceramic and the chamoy traditions symbolize layers of culture as shaped by globalism and localism.

At one point in our conversation, I was momentarily embarrassed when I couldn’t recall the Filipino term for dried sour plums (kiamoy), a precursor to Mexico’s chamoy. It was an aspect of my identity as a third-generation Filipina that was also irretrievable to me that day. Shih was understanding and gracious in her response: “One of the really fun parts of the work I get to do is learning a lot of these histories that get hidden from us.” Given Shih’s academic background — she holds a PhD from Stanford University in linguistics — it makes sense that she brings deep research to her practice. Her art is rich with symbolism and history. But Shih’s work is also playful and, much like her response to me, generous in the invitation it extends to viewers to bring their own identities to her pieces in order to construct meaning for themselves. I may have felt unmoored among the Geffen’s myriad corners and paths, but never when I was standing in front of Shih’s piece.

Installation view of the inaugural presentation in the David Geffen Galleries, April 2026, featuring (top) Stephanie Shih’s 梅國 (Still life with chamoy and Dirty T Tamarindo) (2025- 26) and (bottom) Jar (c. 1700-50).

(Museum Associates / LACMA)

Claire Salinda: Your composition captures flowers, chamoy and other candies and fruit sumptuously arranged in and around a ceramic jar from LACMA’s permanent collection. How did you decide on chamoy as a subject? And how is it contextualized within the new David Geffen Galleries?

Stephanie Shih: “梅國 (Still life with chamoy and Dirty T Tamarindo)” is on display in “The Global Appeal of Blue-and-White Ceramics.” The gallery presents a condensed history of blue-and-white ceramics globally in dishes, starting in the Middle East with a 9th century Iraqi piece. From the Middle East we really got the use of cobalt in designs, and that married with the introduction of porcelain from China. We also have the Iznik kilns in Turkey, which are still operating today, and influences into Southeast Asia, and so on. Later on, the influence spread farther afield into Japan and France, where they started adding even more to it. The blue-and-white tradition has really spread globally, so this gallery is a nice microcosmic story of the effects of globalism before modern globalism.

For a long time I’ve been wanting to make a piece about chamoy and was just waiting for the opportunity to do so. The story of chamoy really parallels this journey of blue-and-white ceramics, which got to Mexico because of Spanish colonialism and then was adopted by local artisans. They really made it their own in the Talavera tradition. Chamoy similarly comes from Asia through pickled plums, particularly China via the Philippines. Filipino laborers came to Mexico via colonialism, and adapted and adopted champoy with spices and chilies from Mexico to become chamoy.

The curator, Susie Ferrell, gave me a whole list of blue-and-white surveys that they were looking at. We went to storage and to the conservation labs to look at all the pieces and we ended up choosing two pieces to work with. The one in “梅國 (Still life with chamoy and Dirty T Tamarindo)” is a Mexican Talavera jar from the 1700s. It’s the first non-Asian origin institutional ceramic I’ve gotten to work with in my career, which is the reason that I gravitated toward it.

Chamoy has been used by a lot of modern day food makers and chefs with American nostalgic candies, like peach rings and gummy worms, and my personal favorite, Gushers. One of these food makers, Alana Solis, who’s based in Tucson, runs Dirty T Tamarindo, a chamoy candy business she started during the pandemic. It was from her that I learned the history of chamoy, and so I wanted to do a piece with her candies for a long time. And this is just a really perfect opportunity with the Talavera jar.

I had pitched to Susie that it might be nice to have a second ceramic in the piece, a companion that demonstrates the origins and precursors of the blue-and-white ceramics in Mexico, a Chinese piece or something. She actually picked the one pictured here, which is also from the LACMA collection. It’s a 12th century Qingbai ware prunus vase, a meiping jar. When Susie pitched it to me, I didn’t even realize how perfect it was: A prunus vase is usually what they put plum blossoms in, and meiping means beautiful plum vase. It just ended up being a really, really good pick from her.

CS: You built a studio space within the gallery to create the piece. I’m curious about the constraints and what was surprising for you.

Artist Stephanie Shih’s makeshift set in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA) David Geffen Galleries for her two-week commission project residency; Light test detail.

(Stephanie Shih)

SS: I was here for two weeks. I had a friend build a wall, we painted it downstairs and then brought it in and had it in the gallery with the light coming in through the windows. They gave me a refrigerator to store all the food, because I wasn’t supposed to have it out in the gallery space. We built out work tables too … it’s hard to kind of imagine with all the other stuff here now.

It was in December, and so the building was in several stages of installation with the art. There were just stacks of crates and boxes, which is amazing — it was very cool to just see statues half unpacked.

And actually, seeing everything get installed affected my thinking about the frame. Originally I wasn’t going to do a framed piece, it was just going to be on a panel. But then as I saw everything else go up, there was a weightiness to the way everything was framed and thought about. A lot of the frames are gold gilded, which are incredibly beautiful and historical. I wanted something that played off of that tradition, but using a red frame made it really obvious that it’s not 100% within tradition.

CS: How does this commission fit into your practice?

SS: My work started out really thinking about the artistic references we get as people working in food and still life. So many of the references are of this very Eurocentric art historical tradition. But if you look at that tradition, many things are taken from other cultures and used to symbolize the access and wealth and value that was assigned to these objects from the perspective of European imperialists, to put it nicely. It wasn’t until very recently that people were even thinking, “Well, where are these things from? What other artistic traditions does that mean that we’ve sort of borrowed from?” And so a lot of my work thinks about responding to that, but also taking back some of that tradition to tell stories of diaspora communities today here in the U.S.

From there, I’ve really started thinking a lot about the construction of identity and how we get to the things that symbolize who we are, and how we use symbols as we move through the world. As a cognitive scientist and linguist, a lot of my research training is about symbols and about the construction of identity in that way.

CS: Do you think that this piece could have been made anywhere else?

SS: No, I don’t think so. There’s something so special about the mission with the new building, how it’s so much more fluidly built and how LACMA is trying to think curatorially outside of the silos that have been set up by traditional art history. Thinking about that really, really influenced my approach to these pieces in terms of trying to collapse in each piece the timescales of historical influences and contemporary identity, but also the locality.

There’s stuff in “梅國 (Still life with chamoy and Dirty T Tamarindo)” that’s very global and far away, but also hyper local and here in L.A. For instance, the butterfly was found by my friend just a couple miles north in WeHo while I was working at LACMA. It’s native to California.

Do you know who Rachel Ruysch is? She was one of the big Dutch still life painters and in some of her later work, she was able to access flowers and plants from the American West, which was really rare at that time. She has a piece with prickly pear cactus as well as datura in it, which is crazy. We see those plants right here, but not in England and the Netherlands, where she was working at the time. Seeing that piece was part of the influence as well. In my piece, we have candy stripe ranunculus, which I was able to find for the candy. The cactus is from my backyard. There’s marigold and chamomile for their significance in Mexican culture, and the hibiscus flower, which has a long history across the Pacific Rim, tracing a lot of the places that ended up with chamoy and sour plums. I wanted a little nod to Hawaii with the pineapple because that’s where we also get salted plum culture.

Artist Stephanie Shih poses on set.

(From the artist)

CS: As we stand and chat in front of “梅國 (Still life with chamoy and Dirty T Tamarindo),” I can’t help but notice folks stopping to take it in. How is it being here and seeing people interact with the work?

SS: Oh, really fun!

CS: Do you ever want to interrupt them to answer a question you overhear?

SS: No. I think my favorite part of watching people interact with the pieces is what they bring to it. Some people see the chamoy immediately and they recognize their experiences in it, which is really lovely to see. Like, I can see someone’s been pointing at it, there’s a nice fingerprint mark. That’s funny. Some people recognize the candy in it. Kids often ask me, “How did the gummy butterflies fly?” and that’s really fun to answer. I appreciate that everyone brings their own experiences to it, and that sort of completes the piece for me.

Beijing warmly welcomes the peace agreement and memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, considering it an important step toward de-escalating regional tensions. China supports the diplomatic path to resolving the crisis, based on a clear strategy aimed at protecting its economic and strategic interests. Beijing emphasizes that a permanent ceasefire, the protection of national sovereignty, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and ensuring the safety of international navigation are top priorities. China contributed behind the scenes to shaping the negotiating framework and influencing Tehran to accept the agreement with the United States in order to safeguard its vital interests in the continued flow of Iranian oil. Accordingly, China officially welcomed the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran, affirming that the agreement represents a crucial step toward de-escalating regional tensions. The Chinese diplomatic welcome focused on the key provisions of the agreement, as stated by the spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These provisions guarantee a comprehensive ceasefire, freedom of navigation, energy security, an end to the naval blockade, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies. China considers this essential for its energy and economic security. This agreement, along with the nuclear framework and negotiations, marks the conclusion of the first phase, followed by a 30-60 day negotiation period to discuss the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and the lifting of sanctions). This Chinese announcement came in support of international mediation efforts ahead of the official signing ceremony in Geneva.

The most prominent points welcomed by China in the US-Iranian agreement, according to announcements and follow-up by Chinese diplomatic channels and as included in the key provisions of the memorandum of understanding, were a cessation of military operations; an immediate and permanent ceasefire on all fronts, including the Lebanese front; freedom of navigation through a commitment to end the naval blockade and open the Strait of Hormuz to global trade and energy supplies; and the nuclear framework, with the conclusion of a phase one agreement stipulating that negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program (uranium enrichment and sanctions relief) would take place within a specified timeframe of 30 to 60 days following the signing.

China has played a pivotal, often unacknowledged, role as a diplomatic bridge between Tehran and Washington to protect its strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. The dimensions of China’s behind-the-scenes role include ensuring the flow of energy. Beijing seeks to maintain stability in the Gulf region to guarantee the uninterrupted supply of Iranian oil and to protect its interests and investments in the Belt and Road Initiative. Iran represents a crucial geographical and strategic hub in China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. To this end, Beijing has sought to leverage its strong economic ties and strategic partnership with Tehran to persuade it to make flexible concessions during critical times, while offering support to avoid military escalation. Beijing fears that the collapse of diplomatic channels could lead to a regional war that would jeopardize its extensive investments in the region.

On the other hand, Beijing seeks to counterbalance American influence. China prefers a negotiated framework between Tehran and Washington that limits American unilateral hegemony and positions itself as a responsible international player capable of peacemaking. China’s vision for diplomatic balancing between Washington and Tehran is shaped by several key strategic axes, most importantly (establishing the principle of a political settlement). Here, Beijing consistently emphasizes that dialogue is the only solution to the Iranian crisis, rejecting military escalation that harms the security of navigation and global trade. This is coupled with regional and international networking, where China supports parallel diplomatic efforts, such as Pakistani mediation. Beijing maintains continuous communication with the parties to the crisis to ensure the opening of indirect negotiation channels that prevent a full-scale confrontation and safeguard vital interests. China has maintained the flow of Iranian oil while simultaneously strengthening its extensive economic partnerships with the Gulf states, granting it unique diplomatic weight and influence that Western powers lack. Despite this notable progress, Beijing faces ongoing challenges due to US containment policies. China rejects Washington’s classification of its major technology companies as military entities and threatens retaliatory measures, making Beijing’s attempts to create a strategic balance with the United States an extremely delicate and sensitive process.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can see how successful Beijing has been in transforming escalating tensions in the Middle East into strategic gains. China has played an active mediating role by supporting diplomatic talks and the memorandum of understanding for peace between Washington and Tehran, thus positioning itself as a responsible international power seeking to establish stability and move away from unilateral hegemony.

Behind a veil of good-natured diplomacy, American adversaries are exploiting the conflict in Iran by gaining insights, strategic lessons, and geopolitical power while the United States wages feckless war against the Middle Eastern theocracy. Beyond the bombings, the blockade, and the oil prices, Russia and China keenly watch how America struggles, succeeds, and scrambles. In doing so, these adversaries are leveraging the conflict to challenge America’s readiness, aid its adversaries, and gain invaluable intel on America’s successes and failures.

The concept of observing a conflict to acquire critical intelligence on how to best conduct combat is not unique to the war in Iran. For example, in the Russo-Ukrainian War, America has gained indispensable knowledge on the most and least effective tools of 21st-century warfare, including information on the power of unmanned aerial systems. With the war in Iran, though, Russia and China are the scientists, and America is the experiment. The Middle East is now a testing ground for cutting-edge drone swarm technologies and a catalyst for how smaller powers can effectively deny their adversaries from accomplishing their objectives—a lesson that China is certainly eager to learn about for a possible conflict over Taiwan. Therefore, when America wages war against Iran, there are consequences that are crucial to recognize, and one of those consequences is that the United States is inadvertently empowering and informing its adversaries.

Maintaining its signaled commitment of multipolarity and geopolitical neutrality, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning commented, “…China…has been making active efforts to promote ceasefire and peace…we will continue playing an active role in restoring…tranquility to the Middle East…” Reality demonstrates that this is false. China is discreetly gaining intelligence on the U.S. military’s readiness, pacing, and warfighting strategies. Furthermore, China has directly supported Iran, providing anti-missile weaponry, building blocks for ballistic missiles, and invaluable military intelligence to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Instead of promoting peace and tranquility, these actions are designed to empower Iran and keep America locked in the struggle, weakening the country and allowing China to acquire more intelligence on U.S. readiness. Despite China’s claimed intentions, it’s clear that the nation is bolstering Iran’s strength and sustaining its defenses. Even from a domestic point of view, these actions are increasing domestic American division and the depletion of America’s defense resources. The conflict with Iran is not limited to Iran; by proxy, it’s with America’s foremost adversaries, too.

Similarly, Russia has provided critical support to Iran in the form of targeting intelligence, which Iran couldn’t have otherwise acquired. Shahed drones, assets that have proven to be exceptionally effective against western defenses, are manufactured in Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone and are being provided to Iran by Russia. Contradicting these actions, a statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the country “…stands ready to assist in advancing peaceful solutions grounded in international law, mutual respect, and a balanced consideration of interests.” But equipping Iran with efficacious tools of war is not a peaceful solution. Giving the nation targeting information cannot be construed as a neutral or geopolitically insignificant act. In reality, America’s adversaries are taking an active, hands-on approach to the war in Iran, indirectly but clearly aiding the nation and actively working against U.S. goals.

In response to this tacit yet significant aid to Iran, the natural response for America should be to publicly highlight the hostile actions of its adversaries. But the United States has been hesitant, if not downright unwilling, to do so. For example, Matthew Whitaker, the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, commented that “China certainly is not participating and is not aiding and abetting the Iranian demise…” Separately, he claimed, “There’s no indication that we can talk about publicly that the Russians are participating with the Iranians.” Public investigations, though, have proven both those assertions false. The trepidation of the United States to clearly and confidently condemn its adversaries’ belligerence in the region is an enormous blunder of strategic communications. Contrasting this, Russia and China have simultaneously and aggressively pursued campaigns of condemnation to weaken America’s global power. For example, Russia has often claimed that certain U.S. support to Ukraine may constitute an act of war; China strongly condemned recent American intervention in Venezuela as violating the international laws by which America claims to be guided. U.S. adversaries are eager and willing to strategically undermine and criticize U.S. actions, yet America is unwisely unwilling to do the same.

Russia’s and China’s cooperative aid to Iran demonstrates that the conflict is, in many senses, between world powers. A new ‘axis of resistance’ against Western liberalism is developing, and allowing American adversaries to act without denunciation is a failure of strategic communications and allows these nations to act with undeserved impunity. As the United States continues to wage war against Iran, it’s crucial to recognize that every bomb America drops, every mission American soldiers complete, and every destroyed military asset is a datapoint that U.S. adversaries will exploit. Russia’s and China’s critical support to Iran is hostile and counter to American goals; ignoring this is strategically imprudent. Beyond the explosions, America’s adversaries are watching—and acting. It’s the responsibility of the United States to expose those actions for what they really are.

THE BECKHAMS appeared to put on a united front after they hit back at Brooklyn’s teams claims that Harper’s visit was “choreographed”.

Harper, who was in the US to see footballer dad David, 51, get a star on the Hollywood Walk of Fame, was seen arriving at Brooklyn’s Beverly Hills pad in a SUV.

The 14-year-old arrived “unannounced” and “left seconds later without seeing him”, according to claims in Page Six.

A spokesperson for Brooklyn and his wife Nicola Peltz hit out at his famous parents, claiming they organised the whole thing – an allegation dismissed by family source as “clearly nonsense”.

In new photos, David and Victoria, 52, were seen out for dinner at Nobu in Malibu amid the ongoing feud with Brooklyn.

The family appeared tense as they headed into the swanky eatery.

READ MORE ON THE BECKHAMS

‘SET UP’

Brooklyn Beckham’s team accuses David & Victoria of choreographing Harper’s visit

JOG ON

Brooklyn Beckham ignores dad David’s Hollywood Walk of Fame with jog in NYC

The fashion designer wore a khaki midi dress and black heels with a pair of oversized glasses, while David opted for a white T-shirt and black jeans.

Victoria and David’s son Romeo, 23, was also present for the dinner, along with his girlfriend Kim Turnbull, 25.

Romeo has stood by his parents throughout the family fallout his brother.

And last night was no different as he attended the meal out, just a day after sister Harper attempted to heal the rift by visiting Brooklyn’s LA home.

Harper was reportedly hand-delivering a letter as she arrived at Brooklyn’s home.

A rep for Brooklyn and Nicola said: “That photographers were in place as the letter was hand delivered says it all – this was choreographed for the cameras.”

But source for the Beckhams hit back today, saying: “This is clearly nonsense and just another untrue and unfair accusation.”

Shortly after news of Harper’s very brief visit, Brooklyn took to social media to reveal that he wasn’t in Los Angeles.

He shared a photo of him jogging in park in New York City.

Yesterday a source told Page Six how the budding chef, married to actress Nicola Peltz, 31, was out of town with his wife.

Earlier this year, David and Victoria Beckham‘s eldest son let rip at his parents in a brutal social media takedown – and said he has no wish to reconcile.

In a scathing statement, Brooklyn told how he grew up with “overwhelming anxiety” having been “controlled” by his parents most of his life.

Since then, understandably, tensions have been high.

This week, Brooklyn snubbed former England footballer David on his special commemoration day.

He gave his speech before unveiling his star and he mentioned his children – but did not name them individually.

“My beautiful children who are the reason I get out of bed in the morning,” he said while choking back tears.

“Kids, I hope you bring my grandchildren here one day and tell them about a boy who dreamed big,” he added.

Later on, David closed down any potential chat about Brooklyn as he insisted the family troubles are a “private matter”.

Brooklyn’s furious tirade on Instagram came amid a bitter family feud which has rumbled on for months.

In his jaw-dropping message earlier this year, he made 12 key accusations towards his loved ones including allegations of “bribery” and family members telling Nicola “she’s not family”.

During his bombshell post, Brooklyn claimed: “I grew up with overwhelming anxiety. For the first time in my life, since stepping away from my family, that anxiety has disappeared.

“I wake up every morning grateful for the life I chose, and have found peace and relief.”

He added: “My parents have controlled narratives in the press about our family.

“The performative social media posts, family events and inauthentic relationships have been a fixture of the life I was born into.”

At the time, he was criticised for “hypocrisy” after Brand Beckham had opened many doors for him in his career.

He also alleged Victoria cancelled making his spouse Nicola’s wedding dress “at the 11th hour” and that his mum then “hijacked” their first dance.

In six blistering posts on his Instagram stories he claimed dad David and mum Victoria have been trying to “endlessly ruin my relationship” with Nicola.

He said: “I do not want to reconcile with my family. I’m not being controlled, I’m standing up for myself for the first time in my life.”

Friends of the Beckhams told The Sun how the pair had been left “floored” by their son’s accusations.

The U.S. men’s soccer team isn’t only trying to win games in this World Cup. It is trying to win hearts and minds as well.

“We want the game to grow,” star midfielder Christian Pulisic said. “We want to get Americans excited to watch this game, to watch our team. That’s obviously a big goal of ours. And being successful would give that the best boost.”

The Americans certainly got a great start Friday, opening the second World Cup played on U.S. soil with a dominant 4-1 win over Paraguay. It was one of the most complete performances the American men have had on the sport’s biggest stage, with Folarin Balogun scoring twice, Pulisic setting up two goals, and just one momentary lapse on defense separating goalkeeper Matt Freese from a shutout.

The U.S. passed well, defended well and, most important, was clinical and dangerous in front of the net, finishing well.

U.S. midfielder Giovanni celebrates with Antonee Robinson and Sebastian Berhalter after scoring against Paraguay.

(Robert Gauthier/Los Angeles Times)

“It was a real statement,” Balogun said. “And that’s what we wanted. I’m very delighted with the overall performance.”

The effort was warmly received by a sold-out crowd of 70,492 at SoFi Stadium, with record-setting crowds watching on TV throughout the country.

Fox Sports announced 15.99 million watched the win, making it the most-viewed U.S. World Cup match on English-language television.

And the Spanish-language broadcast drew a total audience of 8.9 million across Telemundo, Peacock and Telemundo’s streaming platforms. It was the most-watched U.S. World Cup match on Spanish-language television network platforms, harking back to the 1994 World Cup, the first played in the U.S. that also attracted record TV audiences.

At 38, captain Tim Ream is the only member of the team who was alive in 1994, but he and his younger teammates repeatedly have been reminded of the impact that tournament had on soccer in the U.S. That 1994 team won just one game, though, scored just two goals and didn’t make it past the round of 16.

This team is convinced it can do better — on and off the field.

Fans cheer after U.S. beat Paraguay to open the World Cup Friday at SoFi Stadium.

(Kelvin Kuo/Los Angeles Times)

“It’s trying to be an inspiration for the next generation and grow the game,” midfielder Tyler Adams said. “I think we have the opportunity to do that.”

Part of that is kick-starting the kind of interest in soccer that briefly swept the country during the first U.S. World Cup 32 years ago. And this team certainly energized fans Friday.

“Having this crowd around us, seeing the red, white and blue, it’s awesome,” Pulisic said. “It’s really pushing us forward. We just hope it continues like that.”

It will if Pulisic and Co. continue playing like that.

The U.S. controlled the ball for nearly an hour of the 90 minutes, completed more than twice as many passes as Paraguay and took almost twice as many shots. It was a game that was as attractive and inviting as it was one-sided, one that might turn the most skeptical viewer into a fan.

It was, midfielder Weston McKennie said, the kind of game that could push the U.S. closer to becoming a proper soccer nation.

American midfielder Weston McKennie outruns two Paraguay defenders.

(Kelvin Kuo/Los Angeles Times)

“Because it’s a World Cup and it’s in America, people came out,” McKennie said. “We’re OK with that. There’s a lot of people that maybe have never come out to support us. But hopefully today, with this performance, they can connect with us.

“You feel this electricity in the stadium and the passion. That’s one thing that’s going to change soccer here.”

Pulisic and McKennie helped put the U.S. in front to stay in the seventh minute, although the goal was credited to Paraguayan midfielder Damián Bobadilla, who got his right foot in front of a McKennie pass intended for Balogun and deflected it into the net for an own goal. Pulisic made the whole sequence happen, however, pushing the ball between a pair of defenders before poking it on to McKennie in the center of the box.

Balogun scored twice in the final 20 minutes of the first half, one-timing a perfect pass from Pulisic in from the penalty spot in the 31st minute, then running on to a perfectly weighted through ball from Malik Tillman and avoiding two defenders to line a left-footed shot into the top left corner five minutes into stoppage time.

The brace was the first of Balogun’s international career and came in his World Cup debut before a crowd of family and friends, a cheering section he saluted from behind the goal line after scoring.

“I had to sort through a lot of ticket [requests.] It’s a dream night, you know? I’ve not been able to take it all in,” said Balogun, whose brace marked the first multigoal game by an American in the World Cup since 1930.

And that wasn’t the only history the U.S. made Friday. Defender Chris Richards, whose status for the opener was in doubt after he tore two ligaments in his left ankle a month ago, completed all 83 of his passes, the most without a miss in a World Cup game since 1966.

Mauricio pulled one of those goals back for Paraguay in the 73rd minute, before Gio Reyna closed the scoring with his first World Cup goal deep in stoppage time.

Pulisic, who said he took a kick to his left calf in the first half, was replaced by Sebastian Berhalter to start the second. Pulisic showed no signs of injury while talking with reporters after the match, and coach Mauricio Pochettino is hopeful the injury will not limit Pulisic during the next match Friday against Australia.

For the U.S., the commanding win over Paraguay was just the start. The best, the players promise, is yet to come.

Fans fill SoFi Stadium during the U.S. World Cup win over Paraguay on Friday.

(Kelvin Kuo/Los Angeles Times)

“Today was a great starting point for us,” McKennie said. “But we know that’s just a start and this is something we don’t want to over-celebrate. Because we want this to be the normal for us.

“We have two more games to go in the group. Hopefully we improve.”

Added Pulisic: “There’s so much more we want to accomplish.”

And not all of that will take place on the field.

The U.S. men’s national team made its first World Cup game on home soil in 32 years one to remember, defeating Paraguay 4-1 in front of a sold-out crowd at Los Angeles Stadium (SoFi Stadium) in Inglewood on Friday night.

Here’s a look at some of the best moments before and during the game as captured by the Los Angeles Times photography staff:

U.S. fans march to Los Angeles Stadium (SoFi Stadium) before the start of the U.S.-Paraguay World Cup match Friday.

(Ronaldo Bolanos / Los Angeles Times)

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1. David Beckham, right, and Tom Cruise waves to fans before the World Cup group stage match. (Allen J. Schaben / Los Angeles Times) 2. Katy Perry, right, and Tius Luka perform during the World Cup opening ceremony before the U.S.-Paraguay match. (Allen J. Schaben / Los Angeles Times) 3. U.S. players, left, and Paraguay players enter the pitch before their World Cup group stage match. (Allen J. Schaben / Los Angeles Times)

U.S. forward Christian Pulisic, right, controls the ball in front of Paraguay defender Juan Jose Caceres during the first half Friday.

(Ronaldo Bolanos / Los Angeles Times)

U.S. defender Antonee Robinson, right, and Paraguay midfielder Diego Gomez battle for the ball during the first half. (Kelvin Kuo / Los Angeles Times)

U.S. midfielder Weston McKennie celebrates after a U.S. goal in the first half against Paraguay. (Kelvin Kuo / Los Angeles Times)

U.S. star Christian Pulisic celebrates after a goal in the first half of a 4-1 win over Paraguay at the World Cup on Friday at Los Angeles Stadium (SoFi Stadium).

(Kelvin Kuo / Los Angeles Times)

U.S. players and coach Mauricio Pochettino, center, celebrate after a 4-1 win over Paraguay in the World Cup at Los Angeles Stadium (SoFi Stadium) on Friday night.

(Allen J. Schaben / Los Angeles Times)

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1. Paraguay midfielder Cristian Roldan heads the ball over U.S. striker Folarin Balogun during the second half. (Robert Gauthier / Los Angeles Times) 2. Paraguay forward Julio Enciso jumps over U.S. defender Chris Richards during the second half. (Robert Gauthier / Los Angeles Times) 3. A stage is placed for the opening ceremony before the start of the U.S. vs. Paraguay match at Los Angeles Stadium (SoFi Stadium) on Friday. (Robert Gauthier / Los Angeles Times)

Fans cheer during the United States’ 4-1 win over Paraguay at the World Cup on Friday.

(Robert Gauthier / Los Angeles Times)

By June 2026, the cracks inside the GOP weren’t hidden anymore. On May 19, the Senate voted 50–47 to push forward a bipartisan war powers resolution that would limit President Donald Trump’s ability to keep military ops going against Iran. Four Republican senators crossed the aisle and voted with Democrats. Then on June 3, the House went even further with a 215–208 vote—four House Republicans joined Democrats in a pretty blunt pushback against Trump’s leadership.

At first it looked like just another fight over war powers and Congress doing its job. But it feels like something bigger: the start of a real tug-of-war over what the Republican Party is going to be once Trump isn’t the center of everything.

For almost ten years now, Republican politics has been all about Trump. You rose if you stood with him, and you got sidelined if you didn’t. Loyalty often counted more than old-school conservative ideas, passing bills, or sticking to principles. But every party eventually has to answer the tough question that personality-driven movements hate: what happens when the big guy starts looking more like a problem than a winner? That question is getting harder for Republicans to dodge.

Trump didn’t just take over the party in 2016 — he remade it. The old Republican worldview of strong alliances, free trade, and steady leadership shifted toward a more populist, Trump-centered style.

It worked for a while. He won elections, fired up voters who felt ignored, and built a super-loyal base. As long as the wins kept coming, most Republicans went along. Parties get tested in the tough times, though — not the good ones. And the Iran conflict is turning into exactly that kind of test.

A lot of Republicans who backed Trump’s rise never thought they’d end up defending another big Middle East war. Trump made “no more endless wars” one of his best lines—slamming both parties for the messes in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Now the fighting with Iran has dragged on for months. Costs are adding up, gas prices sting at the pump, and nobody’s really clear on what “winning” would even mean. That’s created real quiet discomfort inside the party. The senators and reps who voted to rein in Trump’s war powers weren’t just talking procedure. They were signaling that blind loyalty isn’t automatic anymore.

Parties talk a lot about ideology, but when things get serious, survival often wins out. Some Republicans are starting to put distance between themselves and Trump — not because they hate everything he stands for, but because they don’t want their own careers sinking with one person. There’s a real difference between backing conservative policies and handing the whole party over to a single leader. More of them seem to be waking up to that.

What’s interesting is that the pushback is coming from inside the tent. Democrats opposing Trump is old news. When Republicans do it, it hits different. Senators like Rand Paul, Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, and Bill Cassidy broke ranks on the Senate vote. In the House, guys like Thomas Massie, Brian Fitzpatrick, Tom Barrett, and Warren Davidson did the same. These are still small numbers. But big shifts often start small.

The bigger story might be that some Republicans are finally imagining a future without Trump dominating every headline. A younger crop is coming up—they agree with him on immigration, trade, and culture wars, but they don’t want the party to be defined only by personal loyalty to him forever. They want a Republican Party that can keep going after he’s gone—Trumpism as one important piece, not the whole thing.

History shows parties sometimes tie themselves too tightly to charismatic leaders. Sometimes it revitalizes them. Sometimes it drags them down.

Right now, some inside the GOP worry Trump might be moving from asset to liability—especially with the Iran war dragging on and polarization getting worse. Trump is still the biggest force in the party with a rock-solid base. But power and lasting control aren’t the same.

These congressional votes show that at least some Republicans are already looking ahead to the next chapter. They see the risks of hitching the whole party’s future to one man. Whether they’re right or wrong, time will tell. But the conversation inside the party has clearly moved past just Iran or war powers. It’s now about whether the Republican Party still belongs to Trump — or whether it can finally start belonging to itself again.

Since the public launch of large-language models like ChatGPT and OpenAI in 2020, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is gaining ground across a variety of private and public areas,  the prospect of not only facilitating mundane tasks but also revolutionising labor markets, research, medicine and militaries.  

The gilded age of AI

But as the presence of AI is becoming an increasingly normalized part of everyday life, from summarizing texts, fact-checking a statement or composing an email, it is easy to overlook the more nefarious purposes of surveillance, discrimination and persecution for which AI can be used at the state level. This is an increasingly pertinent issue, with the surge of state-based AI surveillance—such as ’safe cities,’ facial recognition, and smart policing—since 2018, extending to at least 75 of the 175 countries with available data. While this trend is present on all continents, there are regional disparities in application, with AI surveillance present in almost 70% of the surveyed African states, over 50% of South East Asian states, and just under 40% of European countries use AI for surveillance. Thus, AI surveillance is not limited to authoritarian states; according to one report, 51% of liberal democracies use AI for surveillance purposes. How, then, is AI being used for surveillance in China, the Middle East, US, and Europe? 

China—a spearhead for surveillance

China dominates the AI surveillance sector, with companies like ZTE and Huawei present in over 63 countries, vastly outnumbering the US. This presence is especially noticeable in Africa and Asia, where the use of Chinese surveillance technology correlates closely with  participation in the cross-continental Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. In particular, China has been exporting its ‘safe city’ model, which has already been domestically implemented in cities like Beijing as part of its social credit system, to Saudi Arabia, Uganda, and Thailand as well as European cities like Valenciennes, which in 2017 was gifted safe city technology by Huawei. This model connects an extensive network of facial recognition cameras and police body cameras into intelligent command centers using algorithms to predict crime.

Individual freedom versus national security

While states are justifying these measures by reference to crime reduction and national security, organisations are warning about the implications of AI surveillance for privacy, systemic discrimination civil rights and democratic freedoms as AI allows for cost efficient surveillance at an unprecedented spatial and temporal scale. For example, China has domestically implemented large scale AI surveillance encompassing over 600 million cameras, coupled with large language models for minority languages to sharpen its surveillance of the communication of its Tibetan, Uyghur, Korean, and Mongolian minorities. In the Xinjiang province, the Chinese state has created an Integrated Joint Operations Platform, which employs an extensive network of CCTV cameras, facial recognition devices, and or WiFi surveillance devices to suppress political dissent among the province’s Uyghur minority. Such Chinese technology has reportedly also been exported to Saudi Arabia and Iran for similar purposes of suppressing political dissent, and to enhance the precision of drone air strikes in Ukraine and the Middle East.

AI surveillance beyond autocracies

However, the West is not immune to these developments. The US government recently found itself in a legal dispute with AI company Anthropic after the company refused to allow the government to use its ground breaking AI model Claude for domestic surveillance without built-in restraints. The US government claimed that this jeopardised national security by preventing the state from identifying espionage. In addition, US President Trump has issued various executive orders to increase the adoption of AI by federal agencies over state regulations. Indeed, the US already uses surveillance technology deployed by Israel on the occupied West Bank, to stem migration on the Mexican border. Moreover, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) admitted in March 2026 that federal agencies are buying personal data from data brokers, including location data collected by private companies, in order to track citizens.

Europe: between security, migration and regulation

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) is exploring Automated Border Crossing technologies. The intelligent system iBorderCtrl is currently being piloted in Greece, Hungary and Latvia  applies AI lie detectors to immigrants, with immigrants found lying being automatically detained for further questioning. This system has been criticised by human rights activists and academics as a scientifically weak and potentially discriminatory practice. Thus, even though AI is more regulated in Europe than elsewhere in the world, with the EU AI Act of 2024 restricting large scale usage from sensitive areas through, the risk of questionable AI use in the name of national security remains salient.

Indeed, several member states are stretching the AI Act’s limitations on large-scale surveillance. For example, Luxembourg has since 2025 pursued plans of expanding its use of Trojan spyware from state security and terrorist threats to encompass a broader range of crimes, such as child exploitation, currency counterfeiting and human trafficking. Similarly, the government of Ireland is seeking to expand the powers of the police and Defense Forces to intercept conversations on encrypted platforms like WhatsApp, and iMessage, and other social media platforms. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic was forced to end its use of facial recognition at Prague Airport after six months as it was found to violate the EU AI Act. Likewise, Hungary authorized the police to use real-time facial recognition to identify participants in LGBTQ+ parades in April last year, in violation of the AI Act.

Digital emancipation or authoritarianism?

Thus, it appears that national and international regulation has been lagging behind the rapid tech innovation of recent years. As with any innovation, AI is a neutral tool—but it can be used in ways good or bad depending on the decisions of power-holders. Thus, the application of AI calls for increased scrutiny, accountability and implementation to safeguard the benefits and prospects of improvement it holds out from being hijacked by nefarious purposes undermining democracy and human rights.

Authors: Marin Mae Ekstrom and Wilder Alejandro Sánchez*

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) recently held a summit focused on “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” While the May 15 meeting itself did not offer any groundbreaking resolutions, all five heads of the OTS member states participated and reaffirmed their commitment to greater cooperation and integration. This summit was just one example in a series of events that demonstrate growing unity and collaboration among the Turkic states.

How far integration will go between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and Uzbekistan is debatable. There are several regional initiatives that are bringing these countries, as well as other states across the Caucasus and Central Asia, together, including connectivity projects such as the Middle Corridor and the Uzbek-Kyrgyz-Chinese railway, as well as agencies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union.

However, to secure the success of most multilateral initiatives, bilateral relations between participating members must be consolidated. When ties between two countries are stabilized and routinely strengthened, a bilateral friendship serves as a building block for expanding to additional actors and ensuring constant, reliable dialogue and collaboration among all involved players.

Türkiye, the leader of the Turkic world in terms of population, economic strength, and growing global geopolitical influence, is leveraging shared Turkic heritage to deepen and cement engagement with other OTS members. Uzbekistan is a natural and important partner: as the most populous Central Asian state, it is the second-largest majority-Turkic state in terms of both language and population. The landlocked nation has the third-largest economy in the Turkic world and is rapidly developing economically and expanding its membership in international initiatives.

This commentary will thus provide an analysis of Ankara-Tashkent relations. However, while statements by presidents & joint economic and investment projects are important parts of this geopolitical puzzle, the true sign of integration between two nations often occurs at the cultural level.

BILATERAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Bilateral relations between Türkiye and Uzbekistan are particularly dynamic. It is noteworthy that high-level meetings occur quite regularly: Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Türkiye and Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan met in Ankara on January 29, as part of the 4th meeting of the Joint Strategic Planning Group (JSPG). The two leaders signed several agreements, including the “Decision on Cooperation Mechanisms for Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Relations between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Uzbekistan,” an agreement on health cooperation, a memorandum of understanding for the development of international transport corridors, and a memorandum of understanding for promoting cooperation in mining.

The two countries celebrated 34 years of diplomatic relations, and the Turkish state-run news agency Anadolu marked the occasion with a March op-ed; the essay described bilateral relations as evolving into a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” The Uzbek presidency has utilized the same wording to describe the current level of bilateral relations.

Trade between Türkiye and Uzbekistan has nearly tripled over the past decade, rising from USD$1.2 billion in 2016 to over USD$3 billion in 2025. Short and long-term trade targets amount to USD$5 billion and USD$10 billion, respectively. Türkiye is the fourth-largest trading partner of Uzbekistan, accounting for 3.7% of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade. Uzbekistan is not as high a trade priority for Turkiye: even in Central Asia, which is not Turkiye’s primary trade area, Kazakhstan is a larger overall partner. Although neither country is pursuing top trading status with the other, trade and engagement remain high priorities for both Ankara and Tashkent. The evidence clearly displayed that both nations have taken major strides to consolidate both political and economic engagement.

THE CULTURAL FACTOR

From a cultural standpoint, Türkiye has swiftly gained soft power traction in Uzbekistan. Turkish TV series and movies enjoy immense popularity in Uzbekistan: the appeal of Turkish media, coupled with expanded transit options between the two countries, has inspired a tourism boom to Türkiye. From January to October 2025, over 230 thousand Uzbek nationals traveled to Türkiye for various reasons, a 16.3% increase compared to the same period in 2024.

Conversely, Uzbek influence in Türkiye is also increasing. Turkish tourism to Uzbekistan is also rising: between January and April 2025, around 49,400 Turkish citizens visited Uzbekistan for tourism, a 57.4% increase compared to the same time period in 2024. Turkish businesses are also investing in Uzbekistan’s tourism sector: Turkish partners support 12 hotels and over 100 joint restaurants, and in 2025-2026, Turkish investors pledged to help finance 11 additional hotel projects.

Language is another area of soft power, as Turkish is one of the top five most popular foreign languages to learn in Uzbekistan. Factors, including the popularity of Turkish media, academic study, and career opportunities, have bolstered its appeal. Although the study of Uzbek in Türkiye is not as widespread, the linguistic overlap between the two makes it relatively easy for a native Turkish speaker to learn Uzbek and vice versa, making it a less daunting endeavor than the study of other languages.

Cultural relations and people-to-people diplomacy are sometimes overlooked in grand analyses of international relations, as analysts and scholars often focus on presidential summits, trade agreements, investment, or joint military initiatives. However, people-to-people relations, as well as cultural and public diplomacy, are important tools in a country’s toolkit for strengthening grassroots ties.

Generally speaking, the OTS and its member governments support initiatives to promote people-to-people relations and to continue developing a common Turkic identity. During the recent OTS summit, the five leaders reaffirmed their determination to deepen cooperation in digital transformation, innovation, artificial intelligence, connectivity, and sustainable economic development. More broadly, they highlighted their shared commitment to further deepening solidarity, mutual trust, and strategic cooperation within the Turkic World in line with the objectives of the “Turkic World Vision-2040.”

Specifically, the heads of state “laid a time capsule to officially launch the construction of the Center of the Turkic Civilization.” This Center has been described by regional officials as “a groundbreaking architectural complex that will utilize AI, VR, and holography to immerse visitors in the rich philosophy and history of the Turkic World.” Moreover, during the January meeting between Erdoğan and Mirziyoyev, the two heads of state signed a Cultural Cooperation Plan for 2026-2027. Thus, a key strategy for encouraging Turkish-Uzbek bilateral ties is to highlight their commonalities within the wider Turkic cultural and linguistic sphere.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS

Tashkent-Ankara relations are generally strong, but additional factors complicate their full level of engagement. Although Ankara is very much interested in increasing connectivity with Central Asia via the Middle Corridor and engaging with the Turkic world, those are not its primary objectives. Issues like the Russo-Ukrainian War & the Black Sea; the recent conflict between Iran against the United States and Israel, as well as the related spillover across neighboring Lebanon and Syria; and even the upcoming elections in Armenia, are all arguably higher priorities for Ankara. Domestically, Türkiye is facing its own obstacles, as Erdoğan maintains a tight grip on power while the Turkish economy remains plagued by rising inflation and currency depreciation.

Similarly, Tashkent wants to improve connectivity with Türkiye via the Middle Corridor, but it also wants to increase trade and investment with China and attract investment and partnerships from the Gulf States and India. A good example of this diversification of partnerships is Tashkent’s new airport, to be built via investments and partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea. Meanwhile, Moscow remains committed to maintaining its historical influence across Eurasia (President Mirziyoyev visited Moscow for the May celebrations of the Great Patriotic War, one of the few leaders to do so), while the current US administration is focused on transactional diplomacy to secure access to critical minerals and rare earth elements that Uzbekistan has in abundance.

Ankara’s engagement in recent years with Central Asia via the OTS, the Middle Corridor, and bilateral interactions has attracted widespread academic and scholarly interest. However, there is a predictable focus on diplomatic, security, and trade & investment analyses; for example, a 2024 analysis on Tashkent-Ankara relations published by the Central Asia Caucasus Institute did not mention tourism, cultural diplomacy, or education (apart from military education).

That said, the frequently overlooked factors of cultural and public diplomacy will likely be critical to promoting long-term, successful cooperation between Türkiye and Uzbekistan: Turkish pop culture has had a strong influence in Uzbekistan, tourism is growing, and Turkish language study is increasingly popular there. population to learn Turkish. While Uzbekistan’s cultural and language appeal does not hold the same sway in Türkiye, the country is nonetheless growing in terms of global soft power appeal indicators. Uzbekistan’s rebranding as a globally-oriented and dynamic society steeped in rich Islamic and historical heritage -for example, by leveraging the legacy of legendary cities such as Bukhara, Samarqand, and Khiva- echoes the Kemalist model of a Türkiye embracing both modernity and its Ottoman historical legacy. Thus, framing the contemporary Uzbek national narrative as parallel to the Turkish one could help bolster its appeal in Türkiye and strengthen the sense of collective identity in the broader Turkic cultural space.

*Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He is also a non-resident fellow at Cfive, a think tank headquartered in Astana, Kazakhstan.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views or policies of any organizations with which the authors are affiliated.