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Published On 18 Sep 202618 Sep 2026
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The oil “mega-deal” signed between the US and Venezuela has caused major repercussions on plenty of themes: from the legality and timeframe of the agreement to the economic and political implications and, last but not least, the controversial role of Alejandro Betancourt.
A couple of issues are also missing from recent discussions: the effects of these new deals on Venezuela’s environment and its implications for the global climate crisis.
One exception was the coverage made by the NPR’s “All Things Considered” program, where energy and climate correspondent Julia Simon interviewed Paasha Mahdavi, a political science professor at University of California, Santa Barbara, who has this to say about what the new Orinoco Belt developments by major oil company Chevron could do.
“This expansion is effectively a carbon bomb. And so if Chevron does produce this field, that’s roughly 52 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year additional. That is a huge number.”
On September 2nd, the same day those deals were signed in Miraflores Palace, the United Nations Environmental Program released the report “Limiting Overshoot,” which indicates that the 1.5° threshold to limit global warming established in 2015 by the Paris Climate Accords was already crossed and therefore the world must prepare for the fallout.
But in the last few days, several Venezuelan environmental NGOs and other civil society groups are sounding the alarm about the negative consequences that those agreements could produce here. Mongabay published this map about the areas that are impacted by oil extraction in Venezuela.
Venezuelan NGOs Clima 21 and Provea made public a joint statement in which they say that “the economic recovery cannot be made at the expense of environmental human rights. No economic interest can prevail over the constitutional and international right to a healthy, safe and sustainable environment…”
They proposed five points of commitment for all involved, which include transparency and public information, effective enforcement of environmental obligations, urgent management of oil spills, protection of vulnerable communities and a transition to a sustainable model for the country.
Local NGO Azul Ambientalistas claimed that in recent months there have been visible signs of spills and gas leaks in the Lake Maracaibo area, which increased after the reactivation of activities there earlier this year.
Alejandro Alvarez, director of NGO Clima 21 told Caracas Chronicles about what this overall commitment could entail: “It must take into a medium-to-long term strategic plan of reducing the fiscal dependence of the oil rent through investment in areas not related to the extraction and use of fossil fuels. There are already forecasts that could define alternative economic areas to generate currency without the extraction of petroleum.”
In similar terms, Transparencia Venezuela mentioned the need to adjust any oil investment and development to what’s established in Article 129 of the Constitution, including “environmental and socio-cultural impact studies” and “the obligation to preserve the balance…”
But some went further and openly denounced the US-Nabep deal as the surrender of our national sovereignty and civic rights, as Venezuelan sociologist Emilianio Teran-Mantovani wrote in an article for the Venezuelan Observatory of Political Ecology, an organization that he co-founded.
“The new Oil Agreement is the result of this process of political decomposition that has been unfolding in Venezuela for years; and it is the crowning achievement of the capitulation and dismantling of oil nationalism, which had already begun under Maduro and is now being fully unleashed through U.S. intervention…
“Ultimately, this means that Venezuelans themselves have no place. They hardly matter. Their decisions, expressed, for example, in the July 28, 2024 elections, do not matter. Neither do their social and labor rights. And the environment is even less relevant, an area that has been rendered completely invisible in this conflict.”
“There is no National Policy, National Strategy, nor a National Plan of Adaptation and Mitigation to Climate Change. There’s neither a Climate National Budget nor a National System for an Inventory of Greenhouse Gases…”
Besides these statements, the issue of how this oil deal will affect our surroundings has taken a backseat to other concerns while clouded by a lack of details and overall uncertainty around it, despite the promises of a prosperous recovery made by government officials in Caracas and Washington.
In the meantime, the problem of incidents like oil spills continues to be present to this day, with the most recent one occurring on the coast of Lake Maracaibo near Cabimas, as local NGO Azul Ambientalistas claimed that in recent months there have been visible signs of spills and gas leaks in the lake, which increased after the reactivation of activities in the area earlier this year.
Oil spills have sadly become commonplace over time, but reliable data on the matter is hard to come by, with NGOs like Clima 21 and the Venezuelan Observatory of Political Ecology filling the gap that the State is not providing.
“This possible impact (of the pollution produced by the projects of the oil deals) would add to the systemic chronic environmental crisis of the Venezuelan oil industry, which has a very high accident rate because of the abandonment of safety protocols and protections to the communities and ecosystems in the most affected areas. Our concern is the absence of guarantees in those agreements that these problems will be attended to and solved.”
And then there’s the concern of climate change and its already visible effects around the world. At the moment, the ongoing El Super Niño climate event is exacerbating temperatures, causing historical heatwaves like the recent one in Europe and creating serious worries about food crops and other essential natural resources in many nations, including here in Venezuela.
Evidence of how climate change has directly affected Venezuela can be found in the second academic report on climate change (DRACC), which was formally presented last December by the Venezuelan Academy of Physics, Mathematics and Natural Sciences. In its findings is the acknowledgment that the average temperature in the country has risen 0,22 °C per decade between 1980 and 2015, while global warming is responsible for anomalies in rainfall.
But the most damning conclusion is the complete disregard coming from the Venezuelan State.
“This is an important theme in which the government has made failed or incomplete advances” Alvárez, mentioning two failed projects: wind farms in Paraguaná and solar panels for an indigenous community in Amazonas state, which ended up abandoned.
“There is no National Policy, National Strategy, nor a National Plan of Adaptation and Mitigation to Climate Change. There’s neither a Climate National Budget nor a National System for an Inventory of Greenhouse Gases… …the climate institutional weakness accentuates the vulnerabilities of the national territory to the physical threats of the current climate change…”
“The climate change issue has completely disappeared from the Venezuelan political agenda. We have no information on the position of the government in the next international meetings on the matter,” Alvarez told us. He added that “in any case, we need a commitment of the State to fulfill the obligations of the Paris accords and the COP30 (the most recent UN’s climate change conference held in Brazil in November 2025) that promote an energy transition outside of fossil fuels.”
Given this assessment and the Trump administration’s doubling-down on the exploitation of fossil sources of energy, this oil deal could simply make those physical effects even worse.
Parallel to this is the inclusion of how clean energy sources like solar or wind could not only assist in alleviating the electricity shortage but create new opportunities for our economy. Now, it seems like the only one considered is the hydroelectric power that we largely depend on.
“This is an important theme in which the government has made failed or incomplete advances” Alvárez, mentioning two failed projects: wind farms in Paraguaná and solar panels for an indigenous community in Amazonas state, which ended up abandoned.
Overall, any discussion about the environmental consequences that this controversial oil deal could have for all Venezuelans is not at the forefront. It is not entirely erased from view, however.
The short-term argument also brings a long-term one that our society has been dodging for many years: finding a suitable compromise between the needs of our economic apparatus that require immediate attention and that our hydrocarbon industry can provide, while keeping safe basic things like the air we breathe or the water we use and even trying to preserve the natural wonders that this beautiful country of ours offers.
F1 faces a fresh challenge this weekend at the first Spanish Grand at the new Madring, a hybrid street circuit built on the Ifema complex near the city’s international airport.
Hamilton said: “It’s a massively challenging circuit. Of all the new tracks that I’ve gone to, this one, maybe Saudi, are the two closest in terms of how difficult it was to get on top of the car and find the right lines and such.”
Mercedes driver George Russell said: “It’s a crazy circuit, I would put it. Arguably one of the most risky circuits of the whole calendar.
“Because you have real high-speed corners, sort of Jeddah-esque, the walls are very close, so there’s no margin for error, but then you have other corners… where you’re coming from a high speed into a slow braking zone, you’re braking and turning at the same time, so locking tyres are going to be easy and if you lock up you’ll be straight in the wall.
“So, excited to try that out, I think it’s going to be really challenging for us as drivers, the race is going to be challenging to overtake, so on the whole it’s not an easy one.”
Russell heads into the race 66 points behind team-mate Kimi Antonelli after the Italian’s landmark victory in Monza from 19th on the grid.
The Briton acknowledged that his title hopes with nine or 10 races left, amid uncertainty about the end of the season, were fading fast.
“I would definitely need some luck and I need some good performances,” Russell said. “It’s not really something I’m thinking about, because he’s performing better than me, so he deserves to be leading the championship.
“There’s still a long way to go, but he’s yet to have a bad weekend in terms of performance.
“So he’s performing exceptionally well, my performances are better, but if I want to win this championship, I’m going to need some luck on the way. But it’s not something I’m focused on. I’m focused on driving faster and just finding more performance.”
Antonelli said: “I don’t really want to try thinking about the championship. I think Monza was the proof that I wasn’t driving thinking about, or worrying about the championship. I was just driving to win, to do my best. So that’s the mindset.”
The Italian said his win in Monza was “so far the best day of my life and definitely one I will remember forever”.
He said a day karting with Mercedes on Monday helped him move on from the excitement of the day before.
“After Monza, that night, that day overall, I was very excited. But then going karting on Monday helped me to go back to earth, just go back to the ground.
“It was a good day, good fun day with the team. It was also a way to remind myself where I came from, all the journey that was done.
“And then about pressure, I try to embrace it as much as possible. And I try to see it as a positive thing and try to see it as an opportunity too. That’s also what is helping me to stay calm under difficult situations.”
Late last night, on September 1st, on the day the commercial terminals of Maiquetía airport went back online, US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright landed in Caracas for the second time this year. Of course, Wright didn’t fly commercial, and he was swarmed by a flurry of journalists looking for headlines on the “massive” oil deal that has invaded the news both in the US and Venezuela.
“I think very good times are coming,” Wright told reporters upon his arrival. “As large investments flow into this country, that creates more jobs, which pushes wage pressure up, creates opportunity and prosperity for Venezuelans, and it snowballs: when you get business confidence and investment, it creates all sorts of opportunities—not just jobs, but opportunities for entrepreneurs.”
Wright arrived to give this new partnership a bit more ceremony, but also, very likely to join in the festivities of what is to be an important week for the Trump administration’s push for energy supremacy in the region and for the Venezuelan oil industry. Besides the strange deal that we’re going to unpack in this piece, this week will feature Chevron, which according to Bloomberg is about to invest $7 billion looking to double its production in the country. Also, it is expected that deals with Eni, ONCC, and Colombia´s Geopark will be signed as well. And the icing on the cake, it’s been also reported that one of the agreements with GE Verona to tackle Venezuela’s decaying power grid is close to being executed.
The clumsy communications around the announcement of the deal have generated some negative backlash from the Venezuelan public and skepticism from the same oil majors the Trump administration is trying to woo. Just a couple of hours before Secretary Wright touched ground in Venezuela, Marco Rubio had to jump on a livestream with a Venezuelan journalist in a damage control mission.
Those who brokered the US-Venezuela oil agreement are boasting about historical proportions, about leaving a mark for generations to come, but they took their time to explain why it is so important. Information has been coming out in a very fragmented way, heavily determined by propaganda needs from the Trump administration and the chavista regime. After vague rumors related to Mauricio Claver-Carone taking a step back as the Americans’ informal envoy, and the fall of Harry Sargeant III in Venezuela, we saw an old communication trick, which the Trump administration did not invent, setting the stage for the big news. Washington sent out a first version with catastrophic details, waiting for panic to spread, and published a second, corrected version that would make the news look better than initially perceived. Last week, the first Axios “scoop” talked about 90 billion barrels of Venezuelan oil reserves that the US would own. Now, the current version of the official announcement says it’s 65 billion barrels, so people can say “well, it’s just 65 billion barrels, it ain’t so bad.”
The White House finally published a fact sheet on Monday night disclosing more details about the involvement of the State and “War” Departments in buying the oil produced in 17 Venezuelan fields (supposedly containing about 65 billion barrels) by a private Venezuelan company. North American Blue Energy Partners, or Nabep, is the country’s second biggest crude producer led by notorious Venezuelan oligarch Alejandro Betancourt. To execute this deal, the Rodríguez government is granting a 100-year concession to a Nabep-Pentagon joint venture that looks, sounds and smells pretty unconstitutional from a Venezuelan point of view.
Francisco Monaldi: “Instead of generating more credibility and allowing investors to feel confident, the fact that this is allocated without any bidding and to an individual that has issues with justice, that could be a problem in the future.”
These are the known conditions of the deal:
The US government is trying to sell this to the American public as a way to restock US oil reserves and to cut domestic gas prices, which have a negative impact on Trump’s popularity and the prospects of Republican candidates in November’s congressional elections. In an interview in Spanish published Tuesday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted that the deal was between the US and a private company, not the chavista regime, and offered this as a model the White House expects can be replicated.
Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin America Energy Program for the Baker Institute at Rice University, warned on X that Venezuela’s famous oil reserves are inflated by order of Hugo Chávez: in reality, they are about a third of the 300 billion barrels everyone quotes as the total proven reserves. So those 17 fields must have about 25 billion barrels, instead of 65 billion barrels, an unreliable figure no one should take for certain. Besides that, it would be very hard to actually extract those 25 billion barrels in 25 years, given that most fields are undeveloped. Monaldi added before PBS News that “the presence of the US government could make investors more willing to take the risk of going into Venezuela with all the issues, including the fact that this is an illegitimate government in Venezuela, and that the history of the country, of course, is not great in terms of respecting deals… The other issue is that the Strategic Petroleum Reserve typically uses light oil, and Venezuela mostly produces heavy and extra heavy oil.”
Monaldi thinks that “if it’s an opaque deal that doesn’t seem to benefit the country, then there will be a backlash eventually, and we will end up as in other parts of the world and in Venezuela itself with renegotiation at some point.” Even if the agreement with NABEP means that they can run faster than other private companies, Trump’s anxiety to get American investors to Venezuela won’t be helped by this, because “instead of generating more credibility and allowing investors to feel confident, the fact that this is allocated without any bidding and to an individual that has issues with justice, that could be a problem in the future.”
Amid the fall of Tareck El Aissami and the rise of súper ministra Delcy Rodríguez, Betancourt re-entered the Venezuelan oil scene alongside Trump-linked oil magnate Harry Sargeant.
Harvard scholar Ricardo Hausmann, a former planning minister who leads a research center on economic growth, avoided the oil economy dimension of the matter and just trashed Rubio for betraying the idea of democracy transition. On the other hand, some influential economists see opportunities. Asdrúbal Oliveros chose a middle ground between celebration and condemnation and pointed out that benefits will come as long as the country develops not only the oil fields but the institutions to create accountability.
That Alejandro Betancourt, the CEO of NABEP, is at the center of this deal is bad news in the eyes of observers and Venezuelan journalists familiar with his trajectory.
Over the past two decades, this businessman became a symbol of the bolichico culture, a term apparently coined by investigative journalist Juan Carlos Zapata to define those scions of Venezuelan old-money families who became travel companies of Bolivarian-era corruption. Betancourt and his partners—namely his cousin Pedro Trebbau López and childhood friend Francisco Convit Guruceaga—became synonymous with the vanishing of hundreds of millions of dollars the Chávez government allocated to a newly-formed company, Derwick Associates, to fix the country’s power grid. Both Betancourt and Trebbau were in their late 20s when Derwick first emerged, and had no experience in the electricity sector.
Many things would happen between then and now. Betancourt became famous in Spain for investing in Hawkers, a Spanish sunglasses brand that got him cleaner headlines before local journalists discovered who he was. Prior to the Hawkers move, the three bolichicos created a Bahamas-based company to partner with a Gazprombank subsidiary. The resulting company, called Gazprombank Latin America Ventures, would operate a heavy-crude PDVSA project in the Lake Maracaibo region called Petrozamora. The joint venture did get to hold a steady production, but as with everything Russian, its operations were quite opaque. The Maduro regime eventually raided its offices and forced Betancourt to leave the country.
Betancourt faces probes in Spain and Switzerland. US prosecutors investigated him as an alleged co-conspirator in the $1.2 billion money-laundering scheme that targeted Convit and others, but didn’t charge the former.
Amid the fall of Tareck El Aissami and the rise of súper ministra Delcy Rodríguez, Betancourt re-entered the Venezuelan oil scene alongside Trump-linked oil magnate Harry Sargeant. Through Nabep, Betancourt and Sargeant took control of a number of oil projects (including the Petrozamora fields) under the CPP scheme, in which private companies could hold a larger stake than the State (running counter to the country’s hydrocarbons legislation until it was changed this year).
Betancourt seems to have a hand on both sides of Venezuela’s political conflict. That a close relative of Juan Guaidó was seen visiting Betancourt’s castle in Spain, in the company of Trump ally Rudy Giuliani, helped to cement the bad reputation of the interim government. In fact, Rubio now alleges that Betancourt was a friend of the opposition to deflect the suspicion that the tycoon is a man of the Rodríguez regime, and that the US chose Nabep because it is the biggest private company in the Venezuelan oil sector. Questioned by journalist Sergio Novelli about Betancourt’s past, the Secretary of State said that the businessman faced no charges “in our system.”
Over the past several weeks, Betancourt reemerged as a key operative between the Trumpworld and the Rodríguez government. The Washington Post reported last week that the Trump administration lobbied Switzerland to “resolve” an ongoing money-laundering probe into Betancourt without him facing criminal charges. Despite such a level of external interference, Betancourt remains under investigation in both Spain and Switzerland. He hasn’t been charged in these countries. US prosecutors investigated Betancourt as an alleged co-conspirator in the $1.2 billion PDVSA money-laundering scheme that targeted Francisco Convit and many others, but did not charge the former.
Distrust has grown in the Venezuelan public sphere. Before the oil agreement was announced, Cazadores de Fake News published an investigation about the network of social media accounts defending Betancourt. Hours after the White House published the fact sheet, an Axios piece tells the story of Betancourt as the global, influential businessman that promoted the Trump-backed Guaidó government and, during the events of January 3, persuaded Delcy Rodríguez to cooperate with Rubio. An Axios source even says that Maduro would still be in power had Betancourt not helped to remove him.
As another blackout hit Western Venezuela over the weekend, Delcy Rodríguez released a video statement saying this was about improving the future of the country. She was emphatic in thanking Trump and Rubio, and assured the nation would preserve sovereignty of the oil reserves while turning into a big energy powerhouse. Social media reacted by reproducing pre-2026 footage of her and Diosdado Cabello accusing the opposition of offering all our oil to the US. The most significant detail remains a mystery: what Delcy Rodríguez is demanding in exchange for signing and enforcing this deal.
The most enigmatic reaction in the Venezuelan opposition came from María Corina Machado: she hasn’t said anything, really. A couple of days after Trump’s announcement, the opposition leader remotely attended an international conference held in Slovenia. She did not mention the reported contents of the deal or the role of Betancourt, but insisted on the potential of Venezuela as the energy hub of the Western Hemisphere in light of the Ukraine War and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz. Machado added that a democratic government could serve as a bridge between the US, Europe and Latin America.
Leopoldo López and Julio Borges, two important opposition figures who held leadership roles in the past, also remain quiet. Their political parties are linked to a US-sponsored working group meant to reform the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) and electoral authority. López and Borges previously praised the US for its role and welcomed the progress made in August. In the deal’s factsheet, the White House says these talks resulted in significant reforms to the Venezuelan judiciary and the release of hundreds of political prisoners, which are grossly exaggerated claims. The reform to the Organic Law of the TSJ has not been approved yet, though the National Assembly sanctioned it on Tuesday night.
Edmundo González Urrutia said more, but not much against it. He stated that “Venezuela’s recovery cannot be measured only by the barrels it produces again, but by the lives that wealth allows us to rebuild.” He made no mention of Delcy, the deal’s legality, or its conditions, but wondered whether oil will improve the lives of all Venezuelans or only some this time around. He asked what those millions of dollars could mean to a family that lost a home and is still waiting to rebuild it, to someone who arrives at a hospital to find no supplies, to a community that lives waiting to see when the water will come. González did not denounce the agreement, but reflected on the difference between financial resources reaching the country and reaching the families that need it most.
Ruling chavismo has invoked its “loyalty to national sovereignty and the well-being of the people,” offering a list of crises the deal is supposed to solve: economic reactivation, the recovery of public services, care for those affected by the double earthquake, jobs, workers’ wages.
Juan Pablo Guanipa, a popular ally of Machado in Primero Justicia, sort of misread the animus. He called for a “calm reading” of the deal hours after it broke, arguing that Venezuela cannot develop its reserves without massive foreign capital. “If we see new jobs, more investment, more income, and a new economic upturn, this agreement will earn its backing. But if we don’t see it, little by little, popular rejection will follow.” His critique became sharper days later. From a rally in Falcón, Guanipa denounced that no government without an electoral mandate—like Delcy’s— has the standing to enter binding commitments like this.
Henrique Capriles did better, insisting Venezuelans were entitled to defend their oil, their interest and their future: “What is the deal’s scope? Its legal basis? What do Venezuelans receive? What do they give up, and under what conditions? Questions, he noted, no one can begin to answer when the country doesn’t even have clarity on this year’s oil income.” He recognized that, although oil remains the only lever at hand to “push everything” and grow the economy, the triumvirate of the Rodríguez siblings and Diosdado Cabello are not qualified to lead that commitment, and will only coat the process with more opacity and corruption.
Diosdado Cabello is yet to say a peep, though we expect him to put some nice words together for his Con el Mazo Dando TV show tonight. PSUV, Venezuela’s ruling socialist party still under Cabello’s control, fully backed Delcy Rodríguez’s leadership in light of the oil deal. The party recalled its historical loyalty to national sovereignty and the well-being of the people, offering a list of crises the deal is supposed to solve: economic reactivation, the recovery of public services, care for those affected by the double earthquake, jobs, workers’ wages. According to them, Rodríguez was simply using “every tool possible within the constitutional framework to put our immense hydrocarbon reserves at the service of national development.” During last night’s session, the Rodríguez-controlled National Assembly passed a motion supporting the “US-Venezuela Binational Energy Agreement.”
Maduro’s son, “Nicolasito” Maduro Guerra, came out in support of the “historic” deal—as he called it, in English. He quoted an interview where his father said the State was fully open to the return of American capital to the Venezuelan oil industry. Which isn’t exactly false: before the US captured Maduro on January 3, The New York Times reported that the dictator had offered all existing oil and gold projects to US companies in exchange for being allowed to remain in power.
Rafael Ramírez, Venezuela’s oil tsar under Hugo Chávez who oversaw PDVSA’s total collapse and the embezzlement of billions of public funds, called the new deal illegitimate, unconstitutional, and a pillage (saqueo). He considered it a ploy by the Trump administration ahead of midterms, as the “Venezuelan case has become the only success to show their [voter] base,” further criticizing Delcy and US policy in an interview with El Nacional. Among other original chavistas that broke with the Maduro regime, Chávez’s former propagandist Andrés Izarra used a double-edged sword: “Delcy is carrying out Machado’s oil plan.” He also tweeted that the agreement was high treason for which its enforcers should be tried.
Juan Barreto, the former chavista mayor of Caracas who is trying to become a relevant opposition figure, quote-tweeted Alejandro Betancourt’s defense of the agreement (who had said that it would benefit Venezuelans and Americans alike) and took the class war route: “The true head of the transition speaks: from intervention to colony… from the stands, the traditional political class and the elites applaud, begging for a scrap… in the streets, neighborhoods, and factories, the people converse, organize, unite…Workers across the country, begin national dialogue and consultation.” Elías Jaua followed suit. The former chavista vice president and career chavista minister said Venezuela is now under the occupation of a foreign invader, calling for grassroots organizing and the recovery of national independence. In what seems to be an ongoing effort to distance himself from what remains of chavismo in power, Jaua clarified he had not spoken to any government official or PSUV leader.