Egypt

THE summer is almost over here in the UK, and if you are already craving some autumn sun don’t fret, as there are plenty of options out there.

Here are 10 destinations with high temperatures even in October – and some spots are less than three hours away from the UK.

Marrakesh, Morocco

A top choice for autumn sunshine is Marrakesh in Morocco which in October has highs of 28C – and it’s three and a half hours from the UK.

Marrakesh is nicknamed the ‘Red City’ because it’s been built from red clay and sandstone so in the sunlight it appears to glow an orange-red colour.

While it doesn’t have beaches, there’s plenty to explore from its Bahia Palace to shop-filled souks.

Or head to Jemaa el-Fnaa square for vibrant cafes and colourful market stalls.

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UK indoor waterparks MAPPED with 30C temps, white-knuckle rides & £2.50 tickets

With Wowcher you can buy a 4* holiday to Marrakesh including a hotel stay and return flights from £59pp from October 5-9.

Seville, Spain

Under three hours away from the UK, Seville is Spain’s fourth-largest city with lots to offer from its tasty tapas and fabulous flamenco.

Not to mention in early October temperatures tend to sit around 26C on sunny days.

Top spots to see include Plaza de Espana – and pop by El Rinconcillo, the city’s oldest tapas bar where a huge glass of wine barely costs £3.

With loveholidays, book a stay at the Ilunion Alcora Sevilla which has sweeping views of the city, and a luxury swimming pool.

A four-night stay between October 19-23 starts from £279pp with return flights to London Gatwick.

Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt

Dubbed to be super popular next year (so get ahead of the game), Sharm El Sheikh is in Egypt.

The resort city on the Red sea has world-class reefs, incredible beaches and average highs of 31C in October.

For Brits, it has lots to offer alongside its sunshine like all-inclusive hotels and waterparks.

With Wowcher, there’s an offer for a seven-night 4* all inclusive Sharm El Sheikh getaway with return flights – the hotel has a spa, sauna, gym, tennis courts and watersports.

Book a stay at the Sharm Club Beach Resort from £299pp

Antalya, Turkey

If you’re seeking autumn sunshine, why not look in what has been called ‘paradise on earth‘?

Antalya sits on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey with beautiful beaches, mountain scenery and October highs of 26C.

To make it even better, the average flight time from the UK is around four and a half hours.

There’s a current offer with Wowcher for a 4* Antalya getaway in a sea view hotel stay with breakfast and return flights included.

Book a stay from 5-8 October from £159pp.

Limassol, Cyprus

Five hours away from the UK is the city of Limassol in Cyprus which has daytime highs of 27C next month.

Some favourite sunbathing spots include Kourion Beach and Pissouri Beach which has been described as a “beautiful rustic pebble beach with pristine water.”

The largest waterpark in the country, Fasouri Watermania Waterpark, is open for weekends during October.

With loveholidays, you can book into the Troodos Hotel which is minutes from Mount Olympus and is surrounded by natural beauty.

A seven-night holiday between October 5-12 starts from £369pp.

Reggio Calabria, Italy

In just three hours, you could be basking in the Italian sunshine in Reggio Calabria with city with sun, beaches, mountains, waterparks and lots of history.

Not to mention there are highs of 26C in October and Brits can fly directly to Reggio Calabria from London Stansted and return fares start from under £30.

As southern Italy is the perfect place for vineyards, there are even vineyard tours and wine tastings for £20.

You can book a getaway with loveholidays to La Bussola a hotel with huge swimming pools and plenty of space to sunbathe.

A seven-night break between October 4-11 starts from £270pp.

Tenerife, Canary Islands

The Canary Islands are a safe option for autumn sunshine, and in October, the island of Tenerife has highs of 26C.

The island also has hundreds of beaches, coastal towns with bustling promenades and head up to Mount Teide National Park on the cable car.

Siam Park, an enormous Thai-themed waterpark is open throughout next month too.

It has high-speed slides, family zones, beaches and plenty of swimming pools.

With Wowcher, book an all-inclusive break to Tenerife from October 5-8 including return flights from £169pp.

Fuerteventura, Canary Islands

Tenerife’s trusty neighbour, Fuerteventura has the same high temperatures – and can actually be cheaper.

On the second largest Canary Island, you can explore a number of beaches like Playa de Matorral, Corralejo and Playa Bajo de la Burra.

It’s easy to take a boat excursion out into the waters and go snorkelling to spot colourful fish and sometimes even stingrays.

Also make sure to check out Acua Water Park and hike on Corralejo Natural Park.

With Wowcher, book an all-inclusive break to Fuerteventura including return flights from £179pp.

Sousse, Tunisia

It’s no secret that Tunisia is a top spot when it comes to staying sunny during autumn.

In October, daytime highs can reach 28C – perfect sunbathing weather.

Sousse in particular is known for its sandy beaches and modern marina with boutique shops and boat trips.

Tunisia is relatively cheap too with a pint of beer costing less than £2.

With loveholidays, book a seven-night break between October 9-16 to Riadh Palms which has an enormous swimming complex – prices start from £415pp.

Dubai, UAE

In the UAE, Dubai offers all the delights of an autumn getaway from its many luxury hotels to its thrilling waterparks and exotic beach clubs.

You can do all this next month while enjoying highs of 35C – and Emirates offers direct flights to Dubai which get there in seven hours.

Don’t forget to hit the shops or head to the Grand Souk for tasty treats like stuffed breads.

Or try a Iranian falooda — a sorbet-like dessert made of thin rice noodles and syrup.

With Wowcher, book a break to Dubai (a four or seven night stay) including breakfast and return flights from £449pp.

In terms of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, the FCDO no longer advises against travel to the UAE, but warns that “the situation in the Middle East remains unpredictable”.

*Prices correct at the time of publication.

Italy’s defence minister warns of severe economic fallout if Bab al-Mandeb becomes impassable, bypassing EU delays.

Italy will deploy warships to ensure safe passage for its commercial vessels through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, Defence Minister Guido Crosetto said, adding that Rome would not wait for a joint decision from the European Union.

“We have the capabilities to protect the passage,” Crosetto said, warning that if the waterway became impassable, the economic consequences would be severe.

The Italian defence minister said that Rome “must not allow bureaucratic delays in decision-making to exacerbate an already complex situation”.

Bab al-Mandeb links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, forming one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors between Europe and Asia and a critical route for oil, gas and container traffic heading to and from the Suez Canal.

Roughly 12 to 15 percent of global trade has historically passed through the narrow waterway, which separates Yemen from Djibouti and Eritrea on the African side and is only about 30km (19 miles) wide at its narrowest point.

The strait’s importance has grown sharply since Iran effectively seized control of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year amid its war with the United States and Israel, choking off the world’s most important oil chokepoint and pushing much of the Gulf’s crude exports towards alternative routes.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, has increasingly relied on pipelines and Red Sea shipping to bypass Hormuz altogether, making the Bab al-Mandeb strait one of the last major arteries still open to Gulf oil reaching global markets.

Control of the strait has been contested for years, as Yemen’s government, Houthi rebels and, at times, forces in the region have held stretches of its coastline at different points since the war in Yemen began in 2015.

The significance of the strait has been hit dramatically in the past few weeks, when the Iran-backed Houthi movement launched a rapid offensive that brought the entirety of Yemen’s western Red Sea coast under its control, including several strategically located islands.

The advance has given the Houthis effectively unrestricted access to the waterway, a development seen as a major setback for international shipping, given the group’s history of attacking vessels it associates with the US or its allies in the region.

The US and the European Union have already carried out military operations aimed at better protecting merchant ships from Houthi attacks in the area, though those efforts have struggled to fully secure the route as fighting in Yemen has escalated.

Israel’s defence minister has pledged to remove Palestinians from the besieged Strip.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has rejected any plans for Palestinian displacement, following comments by Israel’s defence minister saying the army would “finish the job” in Gaza.

Speaking during a visit by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on Wednesday, el-Sisi stressed “Egypt’s firm stance against the displacement of the Palestinian people or any attempt to annihilate the Palestinian cause”, the Wafa news agency reported.

Abbas praised Egypt’s steadfastness in defending Palestinian rights and reiterated that “Gaza is an integral part of our state.”

The Egyptian leader’s comments came hours after Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz said the army would “finish the job” in Gaza, “so that we can also implement the migration plan.”

Katz said earlier this month that Israel was ready to remove Palestinians from Gaza by sea and land, but was waiting for the United States, which he said was discussing where the two million people would go.

US Ambassador Mike Huckabee has denied any plan to “displace people out of Gaza against their will”. In February, Huckabee explicitly said he “would be fine” if Israel took most of the Middle East in accordance with his interpretation of the Bible, but then suggested the remark was selectively edited.

Nearly all of Gaza’s population has been internally displaced, and most of the territory lies in rubble after three years of a war that has killed more than 73,700 Palestinians.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said earlier this month that the army would not withdraw from the Gaza Strip, despite a US-backed ceasefire plan that came into effect in October stipulating it as a condition.

Netanyahu claimed Israel controls 60 percent of the Palestinian enclave and promised not to pull back until Hezbollah is disarmed.

His government has been pushing for more Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory in the West Bank, including through a controversial settlement project dubbed E1 designed to construct thousands of housing units between Jerusalem and the Maale Adumim settlement.

Israeli human rights group B’Tselem warned this week that Israel is executing a systematic and accelerated campaign to dismantle “Palestinian collective life” and establish permanent Jewish-Israeli sovereignty across the occupied West Bank.

Egypt can leverage the US-China rivalry and its strategic partnership with Beijing to bolster its national security and its position as a global logistics hub through several strategic avenues:

1) Enhancing its status as a global logistics and trade center, through:

– Developing the Suez Canal Economic Zone: Leveraging the massive Chinese investments and projects in the TEDA zone in Ain Sokhna to establish vital industries such as green hydrogen, solar panels, and electric vehicles, transforming Egypt from a mere waterway into a global manufacturing and logistics hub.

– Linking the Belt and Road Initiative with Egypt’s Vision 2030: Integrating Egyptian ports, such as East Port Said, Alexandria, and Ain Sokhna, into the Chinese maritime trade network, while maintaining a balance that allows for alternative investments in other ports and logistics corridors to expand its options and international network of allies.

– Alternative Supply Chains: Egypt offers a secure regional base for global and Chinese companies seeking to diversify their supply chains away from areas of direct conflict, leveraging its strategic location connecting three continents.

2) Enhancing National Security and Red Sea Security, through:

– Diversifying Sources of Armament and Military Technology: The partnership with China allows Egypt to acquire advanced military technology, such as drones, air defense systems, and space and satellite technology, without the stringent political conditions imposed by Washington, thus strengthening the independence of Egyptian military decision-making.

– Securing Navigation in the Red Sea and the El-Mandeb Strait: This can be achieved by utilizing the Chinese military presence in Djibouti and China’s interest in maritime security to coordinate and build a joint security umbrella protecting the Suez Canal from emerging threats, such as attacks in the Red Sea, given that the stability of this waterway is a vital shared interest for both Egypt and China.

– Balancing Political Pressures: By employing flexible diplomacy and strategic balancing, Egypt’s rapprochement with China (especially after joining the BRICS group) provides it with strong leverage in its negotiations with the United States and Western international institutions, and vice versa.

3) Egyptian Expansion and Influence in Africa via China, through:

The Joint Projects (Triangular Cooperation) by acting as a strategic gateway for Chinese investments directed towards the African continent, through the implementation of joint infrastructure projects (roads, power plants, dams) in cooperation between Egyptian and Chinese companies in the Nile Basin and Horn of Africa countries, Egypt can enhance its influence and development diplomacy.

Here, Egypt can benefit from international and Chinese competition over Africa, the Red Sea, and Ethiopia, and from its partnership with China, to strengthen its national security and its position as a logistical and commercial hub. Thus, Chinese economic influence can become a factor of stability and development for Egypt, rather than a new arena for international competition in the future.  Egypt can enhance its national security and logistical standing by leveraging its unique strategic location as a link between Africa, Asia, and Europe and by transforming international competition and its partnership with China into well-considered development opportunities. This can be achieved by studying and understanding the following strategic dimensions:

– First: Mechanisms for Egypt to Benefit from International Competition and the Chinese Partnership

– Developing Global Logistics Hubs: Continuing to expand and develop the Suez Canal Economic Zone in conjunction with Chinese investments, such as the TEDA Zone in Ain Sokhna, to transform the canal from a mere waterway into a global manufacturing and re-export hub.

– Continental Connectivity and Infrastructure: Leading regional connectivity projects in Africa, such as the Cairo-Cape Town Highway and the Lake Victoria-Mediterranean Waterway Project, and utilizing funding from China’s Belt and Road Initiative to connect African trade to the Red Sea.

– Diversifying security and military partnerships: Leveraging international competition in the Red Sea to secure navigation and combat piracy and terrorism through building flexible alliances and modernizing Egyptian naval capabilities (the Berenice naval base) without aligning completely with any single international power.

– Localizing industry and technology: Making technology transfer and the localization of industries, such as electric vehicles, renewable energy, and communications, a requirement in investment contracts with China and Western countries. This will reduce reliance on imports and bolster Egyptian economic security.

– Second: Chinese Economic Influence: Stability and Development or an Arena of Competition? Future indicators of Chinese influence in Egypt and the region point to two overlapping scenarios:

– The first scenario: A factor of stability and development, achieved by focusing on infrastructure, providing soft loans, creating local job opportunities, and supporting regional integration. This would have a positive impact on Egypt and Africa, contributing to easing conflicts stemming from poverty and offering African countries alternative financing options for developing their economies.

– The second scenario: Chinese influence within Africa as a negative factor, transforming it into a new arena of international competition. Increased Western (American and European) fears of Chinese hegemony and attempts to contain it through counter-initiatives or political pressure could turn the Red Sea region and Africa into areas of military and political polarization, forcing countries to choose between the Eastern and Western blocs.

– Third: Analyzing China’s role regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) issue and whether Beijing can play a role in supporting stability and negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia

On the other hand, given China’s growing relations with Ethiopia and the Nile Basin countries, its role regarding the GERD issue can be viewed positively for Egypt. Beijing can play a role in supporting stability and negotiations, even though its economic interests might make it more cautious about clashing with Ethiopia. Here, China adopts a pragmatic and cautious approach, balancing its substantial economic interests in Ethiopia with its strategic relationship with Egypt. This limits its role to quiet diplomacy and calls for negotiations without exerting direct pressure or engaging in confrontation with Addis Ababa. This can be understood through:

1) Analyzing China’s role regarding the GERD

– Technical and financial support: Chinese companies and funding have contributed directly to the infrastructure and electricity distribution stations associated with the GERD and Ethiopian projects.

– Non-interference policy: Beijing traditionally adheres to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and avoids taking public stances against Ethiopian development projects.

– Diplomatic balance: China is careful to issue joint statements with Egypt emphasizing the importance of international law and the need to avoid harming water security, but these remain diplomatic statements that fall short of exerting pressure through mediation.

2) Can Beijing support stability and negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia?

– The capacity exists: China possesses significant economic and financial influence over Ethiopia, enabling it to exert influence if it so desired, given the scale of its investments and loans.

– The will to exert pressure is lacking: China refuses to become a serious mediator or a pressure party and prefers to distance itself from the sharp points of contention between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

– Maximum possible role: Beijing’s available role is limited to quiet mediation and encouraging the parties to return to regional negotiating tables without imposing binding solutions.

3) Economic interests and avoiding confrontation:

– Deep strategic partnership: For China, Ethiopia is a key gateway and the heart of Africa ​​for implementing the Belt and Road Initiative and penetrating the Horn of Africa.

– Interconnected projects: Chinese interests in Ethiopia are linked to agricultural, electricity, and railway projects that directly benefit from the dam’s energy.

Here, we conclude that major economic interests make China very wary of losing its Ethiopian ally, which keeps its position biased towards avoiding confrontation and refraining from imposing any forced settlement on it.

From this, we understand that Chinese influence holds enormous developmental potential for Africa, but it remains surrounded by the risks of geopolitical competition with other powers, most notably the United States.  Egypt’s ability to achieve diplomatic balance and rely on a policy of multiple partners is the guarantor of transforming this influence into a stabilizing factor that supports its national security.

The People’s Republic of China achieved a historic and unprecedented participation in the second edition of the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition (EIAS 2026), which was held at El Alamein International Airport from September 8 to 10, 2026. The Chinese participation came just days after the conclusion of the joint Egyptian-Chinese air force exercises Eagles of Civilization 2026. The significance of this Chinese military presence lay in the display of a fully integrated and realistic combat air system, not merely models. In this context, the Egyptian researcher will attempt to divide the significance of China’s participation in the El Alamein Air Show into several key areas, including:

– First: China’s prominent participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Show in Egypt as a strategic shift in the regional arms market

Here, China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Show constitutes a significant strategic shift in the regional arms market. Beijing has moved beyond the traditional approach of selling individual military components to present itself as a supplier of comprehensive and integrated air combat systems, competing with Western and American powers in the Middle East and Africa. China’s participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition focused on several strategic axes to promote and analyze the concept of a full-suite solution. This was achieved by emphasizing that China does not simply sell aircraft but rather offers a comprehensive defense solution, encompassing attack fighters, logistics support aircraft, aerial refueling, and command and control systems, known as C4ISR.

The People’s Liberation Army of China sought to highlight China’s military and defense role and promote the Chinese model as a ready-made competitive alternative. This was done by showcasing the competitive advantages of Chinese defense industries, such as the absence of complex political conditions, rapid delivery, and comprehensive technology transfer to Middle Eastern and African markets. Furthermore, the focus was on the geopolitical depth, linking the Chinese presence in El Alamein to Beijing’s broader vision of strengthening security and economic partnerships with countries in the region.

– Second: Showcasing the most prominent Chinese aircraft platforms participating for the first time outside of China at the El Alamein exhibition

As for the most prominent Chinese aircraft platforms participating for the first time outside of China, for the first time in its history, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) showcased four of its latest operational aircraft models at an air show outside of China. The most prominent of these were

– The Chinese J-16 multirole fighter (J-16)

This air superiority and heavy ground attack fighter garnered widespread international attention.

– The Chinese YY-20A aerial refueling tanker (YY-20A)

This Chinese heavy transport aircraft provides refueling to extend the operational range of fighter jets.

– The Chinese KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft (KJ-500)

This represents an airborne command and control system.

– The Chinese Z-20K military helicopter (Z-20K)

This is a multi-role helicopter designed for search and rescue and tactical operations.

Regarding the Chinese weapons and drones on display at the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition, the AVIC (Aerospace Industries of China) showcased its advanced defense capabilities in the outdoor exhibition area through:

– A demonstration of the Chinese Wing Loong-10B stealth drone (Wing Loong-10B):

This is a high-altitude, long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed for reconnaissance and precision strikes.

– A demonstration of Chinese smart munitions and missiles:

The Chinese drone was displayed surrounded by advanced air-to-air missiles, such as the PL-108 & PL-12AE. In addition to a demonstration of the Chinese anti-radar and anti-radiation missile (YJ-9ER1).

– Third: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) showcased its capabilities through a technical display (capability integration), dividing its export-available air systems into functional groups for attack, others for support and refueling, and a third group for command and control, during China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein Air Show in Egypt.

In this context, the PLA sought to leverage China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein Air Show in Egypt as a new and strategic launchpad for China in North Africa. This included showcasing the size of the Chinese pavilion and the equipment on display, such as aerobatic aircraft and unmanned combat aerobatics. The Chinese Ministry of Defense emphasized the technical aspects of this capability integration display, highlighting the division of its export-available air systems into functional groups for attack, others for support and refueling, and a third group for command and control. As follows:

■ The offensive functional groups were represented by a display of China’s modern fighter jets and attack drones, such as the Wing Loong family.

■ As for the support and refueling functional groups, China’s strategic transport and aerial refueling aircraft, such as the Y-20, were showcased.

■ The third functional group focused on (command and control), with China displaying its early warning aircraft and airborne command centers.

– Fourth: Analyzing and understanding the strategic dimensions of China’s participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition, aimed at attracting more interest in the Chinese aerospace sector and promoting widespread military sales of Chinese military, defense, and armament equipment

Thus, we can analyze and understand the strategic dimensions of China’s participation in the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition, which aimed to attract more interest in the Chinese aerospace sector and promote widespread military sales of Chinese military, defense, and armament equipment. Therefore, we find that the extensive Chinese presence at the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition constitutes a genuine breakthrough. Beijing did not aim to promote individual pieces but rather to demonstrate its ability to provide a comprehensive and integrated air combat system, encompassing attack, support, refueling, and command, as a competitive alternative in the Middle Eastern and African markets.

Analyzing the economic and strategic dimensions of China’s extensive participation in the El Alamein exhibition, we observe the extent to which the Chinese People’s Liberation Army focused on achieving broad military exposure for its participation during the exhibition. This included showcasing how these Chinese defense, military, and air systems can reduce operating costs for purchasing countries while ensuring their independence in defense decision-making, without imposing political conditions or prior operational restrictions, unlike many Western and American systems.

The chatter among Barcelona fans this summer was all about who would be the club’s next star striker after Robert Lewandowski – the team’s top scorer for the past four seasons – left to play in the United States.

The 18-year-old Egyptian, Hamza Abdelkarim, was not an answer anyone would have given at the beginning of preseason. This time last year, he had only played a single game at senior level, and that was for Cairo giants Al Ahly.

But as Barca’s dogged pursuit of Argentinian striker Julian Alvarez from rivals Atletico Madrid ended in failure, and the club only managed to secure a 10 million euros ($11.5m) move for Gabriel Jesus on the transfer window’s deadline day on September 1, Abdelkarim emerged from obscurity to dominate headlines in Catalonia and Egypt.

Abdelkarim’s four goals in five games made him Barcelona’s top scorer during preseason. He even scored against his boyhood club, Al Ahly, in the Joan Gamper Trophy – the fixture that is used to introduce the team to the fans and inaugurate the league season – but chose not to celebrate the goal as a mark of respect.

“Hamza offers something different,” Adrian Healey, ESPN’s La Liga match commentator, told Al Jazeera.

Fans in Egypt and Barcelona have taken to calling him the Egyptian Erling Haaland on account of his physical prowess and presence in the box.

When the striker caught the eye of FC Barcelona, a low-risk, low-commitment agreement was struck in the winter transfer window with Al Ahly to bring him to Spain. A six-month loan period was cut in half due to paperwork issues, but Abdelkarim made up for lost time by scoring goals; not for the first team, or even the reserves, but the Under-19 team – netting six times in 11 games.

Abdelkarim had also impressed for Egypt at the 2025 U17 World Cup, grabbing two goals and an assist in four appearances.

Despite the lack of top-level experience, Abdelkarim had done enough to prompt Egypt national team manager Hossam Hassan to take a gamble by selecting the uncapped teenager for his World Cup 2026 squad.

The veteran Mostafa Mohammed was left at home in favour of Abdelkarim, who went on to make his debut against Brazil in a friendly and featured in four World Cup matches.

On the advice of Mohamed Salah, the striker decided not to take a vacation after the World Cup and returned to Barcelona immediately after Egypt were knocked out by Argentina in the round of 16.

“Mohamed Salah is always talking to me, and I follow everything he says. He is an example to be followed, and the success he achieved is not by accident,” he told Egypt’s OnSport after FC Barcelona lifted the Joan Gamper Trophy.

The exposure to a professional like Salah has only served to supercharge Abdelkarim’s development.

Barcelona had already seen enough and decided to make his loan move permanent in June, paying Al Ahly 1.5 million euros ($1.75m) for his services.

“I am not surprised at all in Hamza’s [emergence],” Ismail el-Hamalawy, a footballing content creator who has closely followed the young striker’s journey, told Al Jazeera, citing his World Cup performances.

“He is the striker Egypt has been missing for two decades,” el-Hamalawy told Al Jazeera.

The only other Egyptian-born player to have played in La Liga was Mido, who came through the ranks at Zamalek before leaving Egypt as a 17-year-old in 2000 and played in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, France, Italy and England.

At the turn of the century, most Egyptians followed Mido’s progress through newspapers and local talk shows. Now, Egyptians can easily track Abdelkarim’s development in real time online.

The interest has been so profound that Barcelona signed a surprise sponsorship with EgyptAir through the 2028-29 season this week as both entities look to leverage the image of Egypt’s next great footballer for commercial gain.

The club is now scrambling to improve his contract so that a larger buyout clause can be installed. As it stands, the 18-year-old could be poached by a rival club for only 15 million euros ($17m), so the Catalan giants are looking to place a 150 million euros ($174m) buyout clause to ward off any potential suitors.

An unused substitute in the first two matches of the season, Barcelona coach Hansi Flick has repeatedly told the media that the striker’s time will come.

“He deserves to play, and he will play,” Flick said. “I see him improving day by day. He has the right attitude and mentality.”

With such little top-level experience, it could have been considered irresponsible of the club to give the youngster too much responsibility too soon.

“He will have to [be] patient, but he will get minutes,” Healey said. “[But] I am not sure the signing of [Gabriel] Jesus changes much for him, as I see [Jesus] as just a stopgap solution. Abdelkarim might have had less minutes had Alvarez signed.”

On August 31, Abdelkarim replaced Raphina in the final five minutes of Barcelona’s 5-2 win over Rayo Vallecano.

With an official debut out of the way, the striker can focus on clearing the next hurdle – scoring his first official goal for the La Liga champions.

RIYADH: Egypt’s annual nationwide inflation rate eased to 12.7 percent in August from 13 percent in the previous month, as lower food prices offset increases in electricity, housing and other household costs.

The nationwide consumer price index was unchanged from July at 289.8 points, according to data from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. Annual urban inflation also eased to 14.5 percent from 14.9 percent in July. 

Egypt continued to experience faster price growth than several regional peers, although the latest available comparative readings are for July rather than August. 

Saudi Arabia’s annual inflation was 1.8 percent in July, while Jordan’s was 2.7 percent, according to official data from the respective countries. Morocco recorded a 0.6 percent annual decline in consumer prices.  

The International Monetary Fund expects Egypt’s inflation to rise to 16.7 percent in the second half of 2026, reflecting higher energy prices, exchange-rate depreciation and unfavorable base effects. 

In its latest report, CAPMAS stated: “The food and beverages division recorded a decrease of 1.2 percent due to a 0.1 percent decrease in the prices of cereals and bread, a 1.5 percent decrease in the prices of meat and poultry, a 0.1 percent decrease in the prices of fish and seafood, and a 7 percent decrease in the prices of vegetables.”  

Housing costs climb  

Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels rose 1.9 percent during the month. Electricity, gas and fuel prices increased 4.3 percent, while actual rents rose 0.8 percent and housing maintenance costs increased 0.5 percent.  

Prices for furnishings and household equipment rose 0.7 percent, while clothing increased 0.5 percent, healthcare 0.4 percent, transport 0.2 percent, and restaurants and hotels 0.5 percent. 

On an annual basis, housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels recorded the largest increase, at 33 percent, with actual rents up 28 percent and electricity, gas and fuels rising 22.4 percent. 

Transport costs increased 21.7 percent annually, while education rose 20 percent and recreation and culture increased 15.3 percent. Food and beverages prices rose 6.5 percent, with vegetable prices up 27.7 percent.  

Monetary policy  

The inflation data comes after the Central Bank of Egypt kept its key interest rates unchanged last month, with the overnight deposit rate at 19 percent and the lending rate at 20 percent. The main operation and discount rates were maintained at 19.5 percent. 

The CBE expects headline inflation to accelerate through the third quarter because of unfavorable base effects before gradually declining from the first quarter of 2027. It expects inflation to converge toward its 7 percent target, plus or minus 2 percentage points, during the second half of 2027.  

The central bank has warned that the inflation outlook remains exposed to risks from regional hostilities and a stronger-than-expected pass-through from fiscal consolidation measures. 

CAIRO: An Egyptian-Spanish archaeological mission has uncovered a 4,300-year-old tomb near Cairo belonging to an ancient judge who heard the grievances of ordinary people, local authorities said.

The tomb was found at Saqqara, a sprawling necropolis south of the capital, and dates back to the reign of Pharaoh Djedkare Isesi, one of the most influential rulers of Egypt’s Fifth Dynasty who oversaw a period of administrative reform in the 24th century BC, the Egyptian tourism and antiquities ministry said.

It was built for Yunmen, a high-ranking official whose duties included listening to the appeals of the kingdom’s subjects and weighing their complaints before the state.

Amr Al-Tayeb, director of the Saqqara archaeological site, told AFP that Yunmen’s duties “align with the ancient Egyptian concept of Maat”, the goddess and principle of truth, justice and social order.

The find was discovered during this summer’s excavation season in the Mariette Cemetery area of northern Saqqara, as part of a long-running joint project by the Autonomous University of Barcelona and Egypt’s Supreme Council of Antiquities.

The newly discovered mastaba, a flat-roofed tomb typically built for elite officials, contains two funerary chapels: one for Yunmen and another for his father, Ity, a senior scribe responsible for overseeing agricultural lands and offerings.

Yunmen’s chapel is adorned with finely carved reliefs depicting farmers at work, servants carrying offerings and scenes associated with funerary rites. Many of the paintings have retained their original colors despite spending more than 40 centuries buried beneath the desert sands, the ministry said.

Archaeologists also uncovered an ornate facade covered with funerary inscriptions, alongside formal depictions of the tomb owner.

In the neighboring chapel, dedicated to Ity, traces of painted offering scenes survive, alongside a false door, a symbolic gateway through which the dead were believed to receive sustenance from the living.

The discovery comes as Egypt seeks to promote new archaeological finds to support tourism, a key source of foreign currency for the country.

Russia is displaying some of its newest air-launched precision weapons in public for the first time at the El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt this week. The S-71K Kovyor and related S-71M Monokhrom, and the S8000 Banderol, reflect Russia’s effort to field larger numbers of relatively inexpensive standoff weapons alongside its more sophisticated and costly missile types. As such, their development and early employment are closely tied to the war in Ukraine, but they also reflect wider global interest in these kinds of weapons.

The weapons, seen in the tweet embedded below, comprise, clockwise from top left: S-71K Kovyor, an unknown smaller guided munition, S8000 Banderol, and S-71M Monokhrom:

For Russia, the requirement has become increasingly important as the war in Ukraine has evolved into a prolonged contest in which industrial capacity is as critical as technology. Russia has expended huge numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets while also developing an enormous strike-drone campaign. At the same time, Ukrainian air defenses have become progressively more capable, forcing Moscow to use combinations of missiles, drones, decoys, and different flight profiles to penetrate or saturate the defensive network. One lesson is the fact that a weapon does not necessarily have to be as capable as a high-end cruise missile if it can be manufactured in much greater numbers and still present a credible threat to the target.

The S-71M, which TWZ previously reported on in detail after Ukrainian intelligence obtained an example, is a compact, turbojet-powered weapon with a distinctly angular airframe intended to reduce its radar signature. Imagery from Egypt gives a better look at its front end, including a faceted nose flowing into a broad central fuselage. The nose has at least one optically flat transparency for an infrared or TV seeker. Its wings are sharply swept and fold against the belly of the weapon for carriage, while the rear of the weapon terminates in an inverted-V tail arrangement. The overall shape is notably different from Russia’s more conventional cruise missiles of the past.

Ukrainian analysis found that the S-71M incorporates an OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb as its warhead and relies primarily on inertial guidance, rather than carrying a sophisticated terminal seeker, although the seeker window raises questions about that.

Ukrainian intelligence also described its construction as being relatively straightforward, with fiberglass composite material making up much of the outer structure and no evidence identified of specialized radar-absorbing coatings.

As we noted previously, the weapon appears intended as a less expensive, but still survivable standoff weapon option that can be produced in significant numbers.

The S-71M has been tested from the Su-57 Felon fighter, also present at El Alamein. In a press release, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), responsible for the Su-57, said that the S-71M and the S-71K displayed alongside it “were designed for fifth-generation fighters,” although there is no reason why they couldn’t be launched from a wide variety of platforms.

A Su-57 performing at El Alamein, with one of its main internal weapons bays apparently loaded with Kh-69 standoff missiles:

Regardless of launch platform, the nature of the war in Ukraine make that the S-71M particularly useful. Russia has increasingly relied on extemporized glide bombs for attacks against targets relatively close to the front, but those weapons require the launching aircraft to operate within a certain distance of Ukrainian defenses. At least in their earlier iterations, such weapons were also crude and prone to failure. Longer-range cruise missiles offer considerably greater standoff but are more complex and expensive. The S-71M sits somewhere between those categories, providing an air-launched, powered weapon with a relatively large warhead and some degree of low observability without the cost and complexity of a full-size, truly stealthy cruise missile.

The S-71K appears to represent a more capable version of the basic concept. Public information remains limited, but the weapon has been associated with electro-optical guidance and greater onboard processing, potentially giving it a capability to deal with targets in a more flexible manner than the largely pre-programmed S-71M. Exactly how that capability is employed, and how autonomous the weapon actually is, remain less clear from the imagery and information released to date.

As displayed at El Alamein, the S-71K retains the overall faceted, low-observable appearance of the S-71M but has a visibly different airframe and wing arrangement. Its body is notably broad and compact relative to its length, with folding wings that are relatively thick, and a more refined inverted-V tail giving it more the appearance of a small uncrewed aircraft than a conventional air-to-surface missile.

Meanwhile, the Banderol represents a somewhat different path to the same general problem. Ukraine’s intelligence service previously obtained and analyzed an example of the small jet-powered cruise missile, which TWZ reported on last year. The weapon is considerably smaller than Russia’s principal cruise missiles and has been associated with launch from drones and helicopters. Its reported range of around 500 kilometers (311 miles) and relatively small warhead make it something of a complementary system intended to provide another, more economical way of putting a precision weapon onto a target from the air.

In terms of its appearance, the Banderol is more conventionally missile-like, with an ogival central fuselage, a pointed nose, and sharply swept folding wings. Its proportions underline just how small it is compared with Russia’s better-known air-launched cruise missiles.

The Banderol is particularly relevant in the context of the economics of the Ukraine conflict. Russian forces have increasingly used combinations of relatively inexpensive one-way attack drones and more expensive cruise and ballistic missiles. The drones can be produced in large numbers and used to complicate air-defense operations, while the more capable missiles provide greater speed, range, payload, or penetration capability. A small turbojet-powered weapon such as Banderol offers another point on that spectrum.

At leats one image has recently emerged showing a Banderol carried by a Russian Mi-28NM Havoc attack helicopter. This would be in line with unconfirmed reports from Ukraine last month that Russia was using the Mi-28 as an additional launch platform for the weapon, including firing them from over the Sea of Azov to attack targets around Odesa.

Its reported use also illustrates how the distinction between a cruise missile and a large one-way attack drone is becoming increasingly blurred. The Banderol incorporates a conventional missile-like airframe and jet propulsion but has been associated with drone operations and makes extensive use of commercially available components. TWZ’s earlier examination of the weapon also highlighted the extent to which modern Russian weapons programs can combine relatively simple airframes with foreign-sourced electronics and propulsion technology.

Likely Banderol loitering munition on the ground (perspective exaggerates it’s size) and under Orion drone.

Banderol has been reported as one of the munition used in recent strikes and appears to use a jet engine and a FAB-100 warhead or similar. pic.twitter.com/j50DUsNuVe

— krakek (@krakek1) April 27, 2025

Seen together at El Alamein, the three weapons provide an unusually useful snapshot of where Russian air-launched strike development is heading. They are presented alongside a fourth, so-far unidentified munition. This unnamed weapon is notably short and fat, with a cruciform tail, and an optical window in the nose. Its overall size and shape suggest it may have been developed specifically to arm drones.

The appearance of the weapons at an arms fair underscores the fact that Russia is not the only country confronting the problem of producing and fielding sufficient precision weapons at an acceptable cost. The growing interest in lower-cost cruise missiles, loitering munitions, attritable aircraft, and other forms of expendable precision strike is now evident well beyond Russia.

Russia is also clearly trying to make these weapons harder to intercept, an increasingly important consideration as Ukrainian air defenses have demonstrated an ability to shoot down even glide bombs in some circumstances. The S-71K in particular incorporates unusually pronounced low-observable shaping, suggesting that survivability was also a central requirement from the outset.

There is, however, a significant complication to Russia’s attempt to turn its wartime experience into an export opportunity. Buying any kind of weapons from Moscow has become considerably more difficult because of sanctions, restrictions on access to foreign technology and financing, and the wider political risks associated with maintaining a Russian defense relationship. Those factors matter just as much to a prospective customer as the performance of the weapon itself.

Author’s note: earlier reporting on the S-71 family appears to have transposed the S-71K and S-71M versions. Most authoritative accounts now indicate that the more refined, more stealthy version is the S-71K Kovyor (meaning carpet), while the simpler weapon is the S-71M Monokhrom.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Cairo, Egypt – Four days after he disappeared from the Egyptian team camp at the 2026 Under-20 World Wrestling Championships in Slovakia last month, 19-year-old wrestler Ziad Hajjaj Abu Gabal posted a message on Facebook.

“I don’t want my mother and father to be upset with me,” he wrote on August 29. “I did this so I could see myself as a man. I won’t go back to Egypt, my beloved country, until I bring it honour.

“Everything I earn in a month is 700 Egyptian pounds [$13.7], and I’m an international [athlete] … After all this pressure, there was no way I could go back.”

On August 27, another Egyptian wrestler, Mohamed al-Shami, 23, had escaped while his team transited through Rome on their way home from the Mediterranean Games in Taranto, Italy.

In his Facebook post on August 29, Al-Shami said he had come to feel like a financial burden on his family and that he wanted to start earning money for them.

“At a certain point I felt my father was exhausted, that life had become too hard for him,” he wrote. “I’m the eldest of my siblings, so someone had to make a sacrifice and take responsibility.”

While the authorities in Egypt may now try to take legal action against the two athletes, their posts drew a wave of sympathy from Egyptians on Facebook, with many saying they understood the pressures that pushed the athletes to escape from a country mired in poverty.

Indeed, Hajjaj and al-Shami are far from the first Egyptian wrestlers to flee while abroad, and the hardships they describe are widely shared across the sport in Egypt.

Debt and despair

A 27-year-old wrestler, who won several gold medals for Egypt and asked not to be named, told Al Jazeera that fellow athletes under 20 years old earn 700 Egyptian pounds ($13.7) to 800 ($15.7) Egyptian pounds a month.

Older international players reportedly receive between 5,000 pounds ($98.2) and 12,000 pounds ($235.7) a month, depending on their achievements.

“Wrestlers often go into debt to cover supplements and living costs while waiting for prize money that may or may not arrive,” he said.

Ahmed Baghdouda left for France in 2023 immediately after winning silver at the African Wrestling Championships, reportedly over low pay. Tarek Abdel Salam defected to Bulgaria in 2017 amid alleged medical neglect and later won European gold under Bulgaria’s flag. That year, Ibrahim Ghanem also chose to stay in France, subsequently winning a World Championship title for the country.

In October 2025, Mohamed Ibrahim el-Sayed – popular as Kishu and a six-time African wrestling champion, two-time U23 world champion, and bronze medallist in the 67kg category at the Tokyo 2020 Olympics – announced he had taken “the first step” towards switching his sporting allegiance to represent the United States, posting training photos from a facility with the US flag behind him.

Asked by Al Jazeera through a messaging app why wrestlers keep fleeing Egypt, Kishu blamed the wrestling federation.

“It’s the only body that can provide a suitable environment, but the opposite keeps happening,” he said from the US. “The problem isn’t just about money – it goes much deeper than that. When I retire, what am I supposed to do? God forbid I get injured – what happens to me then?”

“I would take the same decision again and again and I advise Egypt’s international players to focus on their training and acquire their rights because it’s their lives that are being wasted.”

Al Jazeera reached out to the president and the vice president of the Egyptian Wrestling Federation (EWF), as well as the president of the Egyptian National Olympic Committee (ENOC), for their comments, but none of them responded.

However, the EWF’s team psychologist Hossam Mohamed said the disappearance of players abroad is not simply down to poor financial compensation or neglect, insisting the state provides good support to wrestlers – whether through financial bonuses, training camps abroad, or accommodation and meals. He said medal bonuses can reach 5 million Egyptian pounds ($98,135) for an Olympic gold.

“The wrestling federation, compared to major sports federations, has limited resources in light of the absence of broadcasting rights and the commercial and audience revenues enjoyed by football,” he noted.

“[But the] core problem for [athletes] isn’t only what they receive during their playing years, but what awaits them after retirement or injury.”

On Hajjaj and al-Shami, he said they competed in international championships, but “receiving bonuses is tied to achieving results – a player who doesn’t finish in a top position doesn’t receive a tournament bonus”, and neither was able to achieve podium finishes in recent competitions.

Gamal el-Badrawy, a former head of Egypt’s kickboxing federation, called on the Ministry of Youth and Sports to impose tighter oversight of national sporting federations and to review bonuses, allowances and health insurance.

“[Athletes] cannot be entirely absolved of responsibility, but the weak financial and administrative system is the main driver,” he told Al Jazeera.

Prosecutors investigate

Meanwhile, Egypt’s Ministry of Youth and Sports has referred Hajjaj and al-Shami to the public prosecutor, accusing them of breaking the rules governing national delegations.

The ENOC separately referred Brigadier General Ibrahim Adel – EWF secretary-general and head of the wrestling delegation at the tournament in Taranto – to its ethics committee for investigation and suspended him from his duties for allowing al-Shami to escape.

Adel refused to comment on the criticisms against the EWF, but told Al Jazeera he believed the moves against him were unfair, pointing to precautionary measures already in place before the trip: notarised undertakings signed by both the players’ guardians and the players themselves committing them to return to Egypt.

Meanwhile, fleeing athletes often leave behind distressed families.

Hajjaj’s father, Hajjaj Abu Gabal, told Al Jazeera over the phone that he was deeply worried for his son after he left the national team in Slovakia, noting that he had switched off his phone for a long time and did not respond to calls.

“I signed the notarised parental consent required for my underage son to travel,” he said, as 21 is the age of full legal adulthood in Egypt. “But no one from the wrestling federation had contacted me since the escape.”

Hajjaj, according to his father, said wrestling required expenses for food, drink, clothing and other needs, including costs related to the training period and participation in championships, and these expenses were a burden on him and the family.

“Whatever happens, he’s still my son,” the father said.

“I keep praying for him to be safe and secure, and may God compensate him for the difficult times he went through.”

This article was published in collaboration with Egab, a platform that empowers journalists from across the Global South to publish stories in international media outlets.

US sanctions Turkish bank over alleged IRGC ties, accusing it of facilitating millions in transactions for Iran.

The United States Treasury Department has imposed sanctions on a Turkish bank and its subsidiaries over alleged ties to Iran, as Washington seeks to economically isolate Tehran.

The Treasury Department accused Golden Global Yatirim Bankasi Anonim Sirketi (Golden Global Bank) on Friday of facilitating “tens of millions of dollars’ worth of transactions for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force” and providing the Iranian government with banking access to move its funds internationally.

Washington alleged the bank “was established for the purpose of enabling Iran’s rahbar network [shadow banking system] to transfer oil revenues from China to Turkey” using gold and cash.

Golden Global Bank responded on Friday, saying it fulfilled all local and international banking compliance rules and would take legal action against the US-imposed sanctions.

There are no transactions conducted by Golden Global Bank that could substantiate the claims made by the US, the bank said in a news release.

“We will exercise all our rights of objection and legal recourse in the most effective manner and will take the necessary actions at the earliest against these allegations and the decision,” the Turkish bank added.

“Financial institutions continue to find out the hard way that we are serious about Operation Economic Outcast,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in a statement published by the department on Friday.

The sanctions place the bank and its two subsidiaries on the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)’s Specially Designated Nationals list, cutting off access to the US financial system.

The bank said individuals and entities named in the OFAC decision “have never been and are not currently customers” of Golden Global.

US Ambassador to Turkiye Tom Barrack said on Saturday that it would be a mistake for Turkish officials “to read [the US’s] narrow measure as a judgement upon Turkiye”.

“The health of the Turkish financial system is not in question; the conduct of one institution was,” Barrack said on X.

Last week, the US took steps towards severing the UAE operations of Egypt’s second-largest bank from financial access after accusing it of processing transactions for companies linked to Iran’s shadow-banking system.

Bessent said on Tuesday on the sidelines of a G20 summit that Washington would likely announce a bank sanction this week and another next week, as it ramps up its economic campaign against Tehran.

Hubert Bartkowiak, from Gniezno in Poland, was told he had to pay £8,640 for three rooms for three nights at the Luxor View Hotel in Egypt, or his reservation would be cancelled

Holidaymakers are being told to pay 12 times more for hotel rooms after booking – or face a cancelled reservation. Forward-thinking Hubert Bartkowiak had been looking forward to a trip to Luxor, Egypt, with friends.

The Pole had booked three rooms for four people at the Luxor View Hotel over a year before the holiday, through Booking.com, forking out $1,040 (£768) for three nights, working out at £64 per person, per night. Hubert, from Gniezno, was shocked to receive a message from the hotel demanding 12 times as much, otherwise the booking would be cancelled.

“Please note that prices have increased; for your booking during this period, the room will be $1,300 (£960) a night,” the message read. With each of the three rooms costing £960 a night, he faced a bill of £8,640. When he refused to pay, the hotel worker implied the reservation would be cancelled and the hotel closed “for renovations” if Hubert turned up.

Do you have a travel story to share? Email webtravel@reachplc.com

“The hotel will be closed for renovations. You’re free to leave. You won’t have any rooms,” a message seen by the Mirror reads. After The Mirror contacted Booking.com on Hubert’s behalf, the hotel decided to honour his booking at the original rate.

However, there are many more people heading to Spain, Tunisia, Egypt and other countries in the path of next August’s eclipse who have already had their bookings cancelled as prices spike. “Raising prices I can understand as demand is high, but changing the price after making a reservation or cancelling it for a better offer is simply unfair,” Hubert said.

Another spurned holidaymaker is Kara Wiley. She booked a hotel in Luxor, paying $681 (£504) for three nights, only to receive a message from the owner demanding $3,900 (£2,886). “This is not affordable for me, and my flights are already booked,” she wrote in a post on a Facebook group.

Facebook groups and Reddit threads are full of such horror stories, with many eclipse hunters now worried that they’ll arrive ahead of the August 2 to discover they’ve nowhere to stay.

Such a scenario befell David Tunnicliffe, who booked a villa in Escalona del Prado, Spain, two years before the eclipse this August. “It was just cancelled by the host one day before we were due to arrive for a week. Sucks to be me, I guess!” David said. David was blanked by the accommodation provider, and his emails bounced. Luckily, David managed to book back-up accommodation at the last minute. It cost twice as much, but the booking platform he used agreed to pay the extra expense.

On Monday, August 2 next year, the moon will block the sun starting in the Atlantic Ocean, crossing southern Spain and North Africa, and moving through the Middle East and the Horn of Africa before ending in the Indian Ocean. The event has been dubbed “the eclipse of the century” due to the length of totality. Total darkness will descend for 6 minutes and 23 seconds in some areas, including Luxor. That is roughly three times the duration of this year’s eclipse.

Following the eclipse this August and the buzz that’s generated, accommodation prices for next year have rocketed. In El Palmar, a villa for six people located around 600 metres from the beach will cost €33,129 (£28,379) for one night. Split between the six potential guests, that would be around €5,522 (£4,730) per person.

According to Citizens Advice, customers should check the terms and conditions for the holiday or booking they’ve made to see if they allow the company to increase the price. Look for something like ‘price variation’ – this means the price can change. They can’t increase it if the terms and conditions don’t allow it. Even if the terms and conditions allow price increases, the company can only increase the price because of:

• fuel price rises which mean transport costs have gone up
• changes to taxes or fees by third parties – like tourist taxes
• exchange rates which affect the price of the holiday

The company has to let you know in writing about their plans to increase the price. They also have to give you a reasonable time to tell them if you accept it or want to cancel. If they’re offering another package instead, they must tell you how much it costs.

The company must tell you about the price rise at least 20 days before the package starts and explain why they put the price up. You have the right to cancel the holiday without paying a fee if the increase is more than 8% – you’ll get back any money you’ve already paid.

The United States has said it will cut off the UAE operations of Banque Misr from the US financial system after accusing Egypt’s second-biggest bank of doing business with the Iranian government.

“ Treasury promised to sever every economic lifeline Tehran has left and finally end the threat of the Iranian regime,” US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent said in a statement on Friday.

“We also warned that Iran’s enablers cannot continue to enjoy access to the US dollar and the global financial system. Banque Misr UAE decided to find out the hard way, and today, we are taking the first step in holding it accountable for its continued, egregious support of the Iranian regime,” he said.

Banque Misr said on Saturday that it was reviewing the US Treasury’s notice.

The move, announced on Friday, comes as Washington has stepped up its efforts to economically pressure Iran, dubbed Operation Economic Outcast, amid the deadlocked truce talks.

Last week, the US Treasury also imposed new sanctions on nearly 60 individuals and entities, targeting networks accused by Washington of helping Iran generate oil revenue, procure weapons and conduct cyber operations.

Iran has, however, rejected the latest US sanctions, with Economy Minister Ali Madanizadeh saying they will fail.

So, what exactly is this financial limit on Banque Misr? How will it work?

Here’s what we know:

What is the new US financial limit on Banque Misr?

On Friday, the US Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposed a rule that would revoke Banque Misr UAE’s correspondent banking access to US financial institutions.

This means that only the UAE branches of Egypt’s second-largest bank will be unable to carry out transactions in dollars and will lose access to the US financial market.

In a statement on Friday, the Treasury said that Banque Misr UAE is a critical node for the Iranian regime’s access to US dollars. It added that it estimates that “between January 2024 and June 2026, Banque Misr UAE processed approximately $1.8bn for 103 companies that are potentially part of Iranian shadow banking networks”.

The treasury added that in order to generate revenue abroad, Iran relies “on multi-jurisdictional shadow banking networks that provide key access to US dollar correspondent banking relationships”.

Banque Misr UAE’s customers include “front companies used by Iran’s Ministry of Defence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to evade US sanctions, as well as to launder money on behalf of Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei,” the Treasury said.

The US government’s proposed punishment is expected to come into effect in 30 days after a public comment period, and will not impact any other branches of the bank.

What has Banque Misr said?

On Saturday, the bank said in a statement that it was reviewing the US Treasury notice.

It said the new “regulatory measures (by the US) are subject to an official period for receiving and studying comments before a final decision is made regarding them.” The bank added that it “is dealing with these measures and the data and estimates they contain with the utmost seriousness and attention, and is studying them thoroughly.”

The bank announced that it will also contact the US Treasury Department for further information and until then, said its branch in the UAE continues to provide banking services to its customers in accordance with the applicable rules and procedures.

Earlier, on Friday, the Central Bank of Egypt said that, together with Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was in contact with US authorities on Banque Misr’s UAE branches.

“The CBE (Central Bank of Egypt) affirms that this measure is limited to Banque Misr UAE’s USD transactions with correspondent banks only. It does not affect any other bank within the Egyptian banking sector, including Banque Misr’s operations in Egypt or any of its other overseas branches,” it highlighted.

What has the UAE said?

The UAE’s banking authorities have said they have launched an investigation into Banque Misr’s operations there.

The UAE central bank said in a statement on Sunday that it had decided to conduct a “special and urgent examination” of Banque Misr’s branches in the country, including “a forensic/in-depth lookback covering the period referred to in the statement issued by the US authorities”.

“The Central Bank expects banks licensed in the UAE not to expose the UAE’s financial system to reputational risks, to respect the laws and regulations of the countries whose financial institutions are used in conducting transactions and not to misuse the advanced financial infrastructure of the UAE,” it added in a statement.

Who else has the US taken action against?

Besides Banque Misr, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on Reza Mohammad Taeedi, the general manager of the Dubai branch of Iran’s Bank Melli, under a counterterrorism authority.

“Bank Melli has facilitated billions of dollars’ worth of transactions through accounts controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF). It has allowed the IRGC-QF and its parent organisation, the IRGC, to move funds inside and outside of Iran. The IRGC-QF’s accounts at Bank Melli have also been used to fund Iranian-aligned proxies and partners, including in Iraq,” the Treasury department said in a statement.

Simultaneously, another Treasury department statement said that OFAC has also sanctioned Hong Kong-based Kameng Trading Limited, which allegedly “aided sanctioned Iranian persons in accessing the international financial system.”

“Sanctioned Iranian exchange house Pedram Pirouzan Exchange House, also known as Opal Exchange, has used Kameng Trading Limited to launder money for Iran,” the Treasury Department said.

Why is the US sanctioning companies doing business with Iran?

Ahead of Friday’s sanctions, on Monday August 24 , the United States announced sanctions on Iran and various global entities doing business with the country, in what officials called an “economic D-Day” and officially dubbed “Operation Economic Outcast” in an effort to isolate Tehran.

At least 60 entities across the Middle East, Asia and Europe have been targeted in the latest sanctions as part of the economic pressure campaign that could further disrupt energy markets and rattle the global economy.

Nearly six months into its war on Iran, the US is seeing little impact from its military operations.

The long-term implications of the war, analysts say, have pushed the Trump administration to try economic sanctions, but these are unlikely to compel Iran into meeting the demands.

“The United States is returning to economic pressure because military force has failed to deliver the quick victory it expected,” Negar Mortazavi, senior fellow at the US-based Center for International Policy, told Al Jazeera last week.

“The ‘economic D-Day’ declaration underscores the war’s failure so far to force Iran’s surrender or achieve Washington’s political objectives.”

Iran has rejected the sanctions.

Last week, Iranian government spokeswoman, Fatemeh Mohajerani, said the government and President Masoud Pezeshkian will guide Iran through these developments.

“The government and the president, with wisdom and resolve, will guide the country through this phase as well. We do not deny the economic hardships; but with sound judgment and by preserving unity, as in days past, we will pass through this intense gauntlet,” she posted on X.

Sardar Mohebi, an IRGC spokesperson, said the US resorting to economic warfare against Iran is itself proof of its defeat on the battlefield.

Ali Akbar Dareini, a researcher at the Centre for Strategic Studies in Tehran, said Iran is so accustomed to sanctions that it will not be hindered too greatly by the new list the US announced.

“[Iran] has a PhD in circumventing sanctions, so Iran is absolutely sure that it will emerge victorious and the US once again will fail in its efforts to suffocate Iran,” Dareini told Al Jazeera last week.

“The goal of the sanctions is to bring about an economic collapse and cause riots in Iran, but this is based on a big, massive miscalculation like America’s military war of aggression against Iran on February 28 that failed.”

The upcoming official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Egypt, scheduled for August 30 to September 3, 2026, coincides with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. The visit will address economic and technological cooperation, as well as regional and international issues, and marks the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Egypt and China. The visit aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries and expand Beijing’s economic and political influence in the Middle East amidst escalating regional and international tensions, while also bolstering China’s role in the Global South.

As an Egyptian academic specializing in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can analyze and summarize the significance of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo and his meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and its importance to China’s influence in the Middle East and the Global South through the following points:

– First: What does China hope to achieve with Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt at this particular time?

This visit of President Xi Jinping to Cairo (the first by a Chinese president to Cairo in nearly a decade) coincides with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It carries several key objectives, including political and international dimensions related to Chinese coordination with Egypt on Middle Eastern issues. The visit comes at a sensitive time, as the region is experiencing tensions linked to the conflict between Iran and the United States and its repercussions on maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets. Beijing also seeks to strengthen its strategic balance and reaffirm its diplomatic presence as an international power that supports diplomatic solutions and cooperates with pivotal countries like Egypt to achieve stability. This follows President Xi Jinping’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.  President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo also carries several economic and trade dimensions, such as expanding the economic partnership and capitalizing on the significant increase in trade between the two countries to deepen cooperation. Furthermore, China will support infrastructure and energy projects in Egypt by boosting Chinese investments in Cairo, including renewable energy sectors such as wind turbine manufacturing plants, transportation deals, and electric trains, in addition to extending currency swap agreements between the two central banks.

The visit also aims to discuss the technological and artificial intelligence file in China’s relations with Cairo, particularly major technological offers, most notably the offer from the Chinese company Huawei to build data and artificial intelligence centers in Egypt. This project is viewed with apprehension by intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Washington, which are attempting to offer Cairo alternatives from major American technology companies such as Microsoft, Nvidia, and AMD.

– Second: Does the visit carry political messages that extend beyond bilateral relations, especially regarding the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit carries major strategic political messages that transcend the framework of bilateral cooperation. It aims to reshape the international order and build a multipolar world, starting with the Global South. The visit also carries messages that go beyond bilateral relations, pushing for a Global South leadership role. Beijing seeks to garner African and Arab support to assert its position as a major power, offering an alternative to Western and American competition and influence. China also aims to promote multilateralism by urging countries in the region to adopt common positions that support international stability and security, moving away from the unilateral polarization of the United States. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping’s visit signals China’s desire to secure its economic interests. Chinese actions are focused on ensuring the security of maritime routes and the stability of energy and trade markets within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Here, President Xi’s visit to Cairo coincides with the launch of the second iteration of the massive joint air exercises, Eagles of Civilization, in August 2026 at Egyptian air bases. These exercises, which follow the first iteration in May 2025, will involve advanced fighter jets from both sides. This sends political and strategic messages to Washington and Tel Aviv about the new military partnership between Egypt and China, the diversification of arms sources, and the independence of Egyptian military and political decision-making in diversifying its partnerships.

Furthermore, the Chinese president’s visit to Cairo carries support for Egypt’s regional role in the Middle East and Africa, reaffirming the pivotal role of Egypt. Choosing Egypt as a starting point reflects Beijing’s understanding of its geopolitical importance as a key link between the Arab world and the African continent and its commitment to addressing regional repercussions. China is also demonstrating its readiness to cooperate with its African and Arab partners to contain the economic crises resulting from conflicts in the Middle East.  In addition to China’s anticipated plan to expand alliances by strengthening the integration of Chinese development projects with major economic blocs such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, this visit also aims to coordinate common positions on de-escalation and maintaining peace and security in the Middle East and to discuss regional conflicts, particularly in the wake of the Gaza and Iran wars.

– Third: What economic files could witness new agreements or steps between Cairo and Beijing?

Economic relations between Cairo and Beijing are increasingly moving towards signing new agreements and taking new steps focused on strengthening joint investments and supporting financial stability. The most prominent joint economic and investment files between Egypt and China are based on supporting financial partnership and currency diversification. This involves renewing and strengthening local currency swap agreements between the Central Bank of Egypt and its Chinese counterpart to facilitate trade and support monetary stability, independent of international currencies. Economic cooperation and currency swaps will be among the top economic priorities of the visit through monitoring the surge in trade and extending the local currency swap agreement to enhance economic partnership within the BRICS framework.

Furthermore, there is a shared Chinese-Egyptian desire to localize industry and technology in Cairo by attracting substantial Chinese investments in electric vehicle manufacturing, new and renewable energy sectors, and advanced technology industries. With the expansion of Chinese projects in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, through the expansion of Chinese industrial and logistical projects within the Suez Canal Corridor, a major value-added production base is being established. China is also supporting Egypt in achieving food security and agricultural development by preparing joint Egyptian-Chinese alliances targeting large-scale agricultural land reclamation projects to enhance food security. This is happening concurrently with Chinese support for infrastructure and smart cities in Egypt through cooperation in urban development projects and modern smart cities.

– Fourth: Can China strengthen Egypt’s role as a key hub for its projects in the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, China is already strengthening Egypt’s role as a key and central hub for its strategic projects in the Middle East and Africa. The pillars of Chinese strategic cooperation with Egypt are based on China’s projects and investments within the Belt and Road Initiative. China considers Egypt a strategic gateway and a vital corridor for the maritime and land Silk Road, given the Suez Canal’s role as a global trade artery.  With the diversification of Chinese partnerships and investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, given the concentration of major industrial projects by Chinese companies in the zone, such as the China-Egypt Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (TEDA). China aims to access African markets through Egypt. Chinese companies utilize Egyptian land and ports as a joint manufacturing base and a launchpad for exporting products and services to markets across Africa and the Middle East. China also seeks to achieve developmental and security integration with Egypt, aligning its five-year development plans with Egypt’s Vision 2030. This is further evidenced by the development of joint military cooperation and air exercises between Egypt and China, such as the Eagles of Civilization exercises between the Egyptian and Chinese air forces, the first iteration of which took place in May 2025 and the second in August 2026.

Beijing also seeks to disseminate artificial intelligence and innovation technologies through Egypt to the African continent, the Middle East, and the Global South.  Especially since Egypt hosts a number of Chinese companies across various sectors, particularly technology, such as Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, ZTE, Midea, and Haier. Furthermore, a $300 million investment fund has been established with Tsinghua University in China, focusing on artificial intelligence and semiconductor design.

– Fifth: To what extent can the Egyptian-Chinese partnership affect the balance of American influence in the region?

The Egyptian-Chinese partnership significantly impacts American influence in the Middle East by diversifying China’s economic and political alliances in the region. However, it does not eliminate the strategic alliances between the United States and several countries in the region, particularly the Gulf states. The partnership between Egypt and China is based on the economic and financial dimension, including major Chinese investments in Egypt. China is pouring billions of dollars into infrastructure projects and the Suez Canal region. China also supports Egypt’s bid to join the BRICS group, led by China and Russia, to reduce its dependence on the dollar and the Western and American financial system. Furthermore, China is keen to closely integrate its Belt and Road Initiative projects with the Egyptian economy. The partnership between Egypt and China also rests on the diplomatic and strategic dimension as well as the diversification of alliances. Egypt pursues a balanced foreign policy that is not limited to a single ally.  Here, the partnership with China grants Egypt greater freedom of movement and a wider margin to maneuver, free from American political conditions and pressures, particularly in the areas of armament and military deals. This creates a delicate balance for Egypt, as it refuses to fully align itself with one power against another, maintaining its security partnership with Washington alongside its relationship with Beijing.

In this context, Beijing does not view Egypt merely as an economic partner, but rather as a strategic gateway and a pivotal pillar of its geopolitical influence in the Middle East and Africa, countering American penetration. This approach stems from China’s desire to fill the political and military vacuums resulting from the decline or fluctuation of the Western and American presence in the region. To this end, China leverages Cairo’s historical and political weight as a platform to expand its diplomatic influence and build partnerships with other countries in Africa and the Arab world. China’s support for Egypt’s membership in the BRICS bloc has provided Beijing with a strong regional ally, bolstering its vision for reshaping the global financial system into a multipolar order in the face of the United States’ unilateral hegemony in the region. This is especially significant given that Egypt represents a crucial land and sea crossroads for China’s Belt and Road Initiative via the Maritime Silk Road, considering the strategic and vital importance of the Suez Canal.

– Sixth: Does Beijing want Egypt merely as an economic partner, or does it see it as a strategic gateway for its influence in the Middle East and Africa?

Beijing views Egypt as a major strategic gateway for its influence, not just an ordinary economic partner. The relationship combines commercial interests with broad geopolitical ties. The economic dimension is based on the importance of the Suez Canal. China considers the Suez Canal a key artery for its trade with Europe and the rest of the world, and it is investing heavily to connect Egyptian ports and roads to its major commercial projects related to its Belt and Road Initiative. In addition to China’s role as a major logistics hub in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, numerous Chinese companies have established factories there to export goods. This is further compounded by Egypt’s strategic and political importance, as well as its sensitive geographical location, which is crucial to China’s interests. Egypt’s position at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe serves China’s regional influence. This coincided with China’s support for Egypt’s formal accession to the BRICS group, a move fully backed by China to bolster both countries’ political and economic weight globally.

Beijing also focuses on the growing security and military dimension of its relationship with Cairo to secure investments and international maritime routes. Chinese ambitions extend beyond simply selling goods; it seeks a greater role in protecting its interests and citizens by strengthening military cooperation with Cairo and diversifying defense partnerships with countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South through Egypt. Beijing sees the growing military cooperation and arms sales to Egypt and the region as an opportunity to undermine Western and American military influence and to forge closer ties with the Egyptian army, one of the largest armies on the African continent. This is the true objective of China in transforming Egypt into a political and military hub that guarantees Beijing’s vital interests in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South.

Accordingly, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo comes at a time when Beijing seeks to strengthen its engagement in the Middle East and expand its relations with developing countries and the Global South, coinciding with escalating competition with the United States for economic and technological influence. Xi’s visit to Cairo also carries significance that transcends bilateral relations, given the ongoing repercussions of a potential US war with Iran and the instability in global energy markets. Therefore, China seeks to leverage Egypt’s pivotal role in achieving regional stability, mitigating crises, and protecting its interests in the Middle East and Africa.

While many tourists flock to Cairo and Giza to see the Pyramids, there’s one perfect spot for history buffs that goes unnoticed

Drifting 2,000 feet above the ground in cloudless skies, I can hardly fathom that the only thing keeping me from plummeting to the ground is a balloon full of hot air and an engine spurting fire.

But here I am, in a hot air balloon rising high above the Valley of the Queens in Luxor, Egypt. It’s one of the most breathtaking things I’ve ever seen – 20 or so other balloons bobbing around us as we take in the ancient temples and ruins dotting the land below us.

Our pilot reaches around his flight contraption to point out the Temple of Hatshepsut. There’s lush green vegetation, too, and people as small as ants working on uncovering more historical sites less than a mile beneath our basket.

I honestly thought I’d be more scared than this, but aside from a slightly bumpy landing – thankfully away from any farmers’ fields in the vicinity – the balloon ride is smooth and offers an incredible view of the landscape.

I arrived in Luxor after three nights spent in the tourist haven of Marsa Alam, on the coast of the nearby Red Sea. Switching the ocean for the River Nile – with our hotel, the Sonesta St. George, located right on the riverbank and accessible by boat – isn’t a hardship at all, and the buildings surrounding me are simply stunning.

A few hours’ drive from Marsa, holidaymakers who travel with TUI can access Luxor for a day excursion or longer. It’s 100% worth the early start and winding coach journey through the nearby desert to reach the historic city, founded in 3000 BC.

Stepping into the hustle and bustle of Luxor, I can imagine exactly what people like Agatha Christie and Howard Carter must have felt doing the same all those years ago.

Along with our incredible hot air balloon trip, I’m whisked away to the Valley of the Kings for a closer look at the ancient tombs, including the one which holds Tutankhamun’s mummy, still meticulously preserved after all those centuries.

Uncovered in 1922, the tomb had been covered in a mountain of rubble from excavations happening higher up on the hill, leaving archaeologists baffled until they finally found its location.

Honestly, I’m not sure why so many more tourists opt for Cairo and Giza over this. Of course, Luxor doesn’t have any pyramids of its own, but there are plenty of sphinxes, statues and incredible temples which offer access to the public.

Seeing the bright colours of the tombs – reds and blues and yellows – and the ancient hieroglyphs still etched into walls and columns is truly surreal. Along with the famous Valley of the Kings, we visit Karnak Temple – which Agatha Christie famously named her Nile steamer after – and Luxor Temple, along with Hatshepsut Temple.

Our guide points out the “first ever spreadsheet”, made so many centuries before the release of Microsoft Excel, and used to count up the food offerings made to the gods when the temples were still in use.

We’re shown the endless line of sphinx statues in various states of disrepair, lining a huge corridor which bridges the temples of Karnak and Luxor together. ‘Sphinx Alley’, as it is so aptly named, was used for the annual Opet Festival, which would see the Ancient Egyptians carry statues of their gods in a parade between the two temples.

All the while, though, I’m certainly not missing out on the metropolitan feel Luxor has to offer. A trip to the local bazaar plunges me right into the heart of the city’s merchant district, and I’m at once surrounded by a gaggle of stall owners attempting to sell me jewellery, T-shirts and Egyptian perfumes.

There’s time to stop for a delicious meal at the historic Winter Palace hotel’s 1886 restaurant, where jackets and ties for men aren’t optional and “smart” clothing is recommended for ladies. It’s the same hotel frequented by big names such as Howard Carter, Tony Blair and Lord Carnarvon.

It’s worth it solely for the hotel’s opulence, however. Artwork lines the corridors, while huge windows look out onto the sweeping gardens, where live music tinkles gently by an impressive fountain.

My hotel itself, the Sonesta St. George, blends traditional Egyptian architecture with modern luxury. Some of the rooms have their own saunas tucked away in the bathrooms, and the property boasts a heated swimming pool overlooking the Nile.

TUI offers all-inclusive packages and bounteous excursions in Luxor, so it’s not somewhere I’d describe as a hidden gem when so many UK tourists choose Cairo as an entry point. But a little deeper into the country you’ll find so much incredible history – though don’t bank on seeing any pyramids.

Book the holiday

TUI offers seven-night holidays to Marsa Alam, Egypt staying at the 5T Jaz Elite Amara on an all-inclusive basis from £990 per person. Book at tui.co.uk or on the TUI app.