Defense

On 18 February 2026, reports emerged that Britain was withholding American permission to use Diego Garcia in any hypothetical strike against Iran. The following day, Trump posted “DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA” on Truth Social, linking the base directly to potential operations against Tehran in terms that left no room for diplomatic interpretation. The sequence lasted forty-eight hours and revealed what months of careful legal construction had obscured: that the architecture of conditional access Britain had built around a strategically significant military installation was worth precisely what the decisive power chose to make it worth. Whether the intervention also carried tactical signalling toward Tehran is a legitimate question, and intra-alliance friction of this kind sometimes functions as maximalist positioning before settlement. What matters analytically, however, is not the post itself but what the post revealed when operational pressure arrived. It was also, for anyone who had read Washington’s December 2025 National Security Strategy carefully, entirely predictable.

Power Does Not Ask

There are two ways to understand how military power operates in the international system, and the Chagos episode forces a choice between them. The first holds that great powers are meaningfully constrained by the frameworks they inhabit, alliance structures, legal agreements, and diplomatic settlements, and that these frameworks produce stable, predictable behavior even when the underlying interests they were designed to manage come under pressure. The second holds that frameworks are expressions of power relationships at a given moment rather than independent constraints upon them, so that when power shifts or decides to assert itself, the frameworks adjust to reflect the new reality rather than containing it. The first is the language of liberal internationalism. The second is the language of realism, and what February produced was an unambiguous realist moment.

The December 2025 National Security Strategy had already committed this diagnosis to paper. The document did not describe Europe as weak through circumstance. It described Europe as having chosen weakness, identifying a “loss of national identities and self-confidence” as the continent’s defining condition and stating openly that it is “far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” The strategy framed European concerns about Russia as evidence of that same condition, noting that this lack of self-confidence was most evident in Europe’s relationship with Russia, despite the fact that European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure save nuclear weapons. Washington’s reading of its European partners, formalized two months before the Diego Garcia friction became public, was of states that had systematically preferred institutional solutions over sovereign ones, legal arrangements over unconditional control, and managed conditionality over the exercise of will. Britain’s handling of Chagos was, in that context, not an anomaly. It was a confirmation.

What is analytically significant about Trump’s intervention is not simply that he rejected the deal but that he did not engage it at all, did not address the ICJ ruling that gave it legal foundation, did not contest the lease terms that were its operational expression, and did not enter the diplomatic logic that had produced it over months of negotiation. A decision of this kind does not derive its authority from the framework it overrides, because it precedes that framework, and the framework itself only ever existed on the sufferance of the power now choosing to move against it. When Trump asserted that leases are “no good when it comes to countries,” he was not making a legal argument that could be answered within the same register. He was stating a principle about the nature of sovereign will: that when it moves, it moves prior to and above whatever conditional arrangements were constructed in the period of its dormancy.

This is realism in its purest operational form, in which states pursue interests, great powers pursue interests with the capacity to enforce them, and legal architecture functions as an instrument of power when it serves those interests and an obstacle to be displaced when it does not. The Chagos deal did not alter the underlying power relationship between Washington and London, but it did create a layer of conditionality over an asset Washington considers operationally essential, and when operational pressure arrived, that conditionality became intolerable, not because Mauritius is hostile, not because Britain is an adversary, but because no great power conducting military projection at a global scale can accept that a weak state sits structurally inside the chain of its operational decisions, regardless of how that state arrived there or how benign its intentions are understood to be.

Beneath the realist logic sits a transactional one, and the two reinforce each other in ways that matter for how Britain should read what happened. Trump does not evaluate alliance relationships by their historical depth or their institutional architecture. He evaluates them by what they yield in the current moment, and every asset is a leverage point to be maximized. Diego Garcia represents unconditional American operational value. The Chagos deal reduced that value by inserting a condition. From a transactional perspective, that insertion was not a diplomatic nuance to be managed but a concession to be reversed, because Trump’s governing principle across every alliance relationship is maximum American gain, and conditionality is by definition a reduction of gain. The decisionism explains how he responded. The transactionalism explains why.

The Geography of Decision

Diego Garcia is not incidental to American power projection in the region, though its significance is that of an enabler rather than a prerequisite. The base sits at the center of the Indian Ocean, within operational reach of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca, and the East African littoral, and it has supported American military operations across that entire arc for half a century through bomber rotations, logistics chains, and a sustained forward presence that no other installation in the basin fully replicates at the same scale and permanence. It does not make American power projection possible in any absolute sense, but it makes it faster, cheaper, and more sustained, which in the context of time-sensitive operational planning against a target like Iran is not a marginal difference but a meaningful one.

The Iran dimension exposes the conditionality problem with particular clarity because the operational context in which Diego Garcia’s value is most acute is precisely the context in which conditional access is most dangerous. American military assets have accumulated across the Middle East, talks are active, and a base capable of projecting strategic airpower directly into the Persian Gulf theater is not a background consideration but a variable whose availability, or unavailability, shapes what options exist and on what timeline. Britain’s reported reluctance to grant operational clearance, under a deal still unratified and still contested in domestic courts, still legally dependent on Mauritius’s continued cooperation, revealed that the conditionality embedded in the arrangement had already entered the operational calculus before any of the stabilizing assumptions behind the deal had time to establish themselves. Strategic friction did not arrive at the end of a long maturation period. It arrived in weeks, because operational pressure does not wait for diplomatic frameworks to consolidate.

That compression of the timeline is itself the most realistic lesson. Power does not defer to the developmental logic of legal arrangements, and when the operational moment arrives, whatever sits between a great power’s will and its objective is reclassified from a framework to be respected into a problem to be solved.

The Structural Position of the Weak

The analytical core of the Chagos case is not about Mauritius’s intentions, which by all available evidence are not hostile, but about the structural position that the deal assigned to it within the architecture of American operational planning, because in the logic of great power competition, it is position rather than intention that determines strategic relevance. By inserting itself, or being inserted, into the chain of conditions governing a great power’s operational freedom, a weak state acquires a form of leverage it could never achieve through military means, and the Chagos deal gave Mauritius exactly that position, not through hostility but through legal standing, not through power but through presence within a conditional architecture that a great power now had reason to find constraining.

For Washington operating within a decisionist strategic logic, that presence is categorically unacceptable regardless of Mauritius’s intentions. The relevant question is not whether Mauritius would obstruct American operations but whether, under the terms of the arrangement, it structurally could, and the answer is yes in a way that no amount of diplomatic goodwill can fully neutralize. Sovereignty transferred to Mauritius is not sovereignty parked with a neutral party but sovereignty that now sits within reach of Chinese economic leverage, meaning the lease does not merely introduce conditionality but introduces conditionality whose future content Washington cannot determine or guarantee. A great power conducting global military projection cannot organize its operational planning around the sustained goodwill of a small state whose strategic orientation it cannot guarantee. That such goodwill is required at all is the problem the deal created.

Weak states do not constrain great powers through legal arrangements in any durable sense, because the constraint only holds when the great power chooses to honor it, and great powers choose to honor constraints only when the cost of non-compliance exceeds the cost of compliance, a calculation that shifts decisively once operational necessity enters the equation and the framework reveals itself to be dependent on tolerance rather than grounded in power.

Conclusion

Britain converted unconditional sovereign control over a strategically significant military installation into a conditional leasehold arrangement whose operationalization depended on a small state’s legal cooperation and presented that conversion as a resolution of vulnerability rather than the creation of a new one. Britain was not being naive. It was an attempt to preserve the base’s long-term legal viability against mounting international pressure, a calculation that the alliance relationship would absorb any friction that followed. What Britain did not account for was that its ally evaluates arrangements not by their legal durability but by whether they constrain American will, and a solution sophisticated enough to satisfy international law was simultaneously insufficiently decisive to satisfy Washington.

From the perspective of the December 2025 National Security Strategy, that conversion was not a surprise. It was the predictable output of a European strategic culture that Washington had already formally diagnosed: one that reaches instinctively for institutional solutions when strong states would resolve through will, that mistakes legal legitimacy for strategic security, and that has internalized the habits of the post-Cold War order to the point where it can no longer easily distinguish between a framework and the power that makes frameworks real.

Trump’s response was the most realistic verdict on that presentation, not an argument against the deal’s legal coherence, which was never in question, but a decision that the framework was insufficient for the operational reality it was meant to serve, delivered in terms that made the underlying logic unmistakable. The framework did not collapse under the pressure. It was revealed, under pressure, to have rested entirely on the assumption that the decisive power would continue to choose not to decide otherwise, an assumption that realism has always identified as the central fragility of arrangements built on consent rather than grounded in power.

The strong do not negotiate with the architecture of constraint, and for Europe, February was less a shock than a reminder that the rules it has built its strategic identity around have always depended on the continued willingness of a decisive power to operate within them.

China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, viewing the increasing American bases and military buildup in the region as a strategy of containment and undermining Chinese influence. Beijing seeks to achieve regional balance through counter-diplomacy, both economic and security, and sees the American escalation as a threat to global stability, prompting it to strengthen its partnerships to protect its interests in the region. The Chinese perspective on the militarization of the region is that the American strategy in the Middle East is an extension of the policy of deterrence and containment, which extends from the Pacific to broader spheres of influence. China views American bases, such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, and other US military bases in Kuwait and the UAE, as an indirect tool to undermine Chinese economic and geopolitical stability. China considers the American military bases in the Middle East as instruments of hegemony and an attempt to contain and diminish its influence. Therefore, Beijing seeks to strengthen its military, diplomatic, and economic presence in the region as a strategic alternative, expanding its influence through its Belt and Road Initiative.

China adopts an approach that opposes the American military presence in the Middle East, prioritizing economic stability to serve its interests. This opposition manifests itself in several ways: supporting parallel security partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia, pressuring host countries like the UAE to prevent American expansion, and pursuing civil-military integration in strategic ports. The Egyptian researcher will attempt to identify and present specific examples of China’s rejection of the American military presence in the Middle East, such as China’s obstruction of the UAE’s F-35 deals. Beijing exerted pressure and raised security concerns that led to the stalling of negotiations for the UAE to acquire American F-35 fighter jets, due to Washington’s apprehension about the growing Chinese presence at the UAE’s Khalifa Port. Another example is China’s intensification of joint military exercises with Washington’s and Israel’s adversaries: China has increased its naval and air military exercises with Iran, a direct rival of the American presence in the region, thus posing a strategic challenge to American hegemony. China has also tried to secure oil routes away from Washington’s protection: China seeks to secure its oil interests through independent partnerships in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf ports, reducing the Arab states’ need for American security protection and reinforcing Beijing’s vision of rejecting American “hegemony.” With (China’s criticism of the US “offensive strategy”): Chinese diplomacy criticizes the excessive US presence and instead calls for diplomatic solutions and “civil-military integration” through infrastructure investment, thus undermining traditional US bases. Here, China uses “soft power” and economic investments in ports, such as those in Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, as tools to diminish the strategic importance of US military bases.

The Chinese perspective is that US bases are used to restrict its movement in vital maritime routes and are viewed as tools of deterrence within the context of great power competition. Therefore, China seeks to secure its economic interests by ensuring its oil and gas import routes and protecting its projects, which has led it to strengthen its military presence, including its base in Djibouti, to match its economic influence. With China offering a “developmental and security alternative”: By enhancing its influence through massive investments and security and technology partnerships, such as developing Huawei’s 5G digital infrastructure and China’s defense partnerships with Egypt, Iran, and the Gulf states, to serve as an alternative to direct military presence. Here, China seeks to achieve “absolute security” by protecting its supply chains and projects without directly engaging in managing regional crises in the American manner, preferring instead to project geoeconomic influence.

Here, China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, deeming it an “adventure” that threatens stability and pushes the region toward the brink. Beijing instead seeks to enhance its influence through diplomacy and economics, with Chinese efforts aimed at undermining the American military presence and supporting regional stability through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. The most prominent features of China’s rejection of the US militarization of the Middle East are China’s opposition to the “militarization” of the region and China believes that US strategies based on military bases and deterrence, particularly against Iran, increase instability. (China’s focus on finding a diplomatic and economic alternative): China focuses on comprehensive economic partnerships, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and prioritizes diplomacy to resolve conflicts, making it appear as a strategic alternative to the US “gunboat diplomacy.” The US “gunboat diplomacy” is a declared strategy of President Trump to counter Beijing’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. To counter this, China is focusing on partnerships and economic interests. From the Chinese perspective, regional stability ensures secure energy supplies and massive infrastructure investments in the region.

This coincides with China’s exploitation of the American retreat in the region. China seeks to capitalize on the relative decline in American strategic interest to act as a balancing power, without direct involvement in crisis management, but with an increasing role in maintaining regional equilibrium. Conversely, China fears that American policies will lead to its encirclement and the curtailment of its economic influence, prompting it to strengthen its military ties with certain regional actors as a form of indirect response.

Therefore, China rejects the principle of American militarization of the Middle East. China seeks to find alternatives to American hegemony by strengthening its diplomatic and economic presence, especially given the recent escalation of American military activity. Chinese military analyses indicate that the recent American military buildup, including aircraft carriers and air forces in the region, increases the likelihood of widespread regional conflicts. To that end, China promotes the concept of “common security,” directly rejecting American military involvement that puts pressure on China’s traditional allies in the region, such as Iran.

Concerned circles in Beijing view the American militarization of the Middle East as a perpetuation of a “Cold War mentality.” This is evident in China’s rejection of the ongoing military alliances established by Washington, which Beijing considers attempts to contain its rising influence and force regional states into alignment, a situation Beijing describes as “American hypocrisy.” The Chinese alternative to American militarization in the region is centered on its strategy of “development over militarization.” China seeks to market itself as a “peaceful partner” focused on development and infrastructure, capitalizing on the partial American retreat to expand its diplomatic and economic influence. Beijing adopts a policy of “cautious neutrality,” committing to “non-interference” in regional conflicts and avoiding replacing the American role as the region’s policeman militarily, preferring instead to focus on its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. While fully aware that the militarization of the region impacts China’s energy security, China prefers to address this through diplomacy and economic partnerships rather than direct military presence. China aims to protect its interests by deepening its economic engagement, thereby prompting a gradual US withdrawal, especially as China continues to present itself as a “responsible power” in the Global South.

Feb. 21 (UPI) — Britain announced it has made a deal with four NATO allies to launch an initiative that would see the five nations manufacture low-cost drones to protect Europe.

The European Group of Five (E5) — Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Poland — announced on Friday that they will launch the Low-Cost Effectors & Autonomous Platforms initiative, or LEAP, which is “inspired by Ukraine’s battlefield innovation,” the British government said in a press release.

The purpose of the program is to jointly develop low-cost autonomous drones that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can use to counter Russian provocation in the airspace above NATO-allied nations, Politico reported.

The first focus of LEAP, according to British officials, will be the development of a new surface-to-air weapon that is lightweight and affordable in order to defend against Russia’s drone and missile threats.

“European security is at a pivotal moment,” Luke Pollard, Britian’s Minister for Defense Readiness and Industry, said after the E5 meeting. “The U.K. and our E5 partners are stepping up — investing together in the next generation of air defense and autonomous systems to strengthen NATO’s shield and keep our people safe.”

Over the course of the last year, Russian fighter jets have violated NATO partner’s airspace, including fighter jets over Estonia and drones over Poland, which the E5 countries said has spurred their new plans.

At a meeting Friday in Krakow, Poland, the E5 members met to with NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska to discuss the plans, which she said would be beneficial for Ukraine, which she said needs its allies to step up their support, as well as for all member nations of NATO in Europe.

Britain noted Friday that the new drone initiative comes as it also works with its European allies to develop long-range precision weapons and hypersonic weapons, with plans to spend more than $500 million on those initiatives just this year.

“The stronger each ally becomes, the stronger NATO will be,” Shekerinska said.

Feb. 21 (UPI) — Ukrainian Defense Forces late Friday night struck a Russian missile production facility that manufactures some of Russia’s fastest and deadliest missile systems.

Ukrainian forces used attack drones to strike the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Russia’s Udmurt Republic, which produces the advanced missile systems, Ukrainska Pravda reported.

The factory builds the hypersonic Iskander and Oreshnik missile systems.

Ukraine‘s general staff confirmed the strike in a statement released on Saturday.

“On the night of February 21, units of the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out a strike with FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. A defense industry enterprise — the Votkinsk Plant in the city of Votkinsk — was hit,” the statement said.

“A fire was recorded on the premises of the facility,” it added. “The results are being clarified.”

The Udmart Republic is located about 770 miles east of Moscow and about 1,300 miles northeast of Kyiv.

The Iskander missile is a mobile system that is carried and launched from atop a large military transport and is capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads with a range of up to 310 miles for some variants. The missile travels at hypersonic speeds of up to Mach 7.

The Oreshnik missile is a medium-range ballistic missile that can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads at distances of up to 1,000 miles and possibly more than 3,000 miles, while traveling at up to Mach 11, or 8,000 mph.

Ukrainian Defense Forces also targeted the Neftegorsk Gas Processing Plant in the Samara Region of Russia and fuel and lubricants storage facilities in Russian-occupied parts of the Donetsk region.

The extent of damage from those strikes is under assessment.

How does Mick Cronin survive this, sending his own player off the court after hustling hard on defense to get a piece of the ball but unfortunately too much contact and drew a foul. Does he not constantly rip his team for weak defense?

Steven Jamerson, you deserved better from your coach and I won’t be surprised if your teammates and UCLA’s decision-makers agree going forward. Except …. he just recently got an extension. Way to go, Martin Jarmond.

Ron Mortvedt
San Bernardino

How can UCLA’s combustible coach possibly demand discipline, hold his players responsible, or blame them for failing to take accountability when, night after night, he’s the most unhinged person in the building? Hey Mick, as my grandma used to say, “When you point a finger at someone, three point back at you.”

Steve Ross
Carmel

Bill Plaschke nailed it in his column today. Mick Cronin just seems to be angry all the time prowling the sidelines. What does that look like to a kid still playing in high school? How AD Martin Jarmond gave him an extended contract with a $22.5-million buyout is beyond me. It’s going to cost UCLA to move on from him. It would be a lot easier if he only starts throwing chairs.

Paul Atkinson
Ventura

The sky has fallen! For the first time I can remember I agree with something Bill Plaschke has written!

Julian Pollok

Palm Desert

As a lifelong fan and proud alumnus, I believe it’s time for UCLA to seriously evaluate the direction of its men’s basketball program. Why would we want a head coach who appears angry every time he’s in the spotlight? Leadership sets the tone, and right now that tone feels tense and joyless. Players want to compete for someone who inspires them and makes them better — not someone whose public demeanor seems rooted in frustration.

Watching from the outside, it often looks like the team is playing tight rather than confident, and that reflects leadership. Mick Cronin has had success and deserves credit for that, but UCLA basketball is bigger than any one résumé; if the standard is sustained excellence and a culture players are proud to represent, then it’s fair to question whether this is the right long-term fit for the program.

Michael Gesas
Beverly Hills

Almost fifty years after the revolution in 1979 that changed the political landscape of Iran, Iran is at the crossroads of its history, which is defined by economic pressures, social pressure, and the changing geopolitical environment. The Islamic Republic was constructed as a combination of revolutionary ideology, anti-Western response, and promise of social justice. In the present day, although the ideological framework is still maintained, the sustainability of that framework is being strained increasingly by the structural economic pressures of the day, generational shifts, and changing regional hegemony.

On the economic front, Iran is continually constrained by global sanctions and inefficiency in its structure. Withdrawal by the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the reimposition of massive sanctions in 2018 have cut off much of the oil exports of Iranian oil, banking, and foreign investment flows. The country works well under its economic potential despite the fact that Tehran has been able to sustain limited oil sales, especially through discounted sales to China and through surrogate routes. The inflation rate has been above 40 percent during the recent years, the Iranian rial is falling drastically, and unemployment among the youth is also a burning issue. It is the middle and lower classes that are directly impacted by these economic pressures and that pose a legitimacy challenge that cannot be solved only through rhetorical means of revolution.

The internal landscape is a manifestation of long-term frustration. Frequent demonstrations regarding fuel prices, the state of the economy, and social liberation indicate the growing disparity between state discourses of resistance and the realities that the citizens encounter. The newer generation born after the revolution has lost any connection with the revolutionary memory of 1979 and perceives governance less as ideologically symbolic and more based on economic performance and individual opportunity. The policy employed by the state has been based on the repressed handling of dissent, which consists of the limitation of the mobilization of protests and the prevention of the collapse of the system. Although this is a way of maintaining short-term stability, it does not deal with structural issues like brain drain, capital flight, falling purchasing power, and diminished faith in long-term economic potential.

The main political quandary is consequently a legitimacy transformation quandary. In the past, the Islamic Republic gained legitimacy through revolutionary mobilization, religious control, and confrontation with the external hostilities, especially the United States and Israel. Nevertheless, the contemporary politics demands more and more performance-based legitimacy—providing economic growth, stability, and material changes in the quality of life. The conflict between ideological stability and realistic adjustment is the characteristic of the contemporary crossroads of Iran.

Iran is geopolitically a country that exists in the complex web of pressures. The United States is still the main external agent, which affects the Tehran strategic calculations. The policy of Washington is alternating between the engagement of diplomacy and coercion, yet the ultimate goal is the same as it is: avoiding the possibility of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons competence and reducing its impact in the region. In Tehran, it will need negotiations that will help soften sanctions and stabilize the economy, but any deal will not collapse under the perception of submission over matters of sovereignty, ballistic missile potential, and relations with the region.

Meanwhile, the nuclear and missile programs in Iran are considered to be existential threats to Israel. The shadow struggle that has been there for a long time, including cyber attacks, precision attacks, espionage, and proxy wars, has heightened strategic mistrust. The intensity of this rivalry is shown by the fact that Israel has been carrying out its operations within Iran and against Iran-related targets in Syria. Any intensification would attract Gulf states and disrupt world energy supply, especially through the Strait of Hormuz, which is a choke point in the oil markets of the world. Even minor confrontations will have a global economic impact, as Iran is strategically placed in the important maritime paths.

The regional policy of Iran has focused on the establishment of strategic depth by alliance and coalition with non-state actors and supportive governments within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. This system becomes a deterrence and leverage factor, making it difficult to engage in a direct military strike on the territory of Iran. Geostrategically, this doctrine of forward defense has enhanced the bargaining power of Iran. But it is likewise causing tension with the other Arab countries and creating the impression of destabilization in the region. The recent diplomatic thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which was facilitated by China, shows that both sides noticed that continued confrontation is expensive in terms of both economics and strategy.

Iran is geographically at one of the most strategic points of Eurasia. It connects the Persian Gulf with Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South Asia. The International North-South Transport Corridor is one of the major trade routes that can make Iran a major transit route between India and Russia and Europe. This geo-economic location, in theory, has colossal prospects of being rolled into new multipolar trade systems. Sanctions and political isolation in reality prevent full access to the global markets. The latter can be said to be strategic convergence, as Iran was brought closer to Russia, especially after the war in Ukraine, as a result of Western pressure. But such convergence also subjects Tehran to secondary sanctions and makes it less flexible in its East-West balancing.

Iran—Concerns about the nuclear problem continue to be the major pivot of the external affairs. Tehran maintains that its nuclear program is nonviolent and has indicated that it is free for verification. But the Western governments require more guarantees and wider negotiations, which can feature missile capabilities and regional operations. It is possible that a strictly limited nuclear deal will minimize the risks of immediate proliferation and alleviate the economic pressure, which might make the Iranian internal situation more stable. Nonetheless, such a deal may not help solve any underlying rivalries between the region but could simply freeze the situation unless there are larger regional de-escalation mechanisms. On the other hand, the inability to find any solution will lead to the further worsening of the economy and the possible military clash.

In a more geo-strategically global understanding, the balance of power between the Middle East and the rest of the world will be influenced by the course of Iran. In case Tehran manages to negotiate the lifting of sanctions and turns in the direction of economic integration with the Gulf states, it will be able to shift from the resistance-focused model to the development-oriented state step by step. This would strengthen the stability of the region, safeguard the energy security, and minimize the motivation to intervene. It would also make the regional rivalry be based more on economic rivalry rather than military rivalry, especially in terms of infrastructure rivalry, trade corridor rivalry, and energy market rivalry.

Nevertheless, should the negotiations fail and the confrontation escalate, Iran might apply the asymmetric deterrence further, increasing the range of its missiles and extending proxy bases. That way would strengthen the preemptive stance of Israel and increase the presence of the US military in the Gulf. The escalation would disorient shipping routes, exert more volatility on oil prices, and disintegrate the security infrastructure in the region. To the surrounding Arab nations, which require diversifying and changing their economies, new warfare would destroy investment conditions and long-term strategies.

On the domestic front, economic resilience is what will sustain the strategic position of Iran. The political principle of endurance can only be stretched so far as inflation undermines the wages and the depreciation of currency undermines savings. This needs structural changes: enhancing transparency, welcoming foreign investment, and a non-hydrocarbon economy, and empowering the business sector. Foreign policy victories cannot entirely offset its dissatisfaction at home without economic change.

After all, the crossroads of Iran is not only ideological but also structural. The state has to strike a compromise between sovereignty and economic need, deterrence and diplomacy, and ideological identity and practical governance. Its strategic location means that its decisions will have a far-reaching impact, not only across its frontiers, but also on the energy markets of the world, the great-power politics, and the new security order of the Middle East. The future of Iran becoming a development-oriented regional power with full membership in multipolar networks or being a sanction-bound resistance state under continuous pressure will not only dictate the internal stability of the country but also the geopolitical orientation of a long-time conflict-ridden and strategically divided region.

Feb. 19 (UPI) — More than 1,000 Kenyans and other Africans have been deployed by Russia to fight in Ukraine after being recruited by “rogue” agencies that some accuse of human trafficking, a Kenyan intelligence report indicates.

Kenya’s National Intelligence Service on Wednesday reported the number of Kenyans deployed by the Russian military rose from more than 200 in November to more than 1,000 now.

The report indicates at least 89 of those deployed in Russia were serving on the front lines. At least one has died and others have returned to Kenya with injuries or mental trauma.

Kimani Ichung’wah, majority leader of the Kenyan Parliament, blamed a network of corrupt state officials whom he accused of cooperating with human traffickers to provide the Russian military with Kenyans to fight in Ukraine.

Staff at the Russian Embassy in Nairobi and the Kenyan Embassy in Moscow also helped Russia to recruit Kenyans, the Kenyan lawmaker said.

The Russian Embassy denied the allegation and said it never has issued visas to Kenyans to travel to Russia to participate in military operations.

Ichung’wah said many of those fighting for Russia are civilians and former police officers and military personnel ranging in age from their mid-20s to 50 and seeking overseas job opportunities, The Guardian reported.

Russia allegedly is paying them a monthly salary of about $2,700 plus housing and offering bonuses and Russian citizenship for their service.

Kenya is not the only African nation that has citizens allegedly fighting for Russia.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha in November alleged more than 1,400 Africans from 36 countries were deployed by the Russian military to fight in Ukraine.

Many of those soldiers are being held as prisoners of war in Ukraine, Sybiha said.

Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, and has resisted peace overtures despite participating in ongoing peace talks.

Feb. 19 (UPI) — The United States has put military forces in place in the Middle East for a potential strike on Iran but President Donald Trump has not decided whether to attack or continue negotiations on Thursday.

A strike could occur as early as this weekend, with naval and air forces quickly coming into place. National security officials met in the Situation Room on Wednesday to discuss courses of action against Iran.

U.S. armed forces have been assembling in the Middle East in recent weeks as the United States and Iran have negotiated a scaling back of Iran’s nuclear program. The latest conversations took place in Geneva on Tuesday, sans Trump who said he would be involved “indirectly.”

The negotiations between the United States and Iran ended without a resolution on Tuesday. Trump has called for Iran to end its nuclear program.

Iranian officials said they agreed with U.S. negotiators on a “set of guiding principles.” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said to expect more details about these negotiations to come forward in the weeks to come. She did not say whether Trump would take action before that happens.

“I’m not going to set deadlines on behalf of the president of the United States,” she said.

In recent weeks, the United States has moved warships to the Indian Ocean while Trump warned Iran over the killings and detainments of thousands of protesters against the Iranian regime.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has an interest in Iran drawing down its missile capabilities as well. Israeli forces have been on alert over the possibility of an open conflict as tensions have continued to heighten.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio is slated to meet with Netanyahu in Israel on Feb. 28, to provide an update on the negotiations with Iran.

The United States launched strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in June, causing what Iranian officials called “serious and significant damage.”

Feb. 18 (UPI) — As the Ukraine war nears its fifth year, more than a third of Ukrainian children remain displaced following Russia’s invasion of its neighboring nation.

Russian forces invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, which has led to the displacement of 2.59 million Ukrainian children, UNICEF reported on Tuesday.

The number of displaced children includes 791,000 who are still inside Ukraine and nearly 1.8 million who are refugees living outside of the country’s borders. Russian forces also have taken many Ukrainian children and relocated them to Russia.

“Millions of children and families have fled their homes in search of safety, with one in three children remaining displaced four years into this relentless war,” said UNICEF Regional Director for Europe and Central Asia Regina De Dominicis.

“For children in Ukraine, safety is increasingly hard to come by as attacks on civilian areas continue across the country,” De Dominicis said. “In many ways, the war is following these children.”

Many children and their families have been forced to flee their homes several times during the war as Russian forces targeted civilian areas.

A recently published UNICEF survey showed that a third of teen respondents between age 15 and 19 said they moved at least two times due to safety reasons so far during the war.

Bombardments by Russian artillery, attack drones and ballistic missiles have killed or injured more than 3,200 children since the war started.

Each year, the number of dead and injured has increased among Ukraine’s children, according to UNICEF.

“Obligations under international humanitarian law must be upheld, and every possible measure to protect children and the civilian infrastructure they rely on must be taken,” De Dominicis said.

“Every child has the right to grow up in safety, and without exception that right must be respected.”

Many of the support services for the country’s children also have been damaged or destroyed, including more than 1,700 schools and other education facilities, which deprives a third of Ukrainian children from attending school on a full-time basis.

Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have deprived millions of Ukrainian children and their families of the power needed to heat their homes and water during the country’s extremely cold winters.

Babies and young children are especially vulnerable to harm due to a lack of electrical power, which could lead to hypothermia and respiratory illnesses.

More than 200 medical facilities also have been damaged or destroyed in Ukraine over the past year and many more before then.

The stress of the ongoing war is putting a severe mental strain on Ukraine’s children, who often experience a constant fear of attacks that force them to seek shelter in basements and remain isolated while at home.

About a fourth of Ukrainian youth between age 15 and 19 say they are losing hope for the country’s future.

UNICEF officials said they are working with local and national authorities to support Ukrainian children and provide them and their families with safe water, healthcare, food, educational support, mental health services and similar needs.

Feb. 17 (UPI) — Oil prices climbed on Tuesday as Iran partially closed the Strait of Hormuz, a critical shipping path, to conduct military drills.

Fars, an Iranian news agency, cited “security precautions” as the reason for the closure, with no indication of when the Strait of Hormuz will fully open again.

About 13 million barrels of crude oil were transported through the strait each day in 2025, making up about 31% of oil shipments by sea. It is the main seaborne export route for Middle Eastern oil shipping to Asia.

Iranian naval forces began the drill “Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz,” on Monday.

The drill involves deploying drones capable of striking aerial and maritime targets and is “focused on enhancing operational readiness, strengthening deterrence, and reinforcing multilayered defense,” Fars reported.

Tuesday is the first time that Tehran has closed any part of the Strait of Hormuz since President Donald Trump threatened military action against Iran in response to the killings of protesters.

The United States has posted warships on the Indian Ocean as Trump attempts to negotiate with Iran to scale back its nuclear program.

The United States and Iran held a second round of negotiations in Geneva on Tuesday. Trump was not present for those negotiations but said he would participate “indirectly.”

Welcome back to the Times of Troy newsletter, where I have emerged from my Hawaiian vacation and probably should be stopped before I buy a Maui timeshare. Please send help.

All jokes (and future debt) aside, we’re ready to roll after a weeklong break on the beach, just in time for the home stretch of the college basketball regular season. Both USC teams are still on the bubble midway through February, albeit one much more comfortably than the other.

The Trojan men’s March hopes are the more tenuous of the two. The sudden ascent to stardom of freshman Alijah Arenas has injected new hope into a hard-luck season. There’s still a ways to go: USC must face Illinois and Nebraska, not to mention UCLA twice, and could still use a couple more Quad 1 wins to bolster its resume. But the talent is there for USC to do some damage in the tournament … if it can make it to March.

The Trojan women are on much steadier ground, slotted at 22nd in the NCAA’s NET rankings. They’ve yet to lose a non-Quad 1 game this season and haven’t lost a game at all since Jan. 25. If the tournament started today, they’d be firmly in the field.

Lindsay Gottlieb has found a means to make it work over the last month, in spite of some shortcomings in a lineup that lost not just JuJu Watkins, but also all the other stars who might’ve lined up to play with her this season. Still, USC has weathered 25 games with a Watkins-sized hole in its lineup, a limited frontcourt and inconsistent play at point guard.

Gottlieb, as coach, deserves a lot of credit for that. As does Kara Dunn, the Trojans’ sharp-shooting grad transfer, who is shooting 51% and averaging 21 points, six rebounds and three assists over her past 11 games.

But USC could not have come this far this season if not for the best freshman in college basketball.

Jazzy Davidson has been every bit the difference-maker in her debut season that she was advertised to be as the top recruit in the 2025 class. She has been an elite defender, a dynamic and varied scorer, a poised and determined leader. She’s delivered in the clutch. She’s dragged USC out of deficits. She leads the Trojans in every statistical category: points (17.2), rebounds (6.3), assists (4.4), steals (1.9) and blocks (2.2).

The numbers only really tell part of the story. When Davidson signed with USC, she expected to play her first season with Watkins. Instead, Watkins injured her knee. The rest of USC’s Elite Eight lineup left. And Davidson suddenly found herself the centerpiece of the team’s hopes. As a freshman.

Those expectations would have weighed heavily on most first-year players, even before considering Watkins’ shadow looming over all the proceedings. But in this case, they haven’t seemed to faze the star freshman in the slightest. She’s been a picture of poise through a season that asked her to be just that. It’s an impossible thing to ask of most 18-year-olds.

And yet, in Davidson’s case, it’s working.

“You talk about overdelivering, to be a freshman and carry the load for us,” Gottlieb said, “she’s just capable of doing almost anything on a basketball court. She’s unique. I know there are several good freshmen in the country. We know how good she is. We see it every day, and we think there’s no one better.”

Someone in SEC country will surely make the case that Vanderbilt point guard Aubrey Galvan has been the nation’s top freshman. Advanced metrics, for one, will tell you that Galvan is worth 3.3 win shares compared to 3.1 for Davidson. She’s certainly been special on the offensive end, pairing up with national player of the year candidate Mikayla Blakes to make the most lethal 1-2 punch in women’s college basketball.

But Galvan is the No. 2 in that attack. That’s the role Davidson was supposed to play as a freshman. Instead, Davidson has been the focal point of opposing team’s game plans from the start, and yet still managed to adjust to the college game on the fly. Her usage rate (28.8%), which measures how often a possession ends with the ball in one’s hands, is higher than any freshman in the country. And she’s only getting better with the ball in her hands.

USC’s hopes this March hinge on Davidson continuing that ascent. It wasn’t supposed to be that way. But here we are. And in some strange, roundabout way, the experience might wind up making USC and its star freshman much better in the long run.

Because next year, USC will welcome not only Watkins back from injury, but also the No. 1 recruit in the nation, Saniyah Hall, as well as 6-foot-4 Aussie forward Sitaya Fagan, who’s redshirting this season. That lineup might be the most talented in USC history.

How it fits together will be the story of next season. But in this one, Davidson has proven she can be whatever USC needs her to be.

Not only the best freshman in college basketball, but the glue that’s kept this Trojans season together.

Mater Dei wide receiver Kayden Dixon-Wyatt pulls in a long reception to score against St John Bosco.

(Gina Ferazzi / Los Angeles Times)

—One last thing about Jazzy. She could stand to be more efficient from the three-point line, where she has made just nine of her last 52 attempts (17%). USC, as a team, has really struggled from behind the arc, which is not something you want in March.

—Chad Baker-Mazara should be back this week. It’s not clear if he’ll be ready for Wednesday’s big matchup. When USC welcomes No. 8 Illinois to Galen Center, it will have been more than two weeks since Baker-Mazara sprained his medial collateral ligament against Indiana. A Grade I sprain usually requires sitting out a week or two, so the timeline is pretty normal. USC is going to need its full arsenal, Baker-Mazara included, to hold its own against the Illini. But if not Wednesday, the sixth-year senior will definitely be back by Saturday against Oregon.

—Chad Bowden wasn’t subtle about his expectations for next season. USC’s general manager told reporters that he was “on a warpath” heading into 2026. He made clear that success next season is “black and white. You’re either in the playoffs or you’re not,” he said. He added that fans “should be unhappy” with a nine-win season and that he was “sick to his stomach” about it. Strong words from someone whose opinion matters a lot within Heritage Hall. Chalk it up as more evidence that a Playoff appearance is the baseline of expectations for Lincoln Riley next season.

—Blue-chip pass-catching prospects Kayden Dixon-Wyatt and Mark Bowman both took less money to sign with USC. That’s a good sign. Bowden said USC hadn’t talked to Kayden Dixon-Wyatt in three or four months while the top-50 receiver recruit was committed to Ohio State. But Dixon-Wyatt decided out of the blue that he was coming to USC, to stay home and play in front of family, even if it meant taking less money than he would’ve gotten in Columbus. He wasn’t the only one. On signing day, Lane Kiffin and LSU swooped in to offer Dixon-Wyatt’s Mater Dei teammate, tight end Mark Bowman, “significantly more” than the deal he had with USC, Bowden said. Bowman made Bowden wait most of the day before reassuring he was always bound for USC. We might look back on that decision as a pretty consequential one, if Bowman lives up to his billing from Bowden as “one of the best players in the country.”

—USC is putting a lot of faith in its linebacker room for 2026. Bowden says he thinks the room will “take the biggest leap” of any position next season, but for the moment, that would require quite a bit of projection. Riley pointed to the progress from Desman Stephens down the stretch of last season, as well as the late emergence of Jadyn Walker, as reasons why USC didn’t feel the need to add more in the transfer portal. USC did add Deven Bryant, who the front office viewed as a quality run defender, and welcomes a freshman in Talanoa Ili who could be involved right away.

—The Big Ten is still pushing the 24-team Playoff – *shakes head* – but its plan isn’t all bad. I am not a fan in the slightest of doubling the size of the Playoff. That would significantly devalue the regular season, while lining the coffers of college football’s ruling class. The Big Ten has dominated the last three years of the 12-team Playoff, and yet it wants to open the field up more? It doesn’t make sense. What does sound logical to me, amid an otherwise insane plan, is the elimination of the conference championship games. Not only would that cut a full week out of the calendar, which needs to happen, it would do away with any questions about whether teams can hurt their resume just by playing another game. Go to 16 teams, do away with conference championship games and please — I beg you — stop tweaking the system.

—USC baseball’s season opened with a combined no-hitter. After beating Pepperdine in its season opener, the Trojans went one step further in their Saturday matchup, serving up the school’s first no-hitter in eight years. Sophomore right-hander Grant Govel went seven innings and struck out 10 batters while walking just one, and freshman Cameron Fausset closed the door with another hitless inning before Andrew Lamb hit a two-run homer to invoke the 10-run rule. Hard to imagine a better start to USC’s first season back on campus.

Olympic sports spotlight

After winning its first indoor NCAA title in 53 years last season, the future of USC men’s track has looked strong this indoor season.

Jack Stadlman, a Temecula native, set the indoor 400-meter freshman record at USC, finishing in second with a 45.51 on Day 1 of the Don Kirby Elite Invite on Friday. Stadlman actually didn’t start running track until his junior year at Temecula Valley High and didn’t start running the 400 until last spring. Now already he’s run the fastest indoor time ever for a freshman at USC and the fourth-fastest time in the NCAA in the event this season. That should set Stadlman up nicely for next month’s NCAA indoor championships.

Freshman Cordial Vann also made a strong impression, tying the indoor freshman record at USC with a 6.60 in the 60-meter sprint. The NCAA best so far this year is a 6.49.

In case you missed it

USC coach Lincoln Riley completes staff featuring new defensive blood, continuity

‘She’s unique.’ Jazzy Davidson helps USC climb out of early hole and win fifth in a row

USC men come up a bit short against Ohio State

What I’m watching this week

Timothée Chalamet in “Marty Supreme.”

I finally had the chance this past weekend to watch “Marty Supreme,” the best picture nominee starring Timothée Chalamet and directed by Josh Safdie. And boy was it worth the wait.

Let me start by saying that I generally dislike sports movies. There are exceptions to this rule, of course. But as someone who spends a lot of time thinking about the beauty and romance and drama inherent to sports, I am a documented hater of the genre.

“Marty Supreme,” though, was no ordinary sports movie. This was a propulsive, anxiety-inducing roller coaster ride as we follow Marty Mauser, played by Chalamet, as he tries to become the face of the emerging sport of table tennis in a post-World War II America. Those plans, as you might imagine, unravel along the way, and in the process, Chalamet gives one of the best performances of the year.

I’m still partial to “One Battle After Another” if we’re talking best picture in next month’s Academy Awards, but “Marty Supreme” is no doubt one of the best movies of the last year.

Until next time …

That concludes today’s newsletter. If you have any feedback, ideas for improvement or things you’d like to see, email me at ryan.kartje@latimes.com, and follow me on X at @Ryan_Kartje. To get this newsletter in your inbox, click here.

The F-35’s ‘computer brain,’ including its cloud-based components, could be cracked to accept third-party software updates, just like ‘jailbreaking‘ a cellphone, according to the Dutch Defense Minister. The statement comes as foreign operators of the jets continue to be pressed on what could happen if the United States were ever to cut off support. President Donald Trump’s administration has pursued a number of policies that have resulted in new diplomatic strains with some long-time allies, especially in Europe.

“If, despite everything, you still want to upgrade, I’m going to say something I should never say, but I will anyway: you can jailbreak an F-35 just like an iPhone,” Gijs Tuinman said during an episode of BNR Nieuwsradio‘s “Boekestijn en de Wijk” podcast posted online yesterday, according to a machine translation.

Tuinman, who has been State Secretary for Defense in the Netherlands since 2024, does not appear to have offered any further details about what the jailbreaking process might entail. What, if any, cyber vulnerabilities this might indicate is also unclear. It is possible that he may have been speaking more notionally or figuratively about action that could be taken in the future, if necessary.

TWZ has reached out to the F-35 Joint Program Office and manufacturer Lockheed Martin for responses to Tuinman’s remarks.

As we have explored in detail in the past, the F-35 program imposes unique limits on the ability of operators to make changes to the jet’s software, as well as to associated systems on the ground. Virtually all F-35s in service today see software updates come through a cloud-based network, the original version of which is known as the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS). Persistent issues with ALIS have led to the development of a follow-on Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN), the transition to which is still ongoing.

The ALIS/ODIN network is designed to handle much more than just software updates and logistical data. It is also the port used to upload mission data packages containing highly sensitive planning information, including details about enemy air defenses and other intelligence, onto F-35s before missions and to download intelligence and other data after a sortie.

Though now dated, the video below still offers a useful explanation of ALIS’ functions.

ALIS: Keeping the F-35 Mission Ready

To date, Israel is the only country known to have successfully negotiated a deal giving it the right to install domestically-developed software onto its F-35Is, as well as otherwise operate its jets outside of the ALIS/ODIN network. The Israelis also have the ability to conduct entirely independent depot-level maintenance, something we will come back to later.

Issues with ALIS, as well as concerns about the transfer of nationally sensitive information within the network, have led certain operators, including the Netherlands, to firewall off aspects of their software reprogramming activities in the past. However, the work still occurs in the United States under the auspices of the U.S. military and Lockheed Martin.

As TWZ has written in the past:

“It’s this mission planning data package that is a major factor to the F-35’s survivability. The ‘blue line’ (the aircraft’s route into an enemy area) that is projected by the system is based on the fusion of a huge number of factors, from enemy air defense bubbles to the stealth and electronic warfare capabilities of the aircraft, as well as onboard sensor and weapons employment envelopes and integrated tactics between F-35s and other assets. To say the least, it is one of the F-35’s most potent weapons. Without it, the aircraft and its pilot are far less capable of maximizing their potential and, as a result, are more vulnerable to detection and being shot down.“

So, while jailbreaking F-35’s onboard computers, as well as other aspects of the ALIS/ODIN network, may technically be feasible, there are immediate questions about the ability to independently recreate the critical mission planning and other support it provides. This is also just one aspect of what is necessary to keep the jets flying, let alone operationally relevant.

TWZ previously explored many of these same issues in detail last year, amid a flurry of reports about the possibility that F-35s have some type of discreet ‘kill switch’ built in that U.S. authorities could use to remotely disable the jets. Rumors of this capability are not new and remain completely unsubstantiated.

At that time, we stressed that a ‘kill switch’ would not even be necessary to hobble F-35s in foreign service. At present, the jets are heavily dependent on U.S.-centric maintenance and logistics chains that are subject to American export controls and agreements with manufacturer Lockheed Martin. Just reliably sourcing spare parts has been a huge challenge for the U.S. military itself, as you can learn more about in this past in-depthTWZ feature. F-35s would be quickly grounded without this sustainment support.

Altogether, any kind of jailbreaking of the F-35’s systems would come with a serious risk of legal action by Lockheed Martin and additional friction with the U.S. government. What would have to happen for a country like the Netherlands to pursue that course of action would also likely be just one symptom of a much more serious breakdown in relations with Washington. Doing this could easily prompt a cutoff in spare parts and other support, if that had not already occurred, which would leave jailbroken jets quickly bricked on the ground. To be clear, cracking the software would do nothing to mitigate the downstream impacts of being shut out from critical sustainment pipelines.

Spats between President Donald Trump’s administration and certain U.S. allies have already created a degree of additional turbulence for the F-35 program, as evidenced by the ‘kill switch’ reporting last year. Most recently, trade disputes and other recent rifts in relations between Ottawa and Washington have led Canadian authorities to launch a review of their F-35 acquisition plans. There are broader questions now about the future of U.S. defense exports, especially in Europe, in light of other diplomatic rifts with Washington.

At the same time, despite his comments about the possibility of needing to crack the jet’s computer systems, Dutch Defense Minister Tuinman remained broadly supportive of the F-35 during the BNR Nieuwsradio podcast.

“Even if this mutual dependency doesn’t result in software updates, the F-35, in its current state, is still a better aircraft than other types of fighter jets,” Tuinman stressed, according to a machine translation of an accompanying story about the podcast from BNR.

Altgoether, questions very much remain about just what ‘jailbreaking an F-35’ might look like in practical terms, and how that might impact the operational utility of the jets in the absence of support from the U.S. government and Lockheed Martin. At the same time, Tuinman’s comments do underscore larger issues surrounding the F-35 program, especially for foreign operators, many of which are not new.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Feb. 15 (UPI) — The U.S. military intercepted an oil tanker overnight that was linked to Venezuela after tracking it from the Caribbean into the Indian Ocean.

The tanker, the Veronica III, was boarded without incident late Saturday night in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility after it attempted to outrun the Trump administration’s naval blockade in the Caribbean, the Department of Defense announced early Sunday.

The United States has now intercepted or seized nine oil tankers associated with Venezuela since Dec. 10 when the administration started enforcing a blockade on oil tankers leaving the South American nation to pressure it’s president, Nicolas Maduro, to leave power.

After the U.S. military captured Maduro in a clandestine early morning mission in January, several tankers scattered from the country, according to reports.

“The vessel tried to defy President Trump’s quarantine — hoping to slip away,” the Pentagon said in a post on X. “We tracked it from the Caribbean to the Indian Ocean, closed the distance and shut it down. No other nation has the reach, endurance or will to do this.”

The Veronica III, flagged in Panama, has previously been linked with transporting sanctioned Iranian oil and working with a sanctioned Chinese ship-management company, Fox News reported.

The tanker was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for shipping Iranian oil to other markets and has since used different names and flags in order to evade capture.

At least 16 tankers docked in Venezuelan ports tried to escape the U.S. naval blockade in the days after Maduro’s capture, the New York Times reported, with at least 12 of them turning off their transmission signals in the effort.

Feb. 14 (UPI) — The U.S. military struck dozens of Islamic State targets in Syria while conducting retaliatory strikes for the deaths of two soldiers and their interpreter.

CentCom said it conducted 10 strikes on more than 30 ISIS targets in Syria from Feb. 3 through Thursday to “sustain relentless military pressure on remnants from the terrorist network.”

The strikes over the past 1.5 weeks targeted ISIS infrastructure and weapons storage facilities with precision munitions sent by fixed-wing, rotary-wing and unmanned aircraft, CentCom officials said.

The aerial strikes continued U.S. Central Command’s Operation Hawkeye Strike attacks after the Islamic State’s ambush on Dec. 13 that killed two Iowa National Guard reservists, Sgt. Edgar Brian Torres-Tovar, 25, and Sgt. William Nathaniel Howard, 29, and their civilian interpreter, Ayad Mansoor Sakat, 54, who was from Michigan.

Three members of Syria’s security forces also were wounded in the ambush.

“There is no safe place for those who conduct, plot, or inspire attacks on American citizens and our warfighters. We will find you,” CentCom Commander Adm. Brad Cooper said in a statement after U.S. forces killed Al-Qaeda-affiliated Bilal Hasan al-Jasim in January.

CentCom also carried out five strikes against an ISIS communications site, logistics node and weapons storage facilities from Jan. 27 to Feb. 2.

The strikes over the past two months have killed or captured more than 50 ISIS militants struck more than 100 ISIS infrastructure sites with hundreds of precision munitions, according to CentCom.

Syrian forces have helped the U.S. military stop ISIS from rebuilding its infrastructure and capabilities and on Friday transported 5,700 detainees to Iraq, where they will be tried in a court of law.

The move occurred as the U.S. military is lowering its troop count in Syria by evacuating a military base in al-Tanf after a 10-year deployment there.

SEOUL, Feb. 13 (UPI) — Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, said Friday that Seoul’s expression of regret over alleged drone incursions was “sensible,” but cautioned that any future flights would trigger a “terrible response.”

The statement, carried by the state-run Korean Central News Agency, followed comments Tuesday by South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, who expressed “deep regrets” over alleged drone flights into the North as part of the Lee Jae Myung administration’s broader push to ease tensions with Pyongyang.

North Korea’s military last month said it shot down a South Korean surveillance drone near the border city of Kaesong. Seoul has denied involvement, saying it does not operate the drone model cited by the North.

Kim described Chung’s remarks as “fortunate” and “quite sensible behavior,” but said South Korean authorities must take preventive measures to ensure such violations “would never happen again.”

“We don’t care who the very manipulator of the drone infiltration into the airspace of the DPRK is and whether it is an individual or a civilian organization,” she said.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea.

“I give advance warning that reoccurrence of such provocation as violating the inalienable sovereignty of the DPRK will surely provoke a terrible response,” Kim said. “Various counterattack plans are on the table and one of them will be chosen without doubt and it will go beyond proportionality.”

A South Korean investigation initially centered on three civilians who were placed under travel bans last month. But a joint military-police task force on Tuesday raided the country’s spy agency and a military intelligence command as the probe widened to include three military officers as suspects.

On Wednesday, the Unification Ministry said Seoul would take immediate action to prevent future incidents.

“The government is conducting a thorough investigation and will immediately implement measures to prevent similar incidents,” ministry spokesman Yoon Min-ho said at a regular press briefing.

Kim’s statement was “signaling the need for joint efforts between the two Koreas to ease tensions and prevent accidents on the Korean Peninsula,” Yoon added.

North Korea is preparing to convene its Ninth Party Congress later this month, where Kim Jong Un is expected to outline a new five-year economic plan and recalibrate military and foreign policy priorities. Analysts will be watching for signs the North will formalize a hardened posture toward Seoul. In 2024, Pyongyang designated the South a “hostile state” and publicly rejected the long-held goal of reunification.

The defense ministry said Friday it has relieved Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Kang Dong-gil from duty over his alleged involvement in former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s botched martial law bid in late 2024.

The move came a day after the ministry took a similar action against Ground Operations Commander Gen. Joo Sung-un over suspicions of martial law involvement, marking the second such suspension of a four-star general appointed under President Lee Jae Myung’s administration.

“The defense ministry excluded the chief of naval operations as of Friday as allegations in relation to the insurrection case have been identified,” ministry spokesperson Chung Binna said in a briefing.

Kang, who served as chief of the directorate of military support at the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the martial law imposition, was among the seven top-brass officers appointed as four-star generals in September last year.

The allegations involving Kang and Joo were not previously verified ahead of their appointment, a ministry official said, acknowledging limitations in the procedure amid efforts to fill the leadership vacuum caused by the martial law bid.

The official said the ministry continues to firmly carry out measures to determine the circumstances surrounding the martial law imposition, regardless of the ranks of personnel involved.

The deputy chief of the Navy will serve as acting Navy chief following Friday’s decision, the ministry said, adding disciplinary action will be considered for Kang.

On Thursday, the ministry said it has identified around 180 personnel as having been involved in the martial law imposition following a monthslong probe into about 860 general-level and field-grade officers.

It also concluded that some 1,600 personnel across the military affiliated with the Army, counterintelligence command, special operations command and Defense Intelligence Command were found to have been mobilized on the night of the martial law imposition.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

The recent use of a laser directed energy weapon to down an aerial object near El Paso, Texas, and its chaotic aftermath, highlight the policy challenges and impediments the U.S. still faces in defending against drone incursions over the homeland. These are major national security concerns and a topic The War Zone has been reporting on for years.

The latest chapter in the ongoing saga of U.S. efforts to begin countering small drone incursions over the country began last week. Reacting to what they thought was a drone operated by a Mexican drug cartel, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel reportedly used a laser directed energy weapon to take down the object, which multiple reports say turned out to be a Mylar balloon. The system, which Reuters identified as a AeroVironment LOCUST laser counter-drone weapon, was lent to CBP by the U.S. Army. This is the first publicly known instance of an object being shot down over the U.S. with a laser in an operational setting.

You can read more about LOCUST and how it works in our story here.

The use of the LOCUST came as the FAA was working on “a safety assessment of the risks the new technology could pose to other aircraft,” The New York Times reported. “F.A.A. officials had warned the Pentagon that if they were not given sufficient time and information to conduct their review, they would have no choice but to shut down the nearby airspace.”

The tug of war between the Pentagon and FAA – which led to a shutdown of airspace over the nation’s 23rd largest city – is a glaring example of the convoluted and conflicting authorities the U.S. relies on to deal with the increasing threat posed by drones.

The FAA did not respond to our request for comment. We also reached out to U.S. Northern Command and AeroVironment for comment.

However, safety concerns about using directed energy weapons, and especially kinetic ones, to take down drones in the U.S. have been a major factor in why they aren’t employed in this role. 

A little less than a year and a half ago, officials at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), which has coordinating authority for counter-drone efforts in the U.S., said the use of such weapons was not yet on the table. The reason is that they can create dangerous or otherwise serious collateral effects that are not a concern in a war zone.

“The biggest thing right now is the impact of the laser when it moves beyond its target,” NORTHCOM Deputy Test Director Jason Mayes said of laser directed energy weapons for counter-drone use. “You know, how far is it going? What’s that going to do? How long does the laser need to remain on target before it begins to inflict damage and so on, right?”

Mayes, speaking to a small group of reporters, including from The War Zone at Falcon Peak 2025, a counter-drone experiment at Peterson Space Force Base in October 2024, also raised questions about whether the laser beam could impact aircraft or even satellites passing by, as well as things on the ground like “hikers up on a hill.”

The military has been working to mitigate those concerns, Mayes proffered at the time.

“I think that we could get to a point where we have approval for that here in the homeland,” he posited.

The video below shows a test of a U.S. Navy shipboard laser directed energy weapon capable of being employed against drones.

USS Portland (LPD 27) tests LWSD laser system

It is unclear when the approval to use laser counter-drone weapons came or how extensive such permissions have been. We also don’t know if the LOCUST system, understood to have been stationed at nearby Fort Bliss, was sent there under a pilot program established under the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). It calls for at least four military installations to be used to speed up the development of counter-drone efforts at bases across the country. The measure includes systems “capable of destroying or disabling a small unmanned aircraft by means of high-powered microwave, laser, or other similar technology.”

Fort Bliss is also home to a significant portion of the Army’s air defense units, which are increasingly charged with the counter-drone mission. The base is also a major hub for border security operations, which the U.S. military often conducts in cooperation with law enforcement agencies, as well.

The future domestic use of laser counter-drone weapons remains an open question, but the NDAA pilot program gives the military additional authorities under existing statutes to at least test them. Still, as we have frequently noted, a confusing and often competing set of federal laws governing the use of counter-drone systems domestically impacted the ability to defend against these threats. The El Paso situation is a case in point of how challenging this can be.

NORTHCOM has authority over the troops and equipment, in this case a laser system, to take down the drones. However, federal laws limit where and when the military can use these systems, which is a large reason why CBP was involved.

In advance of the U.S. hosting the 2026 World Cup and 2028 Olympic Games, the Trump administration pushed to expand counter-drone authorities. Congress granted that when it passed the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

Under a federal law known as 124n, “the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ, including CBP, have limited authority to mitigate drone threats domestically to protect covered facilities or assets,” Scott Shtofman, Vice President & Counsel, Regulatory Affairs for the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), told us. “That authority has been extended and expanded, under the Safer Skies Act of the NDAA, to certain certified state, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies operating under federal training and oversight.”

Still, “it’s not a blanket nationwide shoot down power and only applies in defined threat situations,” he added. 

Meanwhile, under another federal statute commonly referred to as 130(i), “DoW can mitigate drone threats to protect military installations and missions inside the U.S., but it does not have general domestic airspace policing authority,” Shtofman posited.

However, the Pentagon is working to expand its counter-drone capabilities. 

In January, the recently created Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) 401 announced updated guidance for counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) operations. The move empowered installation commanders “to take decisive action to protect military facilities, assets, and personnel within the homeland,” according to a press release at the time.

“The guidance, signed by the Secretary of War on December 8, 2025, streamlines and consolidates existing policies for detecting and mitigating UAS under the authority of 10 U.S. Code § 130i,” the release added, referring to another one of the laws governing domestic counter-small drone efforts. “It addresses the direct and growing threat posed by the proliferation of inexpensive and capable UAS. This updated framework provides commanders with the expanded authority and flexibility needed to dominate the airspace above their installations.”

Among other things, the new rules eliminate restrictions on defense perimeters that reduced installation commanders’ abilities to protect against drones.

“The previous ‘fence-line’ limitation has been removed, giving commanders a larger defensive area and greater decision space to protect covered facilities and assets,” the new rules state.

In earlier reporting, we noted that not all installations were considered “covered” to take down drones. The new rules permit service secretaries to determine which installations should be covered, to increase the number.

Beyond that, the Pentagon is now allowed to share “UAS track and sensor data among interagency partners, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). It also allows for the use of trained and certified contractor personnel as C-sUAS operators.”

“Every commander has the inherent right to self-defense,” the Pentagon told us. “The Department of War will defend its personnel and assets from illicit UAS activity in accordance with our authority under title 10 Section 130i, and the standing rules for the use of force.”

In addition to the numerous drone incursions over U.S. installations that we have frequently covered, cross-border cartel drone operations are a chronic issue, and we have been calling attention to the growing dangers they pose for many years now. Controversy over the El Paso incident was magnified after the White House insisted that the U.S. shot down a cartel drone flying over the border, which was later contradicted by the reporting that it was a mylar balloon.

Regardless of what it was, small drones remain a clear and present danger to the U.S. Whether new technology and additional authorities to use them will make a difference is an open question.

Update: 8:31 PM Eastern –

A U.S. official responded with answers to some of our questions.

1. The limit on the distance installation commanders can counter drones is the capability of their counter-UAS systems and the ability to coordinate with local authorities and communities.
2. No sites have been chosen yet for the counter-drone pilot program.
3. To his knowledge, the El Paso incident was the first time a directed energy weapon had been used against illicit drones in the homeland.
4. There are no statutory preclusions to using directed energy weapons against drones in the homeland.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Feb. 12 (UPI) — Two U.S. Navy ships collided during a refueling operation in South America, injuring two people, U.S. Southern Command said.

The incident occurred on Wednesday when a Navy warship collided with a Navy supply vessel. Two people suffered minor injuries and are in stable condition.

The warship is the Arleigh Burke-class USS Truxtun guided missile destroyer. The other vessel is a Supply-class fast combat support ship, USNS Supply. Both ships remain operational and have continued to sail following the collision.

U.S. Southern Command did not specify the exact location where the crash took place. The cause of the crash was not specified either.

The supply ship has been recently posted in the Caribbean which falls under the purview of U.S. Southern Command. Southern Command presides over military operations throughout South America, Central America and the Caribbean.

The United States has increased its presence in Southern Command’s region in recent months as operations against alleged drug smuggling vessels have intensified.

Last month, President Donald Trump and members of his cabinet presided over the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro and his wife.

It is rare for U.S. Navy vessels to crash into each other. In 2017, 17 sailors were killed in two separate crashes between Navy ships in the Pacific Ocean. The U.S. Navy determined both crashes were avoidable.

The Pentagon, which buys and sells hundreds of billions of dollars worth of weapons every year, is changing how it conducts business. And this time, such a claim being made does seem different than many false starts in the past. The changes come amid a backdrop of growing threats and depleted arsenals, which have magnified the chronic issues of delays and cost overruns for a lot of military hardware, and long waiting lists for foreign customers.

The War Department’s revamping of how it procures and transfers weapons follows executive orders signed by President Donald Trump, who has frequently expressed his displeasure with the defense industry’s long timetables and lack of risk taking without the department footing the bill. 

In January, Trump imposed new restrictions on executive compensation and threatened to cancel contracts with RTX [Raytheon] if it did not step up and invest in “plants and equipment.”

“I have been informed by the Department of War that Defense Contractor, Raytheon, has been the least responsive to the needs of the Department of War, the slowest in increasing their volume, and the most aggressive spending on their Shareholders rather than the needs and demands of the United States Military,” Trump said in a separate post on Truth Social.

Earlier this month, Trump instituted the “America First Arms Transfer Strategy” aimed at ensuring “that future arms sales prioritize American interests by using foreign purchases and capital to build American production and capacity.”

Acting on the first of these executive orders, the Pentagon last week “warned defense contractors to brace for sweeping performance reviews that will identify companies it says aren’t fulfilling their contracts,” The Wall Street Journal reported, citing a message sent to the defense industry.

“We have completed initial reviews to assess company performance as part of this executive order and will now undergo an extended period of review in which we will make noncompliance determinations,” Michael Duffey, the undersecretary of defense in charge of weapons buying, wrote in a Feb. 6 email to executives reviewed by the publication. “Following the upcoming decision period, we will be in touch with identified companies to begin remediation plans.”

Since the executive order was announced, defense companies “have been walking a tightrope trying to satisfy both Trump and their shareholders,” the Journal added. “During quarterly earnings calls late last month, executives from RTX, General Dynamics and other contractors boasted about billions of dollars in capital investments their companies have made to expand weapons manufacturing and defended dividend payouts.”

The Pentagon has also reached agreements with Lockheed Martin and RTX to expand production of munitions, the newspaper noted. It also made a $1 billion investment in L3Harris Technologies to accelerate missile production.

When it comes to selling materiel to foreign customers, Secretary Pete Hegseth on Tuesday announced he was merging two Pentagon agencies into one to speed up deliveries while bolstering American arms makers.

“Everybody wanted weapons, but we couldn’t get them to them fast enough,” Hegseth said in a video posted on X. “And today, as a demonstration of our progress on these issues, I’m proud to share that we’ve completed the realignment of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) and the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) within our Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S) team.”

DCSA is largely responsible for facilitating the sale of U.S. weapons to partners and allies. It is also tasked with developing and planning the long-term partnerships and training opportunities that accompany those sales. DTSA identifies and mitigates risks associated with transferring technology to partners and allies. 

Foreign Military Sales 101

“This realignment has created a single, coherent defense sales enterprise within the department, one that moves at the speed of war, but with the purpose of deterring aggression,” Duffey said in the X video. “Coupled with this new executive order, we’re now positioned to leverage the total aggregated global demand for U.S. weapons.”

The goal, Duffey added, is “to grow our nation’s industrial might, while maintaining the American warfighters’ technological edge” and “we’ll proactively target sales that unlock foreign investment to help power critical production lines, fueling companies to invest in new manufacturing plants, hire more engineers and create thousands of well-paying American jobs, all while better equipping our partners to share the burden of our their own conventional defense.”

Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have placed tremendous pressure on the U.S. defense industry, which is struggling badly to keep up with the demands for both domestic and foreign customers. These wars have consumed large amounts of stockpiled weapons. Many of these munitions take years to produce, a problem exacerbated by global supply chain and procurement decisions. Those worries are exacerbated by China’s increasing belligerence and Russia’s resurgence, which has spurred a massive demand for weapons from foreign customers. An already lugubrious situation will only become exponentially worse should Washington and Beijing tangle kinetically. This would consume advanced munitions and other materiel at an extreme rate.

Amid all these challenges, the pressure is rising on the U.S. defense industry to step up its game even as it suffers ongoing cost overruns and delays. The Pentagon wants to put more of the cost-sharing burden on them to drastically increase production rates. Meanwhile, large prime contractors like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman and others are facing competition from startups like Anduril who are investing hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons development and infrastructure costs, as well as wholly self-funding development of some systems.

This is also manifesting in the Pentagon moving away from a weapon system’s original manufacturer ‘owning’ the program for its lifecycle. This situation, referred to as ‘vendor lock’ makes it impossible to compete sustainment and major upgrade contracts, for instance. Instead, the Pentagon will own the rights to the system and be able to have other companies bid on various aspects of its sustainment and upgrade throughout its service life.

“We will enable third-party integration without prime contractor bottlenecks. Success will be measured by the ability of qualified vendors to independently develop, test and integrate replaceable — excuse me, replacement modules at the component level throughout the system life cycle,” Hegseth said in November. “There’s no more complacency and no more monopolies.”

Still, though Trump and the Pentagon have taken aim at defense contractors, the War Secretary said many of these problems are also at least partially self-inflicted.

“We look at ourselves first, the way we do business,” he said in an interview following his visit to the Bath Iron Works in Maine. “We’ve been impossible to deal with – a bad customer who…year after year, changes our mind about what we want or what we don’t want, and then we make little, small technological changes, which makes it more difficult for them to produce what they need to produce on time.”

“So we have to fix our own house first, provide clarity, simplify the system, allow more people to access it [and] give that steady demand signal…”

The buying and selling of weapons is one of the greatest drivers of the U.S. economy and a critical factor in national security. Changing how the Pentagon conducts its business is a huge and fraught endeavor. How it could reshape the military industrial complex, if it succeeds at all, is yet to be fully understood. As is what exactly will happen to companies that end up on the administration’s ‘naughty’ contractor list.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Feb. 11 (UPI) — Local officials said a Russian drone strike on Ukraine‘s northeastern Kharkiv region killed three toddlers and their father, and injured their pregnant mother Wednesday.

The family was spending its first night in their new home in Bohodukhiv when it was struck during a drone and missile attack, regional leader Oleh Synegubov announced, the BBC reported.

The attack killed 2-year-old twins Ivan and Vladislav, their 1-year-old sister, Myroslava, and their father, Gryhoriy, 34.

The family’s 35-year-old injured mother, Olha, was 35 weeks pregnant and sustained burns and head injuries as the home was completely destroyed, local officials said.

Bohodukhiv Mayor Volodymyr Belyi called the aerial attack a “crime that is beyond human comprehension,” as reported by CNN.

“We lost the most precious thing we had — our future,” Belyi added.

The family recently evacuated the town of Zolochiv, which is located near the Russian border, due to ongoing shelling and sought refuge in Bohodukhiv, which is located 38 miles west of Kharkiv.

The attack shows that Russia has no intention of ending the war that it started by invading Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said.

“Each Russian strike undermines confidence in everything that is being done diplomatically to end this war,” Zelensky said in a statement.

He said Russia deployed 129 attack drones during the overnight hours that struck Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava and Zaporizhzhia.

The aerial attacks carried into the daytime hours on Wednesday and included a strike on a medical vehicle that was carrying five healthcare professionals and civilians. One woman died in that attack.

Russian forces also launched two ballistic missiles that targeted the area near Lviv on Wednesday afternoon, but Ukrainian aerial defenses intercepted and destroyed them.

Russia had paused the aerial attacks for a week amid extremely cold weather, but Monday’s resumption killed a 10-year-old boy and a 41-year-old woman in Bohodukhiv.

The town has been targeted every day so far this week as Russian forces seek to damage energy and transport infrastructure with drones and ballistic missiles.

The strikes caused Ukrainian officials to declare a state of emergency due to the effect on local energy sources.

Tens of thousands of Ukrainians are without power and lack heat and running water during the frigid winter weather.

Russia’s resumption of attacks comes as Ukrainian and Russian officials are considering meeting in Washington, D.C., to further discuss a potential cease-fire and plan for peace.

Feb. 11 (UPI) — The Federal Aviation Administration ended what was initially announced as a 10-day suspension of all flights over El Paso, Texas on Wednesday, hours after closing the airspace.

The FAA stopped all incoming and outgoing flights over El Paso late Tuesday night, citing “special security reasons.” It warned that deadly force may be used against aircraft entering the airspace if they pose an “imminent security threat.”

The closure was triggered by military operations from Biggs Army Airfield in Fort Bliss, about seven miles away from El Paso.

CBS reported that Mexican cartel drones breached U.S. airspace, causing the Department of Defense to disable the drones.

“There is no threat to commercial aviation,” the FAA posted on social media. “All flights will resume as normal.”

When the airspace was closed, the FAA said that it was being classified as “national defense airspace.” The closure also halted medevac helicopters from flying.

“Just pass it on to everybody else, at 6:30 for the next 10 days, we’re all at a ground stop,” an air traffic controller informed pilots in audio recorded on LiveATC.net.

Some travelers received notifications from airlines about changes to their flights and offerings of travel waivers before the closure was lifted.

El Paso is home to the El Paso International Airport, which saw about 3.5 million travelers through the first 11 months of last year. The city has a population of about 700,000.