Chinese

During a long-endurance trek across the Pacific, a small uncrewed surface vessel (USV) owned by a California company had an encounter with a Chinese guided missile destroyer near the Philippines. The Lightfish USV, owned by Seasats, came close enough to the Type 052D guided missile destroyer that it was able to capture the warship on video. Reuters was the first to report about this event.

The incident highlights the growing presence of USVs, and especially in some of the world’s most contentious locales. The USV coming so close to the Chinese surface combatant also underscores the potential danger USVs can pose even to an advanced warship, a fact TWZ has frequently reported on. It also raises questions about the rules of engagement navies, and even some merchant vessels in troubled areas, will have to adopt for when they happen upon USVs that come close without explanation or clear intent.

The incident in question took place about 73 miles northwest of the Philippine island of Luzon, Seasats CEO Mike Flanigan told TWZ. The Luzon Strait is one of the world’s most strategic waterways and a potential flashpoint. It sits south of Taiwan and north of the Philippines, in a channel that provides access from the greater Pacific to the South China Sea and vice-versa. This is an area that is highly trafficked in the air, sea and undersea by major military players in the region and commercial shipping. If a conflict were to break out over Taiwan, this area would be turned into a super weapons engagement zone. In a future war, due to its unique littoral geography and importance, it would be a prime hunting ground for USVs of many kinds.

The encounter involved a Lightfish USV, a 12-foot-long, 305-pound USV that can travel great distances for up to six months with the help of its solar power panels paired with its hybrid powertrain, according to the company. Lightfish is not a speed boat. It prioritizes extreme endurance over anything else, so it couldn’t have ‘chased down’ the warship in question, but many other USVs are very capable of doing just that.

“The Lightfish tracked the Chinese vessel on radar from a range of ~10 nm and visually to a minimum range of several hundred meters,” Flanigan explained in an email. “It took place in the evening Pacific time on June 15th and our team was alerted to it immediately by our watch team that monitors vessel traffic in the vicinity of our deployed USV fleets.”

The Chinese destroyer spotted the Lightfish and took evasive action.

“We don’t know the intent, but we were able to observe the vessel altering course and generally observing the Lightfish USV,” Flanigan noted.

The company discussed it with the U.S. military after the event, but Flanigan declined to offer any details.

The company shared with us two videos of the Lightfish’s view of the Chinese warship. In it, the destroyer appears to be moving very slowly if at all.

The videos are eerily reminiscent of scores of videos released by the Ukrainian military showing its USVs attacking Russian warships, although in this case, the Lightfish had no such capability or intent.

You can see one of those Ukrainian videos below.

As we have reported extensively, Ukraine has demonstrated the devastating potential of USVs against the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Magura family of drone boats, among others, has been central to that campaign, and has taken on a wide variety of roles. Repeated successful strikes against Black Sea Fleet vessels and naval infrastructure forced Russia to relocate much of its fleet from occupied Crimea to the relative safety of bases in mainland Russia.

Yemen’s Houthi rebels were at the forefront of employing kamikaze USVs operationally prior to Ukraine. We first reported on the capability in January 2017, after an explosive-laden Houthi drone boat struck a Saudi frigate. The modern version of this concept traces back to Iran, which developed a variety of rudimentary one-way attack USVs before transferring the capability to its Houthi proxies, who became the first to use them successfully in the Red Sea in 2017. They have since used them repeatedly, targeting shipping during their intervention following the events of October 7th and Israel’s invasion of Gaza.

Fast forward to the present, with the U.S. military employing USVs as offensive strike weapons in combat for the first time on July 12. The strikes, which involved Saronic-built Corsair USVs, occurred amid an escalating exchange of attacks between the United States and Iran centered on the Strait of Hormuz. Among the targets of the drone boat attacks was an Iranian Ghadir class diesel-electric midget submarine.

The following video captures some of those strikes.

Yesterday, using multiple one-way attack surface drones, CENTCOM forces successfully struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran. Three Corsair unmanned surface vessels hit the port at Bandar Abbas Naval Base, marking the first time American forces have employed sea… pic.twitter.com/bOM2kmgRxz

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 13, 2026

More recently, the U.S. Navy showed off the danger its USVs present to potential enemy warships when one of its Global Autonomous Reconnaissance Craft (GARC) USVs took part in its first live-fire training exercise. The kamikaze drone boat was employed during RIMPAC 2026, attacking the ex-USS Peleliu in one of the operation’s high-profile sinking exercises (SINKEX). You can read more about that here. The highly-publicized inaugural drone boat strike against Iran’s port and the use during SINKEX at RIMPAC clearly sends a message that the U.S. Navy is now aggressively pursuing this new form of kinetic surface attack. 

Amazing Footage from USV’s as they Attack the USS Peleliu (LHA 5)

These lessons are not lost on Seasats.

“The Ukrainians have definitively proven the threat that small USVs pose to surface ships,” Flanigan proffered. “With the Lightfish’s range — 8,000+ nm — we’re showing that the entire ocean is ‘in range’ for small USVs and that they aren’t just limited to coastal/littoral assets.”

The June 15 encounter was one of several Seasats USVs have had with Chinese warships. In May, the Lightfish came upon a Chinese Type 056 Corvette while transiting the Taiwan Strait earlier on this journey, Flanigan said. 

“This isn’t our vessel’s first run-in with a Chinese warship,” he noted in a company media release at the time. “But the location and timing make this encounter notable. It’s generally understood that the PLAN aggressively projects its vessels into the sovereign waters of smaller neighbors, but the opportunity to capture and share geolocated photographic evidence of it is unique.”

None of these incidents have resulted in China firing upon the drone boat. Still, these close encounters at sea raise questions about how warships should respond to such sightings, especially given what has taken place in the Black Sea, Red Sea, and more recently, near the Strait of Hormuz.

“This would be a better question for a military end user,” Flanigan answered when we asked him what the rules of engagement should be for these encounters. “I’d imagine it’d depend on the context and region (eg in the Black Sea presumably all USVs are assumed armed and dangerous). For commercial mariners, USVs would probably be treated with caution similar to other maritime hazards, with the level of caution depending on how well and predictably they (the USVs) are signaling their behavior.”

This is important, given the frequency of Lightfish sightings. 

“We have commercial shipping encounters on a nearly daily basis,” Flanigan said. “They happen so often that mariners don’t notice, or if they do, they are curious.”

This is especially true for fishing vessels, he pointed out.

Seasats Lightfish – Autonomous Drone Carrier

“Generally we follow two rules of thought” when it comes to other vessels, Flanigan stated.

The first is that “robotic systems should all fall secondary to human-piloted vessels. Meaning USVs should always avoid human vessels, and safety at sea rules should also bias towards giving right of way and safety of navigation to a piloted vessel,” Flanigan suggested.

The second is that “USVs should comply with COLREGs [International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea] and general navigational policies wherever possible,” he added.

Still, these are not crewed ships with people onboard that can communicate in some fashion. AIS identification is not proof of anything. And there is no way of knowing for certain if a curious USV belongs to a friend or foe. Hanging a flag onboard and painting a service name on the drone boat’s hull is in no way a definitive signal. How much risk will sailors take as the potential threat posed by these systems rapidly evolves and is already firmly in the hands of non-state actors?

It’s also worth noting that destroying a clearly uncrewed drone boat is a much lower threshold of escalation than doing so with a manned vessel, obviously. We have seen this reality played out repeatedly in the air, where an adversary will take a shot at a drone but not a crewed platform during times of tension but not outright war. Regardless of the international norms, taking out a drone boat that gets too close to a warship could become common place based on these factors, as well as the threat picture in the region and the status and proliferation of the technology.

Once again, in this case, the slow and small Lightfish may have been recognized as not a major danger to the destroyer, but as USVs become more common place in all forms, and especially in arsenals of militaries and potential nefarious actors alike, this equation will become more complex.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

Published on
30/07/2026 – 12:57 GMT+2

The European Commission is considering opening an investigation into imports of certain construction materials from several Balkan countries over suspicions that they were made using low-cost Chinese glass fibre already subject to EU anti-dumping duties, according to people familiar with the matter.

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The probe will focus on so-called open mesh fabrics, including thermal insulation systems.

The case comes as the European Commission continues to step up pressure on low-cost Chinese imports, which are contributing to the EU’s record-high €1 billion-a-day trade deficit with China. The commission launched negotiations with Beijing in June in a bid to rebalance trade ties, with hopes of securing tangible results by October.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič expected to travel to China in October.

At the same time, the Commission has warned that it would deploy its trade defence instruments before the deadline to counter low-cost Chinese imports, arguing that China uses unfair practices to gain access to the EU market – including strategies to circumvent EU tariffs.

Open mesh fabrics are often manufactured with Chinese glass fibre, which the Commission has accused Chinese producers of selling at unfairly low prices on the EU market, causing injury to European manufacturers. The EU has targeted glass fibre with additional duties several times in recent years, including imports from Egypt that are produced by Chinese companies.

But Chinese producers are suspected of circumventing those anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties by relying on local manufacturers in several Balkan countries to assemble open mesh fabrics using low-cost Chinese glass fibre.

The overcapacity problem

The EU produces around 1 million tonnes of melted glass annually from installations operating in eight countries, among them Germany, France and Italy.

But according to Glass Fibre Europe, which represents the glass fibre industry in Brussels, Chinese glass fibre overcapacity exceeds 100 percent of total EU market demand, raising the risk of further harm to European producers unless the EU strengthens its trade defence measures.

Over the past year, the number of cases involving alleged Chinese unfair trade practices across several industrial sectors has increased, and the Commission has been criticised for the length of its investigations.

At a summit in mid-June, EU leaders gave the Commission a mandate to review and update its trade defence instruments.

But the EU’s current trade regulation toolbox remains limited, with Commission only able to address unfair trade practices on a product-by-product basis. Additional safeguard measures – including tariffs and quotas – are also under consideration, Euronews has learned, to protect the European chemicals sector from intense Chinese competition.

The Commission was contacted for comment but did not reply.

The Trump administration on Tuesday announced a ban on new foreign-made humanoid robot imports to the US over “unacceptable risks” to the country’s national security.

The move applies to advanced robots – including humanoid and four-legged machines. Many of them are made in China, which is competing with the US to develop robotics and artificial intelligence (AI).

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also banned imports of power inverters – a device used in data centres and solar panels – which it said could also pose a risk to the US economy.

The Chinese embassy in Washington said China has long opposed the US’ “politicising” of trade issues and sanctions based on “groundless pretexts”.

FCC chairman Brendan Carr said the agency was doing its part “to secure America’s critical supply chains”.

The FCC has added the items to its Covered List – a register of goods and services that are deemed a risk to US national security.

The ban applies to new foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and power inverters and does not prevent the sale or import of any existing models that had been previously authorised by the FCC.

The FCC cited concerns that the use of foreign-made inverters could allow overseas firms to turn them off, steal data, facilitate remote access and surveillance by “foreign government actors, or be otherwise exploited through a cyberattack.”

It added that the use of robots made outside the US could allow “malign actors to surveil Americans, enhance the capabilities of foreign intelligence services, or to remotely commandeer the robots.”

The Chinese embassy in Washington also said Beijing will “take all necessary measures” in response to any moves that harm its interests, urging all countries to work together to develop AI “for the positive and for good”.

It called on the US to “abandon its hegemonic mindset, and stop smearing Chinese companies and threatening them with sanctions.”

The BBC has contacted major Chinese robot manufacturers Unitree, UBTech and AgiBot for comment.

The United States has continued to attack Iran for a 13th consecutive night on Thursday and explosions were reported in multiple Iranian cities on Friday morning.

In addition to the ongoing attacks, shipping disruptions continue to intensify. Ship tracking data revealed that just one tanker successfully crossed the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday, marking the lowest level since May 7.

However, shipping data from London Stock Exchange Group shows that two Chinese supertankers carrying crude oil from Saudi Arabia successfully exited the Bab al-Mandeb strait on Friday. This is despite the naval blockade Yemen’s Houthis announced against Saudi Arabia on Monday.

Here is a recap of what happened on Thursday night and Friday.

Where did the US attack Iran?

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said that at 01:00 GMT on Friday, it concluded its latest round of strikes against Iran.

CENTCOM said it targeted Iranian military command centres, drone storage facilities, communication networks, coastal surveillance sites and maritime capabilities.

On Friday, Iranian media reported explosions or attacks across multiple Iranian cities. State broadcaster IRIB reported that explosions were reported in Khondab, Khorramabad, Konarak and Jask. Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency reported that two people have been injured following an early morning drone attack on Khorramabad, citing the deputy governor of the western Lorestan province.

Iran’s Mehr news agency reported on Friday that US missile strikes hit the cities of Andimeshk and Omidiyeh in the Khuzestan province. There were no casualties or injuries.

Al Jazeera’s Tohid Assidi reported from the Iranian capital, Tehran, that explosions were heard on Qeshm island, located in the Strait of Hormuz, on Friday.

Attacks on the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas have injured two people, Iranian media reported on Friday.

Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency reported on Friday that four people were killed and five others were injured in a US missile attack near the southwestern city of Ahvaz.

Where did Iran strike in the Gulf?

Bahrain: In a statement carried by Iran’s Mehr news agency, the Iranian army said it used drones to target fuel storage tanks, equipment warehouses and troop living quarters at Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain.

Jordan: The military added that aircraft hangars, maintenance facilities and accommodation sites at the Muwaffaq Salti/Al-Azraq base in Jordan were also hit, warning that any actions against Iran’s interests would undermine regional security and economic stability.

What have leaders on either side said?

On Thursday, US President Donald Trump stepped up his rhetoric against Tehran. He told the US news website Axios that he may launch the largest strikes on Iran yet, after Tehran carried out another wave of retaliatory attacks on US allies in the Gulf, including hitting a telecommunications tower in Kuwait.

Trump said he was “considering a massive attack” that would be “bigger than ever before”.

“I am close to making a decision. We are all set for it,” Trump said.

Separately, Trump threatened, on his Truth Social platform, that if Iran attacked ships, the US would use Tehran’s frozen assets to pay for repairs.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on Friday that using frozen state assets to pay for future claims sets a dangerous global precedent.

“Seizing another nation’s assets to pay for unrelated future claims is an incendiary precedent,” Araghchi wrote on X.

He cautioned that “those who celebrate or profit from such funds should remember: once governments normalise confiscation, no one’s assets are safe. Ensuing chaos will not be pretty or peaceful”.

The Australian Army has shared photos showing one of its M1A2 Abrams outfitted as a surrogate enemy platform, specifically to represent a People’s Liberation Army main battle tank. Vehicles meant to visually reflect an adversarial platform are a regular feature of exercises involving an Opposing Force (OPFOR). The depiction also reflects Australia’s growing emphasis on preparing for high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific, and an Australian Defense Force that’s increasingly focusing its training and force structure on the challenges posed by China’s rapidly expanding military capabilities.

The photos were published on the Facebook account of the Australian Army’s School of Armor. Located at the Puckapunyal Military Area in Victoria, southeastern Australia, this serves as the army’s center of excellence for mounted combat and armored fighting vehicle training.

According to the school, this specific tank was prepared by soldiers from B Squadron, 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment, as part of the OPFOR element for the Royal Australian Armored Corps Officer Basic Course (ROBC), which includes field training assessments. The latest ROBC will culminate in Exercise Tungsten Forge/Gauntlet Strike, a combined-arms tactical training exercise, and a capstone event for junior officers learning mechanized warfare and tank command. “Good luck to the junior officers as they attempt to outmaneuver a seasoned enemy commander,” the School of Armor declared in the caption accompanying the photos.

The most obvious aspect of the M1A2 Abrams’ transformation is its People’s Liberation Army-style ‘digital’ camouflage scheme, with prominent blocks in four colors — including bright green — over the standard three-tone camouflage. The tank is also fitted with dummy external fuel tanks on the rear of the turret. These are a common feature of Russian and Chinese tank designs, albeit fitted on the rear of the hull, something that’s not possible on the Abrams due to the exhaust outlet.

The end result is an Abrams that’s visually similar to a Type 99, China’s first mass-produced third-generation main battle tank, and the most important in the People’s Liberation Army inventory.

It’s noteworthy, too, that the Abrams’ turret side appears to have the slogan ‘Bing Chilling’ applied. This should be a reference to a video-based meme in which wrestler and actor John Cena is shown saying ‘ice cream’ in Mandarin — words that can be phonetically written as ‘Bing Chilling.’

Overall, the primary objective of surrogate platforms like these is to replicate the visual appearance of potential adversary vehicles, not their exact capabilities or configurations. These surrogate platforms are designed as stand-ins rather than one-for-one copies of foreign equipment. Fielding visually representative vehicles during OPFOR exercises adds an extra layer of realism to training, helping troops practice target recognition, vehicle identification, and other battlefield observation skills under more authentic conditions.

It is possible that the Abrams will additionally be fitted with training devices designed to simulate the firing capabilities and vulnerability of specific adversary vehicles. This can be done using tools like the Instrumentable-Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (I-MILES), a laser-based training aid.

Under a roughly $2.5-billion deal, Australia is getting 75 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks, together with armored support vehicles. The Abrams are being procured under the Main Battle Tank Upgrade, formally known as LAND 907 Phase 2, and the U.S. government approved the sale of these new vehicles to Australia via Foreign Military Sales channels in 2021. Meanwhile, Canberra agreed to provide Ukraine with 49 of its older M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks.

The M1A2 SEPv3 — or System Enhancement Program version 3 — was developed by the U.S. Army to address lessons learned during fighting in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and represents a major advance over the Australian Army’s previous M1A1 (AIM) variants, 59 of which were acquired second-hand from the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The first of the new tanks were delivered to Australia in 2024.

The fact that the Australian Abrams is very much a frontline vehicle, available in limited numbers, explains the cosmetic nature of the OPFOR version. After the exercise is completed, it can be rapidly returned to its normal configuration.

This separates it from more bespoke surrogate enemy platforms, like those used by the U.S. Army’s National Training Center, for example, which relies on visually modified (VISMOD) M113 and Humvee-type vehicles to field surrogate Russian-made T-72s and BTR-90s, among others.

It is not clear whether the Australian Army’s School of Armor has prepared additional Abrams as surrogates, but it does describe “in-service armored fighting vehicles” (plural) as having been adapted. Depending on the scale of the exercise, other candidates might include Chinese infantry fighting vehicles or self-propelled artillery.

At the same time, the People’s Liberation Army is also preparing for a potential conflict by training with surrogate platforms that represent a Western enemy. This is part of a much wider Chinese military investment in replicas and advanced training centers.

Last year, TWZ reported on China’s use of trucks designed to mimic the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), soon after the first examples of the U.S.-made system were delivered to Taiwan. The surrogate vehicles were painted in Republic of Taiwan Army-style camouflage. HIMARS is also used by the Australian Army.

Wherever they are being used, surrogate vehicles give training centers a cost-effective way to replicate foreign military equipment without acquiring and maintaining actual allied or adversary vehicles. Whether elaborate or more rudimentary, VISMODs provide a greater degree of visual realism, while their performance and other capabilities can increasingly be simulated digitally during exercises.

At the same time, platforms chosen as surrogates also offer a snapshot of the strategic priorities and perceived threats of the era.

In this case, the ‘Chinese-look’ Abrams reflects how Australia’s defense posture has shifted significantly in recent years toward preparing for the prospect of high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific, with China’s expanding military capabilities serving as the principal driver.

In its 2023 Defense Strategic Review and subsequent National Defense Strategy, the Australian government placed greater emphasis on deterrence by denial, long-range strike, and the ability to operate alongside the United States and regional partners.

While Canberra tends to avoid explicitly identifying Beijing as an adversary, Australia’s force modernization — including the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS, long-range and hypersonic missiles, enhanced northern basing — is clearly oriented toward countering the challenges posed by the People’s Liberation Army in a potential Indo-Pacific contingency. Increasingly realistic exercises centered on peer threats, such as Chinese tanks, provide further evidence of this.

Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com

A senior North Korean party official and China’s top political adviser have met in Pyongyang and discussed ways to strengthen bilateral exchanges and cooperation, the North’s state media said Thursday.

Jo Yong-won, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), held talks Wednesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Wang, China’s fourth-ranking official, is leading a Chinese party and government delegation on a three-day visit to North Korea through Friday to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the two countries.

During the talks, Jo said the rapidly changing international political situation “has required the two countries to further strengthen the militant unity, support and solidarity and steadily intensify and develop the friendly and cooperative relations” based on the spirit of the treaty.

Jo also said bilateral ties have entered a new stage of development under the leadership of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping, expressing Pyongyang’s willingness to expand strategic communication and cooperation across various sectors.

Wang said the friendship treaty has provided a legal foundation for consolidating the “militant friendship formed at the cost of blood” between the two countries.

He also reaffirmed China’s commitment to elevating bilateral ties to a higher level in line with the consensus reached by Xi and Kim during their summit in Pyongyang in June, according to the KCNA.

The two sides discussed ways to deepen party-to-party exchanges and expand cooperation in various fields, including the economy and culture, with the aim of promoting the well-being of their peoples, the report said.

Wang’s visit comes days after North Korean Premier Pak Thae-song traveled to China to attend events marking the treaty anniversary, where he met with Xi and other senior Chinese leaders.

The exchange of high-level delegations has highlighted increasingly active contacts between Pyongyang and Beijing as the two sides seek to reaffirm their traditionally close ties and deepen cooperation.

“We are closely monitoring the possibility of a meeting between Wang and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, as well as any follow-up cooperation that may emerge from the talks,” an official at Seoul’s unification ministry told reporters.

He added the government is also paying attention to the presence of officials involved in urban management at the talks, saying it could signal discussions on cooperation in the economic and urban development sectors.

The latest exchanges reflect efforts by Pyongyang and Beijing to strengthen strategic communication and party-to-party ties, though it remains to be seen whether the current pace of high-level exchanges will continue beyond events marking the treaty anniversary, the official said.

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Satellite imagery shows China has built what looks to be a new pattern of hardened structures with retractable roofs at a key missile test and training base in Inner Mongolia. Since the late 2010s, this base has also played a key role in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) dramatic expansion of its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities. The more recent additions to the facility appear to be too small and shallow for this purpose. A new report posits they could be used to fire smaller ballistic and/or cruise missiles, and might point to plans for a new “conventional quick-strike capability.”

The China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), part of the U.S. Air Force’s Air University, first called attention to the two new structures yesterday. Though CASI published the report, it stressed that the “opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author,” Eli Tirk, and “do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.” Tirk is a member of CASI’s staff.

“The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has constructed an unknown type of fixed launch system at the 1st Test and Training District in Jilantai that appears capable of launching multiple missiles,” Tirk writes. “Construction began sometime in late 2022, and, at least externally, appeared to be near completion by late 2023.”

The report includes satellite images of the site taken in September and December 2022, as well as January of this year, as seen above and below.

“The excavation for the northern launcher … measures roughly 12.5 meters [40 feet] deep when the image was captured [in September 2022]. While it is possible that this foundation was dug deeper, it is not likely that it would have been significantly deeper, given the potential size of the finished interior of the launch system,” according to Tirk. “The limited imagery available of the finished structure prior to the installation of the launcher closure door restricts more accurate measurement, but this structure appears to be somewhere between 6.4 meters and 11.8 meters [21 to 38 feet] in depth.”

Additional satellite imagery TWZ has reviewed from PlanetLabs shows the rectangular retractable roofs to be approximately 65.5 feet (20 meters) long and just over 21 feet (6.5 meters) wide. The roofs also look to open by sliding sideways along three large rails.

There is at least one other large structure at the site, which could be used for various support functions. There may be additional infrastructure underground. It is also worth noting here that the area with the new hardened structures is connected by road to an earlier facility immediately to the northeast. The tertiary site has several additional large structures contained within a clearly visible perimeter wall.

The roof design, at least, has some broad similarities to the covers on silos associated with older DF-5-series ICBMs, which are also rectangular in shape. For further comparison, the cover on a known ICBM test silo at Wuzhai, some 350 miles to the East of Jilantai, is nearly 74 feet (22.5 meters) long and around 29.5 feet (9 meters) wide. It also slides open to one side along two large rails. Underneath is a tubular silo that would have to be at least around 131 feet (40 meters) deep based on the dimensions of DF-5.

Silos constructed at Jilantai and other sites in China since the late 2010s, associated with newer DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs, have completely different lid designs.

The new structures appear “to have a shorter depth than silos intended for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), suggesting that it may support short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and cruise missiles,” per Tirk’s assessment. “Assuming the actual depth of the launch system is closer to the maximum range, these measurements suggest that these structures would likely be able to support up to an MRBM-class missile, assuming the roughly 10-meter length [nearly 33 feet] of a DF-21 or 11-meter length [approximately 36 feet] of a DF-17. It is also highly likely that this launch structure could easily accommodate SRBMs and cruise missiles.”

The DF-21 is a traditional MRBM design, and there is an anti-ship variant with a reentry vehicle capable of a certain degree of maneuvering in the terminal phase of flight. Though MRBM-sized, the DF-17 is topped with a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and functions in a completely different manner from typical ballistic missiles. In general, hypersonic weapons of this type offer benefits when it comes to penetrating past enemy defenses and for prosecuting time-sensitive targets at long ranges, as you can learn more about here.

China’s Dong-Feng 21 “carrier killer” Salvo Launch

“While there may be space within this launch structure to store a small number of missiles horizontally that are erected vertically prior to launch, a more efficient configuration appears to be a vertical launch system,” Tirk adds. “A vertical launch system would enable the massing of fires for effect, reduce signatures, and maintain the flexibility to employ a variety of different munitions from a single launcher simultaneously, enabling these units to conduct rapid strikes against numerous target types.”

How missiles would be loaded into the launch system is unclear and would depend on its exact design. A specialized loading vehicle or at least a crane might be necessary. There is no indication that the structures allow for road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers to simply drive inside and fire through the open roof.

Tirk also raises the possibility that the site could be tied to Chinese ballistic missile defense developments. The line between ballistic missiles and mid-course anti-ballistic missile interceptors, as well as ground-launched anti-satellite interceptors, is often blurry. The U.S. Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) is notably a silo-launched design, as is Russia’s A-135.

However, Tirk also notes that the base at Jilantai primarily serves the PLARF. This branch of the PLA is not known to have a major missile or air defense role. That responsibility largely falls to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). There are no signs of radars or other features associated with these missions, either. As TWZ has previously reported on in detail, we have seen different types of hardened and unhardened structures with retractable roofs emerge near the border with India and on islands in the South China Sea that do look to be air defense sites.

Other significant additions to the facilities at Jilantai have been observed in recent years. As already noted, this has been especially heavily intertwined with China’s construction of hundreds of new ICBM silos and associated infrastructure spread across three separate fields in the north and western ends of the country.

Overall, Tirk posits that the new structures at Jilantai might reflect “an intent to field a conventional quick-strike capability for a counter-intervention mission set, or possibly to conduct strikes against Taiwan, both of which would provide the PLA with additional capabilities to influence U.S. strategic decision-making.”

“A conventional quick strike capability, like that provided by a vertical launch system, could make PLA leadership more confident in their ability to compel Taiwan and U.S. behaviors during a crisis by threatening or conducting rapid preparatory strikes or counterintervention fires in the early stages of a conflict,” he adds. “Building out these launch systems in sufficient quantities could allow the PLA to rapidly escalate from a quarantine or blockade of Taiwan to conducting elements of a massive preparatory fires campaign against targets on Taiwan, U.S. bases in the first island chain, or U.S. Navy task groups if positioned along the coast.”

“Fixed launching options, however, are difficult to conceal, protect with active defenses and – depending on their location – potentially of limited utility for continued use after their first launch. Expansive investment in this type of system may provide significant “use or lose” incentives to the PLA leadership in the event of an escalating crisis,” he also notes. “It is currently unclear how many of these systems the PLARF intends to construct, which PLARF Base they will be deployed under, and the specific mission set they are intended to support.”

There is still the possibility that these structures could serve another purpose, even just within the PLARF. In particular, if the foundation was dug deeper, this could fundamentally change the assessment. From the outside, the roofs do still look to be too narrow for there to be a traditional silo underneath for any of China’s known ICBMs. That being said, a deeper foundation could accommodate intermediate ballistic missiles (IRBM) or hypersonic types that use larger ballistic missile-type boosters, but that are still smaller than an ICBM. The DF-26 family of IRBMs, at least some variants of which are understood to be capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads, is a particularly key component of the PLARF’s arsenal, and might also benefit from a new fixed launch infrastructure. Like the DF-21, there is also an anti-ship version of the DF-26.

China tests DF-26 missile destroying Mock Aircraft Carrier

The hardened structures with retractable roofs could conceal other assets beyond launchers for any kind of missile. They could have a more specialized testing role, rather than one intended to lead to an operational capability, too. TWZ has previously highlighted other hangar-like structures with retractable roofs, some of which are camouflaged, in an area known as Korla East in the western end of the country. PLAN facilities in this region have been tied to work on missile defense, anti-satellite, directed energy weapon, and electromagnetic pulse technologies, as you can read more about here.

Regardless, the new structures at the base in Jilantai do reflect a broader trend when it comes to hardened military infrastructure in China, as well as elsewhere globally. As we wrote last year, after the emergence of the apparent new pattern of hardened air defense sites near China’s border with India:

“The shelters with retractable roofs at the sites in Gar County and near Pangong Lake also highlight a larger trend when it comes to physical hardening, or at least ‘enclosing,’ that has been observed at Chinese military facilities in recent years. There has been a particularly visible surge in the construction of new hardened aircraft shelters, as well as unhardened, but fully enclosed hangars, at air bases across China, including ones situated on the Tibetan Plateau.”

China has completed the construction of 36 hardened aircraft shelters,new administrative blocks& a new apron at its Lhunze airbase in Tibet. Gives China the option of forward-deploying fighter aircraft & drone systems in its arsenal & reduces the response time needed for the IAF pic.twitter.com/g3kRXpyuRg

— Varun Karthikeyan (@Varun55484761) October 29, 2025

PLA Air Force had 370 Hardened Air Shelters (HAS) and 1100 regular ones in 2010. This increased to 800+ and 2300+ respectively in 2024, according to Hudson Institute.

Storage tunnels dug up in mountains and hardened storage sites for missiles and other war supplies are extra. pic.twitter.com/DQeQbXnGN9

— Jaidev Jamwal (@JaidevJamwal) January 21, 2025

“Vast fields of new silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles have also been built in the western end of China over the past few years. This is all on top of the PLA’s existing array of hardened infrastructure, which includes deeply buried air and naval bases.”

“Chinese construction of new hardened and unhardened aircraft shelters, in particular, is reflective of larger global trends, including in Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well. It has also stood in notable contrast to the lack of such developments in the United States, something that has become a topic of heated debate, which TWZ has been tracking very closely.”

“Growing threats posed by long-range, one-way attack drones, which offer a relatively low-cost way to launch large volume strikes, especially against fixed targets like air bases and air defense sites, have become a particularly significant factor in the hardening debate. Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb also underscored the threats that smaller, shorter-range drones can pose to aircraft and other assets out in the open, and in areas far away from active combat zones. Drones could also be layered in with the many other methods of attack that would be used against the same array of targets.”

Though questions remain about their exact purpose, and the concepts of operations behind them, the new hardened structures with retractable roofs in Jilantai might be a sign of things to come.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

An image has appeared, apparently for the first time, showing a Chinese J-15T carrier-based fighter launching while carrying four anti-ship missiles. The photo offers the clearest indication yet that China’s rapidly evolving carrier force is overcoming one of its longstanding operational constraints: getting heavily loaded strike fighters airborne from its flattops.

The image, at the top of this story, shows a J-15T in full afterburner moments before leaving the deck of the Fujian, the first People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) carrier equipped with catapults. The fighter is armed with four YJ-83K anti-ship missiles — double the number previously seen carried by a J-15 — amounting to a weapons load of roughly 6,400 pounds before accounting for any additional stores that may not be visible.

Previously, in fact, it seems that the latest J-15T version has only ever been seen with a single YJ-83K training round, while the aircraft was still in prototype form.

The YJ-83K is a widely used subsonic anti-ship missile, broadly equivalent to the U.S.-made AGM-84 Harpoon. The radar-guided, turbojet-powered weapon has a reported range of around 112 miles and is armed with a 360-pound high-explosive, semi-armor-piercing warhead. The YJ-83K is a sea-skimming missile cruising at an altitude of 65-100 feet, before dropping down to 16-24 feet during the terminal phase. Most significantly, each of these weapons weighs around 1,600 pounds.

The very reason behind the development of the J-15T was to maximize the potential of Flanker operations from the Fujian, which is equipped with an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), and subsequent carriers. As such, the J-15T is primarily distinguished from the original J-15 in being equipped for catapult takeoff but assisted recovery (CATOBAR) operations, as well as short takeoff but assisted recovery (STOBAR) operations.

Videos provide a comparison of a STOBAR J-15 carrier launch and a CATOBAR J-15T launch from Fujian:

The previous two PLAN aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, both employ ‘ski-jump’ takeoff ramps to launch fixed-wing STOBAR aircraft.

As we have discussed in the past, the primary benefit of the J-15T is its ability to be catapult-launched from a carrier with a heavier payload of fuel and weapons. After all, the Flanker airframe has always been able to carry impressive fuel and weapons loads, but this has been strictly limited when configured for STOBAR operations. This is something that has hampered Russian Navy carrier operations, as much as Chinese ones.

Also significant is the fact that the J-15T has started to introduce domestically produced WS-10H turbofans in place of the Russian-made AL-31F engines previously found on production J-15s.

In the past, it appears that the heaviest loads seen carried by STOBAR J-15s launched from the Liaoning or Shandong comprised two YJ-83Ks and four air-to-air missiles, or, for air defense, four PL-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles and two short-range PL-8B air-to-air missiles.

Regardless, the fact that J-15Ts are now launching from the carrier with weapons loads of around 6,400 pounds is significant.

As well as increasing the anti-shipping potential of the J-15T, the same payload could be translated into additional fuel or other weapons loads.

Among the other weapons options for the jet are the more advanced PL-10 short-range and PL-15 medium-range air-to-air missiles. The J-15T has also been noted with the long-range YJ-15 anti-ship missile, and with a ‘buddy’ refueling pod. Other versions of the YJ-83K that could find their way onto the J-15 include the improved YJ-83KH, which features an imaging-infrared seeker and extended range.

The ability for the J-15T to launch from a catapult-equipped carrier with a heavier payload doesn’t just impact the potential of the strike fighter. It will also translate to the two-seat carrier-compatible J-15 versions, intended to take on additional roles. Chief among these is the CATOBAR-capable J-15DT electronic warfare aircraft, intended to operate in a role similar to the U.S. Navy’s EA-18G Growler. With its array of external jamming pods, the J-15DT also needs to launch (and recover) at heavier weights to make the most of its potential.

There are also rumors concerning a CATOBAR version of the two-seat J-15S, which could serve as a carrier trainer and/or as a multirole strike platform equivalent to the F/A-18F. Here, again, the EMALS will greatly enhance its capabilities.

Beyond marking another milestone in the rapid evolution of China’s carrier aviation capabilities, the new image suggests that the combination of the J-15T and the catapult-equipped carrier Fujian is beginning to deliver the kind of fully armed launch performance that its ski-jump carriers have long struggled to achieve.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Published on 09/07/2026 – 17:14 GMT+2•Updated
17:19

The European Commission launched an investigation on Thursday into Chinese Peking duck after several EU producers complained of unfairly low prices harming their industry.

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Without disclosing their names, the Commission said that five EU producers had complained that China is unfairly subsidising domestic production via its five-year plan for agricultural modernisation.

The probe comes at a time of heightened tensions between Beijing and Brussels, as the EU seeks to shield its market from cheap Chinese imports, triggering Beijing’s ire as it aims to preserve access to the lucrative European market.

After China repeatedly threatened retaliation over several EU legislative proposals restricting access to EU public procurement and setting strict conditions on foreign investment, the two sides started negotiations last week to ease tensions.

However, the EU’s latest move targeting duck imports could disrupt the talks by hitting China’s agricultural sector for the first time.

It also said that the volume and prices of imports had a “negative impact on the quantities sold, the level of prices charged and market share held by the Union industry,” and that this had resulted in “substantial adverse effects on the overall performance” of the sector.

The Commission’s investigation could result in anti-dumping duties being imposed on Chinese producers to protect the EU market.

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties are among the EU’s main trade defence instruments against China’s aggressive push into its market. However, EU leaders gave the Commission a mandate in June to step up efforts to reduce the EU’s €1 billion-a-day trade deficit with China. They want the EU executive, which has competence over trade policy, to review its trade defence tools and pursue a dialogue with Beijing that delivers tangible results.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič met his Chinese counterpart, Wang Wentao, in Brussels last Monday to kick-start negotiations aimed at restoring a level playing field and addressing trade imbalances, which Brussels said had become “unsustainable”.

The EU already imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024, triggering China’s investigations and sanctions targeting EU brandy, pork and dairy products.

The EU hopes to achieve a breakthrough in negotiations with Beijing by October, when Šefčovič is due to travel to China.

Cut to a seedy alley behind a Chinese restaurant in Rome: A dozen mobsters menace a slight young man who suddenly pulls out a pair of nunchucks. He swings the traditional stick-and-chain weapons and makes quick work of his enemies, who fall one by one, groaning in pain.

The comedic, legendary action scene is from the 1972 film “The Way of the Dragon,” written, directed and starring Bruce Lee. The martial arts star was a trailblazer, allowing Asian Americans to see themselves represented in a strong, positive light on-screen.

And now he has secured a place in California history, becoming the first Chinese American in state history to have a day designated in his honor.

Lee was born in 1940 in San Francisco. His mother was of European descent and his father was a Cantonese opera star who was on tour in the city, affording his son birthright citizenship.

Lee grew up in Hong Kong, where he followed his father’s path as a performer, acting in more than a dozen films as a child and studying the close-quarters southern Chinese martial art Wing Chun.

On May 17, 1959, an 18-year-old Lee returned to San Francisco and eventually made his way to Hollywood. He went on to influence an industry that was at the time bereft of Asian American talent, and helped to popularize the genre of martial arts films and ignite Western interest in Hong Kong action cinema.

In recognition of his contributions, state Assemblymember Matt Haney (D-San Francisco) introduced a bill designating May 17 as “Bruce Lee Day” in California. The bill, signed into law Tuesday by Gov. Gavin Newsom, encourages schools and communities to honor Lee’s life and cultural impact.

Haney has described Lee as a “symbol of pride, resilience and possibility for generations who rarely saw themselves reflected with strength and dignity.”

Lee, who saw himself not only as an actor but also as a poet and philosopher, encountered repeated barriers. Up for the main role in the 1970s television series “Kung Fu,” for example, he was rejected in favor of white actor David Carradine.

In 2020, filmmaker Bao Nguyen sought to show how Lee dispelled anti-Asian sentiment and long-held stereotypes of emasculated Asian men in his ESPN documentary “Be Water.”

“The Asian male was the face of the enemy to many Americans,” Nguyen told The Times in 2020. “It was this vicious cycle of society reflecting media and culture, and media and culture reflecting society. There had to be some kind of intervention there and Bruce, in a way, was that intervention. He was the hero that we hadn’t seen before.”

Lee learned much about the systemic oppression that Black Americans faced from his first student, Jesse Glover, who had been a victim of police brutality.

And scholars have pointed out that, although his films had far-from-perfect politics, they touched on themes of fighting oppression. The 1971 movie “The Big Boss” showed Lee battling alongside laborers. “Fist of Fury” saw him opposing Japanese colonialism and discrimination.

Lee died young in 1973, at age 32 — before he was able to witness the full extent of his stardom. He died just one month before the release of “Enter the Dragon,” which was a box-office sensation and is considered a masterpiece of martial arts filmmaking.

Published on
02/07/2026 – 15:24 GMT+2

European car suppliers and manufacturers are divided over Brussels’ “Made in Europe” strategy, an effort to shield the EU market from Chinese competition.

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The EU car industry is facing fierce competition from China, threatening hundreds of thousands of jobs across the bloc. To address the issue, the EU is preparing the so-called Industrial Accelerator Act, which is designed to favour electric vehicles constructed mostly with European components in public procurement and public support schemes.

However, EU car suppliers and manufacturers disagree over the proposed law, currently under discussion by EU countries and the European Parliament, which sets a 70 percent local content threshold for electric vehicles.

According to the European Association of Automotive Suppliers (CLEPA), the Commission’s proposal is a step in the right direction. Based on a study commissioned from management consultancy Roland Berger that Euronews has seen, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery-electric vehicles manufactured in Europe already contain between 80 percent and 90 percent made-in-Europe components.

Consequently, it considers the Commission’s 70 percent threshold to be achievable.

But the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) is pushing for a different methodology, under which regulators would assess finished vehicles instead of the local content in vehicle components.

“A vehicle is far more than the sum of its parts. Its value also lies in the R&D, advanced engineering and highly skilled workforce behind it,” ACEA said in a position paper published on 1 July.

CLEPA responded that under this methodology, a finished vehicle would require only 50 percent EU-made parts and components, with the remaining 20 percent coming from R&D, design and other activities.

This 20 percentage-point dilution of the requirement for EU-made parts “could result in the loss of 350,000 jobs”, CLEPA warned, saying the Commission’s component-level approach would “safeguard the existing manufacturing base”.

“What we are looking at right now is significant competition from best-cost countries, and the dragon in the room is China,” CLEPA Secretary General Benjamin Krieger told Euronews.

“A ‘Made in Europe’ threshold that ignores where the actual parts are built is a label that ignores the European worker,” he said.

June 30 (UPI) — A U.S. federal judge has sentenced exiled Chinese entrepreneur Guo Wengui to 30 years in prison for defrauding investors of more than $1 billion.

Guo, also known as Ho Wan Kwok and Miles Guo, is a Chinese national who made his fortune in Chinese real estate before fleeing China, in 2014, relocating to the United States around 2015.

He was arrested in March 2023 on a series of fraud and money laundrying charges. Federal prosecutors alleged that, beginning around 2018, he led a conspiracy that defrauded his online followers of more than $1 billion through investment and membership schemes tied to his anti-Chinese Communist Party movement and related business ventures.

In sentencing him on Monday to the three-decade punishment that the prosecutors had requested, Judge Analisa Torres in a Manhattan courtroom said Guo had “preyed on people seeking to bring democracy to China,” The New York Times reported.

During the trial, the prosecutors alleged that in around 2018, he created two nonprofit organizations, which he used to amass followers aligned against the CCP and who were inclined to believe his business advice.

In the years that followed, Guo established several investment opportunities that he advertised to his online followers, who gave him hundreds of millions of dollars over the years.

Prosecutors alleged that Guo had used the money he stole from his followers to line his own pockets, buying himself and cloase relatives luxuries, such as a 50,000-square-foot mansion, a $4.5 million Ferrari sports car and two $36,000 mattresses. He also used the money to finance a $37 million luxury yacht, they said.

Guo denied the accusations.

During sentencing Monday, Torres also imposed ann $889 million forfeiture order against Guo, chastising his “exploitation of a philanthropic purpose, his history of intimidation of critics and his refusal to accept responsibility,” The Guardian reported.

Yanping “Yvette” Wang, Guo’s former chief of staff, was sentenced to 10 years in January 2025 after pleading guilty to related wire fraud and money laundering charges. A second co-defendant, Kinn Ming Je, also known as Willian Je, has been charged with several fraud and money laundering charges.

Guo is also an associate of Steve Bannon, a longtime ally and former top aide to President Donald Trump.

Bannon was arrested in August 2020 aboard a yacht owned by Guo on charges related to a crowdsourced campaign to raise money to build barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Chinese media and think tanks view the United States’ hosting of the FIFA World Cup from a purely geopolitical, economic, and commercial perspective, critically assessing the infrastructure and political climate. Chinese circles see the tournament not merely as a sporting event but as a central tool for the United States to polish its image, bolster its global leadership amidst current international polarization, and advance its political agenda. This perspective is highlighted through several key points, the most important being the geopolitical dimension. Here, Chinese think tanks argue that the tournament reflects the level of competition between major powers, with Washington attempting to use hosting as a soft power tool to project its influence. However, Chinese media, in turn, emphasized the state of sharp international polarization and division, criticizing the political challenges and the wrangling that accompanied the broadcasting negotiations. Furthermore, a number of (commercial considerations) have been raised, with the tournament facing criticism from Chinese media due to its exorbitant cost and the significant time difference between North America and China, leading to a decline in Chinese public interest. This hesitation was reflected in the negotiations, as FIFA incurred financial losses after China Media Group (CMG) signed the broadcasting agreement late and at a price significantly lower than FIFA’s requested.

Regarding the (organizational and policy challenges), Chinese research and media institutions expressed reservations about the tournament’s logistical challenges, particularly the longer travel distances between host cities compared to previous editions, as well as concerns related to US immigration laws and security restrictions. Despite the absence of the Chinese national team from the tournament, China’s commercial involvement was substantial. Beijing demonstrated its active presence through Chinese commercial sponsors, such as Hisense, and sporting goods factories in eastern China, which reaped significant economic benefits from manufacturing tournament flags and souvenirs. Chinese media coverage, particularly through its official channels, was extensive. CGTN, the Chinese state broadcaster, developed comprehensive plans to broadcast and cover the matches, ensuring the event reached millions of Chinese fans across its various platforms.

Furthermore, Chinese state media and intelligence and military think tanks utilized Washington’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup to offer a number of strategic, media, and intellectual analyses regarding China’s calculations in response to American actions. Major events are often used as a primary arena for geopolitical competition between the two superpowers. Beijing’s vision can be summarized by its use of major sporting, cultural, and other events as a political tool. Beijing views Washington’s hosting of major international tournaments or events as more than just sporting or cultural occasions; it sees them as an extension of American information and decision-making strategies aimed at projecting American influence and hegemony globally. While China seeks to highlight international contradictions, Beijing has directed its media apparatus to demonstrate that Washington’s attempts to unilaterally assume leadership or project messages of unity are, in reality, met with sharp division and polarization within the international system. Here, China has attempted to counter American soft power. This media coverage of the FIFA World Cup in the United States reflects a continuous Chinese effort to neutralize Western and American soft power by focusing on structural issues in international relations, such as the absence of multipolarity, and by promoting the Chinese model as an alternative striving for a more balanced world.

In this context, Chinese media and think tanks view the United States’ hosting of the World Cup through the lens of soft power, geopolitical strategies, and trade, while sharply criticizing the infrastructure and political circumstances surrounding the tournament, particularly in the aftermath of the Iran War and a number of global geopolitical upheavals stemming from US policies. Chinese analyses focus on purely commercial interests, criticizing the exorbitant costs of broadcasting rights. Conversely, they highlight the role of leading Chinese companies in profiting from the event by providing innovative and advanced broadcasting technologies and exporting merchandise and fan supplies. However, they also offer several critical observations regarding the infrastructure and political climate. Chinese research centers express critical skepticism about the readiness of US cities, suggesting that complexities related to visa requirements and a strict security and political environment could hinder fans and undermine the freedom of movement necessary for such events.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can discern the perspective of Chinese media and research centers that the United States exploits hosting international sporting and political events as a prominent tool for employing sports to enhance American soft power, attempting to project influence to manage conflict, and solidifying its leadership of the global order. Therefore, Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies have developed a comprehensive media and research plan to expose American polarization worldwide. Conversely, Chinese media and think tanks emphasize Washington’s failure to garner international consensus, highlighting the sharp division and widening gap between Western powers and the rising powers of the Global South. This underscores the mechanism of conflict transformation, where competition is no longer limited to the economic and military spheres but has expanded significantly to encompass soft power tools and media discourse. This reflects a picture of expanded strategic competition and its impact on international stability.

Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, condemns designation, calling it ‘discriminatory’.

The United States has designated Chinese corporate giants Alibaba, BYD and Baidu as companies that support China’s military, expanding its blacklist to some of the country’s best-known commercial brands.

The Pentagon included the firms in an update on Monday that is likely to complicate the fragile detente under way between Washington and Beijing after years of rocky relations.

China’s embassy in Washington, DC, condemned the listing as “discriminatory” and an example of the US government “overstretching” the concept of national security.

“Chinese companies that do business overseas have been strictly observing laws and regulations of their host countries,” an embassy spokesperson said.

“The US should stop its wrong practice and create a fair, just and non-discriminatory environment for Chinese companies.”

Alibaba, BYD and Baidu did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The Pentagon’s list of “Chinese military companies,” which is updated annually, now includes 188 firms, up from 134 in 2025.

Firms included on the list, which was created in 2021, will be barred from consideration for US defence contracts from later this month.

The Pentagon defines “Chinese military companies” as entities owned or controlled by the Chinese military, or that contribute to China’s “military civil fusion”, referring to Beijing’s strategy of melding civilian and defence-related research and innovation.

Companies must also carry out some of their operations in the US to be designated.

The expansion of the blacklist comes less than a month after US President Donald Trump met Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing for a two-day summit aimed at lowering the temperature in their countries’ years-long trade war and tech rivalry.

Alibaba, Baidu, and BYD are among China’s most prominent brands, claiming the top spots in the e-commerce, internet search and electric vehicle markets, respectively.

The addition of several household brands not normally associated with the defence sector mirrors last year’s designation of tech firm Tencent, the owner of the ubiquitous messaging app WeChat.

Other additions to the list include RoboSense Technology, an AI and robotics company with headquarters in Shenzhen, and Hangzhou-based Unitree Robotics.

RoboSense Technology and Unitree Robotics did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Dennis Wilder, a national security expert who worked on China at the CIA and the White House’s National Security Council, expressed scepticism about the feasibility of implementing such a “broad-brush” blacklist.

“Although it may make some US firms wary of engaging with the labelled entities, in fact, many US firms already have deep relationships with these entities, that they are not going to give up unless there are real penalties attached to working commercial deals with them,” Wilder told Al Jazeera.

“Sanctions that range this widely are sanctions that don’t work. Unless the US is willing to decouple from the Chinese economy altogether, these sanctions are simply performative,” Wilder said.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang on Sunday is significant for one reason.

It’s not that they are meeting: The two men met in Beijing just a year ago when China held a massive military parade to mark 80 years since Japan surrendered unconditionally to Allied forces, bringing an end to the second world war.

What’s surprising is that Xi is travelling at all.

The Chinese leader has not travelled to Pyongyang since 2019, having steadily cut down his travel in recent years, and world leaders like US President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin generally come to him these days.

“We need to remember that Xi Jinping has not really travelled abroad that much,” William Yang, Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Northeast Asia, told Al Jazeera. “The growing trend is foreign leaders heading to Beijing to meet with him.

“For Xi Jinping to be the one who decides to travel to Pyongyang, it shows the level of significance that China attaches to this trip.”

Xi averaged about 14 trips a year between 2013 and 2019, but dropped to approximately six a year between 2022 and 2025, according to the Asia Society. In 2020, he made just one overseas trip, and in 2021, he made none, as China grappled with the COVID-19 pandemic.

He may be travelling now, though, amid concerns about North Korea’s relationship with Russia, Yang said.

Senior partner no more?

Traditionally, Beijing played the role of senior partner in the China-North Korea relationship, with North Korea heavily dependent on China for as much as 95 percent of its trade, according to one 2022 estimate from the National Committee on North Korea, a US-based nonprofit.

That dynamic has been changing since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however. North Korea has provided Russia with critical weapons, artillery and manpower and is credited by observers with helping to keep Moscow’s war machine going.

South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy, a government-funded research institute, estimates that since 2023, Moscow has paid North Korea as much as $14.4bn for troop deployments and the export of “artillery, shells, and guided and ballistic missiles”.

The report said that North Korea may only have received between $580m and $1.5bn of that in the form of “goods”, which means there is a “significant possibility that the majority of the payment from Moscow was in the form of ‘sensitive military technology or related precision parts and materials that are difficult to observe via satellite’,” according to a translation.

Although China shares a mutual defence treaty with North Korea, it is still wary of North Korea acquiring new military technology, Yang said.

“Beijing has always been very careful about providing military assistance to North Korea because they do not see a militarily stronger North Korea as necessarily in its favour,” he said. “A North Korea that is militarily emboldened through its relationship with Russia could be a potential source of disruption to the balance of power and status quo on the Korean Peninsula.”

North Korea has already carried out eight missile launches since the start of the year, and in May unveiled a new AI-guided tactical cruise missile, according to North Korean media and the US Naval Institute.

Earlier this week, North Korean state media also released photos of Kim touring a new “weapons-grade nuclear materials” factory, which would be used to expand Pyongyang’s nuclear capability at an “exponential rate”.

Fluctuating tensions

North Korea has technically been at war with South Korea since 1950, with the conflict suspended by a 1953 armistice agreement. The two countries are divided by a 250-kilometre-long (155-mile-long) Demilitarized Zone, splitting the Korean Peninsula.

Tensions have fluctuated dramatically over the years, reaching a recent low point in 2024 when Kim abandoned the long-term goal of Korean unification.

He has largely cut off communications ever since, according to observers. On Friday, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it hopes that Xi’s trip will “play a constructive role in addressing issues related to the Korean Peninsula” – suggesting that Seoul may have lobbied the Chinese leader to try to smooth over relations.

South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young separately told reporters last month that he expects the two leaders to discuss a possible meeting between Kim and Trump later in the year.

Xi may also be alarmed by other security developments in East Asia, including news of a possible military-logistics ‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌support pact between South Korea and Japan, which was raised at the Shangri-La Dialogue of regional defence officials in Singapore last weekend.

While China and South Korea’s relationship fluctuates, its ties with Japan are acrimonious due to longstanding grievances dating back to Imperial Japan’s occupation of China in the 1930s and 1940s. Beijing has also objected to recent moves by Tokyo to expand its de facto military.

A new type of submarine that appears to lack a traditional sail has emerged in China. The same shipyard launched a smaller ‘sailless’ submarine — a technology demonstrator — eight years ago. More recently, a top Chinese shipbuilding conglomerate put forward a concept for an uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) with a broadly comparable hullform. Designs of this kind can offer benefits in terms of speed, maneuverability, and reduced acoustic signature, but also have major drawbacks.

TWZ has obtained imagery of the submarine in question at JN (Jiangnan) Shipyard in Shanghai on June 1, as seen at the top of this story and below, from Vantor (previously Maxar Technologies). The boat, the name and/or designation of which are currently unknown, first appeared there sometime at the end of May, according to Naval News. That outlet was first to report on this development.

From the imagery, the submarine does not have a traditional sail. However, the exact shaping of what is present is also not entirely clear from the view that is currently available. As noted, JN Shipyard is known to have built at least one other ‘sailless’ submarine in the past, which we will come back to later on.

Writing for Naval News, undersea warfare analyst H.I. Sutton has assessed the design to be roughly 394 feet (120 meters) long and to be between 33 and 36 feet (10 and 11 meters) wide. What its intended missions might be are unknown, but this is certainly larger than common diesel-electric submarines (SSK) and even longer than most nuclear fast attack submarines. For comparison, variants of China’s Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), some of the most modern submarines in People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) service today, are approximately 356 to 360 feet (108 to 110 meters long) and 36 feet wide. The official stated length and width of the U.S. Navy’s Virginia class SSNs, across all existing subvariants, are 377 feet (114.8 meters) and 34 feet (10.36 meters), respectively.

We can also see that the submarine at JN Shipyard has an X-form rudder configuration, something that first appeared on a submarine in China in 2024. This offers advantages over cruciform stern arrangements with horizontal and vertical rudders when it comes to maneuverability, efficiency, and safety.

An X-shaped stern is a feature now further associated with a next-generation Chinese attack submarine design commonly, but still unofficially, referred to as the Type 095. Naval News also reported today on the recent launch of what may be another Type 095, which has a traditional sail, at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, hundreds of miles to the north of Shanghai. This appears to have caused some confusion online, with some mistaking the boat at Bohai for the ‘sailless’ type.

The newly emerged submarine at JN Shipyard may also have a shrouded propulsor, which could be a pumpjet type. Pumpjets offer further benefits for quieter operation, especially at higher submerged speeds.

The absence of a traditional sail is still the most notable aspect of the new submarine at JN Shipyard. Omitting a large structure sticking out of the top of the hull helps significantly with streamlining the overall design. Eliminating that drag can allow greater optimization for speed and maneuverability while submerged. It can also help make the submarine quieter and, by extension, harder to detect, even while transiting through an area at higher speeds. This can be especially useful when racing out to threats, even those far away.

Not having a traditional sail could impose certain design constraints. Traditionally, naval submarines have used their sails to mount periscopes and other sensor masts, as well as extendable communication antennas and snorkels to help cycle air without fully resurfacing. That is space that can be used for other purposes, including launchers for countermeasures and general storage.

Above all else, while running on the surface, the sail is key for general navigation and situational awareness. It can also provide an elevated position for local force protection or supporting vertical replenishment (VERTREP) operations. If sufficiently hardened, it can even break through feet of ice during operations in and around the polar regions.

The lack of a sail might reflect a focus on seabed operations far from the surface where mast deployment and other considerations might be less pressing. At the same time, the design’s features could just as easily be centered on improving performance, including the ability to make transits as quickly as possible during blue water operations. It could also offer benefits for shallow-water operations, though we have noted that, overall, it is very large compared to SSKs.

As mentioned, a smaller ‘sailless’ submarine had already emerged at JN Shipyard in 2018. H.I. Sutton previously estimated that design to be around 150 feet (45 meters) long and 15 feet (four to four-and-a-half meters) wide. That submarine also had a non-X-shaped rudder arrangement and what appeared to be an unshrouded propeller. The exact reasons for building that boat and how it has been utilized over the years remain unknown, but it would have at least provided a testbed and technology demonstration platform to explore this design concept, and potentially other capabilities. Whether it was designed for crewed or uncrewed operation, or to be optionally crewed, is not clear, either. The same is true of this new submarine, though it seems unlikely it is uncrewed.

At the Zhuhai Airshow in 2024, the state-run China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) did show a model of an unprecedentedly large, diesel-electric UUV. Its overall design was highly reminiscent, at least in broad strokes, of JN Shipyard’s original ‘sailless’ submarine, as TWZ noted at the time. JN Shipyard is one of many subsidiaries of CSSC.

CSSC said at the time that the drone submarine could be configured to perform a wide array of missions, including launching attacks on enemy vessels, laying mines, supporting special operations forces, and serving as a mothership for smaller uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV). You can read more about all of this here.

Other shipyards and navies around the world have explored low-profile submarine designs in the past, but designs have generally been consigned to the world of paper concepts and limited experimentation. The U.S. Navy, for instance, previously tested a Large Scale Vehicle Range (LSVR) subscale demonstrator submarine with a novel sail structure. The Navy’s Acoustic Research Detachment (ARD) conducted that work in a lake in Bayview, Idaho.

In 2021, the Navy also notably put out a contracting notice calling for concepts for inflatable sail structures, which could combine the benefits of traditional sails and low-profile designs. What degree of work the service may have conducted since then on this Inflatable Deployable Sail System (IDSS) is unclear, but it underscores how important a sail is for general operations on the surface.

The PLAN’s submarine force otherwise continues to grow in terms of capability and capacity, with an increasing number of more modern types. U.S. officials have openly said in the past that the quality of newer Chinese submarines has been getting closer in parity to American designs. All of this is further underscored by the recent appearance of the other new submarine at Bohai. In addition to new nuclear-power designs, China is also understood to be developing at least one design with a hybrid nuclear/conventional propulsion system, referred to as the Type 041 or Zhou class. The first known example of the Type 041 came to light after it looked to have sunk in a shipyard in 2024.

Greater use of nuclear propulsion promises to extend the reach of Chinese submarines in the Pacific and beyond, and is clearly part of the PLAN’s larger vision for naval power projection going forward.

“The PLA Navy is executing a significant strategic shift from diesel-electric to all-nuclear construction, representing a fundamental departure from historical construction patterns,” U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mike Brookes, head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote in prepared remarks ahead of a hearing before members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March.

Brookes also highlighted how the hybrid Type 041, specifically, could offer “greater endurance, potentially filling regional patrol and presence missions more economically than full-size SSNs [attack submarines] and SSGN [guided missile submarines.”

China has significant demands for naval presence, in general, especially to assert its extensive and widely disputed maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere. The PLAN continues to expand the scale and scope of its combat fleets, overall, at a pace that far exceeds that of other navies globally. This includes the U.S. Navy, where the disparity has become increasingly concerning, as TWZ routinely highlights.

More remains to be learned about the newly emerged submarine at JN Shipyard, but it could point to new low-profile designs without traditional sails, possibly to act as the PLAN’s underwater high-speed interceptor, being part of China’s larger future submarine future.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Department of Commerce issues guidance on chip restrictions amid concerns about loopholes in export control regime.

The United States has issued a notice affirming its restrictions on shipments of semiconductors to subsidiaries of Chinese companies located outside China amid concerns about loopholes in Washington’s export control regime.

The Department of Commerce said in the guidance issued on Sunday that its licensing requirements for the export of advanced AI chips applied to all businesses with headquarters or a parent company in China.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which falls under the Commerce Department, said it issued the clarification in response to questions about whether it was enforcing preexisting licence requirements after it had overturned former President Joe Biden’s AI Diffusion Framework.

“The answer is yes,” the BIS said in the notice.

Unveiled in the final days of the Biden administration, the AI Diffusion proposed the implementation of a globe-spanning framework to control access to AI chips, including export caps for all but the closest US allies.

The framework drew backlash from tech firms, including Nvidia, the world’s most valuable chip company, which cast the proposal as a threat to innovation and cross-border collaboration.

President Donald Trump’s administration scrapped the framework last May, ahead of its implementation, citing the “burdensome new regulatory requirements” and the harm it would do to Washington’s diplomatic relations with other countries.

Chip giant Nvidia, whose top-of-the-line Blackwell GPUs are banned for export to China, said it had already been operating in keeping with the clarified rules.

“The guidance reaffirms that NVIDIA’s sales and vetting process is correct – consistent with our existing approach, licences are required to ship controlled products to PRC headquartered companies,” a Nvidia spokesperson told Al Jazeera, using the acronym for the People’s Republic of China.

AMD and Intel, Nvidia’s main competitors in the GPU space, did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

TSMC, which manufactures the most advanced chips on behalf of clients such as Nvidia, did not immediately return an email seeking comment.

The BIS also did not respond to inquiries.

Chris McGuire, a former State Department official who worked on technology policy in the Biden administration, accused the Trump administration of providing Chinese companies a loophole to buy export-controlled chips.

“Chinese companies have been buying these chips, very likely at scale. And because BIS has not updated export control regulations to clearly state what it IS enforcing, all of this was legal,” McGuire said in a post on X.

“This clarification does make clear that Blackwell shipments to China-headquartered companies outside of China are now illegal again – which is good, although obviously we have to see how many shipments have already gone to assess how much damage was done,” McGuire said.

“BIS’ statement acknowledges these shipments have been happening when it says companies who bought chips under this loophole don’t have to stop using them.”

The US has rolled out numerous restrictions on the supply of high-end technology to China, as Washington and Beijing battle for dominance in AI.

In December, Trump announced that he would allow Nvidia to sell its H200 chip to China, in a major loosening of Washington’s export controls.

While not Nvidia’s most advanced chip, the H200 is about six times as powerful as the H20, the most advanced chip previously allowed for export to China.

May 27 (UPI) — Representatives for the Chinese military on Wednesday said forces used electronic interference attacks to drive off a Dutch frigate that was near the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea

The Chinese army’s Southern Theater Command posted on its official social media account that the Dutch ship, the De Ruyter, “illegally intruded into China’s Xisha Islands” and a helicopter stationed onboard had entered Chinese airspace, the South China Morning Post reported. The Paracel Islands are called the Xisha Islands in China.

The islands are about 190 miles from China’s Hainan province. They’ve been under Chinese control since 1974, although Vietnam and Taiwan also claim them.

Chinese forces “took necessary measures including verbal warnings and warning electronic interference,” said Zhai Shichen, representative for the Chinese army’s Southern Theater Command.

“We firmly oppose such acts and solemnly demand that the Dutch side immediately cease its infringement and provocative actions,” Zhai said, USNI News reported. “The Chinese military will maintain a high state of alert at all times and resolutely safeguard China’s national sovereignty, security, and regional peace and stability.”

The Netherlands has not issued a statement on the incident, the South China Morning Post said. It reported that Zhai also said the ship was “extremely liable to trigger misunderstanding and miscalculation” in its actions.

USNI News said the De Ruyter was deployed to the region as part of the five-month-long Pacific Archer mission, which “aims to promote freedom of navigation and foster ties with allies and partners.”

The EU’s new car market maintained steady growth through the first four months of 2026, with nearly 3.8 million vehicles registered, up 4.2% from the same period in 2025. This is according to data published on Wednesday by the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA).

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The figures show a market increasingly dominated by electric and hybrid vehicles, helped by government incentives in major economies and growing competition from Chinese carmakers.

According to ACEA, between January and April 2026, battery-electric cars accounted for 19.7% of the EU market, up from 15.3% a year earlier. Growth was mainly driven by the bloc’s four largest markets, with Italy (+25.5%), Spain (+19.7%), Germany (+6.6%) and France (+2.3%) all recording gains.

In April alone, sales of battery electric vehicles were up by 37.7% in the EU from the same month last year, lifting their market share to 20.6% for the month.

Hybrid-electric vehicles remained the most popular single powertrain choice in April, up 12%, accounting for roughly 36.9% of the month’s sales.

Plug-in hybrids added 16.4%, capturing roughly a 9.8% share in April registrations.

On the other side of the ledger, petrol car registrations fell 16.3% to fewer than 218,500 units, while diesel dropped 17.1% to around 74,000.

Together, petrol and diesel cars accounted for less than 30% of vehicles sold across the EU in April.

European brands performance in 2026

Volkswagen Group retained its position as the bloc’s largest carmaker in the first four months of 2026, accounting for 26.7% of all new registrations, with just over one million units sold, up 2.9% year-on-year.

However, performance varied across the group. Skoda registrations rose 15.5%, and Audi gained 8.6%, while the core Volkswagen brand slipped 3.2%, losing ground across multiple segments.

Stellantis ranked second with a 17.1% market share and over 648,000 units, up a robust 7.8%, driven by a recovery at Fiat of over 32%, and strong gains at Opel and Vauxhall, which together rose 22% in registrations.

Renault Group was the weakest performer in the top three, declining 7.4% to around 384,250 units and accounting for a 10.1% market share, with Dacia registering a particularly sharp fall of more than 15%.

BMW Group and Mercedes-Benz posted gains of 3.9% and 3.8%, respectively, while Toyota and Hyundai Group both recorded modest declines of between 2.5% and 3.1%.

The Chinese surge

The most significant trend in April’s data was the continued rise of Chinese carmakers.

According to ACEA figures, BYD’s EU registrations more than doubled year-on-year in the first four months of 2026, surging 152.9% to more than 71,850 units.

Chery Automobile, through its Omoda, Jaecoo and Jetour brands, grew 267.1% to more than 48,350 units, while Leapmotor, distributing through its joint venture with Stellantis, soared 558.8% to over 28,700 units.

SAIC Motor, owner of the MG brand and the largest Chinese group by EU volume, added a further 10.4% to reach more than 77,000 units.

Combined, Chinese brands accounted for around 6% of EU car registrations between January and April 2026, compared with 3.2% in the same period a year earlier. Across the wider European market, including the UK and EFTA countries, Chinese brands accounted for a combined market share of roughly 7.3% over the same period, up from 3.7% a year earlier.

President Xi Jinping has called on authorities nationwide to learn from the incident.

A gas explosion at a coal mine in China has killed at least 90 people.

State media Xinhua said 247 workers had been on duty underground when the blast ripped through the Liushenyu mine in Qinyuan county, Shanxi province, on Friday.

China’s coal mines are considered among the deadliest in the world due to poor safety standards, weak regulation, and corruption as companies seek to profit from the country’s rapidly expanding economy.

Rescue operations were ongoing as emergency crews continued searching for survivors of the explosion, the deadliest mining disaster reported in China in more than a decade.

The blast occurred shortly after a carbon monoxide alert was issued, with some reports claiming gas levels had exceeded safe limits.

According to state-run broadcaster CGTN, the person responsible for overseeing the mine has been arrested while authorities investigate the cause of the explosion.

President Xi Jinping has urged authorities across China to intensify efforts to prevent major accidents in the wake of Friday’s blast.

“All regions and departments must learn from the lessons of the accident, remain vigilant regarding workplace safety, thoroughly investigate, rectify all types of risks and hidden dangers, and resolutely prevent and curb the occurrence of major and serious accidents,” Xi said.

Video footage posted online from the scene showed several ambulances gathered near the mine.

Shanxi province, where the incident occurred, is China’s main coal-mining region. More than one billion tonnes of coal were extracted there last year, almost a third of the country’s total output.

China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, accounting for more than half of global consumption.

The country is also the world’s largest annual greenhouse gas emitter, while being the biggest producer of renewable energy.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will likely visit North Korea as early as next week, sources said Wednesday.

“We have obtained intelligence indicating that President Xi Jinping will visit North Korea soon,” a high-ranking government official told Yonhap News Agency.

Another government official also said there is a high possibility of Xi visiting North Korea later this month or early next month, noting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi‘s visit to Pyongyang last month and the recent trips by Xi’s security guards and ceremonial staff to the North Korean capital.

During the meeting with Wang, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un expressed willingness to strengthen high-level exchanges and enhance strategic communication with Beijing, as he recalled his visit to China last year.

The two nations mark the 65th anniversary of signing a comprehensive treaty on cooperation this year.

Xi’s possible visit to the reclusive regime also follows summit talks with U.S President Donald Trump in Beijing last week. During the talks, the two leaders reaffirmed their shared goal of denuclearizing North Korea.

A separate government source said the Chinese leader could seek to mediate relations between North Korea and the United States.

During his state visit to China in January, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung asked Xi to help mediate inter-Korean relations, and the Chinese leader responded positively to the request, according to the source.

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