European Union

This year, in the US-China trade war and the grand military parade, China demonstrated economic and military strength that forced the United States to back down. However, Beijing merely displayed its power; various parties discovered that this giant does not know how to wield it.

The US paused its economic attacks on China, but the Dutch government directly “took control of” a Chinese-owned company in the Netherlands—Nexperia—through public authority. The EU expanded anti-dumping measures against China, with France as the main driver behind anti-China economic policies.

The US publicly acknowledged that China’s rising military power in the Western Pacific can no longer be suppressed and adjusted its global strategy to focus on the Western Hemisphere. Yet Japan shifted the Taiwan issue from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, adopting a more confrontational posture and challenging China’s bottom line. Regional countries, in various ways, have called for “peace” in the Taiwan Strait—support that amounts to nothing less than opposing China’s unification and indirectly endorsing Japan’s position. Meanwhile, the Philippines, mired in internal chaos, continued to provoke China in the South China Sea.

Since China has the capability to confront the US, it should have the ability to punish Europe, Japan, and the Philippines for their unfriendliness toward China. But Beijing did not do so. When facing challenges from these parties, it only issued symbolic verbal protests or took measures that failed to eradicate the problems—putting on a full defensive posture but lacking concrete and effective actions. As a result, events often started with thunderous noise but ended with little rain, fizzling out in the end.

From Beijing’s appeasement toward Europe, Japan, and the Philippines, all parties have reason to believe that China is a giant that doesn’t know how to use its own power. This presents a strategic opportunity for the weak to overcome the strong—especially now, as the US contracts its global strategy and distances itself from its allies. Maximizing benefits from China’s side is the rational choice.

For example, with Japan: Beijing responded to Tokyo’s intervention in the Taiwan issue with high-intensity verbal criticism, but its actions were inconsistent with its words. Although it revisited the “enemy state clauses” at the UN, raised the postwar Ryukyu sovereignty issue, and even conducted joint military exercises with Russia 600 kilometers from Tokyo, these actions were far less intense than the rhetoric. Even the verbal criticism cooled down after a month.

The US maintained a low profile on the China-Japan dispute, adopted a cool attitude toward Tokyo, and even indirectly expressed condemnation—likely the main reason Beijing de-escalated. This shows that China’s original intent in handling the incident was to force the US to “decouple” from Japan on the Taiwan issue and isolate Tokyo, which maintains close ties with Taipei.

Influenced by official attitudes, the Chinese people once again mistook official rhetoric for commitments, believing Beijing would go to war if necessary to eradicate Japan’s interference in internal affairs. After all, unresolved deep-seated hatred—akin to a sea of blood—remains between China and Japan. Moreover, this year marks the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, with various events held throughout the year to engrave in memory the national humiliation of Japan’s invasion of China.

But after Trump indirectly criticized Japan for provoking unnecessary disputes, Beijing seemed satisfied and stepped down gracefully. Although the dispute has not ended and continues to develop, like its handling of Philippine provocations, China has placed disputes with neighbors into long-term games, effectively shelving the issues—and causing the Chinese people renewed frustration.

After this three-way interaction, the asymmetry between Beijing’s words and actions has likely become deeply ingrained. In the future, it will be much harder for Beijing to mobilize the 1.4 billion people’s shared enmity.

The key point: In this dispute, who—China, Japan, or the US—gained the greatest substantive strategic benefits? So far, it’s hard to say who won the first round. China appeared to come out looking the best, preserving the most face, yet Japan also gained, and the US obtained leverage for future talks with China.

In the first round of this dispute, China strategically established the legitimacy of denying Japan’s intervention in the Taiwan issue, narrowing Tokyo’s diplomatic space for anti-China actions via Taiwan. Japan’s right wing advanced toward national normalization, hollowing out its peace constitution to cope with US strategic contraction; additionally, the Liberal Democratic Party regained public support. The US demonstrated its influence in East Asia—even after “withdrawing” its military to the second island chain—and raised its bargaining chips at the US-China negotiation table.

However, from a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan gains nothing worth the loss: the Ryukyu Islands will become a burden rather than an outer defense wall. The two major powers, China and the US, will orderly redraw their spheres of influence in East Asia; the US will gain a dignified pretext for abandoning Taiwan, while China will recover Taiwan at a lower cost.

Conversely, beyond the asymmetry between words and actions, there is also asymmetry between actions and strength. Beijing’s greatest loss is that the international community—especially its neighbors and Europe—has seen through China’s essence of appearing fierce but being timid inwardly. They have once again discovered that antagonizing China brings no adverse consequences; on the contrary, it can yield unexpected benefits—provided they give China the face it needs to achieve strategic gains.

For example, Vietnam: After the China-Japan dispute cooled, a Vietnamese warship transited the Taiwan Strait under the pretext of freedom of navigation without prior notification to China, signaling it is not a vassal of Beijing and aligning with Washington’s position.

Vietnam is a major beneficiary of the US-China confrontation, with massive Chinese goods rerouted through Vietnam to the US; transit trade has skyrocketed its economic growth. Thus, it firmly believes maximizing benefits lies in a neutral stance between China and the US. However, from a supply chain perspective, China is the supplier and the US the customer—the latter slightly more important. Factoring in China-Vietnam South China Sea disputes and China’s habitual concessions versus the lethal US carrot-and-stick approach, Vietnam naturally leans more pro-US.

Additionally, during the China-Japan dispute, Singapore’s prime minister publicly sympathized with Japan, while Thailand and Vietnam jointly called for peace in the Taiwan Strait—showing Southeast Asian nations, like Japan, hope to maintain the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait and oppose military conflict in the region, which is equivalent to opposing China’s recovery of Taiwan. Of course, Northeast Asia’s South Korea holds the same view; some countries publicly state it due to internal and US factors, while others choose silence.

China’s neighboring countries all see the fact that the Philippines’ intense anti-China stance has gone unpunished. Despite deep internal political turmoil, Manila can still spare efforts to provoke China in the South China Sea—clearly a profitable path. Neighbors conclude: If China can concede on core interests, what can’t it concede?

On the other side of the globe, Europe has noticed this phenomenon too. The Dutch government rashly took over a Chinese enterprise, severely damaging China’s interests and prestige; Beijing’s response started strong but ended weakly—mainly to avoid impacting China-EU trade, even amid decoupling risks everywhere. No wonder Britain subsequently sanctioned two Chinese companies on suspicion of cyberattacks, unafraid of angering Beijing just before Prime Minister Starmer’s planned January visit to China.

In short, whether on the regional Taiwan issue or extraterritorial China-EU economic issues, China faces a broken windows effect. Although from a grand strategic view, all related events remain controllable for Beijing, appeasement only invites more trouble. It’s not impossible that China will eventually be unable to suppress public indignation and be forced to suddenly take tough measures—like at the end of the pandemic, when people took to the streets and Beijing immediately lifted lockdowns, rendering all prior lockdown justifications untenable overnight.

Indeed, China currently appears as a giant that doesn’t know how to use its power. But when a rabbit is cornered, it bites. When Beijing is forced to align actions with strength, the intensity will be astonishing; then, China will want more than just face.

There’s a saying: Attack is the best defense. But with its long history, this nation views offense and defense more comprehensively. The Chinese believe that when weak, attack is the best defense; when holding an advantage, defense is the best attack. As long as the opponent’s offense can be controlled within acceptable limits, persistent defense inflicts less damage than the opponent’s self-exhaustion in stamina. Conversely, when at a disadvantage, a full assault is needed to reverse it.

In other words, China doesn’t fail to know how to use power; it deems using power uneconomical. This explains why the West walks a path of decline while China continues rising—the latter accumulates power, and the former overdraws it.

President Trump is shrewd and pragmatic; he knows cornering China awakens the giant, so he eased US-China relations. But simultaneously, the US doesn’t mind—and even quietly encourages—its allies to provoke China, while positioning itself as a mediator to benefit. This is a reasonable tactic and the most effective offensive against China.

Xi Jinping once said China has great patience—implying that if patience is exhausted, the world will see a completely different China, one that uses power without regard for cost.

European farmers are protesting against the EU-Mercosur deal.

That is as signing has been postponed until January, due to disagreements in Europe.

The European-South American deal, planned for more than 25 years, would create the world’s largest free-trade zone.

So, why is there division?

Presenter: Folly Bah Thibault

Guests:

Pieter Cleppe – Editor-in-chief at BrusselsReport.eu
Ciaran Mullooly – Member of the European Parliament for the Independent Ireland group
Gustavo Ribeiro – Founder and editor-in-chief of the Brazilian Report online newspaper

EU delays Mercosur trade deal until January amid farmer protests and opposition from France and Italy.

The European Union has delayed a massive free-trade deal with South American countries amid protests by EU farmers and as last-minute opposition by France and Italy threatened to derail the agreement.

European Commission chief spokesperson Paula Pinho confirmed on Thursday that the signing of the trade pact between the EU and South American bloc Mercosur will be postponed until January, further delaying a deal that had taken some 25 years to negotiate.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was expected to travel to Brazil on Saturday to sign the deal, but needed the backing of a broad majority of EU members to do so.

The Associated Press news agency reported that an agreement to delay was reached between von der Leyen, European Council President Antonio Costa and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni – who spoke at an EU summit on Thursday – on the condition that Italy would vote in favour of the agreement in January.

French President Emmanuel Macron had also pushed back against the deal as he arrived for Thursday’s summit in Brussels, calling for further concessions and more discussions in January.

Macron said he has been in discussions with Italian, Polish, Belgian, Austrian and Irish colleagues, among others, about delaying the signing.

“Farmers already face an enormous amount of challenges,″ the French leader said.

The trade pact with Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay would be the EU’s largest in terms of tariff cuts.

But critics of the deal, notably France and Italy, fear an influx of cheap commodities that could hurt European farmers, while Germany, Spain and Nordic countries say it will boost exports hit by United States tariffs and reduce reliance on China by securing access to key minerals.

Brazil’s President Lula says Italy’s PM Meloni asked for ‘patience’

The EU-Mercosur agreement would create the world’s biggest free-trade area and help the 27-nation European bloc to export more vehicles, machinery, wines and spirits to Latin America at a time of global trade tensions.

Al Jazeera’s Dominic Kane, reporting from Berlin, said Germany, Spain and the Nordic countries were “all lobbying hard in favour of this deal”. But ranged against them were the French and Italian governments because of concerns in their powerful farming sectors.

“Their worry being that their products, such as poultry and beef, could be undercut by far cheaper imports from the Mercosur countries,” Kane said.

“So no signing in December. The suggestion being maybe there will be a signing in mid-January,” he added.

“But there must now be a question about what might happen between now and mid-January, given the powerful forces ranged against each other in this debate,” he added.

Mercosur nations were notified of the move, a European Commission spokeswoman said, and while initially reacting with a now-or-never ultimatum to its EU partners, Brazil opened the door on Thursday to delaying the deal’s signature to allow time to win over the holdouts.

Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said Italy’s Meloni had asked him for “patience” and had indicated that Italy would eventually be ready for the agreement.

The decision to delay also came hours after farmers in tractors blocked roads and set off fireworks in Brussels to protest the deal, prompting police to respond with tear gas and water cannon.

Protesting farmers – some travelling to the Belgian capital from as far away as Spain and Poland – brought potatoes and eggs to throw and waged a furious back-and-forth with police while demonstrators burned tyres and a faux wooden coffin bearing the word “agriculture”.

The European Parliament evacuated some staff due to damage caused by protesters.

Thousands protest as EU leaders clash over trade pact farmers fear will flood Europe with cheaper South American goods.

Hundreds of tractors have clogged the streets of Brussels as farmers converged on the Belgian capital to protest against the contentious trade agreement between the European Union and South American nations they say will destroy their livelihoods.

The demonstrations erupted on Thursday as EU leaders gathered for a summit where the fate of the Mercosur deal hung in the balance. More than 150 tractors blocked central Brussels, with an estimated 10,000 protesters expected in the European quarter, according to farm lobby Copa-Cogeca.

It made for a twin-tracked day of febrile tension outside and inside at the EU summit as leaders were perhaps more focused on a vote to determine whether they are able to use nearly $200bn in frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine over the next two years.

Outside the gilded halls on the streets, farmers hurled potatoes and eggs at police, set off fireworks and firecrackers, and brought traffic to a standstill.

Authorities responded with tear gas and water cannon, setting up roadblocks and closing tunnels around the city. One tractor displayed a sign reading: “Why import sugar from the other side of the world when we produce the best right here?”

“We’re here to say no to Mercosur,” Belgian dairy farmer Maxime Mabille said, accusing European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen of trying to “force the deal through” like “Europe has become a dictatorship”.

Protesters fear an influx of cheaper agricultural products from Brazil and neighbouring countries would undercut European producers. Their concerns centre on beef, sugar, rice, honey and soya beans from South American competitors facing less stringent regulations, particularly on pesticides banned in the EU.

“We’ve been protesting since 2024 in France, in Belgium and elsewhere,” said Florian Poncelet of Belgian farm union FJA. “We’d like to be finally listened to.”

France and Italy now lead opposition to the deal, with President Emmanuel Macron declaring that “we are not ready” and the agreement “cannot be signed” in its current form.

France has coordinated with Poland, Belgium, Austria and Ireland to force a postponement, giving critics sufficient votes within the European Council to potentially block the pact.

However, Germany and Spain are pushing hard for approval. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz warned that decisions “must be made now” if the EU wants to “remain credible in global trade policy”, while Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez argued the deal would give Europe “geo-economic and geopolitical weight” against adversaries.

The agreement, 25 years in the making, would create the world’s largest free-trade area covering 780 million people and a quarter of global gross domestic product (GDP).

Supporters say it offers a counterweight to China and would boost European exports of vehicles, machinery and wines amid rising US tariffs.

Despite provisional safeguards negotiated on Wednesday to cap sensitive imports, opposition has intensified. Von der Leyen remains determined to travel to Brazil this weekend to sign the deal, but needs backing from at least two-thirds of EU nations.

Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva issued an ultimatum on Wednesday, warning that Saturday represents a “now or never” moment, adding that “Brazil won’t make any more agreements while I’m president” if the deal fails.

Brazilian president says it is now or never after Italy joins France in saying it is not ready to sign trade deal.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has warned he may abandon a long-awaited trade deal between members of the South American bloc Mercosur and the European Union after key countries sought a delay.

The Brazilian leader issued the threat on Wednesday after Italy joined fellow heavyweight France in saying it was not ready to commit to the pact to create the world’s biggest free-trade area.

The EU had expected its 27 member states to approve the deal in time for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to fly to Brazil to sign an agreement with the host, along with Mercosur partners Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, on Saturday.

“I’ve already warned them: If we don’t do it now, Brazil won’t make any more agreements while I’m president,” Lula told a cabinet meeting.

“We have given in on everything that diplomacy could reasonably concede.”

‘Premature’ to sign: Meloni

The deal, more than two decades in the making, has been keenly backed by economic powerhouse Germany, along with Spain and the Nordic countries, amid rising Chinese competition and recent United States tariffs, which have increased the incentive to diversify trade.

It would allow the EU to export more vehicles, machinery, spirits and wine to Latin America, and more beef, sugar, rice, honey and soya beans to flow in the opposite direction.

France, eager to protect its agriculture industry, had already called for a delay on a vote to approve the deal, and gained the support necessary to potentially block the agreement when Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said on Wednesday that Rome was also not ready.

“It would be premature to sign the deal in the coming days,” she told parliament, saying that some of the safeguards Italy is seeking on behalf of farmers were yet to be finalised.

She said Italy did not seek to block the deal altogether, and was “very confident” that her government’s concerns would have been addressed to allow it to be signed early next year,

French President Emmanuel Macron told a cabinet meeting on Wednesday that his government would “firmly oppose” any attempts to force through the deal.

Hungary and Poland are also lukewarm on the agreement.

By contrast, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Wednesday he would push “intensively” for the bloc to approve the deal by the year’s end, in what he described as a test of the EU’s “ability to act”.

EU reaches agreement on agricultural safeguards

In an effort to allay some of the concerns, the EU struck a provisional deal on Wednesday to set tighter controls on imports of farm products, amid a background of farmer protests against the deal.

It determined the trigger for launching an investigation into such imports if import volumes rose by more than 8 percent per year or prices fell by that amount in one or more EU members.

EU leaders will discuss the matter at a Brussels summit on Thursday, a commission spokesman said.

The Eurovision likes to sell itself as a glittering exercise in European unity, colorful, loud, proudly diverse, and (officially) above politics. Yet anyone who has watched the contest with both eyes open knows that “apolitical” has always been more of a brand promise than a lived reality. In late 2025, that gap widened into a full-blown crisis, as a number of broadcasters reported across outlets that Spain, Ireland, Slovenia, the Netherlands, and Iceland signaled they would not take part in Eurovision 2026 after the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) decided not to exclude Israel amid the ongoing war in Gaza, Palestine.

This episode is not simply “politics invading culture.” It reflects a shift in how legitimacy is demanded and contested in Europe’s cultural diplomacy, particularly when public broadcasters operate under constant online scrutiny. A constructivist lens helps explain why withdrawal can become socially “appropriate” not only because of interests, but because identities, norms, and public expectations set the boundaries of acceptable action.

Eurovision’s political DNA

Eurovision was launched in 1956 as a post-war cultural bridge. Its origin story is important: a shared stage was meant to build familiarity, and familiarity was meant to soften rivalry. That heritage still shapes the contest’s self-image. But Eurovision has long functioned as a stage where politics appears in coded ways through voting patterns, representation debates, and symbolic messaging.

In 2026, the argument is no longer coded. The EBU’s insistence that Eurovision must remain apolitical is being tested by publics who increasingly expect cultural institutions to reflect basic humanitarian values. This tension has been building for years, but the Palestine crisis and the EBU’s decisions have turned it into a legitimacy problem, not merely a public relations headache.

Why withdrawal became “appropriate”

Constructivism in international relations focuses on how identities and norms shape behavior. States and national institutions do not act only from material interests; they also act from what is socially acceptable, what fits their self-image, and the expectations of their audiences.

Three dynamics stand out.

Identity signalling, domestically and externally

For several withdrawing countries, participation carried an identity cost. Public broadcasters—especially those that see themselves as guardians of civic values—operate within national narratives about solidarity, rights, and moral responsibility. Remaining in the contest while public debate framed Israel’s participation as incompatible with humanitarian concerns risked looking like complicity or indifference. Withdrawal, by contrast, functioned as a signal: this is who we are, and this is the line we will not cross.

Importantly, this signalling was not addressed only to external audiences. It was also addressed inward towards domestic publics, artists, and civil society networks. In many European societies, those constituencies are no longer passive consumers of cultural events; they are active participants in the reputational economy surrounding public institutions.

Norm cascades and moral momentum

Once a few broadcasters moved towards withdrawal, the decision quickly gained social momentum. This is what Finnemore and Sikkink described as a “norm cascade”: when a norm shifts from being optional to being expected, and the reputational cost of non-compliance rises. In practical terms, it can start to feel safer to leave than to stay—because staying invites condemnation, while leaving can be framed as moral coherence.

This is also why the dispute escalated so quickly. A single broadcaster withdrawing is a story. Multiple broadcasters withdrawing is a pattern, and patterns trigger moral comparisons. The question changes from “Why did they leave?” to “Why are you still staying?”

The ‘apolitical’ norm is under strain because it looks selective.

The apolitical claim does not collapse simply because people become more emotional. It collapses when it appears inconsistent. Critics repeatedly pointed to Russia’s exclusion in 2022 after the invasion of Ukraine and asked why a different standard was being applied now. The EBU, for its part, has emphasized the contest’s non-political ethos and introduced new rules aimed at insulating Eurovision from government influence.

But in the public sphere, the argument is not purely procedural. It is moral and comparative: if Eurovision can act decisively in one case, why not in another?

Constructivism predicts that institutions struggle when the norms they rely on no longer align with the moral intuitions of their audiences. That is exactly what this crisis reveals.

Digital activism as a legitimacy engine

If this controversy had happened twenty years ago, it would likely have moved more slowly, mediated by newspapers and official statements. Today it unfolds in a real-time digital public sphere where narratives travel quickly across borders and reputational costs escalate fast. Online mobilization—through petitions, artist statements, and hashtag campaigns—helped turn Eurovision into a symbolic battleground, pressuring broadcasters to respond to highly visible moral claims.

Two effects matter most. First, digital dynamics accelerate moral consolidation, which means once “selective neutrality” becomes a dominant frame, hesitation itself is read as a political stance. Second, institutions face continuous visibility. Decisions are no longer a single event but an ongoing justification process, renewed by viral moments and high-profile protest actions linked to Israel’s inclusion.

For cultural diplomacy, this shifts the logic of soft power from image-making towards moral credibility under public scrutiny.

Withdrawal as cultural diplomacy

Withdrawal from Eurovision is, in a strict sense, symbolic. But symbolism is precisely what cultural diplomacy trades in. The act of leaving, particularly when done by public broadcasters, served three strategic functions.

First, moral signalling, which meansbroadcasters and states communicated alignment with humanitarian values and a refusal to normalize perceived injustice.

The second one is reputation management.  In a digital environment, silence can be more costly than action. Withdrawal can reduce domestic backlash and preserve trust in public institutions.

Last, this is ethical positioning as soft power.  The logic of soft power is shifting from colorful branding to ethical coherence. A state may gain credibility not by appearing “fun,” but by appearing consistent with its professed values.

These functions help explain why the controversy is bigger than Eurovision. What is being tested is the idea that cultural platforms can remain insulated from global crises. Many audiences no longer accept that separation.

The EBU’s dilemma: rules, legitimacy, and consistency

The EBU now sits at the center of competing demands. On one side is the institutional need for predictability: rules that keep Eurovision from becoming an arena for state-to-state confrontation. On the other side is the public demand for moral consistency: rules that do not appear selective or politically convenient.

The EBU’s recent approach of avoiding an immediate exclusion decision while adjusting rules—may be defensible from a governance perspective.

Yet governance solutions do not automatically restore legitimacy, because legitimacy is also emotional and relational. It depends on whether audiences believe the institution is acting in good faith and applying standards fairly.

This is where cultural diplomacy meets a hard truth: neutrality is not simply declared; it is earned. And in the digital age, it is re-earned continuously.

What this means for Europe’s cultural diplomacy

Three implications stand out.

First, moral expectation is becoming structural.  European publics increasingly demand moral coherence not only from governments but from cultural institutions as well. Cultural diplomacy is being asked to carry ethical weight.

Second, “European values” are being operationalized. They are no longer abstract slogans. They are used as benchmarks to judge institutions and to accuse them of hypocrisy when they fall short.

Third, public opinion has become a strategic force, not background noise.  Digital mobilization can shape state behavior indirectly by pressuring broadcasters, artists, and institutions that sit at the heart of national identity.

Policy takeaways

If the EBU seeks to protect Eurovision’s legitimacy without turning it into a geopolitical tribunal, three steps would help. First, it should clarify participation principles by defining what “neutrality” means operationally and what thresholds trigger institutional action. Second, it should build a credible consistency mechanism, as audiences will continue comparing cases and demanding transparent reasoning. Third, the EBU should treat the digital sphere as part of governance: proactive engagement and rapid clarification now shape institutional survival as much as formal rule-making.

Conclusion

Eurovision 2026 is not simply a cultural controversy with political noise attached. It is a case study in how identity, norms, and digital activism are reshaping Europe’s cultural diplomacy. Constructivism helps explain why withdrawal became not only possible but, for some, necessary: it aligned state-linked institutions with the moral expectations of their publics.

Eurovision was built to bridge Europe after war. Ironically, its newest crisis shows that unity today is conditional: audiences increasingly expect cultural institutions to be transparent, consistent, and ethically credible, especially when global suffering is impossible to ignore.

US President Donald Trump has said that an agreement to end Russia’s war on Ukraine is “closer than ever” after key leaders held talks in Berlin, but several officials said that significant differences remain over territorial issues.

Trump told reporters in the Oval Office on Monday that he had “very long and very good talks” with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the leaders of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and NATO.

“We’re having tremendous support from European leaders. They want to get it [the war] ended also,” he said.

“We had numerous conversations with President [Vladimir] Putin of Russia, and I think we’re closer now than we have been, ever, and we’ll see what we can do.”

Zelenskyy had earlier said that negotiations with US and European leaders were difficult but productive.

The high-level discussions, involving Zelenskyy, a US delegation led by envoy Steve Witkoff, Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and European leaders, took place in Berlin over two days amid mounting pressure from Washington for Kyiv to make concessions to Moscow to end one of Europe’s deadliest conflicts since World War II.

In a statement following the talks, European leaders said they and the US were committed to working together to provide “robust security guarantees” to Ukraine, including a European-led “multinational force Ukraine” supported by the US.

They said the force’s work would include “operating inside Ukraine” as well as assisting in rebuilding Ukraine’s forces, securing its skies and supporting safer seas. They said that Ukrainian forces should remain at a peacetime level of 800,000.

Two US officials, speaking to the Reuters news agency, described the proposed protections as “Article 5-like”, a reference to NATO’s Article 5 mutual defence pledge.

Ukraine had earlier signalled it may be willing to abandon its ambition to join the NATO military alliance in exchange for firm Western security guarantees.

Speaking to reporters in Berlin, Zelenskyy said that Kyiv needed a clear understanding of the security guarantees on offer before making any decisions on territorial control under a potential peace settlement. He added that any guarantees must include effective ceasefire monitoring.

Ukrainian officials have been cautious about what form such guarantees could take. Ukraine received security assurances backed by the US and Europe after gaining independence in 1991, but those did not prevent Russia’s invasions in 2014 and 2022.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Washington had offered “considerable” security guarantees during the Berlin talks.

“What the US has placed on the table here in Berlin, in terms of legal and material guarantees, is really considerable,” Merz said at a joint news conference with Zelenskyy.

“We now have the chance for a real peace process,” he said, adding that territorial arrangements remain a central issue. “Only Ukraine can decide about territorial concessions. No ifs or buts.”

Merz also said it was essential for the European Union to reach an agreement on using frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine to demonstrate to Moscow that continuing the war is futile. He warned that EU members must share the risks involved in appropriating those assets, or risk damaging the bloc’s reputation.

Meanwhile, the EU has adopted new sanctions targeting companies and individuals accused of helping Russia circumvent Western restrictions on oil exports that help finance the war.

In Moscow, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Putin was “open to peace and serious decisions” but opposed to what he described as “temporary respites and subterfuges”.

Reporting from Berlin, Al Jazeera’s Dominic Kane said the outcome of the talks remains unclear.

“We know American emissaries were speaking to Ukrainians here in Berlin yesterday and today. Talks between those two groups have finished, according to a statement by Zelenskyy’s office,” Kane said.

“What we don’t yet know is how much of the US-led 28-point plan – parts of which were acceptable to Moscow but strongly opposed by Kyiv and EU officials – remains intact.”

Kane added that the German government has presented a separate 10-point proposal focused on military and intelligence cooperation rather than a peace settlement. European leaders are expected to continue discussions on the remaining areas of disagreement.

Fighting continues

Meanwhile, Ukraine said on Monday that Russia launched 153 drones overnight, with 17 striking their targets.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence said its forces destroyed 130 Ukrainian drones over Russian territory.

Kyiv said its underwater drones struck a Russian submarine docked at the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Ukraine has stepped up naval attacks in recent weeks on what it has described as Russia-linked vessels in the Black Sea.

Russian forces have continued to target the Ukrainian port city of Odesa, with two Turkish cargo ships hit in recent days. Kyiv said the strikes were aimed at Russian targets.

Zelenskyy also accused Moscow of using its attacks as leverage in peace negotiations.

He said Russia has struck every power station in Ukraine as part of its campaign against the country’s energy infrastructure.

I recall how, when I was still teaching EU law at ULB, I used to point to Article 122 TFEU with a certain pride bordering on mischief. “Students,” I would say, “we always complain that the treaties leave us powerless in a crisis—but look, quietly hidden in plain sight, there is this little Swiss-army-knife provision that lets the Council act fast, by qualified majority, in a spirit of solidarity, when severe economic difficulties arise.” I presented it as one of the smartest pieces of constitutional engineering in the entire treaty. Today, I am no longer so proud.

The European Commission is now invoking that very Article 122(1) TFEU in December 2025 to make the immobilization of €210 billion of Russian central bank assets permanent and to transform them into collateral for massive loans to Ukraine. Yet Article 122 is an economic-policy tool—not a foreign-policy or sanctions instrument. Freezing a third country’s sovereign reserves is, by definition, a restrictive measure governed by Article 215 TFEU, which requires unanimity under the CFSP.

The objective behind this legal switch is transparent: to bypass the vetoes of Hungary and possibly Slovakia. But this is a textbook evasion of the unanimity rule, the very type of maneuver the Court of Justice has repeatedly condemned—most famously in its 2012 ruling on sanctions against Zimbabwe.

Nor are the textual prerequisites of Article 122(1) even remotely satisfied. Its triggers—“severe difficulties in the supply of certain products, notably energy” or threats to the balance of payments—simply do not correspond to political inconvenience in renewing sanctions. And the Court has never equated a geopolitical stalemate with an “economic emergency.”

The Commission’s approach also stretches the Union’s powers far beyond their constitutional limits. The EU does not possess a general emergency competence and has no authority to adopt quasi-confiscatory measures against the central bank of a third state. Under customary international law, central-bank assets enjoy near-absolute immunity; using them as loan collateral without judicial process or a peace treaty amounts, in many experts’ view, to unlawful expropriation.

Such a precedent would be economically reckless. The ECB has repeatedly warned—if mostly behind closed doors—of the catastrophic effects this could have on the euro’s status as a reserve currency. The “without prejudice” clause in Article 122 does not grant it supremacy over more specific legal bases that deliberately require unanimity.

And even if one were to ignore these structural limits, the litigation risk is enormous. Should the Court annul the regulation—a highly probable outcome once Belgium files—the assets will need to be released, the loans will become illegal, and both the Union and Euroclear could face joint liability in the hundreds of billions.

For all these reasons, the overwhelming majority of independent EU and international-law scholars view the attempt to rely on Article 122(1) as legally indefensible. The political majority may still force the measure through in December 2025, but litigation is inevitable. When the action for annulment reaches Luxembourg, the court is likely to strike it down within one or two years. And in the process, my once-beloved Article 122—the provision I used to celebrate as a masterpiece of flexible, solidarity-driven drafting—may emerge severely damaged, perhaps permanently.

I never thought I would live to see the day when this provision would be twisted into what the Belgian Prime Minister has openly called “theft.” One further doctrinal point makes the misuse even clearer: Article 122(1) defines its object and purpose with remarkable precision. It authorizes Council action “in a spirit of solidarity between Member States” when Member States face severe economic difficulties. This solidarity clause is not decorative; the Court has repeatedly affirmed its binding nature.

A systemic reading reinforces this conclusion. Article 122(1) cannot be used to grant financial assistance—a power explicitly reserved for Article 122(2), which functions as a lex specialis. Measures under paragraph 1 therefore cannot include loans or any other form of financial aid, let alone the conversion of a third country’s frozen sovereign assets into collateral for a €100–200 billion lending operation to another third country. The Commission’s proposal is not merely constitutionally illegitimate for hijacking a CFSP sanction; it is textually impossible.

Recent developments only underscore the trend toward abusing Article 122 as a general crisis-financing mechanism. On 19 March 2025, the Commission proposed a Council regulation establishing the “SAFE instrument” (Security Action for Europe) to rapidly expand Europe’s arms industry. Although the proposal generically cites “Article 122 TFEU,” it is clear from its substance—providing financial assistance to Member States to support urgent, large-scale defense investments—that it relies on Article 122(2).

The SAFE regulation would mobilize €150 billion from the EU budget in the form of subsidies and subsidized loans for national defense projects. Since Member States may receive financial aid from the Union budget on account of severe difficulties only under Article 122(2), the proposal cannot be grounded in Article 122(1). Its explanatory memorandum invokes the “exceptional security context” and the need for “massive investments” in defense manufacturing—but these are political arguments, not legal ones.

Taken together, the Russian-assets plan and the SAFE proposal amount to a systematic attempt to transform Article 122 into a universal crisis and security financing clause—a purpose it was never designed to fulfill.

The European Parliament, while strongly supportive of assisting Ukraine, has raised alarm over this distortion of a 1957 economic-emergency provision, adopted in secret, by a qualified majority, without parliamentary scrutiny. When the case reaches Luxembourg, the Parliament will argue—rightly—that the Emperor has no clothes. And on current jurisprudence, the Court is likely to agree.

Article 122 allows the Council to legislate alone. That was grudgingly tolerated for €3 billion of extraordinary own resources during COVID. For €210 billion of another state’s sovereign assets in peacetime, it is constitutionally explosive.

The real motive remains the neutralization of Hungary’s veto in the CFSP. But the Court has annulled every previous attempt to launder a CFSP measure through a non-CFSP legal basis (see Case C-130/10). And while the war undeniably harms Europe’s economy, the Court has never accepted “we need to bypass a veto” as equivalent to an energy-supply crisis or a balance-of-payments emergency.

If the General Court or the ECJ strikes down the €150 billion defense fund for exceeding the scope of Article 122, then the Russian assets regulation—which is even further removed from classic economic policy grounds—has virtually no chance of surviving judicial review.

I travelled to Lille, France to explore its charming Christmas market, but when I tried to buy French cheese to bring home, I remembered UK restrictions on dairy products from the EU

In a bid for some festive cheer, I embarked on a day trip to France to experience their Christmas market and explore the local area. Travelling via Eurostar allowed me the liberty to bring back a few souvenirs, but there was one rule that tripped me up on my return journey.

My adventure started at London St Pancras International, where I hopped on the 9:01am Eurostar heading for Lille, France, a city nestled near the Belgian border. The Eurostar whisked me to the French city in just an hour and 23 minutes, so by 11.30am, I was stepping out of the train station, ready for exploration.

I spent the day meandering through Lille’s Christmas Village, which features an enchanting enclosed market brimming with an array of gifts and scrumptious treats, along with additional festive decorations scattered around the city. Later, I strolled through the charming cobbled streets lined with independent boutiques, bakeries, coffee houses and taprooms – a testament to their close ties with Belgium.

READ MORE: All the train travel changes you need to know before Christmas 2025

The day was well utilised, and after a seven-hour quick tour of Lille, I headed back to the train station to catch the 18.36 Eurostar home. But not without a detour to the local supermarket, Carrefour, conveniently situated next to the station.

Free from the baggage and liquid limitations that come with air travel, I reckoned it was the ideal chance to bring back some French treats to share with family over the festive period. After sampling some of the most delectable French cheese at the Christmas market, the rich dairy delights topped my must-buy list.

However, I then recalled an email I’d received from Eurostar prior to my journey. The correspondence bore the heading ‘Important: Temporary food entry restrictions in Great Britain’ and explained that holidaymakers visiting the EU are prohibited from bringing cheese, amongst other foodstuffs, back to the UK.

Clarifying the implications for Britons travelling to the EU, the email stated: “The UK has introduced temporary restrictions on milk, dairy products, and certain meats from the EU. This is to prevent the spread of foot and mouth disease following a rising number of cases across mainland Europe.Travellers can no longer bring the following meats and animal products from the EU into Great Britain for personal use:This also includes items like sandwiches, cheese, cured meats or raw meats. Please ensure you don’t take any of these products with you on your journey to London.Some exceptions apply to infant food and special food needed for medical reasons. Please check what you’re allowed to bring on GOV.UK.”

While I was thankful, remembering the email before purchasing any produce, I was slightly disappointed that I couldn’t bring back a selection of cheese for Christmas. However, I fully understood the reasons why.

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Swiftly abandoning that idea, I decided to focus on acquiring a few bottles of wine for the upcoming festive season. It seemed only fitting, given France’s renowned status as one of the world’s top wine-producing countries!

For those considering bringing home some vino, Eurostar provides guidance on their website: “We appreciate that passengers often want to bring a few bottles back from their trip and we are happy for customers to bring unopened bottles of alcohol to take on to their destination. Any passengers with large quantities will need to contact a courier service.”

They further stated: “Although you can bring alcohol with you and we serve alcohol on board, safety is our top priority. So, please drink in moderation. If you behave in an antisocial way which ruins the journey for other passengers or break any laws or by-laws, we might ask you to leave the train at the nearest station.”

Have you got a travel story you want to share with us? Email us at webtravel@reachplc.com

A court in Germany has ruled in favour of Ryanair and issued a series of rulings against claims company Flightright, prohibiting the firm from claiming customers encounter “hurdles” when contacting the airline’s customer service

Ryanair has won a won a key court battle against a claims company that passengers turn to get compensation for delayed and cancelled flights.

The firm called Flightright encouraged flyers to use their services when taking any sort of action against the low cost airline. But now a court in Germany has ruled in favour of Ryanair and issued a series of rulings against Flightright. The court has legally prohibited Flightright from claiming that customers encounter “hurdles” when contacting the airline’s customer service.

Experts said this ruling marks a significant point in the dispute between the Irish low-cost carrier and companies specialising in enforcing compensation claims under EU Regulation 261.

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Earlier this week the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in the German city if Hamburg banned Flightright from telling passengers to ignore Ryanair entirely. Judges also ordered the company to admit it always puts a 14 percent “lawyer surcharge” on top of its advertised fee.

A huge £210,000 fine will hit every future breach of the ruling. Ryanair accused Flightright of misleading advertising and profiting from the misery of delayed travellers.

The airline says platforms like Flightright routinely take up to a whopping 40 percent of a €250 EU compensation payout meant for passengers. Ryanair’s marketing chief Dara Brady welcomed the verdict and told passengers to cut out greedy middlemen.

He said customers who go direct will receive 100 percent of their payout under EU Regulation 261.

He claimed Ryanair offered “a simple, transparent system that avoids rip-off fees”. EU rules promise €250 for delays on flights up to 1,500 kilometres and a tasty €600 for longer flights delayed more than three hours.

The verdict piled onto a list of previous legal defeats suffered by Flightright. Claims companies are controversial because they cherry-pick “easy wins” they can cash in on. They collect hefty commissions for filing paperwork while posing as consumer champions.

Industry insiders say Ryanair is less complicated than many rivals when it comes to issuing refunds. Ryanair is using this to humiliate companies that portray it as hostile to customers.

Travellers who refuse to deal with airlines directly can use Germany’s free arbitration service, which claims 80 to 90 percent success without fees. The ruling exposes the claims-industry model as a profit hunt fuelled by delay payouts, not public service.

On Flightright’s website, it claimed: “No one enjoys flight delays, but it’s important to know that you have rights! If your flight began in the EU, or landed in the EU with a European airline, you could be eligible to claim up to £520, depending on flight distance and delay length, no matter the ticket cost.

“The only conditions are that the airline must be responsible for the cause of the delay, and you must have reached the final airport in your trip with a delay of at least three hours.

A British company has unveiled plans for a new ‘flying taxi’ service that would whisk passengers to the airport in a matter of minutes, but there are still some regulatory hurdles to overcome

A British firm has revealed bold plans for a ‘flying taxi’ service that will transport passengers to airports, with this cutting-edge travel option expected to cost no more than an Uber.

Vertical Aerospace claims its electric Valo aircraft, engineered to reach speeds of up to 150mph across distances of up to 100 miles, could provide swift and effective city-to-airport links, enabling travellers to bypass airport traffic jams. For instance, a journey from Canary Wharf to Heathrow Airport would take just 12 minutes by aircraft versus an hour by road.

The firm, which recently conducted flight trials at Cotswolds Airport, is now targeting airline-standard safety approval by 2028 before launching commercial operations in early 2029.

Vertical Aerospace has released images of its prototype aircraft, which it claims delivers a luxurious experience for up to six passengers, featuring ample baggage capacity. Pictures of the aircraft reveal a sleek, contemporary design with an interior boasting comfortable seating and big windows, reports the Express.

Despite the aircraft’s high-end appearance, the company intends to provide an affordable and accessible service. A spokesman confirmed: “Ultimately, the potential is for this aircraft to be a similar cost as hiring an Uber.”

Vertical has also announced its proposed route network at launch, which would initially link Cambridge and Oxford -Bicester with the capital as well as Heathrow and Gatwick Airport. Aside from airport transfers, the firm suggests these innovative aircraft could be used for emergency medical services, cargo delivery, and even defence operations.

Vertical confirmed plans to build seven aircraft in the UK for testing with the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).

In a statement, Vertical announced approximately 1,500 pre-orders for Valo. The company projected that manufacturing these aircraft could generate 2,000 skilled jobs in the UK by 2035.

Stuart Simpson, CEO of Vertical Aerospace, stated: “Electric flight will transform how cities move, and London is one of the best places in the world to prove it. With Skyports and Bristow, we have the aircraft, infrastructure and operational strength to lead this market. These plans show the commercial potential of services we aim to see operating following regulatory approval in 2028 and we look forward to bringing them to life with our partners.”

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However, gaining CAA approval could pose a challenge for these futuristic vehicles. At present, the CAA is conducting a consultation on vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft to ensure their safe operation within the UK.

The consultation commenced last month and will continue until the end of January 2026, inviting interested parties to share their views. This process will help establish safety standards for pilot licenses, aircraft, and landing sites, ensuring the proper regulation of VTOLs.

Have a story you want to share? Email us at webtravel@reachplc.com

A proposed tax increase in one European country has sparked concern

Ryanair has blasted moves that could see passengers pay higher bills under moves to increase airport departure taxes in one popular European destination by as much as double the current rate. In Belgium, the current federal tax stands at five euros per passenger and will be increased to 10 euros per passenger from 2027, which may see costs pushed onto passengers.

On top of this, Charleroi Airport in Belgium will reportedly make passengers spend three euros on their flights, according to proposals made by the Charleroi City Council. Some European publications have speculated this will push competition onto cheaper flights in neighbouring airports such as Paris-Beauvais and Lille Airport.

Ryanair are furious. In response to the proposed tax change, the airline has already confirmed this week that it will cut one million seats from its Brussels Winter 2026/27 schedule.

Ryanair said this move will also affect 20 routes on the schedule while arguing that the move is in direct opposition to other EU markets such as Slovakia, Sweden, Italy, and Hungary, where it claims such taxes are being cut down to drive up tourism. Because of this, Ryanair is calling on both the Belgian Prime Minister De Wever and the Mayor of Charleroi, Thomas Dermine, to reverse the proposed plans.

Ryanair’s Jason McGuinness said: “The De Wever Govt has bizarrely decided to further increase Belgium’s already sky-high aviation tax by another +100% from Jan 2027, on top of the +150% in July last. These repeated increases to this harmful aviation tax make Belgium completely uncompetitive compared to the many other EU countries, like Sweden, Hungary, Italy, and Slovakia, where Govts are abolishing aviation taxes to drive traffic, tourism, and jobs.

“As a result of this second tax hike in just 5 months, Ryanair has been forced to cut -22% of its Brussels traffic (-1m seats), -5 aircraft from our Charleroi base (loss of US$500m investment), and 20 routes (13 from Charleroi & 7 from Zaventem) for Winter 26/27. Should the Charleroi city council proceed with its ill-judged proposal to introduce further taxes on passengers departing from Charleroi next year, these cuts will deepen as Ryanair will be forced to reduce flights, routes and based aircraft at Charleroi from as early as April 2026 with thousands of local jobs at risk.

“If Prime Minister De Wever and his Govt really wanted to revive Belgium’s economy, they should abolish this harmful aviation tax, not double it. Despite so many other EU countries taking this step to support their economies, Belgium is going in the opposite direction, driving up access costs and pushing airlines and tourism elsewhere.

“We urge Prime Minister De Wever to scrap this damaging aviation tax before Belgian’s traffic, tourism, jobs, and the wider economy collapse any further. Furthermore, the Charleroi city council needs to abandon its lunatic plans to increase taxes driving job losses with the effect of lowering payroll, VAT and corporate tax receipts for the local economy.”

Belgium receives more than 18 million tourists each year. According to the latest data from the British government, around 1.3 million Brits travel to Belgium each year.

The proposed doubling is reportedly designed to help finance airport infrastructure and meet new environmental requirements, according to Air Journal.

When French President Emmanuel Macron inaugurated France’s Space Command in Toulouse on 12 November 2025 and declared that “space is no longer a sanctuary; it has become a battlefield,” few expected such swift validation. Two weeks later, at the ESA Ministerial Council in Bremen on 26–27 November, member states delivered the largest budget in the agency’s history—€22.1 billion for 2026–2028, a 30% increase over the previous cycle—with an unprecedented focus on security, defense, and strategic autonomy. The Bremen decision has transformed Macron’s stark warning from rhetoric into funded reality and confirmed that Europe is finally awakening to the fact that the next decisive domain of great-power competition lies far above the Earth’s atmosphere.

Paris is preparing to invest about €4.2 billion in military space activities from 2026 to 2030 and around €16 billion in civilian and dual-use programs by the end of the decade. The ambition is to strengthen Europe’s resilience in orbit, reduce dependence on non-European systems, and create an industrial base capable of supporting long-term security objectives.

French planners are betting on a new generation of proximity‑inspection satellites to anchor this strategy, with demonstration flights envisaged in the second half of the decade and operational testing to follow. These satellites can approach, observe, and, if required, interdict suspicious objects in orbit. France is also exploring non‑kinetic tools—lasers and electromagnetic systems among them—designed to disrupt hostile platforms without creating debris. Paris has rejected destructive anti-satellite testing and argues that Europe must enhance space security without undermining international norms.

The European Union is entering this field late. Russia and China have already developed advanced inspection and interference capabilities. In September 2025, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius revealed that two Russian Luch or Olymp satellites were shadowing Intelsat platforms used by the Bundeswehr. The episode underscored Europe’s lack of awareness and defensive capacity in orbit.

In Brussels, officials are floating the idea of a “European Space Shield”—a more integrated architecture to protect satellites and align EU and NATO postures. Success will depend on the willingness of member states to coordinate procurement, share data, and harmonize strategic objectives. Europe’s current system remains fragmented and is often slowed by national industrial preferences.

Macron has also called for reform of the European Space Agency’s geographic return rule, which distributes contracts according to member-state contributions rather than technical merit. The French position is that this rule limits innovation and prevents Europe from responding quickly to fast-moving threats in orbit.

There are challenges. Even non-kinetic defenses can be misinterpreted as escalatory. The orbital environment is crowded, vulnerable to miscalculation, and poorly regulated. France has therefore paired its military investments with calls for new rules of behavior and a European proposal for an orbital code of conduct. Such a framework would help prevent misunderstandings and promote transparency.

The ESA Ministerial Council that concluded in Bremen on 27 November delivered what many had doubted was possible: a €22.1 billion envelope for 2026–2028 that explicitly prioritizes space security, resilient navigation (FutureNAV), Earth-observation continuity, and dual-use technologies. Germany increased its contribution by nearly a third despite domestic fiscal constraints, while the package includes more than €1 billion for programs directly supporting defense and sovereignty. Crucially, ministers opened the door to greater flexibility on the controversial “geographic return” rule for critical security projects—a French demand that had been resisted for years. Bremen did not create a fully unified European space-defense policy overnight, but it transformed Macron’s Toulouse rhetoric into funded reality and gave the proposed European Space Shield its first serious financial and political tailwind.

Satellites underpin critical EU functions, including climate monitoring, secure communications, trade logistics, and border management. Rivals are developing tools that can dazzle, jam, or disable them. Europe cannot assume that these systems will remain safe without deliberate action.

Macron’s announcement in Toulouse should be seen as a strategic warning. Europe has the capacity to protect its interests in orbit, but only if it acts with coherence and political determination. The challenge for the European Union is not technological. It is the ability to work collectively and with a sense of urgency. In an era in which conflict begins long before military forces deploy, the EU’s strategic autonomy may depend on decisions made far above the atmosphere.

These are the key developments from day 1,386 of Russia’s war on Ukraine.

Here’s where things stand on Thursday, December 11:

Fighting

• Ukrainian sea drones hit and disabled a tanker involved in trading Russian oil as it sailed through Ukraine’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea to the Russian port of Novorossiysk, a Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) official said.
• The Dashan tanker was sailing at maximum speed with its transponders off when powerful explosions hit its stern, inflicting critical damage on the vessel, the SBU official said. No information was available on possible casualties from the attack.
• The attack marks the third sea drone strike in two weeks on vessels that are part of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” – unregulated ships which Kyiv says are helping Moscow export large quantities of oil and fund its war in Ukraine despite Western sanctions.
• Three people were killed and two wounded by Ukrainian shelling of a hospital in the Russia-controlled part of the Kherson region in Ukraine, a Russia-installed governor claimed on Telegram. All those killed and injured were reportedly employees of the medical facility.
• Ukrainian forces are fending off an unusually large Russian mechanised attack inside the strategic eastern city of Pokrovsk, Kyiv’s military said, including “armoured vehicles, cars, and motorcycles”.
• Russian drones have hit the gas transport system in Ukraine’s southern Odesa region, a senior Ukrainian official said, in an area which contains several pipelines carrying US liquefied natural gas to Ukraine from Greece.
• Russian air defences shot down two drones en route to Moscow, the city’s Mayor Sergei Sobyanin said.

Peace deal

• President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine had agreed on key points of a post-war reconstruction plan and an “economic document” in talks with United States President Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and BlackRock CEO Larry Fink.
• “The principles of the economic document are completely clear, and we are fully aligned with the American side,” Zelenskyy said. “An important common principle is that for reconstruction to be of high quality and economic growth after this war to be tangible, real security must be at the core. When there is security, everything else is there too,” he said.
• Zelenskyy also said work was proceeding on the “fundamental document” of a US-backed 20-point plan aimed at ending the war. He said two other associated documents dealt with security guarantees and economic issues.
• The leaders of Britain, France and Germany held a call with President Trump to discuss Washington’s latest peace efforts to end the war in Ukraine, in what they said was “a critical moment” in the process.
• French President Emmanuel Macron said Trump and the European leaders discussed how to move forward on “a subject that concerns all of us”.
• There will be another meeting on Thursday of the leaders of the so-called “coalition of the willing” group of nations backing Ukraine, said the French presidency, adding that this meeting would be held via videoconference.

Military aid

• The US House of Representatives has passed a massive defence policy bill authorising a record $901bn in annual military spending, including $400m in military assistance to Ukraine in each of the next two years and other measures reinforcing the US commitment to Europe’s defence.

Politics and diplomacy

• Trump again expressed concern that Ukraine had not had an election in a long time, putting additional pressure on Zelenskyy to hold one.
• Zelenskyy said he had discussed with Ukraine’s parliament legal and other issues linked to the possibility of holding an election during wartime, and urged other countries, including the US, not to apply pressure on the issue.
• Wartime elections are forbidden by law in Ukraine, but Zelenskyy, whose term expired last year, is facing renewed pressure from Trump to hold a vote.

Regional security

• Following a report from the head of Kyiv’s foreign intelligence service that Russia and China were taking steps to intensify cooperation, Zelenskyy said there was a “growing trend of the de-sovereignisation of parts of Russian territory in China’s favour”, primarily through Moscow’s sale of its “scarce resources” to Beijing.
• “We … note that China is taking steps to intensify cooperation with Russia, including in the military-industrial sector,” Zelenskyy wrote on X.

A report from the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, Oleh Ivashchenko. There were many details regarding the foreign policy situation surrounding Ukraine and the economic situation in Russia – specifically, the dependence of its companies and state system on… pic.twitter.com/xV5fvx6RvR

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) December 10, 2025

Sanctions

• The US has extended a deadline for negotiations on buying the global assets of Russian oil company Lukoil by a little over a month to January 17. Trump imposed sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft, Russia’s two biggest energy companies, on October 22 as part of an effort to pressure Moscow over its war in Ukraine, and Lukoil put its assets up for sale shortly after.
• Russian prosecutors asked a Moscow court to seize the assets of US private equity fund NCH Capital in Russia, the Kommersant newspaper said, citing court documents. Prosecutors accused the fund’s owners of financing Ukraine’s military forces.
• European Union ambassadors have greenlit the bloc’s plan to phase out Russian gas imports by late 2027, three EU officials told the Reuters news agency, clearing one of the final legal hurdles before the ban can pass into law.

“The threat that I worry the most about vis-a-vis Europe is not Russia, it’s not China, it’s not any other external actor. What I worry about is the threat from within,” Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference, February 14, 2025.

America’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) marks an ideological and substantive shift in U.S. foreign policy. The administration of President Donald Trump is attempting to define a new “America First” foreign policy doctrine that is deeply pragmatic. It invokes the Monroe Doctrine but with a “Trump Corollary.” The agenda of previous administrations to spread democracy around the world through foreign military interventions is no longer the aim. Foreign policy choices will be made based on what makes the United States more powerful and prosperous. This is a truly pivotal moment in the way the US will navigate world affairs.

This NSS is a real, painful, shocking wake-up call for Europe. It is a moment of significant divergence between Europe’s view of itself and Trump’s vision of as well as for Europe. If Europe had any doubt that the Trump administration is fully committed to a tough love strategy, it now knows it with certainty. The administration is asking — demanding, really — that Europe polices its own part of the world and, most importantly, pays for it itself. The strategy—which has been long overdue—chastises Europe for losing its European character. The orientation behind the words seems to indicate that the US sees Europe as evolving into a rigid, intransigent, globalist entity. And the latter is apparent given the EU’s reaction to the new NSS as illustrated by Brussels and the establishment elite of France, Germany, Poland and the Baltics: one of shock and dismay as met Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech.

The continent of Europe is plagued with immigration issues and a predilection towards censorship, according to the US president’s newly issued National Security Strategy (NSS).

Europe is facing potential “civilizational erasure” as EU policymakers encourage censorship, stifling of political dissent, and turning a blind eye to mass immigration.

The landmark and strongly worded document released on Friday says that while the EU is showing worrying signs of economic decline, its restive cultural environment and internal political instability pose an even greater threat.

The strategy cites as serious concerns EU-backed immigration policies, suppression of political opposition, curbs on speech, collapsing birthrates, and “loss of national identities and self-confidence.” It warns that Europe could become “unrecognizable in 20 years or less.”

Over-regulation

The document argues that many European governments are “doubling down on their present path,” while the US wants Europe “to remain European” and abandon what it termed “regulatory suffocation.”  The latter is an apparent reference to America’s push back against the EU over its strict digital market guidelines, which Washington claims discriminate against US-based tech giants such as Microsoft, Google, and Meta.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Friday denounced the European Commission’s $140 million fine against Elon Musk’s social media platform X, calling it an attack on American tech companies and “the American people.”

Rubio wrote on X, “The European Commission’s $140 million fine isn’t just an attack on @X, it’s an attack on all American tech platforms and the American people by foreign governments. The days of censoring Americans online are over.”

Rubio’s comments reflected others within the Trump administration, including Vice President JD Vance, who also posted on the social media platform that the Commission was punishing X for not engaging in censorship.

“The EU should be supporting free speech, not attacking American companies over garbage,” he wrote.

Immigration

Another one of Washington’s key objectives is “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations,” the paper adds.

Trump’s strategy notes that the rise of “patriotic European parties” offers “cause for great optimism,” in a reference to growing bloc-wide support for right-wing Euroskeptic parties calling for strict immigration limits.

The document proclaims that “the era of mass migration is over.”  It argues that large inflows have strained resources, increased violence, and weakened social cohesion, adding that Washington is seeking a world in which sovereign states “work together to stop rather than manage” migration flows.

Normalizing relations with Russia

President Trump’s security strategy for the US also calls for a swift end to the Ukraine conflict and preventing further escalation in Europe.

To this end, the US has placed the restoration of normal ties with Russia at the center of its newly released National Security Strategy, presenting both aims as among America’s core interests.

The 33-page report outlining President Donald Trump’s foreign-policy vision was released by the White House last Friday.

“It is a core interest of the United States to negotiate an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine,” the paper states, “in order to stabilize European economies, prevent unintended escalation or expansion of the war, and reestablish strategic stability with Russia.”

It notes that the Ukraine conflict has left “European relations with Russia… deeply attenuated,” resulting in destabilization of the entire region.

The report criticizes EU leaders for “unrealistic expectations” regarding the outcome of the conflict, arguing that “a large European majority wants peace, yet that desire is not translated into policy.”

The US, it says, is ready for “significant diplomatic engagement” to “help Europe correct its current trajectory,” reestablish stability, and “mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states.”

In contrast with the US national strategy during Trump’s first term, which emphasized competition with Russia and China, the new strategy shifts the focus to the Western Hemisphere and to protecting the homeland, the borders, and regional interests. It calls for resources to be redirected from distant theaters to challenges closer to home and urges NATO and European states to shoulder primary responsibility for their own defense.

The document also calls for an end to NATO expansion—a demand that Russia has repeatedly voiced, calling it a root cause of the Ukraine conflict, which Moscow views as a Western proxy war.

Overall, the new strategy signals a shift away from global interventionism toward a more transactional foreign policy, arguing that the US should act abroad only when its interests are directly at stake.

President Donald Trump’s new National Security Strategy puts the Western Hemisphere at the center of US foreign policy and revives the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, appending it with a “Trump Corollary.”

The document invokes the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine but pushes it further. It states that the US will block “non-Hemispheric competitors” from owning or controlling “strategically vital assets” in the Americas, including ports, energy facilities, and telecommunications networks. It describes the Western Hemisphere as the top regional priority, above Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific, and ties that status to controlling migration, drug flows, and foreign influence before they can reach US territory—clearly a fundamental and much-needed break with the foreign policies of recent presidential administrations.