Oil prices rose on Thursday after US President Donald Trump warned Iran that “time is running out” and said a “massive armada” was heading towards the region if Tehran failed to agree to a nuclear non-proliferation deal.
In a Truth Social post, Trump said a fleet larger than the one sent to Venezuela was ready to “rapidly fulfil its mission, with speed and violence, if necessary” if Iran refused to negotiate a deal guaranteeing “no nuclear weapons”.
Global benchmark Brent rose by about 2.02%, trading at around $68.73 per barrel, while US crude (WTI) hovered around 2.15% higher, at $64.57 per barrel.
Trump previously threatened to attack Iran if it killed protesters during the ongoing protest movement across the country. Estimates of those killed range from around 6,000 to as many as 30,000, according to various reports.
Oil delivery disruptions
If the US were to escalate militarily, it could disrupt oil flows to countries that still trade with Iran.
Iran’s economy is already under heavy pressure from US secondary financial sanctions on its banking and energy sectors, compounded by the reimposition of JCPOA snapback sanctions.
These measures have severely limited Iran’s access to the Western financial system and constrained its ability to trade openly.
As a result, Iranian exports rely heavily on so-called “dark fleets,” ship-to-ship transfers and intermediary routes designed to obscure cargo origins along major maritime corridors.
Yet despite years of sanctions, Iran has retained access to oil markets, underlining the difficulty of fully enforcing restrictions on a high-value global commodity.
“Iran has a number of markets for its oil, despite the Western sanctions regime,” said Dmitry Grozubinski, a senior advisor on international trade policy at Aurora Macro Strategies.
China at centre of enforcement risk
China remains the largest buyer, with reports suggesting Iranian crude is often rebranded as Malaysian or Gulf-origin oil before entering the country.
“Independent refineries are purchasing it using dark fleet vessels, with transactions conducted through small private banks and in renminbi,” Grozubinski said.
Other destinations for Iranian oil and derivatives include Iraq, the UAE and Turkey, further complicating enforcement.
“It’s extremely difficult to maintain comprehensive sanctions on oil,” Grozubinski said, “especially when it requires policing transactions between Iran and states that don’t fully share Western priorities.”
China currently imports an estimated 1.2 to 1.4 million barrels of Iranian oil per day — around 80 to 90% of Iran’s crude exports.
US escalation could provoke Beijing
That dependence makes Beijing the central variable in any escalation. Analysts say China would be the most likely major economy to resist compliance and retaliate.
“Beijing has already signalled it would respond if Trump follows through,” said Dan Alamariu, chief geopolitical strategist at Alpine Macro, warning of renewed US–China trade friction.
One risk raised by analysts is the potential for China to again restrict exports of rare earths — a tool it has previously used during periods of trade tension — although such a move is considered unlikely in the short term.
“It’s not the base case,” Alamariu said, “but it’s not impossible.”
On the Trump administration’s decision to work with Delcy Rodríguez
Forcing Maduro out: “We made multiple attempts to get Maduro to leave voluntarily and to avoid all of this. Because we understood that he was an impediment to progress. You couldn’t make a deal with this guy.”
The first goal wasn’t a rushed attempt at a democratic transition or vote: “You can have elections all day. But if the opposition has no access to the media, if opposition candidates are routinely dismissed and unable to be on the ballot because of the government, then those aren’t free and fair elections. That’s the endstate that we want. Free, fair, prosperous and friendly Venezuela. We are not gonna get there in three weeks. It’s going to take some time. So objective number one was stability.”
Not a quick, straightforward process: “For the first time in over a decade and a half there’s a real possibility of transformation. And a lot of it will depend on them. There are many people living in Florida and across the country who would like to go back and be a part of Venezuela’s economic life. Many of them are eager to do so. And Venezuela is going to need them to go back and rebuild the businesses that were taken (…) This is not a frozen dinner that you put in a microwave and two and a half minutes later it comes out ready to eat. These are complex things. We’ve seen this play out. I use the example of Paraguay and Spain, there are others. When there’s a transition from autocracy to democracy, it’s not linear.”
“At the end of the day, we are dealing with people over there that have spent most their lives living in a gangster paradise … We are certainly better off today in Venezuela than we were four weeks ago, and I think, and hope, and expect that we will be better off in three… pic.twitter.com/JABFkHoBEB
Rubio didn’t want to get involved in the issue of an investigation into Delcy by US prosecutors. She wasn’t arrested because she hasn’t been indicted like Maduro, and they work with her because those who control the weapons and the institutions are regime figures. The US managed to avoid war, millions of people were prevented from fleeing to Colombia, by establishing communication with key regime actors.
To critics of US policy in Venezuela, Rubio put it this way: “You told us you didn’t want any more regime change, and now you criticize us for not changing the regime.”
Rubio said he doesn’t want chavismo to entrench. According to him, the US goal is not to leave “people from this system” in power (who he claims not to trust), but right now it’s necessary to preserve a level of respect and communication maintained so far (since the January 3 military intervention).
On Venezuelan oil
The Secretary of State insisted that the chavista regime was sustained by corruption, something that is no longer sustainable, and that oil money “will not go to the drug cartels.”
Funds from the oil sales will go into a Venezuela-owned account in Qatar that the US will be able to supervise: “They needed money quickly to fund the police officers, the sanitation workers, the daily operations of government. So we’ve been able to create a short-term mechanism. This is not gonna be the permanent mechanism, but this is a mechanism in which the needs of the Venezuelan people can be met through a process that we’ve created where they will submit every month a budget of what needs to be funded. We will provide for them at the front end what that money cannot be used for. And they’ve been very cooperative in this regard. In fact, they have pledged to use a substantial amount of those funds to purchase medicine and equipment directly from the US.”
In probably his most clear acknowledgement as of yet, Marco Rubio states that the end goal for the Americans is a democratic Venezuela 🇻🇪, achieved through free & fair elections.
But Rubio also hints that elections are more of a long-term objective, and won’t be held very soon. pic.twitter.com/xndUGxHwXE
From 0:30, Rubio explains the BCV-owned account in Qatar.
Rubio also said another $300 million might come in, but Delcy & Co. first must allow an audit of the initial funds to ensure they are being used appropriately.
On the other hand, China can buy Venezuelan oil, but at market price. No Maduro-era discounts set as a result of US sanctions. The Secretary of State said the US wants to lift said sanctions to boost economic activity, but he doesn’t expect the recovery to involve US spending.
Rubio celebrated the amendment process of the Hydrocarbons Law, which basically eliminates many of the restrictions on foreign investment in the oil industry. It doesn’t go far enough to attract more investment, but it’s a big step compared to where things were three weeks ago.”
He suggested that companies would invest in Venezuela knowing their money is safe and their assets wouldn’t be taken away. The goal is to create the conditions for a normal, stable and transparent business environment in Venezuela. Their heavy crude isn’t unique, Canada has it too: “It’s not irreplaceable. But we understand that that is the lifeline and their natural resources will allow Venezuela to be stable and prosperous moving forward. what we hope to do is transition to a mechanism that allows that to be sold in a normal way, a normal oil industry, not one dominated by cronies, graft and corruption.”
Threats to the Rodríguez regime
Rubio expressed the regime’s performance is being assessed based on actions, not discourse. Stopping Venezuela from being the backyard of China, Russia and Iran would be a huge step.
“For the first time in 20 years, we are having serious conversations about eroding and eliminating the Iranian presence, the Chinese influence, the Russian presence as well. In fact, I will tell you that there are many elements there in Venezuela that welcome a return to establishing relations with the United States on multiple fronts,” Rubio said.
“The only military presence you will see in Venezuela is our Marine guards at an embassy. That is our goal, that is our expectation, and that is what everything that outlines towards. That said, if an Iranian drone factory pops up and threatens our forces in the region, the… pic.twitter.com/uTh9njjkGU
He acknowledged that political prisoners are being released, though not at the pace he desires, and that US officials would be mindful of how opposition leaders coming out from hiding would be treated (Delsa Solórzano being the last example).
Rubio said the US is generally pleased with how things have evolved in the past three weeks, but “we’ll let them know” if that changes. He does not anticipate any further military action in Venezuela in the short term. He claimed the use of force would depend on the stabilization goals being met, not on helping those goals.
“The only military presence you will see in Venezuela is our Marine guards at an embassy. That is our goal, that is our expectation, and that is what everything that outlines towards. That said, if an Iranian drone factory pops up and threatens our forces in the region, the president retains the option to eliminate that threat.”
On the future
Rubio was reluctant to provide a precise timeline for the current arrangement between Venezuelan authorities and the US. The Trump administration wants to see rapid progress, he suggested. And in five months, the situation must be different to what they currently see.
In the long term, the US wants Venezuela to have a democratically-elected government. But that stage wouldn’t be achieved in a matter of weeks (see quote in sub-section one). Rubio said he wants María Corina to be part of the transition and to be able to participate in an election at some point. He acknowledged they’ve known each other for the past 12 years, and both him and Trump respect the opposition leader.
Finally, Rubio explicitly labeled the Venezuelan opposition as diverse. He said that both opposition figures like Maria Corina who never supported chavismo and chavistas that disliked Maduro (which he called people “committed to chavista ideology) should have representation, and that internal reconciliation would allow those sectors to participate in national politics. The ultimate goal is legitimate democratic elections, and whatever happens, Rubio hopes the next Venezuelan leaders will have cordial relations with the US.
A digital nomad visa is a document or program that gives someone the legal right to work remotely while residing away from their country of permanent residence. A digital nomad is someone who lives a nomadic lifestyle and uses technology to work remotely from outside their home country.
Although only some countries have visas targeted at digital nomads, many offer visas that are liberal enough to allow nomads to work remotely without becoming a resident. Forty regions offer remote working visas, including Anguilla, The Bahamas, Croatia, Spain, Norway, and Colombia, among others.
Key Takeaways
Digital nomad visas allow individuals to legally live and work in another country.
A digital nomad lives a nomadic lifestyle and uses technology to work remotely from outside their home country.
These visas are available to students and workers, although the costs and requirements tend to vary.
Many countries that offer these visas allow individuals to apply for themselves and their dependents.
Although a digital nomad lifestyle allows you to have a long vacation while you work, it can be stressful and may hinder the formation of long-lasting relationships.
What Is a Digital Nomad Visa?
A digital nomad visa is a type of visa that allows digital nomads to live and work in a foreign country for longer than a normal tourist visa. They may also offer favorable tax schemes for nomads that stay long enough to need to declare a new country as their tax residence.
Although many digital nomads take advantage of lenient temporary residence visas, only a few countries have debuted visas specifically for digital nomads or remote workers. Other countries simply offer visas that work with the frequent moves that many remote workers prefer. And still other countries have visas that cater to freelancers or entrepreneurs but aren’t open to remote workers employed by a foreign company in a full time capacity.
Both workers and students can use digital nomad visas, although the costs and requirements may differ. For example, the Work From Bermuda Certificate requires scholars to provide proof of enrollment in an undergraduate, graduate, doctoral, or research program with their application. Remote workers or self-employed applicants aren’t required to be enrolled in school.
Some countries allow employers to apply for a digital nomad visa for their company. Dominica’s program charges $800 (USD) plus an additional $500 (USD) for each employee for a business of four or more people.
Important
The information provided in this article focuses on digital nomad visas solely in the context of remote workers—not those who want to study abroad or people who are seeking a lengthy corporate retreat.
Who Offers Digital Nomad Visas?
As of 2025, over 50 regions offer programs for temporary remote workers. Besides the regions highlighted below, the following countries also accommodate the digital nomad: Abu Dhabi, Albania, Argentina, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Spain, Belize, El Salvador, Panama, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Dubai, Bali, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Grenada, Namibia, Andorra, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
Other countries offer flexible visas that may attract digital nomads, but they’re not strictly remote a work visa. Some are temporary residence visas, while others offer lenient tourist visas that many use as a remote work visa. Countries that offer remote or freelance friendly visas include Croatia, Armenia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Mexico, Thailand, Serbia, Aruba, Montenegro.
North Macedonia, Goa, and Peru have each either discussed or announced digital nomad visas, but they aren’t available at the time of writing.
Antigua & Barbuda
Roberto Moiola / Sysaworld/Getty Images
Nomad Digital Residence is a long-stay program offered by both islands for remote workers. The visa is good for two years and costs $1,500 (USD) per individual, while couples and families of three or more must pay $2,000 (USD) and $3,000 (USD), respectively.
Applicants must fill out the application and submit up to 11 documents, including proof of expected income of at least $50,000 (USD) for each year of the program.
The Bahamas
Per Breiehagen/Getty Images
The Bahamas Extended Access Travel Stay allows digital nomads to work remotely for one year from any of 16 islands. An application requires a $25 (USD) fee, a valid passport data page, a medical insurance card, and proof of employment.
The application typically takes just five days to process. Approved applicants must pay $1,000 (USD) to receive their Work Remotely permit. You must add $500 (USD) for each dependent if they plan to join you.
Fast Fact
The nomad visas in this list are available to American remote workers. If you hold a passport from another country, especially one in the European Union, you may not need a special visa, as EU citizenship provides the right to work in any EU country. Outside of the EU, European passport holders may also need to obtain a visa to work and live for more than the standard tourist visa.
Barbados
Atlantide Phototravel/Getty Images
The Barbados Welcome Stamp established a visa that allows visitors to work remotely for up to one year. The application fee is $2,000 (USD) for individuals and $3,000 (USD) for families.
The application must be accompanied by two identical 50 x 50 mm photographs (that meet the specific visa photo requirements of the Barbadian government), the biodata page of a passport, and proof of relationship of dependents (if applicable).
Applicants must also prove that they will earn $50,000 (USD) during their 12-month stay.
Bermuda
Marc Guitard/Getty Images
The Work From Bermuda Certificate permits digital nomads to work remotely for 12 months. The $263 (USD) application fee must be accompanied by health insurance and proof of employment. Applicants cannot have a criminal record.
Although there isn’t a minimum requirement, applicants must have enough income to support themselves for the full year. Family members will also need to pay a fee and apply separately, but all applications must be submitted on the same day. The turnaround time is approximately five business days.
Cabo Verde
Wirestock/Getty Images
The Cabo Verde Remote Working Program is available to remote workers originating from Europe, North America, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, and the Economic Community of West African States.
Applicants must:
Have a minimum bank account balance of €1,500 for individuals and €2,700 for families for at least the last six months
Submit five total documents with the application, including a passport and health insurance
Provide 10 total documents to border authorities in person after arriving at one of the 10 islands, though there is some overlap between the two sets of documents
Processing time can take roughly two weeks. The visa is valid for six months and can be renewed for another 12 months.
Costa Rica
Giordano Cipriani/Getty Images
This Central American country’s digital nomad visa, also known as Stay (Estancia) for Remote Workers and Service Provider, offers a one-year remote work opportunity.
Prospective visitors are required to have a monthly income of $3,000 (USD). That amount increases to $5,000 (USD) if there are dependents involved.
Other requirements include, but are not limited to, the payment of a $100 (USD) application fee, bank statements proving income, proof of medical insurance, and a valid passport. The permit can be renewed as long as all requirements are still being met.
Curaçao
Cultura RM Exclusive/RUSS ROHDE/Getty Images
This Dutch Caribbean island offers the @HOME in Curaçao program. Available to remote workers for six months, residency can be extended for an additional six-month period. American or Dutch citizens don’t need a visa—they’re already permitted to stay in Curaçao for up to six months as a tourist.
Outside of a $294 total for fees, the application also requires a copy of a passport photo, proof of solvency, and proof of health insurance. Processing time is approximately two weeks.
All applicants must file individually. Families may also apply for the program, but they must do so under the main applicant.
Czech Republic
Alexander Spatari/Getty Images
The Czech Republic’s freelancer visa, Zivno, is a bit trickier to acquire than most on this list. This program requires a variable fee, in addition to proof of minimum income equal to 1.5 the gross average annual salary listed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. (This amount changes annually.) You must also have documents like a passport, proof of accommodation, criminal record, etc.
The Zivno is only open to residents of a few countries: Australia, Japan, Canada, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Singapore, and Israel. The visa lasts for one year but holders may apply for an extension before the initial visa expires.
Dominica
Westend61/Getty Images
Dominica, also known as the Nature Island of the Caribbean, provides an 18-month Work In Nature Extended Stay Visa for digital nomads.Applicants must present proof of expected income of $50,000 for the next 12 months. There is also a $100 application fee and either $800 single or $1,200 family visa fee—all in USD.
Several other documents, including the biodata page of a passport, a bank reference letter, and proof of health insurance, must also be submitted alongside the application. Approval letters are often sent within 14–28 days.
Estonia
Frans Sellies/Getty Images
On Aug. 1, 2020, Estonia launched an official Digital Nomad Visa for remote workers to remain in the country for up to one year. Applicants need proof of a minimum of €4,500 in gross income and pay a state fee of €90 or €120 for a Type C (short stay) or Type D (long stay) visa, respectively.
Additional requirements include having a valid travel document and health insurance. They must also pass a background check. Applications must be submitted in person at the nearest Estonian Embassy or Consulate, and the processing time can take up to 30 days.
Iceland
Arctic-Images/Getty Images
The long-term visa for remote workers program is available to digital nomads from any country that doesn’t require a visa to travel to Iceland and isn’t available to any that are part of the EU, the European Economic Area, and/or the European Free Trade Association.
The visa can be issued for up to 180 days, so long as applicants apply and are accepted before coming. If you apply after arrival, the visa is only valid for 90 days. You must prove a monthly income equivalent to 1 million króna (ISK) for singles or 1.3 million ISK for couples. Each applicant must submit a separate application and pay a 40,000 ISK processing fee separately for each one.
Applications will also require a passport photo (no older than six months), copies of a passport, proof of health insurance, proof of purpose of stay in Iceland, and potentially a criminal record check.
All applications must be submitted in person or via mail to the Directorate of Immigration at Dalvegur 18, 201 Kópavogur.
Malta
chantal/Getty Images
The Nomad Residence Permit allows digital nomads to work remotely within the archipelago for one year. It can be renewed at the discretion of Residency Malta, as long as the applicant still meets the set eligibility criteria.
Applicants must meet a gross yearly income threshold of €42,000, hold a valid travel document, have health insurance, acquire a valid property rental or purchase agreement, and pass a background check.
Once the application and all required documents have been submitted via email, instructions will be sent to pay a €300 administrative fee for each applicant, including any family members included on the application.
Mauritius
Stuart Westmorland/Getty Images
The Premium Travel Visa offers one year of remote working abroad with the potential for renewal. The best part? The Premium Travel Visa is 100% free—no fees of any kind.
Prospective travelers must submit multiple documents with their online application, such as a valid passport, proof of travel and health insurance, and a copy of their marriage certificate (if applicable).
Applications are processed within 48 hours after they’re submitted.
Montserrat
Emad Aljumah/Getty Images
The Montserrat Remote Work Stamp is valid for one year of remote working. It requires proof of an annual income of $70,000 (USD), and there’s a $500 (USD) fee for single travelers or a $750 (USD) fee for families of up to three dependents (plus a $250 (USD) fee for any additional dependents).
Proof of valid health insurance, a copy of passport biographical data, a passport-size photo, a police record,and proof of employment or a business incorporation certificate are also required.
Processing takes seven working days after the application is submitted.
Portugal
Alexander Spatari/Getty Images
Portugal offers a D8 digital nomad visa that is valid for two years. It can be renewed for up to five years. The national visa costs €110, while the residency visa may come with additional charges.
In addition to the application form, prospective residents must provide a valid passport, two passport-size photos, valid travel insurance, proof of residence (if applicable), proof of sufficient income, proof of owning a business entity (or a contract for providing services), and a criminal record.
Income requirements for the D8 are, as of 2026, €3,480 per month.
Seychelles
levente bodo/Getty Images
The Seychelles Workcation program enables digital nomads to work remotely from any of the 115 islands that comprise the archipelago for as little as one month or as much as one year.
There is a €45 fee, and prospective travelers must also provide a valid passport, proof of being an employee/business owner, proof of income (exact amount unspecified), and a valid medical and travel insurance policy with their application.
Family members can also join an applicant as ordinary visitors, so long as they meet all requirements and submit birth and/or marriage certificates, whichever is appropriate.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Digital Nomad Visas
It’s crucial for anyone considering working abroad to review and follow whatever is requested by their temporary residence of choice. While there are certain benefits to working on a digital nomad visa, there are also some downsides to keep in mind.
Advantages
The obvious benefit of these programs is that you can enjoy a long vacation while maintaining a stable source of income without putting your career on hold. Most regions that offer digital nomad visas already have the infrastructure necessary to support remote workers, such as strong wifi as a selling feature.
Disadvantages
Being a digital nomad requires a job that’s remote and flexible. This is especially important when it comes to logging in hours when there’s a time difference. Although these kinds of jobs have become more common in the wake of the pandemic, this may be a guaranteed deal-breaker for some companies and workers.
Visas can be costly, and if the application for your next destination is rejected, you could be left scrambling to find a new place to live before you’re forced to leave when your current visa expires. Moving around can also make it harder to form long-lasting relationships, while the constant distance can also put a strain on existing ones.
Unless a country offers you permanent residency when your temporary visa expires, there’s little point in putting down roots where you won’t be living after a year or so. Although this lack of ties can be seen as a plus to those who value their independence, anyone thinking about a lengthy period abroad should carefully consider how isolating it might be.
Another consideration is your tax residency. Most countries will consider you a tax resident if you stay more than 183 days. Consider how that may impact your U.S. taxes and eat into your income. Unless you qualify for a specialized digital nomad tax scheme, you may find yourself paying higher taxes than you would back home.
Cons
Job must be remote and may require flexibility
Stress associated with constant moving
Expensive
Harder to plant roots and form long-lasting relationships
Potential for higher tax rates
Digital Nomads vs. Remote Workers
Although the term remote worker has become increasingly common, it isn’t perfectly synonymous with being a digital nomad. All digital nomads are, by necessity, remote workers. Yet the latter term can also apply to those who simply operate from their permanent residence instead of from an office. Laws differ, but entering a country as a tourist generally doesn’t permit the traveler to work while living there.
Working remotely (in your home country) wasn’t as popular in decades past as it is today. That’s because many employers felt that their employees wouldn’t be productive if they worked away from the office. Those who needed to work from home were given special permission for certain reasons, such as family or a lack of workplace accommodations.
Telecommuting has since become very commonplace, boosted by the pandemic. Many companies now believe that working from home can increase productivity. Some research indicates that people who work from home end up working 1.4 days more than in-office workers.
What Is a Digital Nomad?
A digital nomad is someone who works entirely remotely using digital technologies. A digital nomad may work out of cafes, beaches, or hotel rooms, and from anywhere in the world, as they’re not tied down to any one location.
What Is a Digital Nomad Visa?
A digital nomad visa legally allows visitors to work remotely for a foreign country and receive foreign income for an extended period of time. Several countries today offer such long-term stay arrangements to work digitally abroad.
What Other Countries Offer Digital Nomad Visas?
While we profile just a few countries with digital nomad visas, over 70 countries or regions either have a digital nomad visa, an equivalent that would allow digital nomads to work, or have one in the pipeline as of 2025.
The Bottom Line
The number of areas of the world that offer digital nomad visas is growing. Such travel programs can provide cultural and extended stay benefits to travelers who long to live and work in a country they’ve perhaps only dreamed about or visited briefly. Each country has specific requirements for its digital nomad visa, so be sure to do all the necessary research before you begin the application process.
In recent days, the Venezuelan public debate has been filled with comparisons between what has transpired after the January 3 US military operation and the era of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908–1935), the Andean strongman who ruled for 27 years. The immediate flashpoint is the National Assembly’s proposed reform of the 2006 Hydrocarbons Law, designed to reopen the oil industry to private capital.
Displaced chavistas such as Andrés Izarra argue the reform is unconstitutional and evokes the “servile” terms under which Gómez granted oil concessions to foreign firms in the 1920s. Yet the comparison extends beyond oil: chavismo’s political economy resembles Gómez’s in three recurring ways: monopoly rents, opaque bargains with capital, and repression that doubles as a system of extraction.
Scholars of early twentieth-century Venezuela have shown that corruption and the privatization of public office of the Gómez era functioned as governing tools that helped finance coercion, reward loyalists, and develop a powerful and centralized state. Gómez assembled a ruling coalition by binding regional powerbrokers and emerging civilian interests to state-sanctioned rents, especially through monopolies granted under the dictator’s shadow. The arrangement remains familiar to Venezuelans who have watched chavismo merge political loyalty, access to state resources, and personal enrichment into a single logic of rule. Those mechanisms are easiest to see in the political economy of monopoly, contracts, and prisons.
Public office as private business
First, monopoly rents have flourished under authoritarian rule. Under Hugo Chávez, the progressive erosion of checks and balances, and the hollowing out of democratic constraints, helped reconstitute a patrimonial logic of governance. Discretionary access to state resources became a core currency of political loyalty. Over time, the government entrusted senior military officers with the “management” of strategic sectors and state enterprises, creating incentives in which institutional loyalty and personal stake became difficult to disentangle. Alongside these appointments, the state’s dense architecture of controls and bureaucratic choke points created new opportunities to extract rents, shifting costs onto ordinary Venezuelans while protecting insiders. A similar political logic constructed power in Venezuela more than a century ago.
Gómez consolidated his ruling coalition through a tacit understanding: public office could be treated as private business, so long as loyalty held and order endured. One reliable stream of income that lubricated those clientelistic networks came from the cattle business. Beginning early in the regime, the autocrat and his circle leveraged control over cattle supply and slaughtering channels, backed by selective taxation and regulatory privilege, to squeeze competitors and reward allies. Another, more explicitly fiscal mechanism, was tax farming. The state granted private individuals the right to collect specific federal taxes, liquor being a prominent case, in exchange for a fixed payment to the treasury, leaving the tax farmer free to pocket the surplus. Many of the habits we now associate with the petrostate were already baked into everyday monopolies on beef and booze. Oil did not invent rent-seeking; it amplified it, turning familiar practices of privileged access into vastly more lucrative rents.
Delcy’s CPPs transfer operational and investment burdens to private actors, while the state retains political control. These deals have created a new class of intermediaries whose profitability depends less on technical competence than on privileged access to decision-makers.
If the military profited from monopolies in agriculture and cattle ranching, oil gave Gómez a broader instrument: it allowed him to co-opt civilian elites who had long bristled at Andean hegemony. Beyond the autocrat’s immediate family, the most visible beneficiaries of the concession trade were lawyers, engineers, bankers, and other members of the professional classes who monetized access, paperwork, and proximity to power in the new petroleum economy.
A comparable dynamic has surfaced amid PDVSA’s collapse. As the government ignored the current hydrocarbons framework, “productive participation contracts” (CPPs) emerged as a salient workaround. These arrangements effectively transfer operational and investment burdens to private actors, while the state retains political control. Investigative outlets have traced how these opaque deals created a new class of intermediaries whose profitability depends less on technical competence than on privileged access to decision-makers. The Anti-Blockade Law, in turn, has provided the legal umbrella for confidentiality, shielding contract terms from public scrutiny in the name of national security and sanctions evasion.
This pattern is not an accidental echo of the 1920s concession era: the bargain with foreign capital then was not merely economic, but political and deliberately opaque. And when monopolies and privileged access harden into a system, those who cannot buy their way around it are left to absorb the costs; those who challenge it often face a harsher penalty than economic hardship, imprisonment.
Extractivist fear
La Rotunda became a landmark of political oppression under Gómez. In its cells, political prisoners endured systematic torture and humiliation, and the regime’s agents turned captivity into a market through constant extortion for money, food, and favors. Many detainees suffered forced labor so that the infrastructure they built (roads and highways), and that the dictatorship showcased as “modernization,” often bore the hidden imprint of coerced bodies.
That same logic is painfully recognizable today for families with relatives held at El Helicoide and other detention centers. Relatives bring medicines, food, and basic supplies only to face a system in which guards and intermediaries can confiscate, withhold, or demand payments simply to deliver necessities, or even to confirm that a detainee is still there. Imprisonment becomes not only repression, but another revenue stream: a mechanism of extraction layered onto fear.
If the Gómez precedent teaches anything, it is that once an authoritarian equilibrium is broken, restoring the old order is far harder than improvising a new one.
These parallels go a long way toward explaining why both systems proved so resilient, able to ride out internal shocks by combining repression with co-optation, and by making access to rents the glue of elite cohesion. Important differences remain, however.
The dawn versus the sunset of democracy
Gómez ruled over a country still shaped by civil war legacies and weak national institutions. Part of his historical significance lies in how his dictatorship centralized coercion, built a state apparatus, and disciplined regional caudillos, an infrastructure that later governments could eventually open. Democracy did not arrive automatically, but the post-1935 succession did produce a cautious opening under presidents Eleazar López Contreras and Isaías Medina Angarita as the political opposition pressed for change.
Chavismo, by contrast, emerged through elections. It initially spoke the language of participation and inclusion, yet over time it systematically hollowed out checks and balances and concentrated authority in ways that destroyed institutional autonomy. In any case, neither model was indefinitely sustainable. Both eventually confronted moments of succession, and the question shifted from endurance to what, exactly, would replace them.
In both transitions, it was not ordinary domestic pressure that structurally broke the authoritarian bargain, but a decisive external shock. Gómez weathered conspiracies, incursions, and waves of dissent; in the end, only death removed him. For chavismo, the US extraction of Maduro abruptly altered the balance of power inside the ruling coalition, fracturing the status quo among factions and forcing them to operate under Washington’s shadow for the foreseeable future.
After 1935, López Contreras and Medina Angarita moved quickly to neutralize the most predatory residues of Gomecismo, including the family clique. They steered the system gradually toward institutional consolidation and political opening. Echoes of that succession moment now hover over Venezuelan politics.
It is too soon to tell where this transition leads, who will define its project, or what counter-moves it will invite. If the Gómez precedent teaches anything, it is that once an authoritarian equilibrium is broken, restoring the old order is far harder than improvising a new one. Whether that improvisation produces a democratic opening, or a reconstituted chavismo capable of surviving even where Gomecismo could not, remains the central question.
French firms Danone and Nestlé saw a continued plunge in their share prices on Wednesday after a safety crisis involving baby formula.
At around midday in Europe, Danone shares were down 0.48%, while Nestlé shares slipped 0.33%.
A number of national authorities have issued their own warnings after an initial recall announcement from Danone last Friday.
The French firm said it was pulling “a very limited number of specific batches” of baby formula from the market, linked to fears that they could be contaminated with a dangerous toxin. Cereulide, the substance in question, can cause nausea and vomiting.
The recall came after Nestlé, one of Danone’s competitors, announced earlier in January that it would be pulling specific batches of its infant formula from shelves.
This global action followed a smaller recall in December, when cereulide was first found in a Nestlé factory in Nunspeet, the Netherlands.
Analysts estimate that the recall could cost Nestlé over €1bn, although the firm has said that it does not forecast a significant financial hit. Even so, the company will be working to improve its public image and quell doubts over product safety.
The contaminations detected by the companies have all been traced to a single Chinese supplier of arachidonic acid oil, a critical ingredient in premium infant formulas.
Private firm Lactalis has also been affected, along with smaller firms like Vitagermine and Hochdorf Swiss Nutrition.
The French authorities are currently investigating the deaths of two babies reported to have consumed Nestlé infant formula affected by the recalls due to cereulide contamination. So far, no causal link has been established.
“We are following developments with due attention and remain fully available to the authorities, cooperating with complete transparency,” said a Nestlé spokesperson last week.
Infant formula accounts for about 21% of Danone’s group revenue, according to Bernstein analysts. For Nestlé, the category likely represents around 5%.
In its recall statement, Danone stressed that it “never compromises on food safety”, adding that its priority “is to ensure that parents and healthcare professionals can continue to place their trust in the safety and quality of our infant formula products”.
Apologising for the recall, Nestlé said that the measure was “in line with… strict product quality and safety protocols”.
Former European Central Bank president Mario Draghi will attend an informal meeting of European Union leaders at the invitation of European Council President António Costa, who is looking to accelerate the implementation of his competitiveness report.
The retreat will take place on 12 February and will focus on boosting the European economy. Former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta will also participate in the gathering.
Draghi and Letta penned two influential reports on the EU single market and competitiveness in 2024.
In an interview with Euronews from New Delhi, where the EU signed a major trade deal with India, Costa said the retreat will serve to kickstart a cross-institutional debate on how to strengthen the European economy and implement their reform agenda.
“I invited Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta to join us as we take stock of what we’ve done but also look at what we need to deliver,” Costa said.
“We need to create renewed momentum and give a new impetus” to their call for reforms.
“I expect leaders to give clear political guidance to the Commission and the Council as they did last year on defence and security,” he added. “This time, for the single market.”
Costa has held a series of informal meetings bringing together the 27 leaders to brainstorm without the formalities of a European summit, which usually sees a stricter agenda and looks for compromise to deliver unanimous conclusions.
The retreat format, he argues, allows for more open discussions. Last year, leaders met alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer to discuss European security and defence. By inviting Draghi and Letta, Costa hopes to reinstate momentum around their recommendations published in 2024.
Last year, the European Commission’s efforts focused on reducing red tape and cutting bureaucracy pegged to excessive EU regulation. While pushing for simplification of existing rules, analysts suggest the executive is not doing enough to push forward actual reforms in line with the recommendations of the two reports.
A report by the European Policy Innovation Council published in September last year suggested that only 11% of the recommendations listed in the Draghi report had been implemented in its first year even as the Commission referred to it as its economic compass.
Draghi’s attendance could serve to sharpen minds as the former ECB president is highly influential in diplomatic circles, the European capitals and the EU institutions where his speeches are closely monitored.
Draghi has repeatedly called for the bloc to work as a true union and called for a “pragmatic federalist” approach in a changing world.
Draghi has also expressed support for joint borrowing by EU member states to finance large projects of common interest such as security and defense, and called for the integration of the European capital markets to attract and scale up investments.
Watch the full interview with Council President António Costa on The Europe Conversation on Euronews on 28 January.
Not even a month in since the Trump administration captured Nicolás Maduro and the left-wing, Bolivarian regime led by Delcy Rodríguez has been “extremely cooperative.” “Thus far,” the White House said, she has“met all of the demands and requests of the United States”— around favoring American oil companies and investment, stopping narco-trafficking, and severing subordinance to extra-hemispheric rivals.
“Thus far” being the operative word. While in the immediate aftermath she appears to have stabilized the regime while cooperating with Trump, over the medium to long-term, Rodríguez’s attempt to satisfy US demands will likely require her to modify the very structures and processes—i.e., the mechanisms—that have underpinned the regime’s internal cohesion and stability for over two decades.
Delcy, indeed, is in a quagmire.
Alas, that Delcy’s regime has remained stable is unsurprising. The Venezuelan regime has historically turned threatening crises—from mass protests, an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, and economic sanctions to a parallel government recognized by over 50 nations—into recurrent opportunities for consolidation. These survival mechanisms rely on loyalty coerced from civilians and engineered among military and political elites by weaponizing access to dwindling economic rents—from oil, as well as agriculture and minerals, illicit networks, and dependence on China, Russia, and Iran. The scale of this systemic pillaging is vast: since the Chávez era only, at least $300 billion have been diverted to fuel these survival mechanisms.
On the other hand, these are the mechanisms that the Trump administration expects to be overhauled or abolished. While these structures and processes were originally established by the regime, for the regime, the post-Maduro reality is that Rodríguez must now modify them with the US, for the US.
Rodríguez must also redirect scarce resources from pillaging into investments in ruined public infrastructure (especially roads, highways, freeways) and even in basic services like water or domestic gas.
Hence, Delcy’s quagmire. Reforming these mechanisms enough to satisfy the economic and security interests of a forceful (and eager) US administration risks, for regime elites, severing their access to rents that engineer their loyalty. Yet, mere superficial reforms risk Delcy’s fate with her new patron. Trump himself made it clear: “All political and military figures in Venezuela should understand what happened to Maduro can happen to them, and it will happen to them if they aren’t just, fair, even to their people.”
Take for instance Trump’s demand that Venezuela grants privileged access to US oil companies and allows the US to have control over allocation from the financial proceedings. For Rodríguez to fully meet this, it will likely require much more than a mere reform of the Hydrocarbons Law. It necessitates the regulation, hiring, mobilization, and investment of resources to rebuild a decades-neglected, decimated national electricity grid, with 75% of Venezuelans suffering daily outages. Furthermore, Rodríguez must also redirect scarce resources from pillaging into investments in ruined public infrastructure (especially roads, highways, freeways) and even in basic services like water—to which only 36% of Venezuelans have daily access—or domestic gas, where over 70% receive it once every three months! And, on top of this, there is a Frankenstein-type financial system that has also presented opportunities for graft and provides all but predictability.
Washington’s expectation that scarce resources be directed toward restoring infrastructure and basic services while overhauling structural financial distortions to ensure US firms operate safely and profitably will strongly constrain Rodríguez’s ability to allow her inner circle to siphon these limited rents. Rodríguez will likely have to interfere with the very mechanisms of survival that have kept the elite unified: to satisfy Trump jeopardizes internal unity; to preserve internal unity risks facing the fate of Maduro.
During a recent visit to Caracas, CIA Director John Ratcliffe demanded Rodríguez to ensure Venezuela is no longer a “safe haven for America’s adversaries, especially narco-traffickers.” But this requires eliminating the shadow economies that have largely sustained the regime. As oil output collapsed by about 90%, it has been demonstrated that the regime has pivoted to illicit enterprises—along with the regime’s acquiescence to criminal groups in their territory. Illegal mining and drug trafficking, for instance, have reportedly accounted for over a quarter of Venezuela’s economy.
The Trump administration’s eagerness (or impatience) over reforms in Venezuela, plus its immense leverage and willingness to exercise it, may eventually make it realize the need for a swift and credible timeline for re-institutionalization and electoral reform.
Furthermore, China has become the regime’s primary economic patron, absorbing sanctioned crude. With the US interdicting shadow-fleet vessels in the Caribbean and demanding a severance of ties with Beijing, regime insiders—particularly the military, which controls critical pillars of domestic oil production and gasoline distribution—now face unprecedented structural strain. The security apparatus is similarly entangled with Russia, a partner that occupied key strategic voids left by the US and provided the military with hardware and gray market financial networks. These networks will not disappear overnight. Trump’s demand for a strong severance from illicit and foreign ties will likely be a turbulent process.
Complying too strongly with Trump will likely require Rodríguez to cut off many of the elites—and their related structures—that, by enriching the regime, have averted threatening crises for over 20 years. Complying too little with Trump to avoid overhauling internal-regime mechanisms, however, risks the ire of a Trump administration that has staked significant political capital on Venezuela’s transformation, especially in a critical election year.
Will the regime, as María Corina Machado suggested, “be forced to dismantle itself”? While not ensuring democratization, altering survival mechanisms to avoid the fate of Maduro could open junctures towards political liberalization. Conversely, prioritizing elite loyalty and existing mechanisms of enrichment over US expectations of reform and improvement risks unilateral dislodgment. While neither path guarantees democracy in the short term, the Trump administration’s eagerness (or impatience) over reforms in Venezuela, plus its immense leverage and willingness to exercise it, may eventually make it realize the need for a swifter and credible timeline for re-institutionalization and electoral reform.
Amidst this uncertainty, rather than a narrative of Delcy’s uncontested longevity, the politics of post-Maduro Venezuela suggests that the possibility of critical junctures favoring a transition toward democracy remains, today, more resonant than ever.
After months of intense negotiations, the European Commission concluded on Tuesday a free-trade deal with India which sharply reduces tariffs on EU products from cars to wine as the world looks for alternative markets following President Donald Trump’s tariff hit.
The announcement was made during a high-level visit by European authorities including Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Both countries hailed a “new chapter in strategic relations” as the two looks for alternatives to the US market.
India is currently facing tariffs of 50% from the Trump administration, which has severely dented its exports. After sealing the Mercosur deal with Latin American countries earlier this month, the EU has said it aims to speed up its trade agenda with new partners.
“We did it – we delivered the mother of all deals,” von der Leyen said after the deal was announced. “This is the tale of two giants who choose partnership in a true win-win fashion. A strong message that cooperation is the best answer to global challenges.”
Talks went down to the wire with negotiators meeting over the weekend and in the early hours of Monday. The deal says it will bolster the “untapped” potential of their combined markets but did not include politically sensitive sectors such as agriculture.
The EU’s powerful trade chief Maroš Šefčovič, who in charge of negotiating on behalf of the 27 EU member states, said Brussels aims for a fast implementation by 2027.
In an interview with Euronews from Delhi after the deal was announced, Šefčovič said the India deal showcases the EU’s new approach when it comes to trade: more pragmatic on deliverables, rather than getting stuck on political red lines.
“We resumed negotiations with a new philosophy, being very clear in saying: if this is sensitive for you, let’s not touch it,” Šefčovič told Euronews, describing the strategy as a gamechanger.
A win for European exports looking to tap Indian market
Under the agreement, the EU aims to double goods exports to India by 2032 by cutting tariffs on approximately 96% of EU exports to the country, saving around €4 billion a year in duties. At its full potential, the deal creates a market of 2 billion people.
Europe’s carmakers emerge as beneficiaries, with Indian customs duties gradually reduced from 110% to 10% under a quota system. Tariffs in sectors including machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals will also be almost entirely eliminated.
Wine and spirits, key exports for countries like France, Italy and Spain, will see duties reduced from 150% to around 20 to 30%. Olive oil duties will be cut to zero from 40%.
After years of tensions with EU farmers, the Commission said sensitive agricultural products had been excluded from the agreement, leaving out beef, chicken, rice and sugar.
When it comes to India, the agreement keeps trade terms on dairy and grain untouched in line with the demands of the Indian authorities, which saw it as a red line.
The Commission, which negotiated the deal on behalf of the EU’s 27 member states, said it included a dedicated sustainable development chapter “which enhances environmental protection and addresses climate change.”
The agreement does not cover geographical indications, another contentiousarea for negotiators, which will be addressed in a separate deal aimed at protecting EU products from imitation on the Indian market.
Deal cut under pressure from Trump’s tariffs
The timing of the deal is important as the two sides look to de-risk their economies from the threat of Trump’s tariffs.
The EU saw tariffs triple to 15% last year under a contentious deal and India is currently operating under a 50% tariff regime from Washington.
The Trump administration slapped an additional 25% duty on India last year as punishment for buying Russian oil, which India has defended citing a need for cheap energy to power a country of 1.4 billion people.
Talks between the EU and India first began in 2007 but quickly ran into hurdles.
Negotiations were relaunched in 2022 and talks intensified last year as the two sought to cushion the impact of Trump’s return to the White House.
After the deal was signed during a two-day trip on Tuesday, in which the chiefs of the Commission and the European Council were guest of honour, the EU said the deal showcases that “rules-based cooperation” remains the preferred path for the bloc – and a growing number of partners from Latin America to India.
Before the deal can be implemented, the European Council and the European Parliament will have to ratify it, which can become an arduous process.
The Commission hopes to begin implementing the agreement from January 2027.
This story has been updated with comments by Commissioner Šefčovic to Euronews. Watch online and on television.
A new wave of agentic AI systems is reshaping banking operations. Unlike typical large language model (LLM) applications that answer prompts, agentic systems execute sequences of actions: querying systems, retrieving documents, transforming data, and producing outputs. Quietly, these autonomous tools are beginning to redefine the banking technology landscape.
The potential impact is sufficiently profound that McKinsey is now framing agentic AI as a structural shift in banking rather than a side bet; the consultant estimates that AI adoption—including agentic AI systems—could reduce banks’ aggregate cost base by 15% to 20%. Bain, in its 2025 report, “State of the Art of Agentic AI Transformation Technology Report,” cites that in the first half of 2025, “tech-forward enterprises” turned their focus from automating tasks to redesigning entire workflows, as early adopters get to grips with how agents—or the AI systems that independently handle multi-step tasks by coordinating tools, data and actions to meet specified objectives—may coexist safely and collaborate productively. Yet progress is limited.
Although agentic AI may hold promise, definitional confusion and implementation hurdles mean very few true use cases exist, cautions Armand Angeli, AI and automation specialist and vice president, Digital Transformation and AI Group, at DFCG, the French network of CFOs.
“Financial institutions still struggle to understand and implement agentic AI properly,” he says, “and are jumping too fast into these new tools without addressing the fundamentals of data quality, clear processes, skillsets, and ROI [return-on-investment]. There’s a high degree of confusion about what agentic AI is, with people equating AI assistants or RPA [robotic process automation] with true agents. Only a very small number are actually building and scaling agentic effectively.”
Angeli also contends that people overuse the word “agentic.”
“GenAI is mistaken for agentic because it seems intelligent or retrieves data,” he says. “But GenAI is relatively simple and doesn’t self-correct, unlike agents with memory and feedback loops for auto-healing and learning. Building these agents requires mapping complex processes and understanding where the data is, which can take months and thousands of euros in costs. It’s a fine line between a simple agent or RPA and true agentic AI.”
Even though the tools themselves are complex, their appeal is straightforward and powerful.
Where Agentic AI Is Actually Being Deployed
Whether LLM-powered information retrieval agents, single-task agentic workflows, cross-system agentic workflow orchestration, or multi-agent constellations, true agentic AI can perform complex tasks independently within defined boundaries, all with limited human intervention.
BBVA Peru’s Blue Buddy agentic AI assistant is an example. The “lightning-fast knowledge synthesizer” autonomously navigates the commercial bank’s vast ecosystem of unstructured data—product manuals, regulations, and complex processes—to deliver precise, contextualized answers in real time and in a risk managed way.
“We’re not just exploring AI; we’re putting it to work on the front lines of our business,” says Benjamín Chávez, head of engineering at BBVA Peru.
UK-based consultant Capco recently deployed an agentic AI assistant at a global investment bank to support junior bankers in producing credit memos, company profiles, and peer benchmarks.
“Previously, analysts could spend five to ten hours a week on a single memo, largely on manual data gathering, formatting, and rewriting,” says Charlotte Byrne, Capco’s UK GenAI lead. “The new workflow allows a banker to request, for example, ‘Draft a credit memo for a corporate client with the latest financials and peers.’ The agent delivers a first draft within minutes.”
The client bank ultimately saw a 50% reduction “in time spent on the mechanical parts of the process.”
Wells Fargo recently announced a collaboration with Google Cloud that will deploy agentic AI at scale via 2,000 employees, with further plans for bank-wide rollout. The tools Google Cloud will supply synthesize information, automate workflows, and boost agility; key applications include triaging foreign exchange post-trade inquiries and navigating guidelines in corporate and investment banking. In Greece, Eurobank is working with EY to develop a scalable, automated system that embeds agentic AI into core banking operations.
In each case, the goal is to replace high-volume, repetitive workflows. But implementation is not without its challenges.
During Capco’s recent rollout, while AI algorithms themselves did not present an issue, the client bank’s internal requirements complicated the process. “We had to use guard-railed, bank-approved models,” says Byrne, “which meant investing heavily in prompt design, retrieval quality, and validation. Governance also added long lead times; simply getting proof-of-concept approvals took nearly two months, by which point the model landscape had already shifted again.”
Engagement was another challenge. Asking already stretched teams to dedicate extra hours to testing is often one of the practical challenges of implementing agentic AI, and adoption suffers if solutions are built too far from the day-to-day workflow. And while banks see the potential of autonomous agents, Byrne observes, few currently have the infrastructure to use them effectively and safely, with poor data and legacy systems the key obstacles.
“Most AI failures in banking have nothing to do with the models themselves,” she says; many banks still lack clean APIs into core systems or struggle with slow, fragmented approval cycles that are incompatible with iterative AI development.
Scaling The Challenge
Scaling GenAI from “lab to regulated banking environment” is no small feat, BBVA’s Chávez concedes. Operationally, BBVA’s major challenge was transforming vast amounts of unstructured data into a clean, corporate-grade knowledge base.
“We had to implement rigorous data governance to ensure the agent’s ‘brain’ was fueled only with accurate, up-to-date information,” he notes.
Chang Li, chief manager, Nippon Life Insurance
And while agentic AI has generated significant enthusiasm, there are, as yet, only isolated examples of success, and tangible value across financial services remains limited. Ambiguous strategic objectives, organizational complexity, and the challenge of replicating interpersonal dynamics represent critical barriers, says Chang Li, chief manager, Nippon Life Insurance Company, director of the Fintech Association of Japan, and ambassador for FinCity.Tokyo.
“First, we must understand what we’re looking to achieve, whether that’s better customer communication or cost cutting,” she says. But defining strategy and purpose is difficult for any one division alone; it requires collaboration between departments, Li notes, since bureaucratic structures often prevent meaningful conversations between the correct stakeholders.
Are there concerns about agentic AI taking over from humans in some finance functions? That may no longer be the right question, Li says: “I think it’s more useful to think about the conditions under which the first human ‘channel’ might be taken over by AI and consider how companies should prepare for that.”
The necessary degree of trust is not yet in place for agentic AI to truly replace humans in banking, however. “Currently, agentic AI is only feasible for the information collection step,” says Li, with an agentic contract still “a few years” off.
For BBVA, building trust into agentic AI systems is foundational. “In the financial sector, trust is our most valuable currency,” says Chávez. The bank proactively aligns with demanding emerging standards, including frameworks from Europe and the US, in addition to Peruvian regulations.
“This ethical stance has directly shaped our strategic roadmap,” he notes. “We’ve prioritized decision support use cases over autonomous decision-making. We started where AI assists and humans validate. It’s the most responsible way to deliver immediate value while mitigating risks and building the trust needed for deeper automation.”
In an era of falling revenues, financial institutions may find the productivity gains they need from agentic AI, McKinsey suggests, predicting that early adopters will secure a lasting advantage over slow movers: but not overnight.
McKinsey anticipates a breakout agentic business model will emerge in the next three to five years and is urging bank executives to focus on a small number of high‑value workflows, such as frontline sales, account planning, and financial close processing; define clear guardrails for agent autonomy; and invest early in data quality and risk controls to ensure pilots can scale safely: all with “surgical precision” in identifying the potential earnings impact.
Crypto firm Ripple has been granted conditional approval in its bid to secure a national trust bank charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—the US federal regulator that supervises national banks and federal savings associations.
Ripple, together with four other crypto-related businesses, Circle, BitGo, Fidelity Digital Assets, and Paxos, won provisional agreement from the OCC despite opposition from Main Street banks.
The OCC tentatively approved Ripple, creator of the RLUSD dollar-backed stablecoin and XRP payment token, and Circle, issuer of the USDC stablecoin, to establish national trust banks. Elsewhere, the OCC also gave preliminary approval to BitGo, Fidelity Digital Assets, and Paxos, to convert from state-regulated trust companies to nationally regulated trust banks.
Analysts say the pushback from banking industry groups might be an overreaction. The American Bankers Association, Independent Community Bankers of America, and Bank Policy Institute argue that granting charters is a backdoor into the banking sector that poses a systemic risk.
“[The] decision by the OCC to grant conditionally five national trust charters leaves substantial unanswered questions,” said Greg Baer, president and CEO of the Bank Policy Institute, in a prepared statement. “Chiefly, whether the requirements the OCC has outlined for the applicants are appropriately tailored to the activities and risks in which the trust will engage.”
But national bank trust charters do not allow regulated entities to solicit deposits, offer checking or savings accounts, or access insurance from the FDIC [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation], which underwrites most banking deposits in the US.
Despite the OCC’s provisional approval, crypto firms must still satisfy the OCC’s capital, risk, and governance standards before full approval is granted.
Meanwhile, Ripple has secured approval from Abu Dhabi’s financial regulator, permitting Ripple’s RLUSD stablecoin for use inside the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM)—a financial center—as an Accepted Fiat-Referenced Token. Approval from the Financial Services Authority will place RLUSD alongside a small group of tokens approved for ADGM use. Earlier this year, RLUSD received approval from the Dubai Financial Services Authority and has recently expanded its Middle East footprint into neighboring Bahrain.
