Economics

The Jamieson Greer has told Mexican industry leaders that tariffs imposed by Donald Trump will remain in place, even as negotiations to revise the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement intensify ahead of a July review deadline.

The remarks, delivered during meetings in Mexico City, signal a major shift from decades of tariff free trade under USMCA and its predecessor NAFTA.

End of Zero Tariff Era

According to multiple sources, Greer made it clear that the United States does not intend to return to a zero tariff framework.

This marks a fundamental change in North American trade policy, where free trade in autos and parts had been the norm for over 30 years. The introduction of tariffs, including a 25 percent duty on automotive imports, has disrupted deeply integrated supply chains across the region.

Impact on Key Industries

The implications for Mexico are significant:

• More than half of Mexico’s auto and steel exports go to the United States
• Vehicle exports have already declined, with job losses in the auto sector
• Steel and aluminum industries face steep duties, some as high as 50 percent

These pressures have weakened Mexico’s competitive position, especially as the United States has negotiated lower tariffs with other partners.

Shifting Trade Rules

U.S. negotiators are also pushing for stricter rules of origin.

Proposals include requiring 100 percent North American sourcing for key components such as engines and electronics, up from current thresholds of around 75 percent. This would force manufacturers to further regionalize supply chains, potentially increasing costs but aligning with Washington’s goal of boosting domestic production.

Mexico’s Position

The Mexican government, led by Claudia Sheinbaum, is seeking relief from tariffs as part of the USMCA review. Officials aim to secure at least partial reductions, particularly in the auto and steel sectors, before finalizing broader trade revisions.

However, the latest signals from Washington suggest that while some easing may be possible, a full rollback is unlikely.

Why It Matters

This development underscores a broader shift in global trade policy away from pure free trade toward managed trade and economic security.

For Mexico, the stakes are high due to its deep economic integration with the United States. Persistent tariffs could reshape manufacturing patterns, investment decisions, and employment across North America.

What’s Next

Formal negotiations are set to begin in late May, with both sides aiming to resolve key disputes before the July deadline.

Key areas of focus will include:

• Tariff levels on autos and metals
• Rules of origin requirements
• Broader economic security cooperation

The outcome will determine the future structure of North American trade.

Analysis

The U.S. position reflects a strategic recalibration rather than a temporary policy shift. By normalizing tariffs, Washington is prioritizing domestic industry and supply chain control over traditional free trade principles.

For Mexico, this creates a structural challenge. Its export driven model, built on open access to the U.S. market, now faces persistent barriers. While some adjustments may preserve competitiveness, the era of frictionless trade appears to be over.

Ultimately, the negotiations will test whether North America can adapt to a new trade paradigm or whether tensions will deepen within one of the world’s most integrated economic regions.

With information from Reuters.

European stock markets slipped on Monday as investor sentiment weakened amid renewed tensions between the United States and Iran. The downturn followed the seizure of an Iranian cargo ship by US forces and Tehran’s vow of retaliation, raising fears that a fragile ceasefire nearing its expiry may collapse.

The situation has been further complicated by Iran’s rejection of fresh peace talks and ongoing uncertainty over maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy route.

Market Reaction

The pan-European STOXX 600 index declined by 0.8%, reflecting broad-based caution across financial markets. Major indices also moved lower, with Germany’s DAX down 1% and France’s CAC 40 falling 0.9%.

Losses were concentrated in sectors sensitive to geopolitical risk. Travel and leisure stocks led declines, followed by banking and automobile shares, which also came under pressure. In contrast, energy stocks rose as oil prices surged, reflecting concerns about supply disruptions.

Oil and Energy Impact

Crude oil prices jumped sharply, with Brent crude rising more than 5% to around $95 a barrel. The increase reflects heightened fears of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of global energy trade passes.

Energy-dependent European economies remain particularly sensitive to price volatility, adding to investor caution across broader markets.

Geopolitical Tensions

Market sentiment shifted sharply from the previous week’s optimism, when easing signals from the Strait of Hormuz had briefly boosted equities. That optimism faded quickly after renewed maritime incidents and political escalation.

The United States and Iran continue to exchange accusations over ceasefire violations, while diplomatic efforts appear increasingly uncertain. The rejection of fresh negotiations by Iran and continued US pressure have added to concerns that the conflict could intensify further.

Outlook

Financial markets remain closely tied to developments in the Middle East. With the ceasefire approaching its expiration and no clear diplomatic breakthrough in sight, volatility is expected to persist.

Investors are likely to remain cautious until there is greater clarity on both maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and the future of US–Iran relations.

With information from Reuters.

The smartest thing Trump can do for the United States is to adopt a “cake-sharing” strategy to cope with the arrival of a multipolar era. He wants to ensure that America still gets the largest slice of the cake, with its power base rooted in traditional energy—oil and natural gas.

This aligns well with “Cold War thinking.” From the perspective of oil reserves, the United States plus its friendly Gulf states accounts for about 55%–60% of the global total. If Venezuela—now under U.S. control—is added, the share rises to 72%–77%.

Spreading out the energy map, according to estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Greenland holds approximately 39 billion barrels of oil equivalent (combining East and West Greenland). Cuba has 4–5 billion barrels.

Nigeria, a major oil-producing country in Africa, has 37 billion barrels of oil reserves. The Trump administration has threatened military action against it under the pretext of “persecuting Christians.”

Iran’s oil reserves stand at 2,086 billion barrels, accounting for 13.3% of the global total.

The regions Trump has singled out—Iran, Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Nigeria—clearly show that he is deciding how to “share the cake” with China and Russia based on the traditional energy map.

Although reserves and actual output are two different things, for Trump this is irrelevant. What he puts on the negotiating table is merely a piece of paper for “bidding”—he doesn’t need to worry about minor details.

On the other side of the negotiating table, China’s chips are new energy and critical minerals. In the area of critical minerals, Iran, Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Nigeria all possess rich potential, and all have varying degrees of investment and cooperation ties with China.

One reason Trump scorns “new energy” may be that, within his limited term, competing with China in the new energy field is simply impossible. In the traditional energy domain, however, the United States holds a significant advantage.

Successfully pocketing Venezuela has encouraged Trump to take risks in Iran. Originally, Trump wanted to approach Beijing for a major deal from the position of a traditional energy hegemon, but Iran’s fierce resistance has dampened his ambitions. The United States has been outmaneuvered by Iran, and Trump has postponed his visit to China.

Iranian President Pezeshkian publicly stated: “China is now also seen by the United States as its main enemy; we are just next in line. They want to take us down first, then deal with China.” Behind this statement lies the landscape of U.S.-China competition over energy and critical minerals.

It cannot be said that Trump is unrealistic—this “cake-sharing” strategy has its own rationality. Nor can it be said that Trump has overestimated America’s military strength, because he knows very well that the United States cannot even handle the Houthis, let alone Iran. One can only say that the success of the “decapitation operation” in Venezuela has inflated his sense of luck, and Israel has exploited this psychology to successfully lure Trump into risking involvement in Iran.

The United States and Israel jointly eliminated the appeasement faction in Tehran and greatly underestimated Iran’s counterattack capability. They wanted to control oil but ended up being controlled by Iran on oil export routes. This is a complete strategic failure, and its medium- to long-term damage to the United States far exceeds the energy sector.

We don’t even need to discuss the rise and fall of petrodollars versus petroyuan—just look at the new energy sector. This round of energy crisis has greatly heightened the global urgency for new energy development, and the countries and regions most urgently in need are precisely America’s allies worldwide, including the Gulf states.

America’s allies are mostly developed countries. They have long recognized that China is a superpower in new energy. Before the Iran war, the broader Western camp was developing new energy while trying to reduce dependence on Iran. Now, however, the sense of urgency has pushed these countries to rely even more deeply on China.

These countries and regions include France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, as well as India, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. They are either industrially advanced or rapidly industrializing countries that heavily depend on stable energy supplies.

In the core area of the Iran war—the Gulf states—are also actively accelerating the development of new energy industries, with the solar industry as the key focus. China is the only source capable of providing cheap, high-quality equipment and products. After the war ends, Iran may also exchange oil for the components needed for new energy development with China, achieving economic diversification like the Gulf states and reducing reliance on oil exports.

China’s solar equipment originally suffered from overcapacity; now it stands to gain relief.

What revolves around the core issues of new energy is nothing more than industrial supply chains and critical minerals. In this regard, mainland China’s industrial strength needs no emphasis. In critical minerals, the Democratic Republic of the Congo—China’s deep cooperation partner—will see half of its cobalt mines belong to Chinese enterprises. Given that Congo holds the world’s largest cobalt reserves, China will possess an indisputable “cobalt dominance.” Cobalt is a key mineral for lithium-ion batteries.

In addition, graphite and tantalum are also dominated by China. Tantalum is a critical metal for capacitors, which are essential for stabilizing wind and solar power generation. Graphite is the anode material for lithium-ion batteries and an indispensable mineral for renewable energy storage systems and solar panel production.

Currently, renewable energy plus nuclear power accounts for 40% of global electricity generation, while fossil fuels still account for 60%. However, when looking at the global share of “capacity” (installed capacity) for renewable energy plus nuclear, it has already reached about 55%. Among this, renewable energy accounts for 49.4% and nuclear for about 5%.

“Capacity” refers to installed capacity—in plain terms, the theoretical maximum power generation. The actual global generation share of renewable energy is about 32%. The gap between theoretical and actual values exists because renewable energy generation is less stable than fossil fuels. Adding nuclear’s actual generation share (about 8%), the actual generation share of so-called low-carbon energy reaches 40% globally.

There is no doubt that the oil crisis will inevitably trigger a “green energy surge.” Looking ahead five years, the actual generation share of green energy will exceed 50%. Assuming nuclear can grow to 10% of actual generation and renewables grow by 8%, China’s additional revenue from the global renewable energy business in the next five years could reach the level of hundreds of billions of dollars.

From this perspective, China—which strongly supported green energy development from the very beginning of the climate agenda—did so not so much for carbon reduction as for industrial preparation in the name of energy security. Expanding the global new energy business is merely an added value.

Of course, the key technologies for manufacturing new energy equipment may be even more important than critical minerals. Last November, China imposed export controls on certain lithium batteries, key cathode and anode materials, and their manufacturing equipment and technologies. Given that China controls about 96% of global anode material production capacity and 85% of cathode material capacity, the impact of these export controls is enormous.

On April 15, according to Reuters, China has held preliminary consultations with solar panel production equipment suppliers and is considering restricting exports of the most advanced technologies and equipment to the United States. If true, Beijing is raising the stakes in new energy, waiting for Trump to come to the negotiating table in May.

Admittedly, Trump has no intention of developing new energy. However, considering that the Democrats may return to the White House in three years, Beijing is now blocking America’s path to new energy development, essentially laying the groundwork for U.S.-China competition three years from now.

If Trump’s energy strategy map on the table also included a new energy layer, he should realize that the setback in the Iran war has allowed the new energy domain to encroach upon the traditional energy domain, enabling China to expand its energy power without firing a single shot. As for critical minerals, the United States has made no outstanding progress—at least nothing sufficient for Trump to boast about.

Now, the “cake” being pushed in front of Xi Jinping is getting bigger and bigger. On the surface, Beijing has gained it effortlessly, but today’s harvest is mainly due to strategic 布局 made one step ahead. These layouts are often “low-profit” but highly effective investments, and new energy is merely one of them.

In an uncertain world, those who provide “certainty” win. Therefore, the winner of the Iran war is China—even if Beijing is extremely reluctant to admit it.

There is another way to read the ongoing Middle East crisis, one that makes legible what standard analysis consistently struggles to explain. It begins not with capability but with the geometry of the system through which capability must travel to produce effects. The United States and its partners possess overwhelming military superiority over Iran, and that superiority is not in question, yet the conflict has produced a pattern that defies its logic. A superpower coalition has been unable to impose coherent strategic outcomes against an adversary operating through proxies, low-cost disruption, and the systematic exploitation of global commercial vulnerabilities.

Over the past two years, we have seen multiple instances of this kind of disruption with consequential effects on the global system. Houthi drones force the rerouting of global shipping, with Red Sea cargo volumes falling by roughly 50% through early 2024 as major carriers diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks to transit times, driving freight costs sharply higher across European markets, and costing Egypt nearly $800 million per month at peak in lost Suez Canal revenue. A non-state network spanning Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza has absorbed sustained air campaigns, targeted eliminations of senior commanders, and repeated ground operations without losing its capacity to generate coordinated pressure across multiple theaters simultaneously. The asymmetry seems to follow a deliberate strategic logic that raw power analysis struggles to read, precisely because the conflict operates on a surface that capability assessments were never designed to map. What this suggests is that the decisive variable is not what actors possess but whether the relationships connecting them can transmit coordinated action when the system is under strain.

When that system cannot coordinate, something important breaks down. An alliance that formally exists but faces operational friction at every decision point ceases to be an alliance in any meaningful strategic sense. A security guarantee that cannot be transmitted rapidly to the partner it is meant to protect has, in effect, already failed its primary function. It follows that the gap between what a system formally is and what it can actually do under pressure is not a secondary consideration but the surface on which this conflict is being decided. Conventional analysis, calibrated to count warheads and assess intentions, consistently leaves this gap unmapped.

Analysts know that Saudi Arabia’s OPEC production decisions have repeatedly positioned Riyadh against Washington’s economic preferences, they know that European energy dependency complicates transatlantic alignment, and they know that Iran’s proxy network extends across five countries and absorbs military pressure without fracturing. Yet what the available frameworks cannot do is convert that knowledge into a structural reading of the system. They show that these conditions exist. What they cannot show is how those conditions interact, where they compound, and what the aggregate geometry of their interaction means for whether coordinated action is possible at all.

Power analysis was built to read capability differentials between states, and it does that well. Alliance theory was built to read the conditions under which formal commitments hold or fail, and it does that too. Neither, however, was built to read the operational weight of the ties through which capability and commitment must travel to produce effects.

The instruments available are calibrated to answer questions different from those the current situation poses. Deploying them on a problem they were not designed to read produces the consistent failure to explain what is actually happening that has marked analysis of this conflict from the start.

Adjacency mapping is an instrument designed to read that gap by mapping connectivity, by which I mean their operational weight, specifically their capacity to carry coordinated action under strain. What distinguishes it from standard approaches is its unit of analysis. Rather than the actors themselves, it treats the weight of the relationships as primary. The question it asks is not who holds power but whether the ties connecting power-holders can transmit that power when the system needs them to. Two states can be formally allied, operationally integrated in name, and structurally disconnected at the same time, and nothing in standard analysis will tell you which of those conditions is actually operative until the moment of crisis reveals it.

The instrument assigns each significant relationship in the system a weight between 0 and 1, reflecting how frequently the two actors interact operationally, how reliably information moves between them, how the tie has behaved under recent stress, and how quickly it transmits pressure when the system is under strain. At the higher end of the scale, a weight at or above 0.6 indicates that coordination approaches automaticity, and the tie carries load without constant investment to maintain it. Around 0.3, friction accumulates. In this setting, decisions require deliberate effort at every juncture, slowing the system and making it susceptible to gradual degradation that never triggers a visible rupture. At or below 0.2, the tie has effectively ceased to function as a transmission pathway, leaving the actors operationally disconnected regardless of what their formal relationship nominally says.

These weights are analytical judgements calibrated against observable evidence. In other words, their value lies in making visible what experienced analysts already carry as intuition and in giving that intuition a structure precise enough to argue about. The numbers are therefore analytical judgements, not measurements. A more rigorous application would derive them from quantifiable indicators across each dimension, including military interoperability, intelligence exchange depth, crisis responsiveness, economic interdependence, and signaling consistency, averaged and weighted systematically. That work lies beyond the scope of this piece, but the architecture is designed to accommodate it.

There is a risk management dimension to this reading that is worth making explicit. Standard geopolitical risk assessment focuses on actor-level variables such as regime stability, military capability, and leadership intentions. What adjacency mapping adds is a structural layer that those assessments typically miss. A coalition whose load-bearing relationships operate in the friction zone is exposed to a category of risk that capability assessments do not capture and that becomes visible only when the system is read structurally.

What the matrix adds is the ability to see how compound weakness across multiple relationships produces cascading effects that bilateral assessment alone would struggle to predict. A system whose dominant actor holds several weak partnerships faces more than friction. As a consequence, the geometry of those weaknesses determines whether any concerted response is structurally possible at all. Aggregate capability becomes, in that light, secondary to that question.

If we apply this to the Middle East security complex, the instrument produces one possible reading. This reading differs considerably from the picture conventional analysis generates. Its value is not in the precision of the numbers but in making the system’s geometry visible enough to argue about.

The matrix below maps operational connectivity across the system’s key actors. The numbers are analytical judgements, not measurements.

The geometry they make visible is what matters here.

The matrix is intentionally non-symmetric. Where operational influence flows asymmetrically between two actors, the weights reflect that directionality.

The matrix reveals, in this light, a system whose dominant actors are connected at fundamentally different weights. And more significantly, its most important bilateral relationship is operating in the friction zone. It’s formally excluded adversary has constructed the only alternative connectivity architecture in the system. What this implies is that the geometry of the conflict runs considerably deeper than standard alliance analysis tends to suggest.

On the coalition side, the US has high adjacency with Qatar, Bahrain, Israel, and Kuwait, ties that enable rapid coordination and require little maintenance, constituting the operational backbone of what Washington can actually activate quickly.

Its relationship with Saudi Arabia, however, sits at 0.4. That number is analytically more significant than almost anything else in the matrix. Saudi Arabia remains, on most readings, the relationship on which Gulf order coherence formally depends, the anchor of the security architecture since the 1970s, and it is operating in the friction zone where every significant decision requires renegotiation from scratch rather than flowing through an established channel. Saudi Arabia’s invitation to join BRICS in August 2023, yuan-denominated oil transactions with China, and its participation in the Chinese-brokered rapprochement with Iran in March 2023 all point in the same direction. Riyadh is hedging structurally toward China and the broader non-Western order, a posture that sits uneasily alongside its formal security alignment with Washington. Taken together, these are not isolated political episodes but evidence of a tie that has been operating below the coordination threshold for years and whose weakness is, on this reading, the system’s most consequential structural vulnerability.

Through the normalization architecture, the UAE has arguably become the system’s most structurally reliable node at 0.6 with both the US and Israel, its operational integration exceeding Saudi Arabia’s despite Saudi Arabia’s formal primacy. The Abraham Accords of September 2020 established the formal foundation for that integration. The operational depth it has since generated, across intelligence sharing, defence cooperation, and coordinated positioning on Iran, has made the UAE the coalition’s most functionally connected Gulf partner. Oman holds what is perhaps the system’s most anomalous position, meaningful adjacency with both the US coalition and Iran simultaneously, a profile no other state actor in the matrix replicates. That structural position gave Oman the back-channel role it played through the early phases of the conflict, with documented precedent in the secret US-Iran nuclear negotiations that began in Muscat in 2012 and ran through 2013. As the conflict has intensified, Pakistan has assumed the primary mediation function, but Oman’s position as a quiet facilitator has not disappeared; it has simply been supplemented by a node with more direct access to both capitals at this particular moment.

Pakistan has emerged as the conflict’s primary mediation node, hosting the highest-level direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 1979 and brokering the April 2026 ceasefire. That role reflects a structural position the matrix makes legible: high Saudi adjacency, a functioning Iran tie, and a rehabilitated relationship with Washington that no other regional actor currently combines. China’s influence over both Pakistani and Iranian decision-making operates as an exogenous pressure that the matrix only partially captures, and Pakistan’s own domestic constraints, including its difficulty developing direct channels with the IRGC, limit how far that mediation role can ultimately reach.

Iran’s position is where the matrix becomes most analytically revealing. Across the state actors in the system, Iran’s adjacency sits at or near fragmentation, built up through sanctions, absent operational channels, and decades of adversarial signalling that have left Tehran formally isolated from the coordination architecture the United States and its partners have constructed.

And yet the only high-weight tie Iran holds is with its proxy network at 0.7. That single number may go further toward explaining the architecture of the entire campaign than any other figure in the matrix.

It is an asymmetric relationship in which Tehran’s capacity to activate and direct exceeds the reverse influence those actors exert over Iranian strategic decisions. What that single structural condition implies goes further toward explaining the architecture of Iranian pressure operations than most analyses of Iranian intentions or capabilities tend to reach. Iran is geographically central and formally excluded. It is precisely that combination, positioned to apply pressure across every theatre while bearing none of the coordination costs that formal inclusion imposes. That, from this vantage point, is what makes legible a strategy that standard analysis, focused on actors and their capabilities, cannot see.

Seen through this lens, what Iran is doing across the region is something more structurally ambitious than a military campaign. It is attempting to restructure the matrix itself. The goal appears to be less about battlefield victory than about the gradual degradation of the ties connecting the United States to its regional partners, below the threshold at which coordinated response becomes automatic, eroding the will to keep paying the price of alignment while simultaneously building alternative adjacency in the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest.

The Houthi campaign against Red Sea shipping is calibrated to stay below the threshold that would compel a unified military response. It introduces friction into the economic relationships connecting European states to the Gulf system, raising the cost of alignment with Washington’s regional posture without forcing the kind of direct confrontation that would unite the coalition. Strikes on Gulf infrastructure follow the same calibration, persistent enough to signal that the US security guarantee cannot insulate its partners from costs, yet restrained enough to avoid crossing the point at which coalition fragmentation becomes irrelevant because a unified response becomes compulsory. Across Iraq and Syria, simultaneous pressure from affiliated militias prevents the concentration of attention that sustained coalition coordination requires. In each case, the instrument targets a relationship rather than a capability, specifically the weight of the ties whose degradation would restructure the system’s geometry without requiring Iran to displace the existing order directly.

The US-Saudi tie at 0.4 is the primary focus of that degradation effort. Should that threshold be breached, Saudi Arabia hedges. As hedging reduces operational interactivity the tie weakens further. The process risks becoming self-reinforcing. Iranian military superiority over any individual partner is not required to sustain it.

The same logic extends across European actors, though not uniformly. Germany’s industrial exposure to energy price volatility, France’s residual strategic autonomy instinct, and the EU’s institutional preference for de-escalation all produce different thresholds for continued alignment with Washington. Their shared energy dependency gives them asymmetric stakes in the Gulf system’s stability, but their appetite for risk diverges from Washington’s in ways that are not identical across capitals, and each time Iran forces a decision about the cost of continued alignment, that divergence fragments the coalition’s coordination surface further.

By sustaining operational ties with non-state actors across the region, Iran is constructing alternative adjacency in precisely the nodes where US-aligned connectivity is weakest. These are populations and factions that the existing regional order has excluded from the dominant coalition’s coordination architecture. Deliberately so — Iran is building in the structural gaps the system leaves open. Displacing the existing order appears unnecessary. Becoming the more reliable pole of alignment for the actors that order has failed to integrate may be sufficient. All that is required is that the order fragment sufficiently at its margins for that offer to appear credible, and the current trajectory of US-Saudi friction and European hedging is steadily moving in that direction.

The coalition’s instruments are calibrated to military threats. The system, however, is failing along a different surface entirely, or so this reading suggests. The formal architecture remains largely intact, security guarantees have not been withdrawn, Gulf states remain formally aligned, and normalisation agreements hold. And yet the operational adjacency that gives that architecture its functional weight is under sustained pressure from an actor that has correctly identified the gap between formal commitment and operational tie as the system’s primary vulnerability. That identification is outpacing the coalition’s capacity to respond.

On this reading, the surface on which the conflict appears to be decided is not the one the coalition is defending.

What adjacency mapping reveals is a story about geometry. The system’s dominant actor holds formal commitments at weights the system cannot sustain under the pressure being applied to it. Its adversary, in turn, has built the only alternative coordination architecture in the space that those weakening ties leave open. The conflict is likely to be determined by which ties the system can no longer afford to lose under sustained and calibrated pressure. The question is whether the actors currently holding those ties in the friction zone can rebuild them to the coordination threshold before the process of degradation becomes irreversible. That is a question that capability assessments are not well-positioned to answer, and one that a structural reading of the system’s connectivity at least helps to make visible.

Norway is preparing to lift restrictions preventing its $2.2 trillion sovereign wealth fund from investing in government bonds issued by Syria.

The move follows the political transition after the ousting of Bashar al-Assad and the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa, whose government has been seeking economic recovery and international reintegration after more than a decade of war and sanctions.

At the same time, Norway plans to newly restrict investments in bonds issued by Iran, aligning with ongoing international sanctions.

Policy Shift and Financial Context

The Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, the largest in the world, plays a major role in global financial markets. Its investment decisions often influence broader investor behaviour.

The updated policy removes Syria from the exclusion list for government bonds while adding Iran, reflecting changing geopolitical and sanctions dynamics.

Although the fund does not currently hold investments in Middle Eastern government bonds, the policy shift opens the door for future allocations and signals a reassessment of risk and legitimacy.

Geopolitical Significance

Norway’s decision represents a notable step toward Syria’s re-entry into the global financial system. It comes alongside other developments, including the restoration of Syria’s financial links with international institutions after years of isolation.

The move also highlights a divergence in how states are being treated: while Syria is gradually being reintegrated, Iran remains economically isolated due to continued tensions and sanctions.

As one of the world’s most influential sovereign investors, Norway’s stance could encourage other countries and institutions to reconsider their own restrictions on Syria.

Analysis

The decision reflects a broader recalibration of international economic engagement based on political change and shifting strategic priorities. By opening the possibility of investment in Syrian bonds, Norway is signalling cautious confidence in the new government’s direction and stability.

At the same time, the move remains largely symbolic in the short term. The wealth fund has no immediate exposure to Syrian debt, and actual investment will depend on risk assessments, market conditions, and institutional safeguards.

More importantly, the policy underscores how financial tools are increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy. Inclusion or exclusion from global capital markets can legitimise governments, incentivise reforms, or reinforce isolation.

In Syria’s case, gradual financial reintegration could support reconstruction and economic recovery, but it also raises questions about governance, transparency, and long-term stability after years of conflict.

With information from Reuters.

Britain has publicly distanced itself from Washington’s escalating strategy against Iran, with Prime Minister Keir Starmer making clear that the UK will not support any blockade in the Gulf.

Speaking after the United States announced sweeping restrictions on Iranian shipping, Starmer emphasized that Britain’s priority is not enforcement but de-escalation. He stressed the importance of keeping vital trade routes open rather than contributing to further disruption.

What Starmer Said

Starmer’s message was direct. The UK will not be drawn into the conflict and will not support a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Instead, Britain is focused on ensuring the strait remains open. While confirming the presence of British minesweepers in the region, he made clear their role is defensive and aimed at maintaining safe passage, not enforcing restrictions.

Contrast with Washington

The stance puts London at odds with the approach taken by Donald Trump.

The U.S., through United States Central Command, has announced a broad blockade targeting Iranian maritime traffic. Trump has gone further, warning that vessels linked to Iranian payments could be intercepted and threatening force against any resistance.

While Washington frames the move as pressure on Tehran, Britain is signaling concern about the wider consequences.

Why the Strait Matters

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most critical energy routes in the world. A significant share of global oil supply passes through it, meaning even partial disruption can send shockwaves through markets.

For the UK, keeping this route open is not just a regional issue but a global economic priority.

Implications: Cracks in Western Unity

Britain’s refusal highlights a growing divide among Western allies on how to handle the Iran crisis.

The U.S. is pursuing a strategy of maximum pressure, while the UK is prioritizing stability and the prevention of further escalation. This divergence could complicate coordinated action and weaken the overall Western response.

Analysis: A Strategic Balancing Act

Starmer’s position reflects a careful calculation. Supporting the blockade risks entangling Britain in a wider conflict and worsening global economic strain. Opposing it, however, creates visible distance from a key ally.

By focusing on keeping the strait open, the UK is attempting to balance security concerns with economic stability, while avoiding direct confrontation.

Britain’s stance sends a clear signal. Even close allies are not fully aligned on how far to go against Iran.

As tensions rise, that lack of unity could shape the next phase of the crisis just as much as the actions taken in the Gulf itself.

With information from Reuters.

A two day ceasefire between the United States and Iran has paused direct large scale strikes, but key flashpoints across the region remain active.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and escalating violence in Lebanon highlight the limited scope of the truce, exposing gaps in its coverage and enforcement.

Strait of Hormuz Remains Closed

Despite expectations that the ceasefire would stabilise energy markets, the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively shut.

This chokepoint normally handles a significant share of global oil shipments, with around 140 vessels passing through daily under normal conditions. In the first 24 hours after the ceasefire, only a handful of ships were able to transit the route.

The continued disruption has driven immediate delivery oil prices sharply higher, with some refiners in Europe and Asia reportedly paying near record levels.

Donald Trump publicly criticised Iran for failing to uphold what he described as an agreement to allow oil flows, while also signalling that shipments could resume soon without detailing mechanisms.

Disputed Scope of the Ceasefire

A central point of contention is whether the ceasefire extends beyond direct US Iran hostilities.

Iran maintains that the truce should include theatres such as Lebanon, where Hezbollah is engaged in conflict with Israel.

The United States and Israel reject this interpretation, arguing that Lebanon falls outside the agreement’s framework. This divergence has created parallel narratives of compliance and violation, undermining the credibility of the ceasefire.

Escalation in Lebanon

Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has continued, with both sides exchanging strikes.

Israeli forces carried out large scale attacks shortly after the ceasefire announcement, while Hezbollah resumed missile launches following earlier indications it would pause operations.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has since signalled a shift by expressing willingness to begin separate negotiations with Lebanon, focusing on disarming Hezbollah and establishing more stable relations.

Meanwhile, Lebanese officials are attempting to broker a temporary ceasefire as a stepping stone toward broader negotiations, indicating a parallel diplomatic track separate from US Iran talks.

High Stakes Talks in Islamabad

The first direct peace talks between the United States and Iran are scheduled to take place in Islamabad, which has been placed under heavy security lockdown.

Pakistan’s role as mediator underscores its diplomatic positioning, with tight security arrangements including restricted zones and controlled access around the negotiation venue.

The Iranian delegation is expected to be led by Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, while the US side will be headed by JD Vance.

Competing Strategic Objectives

The talks are shaped by fundamentally different goals

The United States seeks

• Limits on Iran’s nuclear programme
• An end to uranium enrichment
• Curtailment of missile capabilities
• Withdrawal of support for regional allies

Iran, by contrast, is expected to demand

• Removal of economic sanctions
• Recognition of its authority over the Strait of Hormuz
• Compensation for wartime damage

Iran’s leadership, now under Mojtaba Khamenei, has adopted a defiant posture, signalling that concessions will come at a high price.

Economic Fallout

The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is already feeding into global economic indicators.

Oil price volatility is expected to influence inflation data, particularly in the United States, where upcoming consumer price figures may reflect the early economic impact of the conflict.

While futures markets have shown some optimism following the ceasefire, spot prices remain elevated, indicating persistent uncertainty about immediate supply conditions.

Military and Strategic Reality

Despite the ceasefire, the broader strategic objectives of the war remain unresolved

Iran retains missile and drone capabilities capable of targeting regional adversaries
Its nuclear programme continues, with a significant stockpile of enriched uranium
The political system has remained intact despite internal unrest

For the United States, initial goals such as dismantling Iran’s nuclear capacity and weakening its regional influence have not been fully achieved.

Analysis

The current situation reflects a fragmented ceasefire architecture in which the absence of a unified framework allows multiple conflicts to persist simultaneously. The continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates how economic leverage can be maintained independently of formal military de escalation, reinforcing Iran’s bargaining position ahead of negotiations.

At the same time, the divergence over whether Lebanon is included in the truce highlights the limitations of narrowly scoped agreements in complex regional conflicts involving multiple state and non state actors. The persistence of Israel Hezbollah hostilities illustrates how parallel wars can undermine broader diplomatic efforts, creating a layered conflict environment.

The decision to proceed with talks in Islamabad despite ongoing violations suggests that both the United States and Iran view negotiations as strategically necessary, even in the absence of full compliance on the ground. This indicates a shift toward diplomacy driven not by stability but by mutual recognition of the costs of prolonged confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

Global currency and commodity markets stabilised slightly on Tuesday after a volatile start to the week triggered by the war involving Iran, United States and Israel. The U.S. dollar steadied against major currencies after earlier declines, following remarks from U.S. President Donald Trump that the conflict could end “very soon.”

Financial markets had been thrown into turmoil a day earlier amid fears that a prolonged war could trigger a major global energy shock. The conflict has disrupted oil and gas exports through the critical Strait of Hormuz, a vital shipping route for global energy supplies.

Although markets calmed somewhat after Trump’s comments, the broader environment remains highly uncertain as investors continue to assess the potential economic fallout from the conflict.

Dollar Holds Ground as Oil Prices Ease

In Asian trading, the U.S. dollar was largely steady against other major currencies after retreating from the highs reached during Monday’s market turbulence.

The currency traded at around 157.73 yen against the Japanese yen and about $1.1632 against the euro, reflecting a stabilisation following the sharp movements seen earlier.

Meanwhile, oil prices remained elevated but declined from the dramatic peaks reached at the start of the week. Brent crude traded at roughly $93 per barrel, still significantly higher than levels before the outbreak of the war but well below Monday’s surge toward $120.

The pullback in oil prices helped ease immediate concerns about a severe energy shock, although analysts caution that volatility could continue if the conflict escalates again.

Investors Remain Cautious

Despite the relative calm in currency markets, analysts say investors are far from convinced that the crisis is nearing resolution.

Rodrigo Catril, a currency strategist at National Australia Bank, warned that markets could continue to experience sudden shifts in sentiment as geopolitical developments unfold.

According to Catril, it remains unclear whether the Iranian leadership would be willing to pursue de-escalation, suggesting that the risk of renewed market volatility remains high.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran dismissed Trump’s suggestion that the conflict could end quickly, describing the remarks as “nonsense.”

Risk-Sensitive Currencies Under Pressure

Currencies closely linked to global economic sentiment weakened as investors remained cautious.

The Australian dollar slipped to around $0.7063, while the New Zealand dollar fell to roughly $0.5912. These currencies often decline during periods of geopolitical uncertainty or when investors shift toward safer assets.

The dollar, by contrast, has benefited from its traditional role as a safe-haven currency during times of crisis. The escalation of the conflict and disruption to energy markets prompted investors to move funds into U.S. assets, supporting the currency.

The British pound recovered from losses earlier in the week to trade around $1.3434.

Energy Prices and Global Growth Concerns

Investors remain concerned that sustained high energy prices could slow global economic growth. Rising oil costs increase expenses for businesses and households, effectively acting as a tax on economic activity.

At the same time, higher energy prices could complicate monetary policy by pushing inflation upward and making it harder for central banks to lower interest rates.

Analysts at Deutsche Bank noted that a broader market sell-off in risk assets would likely require several conditions to occur simultaneously: persistently high oil prices, a shift in central bank policy expectations and clear evidence of a slowing global economy.

Strategist Henry Allen said markets are now significantly closer to those thresholds than they were just a week ago, though the full conditions for a major downturn have not yet materialised.

Analysis: Markets Brace for Prolonged Volatility

The market reaction to the Iran war underscores how closely global financial conditions are tied to geopolitical developments in the Middle East.

While Trump’s comments about a possible quick end to the conflict helped stabilise markets temporarily, the underlying risks remain substantial. The disruption of energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz continues to threaten global oil flows and could trigger renewed price spikes if the conflict intensifies.

For investors, the situation presents a delicate balance. On one hand, hopes for de-escalation could stabilise energy prices and reduce pressure on financial markets. On the other, continued fighting or further disruptions to oil shipments could quickly reignite volatility across currencies, commodities and equities.

Until there is clearer evidence of either de-escalation or escalation, markets are likely to remain highly sensitive to political developments, with the dollar continuing to benefit from its role as a global safe haven.

With information from Reuters.

The war involving Iran, United States and Israel is increasingly affecting energy supplies far beyond the Middle East, with Bangladesh now scrambling to secure fuel imports after disruptions to regional shipping routes.

Bangladeshi officials say the country has begun receiving diesel shipments from suppliers including China and India, allowing authorities to secure enough fuel to meet roughly one month of national demand. Arrangements are also being made to secure supplies for an additional month.

The South Asian nation of about 175 million people depends heavily on imported energy, with roughly 95% of its fuel requirements sourced from abroad. The disruption of Middle Eastern oil flows following the war has therefore exposed Bangladesh to severe supply risks.

Fuel Rationing and Economic Disruptions

To manage the supply shortage, authorities have introduced emergency measures including fuel rationing for vehicles, restrictions on diesel sales and the temporary closure of universities.

Energy shortages are also affecting Bangladesh’s critical export industries. The country is the world’s second-largest clothing exporter after China, and many garment factories rely on diesel-powered generators during power outages.

Industry leaders say the situation has worsened since the conflict began in late February. Power cuts have doubled to as much as five hours per day, forcing factories to rely more heavily on backup generators.

Mahmud Hasan Khan, president of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association, said many companies are struggling to obtain sufficient diesel to keep their operations running during electricity outages.

The shortages threaten to disrupt production in one of Bangladesh’s most important economic sectors, which accounts for the majority of the country’s export earnings.

Emergency Diesel Shipments Arrive

To stabilise supplies, the state-run Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation (BPC) has arranged diesel shipments from international traders.

Energy officials say around 60,000 metric tons of diesel are currently being delivered by three trading companies, with another 90,000 metric tons expected to arrive later this month.

A cargo of approximately 27,000 metric tons from PetroChina has already arrived at Chittagong Port, while another shipment of roughly 28,000 metric tons from Vitol is waiting at the port’s outer anchorage.

Additional supplies are also arriving through a cross-border pipeline from India’s Numaligarh Refinery, which is currently providing about 5,000 metric tons of diesel. Officials said negotiations are underway to secure a further 30,000 metric tons from Indian Oil Corporation.

Bangladesh typically consumes about 380,000 metric tons of diesel each month. However, officials estimate that rationing measures have reduced current demand to around 270,000 metric tons per month.

Oil Imports Threatened by Hormuz Disruptions

While refined diesel cargoes have continued to arrive, Bangladesh faces greater risks in securing crude oil shipments for its domestic refineries.

The country imports about 1.4 million metric tons of crude oil annually under long-term supply agreements with Saudi Aramco and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.

However, shipments from these suppliers must travel through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, which has been heavily disrupted by the war. Officials say at least one cargo of around 100,000 tons from Saudi Aramco has already been delayed in the Gulf due to the ongoing crisis.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy transit routes, and any prolonged disruption could have far-reaching consequences for countries heavily dependent on imported fuel.

Gas Shortages Add to Energy Crisis

Bangladesh’s energy difficulties extend beyond diesel shortages. Severe natural gas shortages have already forced the closure of four of the country’s five state-run fertiliser factories.

Authorities have redirected the available gas supply toward electricity generation in an effort to stabilise power production during the crisis.

The combination of diesel shortages, disrupted oil imports and limited gas supplies is placing growing pressure on Bangladesh’s energy system at a time when global fuel markets are already experiencing heightened volatility.

Analysis: Energy Dependence Exposes Economic Vulnerability

Bangladesh’s struggle to secure diesel supplies illustrates how the war involving Iran is affecting energy-importing economies far beyond the immediate conflict zone.

Countries that rely heavily on imported fuel are particularly vulnerable to disruptions in global energy shipping routes, especially those linked to the Strait of Hormuz. Even temporary interruptions can lead to fuel shortages, higher prices and broader economic disruption.

For Bangladesh, the situation highlights the structural risks created by its dependence on imported energy. Industries such as garments, which rely on stable electricity supplies and backup diesel generators, are especially exposed to supply shocks.

Although emergency shipments from China and India have temporarily stabilised supplies, the situation remains fragile. If the conflict in the Middle East continues to disrupt oil shipments or drive up prices, Bangladesh could face prolonged energy shortages with significant implications for its economy and export industries.

With information from Reuters.