A Peruvian journalist running for political office has been shot dead while out campaigning. Susy Aponte Polo, known as China Polo, was killed just a week after revealing she had received death threats over her investigation into a police chief.
Published On 20 Sep 202620 Sep 2026
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PARIS: France’s ex-culture minister Rachida Dati appeared in court Wednesday on corruption charges linked to dealings with the Renault-Nissan group, just months after her bruising defeat in the Paris mayoral race.
One of the most prominent figures on the French right, Dati, 60, stood in court dressed in black to hear the charges against her, all of which she denies.
Carlos Ghosn, the fugitive former Renault-Nissan chief now living in Lebanon, is being tried in absentia.
Dati has been dogged by controversies for much of her political career.
She resigned as culture minister in February to concentrate on the Paris mayoral race, but lost to Socialist rival Emmanuel Gregoire in March.
She stands charged with corruption and influence-peddling over alleged lobbying for Renault-Nissan between October 2009 and February 2013 while she was a member of the European Parliament.
She became an MEP after serving as justice minister between 2007 and 2009 under President Nicolas Sarkozy.
She has been accused of accepting 900,000 euros (around $1 million) in lawyers’ fees from a Netherlands-based subsidiary of Renault-Nissan.
Dati, who is still the mayor of the French capital’s wealthy seventh district, denies all the charges.
She faces up to 10 years in prison and a fine of up to 450,000 euros, if convicted. She could also face a five-year ban on holding public office.
Her legal team said Dati worked “exclusively” as a lawyer for the Netherlands-based subsidiary.
“Unfounded allegations of influence-peddling in the European Parliament stem from an artificial intellectual construct devised by the prosecution,” her lawyers said.
– ‘Explain facts’ –
French prosecutors argue that a legal services contract signed in 2009 between Dati and Ghosn, under which the former minister was paid an annual fee of 300,000 euros, was used to disguise lobbying work.
Investigators obtained the contract in 2019 during a search of Renault’s headquarters following Ghosn’s arrest in Japan, in a separate case.
Ghosn, the 72-year-old former chairman and chief executive of the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance, was arrested in Japan in 2018 on suspicion of financial misconduct, before being sacked by Nissan’s board.
He made a dramatic escape from Japan hidden in an audio-equipment box, landing in Beirut, where he remains at large.
Ghosn faces a litany of charges, including abuse of power and bribery. He has denied any wrongdoing.
In a letter sent to the court in August and seen by AFP, Ghosn requested that the proceedings be postponed.
Denying any attempt to “delay the trial”, Ghosn said he was prepared to appear by video link to “explain facts” that he disputes.
Dati has repeatedly sought to have the charges against her quashed.
She has also been accused of accepting nearly 300,000 euros in undeclared payments from energy group GDF Suez, also while an MEP.
Prosecutors said last year they were looking into reports that Dati failed to declare jewelry and watches worth 420,000 euros upon taking ministerial office.
She has denied any wrongdoing.
BRASILIA: Revelations that Brazilian presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro is under investigation for alleged corruption and money laundering rocked his right-wing campaign Friday, weeks before elections.
Bolsonaro, the son of former leader Jair Bolsonaro, is vying for the presidency against leftist incumbent Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in the October ballot.
A newly released court document revealed that police have been investigating Flavio Bolsonaro since July regarding possible crimes “in the context of financing the production” of a forthcoming film about his father.
Police conducted dozens of raids Thursday over the alleged embezzlement of public funds by the company that produced the flattering biopic.
“Dark Horse” — starring US actor Jim Caviezel as Jair Bolsonaro — has been under scrutiny as part of a widening corruption scandal that has loomed over the election.
“I have nothing to hide. The film is completely legal,” Flavio Bolsonaro said at a campaign event on Friday.
An investigation of this kind does not prevent someone from running for office in Brazil.
Voters in Latin America’s largest economy head to the polls on October 4, deeply polarized and with a weary sense of deja vu as Lula takes on Bolsonaro.
The 45-year-old senator Flavio Bolsonaro was thrust into the electoral race after his father was jailed for attempting a coup in 2022.
He has styled himself as a “more moderate” version of his firebrand father.
Neck and neck
The right-wing candidate has vowed to “rescue” Brazil from corruption, crime, high food prices and soaring public debt. His speeches are woven through with references to “God, country, family and freedom.”
He has also pledged a heavy hand on crime, which polls show is voters’ main concern.
While Lula has promised to prioritize the fight against organized crime, his challenger blames him for not taking violence seriously enough.
Bolsonaro’s campaign has been hit by disclosures that he approached notorious fraud-accused banker Daniel Vorcaro — head of the collapsed private bank Banco Master — for money, which Bolsonaro said was to finance “Dark Horse.”
According to court documents obtained by AFP, investigators believe Flavio Bolsonaro personally met with Vorcaro and discussed the film’s financing with him on several occasions.
The documents also point to the transfer of $12.3 million from a company indirectly linked to Vorcaro to another tied to an attorney for Eduardo Bolsonaro, Flavio’s younger brother.
A police source told AFP that the targets of Thursday’s raids included Karina Gama, head of the company that produced “Dark Horse,” and Mario Frias, a pro-Bolsonaro congressman listed as the film’s executive producer.
Both have been banned from leaving Brazil pending the investigation’s outcome. Frias has said he is innocent, denouncing the “smoke screen” probe.
Police officials said the money came from parliamentary funds available to lawmakers to finance special projects, usually in their electoral strongholds.
Vorcaro’s alleged interactions with Supreme Court Judge Alexandre de Moraes, whom he apparently asked for legal help days before his arrest, have meanwhile triggered a crisis in Brazil’s top court.
“The impact of corruption scandals is much greater for Lula’s campaign than for Flavio’s,” said political scientist Mayra Goulart from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.
However, new evidence against Bolsonaro closer to the election could influence “voters whose choice is less clearly defined,” she told AFP.
Lula was imprisoned for 580 days on corruption charges in 2018 and 2019, but his conviction was later overturned.
He and Flavio Bolsonaro are neck-and-neck in voting intentions ahead of the first round.
If, as expected, no one wins an outright majority, a runoff will be held on October 25.
Allegations of misconduct between two justices threaten to pull court into political battles ahead of upcoming election.
Published On 8 Sep 20268 Sep 2026
Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Andre Mendonca has ordered the suspension of federal police chief Andrei Rodrigues and the force’s intelligence chief Leandro Almada amid growing divisions that have tested the credibility of the country’s highest court.
The suspensions were announced on Tuesday. Mendonca, appointed by former right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro, has accused Rodrigues and Almada of producing six illegal reports on the activities of justices.
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The move was backed by a majority on one of the high court’s five-member panels.
But it is likely to be challenged by the government, possibly pulling the administration of leftist President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva into a political battle ahead of October’s presidential election.
“Investigating possible evidence of crimes is correct,” Institutional Relations Minister Jose Guimaraes, a top aide to Lula, said in response to the decision on social media. “But this measure smells electoral to me. That cannot happen.”
Polls show Lula and Jair Bolsonaro’s eldest son, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro, in a tight race ahead of the first round of voting on October 4.
The Supreme Court has been roiled by mutual accusations of wrongdoing between Justice Alexandre de Moraes, appointed under centre-right President Michel Temer, and Mendonca, a Bolsonaro appointee.
De Moraes has become a prominent target of right-wing criticism, particularly after he oversaw the case against Jair Bolsonaro for plotting a coup after the 2022 election.
A report detailing possible links between de Moraes and disgraced banker Daniel Vorcaro was made public by Mendonca last week.
De Moraes, however, responded by accusing Mendonca of abusing his power, citing federal police intelligence reports and urging the court to investigate him. Mendonca has now challenged the legality of those reports.
The Vorcaro corruption scandal has widened to include powerful political figures on both the left and right.
Vorcaro was arrested in 2025 for allegedly overseeing one of the largest bank fraud schemes in the history of Brazil, leaving billions in owed money.
Flavio Bolsonaro has also faced scrutiny for his ties with Vorcaro, after he approached the banker for assistance in funding a film about his father. Jair Bolsonaro is currently serving a 27-year prison sentence.
The right-wing senator used Tuesday’s suspension to push his claim that the prosecution of his father was a political “witch-hunt”. The Federal Police had recommended charges be brought against the elder Bolsonaro in November 2024.
“Lula’s special group in the Federal Police officially unmasked,” Senator Bolsonaro wrote in a social media post. “May the honourable and glorious Federal Police regain its autonomy to go after criminals, and not Lula’s political adversaries.”
William Marcel Murad, the federal police’s executive director, released a statement saying that Rodrigues has the agency’s “full confidence” and that agents “will not be shaken by attacks”.
One year ago, thousands of young people took to the streets in multiple Nepali cities to protest against corruption. Following the resulting curfews, arrests and the killing of protesters in a crackdown on the demonstrations, the Gen Z‑led movement forced the government from power, ushering in an interim administration and opening the way for new elections.
Now, as Nepal grapples with the aftermath of devastating floods along its border with Tibet, we examine what has changed over the past year – and whether the demands of the Gen Z protesters have been met.
On September 8, 2025, youth-led “Gen Z” protests began in Kathmandu and other cities of Nepal.
Demonstrators who took to the streets were protesting a series of corruption scandals in the country and were also angered by the rising trend of the children of Nepali government officials – dubbed “Nepo kids” – documenting their lavish lifestyles online.
The protests broke out just days after the country blocked 26 social media sites including Facebook, Instagram, X (formerly Twitter), and TikTok for not complying with government rules about “harmful” content. This ban was lifted when the protests began.
Some young demonstrators defied curfews imposed by the authorities after demonstrations began, leading to arrests and the police firing live rounds at protesters, killing about 76 people. Hundreds of protesters were injured and hundreds more arrested. Protesters also set fire to several government buildings, including parliament, and the army was deployed.
Then, on September 9, Prime Minister KP Oli, 74, resigned from his position. Within a week, Nepal’s former Chief Justice Sushila Karki had been appointed as the country’s new interim prime minister.
Ultimately, the protests culminated in the current government being formed in March this year when 35-year-old rapper-turned-politician Balendra Shah was sworn in as the country’s youngest-ever prime minister.
Shah leads the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), also known as the National Independent Party, a new anti‑establishment party which emerged after the youth-led protests and won more than two‑thirds of the 165 directly elected seats in parliament in March. Traditional parties such as the Nepali Congress and the CPN‑UML have a much smaller representation than ever before.
Although he was not a street organiser of the protests, Shah became one of the most prominent political figures, channelling Gen Z’s anger into his electoral campaign.
They included:
The demands have been met to some extent.
For instance, Oli resigned in the wake of the Gen Z‑led protests, and several senior members of his government also stepped down. Parliament was dissolved, an interim government was established, and new general elections were held in March this year.
“Despite the loss of life and property during the movement, the interim government successfully conducted peaceful elections, leading to the emergence of a new political force in government,” Yog Raj Lamichhane, an assistant professor at Nepal’s Pokhara University, told Al Jazeera.
“The result reflected public disenchantment with the old political establishment.”
In March this year, Nepal police arrested Oli and former Home Affairs Minister Ramesh Lekhak for their alleged involvement in the deadly crackdown on the protesters last year.
However, both men were released in April after a Supreme Court order asked the police not to indefinitely extend the detention. They remain under investigation in connection with last year’s deadly Gen Z protests, but have not been formally charged.
Furthermore, the issue of corruption among political elites has barely been addressed, observers say.
Dinesh Paudel, professor at the Appalachain State University in the US, told Al Jazeera: “The fundamental concerns and issues raised by the young protestor last year are still the same, and there are no governance style changes even after the new elected government, other than some populist rhetorics on small and cosmetic topics.”
Some of the young leaders have entered parliament and government, while others remain in activist groups. The divisions between these two groups of people are becoming more apparent as they often clash over how much to compromise with the old political establishment.
Those who were elected to parliament in March mostly belong to the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), or National Independent Party.
“One of the most exciting and progressive parts is the emergence of youth in politics as most of the parliamentarians are young, educated and have much aspiration to change,” Bishnu Raj Upreti, a public policy analyst and research director at Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), told Al Jazeera.
“The leadership change appears to have brought some positive differences, particularly in the working style of the current prime minister,” Lamichhane said.
However, experts say the younger generation of MPs – those elected under the NIP/RSP banner as well as those in older parties – remains constrained by party hierarchies and Nepal’s entrenched political system.
“They are inexperienced and are still heavily controlled by party structures,” Upreti said. He added that wider generational distrust between young politicians and the older establishment also complicated reform efforts.
“Leadership change has started. It is good, but not enough.”
This has resulted in an apparent divide between those in government positions and those in activist groups.
In May this year, the new government invited Gen Z activists – mostly civil society leaders and youth activists – to give their input for constitutional amendments. However, 25 of the 29 invited boycotted the meeting, saying deeper systemic problems and earlier agreements with the previous administration were being ignored, according to Gen Z activist Aayush Basyal.
Basyal, who was present at the protests last year, said it was “really tricky” for young activists to adjust to working inside the system alongside the new Gen‑Z politicians now in office. “They are trying to cooperate with the authorities they previously challenged, while still pushing for the radical changes they demanded on the streets,” she explained.
“Now the Gen Z protesters of that time are divided into different factions, and some of the factions are vehemently opposing some work of government,” Upreti explained.
“So those who oppose the government are not in positive booking of the government,” Upreti added.
On Tuesday, families of protesters who were killed in last year’s crackdown organised a formal commemoration at what used to be Nepal’s parliament building.
After functioning as the parliament building for almost two decades, it shut down last year when Gen Z protesters trespassed and set fire to it.
Basyal said the authorities provided tight security amid rumours that some groups might try to incite violence, noting that Nepal’s “media economy” often amplifies sensational incidents even when only a few people are involved.
In the meantime, however, the divide within the Gen Z movement is becoming more stark, particularly what some see as a failure by the new leaders to advocate for protesters.
“The injured protesters have generally received medical treatment and certain monetary compensation,” Lamicchane said.
“However, the concept of compensation remains broader than financial support alone. In my view, the true compensation would be the fulfilment of the promises and objectives that inspired the Gen Z movement and the subsequent formation of a new government.”
Basyal said that while some of the people involved in the movement are now MPs or cabinet ministers, others, from poor, minority backgrounds, who lack money and influence, are still in jail and cannot speak up for themselves.
“There are people still in jail, officially more than 900 and unofficially, maybe like 1,600 plus, who are in jail for arson,” Basyal said.
He said it was troubling that these protesters remain in jail, suggesting this risks becoming “institutionalised” and raising questions over whether the government is effectively celebrating impunity.
Activists, he added, hope the new administration will treat these detainees better, but “that is yet to be seen.”
Analysts say structural changes are necessary.
“Although the government has promised reforms, particularly through changes in laws and policies, these commitments have not yet been substantially realised,” Lamichhane said.
Upreti noted that the new government has not begun any structural changes at all.
“Structural changes have to start with changing existing laws and bringing in new laws and policies,” he said.
“From what we’ve seen so far, the new leaders don’t appear to be prioritising that. Massive reform of the bureaucracy is a precondition to achieving the aims of the Gen Z movement, but the government has not yet done meaningful work in this line.”
He added that another important element is to develop better relations and deeper trust with Nepal’s two giant neighbours, India and China, since Nepal’s economic progress and geopolitical balance depend on them.
Experts also say Nepal’s highly centralised system of government is a major obstacle to deeper structural reform.
“Strong collaboration of the federal movement with provincial and local government is the necessary condition for advancing economic progress, but they ignore provincial and local government as they have no provincial and local government. It is not a good approach,” Upreti said.
“Structural changes are necessary and they come from internal power dynamics such as urban-rural divide, inherent conflict between educated elites and peasant farmers and economic and bureaucratically institutionalised corruption,” Patel said. “It is hard to imagine that there will be any structural changes, aiming to making people’s lives better, at this stage and under current circumstances.
“In short, Nepal has missed yet another opportunity from a popular uprising that would fundamentally address Nepali peoples desire for change.”
“This new government seems to be deeply under its own weight of expectation,” Basyal said.
He explained that historically in Nepal, there’s been an “expectation gap”: people expect a lot, governments deliver little, and that gap fuels frustration.
He said that this government has “not been transparent”.
“The prime minister, he doesn’t speak a lot in the parliament. And when he did address the parliament a few times, that was pretty chaotic, as well,” Basyal added.
“If this issue remains unaddressed, it may lead to a second wave of public disenchantment.”
Lamichhane said, however, it will take time to see if the government can address the challenges it faces.
“Let’s hope and wait for changes. Now, it’s not the appropriate time to criticise the government, as Nepal has faced an apocalypse in the form of a massive flood.”
Meanwhile, flags in Nepal flew at half-mast on Monday as the country mourned the more-than-1,300 people who are known to have died in catastrophic floods which ravaged the border region with Tibet late last month. Thousands more people are still missing.
Basyal noted that Nepal’s current constitution was finalised and promulgated in September 2015, only after the devastating April and May earthquakes created urgent political pressure to end nearly a decade of deadlock.
“It feels like the nation comes together only during national disasters. So we’re really hopeful that this sense of unity that is right now will help.”
The anti-immigration Reform UK party said two of its senior officials had stepped down on Friday, following allegations that they were secretly filmed appearing to discuss ways to circumvent UK electoral laws on foreign donations.
The far-right party, whose popularity has soared in the past two years, is already embroiled in several other funding scandals involving its leader Nigel Farage. On Friday, it announced an internal probe into the latest case, which was brought to light by a Channel 4 investigation.
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Reform is currently holding its annual party conference in Birmingham, central England.
Here’s what we know about the foreign funding claims and how they could affect British politics.
Channel 4, an independent broadcaster, aired footage of senior Reform officials Dan Jukes and James Orr meeting with undercover reporters who were posing as prospective Reform backers from the United States.
In one instance during the programme, which was broadcast on Thursday night, footage was shown of Jukes appearing to talk about a proposal for Reform to receive a 500,000-pound ($675,000) donation from one of the men, who was presenting himself as an American financier, through his son, who he said lives in the UK.
The “son” was actually another journalist from investigative group Verbatim, which recorded the exchange.
In separate footage, Orr appeared to discuss a plan for the US donor to fund opinion polls for Reform UK rather than donating the money directly.
He told the undercover reporter that “we just don’t have British-resident donors, British entities, that would support us”.
During the investigation, Verbatim reported that Reform officials arranged for the US donor to pay more than 30,000 pounds ($40,500) to fund three opinion polls, without disclosing the source of the funds.
Channel 4 said it had verified the findings from Verbatim, an offshoot of the Centre for Climate Reporting.
Under UK electoral law, political parties may only accept donations from British voters or UK-registered businesses. Donations from individuals or organisations based overseas are strictly forbidden.
In a statement on Friday, a UK Electoral Commission spokesperson said political parties must report all “permissible donations” they accept exceeding 11,180 pounds ($15,120) and all “impermissible donations” exceeding 500 pounds ($676).
“Parties are responsible for ensuring their internal processes and controls are fit for purpose,” the spokesperson said. “Information about any potential attempt to evade the controls on donations is for the police to consider.”
Following the programme’s broadcast, Reform initially issued a statement denying any wrongdoing and claiming the allegations were a hoax.
In a later statement, however, the party said it was conducting an internal probe and that Orr and Jukes had stepped down pending its outcome.
Orr, the party’s policy head, said he had agreed to step down temporarily and would “cooperate fully” with the investigation.
Jukes, Farage’s long-term aide, denied any wrongdoing but said he had “stepped back from politics in order to clear my name”.
Farage accused the undercover journalists of “entrapment” and told broadcaster LBC, “they got a couple of our contractors to say things that perhaps should not have been said”.
“And as a result of that, you know, they have been removed this morning. And yeah, you know, I’m not happy about it,” Farage said.
“The party has broken no laws, the party has not taken any dodgy money or anything like that whatsoever,” Farage insisted.
It remains to be seen. The UK’s ruling Labour Party has written to the police asking them to investigate possible criminal offences.
The Metropolitan Police said it was aware of the allegations in the broadcast and would assess any information provided to them.
This does not amount to the formal launch of an investigation.
The latest donation scandal is another blow for Reform, which has seen its place as the UK’s most popular party slip in opinion polls in recent months.
Last year, polling by YouGov suggested that Reform had become the most popular political party, and would likely win a UK general election if one had been held then. At that point, Labour was trailing far behind in the polls – projected to win just 27.3 percent of parliamentary seats, compared with Reform’s 41.7 percent. The former ruling Conservative Party stood at just 7 percent.
But a poll this week by YouGov showed Reform now tied with the UK’s left-wing Labour Party with 23 percent support each. The Conservatives have caught up with 20 percent.
This is not the first funding scandal Reform has grappled with, either. In July, Farage dramatically stepped down as Member of Parliament for Clacton amid allegations, also revealed in the UK media, that convicted fraudster George Cottrell, 32, recruited and paid three staff to work on Farage’s social media before the 2024 general election and has continued to allow Farage to use a five-storey Georgian townhouse he rented near Buckingham Palace.
Farage ultimately re-won his seat in Clacton at a by-election but still faces the prospect of a parliamentary inquiry into undeclared funding of 5 million pounds ($6.7m) from Thailand-based billionaire and crypto investor Christopher Harborne, who paid for Farage’s personal security before he announced his candidacy in the 2024 general election. So far, Farage denies all wrongdoing.
This week, Farage told the BBC that the parliamentary inquiry was unfair. He said there was a “wilful attempt, and it’s gone on now for months, to say that everything to do with Reform, that every individual involved with Reform is somehow a crook”.
This is evidence of “the establishment in a very coordinated way fighting back”, he claimed.
However, Justin Fisher, professor of political science at Brunel University of London, told Al Jazeera Reform’s latest donation scandal would further hurt Farage’s standing both within and outside his party, and could cost Reform votes in the next elections.
“If this was an isolated incident, then Reform would probably be able to brush it off,” said Fisher. “But it comes on top of serious questions about a donation to Nigel Farage, and a donation to Reform which allegedly had overseas links. This all contributes to a narrative which Reform is having great difficulty avoiding.”
Late last night, on September 1st, on the day the commercial terminals of Maiquetía airport went back online, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright landed in Caracas for the second time this year. Of course, Wright didn’t fly commercial, and he was swarmed by a flurry of journalists looking for headlines on the “massive” oil deal that has invaded the news both in the US and Venezuela.
“I think very good times are coming,” Wright told reporters upon his arrival. “As large investments flow into this country, that creates more jobs, which pushes wage pressure up, creates opportunity and prosperity for Venezuelans, and it snowballs: when you get business confidence and investment, it creates all sorts of opportunities—not just jobs, but opportunities for entrepreneurs.”
Wright arrived to give this new partnership a bit more ceremony, but also, very likely to join in the festivities of what is to be an important week for the Trump administration’s push for energy supremacy in the region and for the Venezuelan oil industry. Besides the strange deal that we’re going to unpack in this piece, this week will feature Chevron, which according to Bloomberg is about to invest $7 billion looking to double its production in the country. Also, it is expected that deals with Eni, ONCC, and Colombia´s Geopark will be signed as well. And the icing on the cake, it’s been also reported that one of the agreements with GE Verona to tackle Venezuela’s decaying power grid is close to being executed.
The clumsy communications around the announcement of the deal have generated some negative backlash from the Venezuelan public and skepticism from the same oil majors the Trump administration is trying to woo. Just a couple of hours before Secretary Wright touched ground in Venezuela, Marco Rubio had to jump on a livestream with a Venezuelan journalist in a damage control mission.
Those who brokered the US-Venezuela oil agreement are boasting about historical proportions, about leaving a mark for generations to come, but they took their time to explain why it is so important. Information has been coming out in a very fragmented way, heavily determined by propaganda needs from the Trump administration and the chavista regime. After vague rumors related to Mauricio Claver-Carone taking a step back as the Americans’ informal envoy, and the fall of Harry Sargeant III in Venezuela, we saw an old communication trick, which the Trump administration did not invent, setting the stage for the big news. Washington sent out a first version with catastrophic details, waiting for panic to spread, and published a second, corrected version that would make the news look better than initially perceived. Last week, the first Axios “scoop” talked about 90 billion barrels of Venezuelan oil reserves that the US would own. Now, the current version of the official announcement says it’s 65 billion barrels, so people can say “well, it’s just 65 billion barrels, it ain’t so bad.”
The White House finally published a fact sheet on Monday night disclosing more details about the involvement of the State and “War” Departments in buying the oil produced in 17 Venezuelan fields (supposedly containing about 65 billion barrels) by a private Venezuelan company. North American Blue Energy Partners, or Nabep, is the country’s second biggest crude producer led by notorious Venezuelan oligarch Alejandro Betancourt. To execute this deal, the Rodríguez government is granting a 100-year concession to a Nabep-Pentagon joint venture that looks, sounds and smells pretty unconstitutional from a Venezuelan point of view.
Francisco Monaldi: “Instead of generating more credibility and allowing investors to feel confident, the fact that this is allocated without any bidding and to an individual that has issues with justice, that could be a problem in the future.”
These are the known conditions of the deal:
The US government is trying to sell this to the American public as a way to restock US oil reserves and to cut domestic gas prices, which have a negative impact on Trump’s popularity and the prospects of Republican candidates in November’s congressional elections. In an interview in Spanish published Tuesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted that the deal was between the US and a private company, not the chavista regime, and offered this as a model the White House expects can be replicated.
Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin America Energy Program for the Baker Institute at Rice University, warned on X that Venezuela’s famous oil reserves are inflated by order of Hugo Chávez: in reality, they are about a third of the 300 billion barrels everyone quotes as the total proven reserves. So those 17 fields must have about 25 billion barrels, instead of 65 billion barrels, an unreliable figure no one should take for certain. Besides that, it would be very hard to actually extract those 25 billion barrels in 25 years, given that most fields are undeveloped. Monaldi added before PBS News that “the presence of the US government could make investors more willing to take the risk of going into Venezuela with all the issues, including the fact that this is an illegitimate government in Venezuela, and that the history of the country, of course, is not great in terms of respecting deals… The other issue is that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve typically uses light oil, and Venezuela mostly produces heavy and extra heavy oil.”
Monaldi thinks that “if it’s an opaque deal that doesn’t seem to benefit the country, then there will be a backlash eventually, and we will end up as in other parts of the world and in Venezuela itself with renegotiation at some point.” Even if the agreement with NABEP means that they can run faster than other private companies, Trump’s anxiety to get American investors to Venezuela won’t be helped by this, because “instead of generating more credibility and allowing investors to feel confident, the fact that this is allocated without any bidding and to an individual that has issues with justice, that could be a problem in the future.”
Amid the fall of Tareck El Aissami and the rise of súper ministra Delcy Rodríguez, Betancourt re-entered the Venezuelan oil scene alongside Trump-linked oil magnate Harry Sargeant.
Harvard scholar Ricardo Hausmann, a former planning minister who leads a research center on economic growth, avoided the oil economy dimension of the matter and just trashed Rubio for betraying the idea of democracy transition. On the other hand, some influential economists see opportunities. Asdrúbal Oliveros chose a middle ground between celebration and condemnation and pointed out that benefits will come as long as the country develops not only the oil fields but the institutions to create accountability.
That Alejandro Betancourt, the CEO of NABEP, is at the center of this deal is bad news in the eyes of observers and Venezuelan journalists familiar with his trajectory.
Over the past two decades, this businessman became a symbol of the bolichico culture, a term apparently coined by investigative journalist Juan Carlos Zapata to define those scions of Venezuelan old-money families who became travel companies of Bolivarian-era corruption. Betancourt and his partners—namely his cousin Pedro Trebbau López and childhood friend Francisco Convit Guruceaga—became synonymous with the vanishing of hundreds of millions of dollars the Chávez government allocated to a newly-formed company, Derwick Associates, to fix the country’s power grid. Both Betancourt and Trebbau were in their late 20s when Derwick first emerged, and had no experience in the electricity sector.
Many things would happen between then and now. Betancourt became famous in Spain for investing in Hawkers, a Spanish sunglasses brand that got him cleaner headlines before local journalists discovered who he was. Prior to the Hawkers move, the three bolichicos created a Bahamas-based company to partner with a Gazprombank subsidiary. The resulting company, called Gazprombank Latin America Ventures, would operate a heavy-crude PDVSA project in the Lake Maracaibo region called Petrozamora. The joint venture did get to hold a steady production, but as with everything Russian, its operations were quite opaque. The Maduro regime eventually raided its offices and forced Betancourt to leave the country.
Betancourt faces probes in Spain and Switzerland. US prosecutors investigated him as an alleged co-conspirator in the $1.2 billion money-laundering scheme that targeted Convit and others, but didn’t charge the former.
Amid the fall of Tareck El Aissami and the rise of súper ministra Delcy Rodríguez, Betancourt re-entered the Venezuelan oil scene alongside Trump-linked oil magnate Harry Sargeant. Through Nabep, Betancourt and Sargeant took control of a number of oil projects (including the Petrozamora fields) under the CPP scheme, in which private companies could hold a larger stake than the State (running counter to the country’s hydrocarbons legislation until it was changed this year).
Betancourt seems to have a hand on both sides of Venezuela’s political conflict. That a close relative of Juan Guaidó was seen visiting Betancourt’s castle in Spain, in the company of Trump ally Rudy Giuliani, helped to cement the bad reputation of the interim government. In fact, Rubio now alleges that Betancourt was a friend of the opposition to deflect the suspicion that the tycoon is a man of the Rodríguez regime, and that the US chose Nabep because it is the biggest private company in the Venezuelan oil sector. Questioned by journalist Sergio Novelli about Betancourt’s past, the Secretary of State said that the businessman faced no charges “in our system.”
Over the past several weeks, Betancourt reemerged as a key operative between the Trumpworld and the Rodríguez government. The Washington Post reported last week that the Trump administration lobbied Switzerland to “resolve” an ongoing money-laundering probe into Betancourt without him facing criminal charges. Despite such a level of external interference, Betancourt remains under investigation in both Spain and Switzerland. He hasn’t been charged in these countries. US prosecutors investigated Betancourt as an alleged co-conspirator in the $1.2 billion PDVSA money-laundering scheme that targeted Francisco Convit and many others, but did not charge the former.
Distrust has grown in the Venezuelan public sphere. Before the oil agreement was announced, Cazadores de Fake News published an investigation about the network of social media accounts defending Betancourt. Hours after the White House published the fact sheet, an Axios piece tells the story of Betancourt as the global, influential businessman that promoted the Trump-backed Guaidó government and, during the events of January 3, persuaded Delcy Rodríguez to cooperate with Rubio. An Axios source even says that Maduro would still be in power had Betancourt not helped to remove him.
As another blackout hit Western Venezuela over the weekend, Delcy Rodríguez released a video statement saying this was about improving the future of the country. She was emphatic in thanking Trump and Rubio, and assured the nation would preserve sovereignty of the oil reserves while turning into a big energy powerhouse. Social media reacted by reproducing pre-2026 footage of her and Diosdado Cabello accusing the opposition of offering all our oil to the US. The most significant detail remains a mystery: what Delcy Rodríguez is demanding in exchange for signing and enforcing this deal.
The most enigmatic reaction in the Venezuelan opposition came from María Corina Machado: she hasn’t said anything, really. A couple of days after Trump’s announcement, the opposition leader remotely attended an international conference held in Slovenia. She did not mention the reported contents of the deal or the role of Betancourt, but insisted on the potential of Venezuela as the energy hub of the Western Hemisphere in light of the Ukraine War and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Machado added that a democratic government could serve as a bridge between the US, Europe and Latin America.
Leopoldo López and Julio Borges, two important opposition figures who held leadership roles in the past, also remain quiet. Their political parties are linked to a US-sponsored working group meant to reform the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) and electoral authority. López and Borges previously praised the US for its role and welcomed the progress made in August. In the deal’s factsheet, the White House says these talks resulted in significant reforms to the Venezuelan judiciary and the release of hundreds of political prisoners, which are grossly exaggerated claims. The reform to the Organic Law of the TSJ has not been approved yet, though the National Assembly sanctioned it on Tuesday night.
Edmundo González Urrutia said more, but not much against it. He stated that “Venezuela’s recovery cannot be measured only by the barrels it produces again, but by the lives that wealth allows us to rebuild.” He made no mention of Delcy, the deal’s legality, or its conditions, but wondered whether oil will improve the lives of all Venezuelans or only some this time around. He asked what those millions of dollars could mean to a family that lost a home and is still waiting to rebuild it, to someone who arrives at a hospital to find no supplies, to a community that lives waiting to see when the water will come. González did not denounce the agreement, but reflected on the difference between financial resources reaching the country and reaching the families that need it most.
Ruling chavismo has invoked its “loyalty to national sovereignty and the well-being of the people,” offering a list of crises the deal is supposed to solve: economic reactivation, the recovery of public services, care for those affected by the double earthquake, jobs, workers’ wages.
Juan Pablo Guanipa, a popular ally of Machado in Primero Justicia, sort of misread the animus. He called for a “calm reading” of the deal hours after it broke, arguing that Venezuela cannot develop its reserves without massive foreign capital. “If we see new jobs, more investment, more income, and a new economic upturn, this agreement will earn its backing. But if we don’t see it, little by little, popular rejection will follow.” His critique became sharper days later. From a rally in Falcón, Guanipa denounced that no government without an electoral mandate—like Delcy’s— has the standing to enter binding commitments like this.
Henrique Capriles did better, insisting Venezuelans were entitled to defend their oil, their interest and their future: “What is the deal’s scope? Its legal basis? What do Venezuelans receive? What do they give up, and under what conditions? Questions, he noted, no one can begin to answer when the country doesn’t even have clarity on this year’s oil income.” He recognized that, although oil remains the only lever at hand to “push everything” and grow the economy, the triumvirate of the Rodríguez siblings and Diosdado Cabello are not qualified to lead that commitment, and will only coat the process with more opacity and corruption.
Diosdado Cabello is yet to say a peep, though we expect him to put some nice words together for his Con el Mazo Dando TV show tonight. PSUV, Venezuela’s ruling socialist party still under Cabello’s control, fully backed Delcy Rodríguez’s leadership in light of the oil deal. The party recalled its historical loyalty to national sovereignty and the well-being of the people, offering a list of crises the deal is supposed to solve: economic reactivation, the recovery of public services, care for those affected by the double earthquake, jobs, workers’ wages. According to them, Rodríguez was simply using “every tool possible within the constitutional framework to put our immense hydrocarbon reserves at the service of national development.” During last night’s session, the Rodríguez-controlled National Assembly passed a motion supporting the “US-Venezuela Binational Energy Agreement.”
Maduro’s son, “Nicolasito” Maduro Guerra, came out in support of the “historic” deal—as he called it, in English. He quoted an interview where his father said the State was fully open to the return of American capital to the Venezuelan oil industry. Which isn’t exactly false: before the US captured Maduro on January 3, The New York Times reported that the dictator had offered all existing oil and gold projects to US companies in exchange for being allowed to remain in power.
Rafael Ramírez, Venezuela’s oil tsar under Hugo Chávez who oversaw PDVSA’s total collapse and the embezzlement of billions of public funds, called the new deal illegitimate, unconstitutional, and a pillage (saqueo). He considered it a ploy by the Trump administration ahead of midterms, as the “Venezuelan case has become the only success to show their [voter] base,” further criticizing Delcy and US policy in an interview with El Nacional. Among other original chavistas that broke with the Maduro regime, Chávez’s former propagandist Andrés Izarra used a double-edged sword: “Delcy is carrying out Machado’s oil plan.” He also tweeted that the agreement was high treason for which its enforcers should be tried.
Juan Barreto, the former chavista mayor of Caracas who is trying to become a relevant opposition figure, quote-tweeted Alejandro Betancourt’s defense of the agreement (who had said that it would benefit Venezuelans and Americans alike) and took the class war route: “The true head of the transition speaks: from intervention to colony… from the stands, the traditional political class and the elites applaud, begging for a scrap… in the streets, neighborhoods, and factories, the people converse, organize, unite…Workers across the country, begin national dialogue and consultation.” Elías Jaua followed suit. The former chavista vice president and career chavista minister said Venezuela is now under the occupation of a foreign invader, calling for grassroots organizing and the recovery of national independence. In what seems to be an ongoing effort to distance himself from what remains of chavismo in power, Jaua clarified he had not spoken to any government official or PSUV leader.