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The United States has continued to attack Iran for a 13th consecutive night on Thursday and explosions were reported in multiple Iranian cities on Friday morning.

In addition to the ongoing attacks, shipping disruptions continue to intensify. Ship tracking data revealed that just one tanker successfully crossed the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday, marking the lowest level since May 7.

However, shipping data from London Stock Exchange Group shows that two Chinese supertankers carrying crude oil from Saudi Arabia successfully exited the Bab al-Mandeb strait on Friday. This is despite the naval blockade Yemen’s Houthis announced against Saudi Arabia on Monday.

Here is a recap of what happened on Thursday night and Friday.

Where did the US attack Iran?

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said that at 01:00 GMT on Friday, it concluded its latest round of strikes against Iran.

CENTCOM said it targeted Iranian military command centres, drone storage facilities, communication networks, coastal surveillance sites and maritime capabilities.

On Friday, Iranian media reported explosions or attacks across multiple Iranian cities. State broadcaster IRIB reported that explosions were reported in Khondab, Khorramabad, Konarak and Jask. Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency reported that two people have been injured following an early morning drone attack on Khorramabad, citing the deputy governor of the western Lorestan province.

Iran’s Mehr news agency reported on Friday that US missile strikes hit the cities of Andimeshk and Omidiyeh in the Khuzestan province. There were no casualties or injuries.

Al Jazeera’s Tohid Assidi reported from the Iranian capital, Tehran, that explosions were heard on Qeshm island, located in the Strait of Hormuz, on Friday.

Attacks on the Iranian port city of Bandar Abbas have injured two people, Iranian media reported on Friday.

Iran’s semi-official Tasnim news agency reported on Friday that four people were killed and five others were injured in a US missile attack near the southwestern city of Ahvaz.

Where did Iran strike in the Gulf?

Bahrain: In a statement carried by Iran’s Mehr news agency, the Iranian army said it used drones to target fuel storage tanks, equipment warehouses and troop living quarters at Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain.

Jordan: The military added that aircraft hangars, maintenance facilities and accommodation sites at the Muwaffaq Salti/Al-Azraq base in Jordan were also hit, warning that any actions against Iran’s interests would undermine regional security and economic stability.

What have leaders on either side said?

On Thursday, US President Donald Trump stepped up his rhetoric against Tehran. He told the US news website Axios that he may launch the largest strikes on Iran yet, after Tehran carried out another wave of retaliatory attacks on US allies in the Gulf, including hitting a telecommunications tower in Kuwait.

Trump said he was “considering a massive attack” that would be “bigger than ever before”.

“I am close to making a decision. We are all set for it,” Trump said.

Separately, Trump threatened, on his Truth Social platform, that if Iran attacked ships, the US would use Tehran’s frozen assets to pay for repairs.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned on Friday that using frozen state assets to pay for future claims sets a dangerous global precedent.

“Seizing another nation’s assets to pay for unrelated future claims is an incendiary precedent,” Araghchi wrote on X.

He cautioned that “those who celebrate or profit from such funds should remember: once governments normalise confiscation, no one’s assets are safe. Ensuing chaos will not be pretty or peaceful”.

The Australian Army has shared photos showing one of its M1A2 Abrams outfitted as a surrogate enemy platform, specifically to represent a People’s Liberation Army main battle tank. Vehicles meant to visually reflect an adversarial platform are a regular feature of exercises involving an Opposing Force (OPFOR). The depiction also reflects Australia’s growing emphasis on preparing for high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific, and an Australian Defense Force that’s increasingly focusing its training and force structure on the challenges posed by China’s rapidly expanding military capabilities.

The photos were published on the Facebook account of the Australian Army’s School of Armor. Located at the Puckapunyal Military Area in Victoria, southeastern Australia, this serves as the army’s center of excellence for mounted combat and armored fighting vehicle training.

According to the school, this specific tank was prepared by soldiers from B Squadron, 3rd/4th Cavalry Regiment, as part of the OPFOR element for the Royal Australian Armored Corps Officer Basic Course (ROBC), which includes field training assessments. The latest ROBC will culminate in Exercise Tungsten Forge/Gauntlet Strike, a combined-arms tactical training exercise, and a capstone event for junior officers learning mechanized warfare and tank command. “Good luck to the junior officers as they attempt to outmaneuver a seasoned enemy commander,” the School of Armor declared in the caption accompanying the photos.

The most obvious aspect of the M1A2 Abrams’ transformation is its People’s Liberation Army-style ‘digital’ camouflage scheme, with prominent blocks in four colors — including bright green — over the standard three-tone camouflage. The tank is also fitted with dummy external fuel tanks on the rear of the turret. These are a common feature of Russian and Chinese tank designs, albeit fitted on the rear of the hull, something that’s not possible on the Abrams due to the exhaust outlet.

The end result is an Abrams that’s visually similar to a Type 99, China’s first mass-produced third-generation main battle tank, and the most important in the People’s Liberation Army inventory.

It’s noteworthy, too, that the Abrams’ turret side appears to have the slogan ‘Bing Chilling’ applied. This should be a reference to a video-based meme in which wrestler and actor John Cena is shown saying ‘ice cream’ in Mandarin — words that can be phonetically written as ‘Bing Chilling.’

Overall, the primary objective of surrogate platforms like these is to replicate the visual appearance of potential adversary vehicles, not their exact capabilities or configurations. These surrogate platforms are designed as stand-ins rather than one-for-one copies of foreign equipment. Fielding visually representative vehicles during OPFOR exercises adds an extra layer of realism to training, helping troops practice target recognition, vehicle identification, and other battlefield observation skills under more authentic conditions.

It is possible that the Abrams will additionally be fitted with training devices designed to simulate the firing capabilities and vulnerability of specific adversary vehicles. This can be done using tools like the Instrumentable-Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (I-MILES), a laser-based training aid.

Under a roughly $2.5-billion deal, Australia is getting 75 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks, together with armored support vehicles. The Abrams are being procured under the Main Battle Tank Upgrade, formally known as LAND 907 Phase 2, and the U.S. government approved the sale of these new vehicles to Australia via Foreign Military Sales channels in 2021. Meanwhile, Canberra agreed to provide Ukraine with 49 of its older M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks.

The M1A2 SEPv3 — or System Enhancement Program version 3 — was developed by the U.S. Army to address lessons learned during fighting in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and represents a major advance over the Australian Army’s previous M1A1 (AIM) variants, 59 of which were acquired second-hand from the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The first of the new tanks were delivered to Australia in 2024.

The fact that the Australian Abrams is very much a frontline vehicle, available in limited numbers, explains the cosmetic nature of the OPFOR version. After the exercise is completed, it can be rapidly returned to its normal configuration.

This separates it from more bespoke surrogate enemy platforms, like those used by the U.S. Army’s National Training Center, for example, which relies on visually modified (VISMOD) M113 and Humvee-type vehicles to field surrogate Russian-made T-72s and BTR-90s, among others.

It is not clear whether the Australian Army’s School of Armor has prepared additional Abrams as surrogates, but it does describe “in-service armored fighting vehicles” (plural) as having been adapted. Depending on the scale of the exercise, other candidates might include Chinese infantry fighting vehicles or self-propelled artillery.

At the same time, the People’s Liberation Army is also preparing for a potential conflict by training with surrogate platforms that represent a Western enemy. This is part of a much wider Chinese military investment in replicas and advanced training centers.

Last year, TWZ reported on China’s use of trucks designed to mimic the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), soon after the first examples of the U.S.-made system were delivered to Taiwan. The surrogate vehicles were painted in Republic of Taiwan Army-style camouflage. HIMARS is also used by the Australian Army.

Wherever they are being used, surrogate vehicles give training centers a cost-effective way to replicate foreign military equipment without acquiring and maintaining actual allied or adversary vehicles. Whether elaborate or more rudimentary, VISMODs provide a greater degree of visual realism, while their performance and other capabilities can increasingly be simulated digitally during exercises.

At the same time, platforms chosen as surrogates also offer a snapshot of the strategic priorities and perceived threats of the era.

In this case, the ‘Chinese-look’ Abrams reflects how Australia’s defense posture has shifted significantly in recent years toward preparing for the prospect of high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific, with China’s expanding military capabilities serving as the principal driver.

In its 2023 Defense Strategic Review and subsequent National Defense Strategy, the Australian government placed greater emphasis on deterrence by denial, long-range strike, and the ability to operate alongside the United States and regional partners.

While Canberra tends to avoid explicitly identifying Beijing as an adversary, Australia’s force modernization — including the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS, long-range and hypersonic missiles, enhanced northern basing — is clearly oriented toward countering the challenges posed by the People’s Liberation Army in a potential Indo-Pacific contingency. Increasingly realistic exercises centered on peer threats, such as Chinese tanks, provide further evidence of this.

Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com

A senior North Korean party official and China’s top political adviser have met in Pyongyang and discussed ways to strengthen bilateral exchanges and cooperation, the North’s state media said Thursday.

Jo Yong-won, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), held talks Wednesday, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Wang, China’s fourth-ranking official, is leading a Chinese party and government delegation on a three-day visit to North Korea through Friday to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the two countries.

During the talks, Jo said the rapidly changing international political situation “has required the two countries to further strengthen the militant unity, support and solidarity and steadily intensify and develop the friendly and cooperative relations” based on the spirit of the treaty.

Jo also said bilateral ties have entered a new stage of development under the leadership of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping, expressing Pyongyang’s willingness to expand strategic communication and cooperation across various sectors.

Wang said the friendship treaty has provided a legal foundation for consolidating the “militant friendship formed at the cost of blood” between the two countries.

He also reaffirmed China’s commitment to elevating bilateral ties to a higher level in line with the consensus reached by Xi and Kim during their summit in Pyongyang in June, according to the KCNA.

The two sides discussed ways to deepen party-to-party exchanges and expand cooperation in various fields, including the economy and culture, with the aim of promoting the well-being of their peoples, the report said.

Wang’s visit comes days after North Korean Premier Pak Thae-song traveled to China to attend events marking the treaty anniversary, where he met with Xi and other senior Chinese leaders.

The exchange of high-level delegations has highlighted increasingly active contacts between Pyongyang and Beijing as the two sides seek to reaffirm their traditionally close ties and deepen cooperation.

“We are closely monitoring the possibility of a meeting between Wang and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, as well as any follow-up cooperation that may emerge from the talks,” an official at Seoul’s unification ministry told reporters.

He added the government is also paying attention to the presence of officials involved in urban management at the talks, saying it could signal discussions on cooperation in the economic and urban development sectors.

The latest exchanges reflect efforts by Pyongyang and Beijing to strengthen strategic communication and party-to-party ties, though it remains to be seen whether the current pace of high-level exchanges will continue beyond events marking the treaty anniversary, the official said.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

Satellite imagery shows China has built what looks to be a new pattern of hardened structures with retractable roofs at a key missile test and training base in Inner Mongolia. Since the late 2010s, this base has also played a key role in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) dramatic expansion of its silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities. The more recent additions to the facility appear to be too small and shallow for this purpose. A new report posits they could be used to fire smaller ballistic and/or cruise missiles, and might point to plans for a new “conventional quick-strike capability.”

The China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), part of the U.S. Air Force’s Air University, first called attention to the two new structures yesterday. Though CASI published the report, it stressed that the “opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author,” Eli Tirk, and “do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.” Tirk is a member of CASI’s staff.

“The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has constructed an unknown type of fixed launch system at the 1st Test and Training District in Jilantai that appears capable of launching multiple missiles,” Tirk writes. “Construction began sometime in late 2022, and, at least externally, appeared to be near completion by late 2023.”

The report includes satellite images of the site taken in September and December 2022, as well as January of this year, as seen above and below.

“The excavation for the northern launcher … measures roughly 12.5 meters [40 feet] deep when the image was captured [in September 2022]. While it is possible that this foundation was dug deeper, it is not likely that it would have been significantly deeper, given the potential size of the finished interior of the launch system,” according to Tirk. “The limited imagery available of the finished structure prior to the installation of the launcher closure door restricts more accurate measurement, but this structure appears to be somewhere between 6.4 meters and 11.8 meters [21 to 38 feet] in depth.”

Additional satellite imagery TWZ has reviewed from PlanetLabs shows the rectangular retractable roofs to be approximately 65.5 feet (20 meters) long and just over 21 feet (6.5 meters) wide. The roofs also look to open by sliding sideways along three large rails.

There is at least one other large structure at the site, which could be used for various support functions. There may be additional infrastructure underground. It is also worth noting here that the area with the new hardened structures is connected by road to an earlier facility immediately to the northeast. The tertiary site has several additional large structures contained within a clearly visible perimeter wall.

The roof design, at least, has some broad similarities to the covers on silos associated with older DF-5-series ICBMs, which are also rectangular in shape. For further comparison, the cover on a known ICBM test silo at Wuzhai, some 350 miles to the East of Jilantai, is nearly 74 feet (22.5 meters) long and around 29.5 feet (9 meters) wide. It also slides open to one side along two large rails. Underneath is a tubular silo that would have to be at least around 131 feet (40 meters) deep based on the dimensions of DF-5.

Silos constructed at Jilantai and other sites in China since the late 2010s, associated with newer DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs, have completely different lid designs.

The new structures appear “to have a shorter depth than silos intended for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), suggesting that it may support short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and cruise missiles,” per Tirk’s assessment. “Assuming the actual depth of the launch system is closer to the maximum range, these measurements suggest that these structures would likely be able to support up to an MRBM-class missile, assuming the roughly 10-meter length [nearly 33 feet] of a DF-21 or 11-meter length [approximately 36 feet] of a DF-17. It is also highly likely that this launch structure could easily accommodate SRBMs and cruise missiles.”

The DF-21 is a traditional MRBM design, and there is an anti-ship variant with a reentry vehicle capable of a certain degree of maneuvering in the terminal phase of flight. Though MRBM-sized, the DF-17 is topped with a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and functions in a completely different manner from typical ballistic missiles. In general, hypersonic weapons of this type offer benefits when it comes to penetrating past enemy defenses and for prosecuting time-sensitive targets at long ranges, as you can learn more about here.

China’s Dong-Feng 21 “carrier killer” Salvo Launch

“While there may be space within this launch structure to store a small number of missiles horizontally that are erected vertically prior to launch, a more efficient configuration appears to be a vertical launch system,” Tirk adds. “A vertical launch system would enable the massing of fires for effect, reduce signatures, and maintain the flexibility to employ a variety of different munitions from a single launcher simultaneously, enabling these units to conduct rapid strikes against numerous target types.”

How missiles would be loaded into the launch system is unclear and would depend on its exact design. A specialized loading vehicle or at least a crane might be necessary. There is no indication that the structures allow for road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers to simply drive inside and fire through the open roof.

Tirk also raises the possibility that the site could be tied to Chinese ballistic missile defense developments. The line between ballistic missiles and mid-course anti-ballistic missile interceptors, as well as ground-launched anti-satellite interceptors, is often blurry. The U.S. Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) is notably a silo-launched design, as is Russia’s A-135.

However, Tirk also notes that the base at Jilantai primarily serves the PLARF. This branch of the PLA is not known to have a major missile or air defense role. That responsibility largely falls to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). There are no signs of radars or other features associated with these missions, either. As TWZ has previously reported on in detail, we have seen different types of hardened and unhardened structures with retractable roofs emerge near the border with India and on islands in the South China Sea that do look to be air defense sites.

Other significant additions to the facilities at Jilantai have been observed in recent years. As already noted, this has been especially heavily intertwined with China’s construction of hundreds of new ICBM silos and associated infrastructure spread across three separate fields in the north and western ends of the country.

Overall, Tirk posits that the new structures at Jilantai might reflect “an intent to field a conventional quick-strike capability for a counter-intervention mission set, or possibly to conduct strikes against Taiwan, both of which would provide the PLA with additional capabilities to influence U.S. strategic decision-making.”

“A conventional quick strike capability, like that provided by a vertical launch system, could make PLA leadership more confident in their ability to compel Taiwan and U.S. behaviors during a crisis by threatening or conducting rapid preparatory strikes or counterintervention fires in the early stages of a conflict,” he adds. “Building out these launch systems in sufficient quantities could allow the PLA to rapidly escalate from a quarantine or blockade of Taiwan to conducting elements of a massive preparatory fires campaign against targets on Taiwan, U.S. bases in the first island chain, or U.S. Navy task groups if positioned along the coast.”

“Fixed launching options, however, are difficult to conceal, protect with active defenses and – depending on their location – potentially of limited utility for continued use after their first launch. Expansive investment in this type of system may provide significant “use or lose” incentives to the PLA leadership in the event of an escalating crisis,” he also notes. “It is currently unclear how many of these systems the PLARF intends to construct, which PLARF Base they will be deployed under, and the specific mission set they are intended to support.”

There is still the possibility that these structures could serve another purpose, even just within the PLARF. In particular, if the foundation was dug deeper, this could fundamentally change the assessment. From the outside, the roofs do still look to be too narrow for there to be a traditional silo underneath for any of China’s known ICBMs. That being said, a deeper foundation could accommodate intermediate ballistic missiles (IRBM) or hypersonic types that use larger ballistic missile-type boosters, but that are still smaller than an ICBM. The DF-26 family of IRBMs, at least some variants of which are understood to be capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads, is a particularly key component of the PLARF’s arsenal, and might also benefit from a new fixed launch infrastructure. Like the DF-21, there is also an anti-ship version of the DF-26.

China tests DF-26 missile destroying Mock Aircraft Carrier

The hardened structures with retractable roofs could conceal other assets beyond launchers for any kind of missile. They could have a more specialized testing role, rather than one intended to lead to an operational capability, too. TWZ has previously highlighted other hangar-like structures with retractable roofs, some of which are camouflaged, in an area known as Korla East in the western end of the country. PLAN facilities in this region have been tied to work on missile defense, anti-satellite, directed energy weapon, and electromagnetic pulse technologies, as you can read more about here.

Regardless, the new structures at the base in Jilantai do reflect a broader trend when it comes to hardened military infrastructure in China, as well as elsewhere globally. As we wrote last year, after the emergence of the apparent new pattern of hardened air defense sites near China’s border with India:

“The shelters with retractable roofs at the sites in Gar County and near Pangong Lake also highlight a larger trend when it comes to physical hardening, or at least ‘enclosing,’ that has been observed at Chinese military facilities in recent years. There has been a particularly visible surge in the construction of new hardened aircraft shelters, as well as unhardened, but fully enclosed hangars, at air bases across China, including ones situated on the Tibetan Plateau.”

China has completed the construction of 36 hardened aircraft shelters,new administrative blocks& a new apron at its Lhunze airbase in Tibet. Gives China the option of forward-deploying fighter aircraft & drone systems in its arsenal & reduces the response time needed for the IAF pic.twitter.com/g3kRXpyuRg

— Varun Karthikeyan (@Varun55484761) October 29, 2025

PLA Air Force had 370 Hardened Air Shelters (HAS) and 1100 regular ones in 2010. This increased to 800+ and 2300+ respectively in 2024, according to Hudson Institute.

Storage tunnels dug up in mountains and hardened storage sites for missiles and other war supplies are extra. pic.twitter.com/DQeQbXnGN9

— Jaidev Jamwal (@JaidevJamwal) January 21, 2025

“Vast fields of new silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles have also been built in the western end of China over the past few years. This is all on top of the PLA’s existing array of hardened infrastructure, which includes deeply buried air and naval bases.”

“Chinese construction of new hardened and unhardened aircraft shelters, in particular, is reflective of larger global trends, including in Russia, North Korea, and Iran, as well. It has also stood in notable contrast to the lack of such developments in the United States, something that has become a topic of heated debate, which TWZ has been tracking very closely.”

“Growing threats posed by long-range, one-way attack drones, which offer a relatively low-cost way to launch large volume strikes, especially against fixed targets like air bases and air defense sites, have become a particularly significant factor in the hardening debate. Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb also underscored the threats that smaller, shorter-range drones can pose to aircraft and other assets out in the open, and in areas far away from active combat zones. Drones could also be layered in with the many other methods of attack that would be used against the same array of targets.”

Though questions remain about their exact purpose, and the concepts of operations behind them, the new hardened structures with retractable roofs in Jilantai might be a sign of things to come.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

An image has appeared, apparently for the first time, showing a Chinese J-15T carrier-based fighter launching while carrying four anti-ship missiles. The photo offers the clearest indication yet that China’s rapidly evolving carrier force is overcoming one of its longstanding operational constraints: getting heavily loaded strike fighters airborne from its flattops.

The image, at the top of this story, shows a J-15T in full afterburner moments before leaving the deck of the Fujian, the first People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) carrier equipped with catapults. The fighter is armed with four YJ-83K anti-ship missiles — double the number previously seen carried by a J-15 — amounting to a weapons load of roughly 6,400 pounds before accounting for any additional stores that may not be visible.

Previously, in fact, it seems that the latest J-15T version has only ever been seen with a single YJ-83K training round, while the aircraft was still in prototype form.

The YJ-83K is a widely used subsonic anti-ship missile, broadly equivalent to the U.S.-made AGM-84 Harpoon. The radar-guided, turbojet-powered weapon has a reported range of around 112 miles and is armed with a 360-pound high-explosive, semi-armor-piercing warhead. The YJ-83K is a sea-skimming missile cruising at an altitude of 65-100 feet, before dropping down to 16-24 feet during the terminal phase. Most significantly, each of these weapons weighs around 1,600 pounds.

The very reason behind the development of the J-15T was to maximize the potential of Flanker operations from the Fujian, which is equipped with an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), and subsequent carriers. As such, the J-15T is primarily distinguished from the original J-15 in being equipped for catapult takeoff but assisted recovery (CATOBAR) operations, as well as short takeoff but assisted recovery (STOBAR) operations.

Videos provide a comparison of a STOBAR J-15 carrier launch and a CATOBAR J-15T launch from Fujian:

The previous two PLAN aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, both employ ‘ski-jump’ takeoff ramps to launch fixed-wing STOBAR aircraft.

As we have discussed in the past, the primary benefit of the J-15T is its ability to be catapult-launched from a carrier with a heavier payload of fuel and weapons. After all, the Flanker airframe has always been able to carry impressive fuel and weapons loads, but this has been strictly limited when configured for STOBAR operations. This is something that has hampered Russian Navy carrier operations, as much as Chinese ones.

Also significant is the fact that the J-15T has started to introduce domestically produced WS-10H turbofans in place of the Russian-made AL-31F engines previously found on production J-15s.

In the past, it appears that the heaviest loads seen carried by STOBAR J-15s launched from the Liaoning or Shandong comprised two YJ-83Ks and four air-to-air missiles, or, for air defense, four PL-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles and two short-range PL-8B air-to-air missiles.

Regardless, the fact that J-15Ts are now launching from the carrier with weapons loads of around 6,400 pounds is significant.

As well as increasing the anti-shipping potential of the J-15T, the same payload could be translated into additional fuel or other weapons loads.

Among the other weapons options for the jet are the more advanced PL-10 short-range and PL-15 medium-range air-to-air missiles. The J-15T has also been noted with the long-range YJ-15 anti-ship missile, and with a ‘buddy’ refueling pod. Other versions of the YJ-83K that could find their way onto the J-15 include the improved YJ-83KH, which features an imaging-infrared seeker and extended range.

The ability for the J-15T to launch from a catapult-equipped carrier with a heavier payload doesn’t just impact the potential of the strike fighter. It will also translate to the two-seat carrier-compatible J-15 versions, intended to take on additional roles. Chief among these is the CATOBAR-capable J-15DT electronic warfare aircraft, intended to operate in a role similar to the U.S. Navy’s EA-18G Growler. With its array of external jamming pods, the J-15DT also needs to launch (and recover) at heavier weights to make the most of its potential.

There are also rumors concerning a CATOBAR version of the two-seat J-15S, which could serve as a carrier trainer and/or as a multirole strike platform equivalent to the F/A-18F. Here, again, the EMALS will greatly enhance its capabilities.

Beyond marking another milestone in the rapid evolution of China’s carrier aviation capabilities, the new image suggests that the combination of the J-15T and the catapult-equipped carrier Fujian is beginning to deliver the kind of fully armed launch performance that its ski-jump carriers have long struggled to achieve.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Published on 09/07/2026 – 17:14 GMT+2•Updated
17:19

The European Commission launched an investigation on Thursday into Chinese Peking duck after several EU producers complained of unfairly low prices harming their industry.

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Without disclosing their names, the Commission said that five EU producers had complained that China is unfairly subsidising domestic production via its five-year plan for agricultural modernisation.

The probe comes at a time of heightened tensions between Beijing and Brussels, as the EU seeks to shield its market from cheap Chinese imports, triggering Beijing’s ire as it aims to preserve access to the lucrative European market.

After China repeatedly threatened retaliation over several EU legislative proposals restricting access to EU public procurement and setting strict conditions on foreign investment, the two sides started negotiations last week to ease tensions.

However, the EU’s latest move targeting duck imports could disrupt the talks by hitting China’s agricultural sector for the first time.

It also said that the volume and prices of imports had a “negative impact on the quantities sold, the level of prices charged and market share held by the Union industry,” and that this had resulted in “substantial adverse effects on the overall performance” of the sector.

The Commission’s investigation could result in anti-dumping duties being imposed on Chinese producers to protect the EU market.

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties are among the EU’s main trade defence instruments against China’s aggressive push into its market. However, EU leaders gave the Commission a mandate in June to step up efforts to reduce the EU’s €1 billion-a-day trade deficit with China. They want the EU executive, which has competence over trade policy, to review its trade defence tools and pursue a dialogue with Beijing that delivers tangible results.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič met his Chinese counterpart, Wang Wentao, in Brussels last Monday to kick-start negotiations aimed at restoring a level playing field and addressing trade imbalances, which Brussels said had become “unsustainable”.

The EU already imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024, triggering China’s investigations and sanctions targeting EU brandy, pork and dairy products.

The EU hopes to achieve a breakthrough in negotiations with Beijing by October, when Šefčovič is due to travel to China.

Cut to a seedy alley behind a Chinese restaurant in Rome: A dozen mobsters menace a slight young man who suddenly pulls out a pair of nunchucks. He swings the traditional stick-and-chain weapons and makes quick work of his enemies, who fall one by one, groaning in pain.

The comedic, legendary action scene is from the 1972 film “The Way of the Dragon,” written, directed and starring Bruce Lee. The martial arts star was a trailblazer, allowing Asian Americans to see themselves represented in a strong, positive light on-screen.

And now he has secured a place in California history, becoming the first Chinese American in state history to have a day designated in his honor.

Lee was born in 1940 in San Francisco. His mother was of European descent and his father was a Cantonese opera star who was on tour in the city, affording his son birthright citizenship.

Lee grew up in Hong Kong, where he followed his father’s path as a performer, acting in more than a dozen films as a child and studying the close-quarters southern Chinese martial art Wing Chun.

On May 17, 1959, an 18-year-old Lee returned to San Francisco and eventually made his way to Hollywood. He went on to influence an industry that was at the time bereft of Asian American talent, and helped to popularize the genre of martial arts films and ignite Western interest in Hong Kong action cinema.

In recognition of his contributions, state Assemblymember Matt Haney (D-San Francisco) introduced a bill designating May 17 as “Bruce Lee Day” in California. The bill, signed into law Tuesday by Gov. Gavin Newsom, encourages schools and communities to honor Lee’s life and cultural impact.

Haney has described Lee as a “symbol of pride, resilience and possibility for generations who rarely saw themselves reflected with strength and dignity.”

Lee, who saw himself not only as an actor but also as a poet and philosopher, encountered repeated barriers. Up for the main role in the 1970s television series “Kung Fu,” for example, he was rejected in favor of white actor David Carradine.

In 2020, filmmaker Bao Nguyen sought to show how Lee dispelled anti-Asian sentiment and long-held stereotypes of emasculated Asian men in his ESPN documentary “Be Water.”

“The Asian male was the face of the enemy to many Americans,” Nguyen told The Times in 2020. “It was this vicious cycle of society reflecting media and culture, and media and culture reflecting society. There had to be some kind of intervention there and Bruce, in a way, was that intervention. He was the hero that we hadn’t seen before.”

Lee learned much about the systemic oppression that Black Americans faced from his first student, Jesse Glover, who had been a victim of police brutality.

And scholars have pointed out that, although his films had far-from-perfect politics, they touched on themes of fighting oppression. The 1971 movie “The Big Boss” showed Lee battling alongside laborers. “Fist of Fury” saw him opposing Japanese colonialism and discrimination.

Lee died young in 1973, at age 32 — before he was able to witness the full extent of his stardom. He died just one month before the release of “Enter the Dragon,” which was a box-office sensation and is considered a masterpiece of martial arts filmmaking.

Published on
02/07/2026 – 15:24 GMT+2

European car suppliers and manufacturers are divided over Brussels’ “Made in Europe” strategy, an effort to shield the EU market from Chinese competition.

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The EU car industry is facing fierce competition from China, threatening hundreds of thousands of jobs across the bloc. To address the issue, the EU is preparing the so-called Industrial Accelerator Act, which is designed to favour electric vehicles constructed mostly with European components in public procurement and public support schemes.

However, EU car suppliers and manufacturers disagree over the proposed law, currently under discussion by EU countries and the European Parliament, which sets a 70 percent local content threshold for electric vehicles.

According to the European Association of Automotive Suppliers (CLEPA), the Commission’s proposal is a step in the right direction. Based on a study commissioned from management consultancy Roland Berger that Euronews has seen, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery-electric vehicles manufactured in Europe already contain between 80 percent and 90 percent made-in-Europe components.

Consequently, it considers the Commission’s 70 percent threshold to be achievable.

But the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) is pushing for a different methodology, under which regulators would assess finished vehicles instead of the local content in vehicle components.

“A vehicle is far more than the sum of its parts. Its value also lies in the R&D, advanced engineering and highly skilled workforce behind it,” ACEA said in a position paper published on 1 July.

CLEPA responded that under this methodology, a finished vehicle would require only 50 percent EU-made parts and components, with the remaining 20 percent coming from R&D, design and other activities.

This 20 percentage-point dilution of the requirement for EU-made parts “could result in the loss of 350,000 jobs”, CLEPA warned, saying the Commission’s component-level approach would “safeguard the existing manufacturing base”.

“What we are looking at right now is significant competition from best-cost countries, and the dragon in the room is China,” CLEPA Secretary General Benjamin Krieger told Euronews.

“A ‘Made in Europe’ threshold that ignores where the actual parts are built is a label that ignores the European worker,” he said.

June 30 (UPI) — A U.S. federal judge has sentenced exiled Chinese entrepreneur Guo Wengui to 30 years in prison for defrauding investors of more than $1 billion.

Guo, also known as Ho Wan Kwok and Miles Guo, is a Chinese national who made his fortune in Chinese real estate before fleeing China, in 2014, relocating to the United States around 2015.

He was arrested in March 2023 on a series of fraud and money laundrying charges. Federal prosecutors alleged that, beginning around 2018, he led a conspiracy that defrauded his online followers of more than $1 billion through investment and membership schemes tied to his anti-Chinese Communist Party movement and related business ventures.

In sentencing him on Monday to the three-decade punishment that the prosecutors had requested, Judge Analisa Torres in a Manhattan courtroom said Guo had “preyed on people seeking to bring democracy to China,” The New York Times reported.

During the trial, the prosecutors alleged that in around 2018, he created two nonprofit organizations, which he used to amass followers aligned against the CCP and who were inclined to believe his business advice.

In the years that followed, Guo established several investment opportunities that he advertised to his online followers, who gave him hundreds of millions of dollars over the years.

Prosecutors alleged that Guo had used the money he stole from his followers to line his own pockets, buying himself and cloase relatives luxuries, such as a 50,000-square-foot mansion, a $4.5 million Ferrari sports car and two $36,000 mattresses. He also used the money to finance a $37 million luxury yacht, they said.

Guo denied the accusations.

During sentencing Monday, Torres also imposed ann $889 million forfeiture order against Guo, chastising his “exploitation of a philanthropic purpose, his history of intimidation of critics and his refusal to accept responsibility,” The Guardian reported.

Yanping “Yvette” Wang, Guo’s former chief of staff, was sentenced to 10 years in January 2025 after pleading guilty to related wire fraud and money laundering charges. A second co-defendant, Kinn Ming Je, also known as Willian Je, has been charged with several fraud and money laundering charges.

Guo is also an associate of Steve Bannon, a longtime ally and former top aide to President Donald Trump.

Bannon was arrested in August 2020 aboard a yacht owned by Guo on charges related to a crowdsourced campaign to raise money to build barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Chinese media and think tanks view the United States’ hosting of the FIFA World Cup from a purely geopolitical, economic, and commercial perspective, critically assessing the infrastructure and political climate. Chinese circles see the tournament not merely as a sporting event but as a central tool for the United States to polish its image, bolster its global leadership amidst current international polarization, and advance its political agenda. This perspective is highlighted through several key points, the most important being the geopolitical dimension. Here, Chinese think tanks argue that the tournament reflects the level of competition between major powers, with Washington attempting to use hosting as a soft power tool to project its influence. However, Chinese media, in turn, emphasized the state of sharp international polarization and division, criticizing the political challenges and the wrangling that accompanied the broadcasting negotiations. Furthermore, a number of (commercial considerations) have been raised, with the tournament facing criticism from Chinese media due to its exorbitant cost and the significant time difference between North America and China, leading to a decline in Chinese public interest. This hesitation was reflected in the negotiations, as FIFA incurred financial losses after China Media Group (CMG) signed the broadcasting agreement late and at a price significantly lower than FIFA’s requested.

Regarding the (organizational and policy challenges), Chinese research and media institutions expressed reservations about the tournament’s logistical challenges, particularly the longer travel distances between host cities compared to previous editions, as well as concerns related to US immigration laws and security restrictions. Despite the absence of the Chinese national team from the tournament, China’s commercial involvement was substantial. Beijing demonstrated its active presence through Chinese commercial sponsors, such as Hisense, and sporting goods factories in eastern China, which reaped significant economic benefits from manufacturing tournament flags and souvenirs. Chinese media coverage, particularly through its official channels, was extensive. CGTN, the Chinese state broadcaster, developed comprehensive plans to broadcast and cover the matches, ensuring the event reached millions of Chinese fans across its various platforms.

Furthermore, Chinese state media and intelligence and military think tanks utilized Washington’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup to offer a number of strategic, media, and intellectual analyses regarding China’s calculations in response to American actions. Major events are often used as a primary arena for geopolitical competition between the two superpowers. Beijing’s vision can be summarized by its use of major sporting, cultural, and other events as a political tool. Beijing views Washington’s hosting of major international tournaments or events as more than just sporting or cultural occasions; it sees them as an extension of American information and decision-making strategies aimed at projecting American influence and hegemony globally. While China seeks to highlight international contradictions, Beijing has directed its media apparatus to demonstrate that Washington’s attempts to unilaterally assume leadership or project messages of unity are, in reality, met with sharp division and polarization within the international system. Here, China has attempted to counter American soft power. This media coverage of the FIFA World Cup in the United States reflects a continuous Chinese effort to neutralize Western and American soft power by focusing on structural issues in international relations, such as the absence of multipolarity, and by promoting the Chinese model as an alternative striving for a more balanced world.

In this context, Chinese media and think tanks view the United States’ hosting of the World Cup through the lens of soft power, geopolitical strategies, and trade, while sharply criticizing the infrastructure and political circumstances surrounding the tournament, particularly in the aftermath of the Iran War and a number of global geopolitical upheavals stemming from US policies. Chinese analyses focus on purely commercial interests, criticizing the exorbitant costs of broadcasting rights. Conversely, they highlight the role of leading Chinese companies in profiting from the event by providing innovative and advanced broadcasting technologies and exporting merchandise and fan supplies. However, they also offer several critical observations regarding the infrastructure and political climate. Chinese research centers express critical skepticism about the readiness of US cities, suggesting that complexities related to visa requirements and a strict security and political environment could hinder fans and undermine the freedom of movement necessary for such events.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can discern the perspective of Chinese media and research centers that the United States exploits hosting international sporting and political events as a prominent tool for employing sports to enhance American soft power, attempting to project influence to manage conflict, and solidifying its leadership of the global order. Therefore, Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies have developed a comprehensive media and research plan to expose American polarization worldwide. Conversely, Chinese media and think tanks emphasize Washington’s failure to garner international consensus, highlighting the sharp division and widening gap between Western powers and the rising powers of the Global South. This underscores the mechanism of conflict transformation, where competition is no longer limited to the economic and military spheres but has expanded significantly to encompass soft power tools and media discourse. This reflects a picture of expanded strategic competition and its impact on international stability.

Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, condemns designation, calling it ‘discriminatory’.

The United States has designated Chinese corporate giants Alibaba, BYD and Baidu as companies that support China’s military, expanding its blacklist to some of the country’s best-known commercial brands.

The Pentagon included the firms in an update on Monday that is likely to complicate the fragile detente under way between Washington and Beijing after years of rocky relations.

China’s embassy in Washington, DC, condemned the listing as “discriminatory” and an example of the US government “overstretching” the concept of national security.

“Chinese companies that do business overseas have been strictly observing laws and regulations of their host countries,” an embassy spokesperson said.

“The US should stop its wrong practice and create a fair, just and non-discriminatory environment for Chinese companies.”

Alibaba, BYD and Baidu did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The Pentagon’s list of “Chinese military companies,” which is updated annually, now includes 188 firms, up from 134 in 2025.

Firms included on the list, which was created in 2021, will be barred from consideration for US defence contracts from later this month.

The Pentagon defines “Chinese military companies” as entities owned or controlled by the Chinese military, or that contribute to China’s “military civil fusion”, referring to Beijing’s strategy of melding civilian and defence-related research and innovation.

Companies must also carry out some of their operations in the US to be designated.

The expansion of the blacklist comes less than a month after US President Donald Trump met Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing for a two-day summit aimed at lowering the temperature in their countries’ years-long trade war and tech rivalry.

Alibaba, Baidu, and BYD are among China’s most prominent brands, claiming the top spots in the e-commerce, internet search and electric vehicle markets, respectively.

The addition of several household brands not normally associated with the defence sector mirrors last year’s designation of tech firm Tencent, the owner of the ubiquitous messaging app WeChat.

Other additions to the list include RoboSense Technology, an AI and robotics company with headquarters in Shenzhen, and Hangzhou-based Unitree Robotics.

RoboSense Technology and Unitree Robotics did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Dennis Wilder, a national security expert who worked on China at the CIA and the White House’s National Security Council, expressed scepticism about the feasibility of implementing such a “broad-brush” blacklist.

“Although it may make some US firms wary of engaging with the labelled entities, in fact, many US firms already have deep relationships with these entities, that they are not going to give up unless there are real penalties attached to working commercial deals with them,” Wilder told Al Jazeera.

“Sanctions that range this widely are sanctions that don’t work. Unless the US is willing to decouple from the Chinese economy altogether, these sanctions are simply performative,” Wilder said.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang on Sunday is significant for one reason.

It’s not that they are meeting: The two men met in Beijing just a year ago when China held a massive military parade to mark 80 years since Japan surrendered unconditionally to Allied forces, bringing an end to the second world war.

What’s surprising is that Xi is travelling at all.

The Chinese leader has not travelled to Pyongyang since 2019, having steadily cut down his travel in recent years, and world leaders like US President Donald Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin generally come to him these days.

“We need to remember that Xi Jinping has not really travelled abroad that much,” William Yang, Crisis Group’s senior analyst for Northeast Asia, told Al Jazeera. “The growing trend is foreign leaders heading to Beijing to meet with him.

“For Xi Jinping to be the one who decides to travel to Pyongyang, it shows the level of significance that China attaches to this trip.”

Xi averaged about 14 trips a year between 2013 and 2019, but dropped to approximately six a year between 2022 and 2025, according to the Asia Society. In 2020, he made just one overseas trip, and in 2021, he made none, as China grappled with the COVID-19 pandemic.

He may be travelling now, though, amid concerns about North Korea’s relationship with Russia, Yang said.

Senior partner no more?

Traditionally, Beijing played the role of senior partner in the China-North Korea relationship, with North Korea heavily dependent on China for as much as 95 percent of its trade, according to one 2022 estimate from the National Committee on North Korea, a US-based nonprofit.

That dynamic has been changing since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, however. North Korea has provided Russia with critical weapons, artillery and manpower and is credited by observers with helping to keep Moscow’s war machine going.

South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy, a government-funded research institute, estimates that since 2023, Moscow has paid North Korea as much as $14.4bn for troop deployments and the export of “artillery, shells, and guided and ballistic missiles”.

The report said that North Korea may only have received between $580m and $1.5bn of that in the form of “goods”, which means there is a “significant possibility that the majority of the payment from Moscow was in the form of ‘sensitive military technology or related precision parts and materials that are difficult to observe via satellite’,” according to a translation.

Although China shares a mutual defence treaty with North Korea, it is still wary of North Korea acquiring new military technology, Yang said.

“Beijing has always been very careful about providing military assistance to North Korea because they do not see a militarily stronger North Korea as necessarily in its favour,” he said. “A North Korea that is militarily emboldened through its relationship with Russia could be a potential source of disruption to the balance of power and status quo on the Korean Peninsula.”

North Korea has already carried out eight missile launches since the start of the year, and in May unveiled a new AI-guided tactical cruise missile, according to North Korean media and the US Naval Institute.

Earlier this week, North Korean state media also released photos of Kim touring a new “weapons-grade nuclear materials” factory, which would be used to expand Pyongyang’s nuclear capability at an “exponential rate”.

Fluctuating tensions

North Korea has technically been at war with South Korea since 1950, with the conflict suspended by a 1953 armistice agreement. The two countries are divided by a 250-kilometre-long (155-mile-long) Demilitarized Zone, splitting the Korean Peninsula.

Tensions have fluctuated dramatically over the years, reaching a recent low point in 2024 when Kim abandoned the long-term goal of Korean unification.

He has largely cut off communications ever since, according to observers. On Friday, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it hopes that Xi’s trip will “play a constructive role in addressing issues related to the Korean Peninsula” – suggesting that Seoul may have lobbied the Chinese leader to try to smooth over relations.

South Korean Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young separately told reporters last month that he expects the two leaders to discuss a possible meeting between Kim and Trump later in the year.

Xi may also be alarmed by other security developments in East Asia, including news of a possible military-logistics ‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌support pact between South Korea and Japan, which was raised at the Shangri-La Dialogue of regional defence officials in Singapore last weekend.

While China and South Korea’s relationship fluctuates, its ties with Japan are acrimonious due to longstanding grievances dating back to Imperial Japan’s occupation of China in the 1930s and 1940s. Beijing has also objected to recent moves by Tokyo to expand its de facto military.

A new type of submarine that appears to lack a traditional sail has emerged in China. The same shipyard launched a smaller ‘sailless’ submarine — a technology demonstrator — eight years ago. More recently, a top Chinese shipbuilding conglomerate put forward a concept for an uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) with a broadly comparable hullform. Designs of this kind can offer benefits in terms of speed, maneuverability, and reduced acoustic signature, but also have major drawbacks.

TWZ has obtained imagery of the submarine in question at JN (Jiangnan) Shipyard in Shanghai on June 1, as seen at the top of this story and below, from Vantor (previously Maxar Technologies). The boat, the name and/or designation of which are currently unknown, first appeared there sometime at the end of May, according to Naval News. That outlet was first to report on this development.

From the imagery, the submarine does not have a traditional sail. However, the exact shaping of what is present is also not entirely clear from the view that is currently available. As noted, JN Shipyard is known to have built at least one other ‘sailless’ submarine in the past, which we will come back to later on.

Writing for Naval News, undersea warfare analyst H.I. Sutton has assessed the design to be roughly 394 feet (120 meters) long and to be between 33 and 36 feet (10 and 11 meters) wide. What its intended missions might be are unknown, but this is certainly larger than common diesel-electric submarines (SSK) and even longer than most nuclear fast attack submarines. For comparison, variants of China’s Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), some of the most modern submarines in People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) service today, are approximately 356 to 360 feet (108 to 110 meters long) and 36 feet wide. The official stated length and width of the U.S. Navy’s Virginia class SSNs, across all existing subvariants, are 377 feet (114.8 meters) and 34 feet (10.36 meters), respectively.

We can also see that the submarine at JN Shipyard has an X-form rudder configuration, something that first appeared on a submarine in China in 2024. This offers advantages over cruciform stern arrangements with horizontal and vertical rudders when it comes to maneuverability, efficiency, and safety.

An X-shaped stern is a feature now further associated with a next-generation Chinese attack submarine design commonly, but still unofficially, referred to as the Type 095. Naval News also reported today on the recent launch of what may be another Type 095, which has a traditional sail, at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, hundreds of miles to the north of Shanghai. This appears to have caused some confusion online, with some mistaking the boat at Bohai for the ‘sailless’ type.

The newly emerged submarine at JN Shipyard may also have a shrouded propulsor, which could be a pumpjet type. Pumpjets offer further benefits for quieter operation, especially at higher submerged speeds.

The absence of a traditional sail is still the most notable aspect of the new submarine at JN Shipyard. Omitting a large structure sticking out of the top of the hull helps significantly with streamlining the overall design. Eliminating that drag can allow greater optimization for speed and maneuverability while submerged. It can also help make the submarine quieter and, by extension, harder to detect, even while transiting through an area at higher speeds. This can be especially useful when racing out to threats, even those far away.

Not having a traditional sail could impose certain design constraints. Traditionally, naval submarines have used their sails to mount periscopes and other sensor masts, as well as extendable communication antennas and snorkels to help cycle air without fully resurfacing. That is space that can be used for other purposes, including launchers for countermeasures and general storage.

Above all else, while running on the surface, the sail is key for general navigation and situational awareness. It can also provide an elevated position for local force protection or supporting vertical replenishment (VERTREP) operations. If sufficiently hardened, it can even break through feet of ice during operations in and around the polar regions.

The lack of a sail might reflect a focus on seabed operations far from the surface where mast deployment and other considerations might be less pressing. At the same time, the design’s features could just as easily be centered on improving performance, including the ability to make transits as quickly as possible during blue water operations. It could also offer benefits for shallow-water operations, though we have noted that, overall, it is very large compared to SSKs.

As mentioned, a smaller ‘sailless’ submarine had already emerged at JN Shipyard in 2018. H.I. Sutton previously estimated that design to be around 150 feet (45 meters) long and 15 feet (four to four-and-a-half meters) wide. That submarine also had a non-X-shaped rudder arrangement and what appeared to be an unshrouded propeller. The exact reasons for building that boat and how it has been utilized over the years remain unknown, but it would have at least provided a testbed and technology demonstration platform to explore this design concept, and potentially other capabilities. Whether it was designed for crewed or uncrewed operation, or to be optionally crewed, is not clear, either. The same is true of this new submarine, though it seems unlikely it is uncrewed.

At the Zhuhai Airshow in 2024, the state-run China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) did show a model of an unprecedentedly large, diesel-electric UUV. Its overall design was highly reminiscent, at least in broad strokes, of JN Shipyard’s original ‘sailless’ submarine, as TWZ noted at the time. JN Shipyard is one of many subsidiaries of CSSC.

CSSC said at the time that the drone submarine could be configured to perform a wide array of missions, including launching attacks on enemy vessels, laying mines, supporting special operations forces, and serving as a mothership for smaller uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV). You can read more about all of this here.

Other shipyards and navies around the world have explored low-profile submarine designs in the past, but designs have generally been consigned to the world of paper concepts and limited experimentation. The U.S. Navy, for instance, previously tested a Large Scale Vehicle Range (LSVR) subscale demonstrator submarine with a novel sail structure. The Navy’s Acoustic Research Detachment (ARD) conducted that work in a lake in Bayview, Idaho.

In 2021, the Navy also notably put out a contracting notice calling for concepts for inflatable sail structures, which could combine the benefits of traditional sails and low-profile designs. What degree of work the service may have conducted since then on this Inflatable Deployable Sail System (IDSS) is unclear, but it underscores how important a sail is for general operations on the surface.

The PLAN’s submarine force otherwise continues to grow in terms of capability and capacity, with an increasing number of more modern types. U.S. officials have openly said in the past that the quality of newer Chinese submarines has been getting closer in parity to American designs. All of this is further underscored by the recent appearance of the other new submarine at Bohai. In addition to new nuclear-power designs, China is also understood to be developing at least one design with a hybrid nuclear/conventional propulsion system, referred to as the Type 041 or Zhou class. The first known example of the Type 041 came to light after it looked to have sunk in a shipyard in 2024.

Greater use of nuclear propulsion promises to extend the reach of Chinese submarines in the Pacific and beyond, and is clearly part of the PLAN’s larger vision for naval power projection going forward.

“The PLA Navy is executing a significant strategic shift from diesel-electric to all-nuclear construction, representing a fundamental departure from historical construction patterns,” U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mike Brookes, head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote in prepared remarks ahead of a hearing before members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March.

Brookes also highlighted how the hybrid Type 041, specifically, could offer “greater endurance, potentially filling regional patrol and presence missions more economically than full-size SSNs [attack submarines] and SSGN [guided missile submarines.”

China has significant demands for naval presence, in general, especially to assert its extensive and widely disputed maritime territorial claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere. The PLAN continues to expand the scale and scope of its combat fleets, overall, at a pace that far exceeds that of other navies globally. This includes the U.S. Navy, where the disparity has become increasingly concerning, as TWZ routinely highlights.

More remains to be learned about the newly emerged submarine at JN Shipyard, but it could point to new low-profile designs without traditional sails, possibly to act as the PLAN’s underwater high-speed interceptor, being part of China’s larger future submarine future.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Department of Commerce issues guidance on chip restrictions amid concerns about loopholes in export control regime.

The United States has issued a notice affirming its restrictions on shipments of semiconductors to subsidiaries of Chinese companies located outside China amid concerns about loopholes in Washington’s export control regime.

The Department of Commerce said in the guidance issued on Sunday that its licensing requirements for the export of advanced AI chips applied to all businesses with headquarters or a parent company in China.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which falls under the Commerce Department, said it issued the clarification in response to questions about whether it was enforcing preexisting licence requirements after it had overturned former President Joe Biden’s AI Diffusion Framework.

“The answer is yes,” the BIS said in the notice.

Unveiled in the final days of the Biden administration, the AI Diffusion proposed the implementation of a globe-spanning framework to control access to AI chips, including export caps for all but the closest US allies.

The framework drew backlash from tech firms, including Nvidia, the world’s most valuable chip company, which cast the proposal as a threat to innovation and cross-border collaboration.

President Donald Trump’s administration scrapped the framework last May, ahead of its implementation, citing the “burdensome new regulatory requirements” and the harm it would do to Washington’s diplomatic relations with other countries.

Chip giant Nvidia, whose top-of-the-line Blackwell GPUs are banned for export to China, said it had already been operating in keeping with the clarified rules.

“The guidance reaffirms that NVIDIA’s sales and vetting process is correct – consistent with our existing approach, licences are required to ship controlled products to PRC headquartered companies,” a Nvidia spokesperson told Al Jazeera, using the acronym for the People’s Republic of China.

AMD and Intel, Nvidia’s main competitors in the GPU space, did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

TSMC, which manufactures the most advanced chips on behalf of clients such as Nvidia, did not immediately return an email seeking comment.

The BIS also did not respond to inquiries.

Chris McGuire, a former State Department official who worked on technology policy in the Biden administration, accused the Trump administration of providing Chinese companies a loophole to buy export-controlled chips.

“Chinese companies have been buying these chips, very likely at scale. And because BIS has not updated export control regulations to clearly state what it IS enforcing, all of this was legal,” McGuire said in a post on X.

“This clarification does make clear that Blackwell shipments to China-headquartered companies outside of China are now illegal again – which is good, although obviously we have to see how many shipments have already gone to assess how much damage was done,” McGuire said.

“BIS’ statement acknowledges these shipments have been happening when it says companies who bought chips under this loophole don’t have to stop using them.”

The US has rolled out numerous restrictions on the supply of high-end technology to China, as Washington and Beijing battle for dominance in AI.

In December, Trump announced that he would allow Nvidia to sell its H200 chip to China, in a major loosening of Washington’s export controls.

While not Nvidia’s most advanced chip, the H200 is about six times as powerful as the H20, the most advanced chip previously allowed for export to China.

May 27 (UPI) — Representatives for the Chinese military on Wednesday said forces used electronic interference attacks to drive off a Dutch frigate that was near the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea

The Chinese army’s Southern Theater Command posted on its official social media account that the Dutch ship, the De Ruyter, “illegally intruded into China’s Xisha Islands” and a helicopter stationed onboard had entered Chinese airspace, the South China Morning Post reported. The Paracel Islands are called the Xisha Islands in China.

The islands are about 190 miles from China’s Hainan province. They’ve been under Chinese control since 1974, although Vietnam and Taiwan also claim them.

Chinese forces “took necessary measures including verbal warnings and warning electronic interference,” said Zhai Shichen, representative for the Chinese army’s Southern Theater Command.

“We firmly oppose such acts and solemnly demand that the Dutch side immediately cease its infringement and provocative actions,” Zhai said, USNI News reported. “The Chinese military will maintain a high state of alert at all times and resolutely safeguard China’s national sovereignty, security, and regional peace and stability.”

The Netherlands has not issued a statement on the incident, the South China Morning Post said. It reported that Zhai also said the ship was “extremely liable to trigger misunderstanding and miscalculation” in its actions.

USNI News said the De Ruyter was deployed to the region as part of the five-month-long Pacific Archer mission, which “aims to promote freedom of navigation and foster ties with allies and partners.”

The EU’s new car market maintained steady growth through the first four months of 2026, with nearly 3.8 million vehicles registered, up 4.2% from the same period in 2025. This is according to data published on Wednesday by the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA).

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The figures show a market increasingly dominated by electric and hybrid vehicles, helped by government incentives in major economies and growing competition from Chinese carmakers.

According to ACEA, between January and April 2026, battery-electric cars accounted for 19.7% of the EU market, up from 15.3% a year earlier. Growth was mainly driven by the bloc’s four largest markets, with Italy (+25.5%), Spain (+19.7%), Germany (+6.6%) and France (+2.3%) all recording gains.

In April alone, sales of battery electric vehicles were up by 37.7% in the EU from the same month last year, lifting their market share to 20.6% for the month.

Hybrid-electric vehicles remained the most popular single powertrain choice in April, up 12%, accounting for roughly 36.9% of the month’s sales.

Plug-in hybrids added 16.4%, capturing roughly a 9.8% share in April registrations.

On the other side of the ledger, petrol car registrations fell 16.3% to fewer than 218,500 units, while diesel dropped 17.1% to around 74,000.

Together, petrol and diesel cars accounted for less than 30% of vehicles sold across the EU in April.

European brands performance in 2026

Volkswagen Group retained its position as the bloc’s largest carmaker in the first four months of 2026, accounting for 26.7% of all new registrations, with just over one million units sold, up 2.9% year-on-year.

However, performance varied across the group. Skoda registrations rose 15.5%, and Audi gained 8.6%, while the core Volkswagen brand slipped 3.2%, losing ground across multiple segments.

Stellantis ranked second with a 17.1% market share and over 648,000 units, up a robust 7.8%, driven by a recovery at Fiat of over 32%, and strong gains at Opel and Vauxhall, which together rose 22% in registrations.

Renault Group was the weakest performer in the top three, declining 7.4% to around 384,250 units and accounting for a 10.1% market share, with Dacia registering a particularly sharp fall of more than 15%.

BMW Group and Mercedes-Benz posted gains of 3.9% and 3.8%, respectively, while Toyota and Hyundai Group both recorded modest declines of between 2.5% and 3.1%.

The Chinese surge

The most significant trend in April’s data was the continued rise of Chinese carmakers.

According to ACEA figures, BYD’s EU registrations more than doubled year-on-year in the first four months of 2026, surging 152.9% to more than 71,850 units.

Chery Automobile, through its Omoda, Jaecoo and Jetour brands, grew 267.1% to more than 48,350 units, while Leapmotor, distributing through its joint venture with Stellantis, soared 558.8% to over 28,700 units.

SAIC Motor, owner of the MG brand and the largest Chinese group by EU volume, added a further 10.4% to reach more than 77,000 units.

Combined, Chinese brands accounted for around 6% of EU car registrations between January and April 2026, compared with 3.2% in the same period a year earlier. Across the wider European market, including the UK and EFTA countries, Chinese brands accounted for a combined market share of roughly 7.3% over the same period, up from 3.7% a year earlier.

President Xi Jinping has called on authorities nationwide to learn from the incident.

A gas explosion at a coal mine in China has killed at least 90 people.

State media Xinhua said 247 workers had been on duty underground when the blast ripped through the Liushenyu mine in Qinyuan county, Shanxi province, on Friday.

China’s coal mines are considered among the deadliest in the world due to poor safety standards, weak regulation, and corruption as companies seek to profit from the country’s rapidly expanding economy.

Rescue operations were ongoing as emergency crews continued searching for survivors of the explosion, the deadliest mining disaster reported in China in more than a decade.

The blast occurred shortly after a carbon monoxide alert was issued, with some reports claiming gas levels had exceeded safe limits.

According to state-run broadcaster CGTN, the person responsible for overseeing the mine has been arrested while authorities investigate the cause of the explosion.

President Xi Jinping has urged authorities across China to intensify efforts to prevent major accidents in the wake of Friday’s blast.

“All regions and departments must learn from the lessons of the accident, remain vigilant regarding workplace safety, thoroughly investigate, rectify all types of risks and hidden dangers, and resolutely prevent and curb the occurrence of major and serious accidents,” Xi said.

Video footage posted online from the scene showed several ambulances gathered near the mine.

Shanxi province, where the incident occurred, is China’s main coal-mining region. More than one billion tonnes of coal were extracted there last year, almost a third of the country’s total output.

China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, accounting for more than half of global consumption.

The country is also the world’s largest annual greenhouse gas emitter, while being the biggest producer of renewable energy.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will likely visit North Korea as early as next week, sources said Wednesday.

“We have obtained intelligence indicating that President Xi Jinping will visit North Korea soon,” a high-ranking government official told Yonhap News Agency.

Another government official also said there is a high possibility of Xi visiting North Korea later this month or early next month, noting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi‘s visit to Pyongyang last month and the recent trips by Xi’s security guards and ceremonial staff to the North Korean capital.

During the meeting with Wang, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un expressed willingness to strengthen high-level exchanges and enhance strategic communication with Beijing, as he recalled his visit to China last year.

The two nations mark the 65th anniversary of signing a comprehensive treaty on cooperation this year.

Xi’s possible visit to the reclusive regime also follows summit talks with U.S President Donald Trump in Beijing last week. During the talks, the two leaders reaffirmed their shared goal of denuclearizing North Korea.

A separate government source said the Chinese leader could seek to mediate relations between North Korea and the United States.

During his state visit to China in January, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung asked Xi to help mediate inter-Korean relations, and the Chinese leader responded positively to the request, according to the source.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

HONG KONG — As President Trump left Beijing on Friday, Chinese social media resurfaced a familiar nickname for the president — flattering at first glance — declaring that Chuan Jianguo, the “Nation Builder,” had returned.

It was not meant as a compliment. The nation he is building, according to the Chinese, is not the United States but their own, through a series of inadvertent yet costly mistakes inflicted by Trump at home and abroad.

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If the Chinese government was self-assured entering Trump’s summit with Xi Jinping, then the results of the state visit, in which Beijing refused to offer Trump any meaningful deals or concessions, signal their unmistakable confidence in American decline.

Chinese government statements in local media stating as much made their way back to Trump as he was departing, aggravating the president, a U.S. official said. But the White House secured a clarification from the Chinese that seemed to placate Trump. America was only declining under President Biden, they said — not anymore.

President Trump and President Xi Jinping tour Zhongnanhai Garden on Friday in Beijing.

(Evan Vucci / Pool via Getty Images)

The Trump administration argues the trip was a success, having secured the display of conciliation and partnership the president had sought after years of increasingly dangerous acrimony.

Foreign policy hawks on China will be displeased with his new direction of friendship and cooperation with a government they view as openly hostile to the United States. But Trump seems to have reached a similar conclusion as past administrations, that China might require a relationship in pursuit of, as Xi put it, “constructive strategic stability.”

Trump was notably out of character throughout his stay here, deferential to his host, marveling at displays of Chinese power and reticent to speak with the press.

Five times over two days, Trump referred to Xi as his friend, taking every public opportunity to offer his compliments and pats on the back. None of it was reciprocated. The Chinese leader, Trump told Fox News in an interview, was “all business” in private, as well, apparently uninterested in his overtures of personal goodwill.

Presidents Xi and Trump tour Zhongnanhai Garden on Friday.

(Evan Vucci—Pool/Getty Images)

The summit may ultimately be remembered as the moment when Trump recognized a shifting power dynamic, where an American president had the rare and uncomfortable experience of entering a meeting clearly overmatched.

“I think the most important thing is relationship,” Trump said in the interview, describing the summit as “historic.”

“It’s all about relationship,” he added. “I have a very good relationship with President Xi.”

Taiwan was discussed ‘the whole night’

Little of substance was accomplished over two days of talks. But Chinese officials expected no less after warning Trump’s team before the summit that its minimal preparation had failed to lay the groundwork for diplomatic agreements.

Still, the lack of breakthroughs may come as a relief to some in Washington. Trump appears to have held to a long-standing U.S. line on Taiwan, for now, refusing to provide Xi with clarity on whether the United States would defend the self-ruled island if China tries to reclaim it by force.

The two men discussed the matter “the whole night,” Trump told Fox.

If China attacked, “they would be met harshly, and bad things will happen,” Trump said. Yet within the same answer, he questioned Taiwan’s “odds” against China if war were to break out, even with U.S. help, noting its proximity to the Chinese mainland and its vast distance away from the United States.

Whether Trump will proceed with arms sales to Taiwan — passed by Congress and obligated by law under the Taiwan Relations Act — is still an open question.

“If you kept it the way it is, I think China is going to be OK with that,” Trump said, referencing an ambiguous status quo around Taiwan’s status, “but we’re not looking to have somebody say, ‘Let’s go independent because the United States is backing us.’ ”

“Taiwan would be very smart to cool it a little bit,” he added. “China would be smart to cool it a little bit. They ought to both cool it.”

President Trump departs as President Xi looks on after a visit to Zhongnanhai Garden on Friday.

(Evan Vucci/ Pool via Getty Images)

Curious company

Trump’s choice of company in the U.S. delegation left the Chinese with questions over the purpose of the trip.

Lara Trump, a Fox News host and the president’s daughter-in-law, attended alongside her husband, Eric Trump, whose presence as a private citizen running the Trump Organization was a direct appeal to Beijing to treat the administration like a family business. Brett Ratner, director of the “Rush Hour” series and a documentary on the first lady that bombed at the box office, was given prime placement along with America’s top business leaders.

The last time a secretary of Defense attended a presidential state visit to China was on Richard Nixon’s famous trip in 1972. Chinese officials were unsure what to make of Pete Hegseth’s presence — whether it was meant to convey a softer stance, a hardening one, or simply an ignorance of basic diplomatic protocol.

Trump said he felt personally honored by the lavish welcome he received on the edge of Tiananmen Square, outside the Great Hall of the People, where China hosts all visiting dignitaries.

Before a lunch at Zhongnanhai, the secretive headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party, Trump asked Xi if he was special for getting to visit the compound. He was the fourth U.S. president to do so.

While the Trump administration offered itself glowing reviews of the outcome of the summit, the Chinese government offered little to say as he departed. And Chinese media highlighted Beijing’s resolute stance on American priorities — from trade to the Iran war — as evidence of Chinese confidence and American decline.

But all that business wasn’t the point of the trip, Trump told Fox’s Bret Baier. For the president, it was all personal.

“I want to thank President Xi, my friend, for this magnificent welcome,” Trump said in his toast at the state banquet, repeating the personal overture. “The American and Chinese people share much in common. We value hard work. We value courage and achievement. We love our families and we love our countries.

“Together, we have the chance to draw on these values to create a future of greater prosperity, cooperation and happiness and peace for our children,” Trump added. “We love our children. This region and the world — it’s a special world, with the two of us united and together.”

An especially large motorcade ferried President Donald Trump around Beijing during his trip to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping this week. However, a pair of heavily-laden Chinese SUVs with huge custom roofs, a configuration that does not appear to have been previously seen, were of particular interest. The motorcade also featured several other vehicles with interesting, but far less substantial additions to their roofs.

The unusual SUVs were first spotted as Trump’s motorcade moved through the Chinese capital on May 13, as can be seen in the video in the social media post immediately below. They continued to be a feature of the motorcade throughout the U.S. President’s state visit, which wrapped up today.

The U.S. Secret Service has confirmed to TWZ that it was not the operator of any of the vehicles discussed in this piece, but it could not say whether they belonged to the U.S. Embassy or the Chinese government. The Secret Service and other U.S. authorities bring large numbers of vehicles and other assets to support any presidential visit overseas, especially very high-profile ones like Trump’s trip to meet with Xi this week. State Department and other U.S. government resources already in the destination country — or region — are leveraged, as well. Local security forces also help protect American presidents during these occasions.

The two high-top SUVs that were seen in the motorcade are based on one of the current generation models available from Chinese manufacturer Hongqi.

There were two other SUVs with notable modifications to their roofs – a Chevy Suburban and a Lincoln Navigator. There was also a Ford E-series van with a prominently modified roof.

All of the American-designed vehicles in question are available in China, and they were all seen with Chinese license plates. However, the Suburban had a black plate with white lettering, a type issued for foreign-owned vehicles, which might point to it belonging to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. At the same time, China has issued specific diplomatic plates over the years that are black and white, but also include red kanji, which was not seen in this case. A general example of this is seen in the social media post below. We will come back to this later on.

The licence plate “132 021” appears to be a Chinese diplomatic one. The first character in red may be 使 which represents the Embassy. “132” refers to the Mission, which could actually be Czech — though this needs corroboration with other open sources. https://t.co/Y2kvTTD4Wx pic.twitter.com/VQnI1jVMQa

— Christiaan Triebert (@trbrtc) May 2, 2019

Regardless of their operators, the modified Hongqi SUVs were clear standouts that quickly caught attention online.

Trump had his entire motorcade flown in on C-17s a few days ago!

500+ tons of equipment and vehicles, including these advanced surveillance/deterrence SUVs.

They can literally see through walls 👀

A level of security that is incomprehensible ⚠️ pic.twitter.com/Nt94ut5Opn

— Matt Wallace (@MattWallace888) May 13, 2026

The purpose of the custom tops on the Hongqi SUVs is unknown, but they would offer space to fit additional outsized equipment. Possible options might include an electronic warfare system, directed energy weapon, or a communications array. On the subject of advanced electronic warfare systems and directed energy weapons, these capabilities are set to become increasingly commonplace in VVIP motorcades, in general, due to the danger of drone attacks.

A new high-top roof could allow individuals to stand up fully while still inside the vehicle, but the benefit that would provide in this case is unclear. There are no obvious apertures or firing ports. It is unknown whether any part of the very top retracts to allow for the deployment of something inside. There is something of an upper fairing visible on the front, but it could be there for a number of reasons.

Whatever the case, the modified Hongqi SUVs are definitely very heavy-set, with the vehicles running visibly low on their rear axles in particular. There is also some kind of feature attached to the rear of the vehicles. However, without a full view from the rear, whether this might be a lift or something else is not clear. A lift would make some sense considering whatever is inside appears to be very heavy.

There was also clearly some value to having one of the SUVs in this configuration positioned at different points in the motorcade simultaneously. One at the front and one at the rear are seen the main video posted above.

The modified Lincoln Navigator has a far smaller, but still interesting addition to its roof, which could contain an electronic warfare and/or satellite communications systems. It also has what may be a small electro-optical sensor turret on top of the front end of the roof. Several whip-type antennas mounted on top of the vehicle are also seen.

It is worth noting here that marked Chinese Police Ford F-150 pickups were also seen deployed in Beijing during Trump’s visit with a roughly similar configuration, including the sensor turret on top.

The Chevy Suburban also has a slightly raised roof with an array of antennas, including an X-shaped type commonly associated with UHF satellite communications arrays. Interestingly, this SUV looks similar in some broad respects to Suburbans configured as command, control, and communications support vehicles that the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) and certain elements of the U.S. military have operated over the years. These are more commonly referred to as “Roadrunners” and are a staple in U.S. presidential motorcades, as you can read more about here. As already noted, this particular SUV had a type of license plate pointing to a foreign owner. While we know that this is not a U.S. Secret Service vehicle, the WCHA or another U.S. government operator could still be a possibility.

Last, there is the Ford E-series van. The available views of this vehicle are more limited, but it does have a modified roof with what look to be work lights positioned at various points around the edges. This is in addition to the red and blue emergency lights along the front edge. There is also an unknown feature at the top left corner of the roof, which has a cone-shaped protrusion at the front. Its purpose is not immediately clear.

Vans are inherently multi-purpose vehicles by design, and Chinese policies are known to use marked E-series types for various purposes, including riot control. It is possible this particular example could be part of a rapid response team, or serve some other function.

In general, specialized, unique, and sometimes unusual vehicles are common to see in VIP motorcades, especially presidential ones. TWZ has been among the first to call attention to new additions to the U.S. presidential motorcade lineup, in particular, over the years. This includes the appearance of new Cadillac Escalade presidential limousines just in January of this year.

If the vehicles seen during Trump’s recent trip to China, especially the Hongqi SUVs with the huge custom tops, continue to be features of motorcades during state visits by prominent leaders to Beijing, more details about their configuration and functions may emerge.

Special thanks to Newsweek‘s Ryan Chan for bringing this to our attention.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

As Eileen Wang and her supporters tell it, the former Arcadia mayor was led astray by a man she trusted and loved.

After chasing her political ambitions in the San Gabriel Valley suburb, Wang, 58, won a City Council seat in 2022 with the help of a campaign advisor who was also her romantic partner. Two years later, he was charged by federal authorities with secretly working on behalf of the Chinese government.

Wang, a naturalized U.S. citizen, distanced herself from her ex and remained in office, becoming mayor earlier this year. The scandal had mostly quieted — until Monday, on the eve of President Trump’s planned trip to Beijing, when a plea deal was unsealed revealing Wang’s own murky role as an agent for China.

A man walks past an empty space where a photograph of former Mayor Eileen Wang was removed in the lobby of Arcadia City Hall.

(Genaro Molina/Los Angeles Times)

Now, Wang has become a national political talking point, with critics painting her as a calculating foreign agent who sought to infiltrate the American government and undermine democracy.

Katie Miller, wife of top Trump advisor Stephen Miller, blasted Wang on social media site X as a “spy.”

“This is pure China trying to influence U.S. politics and U.S. elections,” Katie Miller said on Fox News.

Back home, some of Wang’s former colleagues in local government say they repeatedly tried to raise alarms about her.

“There were red flags everywhere,” said Sharon Kwan, an Arcadia city council member and former mayor.

Wang admitted in her plea agreement to posting and editing web content at the request of the Chinese government — without disclosing her ties to U.S. authorities, as the law requires. She ran afoul of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, or FARA, a federal statute that experts said has seen ramped up enforcement over the last decade, particularly in cases involving China.

But those familiar with the law — and international espionage — said it does not appear that Wang was engaged in spycraft as it is commonly understood.

Dennis Wilder, a former senior U.S. intelligence official and professor at Georgetown University, said that, in the CIA, Wang would be referred to as “an agent of influence.”

“She’s not a spy in the Jason Bourne sense,” Wilder said, referring to the fictional American agent. “She’s not out there recruiting sources and that sort of thing. That’s not the role that they want for her. But they see this other role as extremely important.”

A man exits Arcadia City Hall on Tuesday.

(Christina House/Los Angeles Times)

A run for city council

Wang moved to the U.S. around 30 years ago, in part, she told The Times in 2024, because she wanted “freedom for speech, freedom [for] thinking.”

Her mother was a Chinese medicine and acupuncture doctor and her father was a physician in Sichuan province before working at USC, she said. Authorities have not detailed how she immigrated or her path to citizenship. She landed in Arcadia, she said, lured by what the school district in the affluent city of 54,000 could offer her two young boys.

She ran an after-school program and was involved in some community organizations, but said she did not move in political circles until shortly before her 2022 run for city council. She switched her party affiliation from Republican to Democrat, which, she said, spoke more to the needs of voters in her district, where many share her Chinese roots.

“I walk about 140 days,” she said of her campaign, adding that she hit every door in her district five times. “I never stop.”

Yaoning “Mike” Sun, Wang’s former fiance, managed her campaign.

Arcadia City Councilmember Sharon Kwan stands outside the front entrance of the San Gabriel Valley suburb’s City Hall. “This is not something where we can just dismiss and pretend nothing happened,” said Kwan regarding the case against ex-mayor Eileen Wang.

(Genaro Molina/Los Angeles Times)

Kwan, who was elected to the city council at the same time, recalled Sun as a constant presence at city meetings and events, “always with the camera.”

“Always recording, always promoting her,” Kwan said. “She was like a celebrity to him.”

Two years after Wang took office, in December 2024, federal authorities arrested Sun on suspicion of acting as an illegal agent of China.

Prosecutors accused Sun in a criminal complaint of working with another man to cultivate Wang as a political asset for the People’s Republic of China or PRC. Federal prosecutors in Los Angeles identified the other man as John Chen, describing him in a sentencing memorandum as “a high-level member of the PRC intelligence apparatus,” who had “met personally” with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Chen instructed Sun to submit reports on Wang, referred to throughout the complaint as “Individual 1,” to Chinese officials, including one the federal complaint said they referred to as the “Big Boss.” A draft of the report allegedly included a request for $80,000 to “support pro-PRC activities in the United States.” Sun was also told to tout Wang’s relationship with an unnamed U.S. congressperson, the complaint said.

Both men eventually pleaded guilty to working as unregistered agents of China, with Sun sentenced this year to four years in prison. Chen was sentenced to 20 months.

Wang spoke with Chen on the day she was elected and three more times over the next few months, according to the complaint in Sun’s case.

“You are doing a good job, I hope you can continue the good work, make Chinese people proud,” Chen told Wang, in a conversation on Jan. 23, 2023, according to the complaint in Sun’s case.

Chen and Sun also coordinated a trip to China in 2023 for Wang to meet with “leadership,” which would include stops in six different places, according to the complaint. It’s unclear whom Wang met with on the trip.

The fallout

After Sun’s arrest, Wang denied to several people that they had been engaged to marry. She said during a council meeting that their relationship ended in spring 2024.

Jolene Cadenbach, a pastor in Arcadia, said Wang confided in her that “she had been lied to” by Sun.

“I think he did a con job on her,” Cadenbach said.

The recent plea agreement gave the wrong impression about Wang, the pastor said.

“It made her sound like she was some kind of spy and it wasn’t like that at all,” she said. Wang was only following Sun’s orders, she added: “He told her to put up this site, she did it. She didn’t really investigate it.”

In a statement, Wang’s lawyers said she “apologizes and is sorry for the mistakes she has made in her personal life.” They said “she genuinely loves this city and is devoted to the people and the community within it,” but “her trust and love for apparently the wrong person… ultimately led her astray.”

Arcadia resident Sonia Martin sits on the porch of her home. Martin said she had long expressed concerns about the city’s former mayor, Eileen Wang.

(Genaro Molina/Los Angeles Times)

After Sun was charged in 2024, Sonia Martin and other Arcadia residents showed up at council meetings carrying protest signs. Martin said she expected Wang to be pushed out. Instead, she said, most council members appeared to unite behind Wang.

“They wanted to have this feeling of, like, everything’s great here. We’re all warm. Look at us, it’s kumbaya,” Martin said.

Kwan said she repeatedly tried to bring up the concerns of constituents to her fellow council members but was brushed off.

“Everybody was just so silent,” Kwan said. “This is not something where we can just dismiss and pretend nothing happened.”

The job of mayor rotates among Arcadia City Council members, and when it was Kwan’s turn last April, she warned during her swearing-in speech that constituents “must remain vigilant against influence of foreign governments, including efforts by the Chinese Communist Party, that may seek to shape local policy for the interests that do not align with our residents.”

Since Wang’s plea agreement became public, some have scoffed at the notion that Chinese spies would establish an outpost in Arcadia, or that the web posts she made before becoming mayor amounted to any sort of meaningful propaganda campaign.

But according to Sun’s plea agreement, local office was just the start. Prosecutors said Sun’s 2023 report for Chinese officials boasted that “during the 2022 U.S. midterm elections, I orchestrated and organized my team to win the election for city council.” He called Wang a “new political star.”

Wilder, the former U.S. intelligence official, said that sounded like a familiar strategy.

“Maybe she would end up in Congress some day or at the state government level. They invest in these folks hoping they move up the political food chain,” the Georgetown professor said. “That is part of the Chinese long game.”

‘San Gabriel Valley deserves better’

In her plea agreement, Wang admitted that from late 2020 through at least 2022, she worked with Sun to run a website called U.S. News Center that branded itself as a news source for Chinese Americans.

Wang and Sun “executed directives” from Chinese government officials, posting requested articles and reporting back with screenshots showing how many people viewed the stories, the agreement says.

Prosecutors also say Wang edited articles at the request of officials and shared information showing the reach of the posts.

“Thank you leader,” she wrote on Aug. 20, 2021, after being complimented for a post that was viewed more than 15,000 times, according to the plea agreement.

Wang never disclosed that the Chinese government had directed her to post the content, according to court documents.

That sort of low-level violation of the law is not supposed to trigger federal charges unless, according to a February 2025 memo by then-Atty. Gen. Pam Bondi to Justice Department prosecutors, the case involved “conduct similar to more traditional espionage.” The Trump administration has pursued other high-profile foreign agent cases recently, with prosecutors winning a conviction Wednesday of a man charged with running a covert police station in Manhattan and keeping tabs on political dissidents.

When news broke of the charges and plea deal involving Wang, current and former city officials said they were not surprised.

A wall of photographs of former Arcadia mayors hang inside Arcadia City Hall. Eileen Wang is shown second from left on the bottom row. Wang admitted in court filings this week to working as an unregistered agent for China.

(Genaro Molina/Los Angeles Times)

“The warning signs around Eileen Wang were public for more than a year before this plea, agreement, and too many people in positions of influence defended and supported her,” April Verlato, a former mayor of Arcadia, said in a statement. “Our electeds should have represented what was best for the community and held her accountable. The San Gabriel Valley deserves better.”

Paul Cheng, mayor pro tem of Arcadia, said the council didn’t move earlier to oust Wang because a majority of its members wanted to let the federal investigation run its course.

“The public always says, ‘Why didn’t you investigate her when her boyfriend was arrested? Why didn’t you do something?’” he said.

Pedestrians walk along a sidewalk next to Huntington Drive in downtown Arcadia on Wednesday.

(Genaro Molina/Los Angeles Times)

But, he emphasized, “council members are not federal investigators.”

“We are not supposed to get involved,” said Cheng, an attorney. “It would make the situation 10 times worse.”

Cheng spoke highly of Wang, painting her as a committed civil servant with a passion for veterans, first responders and diversifying the businesses on Baldwin Avenue, the city’s main corridor.

“She probably attended the most events compared to all of us,” he said. “People have tried getting me to say she’s a horrible person, but I can only say what I saw, which was I thought she did a good job on council.”