Eritrea

Trade and security are expected to be on the agenda as delegations and leaders from dozens of African countries gather in Moscow for a two-day summit with Russia.

The third instalment of the Russia-Africa Summit will run through October 28–29 and will be chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin and the current African Union chair, Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye.

Russia has boosted security and trade cooperation with African nations as it grapples with Western sanctions imposed in response to its war against Ukraine.

So who will be attending and what is at stake?

Here’s what we know.

What is the Russia-Africa Summit?

The Russia-Africa Summit is a two-day diplomatic and economic meeting being held in Moscow on Wednesday and Thursday.

Leaders and delegations from 48 African countries are meeting to discuss bilateral cooperation spanning politics, defence and technology.

This high-profile forum is the third of its kind. The first summit took place in October 2019 in Sochi, marking an unprecedented turn in Russian-African relations.

What’s on the agenda for the summit?

The event’s official theme is Developing Mutually Beneficial Cooperation and “unlocking the potential of every African country”.

More than 40 sessions and about 100 speakers will cover trade, investment, technology transfer, food and energy security, healthcare, education and youth exchange.

There will also be a business programme, culminating in a plenary session.

Who is attending?

Representatives from 48 African countries will participate, as well as 22 heads of state, according to Kremlin presidential aide Yury Ushakov. Heads of state from 17 countries attended the last summit in 2023.

Fewer leaders came to the last two summits, compared with the first gathering in 2019, when 43 took part, a decline which Moscow blamed on Western pressure.

Russian President Putin is scheduled to meet with his Egyptian counterpart Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

The guest list includes leaders closely tied to Russia’s growing security role in Africa, including Burkina Faso’s Ibrahim Traore and Niger’s Abdourahamane Tchiani.

Kenya’s William Ruto, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni and Namibia’s Netumbo Nandi-Ndatiwah are also expected, as well as Sudan’s Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed al-Menfi, the chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya.

What is the relationship between Russia and Africa like?

Russia has gained far more influence in Africa through security than trade, according to a report by the African Security Analysis group (ASA), a security consultancy.

Russia’s security presence has risen significantly in the region. In 2023, Russian forces, mostly from the Wagner Group, operated in only a few African countries, but the ASA now counts Russian missions or troops in at least nine countries.

Trade between African countries and Russia has exceeded $28bn. It was estimated to be about $16.8bn in 2019, when the first summit was held. But trade is mainly concentrated in a few countries and overshadowed by that of China and the European Union.

Russia’s strongest ties to the continent are in energy, fertilisers, defence and nuclear power, where the state-owned firm Rosatom has signed a string of agreements.

Russia has been an essential supplier of fertilisers and wheat to many countries in the region.

In 2023, Russia exported 200,000 tonnes of grain to Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Eritrea and Zimbabwe. 

Why does this summit matter?

This is the first summit since 2023, so it will be an indicator of how far the relationship has developed and where it is heading, analysts say.

A final declaration and a Russia-Africa Partnership Forum plan should be adopted by the end of the Summit to cover 2027-2029.

Analysts have said that meetings on the sidelines could be more important than the main event, as talks between African delegations and Russian defence officials can illustrate where Moscow plans to expand its military ties.

The recruitment of Africans to fight in Ukraine could also be a growing problem for Moscow, as it has already caused diplomatic concern in countries such as Kenya.

Amnesty International has used the run-up to the summit to raise the issue of Africans being recruited to fight with Russia.

In an open letter, the directors of Amnesty’s African section urged leaders attending the summit to demand that Moscow end what the group describes as deceptive and coercive recruitment of Africans to fight in its war in Ukraine.

East African neighbours Ethiopia and Eritrea are once again perilously close to all-out war.

Territorial disputes have dogged their relations since Eritrea gained independence in 1993.

They fought a bitter war between 1998 and 2000. And despite a truce, they remained in a state of war for nearly 20 years.

The Jeddah accord in 2018 brought peace. But tensions have lingered.

Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of supporting rebels in its Tigray region, while Eritrea accuses landlocked Ethiopia of planning to capture one of its key Red Sea ports.

Can diplomacy end this deep-rooted conflict?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Faisal Roble – Political analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa

Jervin Naidoo – Senior political analyst at Oxford Economics Africa

Matt Bryden – Strategic adviser at Sahan, a think tank focused on governance, politics and security in the Horn of Africa

Eritrea denies troop movement inside northern Ethiopia as US calls for de-escalation.

Ethiopian forces and allied fighters say they have expanded control across Tigray and entered the historic city of Aksum, as fighting in the northern region continues.

The pro-government militia, the Tigray Peace Force (TPF), also claimed on Thursday that troops from neighbouring Eritrea have retreated towards the border.

Solomon Hailemariam, spokesperson for the TPF, said Eritrean forces had sustained significant casualties during the fighting.

But Eritrea’s Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel rejected the claims as false in comments to local media. The extent of the reported losses could not be independently verified.

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), an independent conflict-monitoring organisation, documented Ethiopian government forces and TPF fighters entering Aksum, while rival Tigrayan fighters remained in surrounding mountainous areas.

ACLED also reported Eritrean troops withdrawing across the border through Zalambessa, following advances by Ethiopian forces and their allies into several strategic towns.

“Ethiopian troops are on one side, and Eritrean troops are on the other,” Selam, a resident of Zalambessa whose first name was changed for security reasons, told the AFP news agency on Thursday.

AFP reported that there is no fighting now, but the town has been without power or water for a week.

“We are caught in the middle and living in deep anxiety,” Salem told the news agency.

Trading accusations

ACLED also documented Ethiopian tanks and heavy weapons moving towards the Eritrean border on Tuesday, raising concerns about a possible confrontation between the neighbouring countries.

Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea, as well as Sudan and Egypt, of backing a rebel alliance of seven groups that is fighting the government of Abiy Ahmed.

Eritrea has denied accusations that its forces entered Tigray to support the armed opposition groups, accusing Ethiopia of threatening its sovereignty.

Eritrea, which fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal army in the 2020-2022 war, severed diplomatic ties with Ethiopia over the accusations earlier this month.

Khartoum and Cairo have also denied involvement in the conflict.

The TPF supports Ethiopia’s federal government in its campaign against the Tigrayan rebels linked to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

Ethiopian forces captured Tigray’s regional capital Mekelle earlier this month, and the TPLF confirmed that it had withdrawn from the city and moved its regional administration “temporarily” to another location. Government forces also retook the towns of Adwa and Adigrat from the TPLF without a fight. Further, there are reports of Ethiopian advances in the town of Rama, close to the border with Eritrea.

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called for de-escalation in a phone call with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy, following reports of the alleged confrontation between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces.

Rubio said the region could not tolerate more conflict, according to a statement from the US Department of State.

Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood has threatened to ban all Eritreans from entering the UK if the east African country’s government does not accept more returns of small boat migrants and foreign national offenders.

From Thursday, Eritrean diplomats will face restrictions on their movement outside London. Fast-track visas will also be stopped for VIPs.

Ministers have previously pressured other countries into accepting returns by threatening visa bans.

Eritreans were the most common nationality among small boats migrants in the 12 months to June – accounting for 18% of arrivals, external, according to figures from the House of Commons Library.

The Eritrean embassy in London has been contacted for comment.

“Eritrea has had every chance to accept the return of criminals and those with no right to be in the UK. Unlike other countries, it has refused,” said Mahmood.

She said she would not hesitate “to impose further measures on other countries refusing to co-operate”.

The UK government accused the Eritrean authorities of “abruptly” withdrawing co-operation earlier this year.

The restrictions mean diplomats are banned from travelling 60km outside London without permission.

The Home Office said this mirrored restrictions on British officials in Eritrea’s capital Asmara.

Earlier this year, the UK threatened bans against Angola, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Restrictions were announced against the DRC last year, but the Home Office said these have been lifted after co-operation on returns improved.

Angola and Namibia both agreed changes before restrictions were introduced.

When announcing changes to the UK’s asylum system in November, Mahmood said visa penalties would be applied to countries that failed to co-operate with returns policies.

Penalties included an “emergency brake” on visas for countries with high asylum claims until they take back citizens in the UK illegally.

According to Home Office data, more than 20,400 people have arrived in the UK by small boats so far since the beginning of this year, down 40% from the same period last year.

There were more than 40,600 returns and deportations from the UK from July 2025 to June this year – an 8% increase on the same period last year.

Of those who had been returned, less than 6,000 has been convicted of a criminal offence.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – As renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa, public backing by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of Ethiopia’s federal government and Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy are drawing scrutiny.

Both Gulf powers have strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, but their roles differ. The UAE has publicly backed Ethiopia’s government while Saudi Arabia has previously helped broker an Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and was reported to have offered to mediate between the two countries in 2025.

The renewed fighting threatens to unravel the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which ended a war between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan forces. As tensions with Eritrea add to the risks of a wider confrontation, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh offer a window into the interests of external powers in the crisis.

The UAE: Clear alignment, unproven leverage

On September 25, the UAE condemned attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray and the escalation in the neighbouring regions of Afar and Amhara.

Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE minister of state, expressed solidarity with Ethiopia’s government and people, reaffirmed support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement.

The statement made Abu Dhabi’s public position clear: It backs Ethiopia’s federal government while calling for de-escalation and dialogue. It did not establish whether the UAE was providing military assistance or had secured commitments from the parties to end the fighting.

The UAE also has commercial interests across the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) operates Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route launched in 2025 connects the port with Jebel Ali in the UAE, providing an additional corridor for cargo serving inland destinations, such as Ethiopia. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia relies heavily on Djibouti for access to international trade.

These commercial links help explain Abu Dhabi’s interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa. However, they do not establish that the UAE can influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de-escalate or change Ethiopia’s military calculations.

The extent to which Abu Dhabi can use its relationship with the federal government to encourage a political response to the conflict remains unclear.

Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic experience, uncertain engagement

Saudi Arabia has yet to publicly announce its position on the latest fighting in Tigray.

The kingdom has not publicly commented on the renewed war, according to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, although it undertook diplomatic efforts earlier this year to reduce tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF.

Saudi Arabia has previously sought to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that sources said Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two countries amid rising tensions over maritime access and regional security.

A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank said previous Saudi mediation efforts had failed, partly because negotiations did not address Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.

The kingdom’s broader regional alignment also matters. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as backing Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s ambitions for Red Sea access.

This is an assessment of regional alignment, however, not evidence that Saudi Arabia is directly providing military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current fighting.

Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in Red Sea security, a vital corridor for international shipping and its own oil exports. Whether Riyadh will take a more public diplomatic role as tensions escalate remains unclear.

Egypt’s rivalry with Ethiopia adds to regional tensions

Egypt’s role in the crisis is shaped by its longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its growing ties with Eritrea.

Cairo has also stressed that responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with countries bordering the waterway, a position shared by Asmara. The issue has added to regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks reliable access to the sea.

In September, Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of supporting armed groups fighting the federal government, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).

His remarks, reported by Al Jazeera on September 28, did not provide evidence substantiating the accusation. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, subsequently reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference, rejecting suggestions that it had departed from those principles.

He did not directly address the specific allegation of Egyptian support for the TPLF.

Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea has nevertheless become an important part of the regional picture. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026.

According to Egypt’s presidency, the talks covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security.

The two leaders also stressed the importance of coordination to maintain regional stability. The meeting highlighted closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara, but did not establish that either country was involved in the renewed fighting in Tigray.

For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.

Its relations with Eritrea and its disagreements with Addis Ababa form part of the wider regional context, but they are not evidence of direct Egyptian involvement in the renewed conflict. Whether these regional relationships will affect the course of the fighting remains uncertain.

From Tigray to a wider regional crisis

The risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has become a source of tension with Eritrea, whose Red Sea coastline includes the port of Assab. Addis Ababa argues that reliable access to the sea is a national priority while Asmara rejects any threat to its sovereignty.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of sending troops across the border and supporting armed groups. Eritrea denies the allegations and has called on the United Nations Security Council to intervene. The allegations remain contested, but deteriorating relations have raised the stakes of renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia.

A wider confrontation could put more civilians at risk, complicate humanitarian access and disrupt regional trade and security. It would also test whether external partners could encourage restraint without appearing to endorse either side’s military objectives.

The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could provide a channel for diplomatic engagement while Saudi Arabia’s record of regional diplomacy offers a possible opening for renewed talks. However, the available public evidence does not establish that either country is currently leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

Influence must be measured by outcomes

The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be cast as pursuing opposing strategies simply because one has publicly backed Ethiopia’s federal government while the other’s current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not show that either has decisive influence over the fighting.

Their contribution should be assessed by whether they can help secure concrete steps towards de-escalation, renewed political dialogue and a reduction in tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests and past diplomatic achievements may create opportunities for engagement, but they are not substitutes for progress on the ground.

The Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, yet renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of sustaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A durable settlement will depend primarily on the parties themselves. External partners could contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations.

For now, the UAE’s public alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic record offer different potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can turn those relationships into a meaningful contribution towards de-escalation remains unresolved.

Ethiopia and Eritrea have exchanged accusations of aggression at the United Nations, raising fears of a new conflict in the Horn of Africa region as fighting intensifies in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region.

The diplomatic spat comes as Ethiopian troops and allied armed groups advanced across Tigray, where forces from Asmara have allegedly crossed the border to support rebels fighting the government forces.

The two neighbours, which fought a deadly border war between 1998 and 2000, were allies during Ethiopia’s devastating 2020-2022 Tigray war.

However, they have since been at loggerheads over the 2022 peace agreement that ended a two-year civil war between the government in Addis Ababa and Tigray rebels, and over Ethiopia’s demands for access to the Red Sea.

So, what did Eritrea and Ethiopia accuse each other of, and are they inching towards war?

What did Eritrea and Ethiopia say at the UN?

Eritrean troops had advanced as far as 60km (37 miles) into Tigray, Ethiopia told the UN Security Council on Friday, accusing its neighbour of violating its sovereignty.

In a letter, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos described the alleged incursion as “a blatant act of aggression that engages Ethiopia’s inherent right to self-defence”.

He invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognises a country’s right to self-defence, but did not specify what measures Ethiopia was taking.

Eritrea, which won independence from Ethiopia in 1993, rejected the accusations of incursions into Ethiopia, calling them a pretext for an Addis Ababa offensive.

Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh, in his own letter to the UN Security Council on Saturday, urged the body to condemn Ethiopia’s “deplorable declaration of war” and take “deterrent measures”.

He warned that an Ethiopian offensive would cause “huge devastation to the peoples of both countries and destabilise the whole region”.

The accusations come amid a broader dispute over access to the Red Sea.

Landlocked Ethiopia has repeatedly argued that securing direct sea access is essential, while Eritrea fears Addis Ababa intends to seize its port of Assab.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed reiterated on Monday that Ethiopia must have access to the Red Sea.

Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an analyst at Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI), said the narratives of both countries contain “verifiable elements”.

“The danger lies in the fact that each side now treats the other’s narrative as existential,” he told Al Jazeera.

Eritrea and Ethiopia fought a deadly border war from 1998 to 2000. Relations improved after Abiy came to power in 2018, but have soured again in recent years.

Professor Matthias Rompel from the Institute of Sociology at the Justus-Liebig-University Giessen in Germany, said that both sides have legitimate security concerns, but their accusations need to be distinguished from independently verified facts.

“Ethiopia’s allegations of Eritrean military incursions into Tigray… and …the scale of Eritrean involvement, and particularly allegations that Asmara is orchestrating the rebellion against Addis Ababa, remain difficult to substantiate independently,” he told Al Jazeera.

He added that the latest developments suggest that the confrontation is no longer merely about Tigray. “Ethiopia’s quest for Red Sea access, Eritrea’s concerns about sovereignty, and Egypt’s strategic rivalry with Ethiopia over the Nile are interconnected,” he said.

“The conflict, therefore, has the potential to destabilise the wider Horn of Africa, with repercussions for Sudan, Somalia and Red Sea security.”

What is the latest fighting about, and how is Eritrea allegedly involved?

Fighting escalated on September 23 when a rebel alliance, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), launched attacks against Ethiopian government forces across Tigray, Amhara and Afar regions.

The rebels captured Tigray’s capital, Mekelle, and its airport before announcing their withdrawal on October 3. Government-allied forces subsequently entered the city.

In the latest on the battlefront, government and allied forces took Idaga Hamus early Friday and Abiy-Adi, in the Tembien area, on Thursday afternoon, according to Ermiyas Ababu, a commander of the government-allied Tigray Peace Force.

Residents, according to Reuters news agency, also reported the takeover of Idaga Hamus. Gebremedhin Kihishen, a business owner in Tembien, said government-allied forces controlled Abiy-Adi.

It was unclear from those accounts who held the towns immediately before the reported government advance or whether Eritrean troops were involved in the fighting.

Ermiyas previously reported Eritrean personnel entering Adigrat on Tuesday and Idaga Hamus on Wednesday, citing reports from his personnel. Al Jazeera was unable to independently verify the claims.

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), a United States-based conflict monitor, reported that Eritrean troops crossed into Ethiopia near Zalambessa and came under Ethiopian drone attack while advancing towards Idaga Hamus. Eritrea has yet to comment on the development.

Addis Ababa accuses Asmara of financing, arming and directing armed groups, as well as deploying troops inside Tigray. Eritrea denies the allegations, which have not been independently verified.

The renewed fighting threatens to unravel the 2022 peace agreement.

That conflict began in November 2020 after months of tensions between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government and the TPLF, which had dominated Ethiopian politics for nearly three decades before Abiy took office in 2018.

Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces against the TPLF, its longtime adversary. The war killed hundreds of thousands of people and was marked by allegations of massacres, sexual violence and widespread hunger.

The November 2022 Pretoria agreement ended major hostilities, but Eritrea was not a party to the deal. Relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara subsequently deteriorated.

Has Ethiopia sent troops north towards Eritrea?

Multiple media reports say Ethiopian government troops and allied militias entered Adigrat, a strategic city roughly 30km (19 miles) from the Eritrean border, on Saturday.

Three residents confirmed their presence to Reuters, while verified footage showed government-allied militia members walking through the city.

Associated Press news agency footage also showed Ethiopian military vehicles entering Adigrat as some residents welcomed the troops.

Government-allied forces have reported capturing Idaga Hamus and Abiy-Adi, while explosions and alleged drone strikes have been reported near Adigrat.

Are Ethiopia and Eritrea inching towards war?

Analysts warn that Ethiopia and Eritrea may already have moved beyond threats and into a dangerous phase of possible military confrontation.

BISI’s Ibrahim said the two countries have moved beyond “inching” towards war, noting that “The situation has entered a high-risk phase of limited but direct military confrontation with a real possibility of rapid escalation into interstate war.”

He warned that the severing of diplomatic ties removed the “last formal mechanism for crisis management”, while Ethiopian military advances towards the Eritrean border increased the risk of “miscalculation”.

Tom Gardner, a correspondent for The Economist, said the current tensions should be understood in the context of decades of hostility between the neighbours.

Their brief alliance during the 2020-2022 Tigray war was an exception and was driven by a shared hostility towards the TPLF, Gardner told Al Jazeera.

“The Ethiopian government’s strategic goal number one is access to the Red Sea, but also removing Eritrea’s government from the picture,” he noted.

“It’s very much looking like the most dangerous moment for the region since that 1998 to 2000 war.”

Rompel from Justus-Liebig-University Giessen said that the current situation is evolving. “The danger of a wider interstate conflict is real, and the situation has already moved beyond a purely diplomatic confrontation,” he said.

“The central danger is not necessarily that either government has decided to launch a full-scale war, but that military miscalculations, mutual distrust and domestic political pressures could trigger a further escalation neither side can easily control.

“A wider conflict is not inevitable, but the space for diplomatic de-escalation is rapidly narrowing,” he said.

Eritrea denies backing TPLF as Ethiopia alleges collusion, further straining their already volatile relationship.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of an “all-out invasion” in a message to the United Nations Security Council, while Eritrea says it is facing a “war of aggression” from its neighbour.

“The all-out invasion of parts of northern Ethiopia by Eritrea is a matter of public record,” said a letter by Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Gedion Timothewos, which was shared with news agencies on Friday.

“It is a blatant act of aggression that engages Ethiopia’s inherent right to self-defence,” added the letter dated Thursday and addressed to French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot.

Gedion said that Eritrean troops had advanced up to 60 kilometres (37 miles) into Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region and demanded their withdrawal, just days after the two nations cut diplomatic ties.

Eritrea’s Minister of Information Yemane Gebremeskel rejected Ethiopia’s claims.

“The Ethiopian regime has been pursuing, in effect, an unprovoked war of aggression against Eritrea for more than three years now,” he said on X.

Yemane said Asmara had shown restraint since landlocked Ethiopia had essentially declared a war against Eritrea when it stated in 2023 that it would gain access to the sea.

Citing statements made by Ethiopian officials, Yemane accused Addis Ababa of using the current conflict ⁠to take Assab, an Eritrean port, in order to restore access to the Red Sea.

Eritrea also denied Ethiopia’s claim that it is backing the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which is part of an alliance of seven armed groups that has been attempting to overthrow Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government since September.

Over the past week, Ethiopia’s army has pushed back the TPLF and seized the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle.

Witnesses also told the AFP news agency that rebels had lost the Tigrayan cities of Shire and Adigrat. Eritrean troops were reportedly seen in Adigrat before Ethiopian drone strikes hit them, according to several witnesses.

Tumultuous history

Ethiopia and Eritrea have traded accusations since the reported ⁠incursions by Eritrean troops this week raised fears of outright war in the region, where the two nations have fought previous conflicts.

The stakes have been raised this time around by conflicts in the Horn of Africa region and tensions across the Red Sea.

Diplomatic ties between the two have collapsed amid the escalation: Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara and ordered 10 Eritrean diplomats to leave the country last week. In response, Eritrea announced it was severing ties.

The neighbours have a tumultuous history, as Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and they fought a border war for two years in 1998.

Relations improved slightly in 2018 when Abiy took power in Addis Ababa, and Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopia against the TPLF in a civil war from 2020 to 2022.

Eritrea, however, was not part of the peace deal that ended the war, which soured ties soon afterwards.

Tensions are also fuelled by Abiy’s repeated claim that landlocked Ethiopia – which lost its access to the coast when Eritrea secured independence – has a right to sea access, which Eritrea sees as a threat to seize its Red Sea port of Assab.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia – After nearly two weeks of fierce fighting, Ethiopian federal forces entered the Tigrayan capital of Mekelle as forces from an alliance of rebel groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), withdrew from the city.

The fighting that erupted late last month has effectively ended the 2022 Pretoria ceasefire and the fragile peace that followed the devastating Tigray war.

But Mekelle’s capture may mark the end of conventional warfare rather than the end of the conflict. Fighting has continued elsewhere in Tigray, while reports of Eritrean troops entering northern Tigrayan towns have added a potentially more dangerous regional dimension.

Ethiopian federal forces used air power and ground forces to advance across Tigray. After suffering successive defeats around the towns of Alamata and Kobo, rebel forces withdrew into the surrounding countryside. They have pledged to continue fighting.

“We will confront the enemy on our terms and where we choose,” TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael said.

A war that may not be over

There are echoes of the war that began in 2020, when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government declared victory after federal forces captured Mekelle. Tigrayan forces subsequently regrouped in the mountains, retook much of the region and recaptured the capital, prolonging the war for nearly a year and a half.

The renewed conflict could follow a similar trajectory, particularly if the TPLF and other armed groups succeed in turning the mountainous terrain into a prolonged armed rebellion. Ethiopia is already fighting insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia, raising the prospect of its federal forces being stretched across multiple fronts.

But the battlefield reversals suffered by the rebels could have implications well beyond Tigray. They have raised concern in Egypt and among other Ethiopian rivals, according to Hossamaldeen Ibrahim, an African analyst at the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute.

“Egypt views the Renaissance Dam, and any Ethiopian [army] move towards the Red Sea, as a strategic threat, so it has allied with Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia against any Ethiopian unilateralism,” Ibrahim told Al Jazeera.

“Ethiopia is seeking a sea outlet; Eritrea sees this as an existential threat.”

Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions

Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea won its war of independence in 1991, leaving Addis Ababa heavily dependent on neighbouring countries for access to international trade.

Abiy has increasingly made access to the Red Sea a strategic priority since 2023, raising concerns in Eritrea over Ethiopia’s ambitions, particularly over the port of Assab.

Ethiopia currently relies heavily on Djibouti for maritime trade, while also pursuing alternative arrangements, including through Kenya and Somaliland.

After being sworn in on Monday for another five-year term following his party’s victory in the June 1 election, Abiy again put the issue at the centre of his parliamentary address.

“Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea,” he told parliament.

The issue has increasingly become part of a wider regional contest.

A loose regional alignment

In recent months, Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia have found themselves sharing concerns over Ethiopia’s regional ambitions. On October 4, the leaders of the four countries met for a quadrilateral consultative summit in New Alamein, Egypt, where they discussed regional issues and pledged to strengthen political, economic and trade cooperation as well as consultation and coordination.

The meeting does not amount to a formal military alliance, and the four countries have different interests in their dealings with Addis Ababa. The summit’s joint declaration also called for respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

But their concerns increasingly overlap around Ethiopia’s ambitions in the Red Sea, the Nile and the wider Horn of Africa.

Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have also deteriorated sharply since the Pretoria ceasefire. Ethiopia closed its embassy in Eritrea and expelled Eritrean diplomats on October 1, accusing Asmara of hostile acts and involvement in the renewed fighting. Eritrea responded by severing diplomatic ties, while denying that it supported the opposition alliance. Egypt and Sudan have also denied Ethiopian accusations that they are backing the alliance.

The Ethiopian army’s advance into Tigray has added another layer to that rivalry.

“The [Ethiopian army’s] advance in Tigray directly threatens [Eritrean President] Isaias [Afwerki] and the Eritrean state,” said Etana H Dinka, an assistant professor of African history at the University of Miami.

Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopian troops during the 2020–22 Tigray war, but relations between Abiy and Isaias have since deteriorated. Eritrean troops have reportedly been seen in towns in northern Tigray, adding a potentially significant new dimension to the conflict. The Associated Press news agency reported Eritrean troops entering Adigrat and Idaga Hamus after crossing into Ethiopia, while Eritrea has neither confirmed nor denied the troop movements.

Eritrea’s role could be decisive

For Eritrea, the location of the fighting matters as much as its outcome.

A prolonged conflict in Tigray could keep Ethiopian forces tied down and limit Addis Ababa’s ability to pursue its Red Sea ambitions. But a decisive Ethiopian victory could leave the federal government with greater freedom to turn its attention towards regional rivals.

“With reports that Eritrean troops are moving into Tigray, Eritrea seems keen on boosting TPLF forces withdrawing northwards, so that the engagement between Ethiopian and Eritrean soldiers takes place in Tigrayan territory, and not in Eritrea,” said Mohamed Kheir Omer, a researcher focused on the Horn of Africa.

That could create an incentive for Eritrea to support forces capable of keeping the Ethiopian army tied down, without necessarily entering a direct confrontation of its own.

Sudan adds another layer

Sudan’s war adds another dimension to the regional rivalry.

Egypt has provided political backing and logistical and technical support to Sudan’s army, according to the Reuters news agency, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have been accused of atrocities in Darfur.

Ethiopia has faced accusations of facilitating support for the RSF. A Reuters investigation reported in February that Ethiopia was hosting a camp in its western Benishangul-Gumuz region where thousands of fighters linked to the RSF were being trained. Reuters cited eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, who said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support. The UAE denied the allegations, and Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s role.

Those competing relationships are part of a broader contest over the Nile, Sudan, the Red Sea and access to trade routes.

For Egypt, its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam remains a major strategic concern. For Eritrea, Ethiopia’s search for a Red Sea outlet is viewed through the lens of national security. For Sudan’s neighbours, the conflict threatens to reshape regional power balances.

Will Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia intervene?

The shared interests of Ethiopia’s regional rivals do not necessarily translate into direct intervention.

Egypt has its own calculations over the Nile and Sudan. Eritrea has a direct security interest in developments in Tigray. Somalia is dealing with its own security challenges and a complicated relationship with Addis Ababa. Sudan remains consumed by its devastating civil war.

At the same time, Ethiopia’s federal forces now face the possibility of fighting on several fronts.

The TPLF, Amhara Fano and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) have each sought to challenge the federal government in different parts of the country. If they can maintain pressure on the army while retreating from major population centres, the fall of Mekelle could prove to be only the first phase of a much longer conflict.

For Ethiopia’s rivals, the question is whether to exploit that vulnerability or avoid being drawn into another regional war.

The extent of any regional involvement may ultimately depend on whether the TPLF can keep federal forces tied down in Tigray, and away from the Eritrean border.

“It isn’t difficult to understand Cairo’s commitment to prevent Ethiopia from succeeding in the current warfare, whatever its army’s intended goals, including Abiy’s acclaimed access to the Red Sea, are,” University of Miami’s Dinka said.

The question now is whether those regional calculations will remain largely diplomatic or spill into the battlefield.

Eritrea dismisses allegation as Ethiopia’s pretext for more war.

Eritrean soldiers have been seen driving through a northern town inside Ethiopia, witnesses tell the Reuters news agency, days after the neighbouring countries severed ties.

At least two witnesses told Reuters they saw “dozens” of Eritrean soldiers drive through Adigrat in two trucks on Wednesday. The town is located 25km (15 miles) south of the border with Eritrea.

The witnesses said they could identify the soldiers as Eritrean by their off-white camouflage uniforms.

Another Adigrat resident who was not in town at the time said family members had told him they had also seen Eritrean troops, according to Reuters, which could not independently verify their accounts.

“The Eritrean army has entered Tigray in uniform, equipped with heavy weaponry,” said Gebreigziabher Beyene, commander of the Tigray Peace Force, a pro-government militia that has fought alongside the federal army.

“This force is being struck by drones,” he said, adding Eritrea was “deliberately deploying its forces so that the fighting takes place inside Tigray rather than spilling into Eritrea”.

Last week, the chief administrator in Ethiopia’s northeastern Afar region said Eritrean troops were fighting in the area, but Reuters was unable to confirm the claim.

In a statement on X, Eritrea’s Information Minister Yemane Meskel did not deny that troops had crossed the border, but said Ethiopia’s government was creating “a fallacious narrative of ‘self-defense’ to rationalise and camouflage its war of aggression”.

If confirmed, it would mark the first time Eritrean forces have been seen inside Ethiopia since the renewal of fighting between Ethiopian forces and a seven-group armed alliance, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), on September 23.

Ethiopia has accused Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Sudan of backing the armed alliance which is fighting to remove the government. All three countries have denied involvement.

Eritrea announced it was severing ties with Ethiopia on Thursday after Addis Ababa announced it would close its embassy in Asmara and expel 10 Eritrean diplomats.

In a statement, Eritrea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Ethiopia’s actions had left it with “no option but to reciprocate in kind and sever all diplomatic ties with Ethiopia”.

On Monday, Ethiopian forces captured Tigray’s regional capital Mekelle, days after the TPLF confirmed that it had withdrawn from the city and moved its regional administration “temporarily” to another location.

It happened as Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was sworn in for another five-year term, during which he insisted that his landlocked country must have access to the Red Sea.

On the same day, Eritrea joined Somalia, Sudan and Egypt in issuing a joint declaration calling for a political and peaceful solution to the war in Ethiopia.

The declaration appeared to push back against several policies pursued by Ethiopia in recent years, highlighting widening rifts between Addis Ababa and its neighbours.

The rebels are seen leaving the capital of the northern Tigray region, according to local sources.

Ethiopia’s federal army and pro-government fighters have recaptured the main airport in the capital of the northern Tigray region, with the rebels seen leaving the city, according to multiple unnamed sources.

The Ethiopian National Defence Forces regained control of Alula Aba Nega Airport in Mekelle, one source with knowledge of events in the city and a humanitarian source told Reuters news agency on Saturday.

The airport, which is about ⁠10km (6 miles) from the centre of Mekelle, was one of three airfields in the region that were seized by the rebel forces at the start of the fighting on September 23.

The fighters, as well as the leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), were seen retreating from the city, a local journalist and residents told the AFP news agency.

The journalist added that federal forces had not yet been seen inside Mekelle.

“I am concerned that government and public property could be exposed to looting because there are no security forces in the city,” a resident told AFP.

“I am worried that lawlessness could spread in the city, and I am also afraid for my life. I want us to quickly return to law and order,” added another resident.

Al Jazeera could not independently confirm these claims. Media access is currently heavily restricted in Ethiopia, and there have been significant communications blackouts.

Last month, rebels announced the formation of a seven-party rebel coalition led by the TPLF, the same armed group that fought in the 2020-2022 civil war against federal forces from Addis Ababa. The new coalition includes rebel groups of varying sizes from across the country.

Later that month, the coalition started an offensive, seizing three airports around the contested Tigray state and engaging in fighting on the borders with Amhara and Afar states.

The government is now engaged in a counteroffensive, pushing into Tigrayan territory along three axes towards Mekelle, according to the Critical Threats Project, part of the American Enterprise Institute think tank.

Fighting has so far been concentrated in Tigray. However, rebels have reportedly carried out drone attacks on Addis Ababa.

The TPLF and government have not commented on developments on the ground.

The fighting has seen drone attacks, intensified forced conscription, and attacks on civilian infrastructure, according to Amnesty International, a global rights group.

The renewed conflict has not yet reached the heights of the Tigray war, which lasted from 2020 to 2022 and saw hundreds of thousands of deaths, but it is quickly taking on an international dimension.

Risk of conflict spreading

The government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has accused Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of backing the opposition coalition. Khartoum and Cairo have denied involvement.

Eritrea has severed diplomatic ties with Ethiopia over the accusations.

On Thursday, Eritrea also denied involvement in the Tigray conflict, and accused Addis Ababa of “pursuing an agenda of incessant hostility”. It also said Ethiopia, which is landlocked, was planning to invade Eritrea to secure sovereign access to the Red Sea coast.

The TPLF’s leader, Debretsion Gebremichael, said in a video published on Thursday that “the war is regional and it is a war to control the Red Sea”.

Ethiopia has previously ruled out seeking conflict with Eritrea over access to the coast.

Eritrea has cut off diplomatic relations with neighbouring Ethiopia, escalating a long-simmering conflict between the two states rooted in territorial disputes and mutual accusations of interference.

The move comes as fighting flares in northern Ethiopia between Ethiopian federal troops and an opposition alliance that Addis Ababa accuses Eritrea of backing.

The clashes are the most severe in Ethiopia since its 2020-2022 civil war that killed hundreds of thousands of people.

But this time, the ripple effects could go further, potentially fuelling broader unrest in a region already plagued by numerous interrelated conflicts, analysts warn.

Here’s what we know about the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the latest fighting in northern Ethiopia and what it could mean for the region at large:

Why did Eritrea break off ties with Ethiopia?

Eritrea announced it was severing ties with Ethiopia on Thursday, after Addis Ababa announced it would close its embassy in Asmara and expel 10 Eritrean diplomats.

In a statement, Eritrea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Ethiopia’s actions had left it with “no option but to reciprocate in kind and sever all diplomatic ties with Ethiopia”.

The Eritrean ministry accused Ethiopia of pursuing a years-long “agenda of incessant hostility”, including by infringing on its coastal areas and arming fighters opposed to Ethiopia’s government.

Ethiopia has likewise accused Eritrea of backing armed groups opposed to its government. Both sides have rejected the other’s accusations.

The diplomatic breakdown follows months of worsening relations, driven largely by disputes over landlocked Ethiopia’s push for access to the Red Sea and allegations that Eritrea is backing the rebel Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which leads the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, a rebel alliance fighting for control of parts of northern Ethiopia.

Have Ethiopia’s ties with Egypt and Sudan been hit, too?

Yes. Ethiopia accuses Egypt and Sudan of joining Eritrea in backing Tigrayan rebel forces, worsening already strained ties with both countries.

Ethiopia has long been at odds with Egypt over the status of Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project, which Cairo views as a risk to its water security and share of the Nile.

Ethiopia and Egypt have also expelled diplomats. Cairo ordered an Ethiopian diplomat to leave the country on Thursday, after Addis Ababa earlier kicked out an Egyptian diplomat, Egyptian state-linked media reported.

Egyptian state-linked broadcaster Al-Qahera News quoted an Egyptian official as calling Ethiopia’s move to expel the Egyptian diplomat as “regrettable and unjustified” and saying that Cairo responded in line with “the principle of reciprocity”.

The latest conflict also has implications for Sudan, whose military-backed government accuses Ethiopia of backing rebel forces it is fighting in its own civil conflict. Ethiopia rejects those allegations.

“The conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan have become more interconnected, with the Ethiopian government and Sudanese Armed Forces accusing each other of harbouring and equipping respective opposition forces from inside their own borders,” Ahmed Soliman, senior research fellow at the Chatham House think tank’s Africa programme, told Al Jazeera.  “Egypt has also been drawn into the escalation with its long-running enmity with Ethiopia over the Nile.”

What is happening in northern Ethiopia?

Tigrayan-led rebel forces have engaged in clashes with Ethiopian government-backed forces in the country’s north since last week. Fighting is concentrated in three regions: Tigray, Amhara and Afar.

Al Jazeera’s bureau chief in Ethiopia, Mohammed Taha Tawakel, reported that forces loyal to the federal government have made significant gains in the Tigray region, taking control of several towns and closing in on the regional capital, Mekelle.

Further east in Afar, a pro-government armed group claimed on Thursday to have recaptured the town of Erebti, which rebel forces had taken control of earlier in the week. The pro-government group thanked the Ethiopian military for its “magnificent air support” and said it would pursue further advances.

Despite the pro-government advances, Tawakel reported that rebel forces still maintain what he described as a “strong rear link with Eritrea” along the countries’ border.

He also reported growing fears that fighting could move into major urban centres of Tigray, such as Adwa, Axum, Shire and Mekelle. Some people have already begun fleeing to Amhara and Afar, he added.

Outside northern Ethiopia, the conflict appeared to spill into the capital, Addis Ababa, for the first time early on Thursday, as an explosion was reported at the Ministry of Defence.

AFP quoted a diplomatic source as saying small drones were the most probable cause of the blast.

While Ethiopia’s army has a much larger arsenal of drones, rebel forces have previously used them to target airbases and airports in various parts of the country, reported conflict monitor ACLED.

What are the roots of the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute?

Ties between the neighbours have been historically fragile. In 1962, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea. An armed independence struggle, led by Eritrea’s current President Isaias Afwerki, secured independence in 1993. The countries fought another border war from 1998 to 2000.

When Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, he moved to end the tensions and normalise diplomatic relations with Eritrea. During Ethiopia’s last civil war in 2020-2022, Eritrea even backed Ethiopia’s government against the TPLF.

But Abiy’s ambitions to seek direct sea access for landlocked Ethiopia have contributed to recent tensions, say analysts. Abiy has repeated that Ethiopia has a right to sea access, words that officials in Asmara take as a declaration of territorial conflict with Eritrea.

Could the current conflict spread in the region?

Many analysts fear it could.

Laura Hammond, professor in development studies at SOAS University of London, told Al Jazeera this scenario is already under way.

“The risks that conflict will spread to other countries, or that neighbours in the region will be brought into the present conflict are already playing out in terms of Eritrea’s support for the TPLF and the Alliance for Survival,” said Hammond.

“There is a strong possibility that Eritrea will become more involved in the conflict on the ground inside Tigray if it continues much longer,” she continued. “There is also a risk that the conflict could inflame relations with and inside Sudan.”

Martin Plaut, an analyst specialising in the Horn of Africa, also said there was a “real danger” of the conflict spreading.

“The situation is extremely tense and it would only require a spark to ignite a conflagration that could engulf [Ethiopia and Eritrea], as well as neighbouring Sudan,” he told Al Jazeera.

As renewed fighting spreads across northern Ethiopia, the government has accused Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of backing armed opposition groups, raising fears that the conflict could draw in regional powers.

Over the weekend, Ethiopian army chief Birhanu Jula attributed his country’s unrest to those he called Ethiopia’s “historical and contemporary adversaries”.

Birhanu accused Eritrea of being the go-between linking these external powers – including Sudan and Egypt, which he explicitly named – with armed groups inside Ethiopia.

Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt have all rejected the accusations. Speaking to Al Jazeera, Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nader Zaki said that Egypt’s foreign policy was founded on “full respect for the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of states, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries”.

Zaki added that Egypt “is fully committed to the rules of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and rejects any practices that would undermine regional security and stability”.

Major-General Samir Farag, the former head of the Egyptian Armed Forces’ Morale Affairs Department, also told Al Jazeera that the accusations against Egypt were false. “It has not been Egypt’s policy to interfere in the internal affairs of any state in the region,” he said.

Sudan’s military also dismissed the accusations as “baseless” and levelled its own charge of destabilising behaviour at Ethiopia, accusing it of supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces since 2023. Ethiopia has denied those allegations.

Troubled relations

Ethiopia’s relations with the countries it has accused have already been strained by other disputes that predate the latest fighting.

Relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa have remained tense as a longstanding dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) remains unresolved. Competition between the two has increasingly extended to regional security, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Sudan’s relations with Ethiopia are similarly troubled. Since the outbreak of the Sudanese civil war, Khartoum has accused Addis Ababa of providing training, supplies and the use of Ethiopian territory to the RSF.

Eritrea had fought alongside Ethiopia against rebel groups in the latter’s Tigray region during a war between 2020 and 2022, but relations between the two neighbours have since soured, with Eritrea alarmed by Ethiopia’s attempts to gain access to the Red Sea.

Against that background, some analysts and Ethiopian opposition figures say that Addis Ababa is pointing the finger at foreign conspiracies in a bid to rally support behind its national army.

Mohamed Selim, deputy chair of the Egyptian parliament’s African Affairs Committee, told Al Jazeera that he believes the accusations were an attempt to shift attention from Ethiopia’s domestic problems by creating an external enemy and seeking to unify the internal front.

Amani al-Tawil, director of the Africa Programme at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, similarly described the accusations as “an understandable attempt to escape from internal crises”.

She questioned why Egypt would choose this moment to intervene militarily in Ethiopia, given the two have been in dispute over GERD since 2011.

Al-Tawil said the breadth of the new opposition alliance in Ethiopia – seven groups representing disparate ethnic groups and regions announced the coalition last week – presented a challenge to Addis Ababa.

Spillover concerns

The renewed fighting in Ethiopia has spread across Tigray and into neighbouring Amhara and Afar.

Mohammed Hussein, the chairman of the Prosperity Party Afar Region Branch Office – the ruling party in Ethiopia’s Afar region – told Al Jazeera that the three regions together have a population of more than 38 million, according to his estimate, and include areas near the borders with Djibouti and Eritrea, raising fears of a regional war.

Ammar Arki, a writer focusing on Horn of Africa affairs, told Al Jazeera that Ethiopia had, at various stages, blamed Sudan, Egypt and Eritrea for contributing to instability inside Ethiopia.

He said the latest accusations could be interpreted as an attempt to redirect some domestic attention towards an external threat and build support around the federal government.

But Arki warned that the longer Addis Ababa continued to explain its internal crisis in terms of an “external conspiracy”, particularly if neighbouring states responded in the same way, the greater the risk that Ethiopia’s conflict could move beyond Ethiopia’s borders and become regional.