EU-China

On China, the mood at the European Commission has shifted in recent months.

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China hawks are gaining ground inside both the Commission’s powerful Directorate-General for Trade and in the cabinet of President Ursula von der Leyen, Euronews has learned, with drastic new measures being considered to counter what is seen as unfair competition.

The 27 EU commissioners are set to debate on their China strategy on 29 May, with one official saying, “It will be about acknowledging there is a problem and that something needs to be done.”

Tensions flared Monday after China’s Ministry of Commerce threatened retaliation against the EU over its Made in Europe legislation, which sets strict conditions on foreign direct investment.

An EU official told Euronews the Chinese were “playing games,” adding that the Commission’s priority remains engagement with Beijing through multiple channels set up in recent months.

However, Commission services are already working on new measures to address China’s economic threats, sources have confirmed. “We don’t see any move from the Chinese despite all the issues we have flagged with them, so there’s a reflection on whether we should do more,” one said.

Another source said the release of Germany’s trade deficit figures before Christmas marked a turning point for the Commission.

Data published last autumn by Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) showed a record €87 billion German trade deficit with China — a wake-up call in Berlin, long focused on securing market access in China ahead of protecting domestic manufacturing.

China has since surged up the agenda for German industry, for the Bundestag — which has set up a dedicated committee — and for the Commission, whose German president has Berlin’s ear.

The EU has long grappled with cheap Chinese imports threatening its industry. Pressure intensified last year after the US slapped steep tariffs on Chinese goods, effectively shutting its market and pushing Beijing to reroute overcapacity in sectors like steel and chemicals toward Europe.

A recent report by the French High Commission for Strategy and Planning, a French government advisory body, warned that “the production cost gaps, as assessed by industry players [across Europe], have now reached levels incompatible with sustainable competition, averaging between 30% and 40%, and exceeding 60% in certain segments (industrial robotics, mechanical components).”

Under these conditions, how can the EU defend its market?

The bloc’s leverage is mainly limited to its 450 million-strong consumer base. Still, one source said it is “increasingly becoming mainstream” inside the Commission to warn Beijing that the EU market could close without rebalancing.

But the trade-offs are stark.

Chinese electric vehicles — hit with EU tariffs in October 2024 — highlight the dilemma. China depended equally on the US and EU markets for almost all its exports before Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025. “It cannot easily diversify its EVs as it will not sell in Africa, nor in southeast Asia, where there’s no infrastructure,” another source said.

At the same time, Europe remains reliant on China imports in many of the same sectors where China depends on Europe. “Are we to close our market to lithium batteries from China? We cannot do this overnight,” the same source said. The same applies to solar panels, laptops and medical devices.

Commission explores anti-coercion tool

The EU has trade defence tools — including anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties — but they can take at least 18 months to deploy after a complaint is filed. Two sources said the Commission is working on new instruments, but by the time they bite, the damage may already be done.

A fourth source described an overcapacity instrument as still “premature.”

However, Commission services are also mulling the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), which allows the EU to deploy a wide range of measures — from tariffs to restrictions on public procurement or intellectual property — in response to economic pressure from third countries.

The tool, sometimes described as a “trade bazooka”, has never been used since its creation in 2023, but resurfaced after China weaponised rare earth exports in October 2025 during its trade standoff with the US by imposing strict export controls.

Exports resumed after Washington and Beijing agreed on a one-year truce, which also covers Europe. But that deal expires in October 2026, leaving uncertainty hanging over the EU.

Brussels wants the anti-coercion tool ready if needed.

Tensions could rise further after Beijing’s threats over the Industrial Accelerator Act — the Made in Europe legislation now debated by member states and MEPs — or over pressure linked to the Cybersecurity Act, which could phase out Chinese telecom operators from the EU market.

Securing member states’ backing

However, a qualified majority of EU countries is needed to activate the ACI, and member states remain split.

“It requires a political support higher than for the traditional anti-dumping or anti-subsidies duties which can only be rejected by a reversed majority of EU countries,” a source said.

Despite the wake-up call, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz struck a softer tone in March, floating a long-term trade deal with Beijing.

But in Brussels, that idea is off the table.

“There are a number of concerns and real challenges that the European Union has consistently expressed to China that we need to see them meaningfully address before we can even talk about any future agreements or anything like that,” the Commission’s deputy chief spokesperson, Olof Gill, said.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez — who has visited China four times in three years and secured major Chinese investment — backs closer ties with Beijing.

Meanwhile, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever urged a tougher line in an 18 March letter to von der Leyen.

“We have arrived at a point of no return in which we need to make difficult choices in the short term towards China to protect our industries, economies and the well-being of our citizens in the long term,” he wrote.

France, long a proponent of a hard line on China, shares that view.

Published on 18/04/2026 – 22:58 GMT+2•Updated
23:06

A coalition of EU-based chemical producers of titanium dioxide – a strategic chemical used in green energy and aerospace – has lodged a complaint with the Commission alleging unfair foreign subsidies against leading Chinese producer LB Group, which is seeking to acquire a UK plant of British competitor Venator, Euronews has learned.

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The move follows the European Commission’s decision in January 2025 to impose anti-dumping duties on LB Group, a trade defence measure targeting low-priced imports into the EU.

Acquiring a production plant in the UK would allow the Chinese group to export its products to the European market duty-free under the EU-UK trade agreement, circumventing EU anti-dumping tariffs.

The EU chemical sector is under pressure from growing competition from Chinese rivals, which are flooding the market with overcapacity.

The alliance behind the complaint against LB Group includes several companies producing in the EU — US-based Tronox and Kronos, Czech Precheza and Slovenian Cinkarna — collectively accounting for about 90% of EU titanium dioxide production.

Enforcing the Foreign Subsidies Regulation outside the EU

Sources said the complaint was filed in December 2025, urging the European Commission to investigate the Chinese company over alleged unfair foreign subsidies used to finance the acquisition of Venator’s plant.

The EU’s Foreign Subsidies Regulation, adopted in 2022, allows the Commission to investigate non-EU companies to assess whether they benefit from distortive foreign subsidies to make acquisitions in the EU or take part in public procurement.

The tool was initially designed with China in mind, reflecting concerns over excessive state subsidies support for Chinese companies acquiring strategic EU assets or infrastructure. However, the regulation has not yet been applied outside the EU.

The plant targeted by LB Group is located in Greatham in northeast England, which left the EU in 2020 after Brexit. The UK’s Competition and Markets Authority is currently reviewing the deal and is expected to issue a decision in May.

If the European Commission opens an investigation under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, it could set a precedent and send a strong signal globally.

The move would come as the EU chemical industry loses market share in Europe.

According to Cefic, which represents the sector in Brussels, the bloc has lost around 9% of its production capacity since 2022, resulting in the loss of 20,000 direct jobs.

Published on
15/04/2026 – 11:25 GMT+2

The European Commission on Wednesday imposed anti-dumping duties on glass fibre —a key input for the EU’s renewable industry— produced by Chinese companies operating in Egypt, Bahrain and Thailand.

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The move confirms the EU’s push to curb Chinese imports entering the bloc via Belt and Road routes to sidestep tariffs on products officially labelled “made in China.”

Brussels seeks to shield its market from a surge of low-cost imports from the Asian giant, targeting goods it considers heavily subsidized or sold in the EU below production cost in China.

The tariffs on glass fibre from the three countries will range from 11% to 25.4% of the product’s value.

“The investigation confirms the existence of unfair practice, which is an important signal,” Ludovic Piraux, President of Glass Fibre Europe, said.

But he added that the measures adopted “remain insufficient to fully address the predatory strategies pursued through these investments in third countries.”

Job losses loom

China has invested $1 trillion through the Belt and Road initiative – a large-scale infrastructure programme which replaced the former silk road initiative and is aimed at strengthening connectivity, trade and communication across Eurasia, Latin America and Africa. The programme spans more than 150 countries, supporting infrastructure, transport, raw materials extraction and the relocation of industries and state-owned enterprises abroad.

As early as 2010, following an industry complaint, the Commission imposed anti-dumping duties on Chinese glass fibre imports. In the years that followed, Chinese producers established factories in Bahrain and Egypt, from which exports to the EU resumed.

By 2024, glass fibre imports from those countries, along with Thailand, accounted for 24% of the EU market. Egyptian imports alone reached 18%, with Glass Fibre Europe warning the situation could worsen.

This is not the first time the Commission has targeted Chinese products made in third countries under Belt and Road arrangements. It has previously imposed measures on aluminium foil from Thailand and glass fibre produced in Türkiye.

European glass fibre manufacturers have been pushing for action for more than a decade, alongside unions seeking to protect jobs in the sector.

The complaint which lead to Wednesday’s anti-dumping duties was first reported by Euronews in January 2025.

The industry directly employs more than 4,500 workers in the EU and says it supports hundreds of thousands of indirect jobs along the value chain.

Judith Kirton-Darling, General secretary of industriAll Europe, warned that “in the longer term”, the situation could worsen if the EU does not take “a stronger” stance on Chinese dumping.

“It is more than likely that we will face plant closures in Europe which will fundamentally undermine our industry,” she said.

Published on
14/04/2026 – 15:39 GMT+2

Viktor Orbán has positioned Hungary as a European centre for Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers, while disregarding the EU’s tariffs on them.

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Now his political successor, Péter Magyar, appears less inclined to reverse that policy in a radical way.

At a press conference on Monday following a landslide victory against Orbán, Magyar praised China as “one of the most important, largest, and strongest countries in the world.”

“I am very happy to travel to Beijing, and we are very happy to welcome Chinese leaders here in Hungary,” he added.

Magyar also said he would “review” Chinese investments in Hungary – particularly on electric vehicles – but “not with the aim of shutting them down or preventing them from happening.”

In recent years, Hungary was eager to attract Beijing’s largeness, with BYD building its first European passenger EV factory in Szeged in 2024 and major firms such as CATL, NIO and EVE Energy investing heavily in the country.

But that open-door policy has increasingly clashed with the EU’s push to tighten scrutiny of Chinese investments, as China floods Europe with low-cost imports and as many as 600,000 job losses are projected in the EU in the bloc’s auto sector this decade amid intensifying competition from Chinese manufacturers.

Magyar will also have to deal with concerns over alleged forced labour involving Chinese workers at Hungarian plants of EV giant BYD, as well as a recent European Commission probe into unfair subsidies at the same site. Those developments have tarnished the company’s reputation and raised concerns over Beijing’s investments.

Driving more value from investment in Hungary

At his press conference on Monday, the leader of Hungary’s Tisza party did not enter details. But he made clear that Hungary would align its policy more closely with Brussels.

“Rather, the goal is to ensure that those projects comply with European Union and Hungarian environmental regulations, health procedures, and labour safety standards, and contribute to the performance of the Hungarian national economy,” Magyar added.

He also appeared determine to distance himself from Orbán’s wariness of a recent European Commission proposal on “Made in Europe,” which targets China.

The draft law, currently discussed by EU governments and MEPs, would impose stricter conditions on foreign direct investment above €100 million in sectors such as batteries, electric vehicles, solar panels and critical raw materials.

Under the proposal, investors from countries holding 40% of global market share in a given sector would be required to hire at least 50% of EU workers. Additional conditions could include foreign ownership caps below 49%, joint ventures with European partners and technology transfers.

“What we do not want — and will not accept — is for foreign companies to come, receive significant Hungarian state support, employ very few Hungarians, create little to no added value for the Hungarian economy, and at the same time endanger the quality of Hungary’s land, air, and water,” Magyar added, signalling his intention to align policy more closely with Brussels.