Dynamics

Venezuela is once again debating a renewal of its institutions, as if the problem could be solved simply by replacing the people in office. This remains the crucial question: what would have to change among those who wield power so that new rules are respected, even when doing so is inconvenient for them?

We are talking about rebuilding the State, restoring judicial independence, or recovering institutional integrity, often attributing agency to structures that, in practice, operate through human decisions. Behind every appointment, court ruling, or agreement are individuals driven by interests, convictions, fears, and power dynamics. No reform can overlook them.

When a future Supreme Court (TSJ) justice faces the uncomfortable decision of ruling against the interests of those who made their appointment possible, they will recall that the Constitution guarantees their independence; yet, they will also realize that their decision hinges on the safeguards available to them and the personal consequences of challenging those in power.

Individuals who uphold institutions

Following the fall of the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship on January 23, 1958, key political leaders realized that democratic survival required agreements that predated any constitutional framework. Rómulo Betancourt, Rafael Caldera, and Jóvito Villalba represented the parties that signed the Pact of Puntofijo in October of that year. The 1961 Constitution came later, built upon a foundation of compromises reached by former adversaries who had experienced the failure of 1945–1948. The agreements preceded the rules they were meant to uphold.

Those agreements, however, were not all-encompassing. The Communist Party was excluded from the pact, and the system of elite conciliation studied by Juan Carlos Rey ultimately revealed significant limitations regarding representation. Moreover, civilian consensus does not guarantee military obedience. In May and June 1962, the uprisings known as the Carupanazo and the Porteñazo put the Betancourt government to the test.

The 1999 Constitution already provided a Judicial Nominations Committee with civil society participation—much like the one we now expect—yet its operations ultimately became subordinate to political control. 

Democracy survived because key sectors of the Armed Forces remained loyal to the constitutional order, even though their defense of it was accompanied by restrictions and repressive measures. Institutions require individuals willing to uphold them against those seeking to tear them down.

Institutions that sustain individuals

Four decades later, Venezuela embarked on another institutional transformation. The 1999 Constitution promised to expand citizen participation and strengthen rights, yet its existence did not prevent the progressive concentration of power. In 2004, the Organic Law on the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) expanded the court from 20 to 32 justices, facilitating political control over the body. In the presidential elections of July 28, 2024, the National Electoral Council (CNE) declared Nicolás Maduro the winner without publishing the disaggregated results backing its announcement. The electoral fraud exposed a fundamental contradiction: the body charged with guaranteeing the popular will ended up proclaiming a result contrary to the available electoral evidence.

The problem was not simply the gap between a sound Constitution and poor leaders. Over the years, relationships of dependency were built that made it possible to subordinate formally autonomous institutions. Consequently, public offices, judicial decisions, and oversight mechanisms increasingly served the preservation of a political project. The result was that an institution could retain its name, legal powers, and procedures while losing the actual capacity to constrain those in power. The rules remained, but those charged with defending them lacked the independence to do so.

US influence on the process also raises questions about the extent to which agreements reflect the priorities of the Venezuelan people.

In 2026, the debate resurfaces under different circumstances. Following Maduro’s removal on January 3, the government of Delcy Rodríguez is negotiating the renewal of the branches of government. Dinorah Figuera, president of the National Assembly elected in 2015, announced a schedule that seeks to revamp the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) by November and complete work on the National Electoral Council (CNE) by December. These are announced political timelines that remain subject to negotiation.

But who is actually negotiating, and to whom are they accountable? US influence on the process also raises questions about the extent to which agreements reflect the priorities of the Venezuelan people. Furthermore, any given concession can be instantly interpreted on social media—by polarized audiences—as either a victory or a betrayal, thereby raising the political cost of negotiation.

The broader audience watching this process is not solely in Venezuela. Millions participate from abroad in public conversations about the country’s future and will also play a role in defending the institutions that may eventually be rebuilt. Institutional reconstruction must incorporate both the Venezuelans who remain in the country and those who have had to build their lives elsewhere. The experience of exile, diverse life paths, and political differences should not become obstacles to participating in defining our shared future. After so many years of division, the challenge also lies in recognizing ourselves as part of the same society, one in which no one is considered expendable in the effort to rebuild democracy.

Added to this is an issue that no agreement between civilians can sidestep: the continued existence of a military and security structure formed under chavismo. The conduct of those who control the weapons will be a decisive test for any new institutional order.

Society vs. institutional boundaries and agreements

The answer to the initial question (“what must change among those in power so that new rules are respected, even when doing so is inconvenient for them?”) requires concrete guarantees. For a judge to rule independently, the processes of selection and tenure must be shielded from those who expect obedience in exchange for the appointment. The 1999 Constitution already provided a Judicial Nominations Committee with civil society participation—much like the one we now expect—yet its operations ultimately became subordinate to political control. However, the 2024 election also taught us that when the CNE failed in its duty of transparency, citizens and organizations gathered and preserved the tally sheets that allowed the official results to be challenged.

Venezuelan society demonstrated that it can generate evidence and demand accountability, even when an institution fails.

Reconstruction therefore demands reforms capable of altering the incentives for those in power, guarantees for those who have suffered persecution, and oversight mechanisms that do not rely on the goodwill of those governing. Yet, it also requires a society capable of upholding those boundaries. The armed forces also need to find a place within that balance. Transparent rules for promotion and retirement, professionalization, and subordination to civilian authority could offer an alternative to personal loyalty. Their incorporation into the new order cannot imply impunity; distinguishing individual responsibilities and ensuring independent investigations will be essential to prevent inclusion from merely reproducing the privileges of the past.

The experience of the 2024 vote tallies offers a concrete possibility: transforming that capacity for civic organization into permanent oversight of the new authorities.

That capacity also depends on a democratic culture that recognizes the value of disagreement. A democracy is not built among equals, but among people who think differently yet still find reasons to reach compromises. Alterity—understood as recognizing the other in their difference—allows for the acceptance that an adversary also has the right to participate in shaping shared rules. Agreements require this disposition not only to emerge but also to endure and be revised when circumstances change.

For Venezuelans abroad, such participation requires more than just invitations to return: it demands guarantees for exercising political rights, effective mechanisms for participation, and conditions that allow their skills and capabilities to be linked to the country’s reconstruction. Within Venezuela, the experience of the 2024 vote tallies offers a concrete possibility: transforming that capacity for civic organization into permanent oversight of the new authorities, with access to public information and spaces to demand answers.

Institutional frameworks cannot remain static, either. Rules that once facilitated coexistence may require adjustments in the face of new social demands and political transformations. The contemporary challenge lies in the speed of these changes, which demands a greater capacity for understanding from those who govern and better tools for evaluating consequences from society. A democratic civic culture must allow institutions to evolve without becoming subject to the will of whoever happens to hold power at the time.

Domestic and international economic and financial sectors also need reasons to commit to this order. Legal certainty, transparent public contracts, and independent courts would allow informal influences to be replaced by relationships governed by established rules. However, such a commitment requires abandoning advantages gained through discretionary practices. An economy capable of long-term investment needs institutions that protect legitimate activity without relying on personal proximity to power.

Venezuela can overhaul its courts, appoint new electoral officials, and even draft another Constitution. None of that, on its own, will resolve the power dynamics that enabled authoritarianism. Institutions require rules that protect those who enforce them, as well as citizens capable of defending them when their own leaders seek to disregard them. Legitimacy is neither imported from Washington nor decreed from Caracas; it is built through the decisions of those who wield power and a society’s capacity to hold them accountable for those decisions.