China

From deadly floods in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, to antigovernment protests in the Philippines and demonstrations in Italy to show solidarity with Gaza, here is a look at the week in photos.

Amid heightened Japan-China tensions, US President Donald Trump spoke by telephone with Chinese President Xi Jinping. While Trump termed it a positive development, stating he would visit China in April 2026, China claimed that it categorically made it clear that “Taiwan’s return to China was an ‘integral part of the postwar international order.” While it has been reported that Trump requested a phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, the details of the conversation between the two haven’t been made public yet.

Trump’s claim of “extremely strong” US-China relations has once again seized global attention. Earlier, last month, just ahead of his highly anticipated meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, Trump boldly announced on Truth Social, “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!”

Unsurprisingly, the statement sparked widespread discussion, directly invoking China and seemingly reviving the long-dormant G2 concept, an idea previously floated by former President Barack Obama.

This apparent attempt to resurrect the “G2” notion, which envisions shared global leadership between the US and China, marks a notable rhetorical shift and is surprising given that Trump has been hawkish on China even during his first term as the president. By invoking it, Washington has brought back a concept dismissed as a faulty trade-off, given the persistent and often adversarial nature of US-China relations. Media analyses suggest that this move reflects a growing recognition within the US of China’s rising power and an uneasy acknowledgement of its near-equal status on the world stage. The renewed attention signals an implicit acceptance within American policy circles of China’s expanding international influence and the shifting balance of global power.

For China, however, the idea holds little appeal. First, China continues to present itself as a developing country, aspiring to lead the Global South and, eventually, to achieve broader global influence. Unlike the West, China sees strategic value in retaining the support of developing nations to bolster its legitimacy. While it aims to surpass the US militarily, economically, and technologically, it is unlikely to embrace a bilateral framework implying formalized co-governance of the world. Second, the ideological, strategic, and global ambitions gap between China and the US remains vast, limiting the feasibility of any institutionalized G2 arrangement. Third, if such a framework were ever to exist, it would likely involve broader coalitions of nations with differing ideologies, capacities, and priorities, rather than a US-China duopoly. In this light, the G2 concept appears even less plausible for China in 2025 than it did in the 2000s.

While much commentary has focused on how this discourse may be interpreted in China, the implications extend far beyond the bilateral relationship. Washington’s allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific are closely observing these developments. For many in the region, stability in US-China relations is desirable, as it would help mitigate the risks of confrontation, economic disruption, regional instability, and global upheavals. Yet Trump’s rhetoric has also generated unease among America’s regional partners regarding Washington’s long-term strategic intentions.

Concerns are growing that a return to the G2 framework could signal a weakening of US commitment to the Indo-Pacific, particularly in terms of security and regional order. While sustained engagement with China is widely accepted as necessary, framing the relationship as one of shared global governance may alarm America’s allies and partners, especially the Quad countries, the Philippines, and Taiwan. For these countries, any suggestion of a US-China condominium raises doubts about the credibility of the US’s status as a security guarantor and its assurances of collective defense and regional stability.

From the US perspective, reviving the G2 discourse may appear advantageous to smooth the way for a rare earth materials deal with China or to ease bilateral tensions. But fundamental differences and rivalry cannot be erased: China’s ultimate goal is to overtake the US. In all likelihood, China will view G2 rhetoric skeptically, interpreting it as a sign of US weakness and declining influence in the Indo-Pacific.

The Xi-Trump phone call and China’s reiteration of the Taiwan claim put pressure on Trump’s G2 plan. How Trump would manage ties with Japan and Taiwan while building relations with China is an issue worthy of international attention.

Trump’s episodic and erratic approach to China and the region risks eroding the trust the US has painstakingly built with its partners. There is little chance that countries such as India, Japan, or the Philippines would accept a bipolar world dominated solely by the US and China. Rather than serving as a stabilizer, the G2 concept is more likely to be seen as an attempt to divide the world into two poles once again, or worse, as a signal that the US is content with a bipolar world rather than a genuinely multipolar order.

Even if the G2 never materializes, the rhetoric has already strengthened China’s position while placing the US in a strategic bind. In effect, it is a win-win for China but a lose-lose for America. There are limitations to America First not only for the region but also for America itself and its foreign policy. The Trump administration’s path would do well to seriously consider the perspectives of its allies and partners, rather than advancing a strategy that ultimately benefits China.

Japan and China are in their most dangerous diplomatic crisis in years as escalating tensions over Taiwan have cancelled earlier hopes of post-pandemic improvement. After COVID-19 restrictions were mostly lifted by 2023, relations between Beijing and Tokyo seemed to slowly improve. However, by late 2025 a series of disputes especially over the so-called “Taiwan Question” have severely deteriorated into their lowest point in years.

The high-stakes diplomatic visit at the October 2025 APEC summit, where Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi immediately followed a stable-ties agreement with President Xi Jinping by meeting Taiwanese officials, only escalated tensions.

Escalation Through Diplomatic and Military Incidents

Sanae Takaichi, declared on November 7, 2025 during a cabinet meeting, that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could justify Japan using military force in the area. China quickly reacted. China’s U.N. ambassador Fu Cong accused Japan of violating international law warning the country of its “self-defense”. Raising such an issue all the way to the United Nations is a rare move we don’t often see in global geopolitics.

In mid-November 2025 China’s coast guard sailed through waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (islands which are administered by Japan but claimed by China) on patrol and Japanese Coast Guard vessels sent in response. Japan also sent out fighter jets, and even announced plans to deploy Japanese missiles on Yonaguni island (just 110 km from Taiwan) as a deterring measure.

China also announced travel advisories urging its citizens to avoid Japan, with large numbers of airlines offering ticket refunds. Meanwhile, Japanese officials warned their nationals in China to be cautious amid a rise in hostilities. Chinese authorities abruptly canceled planned concerts by Japanese bands, and state media halted screening of new Japanese films.

The Roots of Tensions: History, the U.S. and Taiwan

The island of Taiwan is an indispensably strategic asset for both countries: for China, Taiwan is the core of its national unity; for Japan the security of a separate and democratic Taiwan is now explicitly seen in Tokyo as linked to Japan’s own defense.

Japan’s long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan Question, similar to the one upheld by the United States, has been abandoned by P.M. Takaichi. Authorities in Taipei have publicly supported Japan, urging China to show restraint and highlighting how an invasion would draw in allies including Japan and the U.S. .

Invoking Japan’s World War II era atrocities, China claims moral high ground or justify its own territorial aims. For example, Chinese official statements have reminded audiences of Tokyo’s past warcrimes in the region when attacking Japanese policies in the present. Japanese politicians (especially ones from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party) have grown hawkish to these types of statements, any incident easily tying into nationalist sentiment on both sides.

Rapidly expanding its defense capabilities the Japanese 2025 Defense White Paper explicitly names China as its “greatest strategic challenge” and commits to raising defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2026. New submarine fleets and the potential deployment of medium-range missiles on islands like Yonaguni, have developed into a broader security problem. This means that any Chinese blockade or attack on Taiwan would encircle Japan’s supply lines. Therefore to Japan’s leaders, Taiwan’s fate is inseparable from their own national survival. China in turn, claims an eventual military approach to Taiwan as inevitable by 2027.

Economic Dimensions in East Asia

China and Japan remain among each other’s largest economic partners even amid the confrontation. In 2024 China was still Japan’s second-biggest export market (after the US), with roughly $125 billion of Japanese goods sent there, mainly machinery and automobiles. This has been leveraged as a geopolitical tool. China’s Commerce Ministry now warns that Takaichi’s comments have “fundamentally undermined” the political foundation of economic ties.

After the Fukushima nuclear wastewater release in 2023, China imposed a blanket ban on all Japanese seafood imports. (Japan has pointed out that the UN’s nuclear agency found the discharge safe.) In mid-November 2025 China reinstated these seafood bans.

In another economic sector, Chinese tourists make up about a fourth of all visitors to Japan. Japanese travel agencies organising group tours told Reuters they lost ~80% of their remaining bookings for 2025.

U.S. Security and International Alliance Dynamics

U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass offered guarantees for its ally if China will militarily intervene and The State Department similarly declared its full support for Japan, explicitly opposing any unilateral attempts to alter the status-quo in the Taiwan Strait or East China Sea. U.S. President Donald Trump has so far avoided endorsing Takaichi’s statements, at least publicly.

China often accuses Japan of following the U.S. strategy of containment and have opposed Japan’s involvement in The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and its new defense pacts, such as with Australia, and more recently the Philippines. In contrast, Indonesia, Malaysia and others aim for neutrality.

Analysts suggest that China unusually strong criticism may reflect a strategic calculation, a hope that Prime Minister Takaichi’s term will be short-lived, just as the short tenures of other post-Abe premiers. For China, such a political victory could be a great geopolitical win in promoting its view on the Taiwan Question.

With information from Reuters, The Diplomat and South China Morning Post.

In the world’s most fragile states, war is no longer merely a political tragedy, it is an economic opportunity for those positioned to profit. From the mountains of northern Myanmar to the gold fields of Sudan, a common pattern has emerged: when governance collapses, external powers rush in to secure the minerals, metals, and strategic commodities that the global economy demands. These regions become places where human suffering and environmental destruction become collateral for uninterrupted flows of resources. Two cases stand out in late 2025, Myanmar’s rare earth boom, fueled by Chinese demand, and Sudan’s gold boom, powered by the United Arab Emirates, together reveal a disturbing truth about the global marketplace; world’s green and gold transitions are being built atop the ruins of countries trapped in conflict.

Myanmar: The Human Cost of a Resource Rush

In early 2025, a young man named Sian traveled deep into the mountains of Shan State, Myanmar, desperate for work in a country where the formal economy has collapsed and nearly half the population lives on less than two dollars a day. He was lured by rumors of wages unheard of in today’s Myanmar, $1,400 a month at new rare-earth mining sites run by Chinese companies in territory controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the most powerful of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups. After hours riding a motorbike through dense forest, he arrived at a mine and was hired for a daily pay of about $21. His job was brutal: drilling boreholes and installing pipes for in-situ leaching, a method that involves pumping acidic solutions directly into mountainsides to dissolve and extract elements like dysprosium and terbium, metals that are vital for electric vehicles, wind turbines, advanced radar systems, and nearly every technology central to the green-energy revolution.

The process leaves behind poisoned rivers, contaminated soil, landslides, respiratory diseases, and entire villages unlivable. Researchers and civil society organizations have documented extensive damage: deforestation, chemically burned waterways, collapsed hillsides, and workers buried in mud after heavy rainfall liquefies the weakened terrain. “The toxic effects of rare-earth mining are devastating,” says political geographer Jasnea Sarma. “These communities endure the harm so that others may benefit.”

Yet the industry is thriving. China has cracked down on domestic rare-earth extraction due to environmental damage, but it has not reduced its demand. As a result, the extraction simply shifted across the border into Myanmar, where environmental regulations are weak, labor is cheap, and local armed groups, desperate for revenue, grant Chinese firms access in exchange for payments or profit-sharing.

Satellite imagery analyzed by Myanmar Witness and the Stimson Center shows hundreds of rare-earth mining sites exploding across Shan State, particularly in areas controlled by the UWSA and other China-aligned ethnic armies. Chinese customs data confirms the trend: between 2017 and 2024, roughly two-thirds of China’s rare-earth imports came from Myanmar. In effect, Myanmar has become the hidden engine of the world’s tech economy and its most toxic dumping ground.

For villagers, this boom is a slow-moving catastrophe. People report respiratory ailments, skin rashes from chemical exposure, and contaminated water sources. The deadliest risks are landslides triggered by aggressive deforestation and chemical injection into the hillsides. A 2024 study of rare-earth mining areas in Kachin State found extreme levels of ammonia, radioactive elements, and dissolved heavy metals in local waterways, conditions researchers describe as “entirely unsuitable for human consumption or agriculture.”

What makes Myanmar particularly vulnerable is not just poverty or geography, but political breakdown. Since the 2021 military coup shattered national governance, armed groups have expanded their autonomy, Chinese companies have expanded their presence, and Myanmar’s natural resources have been strip-mined with almost no oversight. In this vacuum, the global economy finds a steady supply of strategic minerals at the lowest possible cost, while local communities absorb the full environmental and human toll

How the UAE is Cashing In on Sudan’s War

If Myanmar reveals how civil wars feed the green-energy transition, Sudan reveals how they feed the financial one. Since April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in a brutal war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Amid mass displacement, ethnic cleansing in Darfur, widespread starvation, and one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, another story has quietly unfolded: the UAE’s deepening role as the central hub for Sudan’s conflict gold.

Sudan is Africa’s third-largest gold producer, and gold has become the lifeblood of the RSF’s war machine. Investigations by the UN, Global Witness, and multiple governments show that the UAE has been the primary destination for Sudanese gold for years, even as the war intensified. Much of this gold is smuggled out of conflict zones in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile, which are areas where the RSF maintains control through massacres and forced displacement. Once the gold reaches Dubai, it is refined, laundered through opaque supply chains, and sold into global markets.

The UAE denies wrongdoing, but the pattern is unmistakable. Gold shipments spike when fighting escalates. The RSF’s ability to sustain operations depends heavily on gold revenues. And the UAE’s own global gold-trading infrastructure, built on lax regulations, low taxes, and discreet financial systems, makes it the ideal partner for armed groups seeking to convert looted resources into weapons and cash.

Sudan mirrors Myanmar in a darker way: where Myanmar supplies the materials for the world’s green future, Sudan supplies the materials for its financial present, stabilizing gold markets, supporting global luxury demand, and solidifying the UAE’s status as an international trading powerhouse. In both cases, the profits flow outward, while the devastation remains local.

Foreign Wars as a Business Model

The parallels between Myanmar and Sudan reveal a broader pattern of 21st-century extraction economics. War and political collapse weaken regulation, eliminate oversight, and create desperate labor pools. Armed groups become local gatekeepers, selling access to mines or smuggling routes. Foreign corporations and governments capitalize on the chaos to secure strategic resources cheaply.

In Myanmar, ethnic armed groups benefit from mining revenues while China secures rare earths vital for its technology sector. In Sudan, the RSF funds its military operations through gold smuggling while the UAE strengthens its global commodities market.

This model is not new. But the urgency of the green transition and the volatility of global commodity markets have made it more aggressive than ever. The world wants cheap inputs for clean energy, financial reserves, and technological superiority. Conflict zones deliver them, evidently at enormous human cost.

The Moral Cost of The Green and Gold Transitions

The stories of Sian in Shan State and the civilians trapped in Sudan’s war zones expose a deeper contradiction at the heart of global development. The world says it wants sustainable energy and ethical supply chains. Yet the materials needed for these transitions are often sourced from places where sustainability and ethics are impossible.

Myanmar, Sudan, Congo, Bolivia, and other resource-rich conflict states are the hidden foundation of modern life in first world countries. Their suffering directly creates the conveniences and technologies that wealthier countries take for granted.

Until the international community demands transparency, enforces sanctions on conflict-linked commodities, and insists that the green future not be contradictorily built on burned earth, Myanmar and Sudan will remain cautionary tales and examples of what happens when the world’s hunger for resources meets its willingness to ignore suffering.

Takaichi’s suggestion earlier this month that Tokyo could intervene militarily if Taiwan is attacked has enraged Beijing.

Japan has denied a report that said United States President Donald Trump had advised Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi not to provoke China over Taiwan’s sovereignty.

In a news briefing on Thursday, Japan’s top government spokesperson Minoru Kihara said “there is no such fact” about an article published in The Wall Street Journal claiming that Trump had made such a remark to the Japanese leader.

He declined to comment further on the details of the “diplomatic exchange”.

The row between Asia’s two biggest economies began after Takaichi had suggested earlier this month that Tokyo could intervene militarily in any attack on self-ruled Taiwan, which China claims as part of its territory.

Takaichi’s remark ignited anger in Beijing.

After the incident, Beijing’s Foreign Ministry said that Chinese leader Xi Jinping pressed the issue in a phone call with Trump on Monday, saying Taiwan’s return was an “integral part of the post-war international order”.

The WSJ reported on Thursday that, shortly after that phone call between the US and Chinese leaders, “Trump set up a call with Takaichi and advised her not to provoke Beijing on the question of the island’s sovereignty”. The report quoted unidentified Japanese officials and an American briefed on the call.

Takaichi said in her reporting of the call with Trump that they discussed the US president’s conversation with Xi, as well as bilateral relations.

“President Trump said we are very close friends, and he offered that I should feel free to call him anytime,” she said.

Beijing, which has threatened to use force to take control of the self-ruled island, also took other punitive steps to register its anger over Takaichi’s initial remarks in parliament on November 7.

It summoned Tokyo’s ambassador and advised Chinese citizens against travelling to Japan.

As the diplomatic row escalated, the Chinese embassy in Tokyo issued a new warning to its citizens on Wednesday, saying there had been a surge in crime in Japan, and that Chinese citizens had reported “being insulted, beaten and injured for no reason”.

Japan’s Foreign Ministry denied any increase in crime, citing figures from the National Police Agency in response that showed the number of murders from January to October had halved compared with the same period in 2024.

Last week, Japanese media reported that China will again ban all imports of Japanese seafood as the diplomatic dispute between the two countries escalated.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun reiterated on Thursday a call for Japan to officially retract Takaichi’s comments.

“The Japanese side’s attempt to downplay, dodge, and cover up Prime Minister Takaichi’s seriously erroneous remarks by not raising them again is self-deception,” Guo told a regular news briefing.

“China will never accept this.”

Meanwhile, Trump’s public silence on Japan’s escalating dispute with China has further frayed nerves in Tokyo.

Some officials worry that Trump may be prepared to soften support for Taiwan in pursuit of a trade accord with China, a move they fear will embolden Beijing and cause conflict in an increasingly militarised East Asia.

“For Trump, what matters most is US-China relations,” said Kazuhiro Maejima, a professor of US politics at Sophia University.

“Japan has always been treated as a tool or a card to manage that relationship,” Maejima told Reuters news agency.

Washington’s envoy to Tokyo has said the US supports Japan in the face of China’s “coercion”, but two senior ruling party lawmakers said they had hoped for more full-throated support from their top security ally in Washington, DC.

Bamboo scaffolding, a centuries-old technique that was traditionally ubiquitous in Hong Kong, is under scrutiny for its role in the city’s deadliest fire in more than a century.

At least 55 people have died, and hundreds are still missing since scaffolding at a housing estate in Tai Po district caught fire on Wednesday, according to the latest government figures.

Bamboo is cheap, lightweight, and strong enough to withstand the city’s many typhoons and tropical storms. Hundreds of bamboo poles can often be seen lashed together on the side of a modern office tower.

But could one of Hong Kong’s iconic symbols also have served as the kindling for one of its most horrific tragedies in decades?

How is bamboo scaffolding used?

Buildings or housing estates – like the one in Tai Po district – encased in bamboo during significant renovation projects are not a rare sight in the city-state. Sometimes, the scaffolding can remain up for a year or more.

Bamboo scaffolding is built by speciality workers known as “spiders”. They lash together bamboo poles to build intricate grid-like scaffolding that is then typically covered in additional netting to catch construction materials.

While the use of bamboo has faded in other parts of Asia, it has been hard to replace it completely in Hong Kong, even with options such as metal scaffolding, said experts.

“It’s light, cheap and fast to build with,” Ehsan Noroozinejad, a senior researcher and construction expert at Western Sydney University, Australia, told Al Jazeera. “Crews carry poles by hand, cut them on site, and wrap awkward facades without cranes. That speed and flexibility keep projects moving and costs down.”

Because it is “light and easy to cut”, bamboo scaffolding also fits the narrow living environment of Hong Kong, said Xinyan Huang, deputy director of the Research Centre for Fire Safety Engineering at Hong Kong Polytechnic University.

But there are other reasons, too, why bamboo is hard to replace.

“It [Hong Kong] has a long history, so it is a tradition, and it is not easy to change tradition,” Huang told Al Jazeera by email. “Any change in the construction industry will meet much resistance from current players.”

There are 4,000 bamboo scaffolding workers in the city, Hong Kong Free Press reported, citing union figures, although the industry is on the decline thanks to increased competition from metal scaffolding and an ageing cohort of workers.

Is bamboo scaffolding dangerous?

Prior to the fire, most concerns around bamboo scaffolding have focused on worker safety.

There were 22 fatal workplace accidents involving bamboo scaffolding in Hong Kong between 2018 and 2024, according to government figures. Six accidents occurred while new scaffolding was being built, while the rest took place during repairs.

Besides the fact that bamboo is by its very nature combustible, it is also structurally weaker and less stable than steel, according to Huang. He told Al Jazeera that it should be phased out for larger projects.

“I think the bamboo scaffolding can be used for small-scale applications, such as installing an air conditioning unit and replacing a window of a room. However, the large-scale usage such as covering the entire building facade should be stopped. Perhaps, a maximum area of bamboo scaffolding can be defined in future regulation,” he said.

What role did bamboo scaffolding play in the Tai Po fire?

The fire is the deadliest in Hong Kong in more than a century, since a blaze in 1918 at the Happy Valley Racecourse in British Hong Kong led to the deaths of more than 600 people.

Bamboo scaffolding played a big role in spreading the fire, according to experts like Anwar Orabi, a lecturer in fire safety engineering at the University of Queensland, although it was helped by other materials in the estate.

The fire broke out on the scaffolding of one of the estate’s towers on Wednesday, but the speed with which the fire spread took many observers by surprise. Orabi said the design of the scaffolding made it difficult to keep the blaze limited to just a few floors.

“In my point of view, the scaffolding presented a path for the fire to spread vertically which compromised compartmentation. The fire ‘climbed’ the scaffolding, and ignited the multiple fuel sources in people’s homes,” he told Al Jazeera by email.

“Fire can break windows by imposing a strong heat flux [flow of heat] which heats up the glass and breaks it. It is also possible that many people left their windows open resulting in ingress of the fire. This resulted in a multi-storey fire,” he said. Heat radiation and embers from one building helped spread the fire to the next, he said, ultimately engulfing seven towers.

Hong Kong officials also say substandard construction materials were another contributing factor. The South China Morning Post reported that the netting placed over the scaffolding did not adhere to the fire code, citing local officials.

Senior police superintendent Eileen Chung said highly flammable Styrofoam boards had also been placed in windows in the housing estate’s lifts, public broadcaster RTHK reported, helping the fire spread.

Two directors and one engineering consultant from the company behind the construction have been detained, Chung confirmed.

Hong Kong’s leader, John Lee Ka-chiu, has promised that all housing estates undergoing significant improvements will now be inspected.

“The government has immediately arranged for inspections of all housing estates across the city undergoing major repairs, to examine the safety of scaffolding and building materials,” he wrote on Facebook.

At the Beijing premiere of “Zootopia 2” last week, Walt Disney Animation Studios Chief Creative Officer Jared Bush encountered a wall filled with letters from people throughout China, all writing about what the original 2016 animated movie meant to them.

They highlighted the optimism of rabbit cop Judy Hopps and how they wanted to emulate her sunny outlook. They cited the unlikely friendship between Judy and her partner in crime, a fox named Nick Wilde, as hope that they could find common ground with different family members. It was a display Bush didn’t see at any other premiere.

“It’s more than just a story,” said Bush, who wrote and directed “Zootopia 2,” directing alongside Byron Howard. “A lot of the time, these characters have helped people through difficult moments of their life. They have a lot of love for these characters.”

To this day, the original “Zootopia” ranks as China’s highest-grossing Hollywood animated film, with a total box office haul there of $236 million. Marketing ahead of the new film has included promotions with 10 brands, as well as displays throughout the country, including in Shenzhen, Chengdu and Beijing.

But over the years, the China market for U.S.-made films has changed dramatically, leading to questions about whether “Zootopia,” which heads to theaters Wednesday, and its loyal following can break through the more difficult landscape that American movies face there today.

Once seen as a major — and lucrative — destination for big Hollywood blockbusters, the country now has a more robust local film industry that’s pumping out strong competitors. The fraying geopolitical relationship between the U.S. and China also hasn’t helped, nor has the increasing trend of younger audiences watching short-form content on their phones.

“It’s important to the industry that both ‘Zootopia’ and ‘Avatar’ work,” said Andrew Cripps, head of theatrical distribution for Walt Disney Studios, referring to the upcoming James Cameron-directed “Avatar: Fire and Ash.” “The overall industry needs some success at year-end, and I think this would be a tremendous sign of confidence in the marketplace.”

China was once seen as a gold mine for certain films — namely, big studio movies — that could get approval from its government for release.

A decade ago, Hollywood movies would regularly haul in more than $100 million at the Chinese box office, with massive blockbusters like 2015’s “Furious 7” and 2014’s “Transformers: Age of Extinction” drawing north of $300 million each. Some films with softer domestic debuts could count on China to supersize their box-office returns, like 2016’s “Resident Evil: The Final Chapter,” which grossed nearly $160 million in China alone, but just $26.8 million in the U.S. and Canada.

In 2016, the domestic Chinese film business saw a significant slowdown in box-office growth. As a result, revenue from imported films — largely those from the U.S., such as Universal Pictures’ “Warcraft” and Disney-owned Marvel Studios’ “Captain America: Civil War” — increased by 10.9%, said Ying Zhu, author of “Hollywood in China: Behind the Scenes of the World’s Largest Movie Market.”

Those foreign films accounted for 41.7% of the total market share at the time, up from 38.4% in 2015, she wrote in an email. To help boost year-end revenue, Chinese regulators even relaxed the so-called blackout on imported films during December, which was traditionally saved for local movies.

“Zootopia” opened in China to just $22 million at the box office, but momentum grew in subsequent weeks. Though a movie from the U.S. typically got a four-week run in China, Chinese regulators made an exception and added two extra weeks, said Bush, who co-directed and co-wrote the 2016 film.

“‘Zootopia’ was somewhat of a real surprise to us here in China,” he said on a video call from Beijing while on the film’s publicity tour. “We didn’t know that it was going to turn into this phenomenon here.”

Known in China as “Crazy Animal City,” the film’s dynamic between lead characters Nick and Judy and their imperfect but caring relationship appealed to Chinese audiences, as did Judy’s backstory of moving from a small town in the countryside to a major metropolis, Bush said. Animated films have also long been popular in the market.

After the film’s success, Disney built the “Zootopia”-themed land in Shanghai Disneyland, which opened in 2023 and is the only such land in any Disney park. The studio recently held the movie’s Shanghai premiere at the themed land, as crowds of fans (both there and in Beijing) dressed up as characters from the film, including lesser-known ones like Fru Fru the shrew and Officer Clauhauser, a pop culture-obsessed cheetah.

But since 2020 and the COVID-19 pandemic, China has pulled back from its embrace of Hollywood films, particularly as its political relationship with the U.S. has chilled.

Earlier this year, China planned to reduce the number of Hollywood films it allows into the country, amid tariff tensions with the U.S. At the same time, China’s homegrown film industry has matured, leading to more locally-produced movies at the box office. A notable success was the animated hit “Ne Zha 2,” which raked in almost $2.2 billion worldwide, $1.8 billion of which was in China.

And similar to the U.S., the Chinese film market has also been dented by the growth of short-form content and increasing popularity of watching entertainment on phones and tablets, keeping theatergoers at home.

That’s all meant a less reliable haul for U.S. films. So far this year, the top-grossing American film in China was Universal’s “Jurassic World: Rebirth,” which brought in $79 million — a far cry from the massive returns some U.S. movies once commanded. The last Disney film that was released in China and made more than $100 million was 2024’s “Alien: Romulus.”

But there are still niches that appeal to Chinese audiences, including family movies, big blockbusters laden with special effects and animated franchises. Cripps said he was “cautiously optimistic” about the film’s reception in China, because of the franchise recognition and the themed land in Shanghai.

“Given what’s happened over the last two to three years, it’s hard to get overly excited until you see some actual data,” he said. “But certainly, it feels good going into it.”

Taiwan has unveiled a T$1.25 trillion (US$39.9 billion) supplementary defence budget, marking one of its most significant military spending increases in recent years. The announcement comes after a sustained period of Chinese military pressure, including near-daily incursions into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone and expanding naval activities. Beijing continues to assert that Taiwan is its territory, while Taipei rejects these claims and argues that China’s actions threaten regional stability. President Lai Ching-te, who has previously signaled a desire to strengthen Taiwan’s defences, aims to increase military expenditure to 5% of GDP by 2030 a major shift for an island long reliant on the United States for support. The new spending plan reflects Taipei’s conclusion that the security environment has deteriorated to a point requiring a rapid buildup of deterrence capabilities.

WHY IT MATTERS

This defence package is significant because it signals that Taiwan is preparing for a prolonged period of heightened tension with China. By raising spending above 3% of GDP for the first time since 2009, Taiwan is accelerating efforts to modernize its armed forces and expand asymmetric capabilities a key strategy for countering a much larger Chinese military. The move also has implications for broader Indo-Pacific security, as Taiwan sits at the center of major global supply chains, especially semiconductors. Any conflict involving the island would have worldwide economic repercussions. Additionally, the announcement tests the United States’ commitment under its legal obligation to help Taiwan defend itself, particularly as the Trump administration has so far approved only a limited number of arms sales this year. The overall decision underscores the growing sense in Taipei that deterrence, rather than diplomacy alone, is essential for survival.

A range of actors will be directly affected by Taiwan’s expanded defence spending. For Taiwan itself, the budget reflects both political determination and public concern, as leaders balance the urgency of national security with domestic expectations about economic priorities. China stands on the opposite end of the debate, condemning the move as wasteful, provocative, and orchestrated by foreign powers, and warning that it will only destabilize cross-strait relations. The United States remains a pivotal player, as Taiwan’s primary security partner and arms supplier, and its actions in the coming months will shape Beijing’s and Taipei’s strategy alike. Regional governments such as Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations are also stakeholders, because escalation in the Taiwan Strait would directly affect their own security and trade routes. Beyond governments, the global technology sector especially companies dependent on Taiwan’s semiconductor production is intricately tied to the island’s stability and therefore to its defence posture.

WHAT’S NEXT

The supplementary defence budget will now move to Taiwan’s legislature, where it is expected to pass given the governing party’s support for military strengthening. Once approved, the government is likely to detail specific procurement plans, which may include new air-defence systems, long-range missiles, drone platforms, and naval upgrades aimed at deterring a potential blockade or invasion. Attention will also focus on Washington, where upcoming decisions on arms transfers will indicate the level of U.S. engagement in Taiwan’s defence strategy. China is expected to respond with a combination of military signaling such as increased air and naval patrols and sharper rhetoric accusing Taiwan of escalating tensions. Regionally, allies and partners may adjust military planning and enhance coordination as they assess the implications of Taiwan’s defence buildup for broader Indo-Pacific stability. Over the next several months, the situation is likely to remain fluid as each stakeholder reacts to the shifting balance of power across the Taiwan Strait.

With information from Reuters.

China’s Foreign Ministry said Trump initiated call with Xi Jinping and that communication was crucial for developing stable US-China relations.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has “more or less agreed” to increase purchases of goods from the United States, President Donald Trump said, a day after a phone call between the two leaders was described by Beijing as “positive, friendly and constructive”.

Speaking to reporters on board Air Force One on Tuesday evening, Trump said he asked the Chinese leader during the call to accelerate purchases from the US.

“I think we will be pleasantly surprised by the actions of President Xi,” Trump said.

“I asked him, I’d like you to buy it a little faster. I’d like you to buy more. And he’s more or less agreed to do that,” he said.

Trump’s upbeat forecast on trade with China comes after Beijing announced last month that it would resume purchases of US soya beans and would halt expanded curbs on rare earths exports to the US amid detente in the tariff war with Washington.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that China had pledged to buy 12 million metric tonnes of soya beans from US farmers this year, but the Reuters news agency reports that the pace of Chinese purchases had been less than initially expected.

China has so far ordered nearly two million metric tonnes of US soya beans, according to data by the US Department of Agriculture, Reuters reports.

The call on Monday between Trump and Xi comes just weeks after the two leaders met in South Korea, where they agreed to a framework for a trade deal that has yet to be finalised.

“China and the United States once fought side by side against fascism and militarism, and should now work together to safeguard the outcomes of World War II,” Xi was quoted as telling Trump in the call, China’s official Xinhua news agency reports.

Xi also told Trump that “Taiwan’s return to China is an integral part of the post-war international order”.

China regards Taiwan as part of its territory and has not ruled out the use of force to unite the self-ruled, democratic island with the Chinese mainland.

The US has been traditionally opposed to China’s potential use of force to seize Taiwan and is obligated by a domestic law to provide sufficient military hardware to Taipei to deter any armed attack.

But Trump has maintained strategic ambiguity about whether he would commit US troops in case of a war in the Taiwan Strait, while his administration has urged Taiwan to increase its defence budget.

Trump made no mention of Xi’s comments on Taiwan in a later post on Truth Social, where he spoke of a “very good” call with the Chinese leader, which he said covered many topics, including Ukraine, Fentanyl and US farm products.

“Our relationship with China is extremely strong! This call was a follow up to our highly successful meeting in South Korea, three weeks ago. Since then, there has been significant progress on both sides in keeping our agreements current and accurate,” Trump said.

“Now we can set our sights on the big picture,” he said.

The US leader also said that he had accepted Xi’s invitation to visit Beijing in April, and had invited Xi for a state visit to the US later in the year.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Tuesday that Washington had initiated the call between Trump and Xi, which spokesperson Mao Ning called “positive, friendly and constructive”.

Mao also said that “communication between the two heads of state on issues of common concern is crucial for the stable development of China-US relations”.

Additional reporting by Bonnie Liao.

US and China have long competed to become world powers, particularly in the technology sector. Since 2022, the US has systematically restricted the supply of high-performance NVIDIA chips to China. In today’s world, competition for power is no longer achieved through traditional means, such as military power. The US uses chips (semiconductors) as an instrument of political pressure. This policy is not just about economic or trade value, but has become part of technological statecraft designed to counter China’s military potential and its use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

Semiconductors as a Provision of Power

The US policy of restricting high-end semiconductors to China shows a paradigm shift, chips (semiconductors) are not only industrial commodities, but have shifted to become a tool for achieving power. Export controls on high-performance chips and components that enable their production have been implemented by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). These steps show that the US is restructuring the geopolitical arena of technology.

AI today relies heavily on chips that can process vast amounts of data. The US restricts the export of high-end chips, such as the NVIDIA H100 and A100. A country’s AI development capacity could be severely compromised without access to these chips. The H100 is more than just a technological component; it serves as a strategic enabler that determines a country’s ability to maintain military dominance.

NVIDIA and the Security Logic Behind Export Control

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on 2023 announcement expanded export oversight, not only targeting on specific chip models but also on component values, most notably in frontier algorithm development. The NVIDIA A100 and H100 are highly advanced datacenter and AI chips. The guidelines are particularly high for training complex AI models on supercomputers, even for military applications or demanding research.

To prevent misuse, the US government has implemented licensing requirements for chips like the A100 and H100 chips, which have put chips like the A300 and H800, made by NVIDIA, under increased scrutiny, despite being categorized as “weak service” chips. Export restrictions stem from concerns that NVIDIA GPUs could be used by China in training AI models related to the US military, not only to slow China’s technological progress but also to safeguard its own national interests.

The US understands very well that high-performance chips are “brain machines” that can accelerate the development of military superiority, intelligence analysis, and even autonomous systems. So it is very clear that limiting the capacity of computing and high-performance hardware is the way to go. To delay a rival’s capabilities without resorting to direct military confrontation. This is a concrete manifestation of the shift in the “battlefield” taking place in the technological and regulatory arenas.

Vulnerable Supply Chains and Dependence on Taiwan

In chip control, the US must recognize that there are undeniable realities. NVIDIA’s chip production goes through a fabrication process that is almost entirely carried out in Taiwan, a country that lies in the geopolitical conflict between Washington and Beijing. The Congressional Research Service (2024) shows that approximately 90% of global advanced semiconductor chip production is based in Taiwan, manufactured by the leading Taiwanese foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. (TSMC). This creates a structural dependency that poses serious risks to US economic and technological security.

If semiconductor production were concentrated in a single region, it would create vulnerabilities that could destabilize the global technological system. Therefore, any tensions in the Taiwan Strait would disrupt US access to the computing infrastructure it maintains. Export restrictions are just one step in a much more complex strategy, requiring the US to diversify production locations and ensure that the chip supply chain is not concentrated in a single region.

Effectiveness and Adaptation Room for China

NVIDIA’s chip restrictions were intended to curb the pace of AI modernization in China, but China was still able to optimize the model’s efficiency. This demonstrates that limiting hardware performance doesn’t always equate to limiting innovation. On the other hand, unofficial market entities have emerged, allowing NVIDIA GPUs to remain accessible through third parties. This adaptation demonstrates that hardware control has limitations, especially when demand remains high and global distribution networks are not always transparent.

Looking at its overall effectiveness, US policy has been effective in slowing China’s computing capabilities, but it hasn’t stopped its strategic potential. Instead, it’s encouraging China to be self-sufficient in strengthening its technological foundation, even though the quality of local chips hasn’t yet matched NVIDA’s standards. In other words, restricting NVIDIA’s chip exports isn’t meant to end competition, but rather to transform it into a race toward technological independence. The policy’s effectiveness will only last as long as China finds a way to adapt, while China is working to fill that gap.

Policy Directions with Greater Strategic Opportunities

The effectiveness of the compute policy is based on a governance architecture that holds every allied country accountable to the same standards. Without a disciplined framework, export controls on China are merely an illusion that is easily penetrated by gaps in different economic and regulatory interests. By creating strategic alignment, which forces every democratic country to reduce the fragmentation of interests, it can open up greater policy opportunities to emerge. Many developing countries see this semiconductor race as a competition for dominance, not as an effort to maintain security.

In other words, a successful computing policy is not one that simply limits China’s space, but one that manages technological gaps without creating competing computing blocs. The geopolitical challenge is maintaining superiority without forcing the world into two technological divides that would be difficult to control. The US strategy to secure a leading position in future technologies requires flexibility in responding to global dynamics.

A Future Determined by Computational Capacity

The debate over NVIDIA chips demonstrates the growing integration of political and technological power. US policy aims not only to restrain the flow of strategic goods but also to build a new computing-based power architecture. However, this policy also presents challenges, including dependence on Taiwan, China’s flexibility, and economic pressure on US chip companies.

In a global world that continues to move toward an AI-driven economy, the future will be determined by who can manage geopolitical risks, understand supply chain dynamics, and design visionary policies. Ultimately, GPU regulation is no longer simply a matter of export control; it demonstrates how countries navigate a power struggle now measured in microchips.

Beijing carries out emergency launch to relieve space station crew left without working return capsule.

China has rushed to launch an uncrewed spacecraft to relieve three astronauts left on board the Tiangong space station without a passage to Earth.

State broadcaster CCTV showed a Long March-2F rocket carrying the Shenzhou-22 spacecraft lifting off from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre shortly after noon local time (04:00 GMT) on Tuesday.

The Shenzhou-22 mission was originally planned to be crewed and take off in 2026.

However, the launch was brought forward after debris damaged the Shenzhou-20, which is currently attached to the Tiangong station, making it unsafe for carrying humans to Earth.

That disrupted the last crew change on the permanently crewed Chinese space station in November.

Unable to fly home in Shenzhou-20, the three astronauts who had arrived in April for their six-month stay were forced to use Shenzhou-21 to return to Earth.

That left the three astronauts currently on board Tiangong without a flightworthy vessel that could return them home in the event of an emergency.

The uncrewed Shenzhou-22 will fill that gap.

The crew at the space station – Zhang Lu, Wu Fei and Zhang Hongzhang – are “working normally”, Chinese officials emphasised.

The incident marks a rare setback for China’s rapidly growing space programme, which plans to send astronauts to the moon by 2030.

Beijing has poured billions into the sector in recent decades as it seeks to match the capabilities of the United States, Russia and Europe.

China became the third country to send humans into orbit after the US and the former Soviet Union in 2022.

In November 2025 a public disagreement between Beijing and Tokyo over Taiwan exposed how the island’s fate now reaches far beyond Taipei, shaping trade, military planning and regional alliances across East Asia and further beyond.

The Taiwan question has recently re-emerged as a tension point between China and Japan. This raises broader questions about East Asian security. Beijing affirms its “One China policy”, treating Taiwan as a breakaway province to be “reunified” by force if necessary and reacts sharply to any foreign involvement. Avoiding rhetoric that might provoke its eastern neighbor until now, the consensus in Tokyo is shifting as many senior Japanese officials say a Chinese assault on Taiwan that threatens Japan’s survival could justify a military response. None of this is new, but the tone is.

China’s Firm Position on Taipei

Beijing’s stance remains absolute: it is Chinese territory, and any formal push or support from foreign actors for its independence is intolerable. Officials frame reunification as inevitable and non-negotiable, part of what state discourse calls the “national rejuvenation” of China. In recent months this posture has been accompanied by more visible coercion: maritime patrols in the South China Sea, large-scale exercises around the island and targeted economic measures against partners perceived to have crossed this line.

Any country that appears to undercut China’s claim through military cooperation with Taipei, public statements of support, or strengthened security ties risks a Chinese response. From Beijing’s point of view, fully controlling the region would extend China’s reach beyond its coast by securing sea lanes and projection space for the People’s Liberation Army. Politically, it would close a chapter Beijing sees as a Cold War remnant after a century of perceived humiliation.

Japan’s Stakes in Taiwan

Tokyo’s formal policy remains rooted in the One China framework as it does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state and officially supports a peaceful cross-Strait resolution. Security considerations and proximity to Taiwan have forced Japanese leaders into increasing their attention to the island in recent years. Hard-line conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s public remarks this month, that a Chinese assault on Taiwan which threatens Japanese survival could trigger a full military response, marked a break with decades of deliberate ambiguity.

It is likely that pending targets have been moved forward and planning for collective self-defence has become more explicit, while defence cooperation with partners particularly the United States under U.S. President Donald Trump has grown more visible. Taipei sits near Japan’s western islands; Yonaguni, the closest island of the Okinawa prefecture is roughly 100 km from Taiwan’s eastern coast and the sea lanes that run here carry a large share of Japan’s energy imports. The presence of substantial U.S. forces in Japan ties Tokyo’s security to Washington’s responses, making it politically and militarily difficult for Tokyo to ignore developments in the Strait.

Reactions, Responses and Confrontation

Responding with strong diplomatic protests and a suite of retaliatory measures to Prime Minister Takaichi’s parliamentary remarks on November 7, Chinese commerce authorities re-imposed bans on Japanese seafood and warned consumers against Japanese products urging its citizens to avoid travel to Japan. Diplomatically, China demanded a retraction and summoned Japan’s ambassador in Beijing to issue a formal protest. This was widely seen as an unusually public move given the recent history of cautious diplomacy in the area.

Japan has issued strong protests over the consul’s remarks and dispatched a senior envoy to Beijing to calm the situation but the talks produced little immediate de-escalation. Japanese fighters were set on high alert after a surveillance drone was detected between Taiwan and Yonaguni, underlining how geographically close this theatre is to Japanese territory. Such moves are not isolated acts but are part of a larger pattern meant to act as a “show of strength” while stopping short of starting a full-scale war.

Why This Small Island is Significant to Both Countries

For Beijing, the island is a core territorial claim bolstered by narratives about sovereignty and historical rectification. Losing the island, or allowing it to consolidate international backing as a separate political entity, would be depicted by Chinese leaders as an unacceptable erosion of national integrity. Its location is also a matter of strategy: full control over the island would make it harder for outside powers to operate in China’s seas.

For Tokyo, the calculus is concrete and immediate. Taiwan’s proximity means that military operations in the straits could quickly affect Japanese airspace and waters. Japanese industry is also deeply integrated with Taiwanese firms notably in fields such as semiconductors and electronics, so instability would hit the stock markets and raise costs for manufacturers.

Possible Future Scenarios and Regional Impact

The stand-off could begin a prolonged period of low-level confrontation. Both Beijing and Tokyo could double down: China sustaining pressure through patrols and economic sanctions, Japan strengthening its military capabilities and aligning more tightly with the United States and other western partners.

This doesn’t mean that there is no time for pragmatic de-escalation from both sides.  Recognising the mutual costs of prolonged hostility, Tokyo could clarify that its statements were contextual and not a call to aggressive action, while Beijing could temper sanctions once its political point has been made. Diplomacy behind closed doors might restore exchanges and trade, though the underlying policy differences between the two countries would remain unresolved. Therefore, such an outcome would buy more time but not resolve the underlying causes of these issues.

A third way would be one where a deeper realignment could take place. Japan might accelerate defence modernisation and legal reforms to make collective defence more actionable. On its part, China could respond by heavily investing and intensifying military presence in its south or seeking closer security ties with partners that counterbalance U.S. influence.

In the worst case, simple miscalculations could lead to direct clashes for example between Chinese forces operating near Taiwan and Japanese ships or aircraft which could rapidly draw in the United States given treaty commitments and strategic interests.

While full-scale war remains unlikely for now, we can never be 100% sure as the simple probability increases more and more with these incidents that have developed recently.

Implications for the Rest of The World

No matter if the situation escalates further or not, the United States will undoubtebly remain a central factor to any such issue. Washington’s alliance with Tokyo and its historically ambiguous but substantial support for Taipei mean that any serious incident will have trans-Pacific repercussions.

Neighbouring states like South Korea, ASEAN members, Australia, India, etc. would be forced into a difficult diplomatic calculation, by balancing economic ties with Beijing against security concerns and relations with Washington and Tokyo. Economically, prolonged instability would disrupt semiconductor production, shipping routes and regional investment, with global consequences.

Most analysts agree that this issue has shifted from a regional diplomatic concern to a great security risk for the larger world. In the near term, careful diplomacy from both sides may limit the damage, but the issues at hand suggest this will most likely be a long term gap in East Asian security. How both sides manage politics and deterrence will determine whether the next phase is a steady containment or a dangerous step toward direct military confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

Because of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statements in the Diet regarding the Taiwan issue, the already fragile China–Japan relationship has deteriorated rapidly. China has issued travel and study-abroad warnings for Japan, effectively halted imports of Japanese seafood, sent coast guard vessels into the “territorial waters” of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and had three warships transit the Osumi Strait in southern Japan.

At the same time, Beijing took the unusual step of announcing in advance that Premier Li Qiang would not meet the Japanese prime minister at the G20 summit. In just ten days, China launched a strong, multi-domain counterattack—political, diplomatic, economic, and military—with no signs of de-escalation.

If Prime Minister Takaichi does not retract her remarks, Beijing is likely to escalate even further and drag the United States into the dispute.

What actually happened? Is China overreacting? How far will Beijing take this confrontation?

Let us revisit the origin of the incident. In response to questioning in the Diet, Prime Minister Takaichi stated, “If China blockades Taiwan using warships and employing force, then no matter how you look at it, this could become a survival-threatening crisis for Japan.”

Pressed by the opposition, she added, “If China imposes a maritime blockade on Taiwan and U.S. forces intervening in that blockade come under armed attack, a crisis could arise.”

International media paid no attention to Takaichi’s clarification and focused only on the headline question: Will Japan send troops if military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait? Accordingly, France’s Le Monde, Britain’s The Guardian, and the Associated Press all ran titles implying that Japan would dispatch forces if Taiwan were subjected to military action.

Japanese scholars have since written articles in U.S. media explaining that “Japanese military intervention in a Taiwan contingency” presupposes that U.S. forces have already intervened, and only then could Japan exercise the right of collective self-defense. Yet the Japanese government has not actively clarified this prerequisite on the international stage, drawing sharp criticism from well-known Japanese commentator Hiroyuki Nishimura for dereliction of duty.

Nishimura’s criticism exposes a widespread misunderstanding: even if the United States militarily intervenes in the Taiwan Strait, as long as Japanese territory is not under armed threat, Tokyo is legally barred from exercising collective self-defense. In other words, under the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, the United States is obligated to defend Japan, but Japan has no treaty obligation to send troops to support U.S. forces in a war that does not concern Japan.

Therefore, the mitigating explanations offered by Japanese scholars on Takaichi’s behalf do not hold water. The Japanese government’s failure to clarify the issue in international media is naturally out of fear of offending Washington. It remains unclear whether President Trump fully understands the “asymmetric” nature of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, and Tokyo has no desire to remind this shrewd deal-making president that when American soldiers are dying on the battlefield, Japan actually has no treaty obligation to send troops.

Unless, of course, the reason for U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait is explicitly “to protect Japan.” Political rhetoric is one thing; the law is another. The fact remains that neither the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty nor Japan’s domestic legislation imposes any legal obligation on Japan to exercise collective self-defense when its ally, the United States, comes under attack.

Another fact: the Philippines is in exactly the same position as Japan. Unless U.S. forces become involved in order to protect the Philippines or Philippine territory is affected by the war, Manila has no obligation to send combat troops to assist the U.S.—it can only provide logistical and base support.

Of course, if the United States does intervene militarily in the Taiwan Strait, it will inevitably claim it is to protect Japan (and the Philippines). But the authority to make that determination lies with Tokyo and Manila, both of which retain a certain right to stay out of the fight. This is precisely why U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby earlier this year demanded that Japan and Australia state clearly what actions they would take to support the United States in the event of a Taiwan contingency. That demand makes it crystal clear that America’s mutual defense treaties do not obligate allies to unconditionally fight alongside U.S. forces.

In short: when their own security is at stake, allies will send troops; otherwise, they will at most offer logistics and bases—no allied soldiers will go to the front lines.

This explains Beijing’s fierce reaction. Even if Takaichi did not mean Japan would intervene unilaterally in the Taiwan Strait, her remarks effectively expanded the “applicability scenarios” of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. If such moves are not checked, they will only encourage the Philippines, Australia, and other anti-China neighbors to follow suit—using the same logic to blackmail or bleed China.

This is not an overreaction, nor is it making a mountain out of a molehill. Beyond realpolitik necessity, the Chinese people have not forgotten Japan’s history of invading China—especially in this 80th anniversary year of the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. If Beijing were to let the matter slide, it would face intense domestic backlash.

Therefore, unless Takaichi retracts her remarks, China–Japan relations will continue to worsen, eventually leading to a situation where “Taiwan is fine, but Japan is in crisis.”

Takaichi may well have intentionally provoked Beijing in order to shore up LDP support, rally Japanese nationalism, loosen the “three non-nuclear principles,” and expand conventional military capabilities. But the backlash has likely been far greater than she anticipated. The key still lies in America’s attitude.

Although the U.S. ambassador to Japan publicly expressed support for Tokyo and criticized Beijing, Washington’s overall response has been relatively muted—Trump has zero interest in letting Japan torpedo his scheduled China trip next April.

On the other hand, Beijing may well conclude that Washington is deliberately allowing Japan to interfere in China’s internal affairs in order to gain negotiating leverage. That would only reduce China’s inhibitions about sanctioning Japan and could lead it to directly challenge the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, pushing the situation to the brink of losing control and forcing the U.S. to rein in Japan.

China has many tools to test the treaty—economic and trade measures, cultural exchanges, diplomacy, and even military options are all on the table. The disputed uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Ryukyu Islands, whose sovereignty remains unresolved, are both historical issues left over from World War II. Although both fall within the scope of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, Washington has never recognized Japanese sovereignty over them.

Regarding the Ryukyus, Beijing can wage a protracted legal battle, continually emphasizing that the Potsdam Declaration never returned the islands to Japan. Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu, Beijing could move directly to military control—land on the islands, demolish Japanese facilities, raise the Chinese flag, and expel foreign vessels—forcing the United States to get involved.

If Beijing is pushed to the point of letting the situation spiral, its price to Washington will be high: it may include, but is not limited to, demanding that the U.S. block Japan from abandoning the three non-nuclear principles, block Japan’s “normalization” (turning the Self-Defense Forces into a full-fledged military), force Japan to pay tangible and intangible reparations for its invasion of China, or even force Takaichi to step down.

Would Trump risk a second Chinese rare-earth embargo over an uninhabited island whose sovereignty does not belong to Japan? The answer is obvious.

Beijing’s current Taiwan strategy has shifted from “opposing independence” to “advancing unification.” Part of that strategy is to make neighboring countries acknowledge—through actual state behavior, not just words—that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair. Japan is the poster child for neighboring hypocrisy—talking peace while acting otherwise. It will be shown no mercy for breaking the promises of diplomatic normalization; Beijing is determined to make a chicken of Japan to scare the monkey.

From this perspective, Prime Minister Takaichi may have thought she could achieve a classic boomerang effect (using the Taiwan issue for domestic political gain by first exporting strong rhetoric abroad). Instead, Beijing has been handed a rare opportunity to use Japan as a target and demonstrate to the world how it will reduce obstacles to unification.

The United States wants to avoid direct confrontation with China and prefers to let proxies stand on the front line so it can reap the benefits while remaining in the rear. On the surface this creates trouble for Beijing, but in reality it also creates endless headaches for Washington—because China will not limit itself to dealing with the proxies; it will drag the United States into the fight.

This is the new tactical phase in U.S.–China competition following the Busan meeting, testing the one-year truce both sides agreed to. Whether proxies are an advantage or a liability for Washington depends entirely on how Beijing chooses to handle the dispute—and Tokyo makes the ideal canary in the coal mine.

China on Friday took its feud with Tokyo over Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Taikachi’s recent comments on Taiwan to the United Nations, as tensions between the East Asian neighbours deepened and ties plunged to their lowest since 2023.

“If Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression,” China’s permanent representative to the UN, Fu Cong, wrote in a letter on Friday to the global body’s Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, referring to the strait that separates mainland China from self-governing Taiwan, which Beijing insists belongs to China. Beijing has not ruled out the possibility of forcibly taking Taiwan.

The diplomatic spat began earlier in November when Taikachi, who took office only in October, made remarks about how Japan would respond to a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan. Those remarks angered Beijing, which has demanded retractions, although the Japanese PM has not made one.

However, the spat has now rapidly escalated into a trade war involving businesses on both sides, and has deepened security tensions over a contested territory that has long been a flashpoint for the two countries.

Here’s what we know about the dispute:

What did Japan’s PM say about Taiwan?

While speaking to parliament on November 7, Taikachi, a longtime Taiwan supporter, said a Chinese naval blockade or other action against Taiwan could prompt a Japanese military response. The response was not typical, and Taikachi appeared to go several steps further than her predecessors, who had only in the past expressed concern about the Chinese threat to Taiwan, but had never mentioned a response.

“If it involves the use of warships and military actions, it could by all means become a survival-threatening situation,” Taikachi told parliament, responding to an opposition politician’s queries in her first parliamentary grilling.

That statement immediately raised protests from China’s foreign and defence ministries, which demanded retractions. China’s consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, a day after, criticised the comments and appeared to make threats in a now deleted post on X, saying: “We have no choice but to cut off that dirty neck that has been lunged at us without hesitation. Are you ready?”

That post by Xue also raised anger in Japan, and some officials began calling for the diplomat’s expulsion. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara protested to Beijing over Xue’s X message, saying it was “extremely inappropriate,” while urging China to explain. Japan’s Foreign Ministry also demanded the post be deleted. Chinese officials, meanwhile, defended the comments as coming from a personal standpoint.

On November 14, China’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Japanese ambassador and warned of a “crushing defeat” if Japan interfered with Taiwan. The following day, Japan’s Foreign Ministry also summoned the Chinese ambassador to complain about the consul’s post.

Although Taikachi told parliament three days after her controversial statement that she would avoid talking about specific scenarios going forward, she has refused to retract her comments.

How have tensions increased since?

The matter has deteriorated into a trade war of sorts. On November 14, China issued a no-travel advisory for Japan, an apparent attempt to target the country’s tourism sector, which welcomed some 7.5 million Chinese tourists between January and September this year. On November 15, three Chinese airlines offered refunds or free changes for flights planned on Japan-bound routes.

The Chinese Education Ministry also took aim at Japan’s education sector, warning Chinese students there or those planning to study in Japan about recent crimes against Chinese. Both China and Japan have recorded attacks against each other’s nationals in recent months that have prompted fears of xenophobia, but it is unclear if the attacks are linked.

Tensions are also rising around territorial disputes. Last Sunday, the Chinese coastguard announced it was patrolling areas in the East China Sea, in the waters around a group of uninhabited islands that both countries claim. Japan calls the islands the Senkaku Islands, while Beijing calls them the Diaoyu Islands. Japan, in response, condemned the brief “violation” of Japanese territorial waters by a fleet of four Chinese coastguard ships.

Over the last week, Chinese authorities have suspended the screening of at least two Japanese films and banned Japanese seafood.

Then, on Thursday, China postponed a three-way meeting with culture ministers from Japan and South Korea that was scheduled to be held in late November.

‘Symbol of defiance’

On November 18, diplomats from both sides met in Beijing for talks where the grievances were aired.

Senior Chinese official Liu Jinsong chose to wear a five-buttoned collarless suit associated with the rebellion of Chinese students against Japanese imperialism in 1919.

Japanese media have called the choice of the suit a “symbol of defiance.” They also point to videos and images from the meeting showing Liu with his hands in his pockets after the talks, saying the gesture is typically viewed as disrespectful in formal settings.

The Beijing meeting did not appear to ease the tensions, and there seems to be no sign of the impasse breaking: Chinese representatives asked for a retraction, but Japanese diplomats said Taikachi’s remarks were in line with Japan’s stance.

What is the history of Sino-Japanese tensions?

It’s a long and – especially for China – painful story. Imperial Japan occupied significant portions of China after the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), when it gained control of Taiwan and forcefully annexed Korea. In 1937, Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Amid strong Chinese resistance, Japan occupied parts of eastern and southern China, where it created and controlled puppet governments. The Japanese Empire’s defeat in World War II in 1945 ended its expansion bid.

The Chinese Communist Party emerged victorious in 1949 in the civil war that followed with the Kuomintang, which, along with the leader Chiang Kai-shek, fled to Taiwan to set up a parallel government. But until 1972, Japan formally recognised Taiwan as “China”.

In 1972, it finally recognised the People’s Republic of China and agreed to the “one China principle”, in effect severing formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. However, Japan has maintained firm unofficial ties with Taiwan, including through trade.

Japan has also maintained a policy of so-called “strategic ambiguity” over how Tokyo would respond if China were to attack Taiwan — a policy of deliberate ambivalence, aimed at leaving Beijing and the rest of the world guessing over whether it would intervene militarily. The stance is similar to that of the United States, Taiwan’s most powerful ally.

How important is trade between China and Japan?

He Yongqian, a spokesperson for China’s commerce ministry, said at a regular news conference this week that trade relations between the two countries had been “severely damaged” by PM Takaichi’s comments.

China is Japan’s second-largest export market after the US, with Tokyo selling mainly industrial equipment, semiconductors and automobiles to Beijing. In 2024, China bought about $125bn worth of Japanese goods, according to the United Nations’ Comtrade database. South Korea, Japan’s third-largest export market, bought goods worth $46bn in 2024.

China is also a major buyer of Japan’s sea cucumbers and its top scallop buyer. Japanese firms, particularly seafood exporters, are worried about the effects of the spat on their businesses, according to reporting by Reuters.

Beijing is not as reliant on Japan’s economy, but Tokyo is China’s third-largest trading partner. China mainly exports electrical equipment, machinery, apparel and vehicles to Japan. Tokyo bought $152bn worth of goods from China in 2024, according to financial data website Trading Economics.

It’s not the first time Beijing has retaliated with trade. In 2023, China imposed a ban on all Japanese food imports after Tokyo released radioactive water from the Fukushima nuclear plant into the Pacific. Beijing was against the move, although the UN atomic energy agency had deemed the discharge safe. That ban was lifted just on November 7, the same day Taikachi made the controversial comments.

In 2010, China also halted the exports of rare earth minerals to Japan for seven weeks after a Chinese fishing captain was detained near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Paul Goldsack has issued a warning to travellers after he arrived at an airport to see trays filled full of confiscated powerbanks that airport staff had judged to be non-code-compliant

Travellers risk losing their battery packs when visiting the world’s most populous country.

Paul Goldsack was surprised to arrive at two of China’s biggest airports, Shanghai Pudong and Beijing Capital, and see trays filled with confiscated power banks.

“At security, all power banks were being inspected, and it was the CCC marks they were looking for. In Shanghai, the security officer looking at my power bank pointed to the CCC mark and gave me a thumbs up,” Paul told the Mirror.

“Nobody checked at Gatwick when we took our first Air China flight, but in China, we made four other flights, plus the one back to London, and a battery pack was checked every time. All Chinese airports now check all power banks for a CCC-approved label. If the power pack doesn’t have one, they CONFISCATE it, no arguments.

Do you have a travel story to share? Email [email protected]

“I personally saw multiple chargers being taken off other passengers. There were trays and trays full of power banks they had taken off travellers at each security point. I was lucky a Chinese friend warned me, or my expensive power banks would be gone.”

China has a power bank restriction on domestic flights, requiring a 3C certification label for all power banks. The three Cs stand for China Compulsory Certification. This rule, which took effect in June 2025, means most power banks sold internationally will be confiscated upon departure, as they do not have the required Chinese certification. Power banks should also not exceed 160 Wh and must be carried in carry-on luggage with the wattage and capacity clearly visible.

Currently, buying a power bank in the UK with a CCC label is hard. Amazon has a couple,” Paul noted. “It’s much easier to buy in China after arrival.”

It’s also important to note that power banks under 100 Wh are generally allowed, while those between 101-160 Wh require airline approval. Power banks over 160 Wh are prohibited. Power banks are never allowed in checked baggage when flying into China. They must be carried in your hand luggage. It’s wise to ensure the capacity (in Wh or mAh) and the 3C certification mark are clearly visible on the device. If not, security may confiscate it.

Over the last few years, several airlines have banned passengers from taking power banks on flights due to concerns that they could catch fire. Vietnam Airlines, Vietjet Air, and, now, Emirates have all banned the use of power banks on flights, while Cathay Pacific issued a similar ban effective from April 7, 2025.

Now, some airlines have started cracking down on another popular electronic item due to similar concerns about flammability. Taiwanese airlines EVA Air, UNI Air and Tigerair no longer allow Bluetooth earbuds, including Apple AirPods, to be placed in checked luggage.

Such audio tech contains lithium batteries, as power banks do. As the earbuds are constantly being charged when they’re in their case, the risk of them suddenly bursting into flames is increased.

The New Zealand Aviation Authority has also set out rules strictly prohibiting the packing of AirPods and other wireless earbuds in checked luggage on flights under its jurisdiction.

“Yes, you can take wireless earbuds and AirPods in your carry-on luggage. They must not go in check-in luggage under any circumstances,” the Kiwi aviation organisation explains.

“Each person is allowed a total of 20 spare batteries or power banks in their carry-on, unless an airline has approved the carriage of more batteries. The wireless earbuds/AirPods charger is considered one of the 20 spare batteries or power banks allowed in passengers’ carry-on.

“Some airlines, including Air New Zealand, specify in their conditions of carriage that you can only travel with your wireless earbuds / AirPods chargers in carry-on and not check-in luggage.”

Nearly a month after an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and an F/A-18F Super Hornet from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz crashed somewhere in the South China Sea, recovery efforts are underway, the Navy told TWZ. The two aircraft suffered mishaps within a half-hour of each other on Oct. 26 that President Donald Trump suggested could have been caused by “bad gas.” The exact cause of the crashes remains unclear.

“USNS Salvor (T-ARS 52), a Safeguard class salvage ship operated by Military Sealift Command, is on-scene conducting operations in support of the recovery efforts,” CMDR Matthew Comer, a 7th Fleet spokesman, said on Thursday. He provided no further details about the Salvor’s location, whether either or both aircraft have been located, or a timeline for recovery. In an email on Nov. 14, Comer told us that the “U.S. Navy has begun mobilizing units that will be used to verify the site and recover” the aircraft.

According to the MarineTraffic.com ship tracking site, the most recent position of the Salvor, dating back to Nov. 9, was just east of the Philippines island of Palawan in the South China Sea. MarineTraffic reports that the vessel left the Philippines on Nov. 8 bound for Guam, but it isn’t clear what its location is at the moment.

Given the tense and contested nature of the South China Sea and its proximity to China, there is likely a level of urgency to this operation to ensure these aircraft, or components from them, don’t fall into the hands of the Chinese. Beijing has a massive amount of assets in the region, and plenty that can handle some kind of recovery effort. The depths in the South China Sea are not that deep, either, making recovery operations easier. Like the U.S., China has foreign materiel exploitation, or FME, programs aimed at recovering weaponry for intelligence analysis and developmental purposes.

As we have written in the past about a Super Hornet recovery effort after one was blown off the deck of the supercarrier USS Harry S. Truman in 2022: “The F/A-18E is also filled with sensitive components, such as its AN/APG-79 active electronically-scanned radar, electronic warfare suite, identification friend-or-foe gear, and communications and data-sharing systems, as well as the software that runs them all. The Navy’s existing F/A-18E/F fleet has been in the process of receiving significant upgrades in recent years, too, as the service plans to continue operating these jets as core components of its carrier air wings for years to come.”

MH-60Rs are the Navy’s rotary-wing submarine hunter and are loaded with sensitive sensors, countermeasures, communications, computers and more that would be of high interest to a foreign adversary, and especially America’s chief naval competitor, China.

For all these reasons, the Navy dispatched the Salvor. It was purpose-built to conduct salvage, diving, towing, off-shore firefighting, heavy lift operations and theater security cooperation missions. According to a U.S. Navy document, it is equipped with: “a 7.5-ton capacity boom forward and a 40-ton capacity boom aft. A dynamic 150 ton lift is possible over the main bow or stern rollers using deck machinery and purchase tackle or hydraulic pullers. She can make a dynamic lift of 300 tons using the main blow rollers and stern rollers in unison.”

For diving operations, “the MK 12 and MK 1 diving systems provide Salvor divers the capability of air diving to depths of 190 feet. The divers descend to depth on a diving stage lowered by a powered davit. There is a hyperbaric chamber aboard for diver recompression following a dive or for the treatment of divers suffering from decompression sickness. For shallow underwater inspections, searches, and other tasks which require mobility, there is a full complement of SCUBA equipment on board.”

During a 2018 mission to recover aircraft shot down in 1944 near Ngerekebesang Island, Republic of Palau, the ship’s master offered some insights into its capabilities.

“The biggest advantage the Navy has with us on the Salvor is that we are standing by for them with a decompression chamber on board for divers, and we have heavy-lift capability,” Capt. Mike Flanagan, a civilian mariner and master of USNS Salvor, said at the time. “It’s just a robust ship. With our 40-ton-lift crane we can bring large and heavy objects off the bottom of the ocean.”

For perspective, Super Hornets have a maximum takeoff weight of 33 tons, according to the Navy. The Seahawks can weigh up to 11.5 tons.

Given its design, the Salvor has taken part in numerous recovery efforts, including the one after the December 2023 crash of a CV-22 Osprey off the coast of Japan last November, which killed eight crew.

As we reported at the time, the aircraft from the Nimitz crashed within a half-hour of each other on Oct. 26 as the carrier was operating somewhere in the South China Sea. The helicopter went down first at about 2:41 p.m. local time. All three crew were recovered.

Both Super Hornet crew ejected and were safely recovered when that aircraft crashed.

As we noted earlier in this story, the day after the crashes, Trump said that “bad gas” could have been to blame. Navy officials confirmed to us that they believed there was no “nefarious” cause to the crash. Last week, the Navy told us the cause is still being investigated. You can read more about the fuel issues in our initial coverage here.

The Nimitz was last spotted Nov. 18 in the San Bernardino Strait separating the Bicol Peninsula of Luzon to the north from the island of Samar to the south, according to open source investigator MT Anderson’s post on X. That’s about 420 miles east of where the Salvor was last seen. 

Last week, the Nimitz took part in a Multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity with Japanese and Philippine vessels to demonstrate “growing regional unity and cooperation,” the Philippine military said, according to Newsweek.

That exercise sparked a warning from China.

“We solemnly urge the Philippine side to immediately stop provoking incidents and escalating tensions,” said the Southern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army, which oversees Chinese military operations in the South China Sea, on Sunday.

It is unknown how long it will take to recover (or demolish) these aircraft or whether the operation will even succeed. The Navy has promised to keep us apprised of its efforts. We will update this story with any significant developments.

Contact the author: [email protected]

Nov. 21 (UPI) — Federal authorities have arrested four people, including two Chinese nationals, on accusations of scheming to illegally export cutting-edge Nvidia technology with artificial intelligence uses to Beijing, which prosecutors said seeks to be the AI world leader by the end of the decade.

Federal authorities in Tampa, Fla., on Wednesday arrested 34-year-old Hong Kong-born U.S. citizen Hong Ning Ho, also known as Matthew Ho, and 45-year-old Jing Chen, also known as Harry Chen, who was in the United States on a F-1 nonimmigrant student visa.

Brian Curtis Raymond, 46, of Huntsville, Ala., and 38-year-old Cham Li, also know as Tony Li, a Chinese national, were also arrested, though when was not clear.

Federal prosecutors alleged in an indictment — unsealed Wednesday but publicized by the Justice Department on Thursday — that from September 2023 until their arrests, the defendants conspired to illegally export NVIDIA graphics processing units to China through Malaysia and Thailand.

“The indictment unsealed yesterday alleges a deliberate and deceptive effort to transship controlled NVIDIA GPUs to China by falsifying paperwork, creating fake contracts and misleading U.S. authorities,” John Eisenberg, assistant attorney general for National Security said in a statement.

The court documents statement that they attempted four separate exports consisting of hundreds of GPUs. The first two shipments saw 400 Nvidia A100 GPUs being exported to China between October 2024 and January. The other two shipments of 50 Nvidia H200 GPUs and 10 Hewlett Packard Enterprises supercomputers with Nvidia H100 GPUS were intercepted by authorities.

In return for the shipments, the defendants allegedly received more than $3.89 million in wire transfers, according to the indictment.

The indictment states they used Tampa-based Janford Realtor, owned by Ho and Li, as a front company to buy the goods and export them to China.

Federal prosecutors alleged that despite being labeled a real estate company, it was involved involved in property transactions.

The court document accuses Raymond of supply the GPUs to Ho through his Alabama-based electronics company.

According to federal prosecutors, China is seeking to become the world leader in AI by 2030 and seeks to use the technology for military modernization efforts, including designing and testing its weapons of mass destruction as well as surveillance tools.

US President Donald Trump’s decision to snub the G20 summit in South Africa this year has handed an opportunity to China, as it seeks to expand its growing influence in the African continent and position itself as an alternative to the dangers of a unilateralist United States.

Washington said it would not attend the two-day summit set to kick off on Saturday over widely discredited claims that the host country, previously ruled by its white minority under an apartheid system until 1994, now mistreats white people.

South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa hit back at Trump’s claim that hosting the summit in Johannesburg was a “total disgrace”. “Boycott politics doesn’t work,” Ramaphosa said, adding that the US was “giving up the very important role that they should be playing as the biggest economy in the world”.

By Friday morning, Trump appeared to have backtracked on his stance somewhat, when speculation that Washington might send a US official to Johannesburg after all circulated.

Regardless, the spat comes as Chinese President Xi Jinping sends Premier Li Qiang to represent him on the world stage. China’s 72-year-old president has dialled back foreign visits, increasingly delegating his top emissary.

“The US is giving China an opportunity to expand its global influence,” Zhiqun Zhu, professor of political science and international relations at Bucknell University, told Al Jazeera. “With the absence of the US, China and EU countries will be the focus of the summit and other countries will look for leadership [from them].”

But observers say that while Trump’s absence will direct heightened attention to Beijing’s statements and behaviour, it does not spell the end of the US-led order altogether.

Jing Gu, a political economist at the United Kingdom-based Institute of Development Studies, said the US’s failure to attend “does not automatically make China the new leader, but it creates visible space for China to present itself as a more stable, reliable partner in governance”.

“It reinforces the perception that the US is stepping back from multilateralism and the shared management of global problems,” she said. “In that context, China can present itself as a more predictable, stable actor and emphasise continuity, support for open trade and engagement with the Global South.”

Expanding influence in the African continent

This year’s G20 will, for the first time, have an African chair and take place on the African continent. The African Union (AU) will also participate fully as a member.

South Africa, which holds the G20 presidency, is expected to push for consensus and action on priority issues for African countries, including debt relief, economic growth, climate change and transition to clean energy.

Zhu, who also serves as editor-in-chief of the academic journal, China and the World, said South Africa’s themes were a “natural fit” for China, Africa’s largest trading partner.

“China aims to become a leader in green energy, and there’s a lot of room for China and African countries to work on that,” he said.

The African continent, with its mineral wealth, booming population and fast-growing economies, offers huge potential for Chinese firms. Li, China’s premier, travelled to Zambia this week, marking the first visit to the country by a Chinese premier in 28 years. The copper-rich nation has Beijing as its largest official creditor for $5.7bn.

Eager to secure access to Zambia’s commodities and expand its exports from resource-rich East Africa, China signed a $1.4bn deal in September to rehabilitate the Tazara Railway, built in the 1970s and connecting Tanzania and Zambia, to improve rail-sea transportation in the region.

“The Chinese economy and African economy are complementary; they both benefit from trade,” Zhu said. The G20 “is a great platform for China to project its global influence and seek opportunities to work with other countries”, he added.

Africa’s growing demand for energy and China’s dominance in manufacturing make the two a good fit, observers say. This is playing out. A report by energy think tank Ember, for instance, found Africa’s imports of solar panels from China rose a whopping 60 percent in the 12 months to June 2025.

According to Gu at the Institute of Development Studies, China will be looking to tap into this growing synergy with Africa and will deliver a three-fold message at this year’s G20.

“First, it will stress stability and the importance of global rules and regulations,” she said. Second, “it will link the G20 to the Global South and highlight issues like development and green transformation”.

Third, “by offering issue-based leadership on topics such as digital economy, artificial intelligence and governance, it will position itself as a problem-solver rather than a disruptor”, the economist added.

China as a bastion of multilateralism

An absence of American officials at this year’s G20 – after skipping the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Korea as well as the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) in Brazil – would be “another opportunity for China”, Rosemary Foot, professor of politics and international relations at the University of Oxford, told Al Jazeera.

“It can contrast, yet again, its declared commitment to multilateralism and responsible behaviour as a major state versus the dangers of a unilateralist America focusing not on public goods but on benefits to itself only.”

China has been looking to expand its influence in Africa as a counterweight to the US-led world order. In stark contrast to Trump’s decision to end Africa’s duty-free era and slap 15-30 percent tariffs on 22 nations, Xi announced at the APEC summit last month a zero-tariff policy for all African nations with diplomatic ties to Beijing.

On that occasion, Xi emphasised China’s commitment “to joint development and shared prosperity with all countries”, stressing the country’s goal to “support more developing countries in achieving modernisation and opening up new avenues for global development”.

Similarly, Li, China’s premier, marked the United Nations’ 80th anniversary at the General Assembly in September by expressing the need for stronger collective action on climate change and emerging technologies, calling for greater solidarity to “[lift] everyone up, while division drags all down”.

His remarks were in stark contrast to Trump’s, who, in his speech, described climate change as the “greatest con job ever perpetrated” and called renewable sources of energy a “joke” and “pathetic”.

Foot said the spotlight will now be on Beijing as it seeks to strike a similar conciliatory pose – and in doing so, set itself apart from the US – at the G20. “Whether Beijing will have a major impact on the G20 agenda is more difficult to determine,” she said.