Egypt

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi surprised observers when he recently announced his intention to leave office after his third presidential term ends in April 2030.

El-Sisi had been widely suspected of moving to amend the Egyptian constitution to allow him to serve another term, or possibly indefinitely.

But speaking at a graduation ceremony at the Egyptian Military Academy, el-Sisi insisted that his departure was a settled matter and that “no one would tamper with” the constitution.

So what is behind the decision? There has been much speculation that el-Sisi may use this declaration to rally popular support for a fourth term or preempt a move by the military against him. But there is also the possibility that he is setting up the next phase of military rule in Egypt.

It is important to point out first that voluntarily leaving power is a risky proposition for any authoritarian leader.

In el-Sisi’s case, his 2030 departure would leave open the possibility that a future Egyptian government could seek to use him as a scapegoat for the country’s problems, possibly even holding him to account for alleged crimes committed during his presidency.

El-Sisi led a coup in 2013 against Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, which was accompanied by massacres and the jailing of tens of thousands of politicians, activists, and journalists.

El-Sisi’s economic record has also been the subject of criticism, with detractors accusing him and his government of corruption, poor fiscal policy and lavish spending on vanity projects. Egypt’s debt stands at 81 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), with interest payments alone exceeding combined spending on healthcare, education, wages and subsidies. Meanwhile, the Egyptian pound has lost more than 80 percent of its value against the US dollar since 2014, while cumulative inflation exceeds 460 percent.

In this context, el-Sisi’s announcement that he plans to step down in 2030 was rather unexpected. Some have speculated that he has no intention of actually leaving office and could go back on his statement, as he has done before.

In 2013, following Morsi’s overthrow, el-Sisi denied that he would run for president.

After telling the media in 2017 that he was committed to “preserving [the constitution’s] two four-year terms and not changing it”, he helped lead the drive to amend the constitution in 2019.

A judicial source told Mada Masr last week that el-Sisi’s announcement left open the door for a “popular call” for the president to remain in office.

A second possibility is that with this move, el-Sisi may be attempting to preempt a possible military intervention, which could become more likely if the economy continues to falter.

In 2011, the military responded to popular protests against former President Hosni Mubarak by forcing him to step down.

The army could attempt to defuse public anger by presenting el-Sisi as a scapegoat, forcibly removing him from power, and replacing him with someone who can preserve a measure of stability as well as secure its vast economic interests.

In that context, a member of parliament said recently that he has heard el-Sisi say in private meetings that he would rather step down than wait for the military to force him out.

But a third and much more likely possibility deserves particular attention: el-Sisi may be preparing to leave the presidency while ensuring that Egypt’s military-dominated political system survives his departure.

It is perhaps not coincidental that during the announcement, he cited Article 200 of the constitution, which gives the armed forces an extraordinary role in Egyptian politics.

The article, amended in 2019, makes the military responsible for maintaining the country’s “democracy” and the “gains, rights and freedoms” of the Egyptian people.

According to el-Sisi, the aim of the article is “to protect the Egyptian state from any attempt to infiltrate it or allow people to take it over who cannot handle the responsibility of this country or who do not even understand the meaning of ‘state’”.

Article 200, combined with Article 234 — which requires that a president secure approval from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces before appointing a defence minister — gives the military significant control over Egyptian political life.

El-Sisi’s vision for the selection of Egypt’s next president gives the military an outsized role. His proposal includes setting up a committee of experts to draft legislation for selecting hundreds of highly educated Egyptians to undergo specialised training at the Egyptian Military Academy.

Applicants, el-Sisi proposes, should hold doctoral degrees, be between 40 and 50 years of age, and be prepared to spend 30 months at the academy learning about the Egyptian state.

The programme would also train future ministers, governors and members of parliament.

Combined with Articles 200 and 234, this proposed mechanism seems intended to preserve the military’s dominance long after el-Sisi leaves office. It could be favourable to him as well.

A genuinely independent, civilian president could seek to investigate massacres overseen by el-Sisi, allegations of corruption, or other alleged crimes. A transition process closely managed by the military is highly unlikely to yield such a result.

The open question now is how an increasingly frustrated and critical Egyptian public will respond to a political process managed by the military that effectively wipes out the need for a popular mandate.

For now, el-Sisi and the military appear determined to shape Egypt’s political future. But the people may have the last word.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Eastern Libya spent nearly seven years denouncing the maritime memorandum Turkiye struck with its rivals based in Tripoli. Last week, it needed a single sitting of the legislature to embrace it.

On October 20, the House of Representatives (HoR) in Benghazi ratified the deal. The European Union condemned the vote, as did Greece, Israel and Egypt.

Yet the ratification was less a Turkish triumph than the final act of a sequence choreographed by Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar, the military commander who controls eastern Libya. The ultimate goal is the Libyan presidency.

The United States is currently trying to broker a power-sharing arrangement between Tripoli and Benghazi. Championed by Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s senior adviser for Arab and African affairs, the deal could install Saddam as Libya’s president.

For that to happen, however, he needs the backing of Ankara, whose sway over western Libya gives it a decisive voice in any such settlement. The ratification of the maritime deal, therefore, is meant to secure Turkiye’s blessing.

The opening move in Saddam’s pursuit of the presidency was a palace coup: a fortnight before the vote, the HoR unseated its speaker, Aguila Saleh, who had spent 12 years in this position. It thus removed both Cairo’s principal ally in the east and the most stubborn obstacle to the memorandum’s ratification.

Yet Saleh’s ouster was never only about Egypt, and the same stone felled a second bird. As speaker and nominal supreme commander, he embodied the de jure authority from which Khalifa’s own command flows, and with a weighty tribal constituency among the Obeidat tribe, he was one of the few men capable of complicating, or even arbitrating, any transfer of power. Removing him cleared Saddam’s path to a handover already quietly under way, which the elder Haftar’s advanced age could hasten at any moment.

Saleh’s successor, Al-Salhin Abdulnabi, a fellow Obeidi, who chaired the HoR’s Libyan-Turkish friendship committee, is able to defuse the risk of tribal backlash while signalling where the chamber now takes its cues.

Whether the gambit pays off will be decided in Washington. Saddam is counting on the Trump administration’s appetite for a Libyan deal, sharpened by Turkish and Emirati lobbying and by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rapport with Trump.

He hopes it can prevail over the objections of Athens and Nicosia and the displeasure of Israel, which is uneasy about Ankara’s reach. This is directly pitting Trump’s transactional instinct against a longstanding US partnership with the Greek-Cypriot-Israeli axis.

The broadside against Israel may even pay a domestic dividend, allowing Saddam to pose as standing up to Israel while dispelling perceptions of a covert channel to it.

Europe, meanwhile, has sidelined itself into near-irrelevance: when Benghazi expelled the EU’s migration commissioner and three member-state ministers on arrival in July 2025, European capitals responded with something closer to grovelling than resolve.

Less than a year later, Athens was hosting Saddam, who duly sidestepped any commitment on an alternative maritime memorandum.

That deference flows from the EU’s navel-gazing fixation on migration that has reduced its Libya policy to counting the boats leaving Libya’s eastern coast for Crete. A Union that implores Saddam to police the very waters now in dispute is in no position to make him pay for redrawing them.

Abu Dhabi, for its part, has every reason to look the other way because it wants Saddam to succeed. None of Khalifa’s sons has been more faithful to the Emiratis, and seeing their most loyal client installed at the apex of the Libyan state would cap a decade of investment in the Haftar project. Whatever their past flirtation with Greece and Cyprus, a maritime line drawn in Ankara’s favour is a modest price for that outcome, though the closeness of that embrace may yet constrain him.

Egypt remains the real question mark: Cairo’s statement objected chiefly to the memorandum’s encroachment on Egypt’s exclusive economic zone and was framed almost entirely in legal terms, a sign perhaps that it is keeping its political options open.

Its relationship with Ankara has been transformed, with the two now aligned on Sudan and the Red Sea. A shared wariness of Israel’s expansionist ambitions has only drawn them closer.

Offering commercial deals could go some way towards softening Egyptian opposition. But Cairo could also lean on its rapport with Ankara to champion an alternative Haftar heir. It would not have to look far for a candidate: Saddam’s brother Khaled, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ chief of staff, is considerably closer to Cairo and publicly criticised the US initiative in April.

Should that happen, Saddam would have little left to bargain with, having cashed in his most valuable chip with the Turks, and the strongest card he still holds is one Abu Dhabi would never let him play.

Cutting off support for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces would win favour in Ankara and Cairo alike, both backers of the Sudanese army, but that would jeopardise the one relationship he cannot afford to lose.

Squeezed between a patron in Abu Dhabi he dare not cross and a partner in Ankara that has already pocketed its reward, Saddam is betting that he can keep both on side long enough for Washington to see the deal through. That he is prepared to run such risks may say as much about desperation as acumen, for the alternative to an institutionalised succession is one contested, perhaps violently, by his siblings or by the constituencies left out of the new order.

History, in Libya, has a mordant sense of humour. The maritime memorandum was the price Tripoli paid for the Turkish intervention that helped halt Khalifa Haftar’s offensive at the gates of the capital and sent his forces and mercenaries into headlong retreat in 2020. Where the father tried and failed to storm Tripoli, the son now hopes to be ushered in on a red carpet woven from the very document that sealed his father’s defeat.

Should he succeed, the instrument of the Haftars’ most humiliating setback will have become the cornerstone of their dynasty. Should Washington baulk, it may instead become the epitaph of the son’s ambitions.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

When Altayeb Alhadi was just six years old, his father died after a well collapsed in his village in White Nile state, south-central Sudan. Two months later, and his mother also died, leaving the five children in the family as orphans. As the eldest of the siblings, it was Altayeb’s responsibility to find work and help the family survive.

At 14, he travelled hundreds of kilometres from his home in Galli village to seek work in the north, where gold mines dot the landscape, so he could feed his siblings and keep them in school.

“We warned him about the dangers, but he was ambitious. Some relatives were already working in the area although they had found jobs in restaurants and other services rather than underground extraction,” Ayateb’s uncle Alhadi Hamid told Al Jazeera.

The boy initially worked in transport and other jobs, but when he heard lucrative stories from miners in the area, he began to search for gold in the surrounding mountains.

Altayeb died in an air strike attributed to the Egyptian military at a gold-mining site near Jabal Al-Aigdat in Sudan’s Red Sea region on October 10, which killed at least 72 miners, a few months after he began working at the site.

“It was less than 30 minutes since we separated, and he said he was going to the mine. We suddenly heard a loud sound of bombardment, and we ran. It was too chaotic with people running in all directions and many attacks taking place within a few minutes,” a fellow miner told Al Jazeera, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“We found Altayeb with his hand and leg [blown off] and a severe injury to his abdomen [which] was open. We tried to help him and took him to a safer place near a mountain. We were terrified. He died within hours. … We couldn’t believe how quickly things could happen.”

Altayeb worked alongside about 15 young men and children, using basic tools to extract gold from the rocks. The miners worked night and day, taking the material they gathered to nearby mills for processing.

Proceeds from any gold found were shared, but earnings depended on the amount of gold recovered and individual agreements. On productive days, the group could earn more than $100, the miner said.

“We used to dig for two to three weeks until we found a gram or less. If the gold percentage in the well wasn’t good, we would change locations. When we found a gram or less, we sold it and shared the profit, which was about $100,” Altayeb’s former colleague said.

For young people supporting relatives, even irregular earnings in these dangerous gold mines can seem preferable to unemployment.

Altayeb told his siblings 10 days before his death that he would soon return home, his sister Rogaia Alhadi told local media.

Friends told the family that Altayeb visited them at a restaurant near the mining site on the morning of the attack, his uncle said. They shared a cup of tea before heading towards the mine for the final time. Minutes later, the air strike hit the area.

Authorities in Egypt have accused Sudanese miners of crossing its border and reportedly linked some to gold smuggling, drugs and human trafficking. The Sudanese side did not respond to these allegations.

Since a civil war between Sudan’s military and the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group broke out in 2023, the economy has tanked and forced thousands with no other source of income to find work in the artisanal gold mines of northern Sudan.

This can vary from independent prospecting to working in investor-owned pits for a share of the proceeds. Earnings depend on the amount of gold found, equipment and fuel costs, and profit percentages agreed with financiers.

Although some miners strike gold, they still face an array of dangers, ranging from collapsing shafts and unstable ground to air strikes. Limited medical care makes mining, particularly in remote areas, especially hazardous.

Living conditions are also extremely hard. Mohamed Awadalkarim, who was a miner in River Nile state for 10 years, said workers often shelter in makeshift huts made from burlap sacks and plastic sheeting. Their diet consists mainly of lentils and sorghum porridge.

But for families without reliable incomes, mining offers a possible source of immediate earnings. Miners may spend hours searching for gold and not find enough to cover their expenses. Others share proceeds with investors or equipment owners, leaving them with limited money left.

Artisanal and small-scale mining accounted for 53.71 tonnes, or about 83 per cent, of Sudan’s declared gold production in 2024, but this was just in areas under government control, according to research by the Chatham House think tank. About one million people were involved in artisanal mining across Sudan’s 18 states, generating $1bn annually for the country.

Artisanal mines, while generally viewed as being outside the main war-funding networks, have still been exposed to violence.

On June 16, several people were reportedly killed and injured in attacks on mining sites near the Egyptian border, according to local sources and miners.

The repeated air strikes near Sudan’s border with Egypt have raised concerns about civilian protection, territorial sovereignty and accountability.

Egyptian authorities have accused Sudanese prospectors of crossing the border to mine near a concession managed by an Egyptian company, but there is little independent evidence to back these claims.

Sudanese military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan reportedly ordered a fact-finding committee involving prosecutors, judicial representatives and security agencies to investigate the attack. Findings from an inquiry into a similar incident announced in June have not been made public.

Altayeb paid the highest price in this regional conflict and the hunt for gold, which provides huge profits for some and meagre incomes for many.

Altayeb’s siblings are now living with their extended family, including uncles, aunts and cousins. People who know them are trying to help his brothers and sisters and are carrying out community initiatives in Galli to keep his memory alive.

“We will raise the children and care for them as he would have wanted. He was young, caring and brave, and he will always be remembered,” Altayeb said.

Libya’s eastern parliament has walked back its objection to an agreement with Turkiye, demarcating boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea.

Its rival administration, the internationally recognised Government of National Unity, signed the deal seven years ago.

The ratification has revived a simmering dispute over exploring a potentially gas-rich region. Greece, Cyprus and Egypt were quick to object, with Athens referring the issue to the UN Security Council.

They say Libya and Turkiye are ignoring their sovereign rights.

So what are the geopolitical implications of this deal in the eastern Mediterranean?

Presenter: Mohammed Jamjoom

Guests:

Sinan Ulgen – Chairman of the Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies

Maria Gavouneli – Professor of international law at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Tarek Megerisi – Director of Informmi, a geopolitical research and advisory firm

Libya’s eastern-based parliament has backed a 2019 maritime deal with Turkiye already signed by the North African nation’s internationally recognised government based in Tripoli to delimit maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea.

The vote on Tuesday came as Turkiye has been cultivating close ties in recent years with the eastern parliament, backed by renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar. Ankara had helped the Tripoli government, known as the Government of National Accord (GNA), push back an offensive in 2020 by Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) that aimed to capture Tripoli.

Egypt and the European Union have rejected the ratification of the maritime borders agreement, calling the deal “null and void”.

On Tuesday, the Tobruk-based House of Representatives voted unanimously to approve the agreement, reversing its 2020 rejection.

Israel also condemned the move while Greece, which said the agreement violates international law, briefed the United Nations Security Council.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan dismissed the criticism, calling the deal “entirely legitimate”.

So what is the deal, and why has it drawn such a backlash? Here’s what you need to know:

What is the deal?

It is a memorandum of understanding that draws a sea border between Turkiye and Libya across the eastern Mediterranean.

It was signed in Istanbul on November 27, 2019, by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fayez al-Sarraj, then-prime minister of the UN-recognised government in Tripoli.

Within weeks, Turkiye sent drones and military advisers to help repel Haftar’s assault on Tripoli.

The deal allowed Ankara to claim large and potentially gas-rich areas of the eastern Mediterranean.

Why does Egypt oppose it?

Because Cairo says it cuts into Egyptian waters.

Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the agreement “constitutes a clear infringement upon Egypt’s sovereign rights within its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf”.

It said the ratification “carries no legal consequences for Egypt”.

President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has historically been one of Haftar’s strongest backers, but experts said their relations have cooled because Haftar allowed his territory to be used to funnel support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group, which is fighting Sudan’s military, the AFP news agency reported.

Cairo is also now a close security ally of Ankara, and in July, Egypt refrained from objecting to a maritime line drawn between Benghazi and Turkiye.

According to exclusive information Al Jazeera received in July, the rapprochement between Ankara and Haftar’s general command included agreements on developing military facilities and advanced surveillance systems.

The agreements also included training programmes in Turkiye for eastern Libyan officers with specialised Turkish defence companies participating in the projects.

Wolfgang Pusztai, a security policy analyst and former Austrian defence attache in Greece, told Al Jazeera that a possible Turkish military presence in eastern Libya was “probably more of a concern for Egypt”.

“This is not so much an issue for Greece, which has a Turkish military presence next door anyway,” he said, adding, “I doubt Cairo would accept this.”

Why does the EU oppose it?

Because two of its member states said it seeks to take their waters.

In a joint statement on Tuesday, European Council President Antonio Costa and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the memorandum infringes on the sovereign rights of third states and does not comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

They reaffirmed the bloc’s solidarity with Greece and Cyprus.

Athens said the deal ignores Greek islands, including Crete, Rhodes and Karpathos, and therefore infringes on its maritime territory, according to a briefing document from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sotirios Zartaloudis, an associate professor in comparative European politics at the University of Birmingham, told Al Jazeera that Athens and Nicosia see the deal as a Turkish attempt to block the “crucial Great Sea Interconnector”.

The planned subsea power cable, which would link Greece’s grid to Cyprus and later Israel, has been delayed by a dispute between Athens and Ankara over waters off the Greek island of Crete, the Reuters news agency reported last year. The project is estimated to cost about $2.1bn.

Turkiye has not signed UNCLOS, which means Ankara is not bound by the treaty’s rules governing maritime boundaries.

On Wednesday, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas urged all countries to respect member states’ sovereign rights under EU and international law, including UNCLOS.

Zartaloudis said both countries had pushed for the EU to condemn the deal, but “so far expectations were not met”, and that “they will try to gain further support against the deal”.

He added that “the main actor in the region is the US”, which he said had not repudiated the agreement.

What does Turkiye say?

Ankara said the deal is lawful and already in force.

Turkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the memorandum safeguards both countries’ rights on the basis of international law and “the principle of equity”.

“There are countries reacting to this. We know why they are reacting,” Fidan told state media.

“However, this is an entirely legitimate deal, both from a legal and a statutory perspective,” he said.

Why did eastern Libya change its mind?

Because Ankara has spent years courting it and its parliament has new leadership.

After Ankara struck a deal with Haftar’s LNA in July, the eastern parliament on October 6 elected Al-Salhin Abdelnabi al-Obeidi as speaker, replacing Aguila Saleh after more than 12 years.

Al-Obeidi previously chaired the Libyan-Turkish parliamentary friendship committee.

Anas El Gomati, director of the Sadeq Institute, a Libyan think tank, told Al Jazeera that the turnaround in eastern Libya was about the route to the presidency under a US mediation plan for Saddam Haftar, Khalifa Haftar’s son and deputy commander.

“Turkiye is now the most consequential outside power in Libya with leverage over Tripoli and a military presence in the west, and he needs it to get there and to stay there,” El Gomati said.

“But a ratified treaty is hard to reverse, so Ankara gets something that looks permanent in return for support that, depending on how the Haftars use it, may not be,” El Gomati said.

Does the vote unite Libya’s rivals?

Not on the issues that divide them most.

Tripoli’s GNU welcomed Tuesday’s vote, meaning both of Libya’s rival centres of power now back the deal.

But El Gomati said the “unification was never about the sea”.

“It’s about who controls the budget, the army and the electoral commission, and this vote touches none of them,” he said.

What happens next?

Athens said it would take all appropriate measures to safeguard its sovereign rights.

El Gomati said implementation now depended on institutions such as Libya’s National Oil Corporation and he expected pressure “to be diplomatic and slow”.

Pusztai said the risk of naval incidents if Turkiye or Libya act on the deal at sea was “very high”.

He said it might also lead to the involvement of the EU naval mission enforcing the UN arms embargo on Libya since 2020.

In August 2020, months after the deal was signed with the GNU, Ankara sent the survey vessel Oruc Reis to explore for oil and gas in waters Greece claims, bringing the two NATO allies to the verge of military confrontation.

Lawmakers adjourn second session as one party tells members to abstain over unclear commitment.

Egypt’s parliament has delayed a vote on authorising its armed forces to support Saudi Arabia, which has come under increasing attack from the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen.

The vote has been adjourned to October 26, the House of Representatives said on Monday. The move prolongs the debate over Egypt’s role in the Yemeni conflict.

The opposition Egyptian Social Democratic Party said it had told its lawmakers to abstain.

The party said parliament had not been given enough information about the mission’s objectives, duration, cost, or the risks to Egyptian troops.

However, the party, which holds nearly a dozen seats, said most of its lawmakers support the measure, according to two members of parliament who spoke to the AFP news agency.

The parliament has been tasked with authorising President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to approve any request from Saudi Arabia for defence assistance amid attacks on the kingdom by Yemen’s Houthis.

The call for support came after the Iran-backed rebel group attacked Riyadh’s international airport and the state oil company Saudi Aramco last week. Saudi authorities say 13 people were killed in the October 10 attack on the airport.

El-Sisi said on Saturday that Egypt would take “any measure” needed to protect its Gulf allies.

“I’m not talking about confronting or attacking anyone,” el-Sisi said. “We’re talking only about defence.”

After approval from the National Defence Council, chaired by el-Sisi, Egypt’s constitution requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority to send troops on a combat mission abroad. The council gave its approval on Sunday.

Egypt’s rocky economy

The Grand Imam of al-Azhar urged Arab and Muslim leaders on Sunday to mediate Egypt’s parliamentary decision and avert further bloodshed.

Saudi Arabia holds an important role in financing Egypt’s rocky economy. It is due to deposit $5.3bn into Egypt’s central bank this month, plus $267.39m in interest.

Egypt’s EGX30 stock index fell early on Monday amid concerns about possible military involvement but recovered to close 0.4 percent higher.

Nematallah Choucri, head of research at HC Securities, told the Reuters news agency that geopolitical developments are the main driver of recent market losses.

Egypt is also affected by the shortage of oil and gas exports from the Middle East due to the United States war on Iran and fighting in Yemen.

Egypt’s economy is heavily dependent on remittances from Egyptians working in the hydrocarbons industry in Saudi Arabia.

Suez Canal threat

Political analyst and Gulf studies expert Thomas Bonnie James told Al Jazeera that the Houthi security threat to Saudi Arabia also threatens the Suez Canal, which Egypt’s foreign minister says has lost about $11bn since the Houthis launched attacks in the Bab al-Mandeb strait in solidarity with Gaza in 2023.

James also said Egypt does not want to be seen as the regional ally that “stood aside while others defended the kingdom”.

Turkiye and Pakistan have made their own pledges after activating the Mecca defence pact with Riyadh, signed in August, amid the deteriorating security situation in the Middle East.

Amman, Jordan – Jordanians fear the country’s border with Israel is turning into a major drug-smuggling route amid a surge in high-tech operations by gangs using drones and helium-filled balloons.

Organised networks active in southern Israel’s Negev Desert have links to groups in Jordan and the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, operating along one of the most heavily surveilled borders in the world, with Jordanian authorities increasingly concerned about the implications this could have for the kingdom.

This escalation coincides with changes in the regional drug trade, particularly after the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in late 2024.

Elements in his regime were linked to the manufacturing and distribution of Captagon, an illegal amphetamine stimulant.

Syria became a hub for the distribution of Captagon to the Gulf, with Jordan a transit point and market for the drug. The Royal Jordanian Air Force carried out periodic strikes on drug manufacturing and smuggling points inside Syria, highlighting the huge security concerns Jordan had about the trade.

Since the collapse of the Assad government and the establishment of a new authority that views the Captagon trade as a national security issue, there has been a decrease in the drug trade from Syria into Jordan.

Although Druze militias in the Syrian province of Suwayda allegedly linked to Israel have been accused of continuing the drug trade, Jordanian security forces are increasingly focused on the Jordan-Israel border.

The use of quadcopter drones and balloons is reportedly among the new tactics used by gangs in Israel to smuggle hashish, crystal meth, and amphetamines into Jordan.

Jordanian security forces are said to be increasingly unhappy with the scale of the drug smuggling operations and have accused the Israeli army of not taking the issue seriously.

Initial data from Jordanian forces recorded 17 interception operations linked to drones during the first half of 2026 in Jordan’s southwestern border area with Israel.

They also recorded 231 smuggling and infiltration attempts and downed 56 drones across various borders during the same period.

Interior Minister Mazen al-Faraya told Al Jazeera that Jordanian forces were continuing efforts to prevent drugs from being smuggled into the kingdom. But they are evidently facing more complex activities by drug dealers.

“There is an increase in drug smuggling operations from Israel to Jordan using drones,” he said. “The number of seized drug cases during the current year reached 15,342 cases. Trafficking cases constituted about 28 percent of them, compared with 72 percent for usage cases.”

Israeli media reports indicate that gangs active in the Negev Desert are behind some of the smuggling operations into Jordan, where drugs can fetch higher profits.

There are estimates that 1kg of hashish can sell for approximately 7,500 pounds sterling (almost $10,000), according to the British newspaper The Telegraph, which recently uncovered the drug smugglers’ latest operations. Israeli security services believe that the price of hashish in Jordan is about 15 times higher than in Israel.

Due to widespread disenfranchisement and poverty, elements within Palestinian communities in Israel have been linked to the drug trade, according to reports. Multiple sources have accused Israel of allowing Palestinian towns and cities to become hotbeds of crime to create divisions and prevent calls for greater rights.

Ammar al-Qudah, a member of the Jordanian Senate and retired major-general in the Public Security Directorate, claimed that organised gangs in the Negev had obtained more than 1,000 drones that were originally used for agricultural and security purposes.

“The smuggling networks are linked to other gangs in Jordan, Sinai and the Negev, and rely on a route starting from Sinai, passing through the Negev, and reaching Wadi Araba, in addition to other routes including the Lebanese border with Israel and the Galilee region towards Syria,” he told Al Jazeera.

They are also using a range of sophisticated technology to bypass security on both sides of the border. This includes the use of helium-filled balloons equipped with GPS devices, drones capable of carrying about 50kg of narcotics, including black hashish and crystal meth, al-Qudah said.

He warned that a portion of the black hashish and crystal meth being smuggled into the kingdom is being sold domestically, with the rest going to other markets in the region.

With such high-tech operations, there are accusations that members of Israeli forces know about drug gang activities, based on past experiences in Egypt.

One West Point report said current and former trackers in the Israeli military in the Negev are being recruited by traffickers to provide intelligence to facilitate their operations in Egypt. In 2012, a number of Israeli service personnel were arrested on suspicion of collaborating with drug smugglers across the Egyptian border.

While there is no proof that the same situation is being repeated in Jordan, many have questioned how drones and balloons carrying drugs could cross a heavily surveilled and guarded Israeli border into Jordan.

Jordan’s counternarcotics department, in cooperation with the armed forces, has tracked such cases and made arrests.

Retired Brigadier-General Daifallah al-Daboubi, a strategic and military expert, said Jordan is witnessing a “reverse drug migration”, starting from the Sinai Peninsula, passing through the Negev region, and reaching the kingdom.

“Groups active in Beersheba and the Negev possess great financial capabilities and use advanced smuggling methods, most notably drones,” he said.

The Israeli army’s preoccupation with wars in Gaza, Lebanon and the occupied Golan Heights has provided smugglers with room to manoeuvre on the Jordan border, he added. But he ruled out the direct involvement of the Israeli political or military leadership in any drug smuggling.

Steps taken by Israel to boost security on its eastern border include the establishment of the 96th Division, which began operating in the Jordan Valley in 2025, and the construction of a controversial security barrier with Jordan.

But none of these measures appears to be designed to prevent drugs from leaving Israel; instead, they appear to be designed to prevent weapons and other illicit merchandise from entering the country from Jordan.

Egyptian president pledges ‘any measure’ to help defend Saudi Arabia ‘if it is requested of us’.

Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has called for an emergency parliamentary session to authorise him to approve any requests from Saudi Arabia for defence assistance, if Riyadh were to ask.

Speaking at a graduation ceremony at the Egyptian Military Academy on Saturday, el-Sisi emphasised Cairo’s readiness to back the kingdom.

Egypt will “carry out any measure to protect” Saudi Arabia “in accordance with the directives of His Majesty King Salman and the directives of the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman”, he said.

“I know that this matter requires the approval of the Egyptian parliament, and I hope that parliament will convene in an emergency session to give us this authorisation, if it is requested of us,” he said.

“I am not speaking in order for us to fight anyone or attack anyone. I am speaking only for defence.”

Attacks on Saudi Arabia

The request follows a barrage of attacks on the kingdom from Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthis, including airports and oil facilities.

Recent Houthi strikes on Saudi Arabia have mainly targeted key infrastructure on the outskirts of the capital, Riyadh, but they appear to be edging closer to the city centre.

Houthi attacks on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport earlier this month killed 14 people and wounded more than 300. Houthi attacks have also been reported on other airports, including Dammam, Abha, Jazan and Najran.

Yemen’s Saudi-backed, internationally recognised government launched a full-scale military campaign against the Houthis this month to recapture territory seized by them.

El-Sisi had backed Saudi calls for secure and unhindered navigation in the Red Sea in a meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince, known as MBS, in Cairo last month.

A statement from the Egyptian presidency then said that “the security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is an integral part of Egypt’s national security”.

Red Sea security

That meeting came just days after the Houthis seized Yemen’s Red Sea coast, gaining significant control over the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the southern gateway to the Suez Canal.

Saudi Arabia already has a defence pact with Pakistan and Turkiye, known as the Mecca Alliance for Defence, which was signed in August.

Earlier this month, the three countries agreed to activate “deterrence measures” under the pact and rapidly deploy forces to the Gulf kingdom to counter attacks by Yemen’s Houthis.

Analysts say Riyadh is looking for help to protect the kingdom and Red Sea shipping and that Egypt, whose Suez Canal revenue depends on the same traffic, is an obvious partner.

They say Egypt is eager to prevent Iran and its allies from imposing control over the region, especially over maritime traffic in the Red Sea, given the direct repercussions for the Suez Canal.

Saudi Arabia has accused Iran of encouraging Houthi attacks against the kingdom, a claim Tehran rejects. Iran has offered assistance to halt the conflict between the two sides.

Spain sanctioned by FIFA after incidents at Espanyol’s stadium in Barcelona, which staged the friendly with Egypt.

Spain have ‌‌‌‌been fined $20,000 and ordered to partially close their stadium ⁠⁠⁠⁠for their ⁠⁠⁠⁠next friendly after supporters twice chanted Islamophobic slogans during the game against Egypt in March, FIFA said ⁠⁠⁠⁠in a statement.

The sanctions relate to incidents at the RCDE Stadium near Barcelona, home of LaLiga club Espanyol, ⁠⁠⁠⁠where some Spain fans chanted, “Who doesn’t jump is a Muslim” during a World Cup warm-up match which ended in a 0-0 draw.

After the second occurrence of the chant, the stadium announcer ‌‌‌‌issued a warning and the scoreboard displayed a message against discriminatory behaviour.

Spain winger Lamine Yamal, who is Muslim, condemned the chants at the time, describing them as disrespectful and intolerable and calling those responsible “ignorant and racist”.

Spanish police launched an investigation the following day, while world governing ⁠⁠⁠⁠body FIFA later started disciplinary proceedings against ⁠⁠⁠⁠the Spanish football federation (RFEF).

It argued that the word ‘Muslim’ was “neither insulting nor pejorative”, adding that the fans’ conduct should be assessed under FIFA’s Article 17, ⁠⁠⁠⁠which covers political, ideological, religious or offensive messages, rather than Article 15, which deals ⁠⁠⁠⁠with discrimination and racist abuse.

However, FIFA’s disciplinary ⁠⁠⁠⁠committee rejected that argument, saying Article 15 does not require the explicit use of a slur and that a term can be discriminatory when ‌‌‌‌used in context as “an insult, taunt, or marker of inferiority”.

FIFA fined the RFEF and ordered the closure of at least ‌‌‌‌15% ‌‌‌‌of available seats for Spain’s next friendly.

Al Jazeera has contacted the RFEF for comment.

Scott, from Cheshire, had visited Hurghada in Egypt twice before, but a taxi ride back from a nightclub on his last trip has put him off returning to the Red Sea destination for good

A Brit has vowed never to return to an Egyptian holiday hotspot after he was scammed.

Scott, from Cheshire, had visited Hurghada in Egypt twice before, but a taxi ride back from a nightclub on his last trip has put him off returning for good. Despite being warned by holiday reps to agree to a total fare before getting in, Scott and his friends ended up paying well over the odds by the end of the ride.

“The worst part is how it’s stuck with me. I’d been to Hurghada twice before and enjoyed it, but that one journey ruined the whole holiday. You forget all the good bits, and that’s the part that stays with you. It’s put me off going back for good,” Scott told the Mirror.

The incident unfolded after an evening out in the beach resort city, which sits on Egypt’s Red Sea coast.

“It was the strangest taxi journey I’ve ever experienced. We’d been told to always agree on a total price before getting in, so that’s what we did. But partway back, the driver pulled over and went off to get himself some food,” Scott explained.

When they got back to the hotel, the taxi driver announced a different, much higher price than they’d expected.

“When we finally got back to the hotel, he suddenly wanted us to pay per person. It felt like, these are tourists, we’re going to rinse them,” Scott said. The situation quickly escalated when the driver mentioned that they would call the police. Unable to speak the local language and unsure whose side the police would take, Scott focused on keeping things calm, and the group ended up paying more than they had agreed just to bring it to an end. “My friend was getting really anxious, and all I could think was, if the police turn up, who are they going to believe?” he explained .