Corruption

In the latest lawsuit against Paramount Skydance, a corporate shareholder has alleged corruption at the highest levels of the company, which is battling to complete its $111-billion takeover of rival Warner Bros. Discovery to create a new media behemoth.

Controlling shareholders Larry Ellison and his son David have presided over a firm that allegedly made “illegal promises and payments to secure regulatory approval,” for the Ellison family’s Paramount purchase last summer, according to the shareholder lawsuit filed this week in Delaware court.

Larry Ellison allegedly discussed with President Trump how Paramount’s pending Warner Bros. acquisition would result in a shake-up at CNN, states the lawsuit filed by Paramount shareholder Paul Robbins.

“The Ellisons [won] the bidding war for Warner Bros. by promising sweeping changes at CNN and other personal benefits to President Trump,” according to the 59-page complaint.

The case was brought on Robbins’ behalf by the nonprofit Public Integrity Project and the advocacy group Freedom of Press Foundation, which has been critical of the Trump’s administration policies toward the media.

The complaint noted that Netflix withdrew from the bidding in February — the same day Co-Chief Executive Ted Sarandos met at the White House with then-Atty. General Pam Bondi and another top official.

The lawsuit suggests Netflix dropped out after recognizing the challenges of dealing with the Trump Administration and that Trump always wanted to see the prize go to Paramount because of his close ties to the Ellison family, who have ushered in more favorable news coverage of Trump and the departure of late night comedian Stephen Colbert.

Robbins does not appear to have first-hand accounts supporting his claims, which are based on public documents and media reports about dealings between the Ellisons and Trump. He has owned Paramount stock since 2021, but the lawsuit does not say how many shares he owns.

He could not be reached for comment.

A Paramount spokesperson could not be immediately reached.

Previously, a Paramount spokesperson said: “No commitments from either David or Larry Ellison have been made to any government body, State AG or federal agency regarding the future of CNN or any other news property, other than the goal to deliver truth-based journalism.”

It’s the third lawsuit lobbed at Paramount this week. On Monday, California Atty. Gen. Rob Bonta led a coalition of 12 Democrat state attorneys general filed a federal antitrust lawsuit seeking to block the Paramount-Warner merger due to concerns about consolidation in movie distribution and cable channels.

The Writers Guild of America added another an antitrust lawsuit against Paramount on Tuesday, alleging the massive merger would result in fewer jobs and lower pay for writers.

Many in Hollywood are opposed to the deal due to fears that another studio consolidation would bring more layoffs, programming cutbacks and a fragile business environment due to the heavy debt burden — nearly $80 billion — that Paramount would have to take on to buy Warner Bros.

The shareholder lawsuit noted that Paramount participated in a raucous event with UFC fighters on the White House lawn in June to celebrate Trump’s 80th birthday and the nation’s 250th anniversary. Paramount has UFC broadcast rights.

The event came two days after Trump’s Justice Department wrapped its regulatory review of Paramount’s Warner Bros. proposal, giving the merger a key green light.

Justice Department investigators reportedly did not have a chance to express potential antitrust concerns when high-level Justice Department officials closed the inquiry — a major win for Paramount and the Ellisons, the lawsuit states.

“There have been some line attorneys in the DOJ that have reviewed this [merger] and have some concerns,” New York Atty. Gen. Letitia James said Tuesday during a virtual town hall with opponents of the merger. “Their analysis of this particular case was ignored by the front office, if you will, at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. [the White House] That’s the front office.”

Ellison’s Skydance Media emerged with its deal to buy Paramount two years ago. Previous controlling shareholder, Shari Redstone, was desperate for an exit and Trump was mounting his White House comeback by battling then-President Joe Biden, then Kamala Harris.

Trump declined an invitation to appear on CBS’ “60 Minutes,” then under Redstone control. He became infuriated by an October 2024 interview with Harris on “60 Minutes.”

Trump filed a $10 billion lawsuit against CBS (he later upped it to $20 billion). After Trump won the election, he had considerable sway over Paramount because it needed his administration’s approval for the sale to the Ellisons.

Paramount agreed to pay Trump $16 million to end his “60 Minutes” lawsuit, allowing the sale to go forward. The Ellisons acquired Paramount in August, then set their sights on Warner Bros. Discovery, which owns CNN.

“The Ellisons proceeded to remake CBS in the President’s image, bought properties he enjoyed, and even hosted events to honor him,” the lawsuit said. “This helped the Ellisons, but it appears to have hurt Paramount and its media outlets.”

In late April, David Ellison hosted an elaborate dinner in Washington to honor the “Trump White House,” according to invitations to the event, “even though President Trump continually insulted journalists at CBS and elsewhere,” the lawsuit said.

On Wednesday, during a confirmation hearing on Capitol Hill, U.S. Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ) blasted acting Atty. General Todd Blanche for his attendance at the dinner while his agency was reviewing the Paramount deal.

Also on Wednesday, the nonprofit news site ProPublica reported Federal Communications Commission Chairman Brendan Carr has accepted $63,000 in free tickets from CBS in recent years — while Paramount mergers were pending.

Times Staff Writer Ben Wieder contributed to this report.

Hungarian parliament passes amendment that would remove President Sulyok, appointed under ex-Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

Hungary’s parliament has approved a constitutional amendment to remove President Tamas Sulyok from his largely ceremonial position, the latest move to dismantle the power of figures associated with former Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

The measure, passed on Monday with 139 votes in favour and only six opposing, would immediately bring an end to Sulyok’s term in office and pave the way for parliament to elect a new president.

Hungarians voted out the right-wing nationalist Orban in April, with new Prime Minister Peter Magyar’s Tisza Party winning in a landslide. The election result ended 16 years of power for Orban’s Fidesz party, which had come to dominate many aspects of the country.

Since Magyar’s victory, he has sought to erode that power, including by removing the current president. The constitutional amendment also introduces a series of judicial reforms, creates a body to investigate alleged financial abuses under the previous government, and imposes a 12-year term limit on lawmakers.

Sulyok now has five days to sign the constitutional amendment passed by parliament. Magyar has said that parliament will launch an impeachment procedure against Sulyok if he does not sign it.

The president and other members of Fidesz boycotted Monday’s parliamentary session.

Sweeping away the old order

The parliament elected Sulyok, a former chief of the Constitutional Court of Hungary, in February 2024. He was nominated to replace Katalin Novak, who resigned after pardoning a man convicted of covering up child sexual abuse.

But days after Magyar’s centre-right Tisza Party won a two-thirds parliamentary super-majority in April, the new prime minister declared Sulyok “unworthy to embody the unity of the Hungarian nation” and demanded that he leave office once the new government was formed.

In June, after the deadline to resign had passed, Magyar branded the president a “puppet” of Orban and promised to strip him and other holdovers from office by constitutional means. Weeks later, he unveiled a reform programme, dubbed “Operation Cleansing Fire”, which seeks to install a new constitution, purge state institutions and establish an anticorruption office.

While the presidency is a largely symbolic post, it is empowered to approve laws and can refer them to the Constitutional Court for review, raising fears that Sulyok might use his presidential powers to stymie Tisza’s ambitious reform agenda.

The jailing of one of Indonesia’s most influential entrepreneurs in a controversial corruption case has raised fears of damage to investor confidence in Southeast Asia’s largest economy.

Nadiem Makarim, the cofounder of the popular super-app Gojek, was last month sentenced to 10 years in prison for allegedly abusing his authority while serving as the country’s education minister.

Makarim was found guilty of giving favourable treatment to Google, an early investor in Gojek, when procuring Chromebook laptops for schoolchildren during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Prosecutors argued that Makarim, who served as former Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s education minister from 2019 to 2024, inflicted state losses of $120m, alleging that he should have been aware the laptops would not work in remote areas with poor internet access.

Critics of the prosecution have argued that the case against Makarim lacks evidence and that the startup founder-turned-politician is the latest victim of a campaign of political retribution being waged by the administration of Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto.

Nicky Fahrizal, a researcher of politics and social change at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, said foreign investors will inevitably think twice before committing capital to Indonesia following the verdict.

“The Nadiem case, along with a string of similar incidents, has served as a warning signal to investors,” Fahrizal told Al Jazeera.

“For them, non-economic factors, such as legal certainty and the quality of the judicial system, are absolute prerequisites.”

Makarim was found guilty by a panel of five judges on June 30, following charges related to the procurement of more than 1 million laptops intended for use in schools in remote and impoverished areas.

At the trial held at the Indonesian Court for Corruption Crimes in Jakarta, prosecutors alleged that Makarim deliberately tailored the tender specifications to favour Google, which invested in Aplikasi Karya Anak Bangsa (AKAB), Gojek’s then-parent company.

Scrutiny of the tender process first arose among the public after it emerged that the Chromebooks often did not work in remote areas, raising questions about how Google was chosen in the first place.

“Choosing a device that relies on an internet connection amid uneven infrastructure… demonstrates a mismatch with needs…” Judge Sunoto said during the sentencing.

Following the verdict, prosecutor Corneles Geeb Paulus hailed the outcome as a victory for “the schoolchildren whose rights were taken away and who were deprived of equitable access to digital education across Indonesia”.

Google has denied providing or offering authorities any inducements to win the tender.

The California-based tech giant, which has a market value of more than $4 trillion, was not indicted in the case.

“From a legal standpoint, authorities seem to have hit a wall in their efforts to secure sufficient evidence and establish the necessary criminal nexus to prosecute the corporation,” the CSIS’s Fahrizal said.

“From a political perspective, Google is a tech giant with immense business influence.”

Taking action against Google could have jeopardised the government’s ongoing digitalisation efforts, Fahrizal added, describing the company as “too big to fail” within the digital sector.

Trissia Wijaya, an Indonesian-born research fellow at the University of Melbourne’s Asia Institute, said Nadiem’s prosecution, coupled with the uncertainty of the business environment under Prabowo, would inevitably erode market confidence.

“Regardless of whether Nadiem is actually guilty or not, he is a symbol of startups and market optimism in Indonesia, especially in the mid-2010s,” Wijaya told Al Jazeera.

“When Gojek started booming and gaining traction, Indonesia was one of the main target countries for global investors, both from the US and China, to invest in the fintech industry,” Wijaya added, describing Indonesia’s business environment as being at a “critical juncture.”

Since taking office in 2024, Prabowo has faced criticism over his handling of the economy, including high levels of spending on public initiatives, such as his signature free lunch programme, which is expected to cost about $15bn this year.

In June, the Indonesian rupiah hit an all-time low against the US dollar, a nadir economic analysts partly attributed to investors’ scepticism about Prabowo’s populist economic policies.

For his part, Prabowo has denied that he is anti-business, while emphasising that Indonesia must uphold the rule of law.

“Some have claimed that I dislike foreign investors and will drive them away, but that is not the case. I have met many investors who are planning to enter the market,” Prabowo told a conference for young entrepreneurs in the city of Lampung last month.

“The government must create a favorable environment for entrepreneurs, including the enforcement of the law. If the law is not enforced, what ensues is the law of the jungle… law based on power, and in the end, that is not good for any of us.”

‘Credibility’ of government policies

Siwage Dharma Negara, a co-coordinator of the Indonesia studies programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, said Indonesia’s reputation as an investment destination had already been in decline before the Makarim verdict.

“Investors are unsure about the credibility of government policies, and they are unsure about the credibility of institutions, whether executive, legislative, or judicial in Indonesia,” Negara told Al Jazeera.

“Nadiem’s case is only one factor that has damaged foreign investor confidence. But there are many other factors that contribute, including government policies that are increasingly less pro-market.”

Teguh Yudo Wicaksono, an economics lecturer at Universitas Islam Indonesia in Yogyakarta, said that although he does not expect the case to have much of an impact on foreign investment, it could deter Indonesian talent based overseas from returning home.

“This could result in a brain drain and Indonesia losing talent,” Wicaksono told Al Jazeera.

Makarim attended Harvard Business School and Brown University in the United States before returning to Indonesia in 2006 and cofounding Gojek four years later.

In 2019, Gojek, which began as a ride-hailing business before evolving into a super-app that also offers food delivery and digital payment services, became the first Indonesian tech company to achieve a valuation of more than $10bn.

Not all observers see the Makarim case as a negative for investor sentiment.

I Gusti Ngurah Bayu Pradana, an expert in business law at the Bali-based Malekat Hukum International Law Firm, said the enforcement of corruption law should be seen as a “positive signal for legal certainty and governance quality in a country, rather than a negative one”.

“Experienced foreign investors generally understand that the greatest risk in investing is not the existence of law enforcement, but rather, legal uncertainty, or a situation in which the rules of the game are unclear, legal processes lack transparency, or enforcement is selective and unpredictable,” Pradana told Al Jazeera.

While Makarim was found guilty of abusing authority and causing state losses, he was acquitted of an additional charge of directly seeking to enrich himself, and he was handed a lower sentence than the 18 years sought by the prosecution.

While reading the verdict, Judge Andi Saputra also presented a dissenting opinion, saying that he found “no evidence of malicious intent or malicious acts” and scant “causal connection or indication between the conflict of interest and the corporate crime”.

The Malekat Hukum law firm’s Pradana pointed to the judge’s dissenting view as evidence of the Indonesian judiciary’s independence and rigorous fact-finding.

“For foreign investors considering Indonesia as an investment destination, the takeaway from this case should not be alarm, but rather confidence that Indonesia’s legal system functions and can hold anyone accountable equally before the law,” Pradana said.

“So long as investment contracts are clearly drafted, business processes are conducted transparently, and implementation complies fully with applicable laws and regulations, investment in Indonesia remains a safe and promising choice.”

The administration of United States President Donald Trump has issued subpoenas against journalists from The New York Times, in what advocates say is an escalating attack on the free press.

Late on Friday, the Times reported that at least four of its reporters have received subpoenas, some delivered to their homes by federal agents.

Those subpoenas compel them to testify before a grand jury in Manhattan on Wednesday.

“The appearance of federal law enforcement agents on the doorstep of news reporters should shock the conscience of any American who believes in the Constitution and the press freedom it protects,” said David McCraw, the newspaper’s lawyer, in a statement quoted by the Times.

News of the subpoenas prompted outcry from leading news groups including the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), which demanded their withdrawal.

“The subpoenas are an extraordinary escalation in President Trump’s efforts to threaten and intimidate independent news organizations, and have a chilling effect on the work of journalists across the country,” said CPJ’s chief executive officer Jodie Ginsberg.

The subpoenas were authorised by a top official in Trump’s Department of Justice: Jay Clayton, the US attorney for the Southern District of New York.

Clayton is in line to succeed Bill Pulte as the director of national intelligence, a cabinet-level role Pulte holds on an interim basis. The Senate is set to begin hearings on Clayton’s confirmation next week.

Scrutiny on NATO travel coverage

At issue is The New York Times coverage of Trump’s return flight from the 2026 NATO summit in Ankara, Turkiye, this week.

While Trump flew to Europe on his new Air Force One, a jet gifted by Qatar and retrofitted by the US military, he left on the old Air Force One.

Trump claimed the switch was made to allow the new jet to visit RAF Mildenhall, an air force base in Suffolk, England, that supports US military operations.

He framed it as an opportunity to allow military members to tour the aircraft.

“It’s going to go to a couple of bases,” Trump said at the time, “so the soldiers can see it because it’s truly magnificent.”

But at the same July 8 news conference, Trump referenced concerns about his safety.

When asked about the airline switch by a reporter from The New York Post, Trump responded, “You know, the life of a president is very dangerous.” He proceeded to add that he’s “number one on the kill list for Iran”.

That same day, The New York Times reported swapped his new presidential jet for his old one because of security concerns, citing anonymous sources. The change reportedly came at the urging of the Secret Service.

Then, the next day, the Times expanded its coverage with a follow-up report, indicating that the new Air Force One lacked the security capabilities of the old jet.

The article anonymously cited two former Air Force officials as saying there would not have been enough time to make the necessary upgrades before the Ankara flight.

It is unclear what modifications have already been made, but experts have estimated that the updates could cost up to $1bn.

Friday’s subpoenas targeted four of the journalists involved in the Times’s reporting on the subject: Eric Schmitt, Tyler Pager, Eric Lipton and Julian E Barnes.

According to the Times, before the subpoenas were issued, the newspaper was contacted by a senior official from the FBI.

That person, who was unnamed, asked the newspaper to hold off on its reporting about Air Force One, citing national security. The FBI official also requested information on the Times’s anonymous sources.

The newspaper, however, declined to provide such information, in line with standard journalistic practice.

A testy relationship with journalists

The subpoenas mark the latest clash between the Trump administration and US media outlets that report on its activities.

Trump himself has a long-running feud with the Times. In September, he sued the newspaper for $15bn in damages, alleging it had defamed him and attempted to “sabotage” his candidacy in the 2024 presidential election, which he won.

After his initial complaint was thrown out as “improper”, Trump refiled it in October.

The Times, for its part, has sued the Department of Defence under Trump over its attempts to impose media restrictions on journalists.

Just this week, the Times also filed a countersuit against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, after it alleged the newspaper had discriminated against a white, male employee for failing to give him a promotion.

The Times has described the effort as an attempt to muffle the press, in violation of the free-speech protections enshrined in the US Constitution’s First Amendment.

The Times is not the only newspaper to face legal backlash from the Trump administration. In December, Trump launched a $10bn lawsuit against the BBC, arguing that a documentary it aired misrepresented his speech before the attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021.

Trump is also seeking $10bn from The Wall Street Journal over its reporting on a birthday message he allegedly sent to convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein. After that suit was thrown out, Trump refiled it in May.

The Trump administration has also taken actions against individual journalists.

In January, for instance, the FBI executed a raid on the house of Washington Post reporter Hannah Natanson, who covered the Trump administration’s efforts to scale back the federal workforce.

The raid came as part of an investigation into a government contractor accused of leaking information to the news media, but at least two judges have barred the Trump administration from using the information it seized from Natanson.

The Trump administration has denied seeking to erode the freedom of the press, instead citing national security needs.

But McCraw, the Times lawyer, argued that, with the latest subpoenas, the White House was trying to restrict “the American public’s right to know how their government is operating”.

“This brazen act should be seen as nothing more than an attempt to prevent the public from knowing what is happening in their country by intimidating journalists from doing their jobs,” he said.

Top Democrats, including Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, also weighed in on the subpoenas, using them to slam Trump as corrupt.

“Donald Trump is one of the weakest, most thin-skinned individuals the world has ever seen,” Schumer wrote on social media.

“Reporters have the right and duty to report the truth. It’s not their fault his foreign-gifted plane is a national security threat. This subpoena is a gross overreach and a disgusting misuse of federal law enforcement resources that should alarm every American.”

The government of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo has been accused of human rights abuses against critics.

Nicaragua’s government has stripped masses of lawyers of their licences to practise, in what critics see as yet another attack on the country’s critics.

On Friday, a United Nations expert called the government’s actions a “purge of the legal profession”, aimed at eroding the country’s final shreds of democratic checks and balances.

Nicaragua’s husband-wife co-presidents, Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, have led a government that has increasingly carried out an all-out crackdown on dissent.

That effort intensified after mass social protests in 2018 that the government violently repressed.

Since then, the government has imprisoned adversaries, religious leaders, journalists and others, forcing thousands to flee the country. It has also stripped hundreds of their Nicaraguan citizenship and possessions.

Since 2018, it has also shut down more than 5,000 nongovernmental organisations, largely religious groups, but also local rotary clubs and scouting organisations.

In recent days, lawyers noticed that their licences to practise law in Nicaragua were removed without explanation from the Supreme Court of Justice’s registry, according to Reed Brody, an American human rights lawyer and member of a UN panel of experts on the Central American country.

Other lawyers also confirmed their certifications were revoked.

There was no official notification by the government, and Nicaragua’s government did not respond to a request for comment by The Associated Press news agency.

Brody said the full scope of the revocation was not immediately clear, but it “would certainly appear to be at least hundreds, if not thousands of lawyers” who were affected.

“This follows the pattern that we’ve been seeing for years. First, they closed the NGOs, the universities, the independent media. You know, they’ve gone after the churches, and now it seems the legal profession,” Brody said. “Anyone who might stand between the government and citizens.”

Brody said he knew of at least 20 lawyers who had been affected.

Juan Diego Barberena, a lawyer and human rights defender exiled in Costa Rica since 2022, was among those stripped of his official certification and said he knew of at least 25 more colleagues like him.

On Thursday, Barberena tried to access his legal accreditation on the government’s database and said his name and licence number were wiped clean from the system.

“This is a means of exercising totalitarian control over the legal profession,” Barberena said. “This means that the dictatorship can decide who gets to practise and who doesn’t.”

The move echoes other steps the government has taken in recent years.

Many Nicaraguan exiles who were stripped of their citizenship and rendered “stateless” have reported similar stories. They or their family members would search for their birth certificates and other legal documents in official databases, only to be told they do not exist.

But Barberena and Brody said the move this week by authorities went a step further, noting that those erased from the system were not just dissenters. Some were simply Nicaraguans living abroad.

Others practised criminal or family law that didn’t touch on politics, while some were government sympathisers, Barberena said.

Brody framed it as a move to whittle away at any last remaining shred of independence in a judicial system already firmly under control of Ortega and Murillo.

“On one hand, it’s an arbitrary measure to punish political dissent,” Barberena said. “On the other, it’s the dictatorship looking medium-term and wanting to prevent lawyers, experts and academics from participating in the future of the country’s institutions.”

Ethics experts sounded the alarm Wednesday after new financial disclosure reports revealed that President Trump’s income ballooned to $2.2 billion in 2025, with $1.4 billion coming from various new cryptocurrency-related businesses.

“It’s bribery. It’s graft. It’s exploitation of public power for private financial gain,” said Kathleen Clark, a law professor at Washington University and an expert in government ethics. “Trump has — with the acquiescence of a somnolent, GOP-controlled Congress and the active assistance of John Roberts’ Supreme Court — transformed the presidency into a massive corruption racket.”

Trump reported income of over $600 million in 2024. But after he entered the White House in 2025, he reported that his income had soared to more than $2.2 billion.

The 2025 annual disclosure report filed with the Office of Government Ethics shows that Trump ramped up his real estate business in countries across the globe, particularly in the Middle East, at a time when his government was negotiating over vital issues of military aid and economic tariffs. The president also expanded his dealings in the relatively new realm of cryptocurrency.

According to the 927-page report, Trump made $635 million in royalties from Celebration Coins and more than $500 million from his World Liberty Financial crypto firm. He drew in millions from a raft of Trump-branded merchandise including God Bless the USA Bibles and sneakers depicting him with his hand raised in a fist. He also brought in $10.4 million from a property in the United Arab Emirates and $9 million from a property in Saudi Arabia.

Noah Bookbinder, an ethics expert and former president of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics, a nonprofit watchdog group in Washington, described Trump’s business dealings while in the White House as “entirely unprecedented, certainly in modern history, but I think by most ways of measuring, in all of American history.”

“This is corruption,” Bookbinder said. “You have a president who has been quite transparently using the presidency in ways that benefit his business interests and intertwining the presidency and business interests.”

But the president and the White House brushed aside ethics concerns about the money Trump is making.

Trump told reporters Wednesday that he made a lot of money before he came to the White House, he had “big institutions” run his money, and that he had benefited, like every other American, as the stock market went up.

“We’re all profiting,” he said. “I’m profiting because I have a lot of money and a lot of cash.”

In a statement, White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said: “Neither the President nor his family has ever engaged — or will ever engage — in conflicts of interest. … All actions by President Trump and his administration are taken in the best interest of the American people.”

Although the report does not show exactly how much Trump is earning — it provides details of revenue, rather than profit — the scale of the president’s cryptocurrency dealings elevated ethics watchdogs’ long-standing concerns.

Jordan Libowitz, a vice president at Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics, said the most concerning detail of the new report is the hundreds of millions of dollars coming in from various crypto ventures partnered with companies that the American public knows little about.

“At a time when his own administration itself is setting regulation for these types of companies,” Libowitz said, “there’s just this massive opportunity for corruption when foreign governments and foreign nationals can pour tens of millions of dollars into the president’s pocket.”

As a real estate mogul, Trump has long invested in hotels, condominiums and golf courses. But cryptocurrency, Libowitz said, offers vastly more potential for corruption.

“There’s only so many hotel rooms you can book, so many rounds of golf, but there’s no limit with crypto,” Libowitz said. “You can just buy his meme coin and he gets a cut, so you kind of take out the middleman, but also the cap or the amount of money you can funnel to the president.”

Libowitz said it was also problematic for Trump to expand his real estate empire in foreign countries, particularly the Middle East.

“Now it seems that almost all his new developments are in foreign countries, and that opens up, if you’re building this giant resort, you’re going to need help from the local government, whether it’s tax breaks or utility issues, or building a road, or speeding up permits,” Libowitz said. “These are ways that foreign governments can do favors for the American president.”

In the half a century before Trump was elected, ethics experts say, presidents from Nixon to Obama publicly released their tax returns, sold properties or put the proceeds in a blind trust managed by someone they did not know.

“They weren’t doing it because they legally had to, but because they thought it was the right thing to do,” Libowitz said.

Ever since Trump was first elected in 2016 and opted to not sell his businesses or put them in blind trusts, ethics experts have urged Congress to impose more aggressive financial oversight over money in politics.

“Congress needs to update the law, and basically, mandate blind trusts and sale of assets and disclosure of tax returns,” Libowitz said.

Noting that the Constitution’s Emoluments Clause explicitly states that the president cannot accept things of value from foreign or domestic governments, ethics experts say Trump is flouting the law and Congress has chosen to not enforce it.

Richard Painter, a law professor at the University of Minnesota and former White House ethics lawyer under President George W. Bush, said Congress needed to close loopholes that exempt presidents from federal conflict of interest laws as well as enforce the Foreign Emoluments Clause.

“Nobody holding a position of trust with the United States government can accept emoluments, profits and benefits from foreign governments, and that is flatly prohibited under the United States Constitution,” Painter said. “Now, if the United Arab Emirates put money into Liberty Financial, as I understand they did … and then Trump makes money off Liberty Financial, that’s a Foreign Emoluments Clause problem.”

Congress, he said, should empower an independent prosecutor to investigate such conflicts.

“The problem with the Foreign Emoluments Clause is how do we enforce it?” Painter said. “The founders and head of the Congress enforced it by impeaching anybody who took a bunch of foreign government money, but I guess that system’s not working. That’s a serious problem.”

Trump has launched a slate of crypto-friendly policies since returning to the White House for a second term.

A new government report has shown that United States President Donald Trump made millions from cryptocurrency and settlements with media companies last year, raising questions about possible conflicts of interest.

On Tuesday, the US Office of Government Ethics released annual financial disclosure forms for both Trump and his vice president, JD Vance.

One 927-page document itemises all of Trump’s reported assets and income for 2025. They include more than $1.4bn from his family’s cryptocurrency ventures.

Trump received more than $500m from World Liberty Financial, a crypto venture he and his sons co-founded. The president also reported another $635m from the sale of his $TRUMP meme coins.

The report suggests that investments in digital assets now generate one of the largest tranches of Trump’s income, overtaking even the real estate empire he inherited from his father.

The revelation is likely to intensify scrutiny of Trump’s policies.

Since returning to the White House in January 2025, Trump has launched a slate of crypto-friendly policies as he seeks to make the US the “crypto capital of the world”.

Early in his second term, for instance, the president announced that his government would create a national strategic cryptocurrency reserve to help ensure the stability of certain digital assets.

He also hosted the first-ever White House cryptocurrency summit.

The forum included several technology leaders that had been under investigation during the administration of Trump’s predecessor, Democrat Joe Biden.

But Trump reversed those actions. In February 2025, for instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced it would drop charges against Coinbase, the largest US-based cryptocurrency exchange, after it was accused of acting as an unregistered broker.

Other digital currency firms came under suspicion for fraudulent transactions.

Trump has coupled the shift away from government oversight with efforts to champion new legislation, including the GENIUS Act.

The law, passed in Congress in July 2025, created a general regulatory framework that required stablecoin, a type of cryptocurrency, to be backed one-to-one by US dollars. Advocates said the law would help to make cryptocurrency more mainstream.

“The entire crypto community: For years, you were mocked and dismissed and counted out,” Trump said during the law’s signing ceremony. “You were counted out as little as a year and a half ago, but this signing is a massive validation.”

But Trump’s increasingly close ties to the cryptocurrency industry have drawn criticism for its potential for corruption.

Last week, five Democratic senators, including Elizabeth Warren and Richard Blumenthal, called on their Republican colleagues to join them in forcing Trump administration officials to testify under oath about their cryptocurrency dealings.

They pointed to investments from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in World Liberty Financial, the company the Trump family co-owns with government envoy Steve Witkoff’s sons.

Those investments, they argued, “raise questions about what more the UAE may receive — or may have already received – at the expense of U.S. national security after investing in the Trump family crypto company”.

The five Democrats urged immediate hearings on the matter.

Indonesia court finds former education minister guilty of abuse of authority and of causing state losses.

A court in Indonesia has sentenced former Education Minister Nadiem Makarim, co-founder of the Gojek app, to 10 years in prison on corruption charges.

Judges at the Jakarta anti-corruption court on Tuesday found Makarim guilty of corruption related to the procurement of Chromebook laptops for schools during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Chief Judge Purwanto Abdullah, presiding over the ruling at Indonesia’s Corruption Court in Jakarta, said a panel of judges had found Makarim guilty of abuse of authority and of causing state losses. He was found not guilty of directly seeking to enrich himself.

The court said the case caused state losses of approximately $120m. It also ordered Makarim to pay a fine of Rp1 billion ($55,850) and Rp809 billion (more than $45m) in restitution, or face additional prison time.

The verdict marks a sharp fall for the Ivy League-educated entrepreneur once seen as a symbol of Indonesia’s startup sector.

Makarim, 41, co-founded Gojek in 2010, growing it from a call centre with 20 motorcycle drivers into a major ride-hailing and delivery platform.

He became one of Indonesia’s youngest cabinet ministers in 2019 and served as education minister until 2024.

Prosecutors said his decision to purchase Chromebook laptops, which run Google’s ChromeOS, was linked to the US tech giant’s investment in Gojek.

Makarim has consistently denied wrongdoing and vowed to appeal.

“The judges couldn’t even look me in the eye,” he said, adding he could not pay the amount ordered under the ruling.

The former minister has said the procurement saved money and called the case an “investigative error”.

In his defence this month, he said: “Experts and factual witnesses have stated: there is no element of state loss, no element of violation of the law, no element of self-enrichment, enrichment of another person or company, and no malicious intent or bad intentions.”

Prosecutors had sought an 18-year prison sentence and Rp5.68 trillion (about $313m) in restitution. Google was not charged and has denied any wrongdoing.

GoTo Group, formed after Gojek merged with Tokopedia in 2021, said Makarim had not had a decision-making role since resigning in 2019.

Makarim, whose lawyer father once served on the ethics committee of Indonesia’s anti-corruption body, said he joined the government to encourage professionals to enter public service.

For more than two decades, corruption has been a serious issue in Iraq.

The oil-rich nation has consistently been ranked as one of the most corrupt in the world.

But this week, its new government has embarked on an unprecedented anti-corruption crackdown.

It’s targeting many high-profile politicians and other senior figures accused of making illicit wealth and abuse of office.

Iraqis have repeatedly protested against what they say is rampant corruption in their nation.

Now, they hope the new government keeps this promise to eradicate what they call a ‘pandemic of fraudulent activities’ at the highest echelons of power.

But what are the challenges ahead in this battle?

Presenter: Imran Khan

Guests:

Ahmed Rushdi – President of the think-tank, House of Iraqi Expertise Foundation.

Renad Mansour – Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House.

Manuel Pirino – Regional Advisor for Middle East and North Africa at Transparency International.

New Delhi, India – Brajesh Kumar climbs three floors every evening to sit in solitude on the rooftop terrace of his house overlooking the Ram Temple in Ayodhya in northern India’s Uttar Pradesh.

Over decades, the 65-year-old has seen the once-sleepy town metamorphose into the biggest flashpoint of the Hindu majoritarian movement, championed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Where the temple stands used to be the site of the 16th-century Babri Mosque, but in 1992 a Hindu mob tore it down, sparking religious riots that killed nearly 2,000 people across the country, mostly Muslims.

Two and a half years ago, Modi presided over the consecration ceremony of the new temple, devoted to the Hindu god Ram. Many Hindus believe Ram, the god worshipped as an epitome of righteousness, was born there.

To Hindu devotees like Kumar, the temple – despite the controversy and deaths that defined its birth – brought a sense of serenity.

Until recently.

For the past month, the temple has been embroiled in allegations that those entrusted with its management have instead embezzled donations worth potentially millions of dollars that the site attracted from devotees.

“We have been betrayed [by the management], who have looted our faith, nothing less,” Kumar told Al Jazeera. “Left to them, they will sell us all one day in the name of religion and stuff their own pockets.”

The allegations have led to police investigations, arrests and political fallout that could shape elections in India’s most populous state that are only months away.

Ayodhya’s can of worms

Since its inauguration, the Ram Temple has been among the top religious sites in India, attracting millions of Hindu devotees.

An independent trust, the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Teerth Kshetra Trust, manages the shrine. Although it is outside the purview of the government, its executive members wield political influence, and some of them come from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the ideological wellspring of the BJP.

The corruption allegations first surfaced this month after Mahipal Singh, a former supervisor of the trust’s accounting team, publicly called out irregularities. Al Jazeera could not reach him for comment.

After a public uproar, Akhilesh Yadav, a former chief minister of Uttar Pradesh from the opposition Samajwadi Party, picked up the issue, alleging that millions of rupees in donations had gone missing.

The mounting pressure pushed the state government, ruled by the BJP, to form a three-member investigation team, which has submitted a report on the alleged misappropriation of donations.

Although the content of the report has not been made public, the state police registered a criminal case and have arrested at least eight people, including those involved in counting cash and valuable offerings at the temple.

More devotees have come forward since, seeking the whereabouts of their valuables, including silver bricks and gold jewellery and artefacts, that they had handed over to the trust’s executives.

On Friday, the trust’s longstanding general secretary, Champat Rai, stepped down with other high-profile trustees. The allegations have been particularly damning for Rai, who has been a central figure in the movement for the Ram Temple.

But it has done little to cool down the tensions in the state, where thousands of devotees, including some BJP supporters, feel cheated.

‘Cunning thieves running Ram Temple’

Santosh Dubey was among those tried for tearing down the Babri Mosque in 1992. He has never shied away from his role and instead has flaunted it.

After the mosque’s demolition, Dubey waited for a final verdict about what was to happen to the site from the courts, where both sides fought bitterly for decades. In 2019, the Supreme Court awarded the site to Hindus – even though it deemed the destruction of the mosque illegal. The top court gave a piece of land to Muslims outside Ayodhya to build a new mosque. In 2020, Dubey and others accused of roles in demolishing the mosque were acquitted — the court cited a lack of adequate evidence.

If those verdicts felt like vindication to Dubey, the alleged embezzlement at the temple has enraged him.

“This corruption causes me deep anguish, a pain that words cannot express,” Dubey told Al Jazeera, speaking from Ayodhya. “All I can say is that nothing less than the death penalty would suffice for them.”

“Cunning, dishonest and ruthless thieves are running the Ram Temple, and they have created such an atmosphere of fear that no one is willing to speak out against them,” he said.

Dubey said the government will struggle to ignore the anger among devotees because the episode batters the BJP’s narrative that it is a saviour of the Hindu faith.

This is not the first time that the temple trust has been the subject of controversy. In 2021, the trust allegedly bought land at highly inflated prices using public donations.

BJP spokespeople refused to comment on the recent allegations when Al Jazeera reached them.

‘Impact on upcoming election’

Devotees of the temple and critics of the government are accusing authorities of attempting a cover-up.

Opposition leader Yadav described the state government’s initial handling of the case as “suspicious”. “The government is arresting the counting staff while shielding the big fish who orchestrated the structural rot,” Yadav said while demanding transparency in the investigation.

Karpatri Maharaj, a prominent Hindu seer associated with the Ram Temple movement, told Al Jazeera that the government is using junior employees as scapegoats and arresting them.

Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, is led by the firebrand Hindu monk-turned-politician Yogi Adityanath, who is often seen as a potential successor to Modi within the RSS-led Hindu majoritarian movement known as Hindutva.

Modi’s party lost a significant base in the state in the 2024 national elections when the BJP fell short of a majority, forcing it to rely on allies’ support to stay in power.

For the BJP, which has long used the campaign for the Ram Temple as a central political plank, the new controversy could prove a challenge before elections in Uttar Pradesh scheduled for early next year, political analyst Rasheed Kidwai said.

“It would have a massive negative impact on the BJP if more religious leaders came forward to speak on this,” Kidwai told Al Jazeera. “This is not something that would be forgotten because it is a matter of faith, and the state chief comes from a religious order himself.”

The episode carries broader lessons, he said: Pandering to religious emotions and fanning divisions can bite back. “What has been benefitting the BJP in these years can also cause immense damage,” Kidwai said.

Iraqi security forces arrested several politicians, lawmakers and senior officials in dawn raids across Baghdad as part of a sweeping anti-corruption campaign ordered by Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi. Elite Counter Terrorism Service units carried out operations in the Green Zone.

Elite security personnel carry out a large-scale operation at dawn in the Green Zone and several neighbourhoods in Baghdad, security source says.

Several Iraqi politicians, lawmakers and officials have been arrested on corruption charges, Iraqi state-run media report.

Several people, including members of parliament “whose immunity had been lifted and officials whose names appeared in … confessions”, were arrested early on Sunday in the capital, Baghdad, the Iraqi News Agency reported, quoting a security source.

It was not immediately clear who had been arrested. There was no immediate official statement on the arrests from the Iraqi government or security forces.

A security source told Al Jazeera that elite Iraqi security forces carried out a large-scale arrest operation at dawn in the fortified International Zone (Green Zone) and several neighbourhoods in Baghdad.

The source said the arrests were carried out by the Counter Terrorism Service and were based on statements provided by Adnan al-Jumaili, deputy oil minister, after his arrest last month on corruption charges.

Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, has pledged to fight corruption and mismanagement that have plagued Iraq for decades.

Authorities seized about $86m in cash this month that was allegedly part of the corruption case against al-Jumaili.

The Associated Press news agency reported that seven people were arrested on Sunday, including five members of parliament. It cited a security agency report it obtained. The AP said some of those arrested were from the political bloc of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.

During November’s parliamentary elections, al-Sudani’s bloc won the largest share of seats, but he did not return as prime minister. He stepped aside amid a deadlock in the Coordination Framework, a group of Shia parties allied with Iran that brought al-Sudani to power. They disagreed for months over their preferred candidate for the post.

Colombia’s outgoing leftist president, Gustavo Petro, has alleged electoral fraud after preliminary results from a presidential run-off saw his handpicked candidate lose by a small margin.

In a barrage of posts on the social media site X on Monday, Petro alleged that the opposition bought votes and Israel and the United States interfered to help opposition far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella win.

Petro has refused to recognise the results and has called for an investigation by the judiciary.

The president, who was barred by the constitution from running for a second term, was Colombia’s first leftist president, putting him at odds with the US.

His administration is praised for reforms that boosted social spending, raised the minimum wage and redistributed land to poorer families. Petro also cut ties with Israel over Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and distanced himself from US President Donald Trump’s administration.

However, critics said his refusal to accept the election results risks inflaming political tensions – and violence. Here’s what we know:

What are the election results?

The first round of the presidential election was held on May 31. Neither of the two leading candidates – Abelardo de la Espriella of the right-wing Defenders of the Homeland movement and Senator Ivan Cepeda of the ruling Historic Pact – secured at least 50 percent of the vote, leading to a run-off on Sunday.

De la Espriella narrowly won with 49.66 percent over Cepeda’s 48.7 percent, according to preliminary results released on Monday by the National Registry, which manages vote numbers.

The razor-thin difference amounts to less than 1 percent of the vote and represents one of Colombia’s closest elections.

Trump-backed de la Espriella, 47, is to take office on August 7. The criminal lawyer is a multimillionaire who campaigned on tougher security and anti-leftist policies. He also has US citizenship.

De la Espriella’s win is part of a recent trend of Latin American countries electing far-right, populist leaders who are pro-Trump. Argentina’s Javier Milei, Honduras’s Nasry “Tito” Asfura, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele and Costa Rica’s Laura Fernandez Delgado all have close ties to the Trump administration.

Why is Petro alleging fraud?

Petro took to X to denounce in a series of posts what he said was voter fraud committed with the help of Israel and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Petro said there was evidence of manipulation of Form E-14, the official, handwritten tally of sheets filled out by poll workers at each voting station.

The form is a physical record of the vote count and is meant to prevent electoral fraud. It is filled out by hand, and digital scans are also uploaded to the National Registry’s portal for public auditing. If found to have errors, parties may request a recount.

Petro alleged that foreign actors accessed the National Registry’s website and rewrote voting data on some E-14 forms.

“Today we have evidence of a change in IP addresses of several servers of the national registry,” he posted.

“This means that the software was compromised and others wrote data for polling stations and voting posts. The only entity in the world capable of doing that is the state of Israel,” Petro added without providing evidence of Israel’s alleged involvement.

Petro said his party had requested a “technical audit” of the voting software before the elections and asked authorities to retrieve the digital footprints of all digitally transmitted documents to avoid modification. He claimed those requests were ignored.

The outgoing president shared videos of what he alleged captured the “premeditated” modification of E-14 forms. He also claimed the manipulation was done “from the offices of the Bautista brothers”.

Who are the Bautista brothers?

Petro was referring to Thomas Greg & Sons, an influential private logistics and security printing firm that runs Colombia’s electoral infrastructure. Until recently, it also printed Colombian passports.

It is run by brothers Fernando and Camilo Bautista Palacio. The duo was convicted of bank fraud in the US in the 1980s.

Thomas Greg & Sons, which was founded by their father, Gregorio, has been contracted by the National Registry for more than a decade to manage election logistics, preliminary vote counting and vote-tallying software.

Petro in April accused the Bautista brothers of negotiating a deal with de la Espriella that would see them secure the presidency for the far-right candidate in return for clinching passport printing contracts once more.

At the time, de la Espriella refuted the claims, and his lawyers threatened Petro with a lawsuit.

What are authorities saying?

Attorney General Gregorio Eljach has dismissed the allegations and told reporters there is “no evidence of fraud” with more than 99 percent of the votes counted.

De la Espriella, meanwhile, has so far not responded directly to Petro.

Is de la Espriella linked with Israel?

Yes, de la Espriella has consistently voiced support for Israel and campaigned in Colombia’s Jewish community, making pro-Israel promises and saying his government would “defend Judeo-Christian principles”.

He pledged to reverse Petro’s 2024 decision to cut ties with Israel and has promised to relocate the Colombian embassy to Jerusalem.

Netanyahu congratulated de la Espriella on Monday, saying: “I look forward to working with you to strengthen the bond between Israel and Colombia.”

How has the US reacted?

In his posts, Petro also blamed Trump for interfering in the elections by publicly endorsing a candidate and thus swaying voters.

Trump endorsed de la Espriella on his Truth Social platform weeks before the run-off.

Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio also congratulated de la Espriella on his preliminary win, and Trump took credit for the far-right candidate’s victory.

“He was in 10th place. I endorsed him, and he won the election. He called me last night and thanked me for the endorsement,” Trump told reporters at the White House on Monday.

Rubio wrote on X: “The Trump administration looks forward to working closely with your incoming administration to advance regional security cooperation, end illegal immigration to the United States, and strengthen our economic ties.”

Petro has invited Trump to make a statement on the electoral fraud allegations.

“I formally invite President Donald Trump to speak,” Petro wrote, adding that the US president bears responsibility for “having supported a candidate and not the freedom of the Colombian people”.

What is the US-Colombian relationship like?

Although both countries have close trade ties, diplomatic relations have often been strained over drug trafficking policies and relations with Israel, among other issues.

But relations essentially collapsed under the Trump and Petro administrations.

Petro in January last year refused to allow US migrant deportation planes to land in his country and said on X that the US “cannot treat Colombian migrants like criminals”.

In October, the US sanctioned Petro, his family and key officials in his government based on unproven allegations of involvement in the drug trade.

In January this year, the US military abducted leftist Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from his Caracas home after the Trump administration accused him of “narcoterrorism”.

June 20 (UPI) — Begona Gomez, the wife of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, had her passport revoked on Saturday because a judge said she is a flight risk ahead of her trial on corruption charges.

Gomez is alleged to have exploited her position in Spain’s government to obtain a position at the Complutense University of Madrid and used public money for her own private interests, Politico, El Pais and The New York Times reported.

In barring Gomez from leaving the country, Judge Juan Carlos Peinado also is requiring her to appear in court every 15 days until her trial, a date for which has not been set.

The first lady has been under investigation since 2024, and is one of several of Sanchez’s allies and relatives that have been accused of corruption, as well — including his predecessor Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero.

In addition to Gomez, Peinado ruled to allow her assistant, Cristina Alvarez, and a businessman who allegedly benefited Gomez’s actions, Juan Carlos Barrabes Consul, to also stand trial.

Allies of both Gomez and Sanchez calling the ruling unprecedented, as well as “delusional, obsessive and shameful.”

“She is innocent,” the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, which Gomez runs and her husband is member of, said in a statement on X.

“She has been judicially and politically persecuted for two years,” PSOE said in the statement. “What happened today is just another step, a democratic scandal that doesn’t hold up. They won’t stop.”

The investigations into Gomez over the last two years are based on complaints alleging that she aimed to benefit from public contracts for companies she has ties to.

“Behaviors such as these emanating from presidential palaces seem more characteristic of absolutist regimes, thankfully long forgotten in our country,” Peinado said in Saturday’s ruling.

Begona Gomez is accused of using her position as the prime minister’s wife ⁠to secure work contracts.

The wife of Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has been barred from travelling abroad as she prepares to face trial on corruption charges.

Investigating judge Juan Carlos Peinado issued the ruling on Saturday, ordering Sanchez’s wife, Begona Gomez, to hand in her passport and appear in front of court twice per month until a verdict is issued. She is charged with embezzlement, influence peddling, corruption in business dealings and misappropriation of funds.

Gomez has consistently denied any wrongdoing in the case, which stems from a complaint filed by an anticorruption group with far-right ties. It focuses on the creation and management of a chair at Madrid’s Complutense University that was co-directed by Gomez, as well as the alleged use of public resources and personal connections to advance private interests.

Sanchez has dismissed the allegations against his wife as an attempt by the right wing to undermine his government. Sanchez’s Socialist Party has said Gomez is innocent and subject to a years-long campaign of political persecution

No date has yet been set for the politically explosive trial.

The case is one of several corruption investigations involving Sanchez’s allies that are approaching trial or already before the courts, increasing pressure on the prime minister.

Several close allies, including the Socialist Party’s number three ⁠and Sanchez’s former transport minister, are under investigation in cases involving alleged ⁠kickbacks linked to public works, oil ⁠and gas contracts, and the procurement of masks during the pandemic. They deny wrongdoing.

Separately, Spain’s High Court said it was investigating former ‌Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero over allegations he led a network that profited from lobbying public authorities ‌on ‌behalf of third parties, including airline Plus Ultra. He denies the claims.

Sanchez, who has not been named in any of the cases, has rejected opposition calls to step down and call early elections.

Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves on earth. It has lithium. It has agriculture, a coastline three hours away from Miami, and—for the first time in a generation a political window. The reconstruction investment case is real. So is the obstacle for every actor, across every ideology, that wants Venezuelan assets to perform.

The obstacle is not the oil price. It is not the OFAC sanctions framework, which has been substantially liberalized since January 2026. It is not even the absence of functioning institutions, though that is the proximate problem every investor will encounter. The obstacle has a nucleus with name, a title, and an active intelligence apparatus. And his continued presence in power is not merely a moral affront. 

This is not a story about mismanagement. Mismanagement leaves a paper trail.

What happened across Venezuela’s infrastructure ministries between 2002 and 2012 lest almost none, deliberately. Over $150 billion in documented railway, housing, and infrastructure contracts were disbursed across that decade. The projects largely do not exist. The documentation largely does not exist. The Tinaco-Anaco railway, a $7.5 billion contract signed with China Railway Engineering Corporation, produced looted campsites and empty concrete columns. The National Railway Plan, budgeted at $150 billion, produced less than one percent of its projected track. 

One of the ministers who oversaw that disbursement period of the infrastructure that is so dire, and who preserved an influence only surpassed by Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, today is the Interior Minister of Venezuela. He controls the national intelligence apparatus, the police, and the armed colectivos. He is Diosdado Cabello, your competing General Partner that has acted without impunity. He carries a live indictment from a New York court on narco-trafficking charges. He is sanctioned by the US Treasury. He hosts a television program that airs every Wednesday evening.

By 2011, the beneficial ownership architecture built by Venezuela’s ruling network spanned more than forty trustees across multiple jurisdictions: a parallel private equity structure embedded inside a sovereign state.

The distinction that every institutional investor must internalize is this: a mismanaged State is recoverable. A State whose productive apparatus was deliberately extracted (not ruined by incompetence but hollowed out because extraction was more profitable than production) presents a categorically different investment problem. The destruction was not the side effect of the governance model. It was the point of it. Cabello remains an icon of that governance model.

The counterparty problem

Conventional private equity rests on a foundational assumption: your counterparty has an interest in the underlying asset performing. Returns depend on it. Exit depends on it. The entire structure of an LP agreement, a term sheet, a co-investment right, all of it assumes a counterparty whose incentive is aligned with asset value.

In Venezuela, the sophisticated actor on the other side of the table for two decades was running a competing structure. One with no limited partners, no fiduciary duty, no quarterly reporting, and a sovereign intelligence apparatus for compliance. That structure had a single mandate: maximum extraction, minimum documentation, zero accountability. It executed that mandate with precision.

By 2011, the beneficial ownership architecture built by Venezuela’s ruling network spanned more than forty trustees across multiple jurisdictions. This is not a warlord’s operation. This is a parallel private equity structure embedded inside a sovereign state.

That sophistication is precisely what makes the residual presence of these networks so consequential for reconstruction capital. They did not disappear with the January 2026 transition. They repositioned. The structures that governed Venezuela’s extraction apparatus are experts at corporate layering: shell companies, nominee directors, off-channel financial instruments designed to distance beneficial owners from the assets they control.

This is the counterparty environment that reconstruction capital is walking into. Not a post-conflict landscape with residual corruption. An active, sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional extraction network that has spent 25 years perfecting its operational security

These are not improvised operations, they are multi-jurisdictional corporate architectures spanning Switzerland, Brazil, Spain, the Caribbean, and more recently Turkey and the Middle East. Each node chosen for its specific regulatory gap or enforcement lag. The $5.2 billion in gold shipped to Switzerland between 2013 and 2016, the Alex Saab procurement network running through Turkey and Cape Verde, the Zapatero indictment revealing consulting structures designed to siphon money from China, Venezuela, and Spain simultaneously these are documented examples of the same operational capability.

These networks retain the best advisors money can pay. Former heads of state, international law firms, financial intermediaries operating across jurisdictions. The Zapatero case is not the exception, it is the template. And they operate with the enforcement discipline of a cartel: strategic asset moves backed by the implicit and sometimes explicit willingness to use coercion when commercial pressure is insufficient. The SDNY indictments against senior regime figures on narco-trafficking charges are not separate from the financial architecture. They are evidence that the same command structure manages both.

This is the counterparty environment that reconstruction capital is walking into. Not a post-conflict landscape with residual corruption. An active, sophisticated, multi-jurisdictional extraction network that has spent 25 years perfecting its operational security, asset acquisitions by “patriotic”expropriations to serve their drug-logistic hubs and is now repositioning for the reconstruction window. 

Why China doesn’t actually want this

China’s position in Venezuela is widely misread as unconditional support. The reality is more commercially specific. China has over $60 billion in loan-for-oil exposure through CNPC and the China Development Bank. Those loans require one thing: barrels flowing. Barrels require functional production infrastructure. Functional production infrastructure requires institutional stability, contract enforcement, and (critically) a counterparty with an interest in assets performing.

Beijing understands this better than any outside observer because its own institutions have investigated the damage. Xi Jinping’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection placed a CITIC Group vice president under investigation for serious disciplinary violations, the same CITIC that embedded confidentiality clauses in Venezuelan housing contracts barring the Venezuelan government from accessing financial information about its own projects. An Andorran court documented $100 million in bribes paid by CAMC Engineering to Venezuelan officials. China did not need backchannel meetings to understand the corruption. Its own companies were defendants in it.

China also enforces its own code of conduct internally. The CCP’s anti-corruption apparatus, operating through the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, has a long reach, including over state enterprise executives who participated in overseas schemes that damaged China’s institutional reputation. Chinese firms implicated in Venezuelan bribery networks in Andorra for payments to PDVSA lobbyists related to Venezuela’s electricity system did not operate without consequence within their own system. Beijing does not publicize these accountability mechanisms, but they exist. The party does not tolerate reputational exposure that undermines its economic diplomacy, regardless of the geography.

Every dollar that disappears into the extraction apparatus is a dollar that does not produce the barrel that services the Chinese loans.

The Trump-Xi summit concluded in Beijing on May 15, 2026, the same day Lamargas exploded on Lake Maracaibo, a facility operated by China Concord Resources Corp under a PDVSA joint venture contract. At the moment, the US and Chinese governments are navigating toward economic stabilization and a framework for managed competition, building on their South Korea thaw. That G2 stabilization has direct implications for Venezuela: a China that is repositioning toward US capital markets, Boeing purchases, and agricultural commitments is a China with diminishing strategic incentive to backstop a Venezuelan network that embarrasses it commercially.

The Chevron model—US-anchored, internationally governed, with Chinese off-take embedded through structured contracts—is precisely the kind of framework that serves Beijing’s debt recovery needs without requiring it to defend the indefensible.

A ministry based in a kleptocracy whose financial architecture is premised on assets not performing for the state is structurally incompatible with Chinese debt recovery. Beijing is not sentimental about this. It is calculating.

China’s $50-60 billion in loan-for-oil exposure to Venezuela requires one thing above all else: barrels flowing. Barrels require functional production infrastructure. Functional production infrastructure requires institutional stability, contract enforcement, and a counterparty whose economic interest is aligned with assets performing. When the ministry overseeing oil production is the same apparatus that systematically extracted value from every sector it touched, railways that produced concrete columns and nothing else, housing programs with $76 billion in unaccounted deficits, power plants that were paid for and never built, you can see that the problem for Beijing is not political. Every dollar that disappears into the extraction apparatus is a dollar that does not produce the barrel that services the loans.

China tried to correct this internally before abandoning the effort. In 2018, Margaret Myers at the Inter-American Dialogue pointed out that Beijing “tried over the past couple of years to guide decision-making in Caracas by providing advice or by tying loans to production capacity projects in the oil sector, in order to try to help Venezuela right itself economically. That has not proven successful.”

By 2016, China stopped issuing new loans entirely. That is not a diplomatic signal. That is a credit committee decision. The same kind of decision any institutional lender makes when the counterparty’s governance structure has made repayment structurally unlikely.

The Brazilian vector

Brazil’s relationship to Venezuela’s reconstruction is complicated by a paper trail that runs through the largest corruption scandal in Latin American history. Odebrecht paid the highest figure of any country outside Brazil itself. Venezuela’s own former prosecutor general, Luisa Ortega Díaz, formally linked those payments to senior Socialist Party figures including Diosdado Cabello after being removed from office and forced to flee the country. The investigation was halted by Venezuela’s highest court. The Swiss banking system was asked to provide a list of Venezuelan recipients. Neither process was allowed to reach its conclusion.

In Brazil, the Odebrecht network reached the highest levels of political life. Federal prosecutors investigated Lula for allegedly lobbying foreign governments on Odebrecht’s behalf after leaving the presidency, and for his role in directing state development bank BNDES financing toward Odebrecht projects abroad. The contracts that linked Odebrecht to Venezuela were not arm’s-length commercial transactions. They were, by Odebrecht’s own admission in its US Department of Justice plea agreement, instruments of a coordinated bribery architecture that spanned twelve countries and operated through a dedicated internal division (the Division of Structured Operations) whose sole purpose was managing political payments.

What does not yet exist is the decision—by US institutional capital—to arrive with a governance structure that the extraction network cannot penetrate.

Brazil has significant commercial interests in Venezuela’s reconstruction, across energy, agriculture, and infrastructure. Those interests are legitimate and Brazilian private capital is a natural reconstruction partner. The complication is not Brazil. It is the specific political-commercial network that governed Brazil’s prior engagement with Venezuela. Odebrecht did not select its Venezuelan counterparties through competitive markets. Contracts were directed through political relationships — between heads of state, with BNDES as the financing instrument, and with the Odebrecht Division of Structured Operations managing the payments in between.

Political networks have institutional memory. The preferred partners that flow through certain diplomatic channels into Venezuela’s reconstruction window carry relationships forged in that prior architecture. A governance framework serious about reconstruction cannot simply exclude Odebrecht, the legal entity. It must screen for the network that Odebrecht served. That screening is structural, not political. It is the difference between Brazilian capital that competes on merit and Brazilian capital that arrives pre-selected by the same diplomatic infrastructure that enabled the extraction.

The structure that worked and the decision that remains

One Venezuelan asset survived twenty-six years of chavismo with its value intact. One. CITGO Petroleum, incorporated in Delaware, governed under US fiduciary law, with its governance architecture anchored entirely outside Venezuelan legal jurisdiction. It survived not because of political protection but because of structural protection. US law held when every Venezuelan institution around it failed. That is not a coincidence. It is the blueprint.

Venezuela sits very close to Miami. Capital will flow in. The question is whether it arrives with a governance structure equal to the threat, or whether it arrives the way it always has in captured states: trusting counterparties who already demonstrated, at extraordinary scale, that trust was the wrong instrument.

The SDNY indicted the man who sits in the Interior Ministry. The US Treasury sanctioned him. He is still in the building. Turkish construction conglomerates, Asian commodity traders, and European energy juniors are already positioning—without FCPA compliance costs, without fiduciary obligations, without LP reporting requirements. They will move faster. They will price lower. This is what happened in Iraq after 2003. It is what happened in Libya.

The architecture to do this differently exists. Human capital exists in the diaspora: eight million Venezuelans left and within them there are over a million that hold verifiable credentials embedded in US and European institutions, carrying the technical and legal knowledge to rebuild what was taken. The OFAC licensing framework exists. The proof of concept exists in CITGO’s survival. What does not yet exist is the decision—by US institutional capital—to arrive with a governance structure that the extraction network cannot penetrate. That decision is the only thing standing between reconstruction and a second extraction with better letterhead.

Venezuela is far from being the only country in the Americas where State institutions have been used to crack down on independent media and protect the interests of ruling elites. In Guatemala, the case of journalist José Rubén Zamora became one of the clearest examples of how prosecutors, courts and political power can converge to silence investigative journalism.

In early April 2025, I interviewed Ramón Zamora, son of Guatemalan journalist and elPeriódico founder José Rubén Zamora. His arrest following years of investigations into alleged government corruption led to the newspaper’s closure and the persecution of people close to him. During our conversation, Ramón Zamora described how Guatemala has developed a tacit network of complicity between State institutions and political authorities, a system that raises broader questions about this new form of power in Latin America and may also help explain how the chavista State in Venezuela operates.

After elPeriódico published two investigations on May 2 and May 3, 2021 into apparent cases of corruption in the government of former President Alejandro Giammattei, the media outlet was subjected to legal persecution that culminated in the arrest of Rubén Zamora, who had dedicated his work to investigating corruption in the Central American country. 

The persecution began with an investigation into alleged bribery by the newspaper to obtain information related to the publications. The judge who heard the case dismissed it. Later, in 2022, an investigation into money laundering related to the sale of works of art owned by Zamora to cover elPeriódico‘s costs was reopened, leading to his arrest.

The imprisonment of Zamora caught the attention of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. In their 2022 and 2023 annual reports, the IACHR requested information from Guatemala regarding the country’s human rights situation and recalled that Zamora has benefited from precautionary measures since 2003 due to risks linked to his journalistic work. Guatemala rejected parts of the assessment as lacking objectivity. Amnesty International described Zamora as a prisoner of conscience and condemned his detention. Zamora was granted house arrest for the second time on February 12, 2026.

Reducing chavismo to a simple narco-structure simplifies the scope that the organization can have, since apparent drug trafficking would not be the essence of the system but rather an activity within it.

During the arrest and initial detention of journalist José Rubén Zamora in 2022, Guatemala was governed by Alejandro Giammattei, a conservative president whose administration faced strong criticism from international organizations over corruption, institutional deterioration, and pressure against journalists and anti-corruption actors. Since January 14, 2024, Guatemala has been governed by Bernardo Arévalo, a progressive and anti-corruption reformist whose presidential term is scheduled to end in January 2028.

His son, Ramón Zamora, says that his father’s persecution is the result of an unwritten agreement between various powerful sectors within the State that aim to protect their interests.  “In Guatemala, there is something my father called the “Pact of the Corrupt.” The Pact of the Corrupts is a tacit agreement that forms a network of corruption spread across political parties and institutions, where those who reach positions of power must govern according to the pact.”

This explanation describes the composition of a de facto cross-cutting network, which has political parties, institutions, and security forces under its control, punishing dissent as a means of survival, subjecting its detractors to exile, imprisonment, and discredit.

“The judge presiding over the case ordered an investigation into my father’s defense attorneys and witnesses, causing his lawyer to go into exile just five days after his arrest. Currently, six of the twelve lawyers who have defended my father have been detained,” says Ramón, who is also outside Guatemala with his mother after the court issued an arrest warrant against both of them. 

“They also persecuted my family. My mother and I were outside Guatemala visiting the United States when the judge handling my father’s case issued an arrest warrant against us, so we decided not to return.”

But how can the Pact explain the nature of the chavista State?

Corruption as political capital

Chavismo is not exclusively a militarized organization or simply a drug trafficking operation. As in Guatemala with the Pact of the Corrupts, the institutions of the chavista State are co-opted and work in the tacit interest of their members, where one of the main means of maintaining the pact is loyalty based on impunity, while corruption operates as political capital.

Consequently, the exercise of power is not oriented toward citizens or the satisfaction of public demands, but rather toward preserving the internal balance of the Pact itself. Governing involves administering concessions, distributing power quotas, and avoiding any decision that could alter the network of interests that sustains the regime. Reforms, when they exist, do not constitute a project of institutional transformation but are carefully calibrated to avoid destabilizing the architecture of loyalties on which the system rests.

This model of governance, the pacted State, is complemented by a logic of repression, combining massive and indiscriminate terror against actors whose actions threaten the balance of the pact. Similar dynamics can be observed in regimes such as Russia, Belarus, Nicaragua, and several Central Asian States. Journalists, judges, political leaders, and internal and external dissidents are the main targets of a system of coercion designed not to mobilize the masses, but to send clear and disciplining signals to those who break the pact. The selectivity of repression does not mitigate its severity. On the contrary, it makes it more efficient and functional in sustaining the apparatus of power.

Reducing chavismo to a simple narco-structure simplifies the scope that the organization can have, since apparent drug trafficking would not be the essence of the system but rather an activity within it. The Venezuelan State has become a web of systematic corruption that makes crime a functional activity of power.

The stability of the system is due to a network of mostly informal agreements between civilian, military, and economic actors who share a common interest: preserving an order in which rupture is more costly than continuity.

In this context, ideology ceases to serve as the system’s organizing principle and takes on a strictly instrumental role. It is not the compass that guides the action of power, but rather an adaptable rhetorical resource used to justify decisions already made to sustain the pact. Chavismo does not act primarily to carry out an ideological project, but rather to preserve a balance of interests between civilian, military, and criminal elites, in which ideas can mutate without the system suffering. Ideology, thus, does not guide the organization: it accompanies it, decorates it, or excuses it, but does not determine it.

The thesis of a pacted State suggests that authoritarian stability rests not only on repression or ideology, but on a shared understanding among political, military, and economic elites that preserving the existing order is preferable to risking rupture. Such systems can appear remarkably resilient precisely because their survival depends less on ideological coherence than on the mutual guarantees exchanged within the ruling coalition.

The notion of a pacted State helps explain why chavismo has shown a capacity for survival that goes beyond personalistic or circumstantial explanations. The stability of the system is due to a network of mostly informal agreements between civilian, military, and economic actors who share a common interest: preserving an order in which rupture is more costly than continuity. As long as that calculation remains valid, the system does not collapse; it adapts, reconfigures itself, and absorbs pressures without altering its fundamental logic. Yet the resilience of pacted States is not immutable.

Such systems begin to weaken when influential actors within the ruling coalition conclude that the regime can no longer guarantee protection, resources, or political survival. Economic decline, succession disputes, international pressure, social unrest, or weakening coercive institutions can alter the cost-benefit calculations sustaining the pact. Similar dynamics were visible in Eastern Europe after November 1989, when regimes in the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria rapidly collapsed once the elite coalitions sustaining them began to fracture internally, a process that would also unfold in Albania.

History suggests that pacted States often project an image of permanence precisely until the internal understandings sustaining them begin, almost imperceptibly, to dissolve.

Voters in Colombia will head to the polls on May 31 for a presidential election. Some of the main concerns for Colombians are healthcare, corruption, and security. Al Jazeera’s Teresa Bo reports from Bogota. 

It’s always spectacular to see a big shot getting caught. Especially when he’s made a long career at the top of an European democracy under a mask of respectability. And, oh so suddenly, it turns out he’s made a fortune dealing with a Latin American dictatorship.

The sequence was— as people love to say today—worth of a Netflix series. 

Hours before getting on another flight to Caracas, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero decided to stay in Madrid once he knew he had just become the first former prime minister in the history of Spain’s 50-year-old democracy to be indicted for a crime. For those who turn on the phone in the morning across the Atlantic, when it is noon in Spain, the news of the indictment came as one bundle with the footage of Zapatero’s office being raided by an anti-corruption investigative unit of Spain’s National Police Corps, known as UDEF.

Zapatero was indicted by Audiencia National (an equivalent of the Supreme Court) for selling his influence to get a financial relief kit for an airline, Plus Ultra, the smallest of four Spanish carriers that received assistance from Madrid as a result of the demand-side shock during the pandemic. This company, with a fleet of seven aircrafts, was also the youngest of the lot, and had the particular feature of having inaugurated routes to Caracas in the annus horribilis of 2017, a time when international operators were withdrawing from the country en masse. As Armando.Info investigative reporter Roberto Deniz would reveal in December 2018, Plus Ultra’s majority stakeholders were from Venezuela.

Eight years later, Zapatero is being prosecuted over allegations of political influence peddling related to the €53 million bailout of Plus Ultra. He also faces charges of criminal conspiracy, document forgery and money laundering. The judge handling the case describes Zapatero as the head of “a stable and hierarchical influence‑peddling structure” meant to “obtain financial benefits as an intermediary, exerting influence over public bodies on behalf of third parties, mainly Plus Ultra.” At least six other individuals are under investigation, including Plus Ultra’s chairman, its CEO, and Alicante-based businessman Julio Martínez Martínez.

The UDEF report says Zapatero and Martínez were at the center of a structure of businesses and consulting firms meant to syphon money coming from China, Venezuela and Spain into his personal accounts.

This latter will be a key character in this story: Martínez Martínez is not only being accused of acting as Zapatero’s frontman in a number of entities that received payments linked to the Plus Ultra (et al) scheme. His own personal records, such as notebook annotations UDEF just made public, suggest he was fully aware of Zapatero’s business and political dealings with the Maduro regime. That evidence seems to point at both opaque trade deals (over Venezuelan light crude, gold, fuel, asphalt, which were the subject of US sanctions until recently) Martínez and Zapatero may have promoted, and knowledge about a number of high-profile political prisoners released this year. The son-in-law of Edmundo González, security expert Rocío San Miguel and opposition moderate Enrique Márquez (who has publicly praised Zapatero) appear mentioned. Martínez´s notes also provide previously undisclosed details about the contents of a constitutional reform Maduro toyed with, but never brought about after stealing the presidential vote in 2024.

All of this adds to the investigations about shady business in the pandemic that involved Spanish businessman Víctor de Aldama, former Transport Minister and PSOE Organization Secretary José Luis Ábalos, and his close advisor Koldo García. The trio famously met Delcy Rodríguez in the tarmac of the Madrid international airport, for a purported conversation over the sale of Venezuelan gold lingots, despite her being the subject of EU sanctions and therefore unable to step on European soil. These three Spaniards (with Ábalos and Koldo being amongst the closest collaborators of Pedro Sánchez in his primary campaign and early government) are the main actors in a series of corruption scandals that have been getting closer to the Spanish head of government, a darling of the International Left whose reputation has been boosted by a knack for antagonizing Donald Trump. But the former aides of Perro Sanxe have been arrested without bail and indicted (and will soon face a sentencing hearing). His brother is facing trial. His wife has also been indicted and is on the verge of facing trial. And now it looks like his political mentor will also face a lengthy process before Spanish justice.

Just after the Zapatero news broke in Spain, predictable reactions began to come across the political spectrum: bloodthirst at the Right, accusations of conspiracy at the Left. Then, the judge made public the 88-page file, fed with a probe that began in 2024, and the ambiance turned in a second. Many allies of the graft-plagued socialist government admitted that the accusations are solid, the evidence overwhelming, and the outlook quite bleak for Zapatero. The conspiracy theory that this was lawfare against the Sánchez government faded away. Spain’s paper of record, El País, traditionally aligned with Zapatero’s party PSOE, wrote a stern op-ed saying that the Sánchez government was forced to investigate this properly to prevent the “enemies of democracy” in the Far Right from charging against the democratic system. “Full cooperation with the judiciary, full respect for the presumption of innocence, and all my support for President Zapatero,” Sánchez said today. 

As you may have noticed, authorities have released more evidence this week. Spanish media ranging from the State-owned, left-leaning broadcaster RTVE to the investigative El Confidencial are carving out a map of the Zapatero network of sociedades mercantiles. While not all of these companies are under investigation, together they received an estimated €2.6 million between 2020 and 2025 from Chinese capital and entities under investigation.

The investigation will likely reveal more details about the dealings between the chavista regime, Zapatero and other politicians and businesspeople close to the Sanchista government.

The UDEF report says Zapatero and Martínez were at the center of a structure of businesses and consulting firms (under not-at-all pretentious names like Inteligencia Prospectiva and Análisis Relevante) meant to syphon money coming from China, Venezuela and Spain into his personal accounts. Money that looks, in many cases, like kickbacks. For instance, Whathefav, a social media agency owned by his two daughters, got a payment of half a million euros for creating a website and a promotional video for Inteligencia Prospectiva SL, which is owned by Guillemo and Domingo Amaro Chacón. These two are Spanish-Venezuelan citizens who happen to be the sons of a businessman involved in a case of insurance fraud with PDVSA. Inteligencia Prospectiva reported losses, but was paying juicy bills to other businesses of the same network, like Whathefav.

UDEF  also cites evidence of conversations between Domingo Amaro Chacón and Julio Martínez Martínez, from 2021 to 2024, discussing a deal with Minerven (coded as “comercialización de amarillo”), nickel reserves in Venezuela, a major tourism development project on La Tortuga Island, and what seems like efforts to promote the opening of the UAE embassy in Caracas (coded as “the desert guys”). All of this may have something to do with UDEF’s suggestion (reviewed here by The Objective) alleging that the Plus Ultra case might be linked to a money-laundering operation involving proceeds from the Venezuelan CLAP food-box scheme, as well as the shipment of 5-8 tons of gold from Caracas to Dubai.

Yes, it’s a lot. And we’re not even getting into other grim details, like reports that Whathefav received a €100,000 payment from the company behind VenApp, which you’ll remember as the mobile app Maduro promoted in the past two years to encourage chavistas to snitch on dissidents.

“I told you so…”

Until that day, Zapatero was able to sell to the Spanish people that he had been in Venezuela not just as a negotiator helping take people out of jail, but as a peacemaker trying to prevent the country from falling into a civil war. Apparently through his good heart and blue eyes.

Suddenly, Spain has discovered that a former president, adored among socialists for his term’s achievements like the disbandment of terrorist group ETA, who left Moncloa Palace with no scandals on his shoulders, and who kept enough prestige to back the rise of Sánchez, is an international operator that used his connections and knowledge to make at least 2.6 million euros in ways that spill way beyond the disputable boundaries of legal lobbying.

Once again, Venezuelans raised their eyes to the sky and whispered with resignation. That “yes, moron, we have known this for years” feeling we are so familiar with. 

This case should remind the EU that post-Maduro Venezuela still harbors kleptocratic networks embedded well within European jurisdictions.

For Venezuelan media, and we dare to say a great deal of the public, Zapatero has been known for years as a loyal operator of the chavista regime who works at the expense of the people to help Maduro, and now the Rodríguez siblings, to preserve power. In doing so, he has kept the boardgame tilted against the opposition. The statesmanship that many Spaniards attribute to Zapatero has served only to defend Maduro’s interests during several negotiation rounds with international presence, and to corner the opposition into disadvantageous arrangements by presenting himself as an arbiter when, in fact, he’s no more than an able messenger of Miraflores. Former political prisoners like Lorent Saleh have recalled how Zapatero pressured their families to keep quiet about torture and abuse endured in prison. All that work, of course, has been handsomely rewarded.

We saw his shadow in the humiliation of president-elect Edmundo González Urrutia, in the Spanish ambassador’s house in Caracas, during his last hours in Venezuela in August 2024. Edmundo was pressured by Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez to sign a self-incriminating letter as a condition for being allowed to leave for Spain. After that, the Rodríguez siblings and Zapatero have actively endorsed each other: one of the Spaniard’s last visits to Caracas saw him declaring next to Jorge and other National Assembly lawmakers as a key international sponsor of the 2026 amnesty law, which Delcy recently discontinued. One of those lawmakers, fake opposition politician Timoteo Zambrano, is another close friend and ally of Zapatero. The latter’s influence looks so significant that Delcy just appointed Zambrano as the Venezuelan ambassador in Madrid.

Bad for Delcy, good for María Corina

The investigation will likely reveal more details about the dealings between the chavista regime, Zapatero and other politicians and businesspeople close to the Sanchista government. It will all depend on what prosecutors can find and prove, but it’s fair to say that a wave of scandals and a thickening of corruption dossiers of this kind could make any democratic government in the world collapse (though with Sánchez, in the end, we’re talking about a man Spanish voters know for surviving all kinds of reputational crises). 

The Spanish government was among the first to recognize Delcy Rodríguez as head of state. As early as January, its top diplomat said he would request that the EU lifts sanctions on Delcy. Just a few weeks ago, the same official confirmed that Caracas would resume talks with the IMF. The Spanish Foreign Ministry used to be run by Josep Borrell, a socialist from the non-Zapaterista faction (the more moderate, Felipista wing) of the ruling PSOE, who has become a vocal critic of both the Maduro dictatorship and Zapatero. But Madrid’s latest efforts to normalize relations with Delcy haven’t gone unnoticed, perhaps encouraged by the Trump administration, and also by Maria Corina Machado’s close ties with the Spanish Right.

With such accusations against a key enabler of this bilateral relationship, the image of normalcy (and common sense) both Sánchez and Delcy are trying to project should take a hit. This case should remind the EU that post-Maduro Venezuela still harbors kleptocratic networks embedded well within European jurisdictions.

We should note this is not a problem where Delcy can turn to the Trump administration for help. Not only because Trump despises Sánchez, but because Homeland Security reportedly gave leads to Spain’s National Police in the Plus Ultra case, in cooperation through the American embassy in Madrid.

A big winner in this case is María Corina Machado, who recently held a massive rally in Madrid’s main square that few Spanish politicians could have matched. Machado was lambasted by Foreign Minister José Luis Albares for refusing to meet Sánchez or other leftwing leaders during her Madrid visit. Throughout her trip, when asked by journalists about this decision, Machado did not name Sánchez but thanked the Spanish government for receiving Venezuelan migrants over the years, while also stressing her utmost respect for Spanish institutions. It is false that Machado only met with the right-wing opposition: she appeared publicly with former PM Felipe González, a historic figure of Spanish social democracy and a key leader of the country’s famous Transition.

Machado may now be feeling some relief about how the whole Spanish saga is unfolding (both Zapatero and Machado have acknowledged they have never spoken to each other).

In another era, she might have summed it up with one of her classic phrases: se los dije.

Murrell admitted the offences at the High Court in Edinburgh after an investigation into the party’s finances.

The former chief executive of the ruling Scottish National Party (SNP), and ex-husband of former First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, has pleaded guilty to embezzling more than 400,000 British pounds ($540,000) from the party’s funds.

Sixty-one-year-old Peter Murrell admitted the offences at the High Court in Edinburgh on Monday, following a years-long investigation into the SNP’s finances and the alleged diversion of donations intended to support the Scottish independence campaign.

Murrell, who was the SNP’s chief executive from 2001 to 2023, was remanded in custody by the judge before a sentencing hearing scheduled for June 23.

Judge James Young said Murrell was responsible for a “gross breach of trust” for embezzling offences between August 2010 and October 2022.

Murrell’s arrest came after a lengthy investigation into the diversion of 600,000 British pounds ($810,400) in SNP donations intended to support the party’s campaign for Scottish independence.

Although part of the United Kingdom, Scotland has a devolved government with powers over areas such as health and education. But the country has so far rejected calls for full independence.

Sturgeon, the former head of Scotland’s administration, quit as SNP leader and first minister in February 2023.

Murrell was arrested in April that year after officers searched the home he shared with Sturgeon near Glasgow, as part of an investigation into the SNP’s finances.

Sturgeon was herself arrested in June 2023 and questioned for seven hours before being released without charge.

Current First Minister John Swinney, who was re-elected to his post following the SNP’s victory in local elections in May, said he felt “betrayed” by Murrell’s actions.

“By embezzling from the SNP, Peter Murrell was stealing the hopes, the dreams and the aspirations of thousands of people all over Scotland,” said Swinney.

‘I am betrayed’

Sturgeon, who was cleared in the probe last year, announced in January 2025 that she and Murrell had separated.

In an Instagram post, she said she was “utterly appalled” by her former partner’s admission and that she had “no knowledge or suspicion whatsoever”.

“To be deceived and let down by a husband I loved and trusted has caused me acute pain,” she added.

Sturgeon stepped down as a lawmaker earlier this year, ending a nearly 30-year career as one of the independence movement’s main figureheads.

Former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero is under investigation in Spain over alleged influence peddling and related crimes in the long-running Plus Ultra airline case.

The High Court said on Tuesday that Zapatero’s office in Madrid was searched along with three other premises, adding that the former premier had been summoned to testify on June 2.

The investigation is tied to the 2021 state rescue of Plus Ultra, which received 53 million euros ($62m) through the state holding company SEPI during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The case escalated in late December after several arrests, including businessman Julio Martinez Martinez, known as Julito, who is considered key to understanding the links between Plus Ultra and Zapatero.

Zapatero is alleged to have been the driving force behind the airline’s bailout and is accused of having pressed the Ministry of Transport, then led by Jose Luis Abalos, to approve the rescue.

Suspicion also centres on Analisis Relevante, Julito’s company, which allegedly received the same amount Plus Ultra later paid to Zapatero. Víctor de Aldama, a Spanish businessman involved in other corruption probes, has alleged Zapatero received 10 million euros ($12m) in commissions.

The bailout remained politically controversial because critics questioned both Plus Ultra’s financial viability and the company’s ownership links to Venezuelan businessmen seen as close to the government of then-President Nicolas Maduro, raising concerns about transparency and possible political influence.

The court is examining whether the aid was properly approved and whether any improper lobbying or influence was involved.

Speaking to the newspaper El Pais, the president of the Andalusian regional government, Juanma Moreno, said: “There has never been a serious investigation process, much less an indictment of a former president. This is something unprecedented and will shake up the government.”

The conservative opposition People’s Party has used the case to sharpen its attacks on Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez of the Socialist Workers’ Party, to which Zapatero also belongs. Sanchez’s administration is already facing separate corruption probes involving figures close to the prime minister as well as investigations touching his wife and brother.

Zapatero, who governed Spain from 2004 to 2011, has long been a key ally of Sanchez and has also drawn criticism from the opposition over business and political ties with Venezuela after leaving office. He has denied wrongdoing before a parliamentary committee.

South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa has refused to resign over a “cash-in-sofa scandal” that continues to haunt his presidency.

Ramaphosa, who addressed the nation on Monday to declare his intention to remain in his post, is set to face a multi-party impeachment committee, which will investigate allegations that he covered up a 2020 break-in at his private ranch and the theft of more than $500,000, concealing the incident from police and tax authorities.

The committee’s findings could spell his impeachment; however, parliament has not provided a timeframe for the investigation, which has yet to commence.

Analysts say the scandal, which has been dubbed “Farmgate”, has been particularly damaging for a president who rode to power in 2018 on an anticorruption mandate, after the much-criticised presidency of Jacob Zuma. Now, eight years later, the case of the cash found stuffed in a sofa at his game ranch could be what takes Ramaphosa down.

Can the South African president survive? Here is what we know.

What’s the scandal all about?

In February 2020, burglars allegedly broke into Ramaphosa’s luxury private ranch, Phala Phala, in Limpopo province, South Africa, and stole $580,000. The cash was said to have been hidden inside furniture at the farm – hence the “Farmgate” label.

Ramaphosa has been accused of covering up the theft and keeping private efforts to trace the burglars a secret to avoid an investigation into where the money had come from – and why it was hidden in a sofa.

Corruption allegations surfaced when a former head of South Africa’s state security agency walked into a police station in 2022 and accused the president of money laundering in relation to the stolen cash.

Later that year, an independent parliamentary committee found that Ramaphosa “may have committed” serious violations and misconduct. In particular, the panel found he had failed to properly report a theft to police as required under anticorruption laws and “acted in a manner inconsistent with his office”.

At the time, the African National Congress (ANC) had a strong majority in parliament – with 230 seats out of 400. It was therefore able to reject the report and refused to open impeachment proceedings.

But the left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) challenged this at the Constitutional Court in Cape Town, which, last week, overturned the government’s rejection of the 2022 parliamentary report and referred it to a multi-party impeachment committee for a full investigation.

What has Ramaphosa said?

Ramaphosa has always denied allegations of corruption and maintains that the stolen cash came from selling buffalo.

Since the constitutional court’s ruling last week, Ramaphosa has been facing renewed calls for his resignation, mostly from opposition leaders. In a televised address on Monday, the president refused to step down.

“While there have been calls in some circles that I should resign, nothing in the Constitutional Court judgement compels me to resign my office,” he said.

“Since a criminal complaint was laid against me in June 2022, I have consistently maintained that I have not stolen public money, committed any crime, nor violated my oath of office,” Ramaphosa said in his address, adding that he has cooperated in all investigations.

The president rejected the 2022 report from the independent panel again, saying: “The complaints against me are based on hearsay allegations. No evidence, let alone sufficient evidence, has been presented to prove that I committed any violation, let alone a serious violation of the Constitution or law, or serious misconduct as set out in the Constitution.”

If the committee does find enough evidence against him, it could direct him to be impeached.

It is unclear how long this will take, however. Ramaphosa has pledged to seek a judicial review of the report’s contents, which, in turn, could delay the investigation of the impeachment committee.

What is the process for impeachment?

If a president is found to have violated the constitution or the law, or is unable to perform the duties of office, South Africa’s National Assembly has the constitutional authority to remove him or her.

Beyond the parliamentary investigation that will now begin into the Farmgate scandal, and which can trigger a vote on impeachment, as well, any member of parliament may introduce a motion seeking the president’s removal. The speaker of the National Assembly would then refer the motion to an independent panel of legal experts to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to proceed.

If this panel decides there is a case against the president, lawmakers must vote on whether to begin impeachment proceedings. After this, a specially constituted impeachment committee is established to carry out a detailed investigation into the allegations. This is separate from the investigation beginning now and could take several months.

Once that committee recommends the removal of the president, parliament holds a final vote to impeach the president. Under Section 89 of the constitution, a two-thirds majority is required – meaning at least 267 lawmakers must vote in favour of removal in the 400-seat National Assembly.

Are there other ways to remove Ramaphosa?

Yes, the South African president can be removed from his job via a no-confidence vote in parliament.

Any member of the assembly can propose the no-confidence motion, and it only requires a simple majority of more than 50 percent.

Ramaphosa would need support from coalition partners to survive a no-confidence vote, however. This has already been proposed by at least two opposition parties in parliament.

Another way could be if his ANC party turns against him, as it did with the last president, Zuma, who came in for years of corruption allegations and was finally forced to resign in 2018.

How strong is Ramaphosa’s position?

Ramaphosa is not only the president of South Africa, but also the leader of its most popular party, the ANC. Nelson Mandela was the ANC’s first Black president after apartheid ended in 1994.

In 2024, the ANC stunningly lost its majority in parliament for the first time following more than three decades in power. Today, the ANC holds 159 of 400 seats in the national assembly, or about 40 percent of seats – and Ramaphosa is governing in a coalition with the Democratic Alliance, which has 87 seats, along with other smaller parties.

But Chris Ogunmodede, an independent analyst of African politics, security, and international affairs, based in Lagos, Nigeria, said Ramaphosa would likely survive any impeachment attempts, “simply because of the arithmetic”.

“His numbers in the parliament virtually guarantee that impeachment will not happen,” Ogunmodede told Al Jazeera.

“It hasn’t been easy, but there is a government that seems to be functional and is showing some signs of reinvigoration,” Ogunmodede added. “There’s a lot of uncertainty on the part of the other coalition parties that suggests that they would much rather be on the side of caution and go with the devil they know, and preserve the government by keeping Ramaphosa in power.”

Despite this, the cash-in-sofa scandal has been damaging, he said.

And, under Ramaphosa, the ANC’s popularity has continued to slide. The party’s national vote share fell from 57.5 percent in the 2019 election to 40.2 percent in the 2024 election, marking its worst performance since the end of apartheid.

The South African economy has shown some signs of improvement, however, and given the Ramaphosa government “something to show for the time that it’s been in power”, said Ogunmodede.

Yet the South African government still faces long-term structural concerns about the economy, the country’s institutions, corruption, crime and other issues, the analyst added.

On the back of underlying anti-incumbency, Ogunmodede said the top court’s ruling on the cash-in-sofa scandal “has resurrected many concerns that South Africans have had about the president and his party, and the political institutions of the country more broadly”.