China

Middle Eastern crises seldom stay localized. They frequently go well beyond the battlefield in terms of politics, strategy, and psychology. Officials in Beijing, Moscow, Taipei, and Kyiv will be keeping a tight eye on events surrounding Iran today, in addition to those in Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv. Power perceptions are shaped by situations like this, and in international politics, perception can be almost as important as actual power.

The current state of affairs presents an unsettling question for China and Russia. A large-scale military operation against a prominent regional actor will unavoidably send signals about the balance of power in the international system if it continues without significant opposition from other big states. The Middle East is not where those signals will end. They will visit other geopolitical hotspots, like Taiwan and Ukraine, where credibility is crucial to deterrence.

Iran has progressively evolved into more than simply another diplomatic friend in Beijing’s eyes. It now plays a part in China’s larger Eurasian economic and strategic strategy. Beijing has been building energy and transportation networks that connect western China to the Arabian Sea through projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Chinese planners considering long-term energy security have taken note of the geographical proximity of the Pakistani port of Gwadar to Iran’s Jask Oil Terminal.

Beijing has long sought variety, which these lines provide. Chinese strategists have been concerned about dependence on maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca for decades. The energy lifelines of the second-largest economy in the world could be threatened by any interruption there. Iran fits into China’s attempt to lessen that vulnerability because of its location and resources. Trade in energy has already strengthened ties between the two nations. Iran has quietly emerged as a major supplier of cheap crude to China in spite of U.S. sanctions. Both nations are able to avoid some aspects of the Western financial architecture since many of those transactions go through China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System and are settled in renminbi.

However, the partnership has grown beyond oil. Beijing and Tehran signed a long-term strategic agreement in 2021 with the goal of working together on infrastructure, energy, and technology for decades. Later, China backed Iran’s admission to groups like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Then came a diplomatic surprise: Beijing assisted in mediating the reestablishment of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, a development that surprised many Western observers.

Taken together, these actions indicated a significant development. China was starting to portray itself not only as a regional economic force but also as a diplomatic player with the ability to influence its political environment.

That ambition makes the current moment particularly sensitive for Beijing. Governments in the Middle East and a large portion of the Global South frequently evaluate great powers based on their actions during times of crisis rather than their words during times of peace. Some capitals may discreetly reevaluate how reliable such support would be in an actual security crisis if China seems unwilling to protect the strategic environment surrounding its alliances.

The ramifications go well beyond Iran. Chinese officials have made it clear time and time again that they would not support Taiwan’s formal independence efforts and will not allow outside meddling in the Taiwan Strait. The legitimacy of those warnings is just as important to deterrence as military prowess. Some Washington policymakers may assume that China is unlikely to take more aggressive action in other areas if Beijing’s response to significant geopolitical shocks involving its partners primarily consists of diplomatic criticism.

Russia faces a different—but no less consequential—set of calculations. Moscow has positioned itself as a major Middle Eastern political mediator for the majority of the last ten years through its military engagement in Syria. Russian soldiers established a key base on the Mediterranean coast and assisted in stabilizing Bashar al-Assad’s regime starting in 2015. From such a vantage point, Moscow participated in almost all meaningful discussions regarding the future of the area.

However, that impact has been diminished. The political landscape has drastically changed as a result of the fall of the Syrian government and the growing power of actors supported by the West in Damascus. In addition to losing a strategic ally, Russia has also lost a significant portion of the regional clout it developed over the course of almost 10 years of diplomatic and military engagement.

In that context, Iran now occupies a far more important place in Moscow’s strategic thinking than it once did. Defense and energy cooperation are two areas where the two nations’ relationship has grown. Iranian drones have contributed to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, establishing a clear connection between the conflict in Eastern Europe and events in the Middle East. The message would reverberate much beyond the immediate battlefield if Iran were to sustain a significant military defeat at the hands of a concerted operation by the United States and Israel. While opposing major powers stayed mostly on the sidelines, observers from all around the world would see that Washington still had the capability to change regional dynamics.

These impressions build up in geopolitics. Credibility develops gradually, frequently over years, but it can deteriorate rapidly. Some governments may start to doubt the geopolitical benefit of aligning with Moscow if Russia seems incapable—or unwilling—to react when a close ally is under severe strain. However, competing nations might feel more confident to test Russian interests in other disputed areas, such as the Black Sea or Ukraine. However, Moscow’s choices are far from straightforward. In order to lessen the impact of Western sanctions, Russia has been fostering stronger commercial connections with a number of Gulf governments in recent years. Openly supporting Iran might make those relations more difficult. But staying completely silent runs the danger of conveying a contrary message: that when tensions rise, Russian alliances provide little strategic defense.

It seems unlikely that either China or Russia will move quickly to engage in direct combat. There would be significant risks of escalation. However, great-power competition seldom relies solely on choices made on the battlefield. There are plenty of other ways to be influential. Both nations have permanent seats in the UN Security Council. They can guarantee that any military action is politically disputed on the international scene by imposing debates, contesting legal justifications, and introducing resolutions, even symbolic ones. Beyond the Security Council, diplomacy is also important. Sovereignty and non-intervention have long been valued in nations like South Africa, Brazil, and India. Even if it doesn’t instantly change the situation on the ground, coordinated pressure from a larger group of states could influence how the issue is portrayed worldwide.

Another option is economic levers. The energy markets continue to be extremely vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. Major exporters continue to have the power to affect supply and pricing decisions by working with producers in organizations like OPEC+. Even little changes can serve as a reminder to the globe that regional conflicts have far-reaching economic repercussions. Great powers are also capable of sending quieter signals. Regional balances are not changing in isolation, as seen by intelligence collaboration, defensive technology transfers, and conspicuous naval deployments in nearby waterways. These actions convey that other important actors are keeping a close eye on them even while they avoid open confrontation.

Ultimately, this moment’s significance goes well beyond Iran. Expectations about how power functions in the international system are gradually shaped by incidents such as these. The precedent starts to take hold if armed action consistently reshapes regional orders without significant opposition from opposing nations. That precedent unavoidably affects Taiwan’s future for China. For Russia, it relates to both the larger security balance throughout Europe and the continuing conflict in Ukraine. Credibility is crucial in both situations.

Moments like this become inevitable tests if Beijing and Moscow want to maintain an international system where power is more widely spread. It is not always necessary to escalate conflict in order to respond. It often involves proving that significant changes in regional power will not happen completely unchallenged through diplomacy, economic pressure, and strategic signaling. There is meaning in silence as well. In places far from the Persian Gulf, how Tehran interprets that silence now could influence strategic decisions tomorrow.

DORAL, Fla. — President Trump said Saturday that the United States and Latin American countries are banding together to combat violent cartels as his administration looks to demonstrate it remains committed to sharpening U.S. foreign policy focus on the Western Hemisphere even while engaged in war in the Middle East.

Trump encouraged regional leaders gathered at his Miami-area golf club to take military action against drug trafficking cartels and transnational gangs that he says pose an “unacceptable threat” to the hemisphere’s national security.

“The only way to defeat these enemies is by unleashing the power of our militaries,” Trump said. “We have to use our military. You have to use your military.” Citing the U.S.-led coalition that confronted the Islamic State group in the Middle East, the Republican president said that ”we must now do the same thing to eradicate the cartels at home.”

The gathering, which the White House called the “Shield of the Americas” summit, comes two months after Trump ordered an audacious U.S. military operation to invade Venezuela and capture its president, Nicolás Maduro, and whisk him and his wife to the United States to face drug conspiracy charges.

Looming even larger is Trump’s decision to launch a war on Iran with Israel a week ago, a conflict that has left hundreds dead, convulsed global markets and unsettled the broader Middle East.

Trump’s time with the Latin American leaders was limited: Afterward, he set out for Dover Air Force Base in Delaware to be on hand for the dignified transfer of the six U.S. troops killed in a drone strike on a command center in Kuwait. They were killed one day after the U.S. and Israel launched their war on Iran.

Trump called the American deaths a “very sad situation” and praised the fallen troops as “great heroes.”

With the summit, Trump aimed to turn attention to the Western Hemisphere, at least for a moment. He has pledged to reassert U.S. dominance in the region and counter what he sees as years of Chinese economic encroachment in America’s backyard.

Trump also said the U.S. will turn its attention to Cuba after the war with Iran and suggested his administration would cut a deal with Havana, underscoring Washington’s increasingly aggressive stance against the island’s communist leadership. “Great change will soon be coming to Cuba,” he said, adding that “they’re very much at the end of the line.”

Cuban officials have said on several occasions that they were open to dialogue with the U.S. as long as it was based on respect for Cuban sovereignty, but they have never confirmed that such talks were taking place.

Who was there

The leaders of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago joined the U.S. president at Trump National Doral Miami, a golf resort where he is set to host the Group of 20 summit later this year.

The idea for a summit of like-minded conservatives from across the hemisphere emerged from the ashes of what was to be the 10th edition of the Summit of the Americas, which was scrapped during the U.S. military buildup off the coast of Venezuela last year.

Host Dominican Republic, pressured by the White House, had barred Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela from attending the regional gathering. But after leftist leaders in Colombia and Mexico threatened to pull out in protest — and with no commitment from Trump to attend — the Dominican President Luis Abinader decided at the last minute to postpone the event, citing “deep differences” in the region.

The Shield of the Americas moniker was meant to speak to Trump’s vision for an “America First” foreign policy toward the region that leverages U.S. military and intelligence assets unseen across the area since the end of the Cold War.

To that end, Ecuador and the United States conducted military operations this week against organized crime groups in the South American country. Ecuadorean and U.S. security forces attacked a refuge belonging to the Colombian armed group Comandos de la Frontera in the Ecuadorean Amazon on Friday, authorities reported.

This joint fight against drug traffickers “is only the beginning,” said Ecuador’s president, Daniel Noboa.

Notably missing at the summit were the region’s two dominant powers — Brazil and Mexico — as well as Colombia, long the linchpin of U.S. anti-narcotics strategy in the region.

Trump grumbled that Mexico is the “epicenter of cartel violence” with drug kingpins “orchestrating much of the bloodshed and chaos in this hemisphere.”

“The cartels are running Mexico,” Trump said. ”We can’t have that. Too close to us. Too close to you.”

The challenge from China

Trump made no mention of his administration’s position that countering Chinese influence in the hemisphere is a top priority for his second term.

His national security strategy promotes a “Trump corollary” to the 19th century Monroe Doctrine, which had sought to ban European incursions in the Americas, by targeting Chinese infrastructure projects, military cooperation and investment in the region’s resource industries.

The first demonstration of the more muscular approach was Trump’s strong-arming of Panama to withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative and review long-term port contracts held by a Hong Kong-based company amid U.S. threats to seize the Panama Canal.

More recently, the U.S. capture of Maduro and Trump’s pledge to “run” Venezuela threaten to disrupt oil shipments to China — the biggest buyer of Venezuelan crude before the raid — and bring into Washington’s orbit one of Beijing’s closest allies in the region. Trump is scheduled to travel to Beijing later this month to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

For many countries, China’s trade-focused diplomacy fills a critical financial void in a region with major development challenges that include poverty reduction and infrastructure bottlenecks. In contrast, Trump has been slashing foreign assistance to the region while rewarding countries lined up behind his crackdown on immigration — a policy widely unpopular across the hemisphere.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted the leaders for a working lunch after Trump left for the event in Delaware. The lunch gave Kristi Noem, whom Trump fired as Homeland Security secretary on Thursday, the chance to make her debut in her new role as a special envoy for the newly formed Shield of the Americas.

“We want our hemisphere to be safer, to be more sovereign, and to be more prosperous,” Noem told the leaders.

Madhani, Goodman and Richer write for the Associated Press. Madhani and Goodman reported from Doral and Durkin Richer from Washington. AP writer Gabriela Molina in Quito, Ecuador, contributed to this report.

March 6 (Asia Today) — China’s central bank governor said Thursday that Beijing has no intention of weakening the yuan to improve trade competitiveness, emphasizing confidence in the stability of the country’s currency.

Pan Gongsheng, governor of the People’s Bank of China, made the remarks during an economic press conference at the annual session of China’s National People’s Congress in Beijing.

Pan said recent movements in the yuan against the U.S. dollar were influenced by several factors, including China’s economic recovery, fluctuations in the U.S. dollar index and seasonal increases in corporate foreign exchange settlements.

“The current exchange rate of the yuan against the dollar remains within the mid-range seen in recent years,” Pan said. “China neither needs nor intends to gain trade competitiveness through currency depreciation.”

He added that the central bank plans to maintain an “appropriately accommodative” monetary policy in 2026, including the flexible use of tools such as reserve requirement ratio reductions and interest rate adjustments.

Demand for yuan-denominated financial instruments has continued to grow. The issuance of yuan-denominated bonds over the past 14 months reached about 1.365 trillion yuan ($200 billion), the highest level on record, according to financial market data.

Analysts say the increase reflects relatively low interest rates in China and the gradual expansion of yuan settlement in international transactions.

Offshore yuan bonds known as dim sum bonds have grown particularly quickly. About 103 billion yuan ($15 billion) worth have been issued so far this year, roughly double the amount recorded during the same period last year.

So-called panda bonds, which are yuan-denominated bonds issued in China by foreign companies, have also expanded, with 51.4 billion yuan ($7.5 billion) issued this year.

Overseas yuan lending reached 425 billion yuan ($62 billion) in 2025, the highest level on record.

Despite the growing use of the currency, analysts say the yuan still faces obstacles before it can rival the U.S. dollar as a major global reserve currency.

China’s leadership, including President Xi Jinping, has promoted the internationalization of the yuan as part of a broader effort to strengthen its role in global finance.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260306010001817

Over the past two decades, China has quietly eclipsed the United States as the dominant trading partner in parts of Latin America.

But since taking office for a second term, United States President Donald Trump has pushed to reverse Beijing’s advance.

That includes through aggressive manoeuvres directed at China’s allies in the region.

Already, the Trump administration has stripped officials in Costa Rica, Panama and Chile of their US visas, reportedly due to their ties to China.

It has also threatened to take back the Panama Canal over allegations that Chinese operatives are running the waterway. And after invading Venezuela and abducting President Nicolas Maduro, the US forced the country to halt oil exports to China.

But on Saturday, Trump is taking a different approach, welcoming Latin American leaders to his Mar-a-Lago estate for an event dubbed the “Shield of the Americas” summit.

How he plans to persuade leaders to distance themselves from one of the region’s largest economic partners remains unclear.

But experts say the high-level meeting could signal that Washington is prepared to put concrete offers on the table.

Securing meaningful commitments from Latin American leaders will take more than a photo op and vague promises, according to Francisco Urdinez, an expert on regional relations with China at Chile’s Pontifical Catholic University.

Even among Trump’s allies, Urdinez believes significant economic incentives are required.

“What they’re really hoping is that Washington backs up the political alignment with tangible economic benefits,” he said.

‘Reinforcing the Donroe Doctrine’

Already, the White House has confirmed that nearly a dozen countries will be represented at the weekend summit.

They include conservative leaders from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago.

Mexico and Brazil, the region’s largest economies, have been notably left out. Both are currently led by left-leaning governments.

In a post on social media, the Trump administration framed the event as a “historic meeting reinforcing the Donroe Doctrine”, the president’s plan for establishing US dominance over the Western Hemisphere.

Part of that strategy involves assembling a coalition of ideological allies in the region.

But rolling back Chinese influence in a region increasingly reliant on its economy will not be an easy feat, according to Gimena Sanchez, the Andes director at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a US-based research and advocacy group.

The US “is trying to get countries to agree that they’re not going to have China be one of their primary trading partners, and they really can’t at this point”, Sanchez said.

“For most countries, China is either their top, second or third trading partner.”

China, after all, has the second-largest economy in the world, and it has invested heavily in Latin America, including through infrastructure projects and massive loans.

The Asian giant has emerged as the top trading partner in South America in particular, with bilateral trade reaching $518bn in 2024, a record high for Beijing.

The US, however, remains the biggest outside trade force in Latin America and the Caribbean overall, due in large part to close relations with its neighbour, Mexico.

As of 2024, US imports from Latin America jumped to $661bn, and its exports were valued at $517bn.

Rather than choosing sides, though, many countries in the region are trying to strike a balance between the two powers, Sanchez explained.

Still, she added that the US cannot come empty-handed to this weekend’s negotiations.

“If the US is very boldly telling countries to cut off strengthening ties with China”, Sanchez emphasised that “the US is going to have to offer them something.”

What’s on the table?

Trump has already extended economic lifelines to Latin American governments politically aligned with his own.

In the case of Argentina, for instance, Trump announced in October a $20bn currency swap, meant to increase the value of the country’s peso.

He also increased the volume of Argentinian beef permitted to be imported into the US, shoring up the country’s agricultural sector, despite pushback from US cattle farmers.

Trump has largely tied those economic incentives to the continued leadership of political movements favourable to his own.

The $20bn swap, for instance, came ahead of a key election for Argentinian President Javier Milei’s right-wing party, which Trump supports.

Isolating China from resources in Latin America could also play to Trump’s advantage as he angles for better trade terms with Beijing.

A show of hemispheric solidarity could give Trump extra leverage as he travels to Beijing in early April to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Urdinez pointed out.

Then there’s the regional security angle. The US has expressed particular concern about China’s control of strategic infrastructure in Latin America and the critical minerals it could exploit in the region to bolster its defence and technology capabilities.

Bolivia, Argentina and Chile, for instance, are believed to hold the world’s largest deposits of lithium, a metal necessary for energy storage and rechargeable batteries.

The Trump administration referenced such threats in its national security strategy, published in December.

“Some foreign influence will be hard to reverse,” the strategy document said, blaming the “political alignments between certain Latin American governments and certain foreign actors”.

But Trump’s security platform nevertheless asserted that Latin American leaders were actively seeking alternatives to China.

“Many governments are not ideologically aligned with foreign powers but are instead attracted to doing business with them for other reasons, including low costs and fewer regulatory hurdles,” the document said.

It argued that the US could combat Chinese influence by highlighting the “hidden costs” of close ties to Beijing, including “debt traps” and espionage.

‘More aspiration than reality’

Henrietta Levin, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, believes that many Latin American countries would prefer to deepen economic engagement with the US over China.

But in many cases, that hasn’t been an option.

She pointed to Ecuador’s decision to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) with China in 2023 after it failed to negotiate a similar agreement with the US under President Joe Biden.

Some US politicians had opposed the deal as a threat to domestic industries. Others had encouraged Biden to reject it due to alleged corruption in Ecuador’s government.

Critics, though, said the resistance pushed Ecuador into closer relations with China.

“ When Ecuador signed their free trade agreement with China a couple years ago, their leader actually made quite clear that they had wanted an FTA with the US and would’ve preferred that,” said Levin.

“But the US didn’t want to negotiate such an agreement, and China did.”

As a result, Ecuador became the fifth country in Latin America to ink a free trade pact with China, after Chile, Peru, Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

For Levin, the question looming over this weekend’s summit is whether the Trump administration will step up and provide alternatives to the economic engagement China has already delivered.

Options could include trade agreements, financing for new development and investments with attractive terms.

But without such offers, Urdinez, the Chilean professor, warns that Trump will face limits to his ambitions of checking China’s growth in Latin America.

“Until Washington is willing to fill the economic space it’s asking countries to vacate, the rollback strategy will remain more aspiration than reality,” said Urdinez.

March 5 (Asia Today) — China has lowered its economic growth target to between 4.5% and 5% for 2026, marking the lowest level in about 35 years as the country grapples with deflation, weak domestic demand and mounting external pressures.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang announced the target Wednesday in a government work report at the opening of the Fourth Session of the 14th National People’s Congress in Beijing.

The new range represents a modest reduction from the government’s previous goal of growth of “around 5%,” which had been maintained for the past three years. The change signals that Chinese leaders acknowledge mounting economic challenges.

One of the biggest concerns is the prolonged downturn in the country’s real estate sector, which analysts estimate accounts for roughly a quarter of China’s gross domestic product. The continued slump has contributed to weakening consumer spending.

Youth unemployment, U.S. tariffs and technology restrictions and broader global uncertainty have also weighed on the outlook, making even the lower end of the target difficult to achieve.

Despite the slowdown, Beijing signaled plans to support the economy through fiscal stimulus. Authorities plan to issue 1.3 trillion yuan in ultra-long-term special government bonds to finance major infrastructure projects and consumption subsidies.

The government also plans to issue an additional 300 billion yuan in special bonds to strengthen the capital base of state-owned commercial banks.

China’s defense budget will rise 7% this year to 1.9096 trillion yuan, slightly lower than the 7.2% increases recorded annually over the past three years.

The continued growth in military spending underscores Beijing’s commitment to modernizing its armed forces ahead of the centennial of the People’s Liberation Army in 2027.

Li also outlined long-term goals tied to the country’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan for 2026-2030, saying China aims to maintain steady economic expansion and double per capita GDP by 2035 compared with 2020 levels.

The premier said China will increase research and development spending by more than 7% annually during the plan period.

In foreign policy remarks, Li said China “firmly opposes hegemony and power politics,” a phrase widely interpreted as criticism of the United States.

However, the tone of the criticism was relatively restrained. Observers in Beijing say the cautious language may reflect efforts to ensure a smooth visit later this month by U.S. President Donald Trump for talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260305010001413

WHEN you think of beautiful attractions to go to on holiday, toilets are rarely top of the list.

But a shopping centre’s bogs have been called the most beautiful in the world – and they hardly look like the ones in Westfield.

The toilets are on the sixth floor of the Deji Plaza Mall in Nanjing in China.

Dubbed the world’s most beautiful bathroom by Architectural Digest, they opened back in 2022 and were designed by X+Living, a Shanghai-based architecture firm.

Inside, are seven relaxation areas as well as male and female toilets.

Visitors enter through what is known as the ‘Experience Hall’ with dark greens and nods to insects and plant life.

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For example, black and white tiles on the floor mimic butterfly wings with touches of gold meant resemble bees.

There’s even a lounge between the men’s and women’s loos, with plush pink sofas designed to look like a ‘flower blooming’.

Guests can make use of glowing vanities too, as well as wireless charging points, with a dressing room per loo.

For mums there is a nursery room and in case of an incident, there is a medical room as well.

The same shopping mall has more themed toilets on other floors.

For example, on the second floor the toilets have a retro style, on the third floor the theme is futuristic.

The fourth floor has a Japanese theme and on the fifth floor the design is ‘extravagant’ and even features a piano.

The sixth floor toilets have several viral videos on social media with people commenting: “That’s a toilet? It looks so much better than most hotels.”

Another person said: “It’s an experience, so much outfit of the day spots.”

A third person commented: “Never thought toilets would be a public attraction but those toilets are very beautiful.”

While nowhere near as grand, London‘s has new loos as well.

New public toilets were unveiled at the Grade-II listed, Piccadilly Circus Tube Station this week, described as “London’s newest tourist attraction”, according to The Standard.

Inside the loos, visitors are greeted by bold blue, pink and yellow tiles.

Murals have been designed by London-based artist James Lambert, with each tile hand-painted and hand-made.

The design of the toilets is inspired by Anteros, the god of requited love and features winged-figures and an arrow motif, meant to show “energy, spectacle, and connection”.

The motif of different lines and shapes is meant to reflect the Art Deco history of the area.

This includes the redesign of the underground station in the 1920s by Charles Holden.

Other venues nearby that feature an Art Deco design include Brasserie Zedel, which has gilded columns and a lavish American cocktail bar.

To see the toilets (or actually use them) at Piccadilly Circus Tube Station, you’ll need to pay the 80p entrance fee.

The toilets are part of a £12.7million council project to upgrade a total of eight public toilets in London including at Green Park, Covent Garden and Leicester Square.

For more toilet-based tourist destinations, last year a Victorian public toilet was turned into a hotel – in the middle of a historic city.

Plus, Tripadvisor’s top-ranked UK toilet is in Scots seaside town and even has its own visitors’ book.

SEOUL, March 5 (UPI) — A South Korea-based human rights organization said Thursday it has identified specific Chinese public security officials and command structures allegedly involved in the systematic forced repatriation of North Korean escapees — a practice it argues could amount to crimes against humanity under international law.

The findings were presented at a seminar in Seoul hosted by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, or NKDB, which released a new report examining how Chinese authorities detain and return North Koreans who cross the border seeking refuge.

The event brought together international human rights experts and officials such as former South Korean ambassador for North Korean human rights Lee Shin-wha, and included video messages from U.N. Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights Elizabeth Salmón and U.S. State Department official Julie Turner.

The report marks a shift from documenting abuses against North Korean escapees to identifying operational responsibility within Chinese security institutions, Donghwi Shin, a human rights analyst at NKDB and one of the report’s authors, said at the seminar.

“Ultimately, the forced repatriation of North Korean defectors can be understood as a structural processing system,” he said. “It is not a simple act of administrative enforcement.”

Human rights groups have long accused Beijing of violating the principle of non-refoulement, a core rule of international refugee law barring the return of people to countries where they face persecution.

China maintains that North Koreans who cross its border illegally are economic migrants rather than refugees and routinely returns them under bilateral border agreements with Pyongyang, despite being a party to the U.N. Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture.

Human Rights Watch said in an October 2025 report that Chinese authorities have forcibly returned at least 406 North Koreans since 2024, warning that those repatriated face a high risk of torture, imprisonment and other abuses upon return.

NKDB’s report, The Machinery Behind the Forced Repatriation of North Koreans in China, analyzes how those returns are carried out through what researchers describe as an organized cross-border system involving multiple government agencies.

Drawing on more than two decades of documentation, the study examines 8,245 recorded cases of forced repatriation and testimonies from 96 survivors who were returned to North Korea after being detained in China.

Researchers said the process typically involves Chinese public security organs arresting North Korean escapees, detaining them in border regions such as Liaoning and Jilin provinces, and transferring them to North Korean authorities at designated crossing points.

The report also includes survivor testimony describing what happens after repatriation.

At the seminar Thursday, one North Korean escapee shared the experience of being repatriated from China in 2014, detailing a brutal 19-month period of processing, interrogation and eventual detention at a forced labor camp in Ryanggang Province near the Chinese border.

The escapee, whose identity was withheld for safety reasons, described routine beatings, torture, malnutrition and humiliation, including a public trial at a marketplace where crowds spat, cursed and threw stones.

“At the prison camp we were forced to work from 4:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. without rest,” the escapee said. “We ate rats and maggots just to stay alive, the only source of protein we could have.”

Ultimately, the escapee’s parents sold their house to pay a bribe that allowed for an eventual release and relocation to South Korea.

However, the experience left lasting scars, including damaged legs and psychological trauma that requires ongoing therapy and medication.

“My only wish is to have one night of deep, peaceful sleep,” the escapee said. “We demand that the facts of our suffering be brought before international courts.”

Such testimony reinforces the legal arguments presented in the report.

Under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, deportation or forcible transfer carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians can constitute a crime against humanity.

The report argues that repeated forced repatriations may meet that threshold if officials knowingly participate in returning individuals to a system where such abuses are foreseeable.

Previous investigations by U.N. bodies and human rights organizations have documented harsh treatment of repatriated North Koreans, including detention, interrogation and abuse inside the country’s prison and labor camp system.

NKDB researchers said the findings raise questions about accountability not only for abuses carried out inside North Korea but also for officials involved in facilitating forced returns.

The organization called on U.N. member states and governments with sanctions authorities to examine the findings and consider possible accountability measures.

Speakers at the seminar said the research should serve as a foundation for policy action.

“The challenge now is translating this research into actual policy change,” former ambassador Lee said. “We must confront the structural causes of repeated forced repatriations in China with clarity.”

“I’m not going to start a war. I’m going to stop wars.”
— Donald Trump, in his victory speech Nov. 6, 2024

It’s bad enough that President Trump has broken that oft-repeated pledge and unilaterally started a war, without engaging either Congress or the American public. And that, by his war of choice against Iran, he has in the most perilous way to date betrayed his signature “America First” standard, at least as longtime proponents Marjorie Taylor Greene, Megyn Kelly, Steve Bannon, Tucker Carlson and others mean it, and as many people thought he did too.

What’s even worse than Trump’s mendacity about stopping foreign wars is the broader truth that his war on Iran underscores: In the major theaters of U.S. foreign policy — the Mideast, Europe and Asia — he is essentially letting foreigners set his course, America’s course. And to state the obvious: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping do not have America’s interests at heart.

It has long been a defining contradiction of Trump that the wannabe strongman repeatedly shows himself to be in thrall to the world’s actual strongmen. His affinity for them has for years puzzled observers in this country and abroad. Trump strikes a pose — say, on negotiating with Iran about its nukes program, promising peace in Ukraine, hitting China with tariffs — only to crumple after a phone call, a meeting or a slap back from his opposite number.

It’s always hard for a person without a strong core to maintain a stand.

Obviously different factors are at play in Trump’s relationships with Israel, a U.S. ally, with longtime adversaries Russia and China and, more specifically, with each nation’s leaders. But all three cases reflect a personalization of foreign policy that is dangerously unique to Trump. For him, it’s less “what’s good for my country” than “what’s good for me” and “who likes me.” Time and again, he’s been explicit about that.

For all Trump’s cosplaying as a strongman, he shows his weakness as a national leader when he lets foreign counterparts share the wheel with him. As a consequence, he’s driving America erratically at best. At worst, he’s steering into another costly, bloody “forever war” of the sort he railed against for decades.

He’s gone in a direction in the Middle East that, polls show, pluralities or even majorities of Americans didn’t want to go. Trump has received none of the initial rally ’round support that past presidents enjoyed after initiating military operations. That’s a hazardous place to be domestically. Most Republicans are behind Trump on the war, but not by the usual high numbers. After all, it was disgust with forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that sent many people flocking to Trump’s “America First” banner to begin with.

For years he warned that other presidents and presidential candidates would start a war in Iran, World War III even. Yet here we are. And after days of what Kelly derided on air as the “10,000 different explanations” that Trump has given for attacking Iran and killing its top political and military leaders, on Monday, Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphatically provided just one: Because Israel was going to strike Iran first, the United States had to join the attack to protect U.S. personnel and assets in the region from Iran’s retaliation.

Cue the blowback in MAGA world: “He’s flat out telling us that we’re in a war with Iran because Israel forced our hand,” MAGA pundit Matt Walsh lashed out online. And then Trump contradicted his secretary of State on the rationale for the attacks. Yet Rubio wasn’t the only one citing Israel’s plans as the war’s predicate. So did House Speaker “MAGA Mike” Johnson. On Tuesday, Trump himself said he had to act fast because the Iranians “were getting ready to attack Israel.”

As Democratic Sen. Mark Warner of Virginia, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, responded, “If we equate a threat to Israel as the equivalent of an imminent threat to the United States, then we are in uncharted territory.”

Similarly, in June, Trump ordered a devastating one-off strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities to support Israel’s 12-day war against Iran. For months after, Netanyahu hounded Trump to stop the subsequent peace talks with Iran and go back on offense with Israel. So now Trump has complied, striking even as negotiations with Iran were ongoing. Sen. Lindsey Graham, the once respected Republican from South Carolina, offered his sycophantic spin: “Bibi and Trump are the modern Roosevelt-Churchill combination.”

The latters’ grave sites surely trembled.

As for Asia, Trump talks a good game against China, and, yes, he’s imposed big tariffs. But just as often he’s backtracked, often after talking with Xi. Trump’s admiration of the Chinese autocrat and his eagerness to please him is palpable. In fact, in dealing with Xi, Trump in both of his terms has violated his own words in “The Art of the Deal”: “The worst thing you can possibly do in a deal is seem desperate to make it. That makes the other guy smell blood, and then you’re dead.”

No one is more worried about Trump’s regard for Xi than the Taiwanese, living under threat from China. Just recently Trump delayed arms sales to Taiwan approved by Congress lest he upset Xi ahead of their Beijing meeting in April.

In Europe, meanwhile, Trump continues to be played by Putin at the “peace” table to end Russia’s war in Ukraine — the war that candidate Trump said he’d settle in a day. More than a year later, he continues to harangue Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky to make concessions to the invader, never demanding anything from Putin.

Most heinously, Trump’s 28-point “peace” plan last November incorporated everything that Putin/Russia dreamed of extracting from Ukraine, and for good reason: The proposal came from Moscow, passed from Putin’s flunky to Trump’s. That followed Trump’s humiliating summit with Putin last August in Alaska, giving the globally reviled Russian an American stage and pageantry and serving no purpose for the United States, only for Trump the showman. All the while, Russia continued ravaging Ukraine.

So much for Trump’s election promise. He doesn’t stop wars (his repeated claims to the contrary). But he does start them.

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March 5 (UPI) — This year marks the 30th anniversary of the Arctic Council, once a hallmark of post-Cold War cooperation in the far north.

For decades, the Arctic Ocean remained at the margins of global power politics — a remote, ice-locked expanse governed largely through scientific collaboration and consensus-based frameworks.

That balance is now shifting. Rapid ice loss is opening seasonal sea lanes, exposing fragile ecosystems and drawing new commercial and strategic interest, even as the suspension of routine cooperation with Russia has strained the council’s role.

The Arctic is emerging as a maritime crossroads where environmental risk, economic ambition and intensifying geopolitical competition increasingly converge.

Established by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, the Arctic Council — bringing together eight Arctic states from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden the United States, Indigenous permanent participants and observers including China — remains the region’s central forum for coordinating science, environmental policy and cooperative governance. Despite mounting geopolitical strain, it continues to provide an institutional platform that could support future U.S.-China maritime cooperation in the Arctic.

Recent diplomacy suggests that even as tensions rise across trade, technology and security, cooperation is still possible when interests align.

The 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, in force since 2021, offers a case in point. By imposing a 16-year moratorium on commercial fishing while joint scientific research assesses the ecosystem, the pact places precaution ahead of competition and provides a model for managing emerging Arctic risks.

The significance of the fisheries decision should not be understated. The agreement brought together Arctic coastal states and distant-water fishing powers, including Washington and Beijing, to manage a region where no fisheries regime previously existed.

In doing so, it transformed an ungoverned expanse of high seas into a shared space of stewardship — governed not by territorial claims, but by science, restraint and a shared recognition of ecological risk.

“The Arctic Council is a dedicated body creating a platform for collaboration built on consensus. It is far from perfect, but it has produced a number of highly influential assessments and created an international community devoted to cooperation and shared stewardship,” said Henry P. Huntington, arctic science director of the Ocean Conservancy.

Science diplomacy as a foundation

For the United States, the Arctic is a strategic frontier and an environmental priority, tied to maritime access, national defense, Indigenous livelihoods and ecological protection.

For China, it is an emerging arena of economic opportunity and global governance engagement. Beijing’s self-description as a “near-Arctic state,” combined with its investments in polar research, ice-capable vessels and Arctic shipping studies, reflects a broader ambition to participate in shaping the rules that will govern the region’s future.

International law scholar Michael Byers said China’s Arctic posture differs sharply from its behavior in the South China Sea. While Beijing has strategic interests in the region through its “Polar Silk Road,” it has no territorial claims in the Arctic and has largely operated within the existing legal framework.

In contrast to its role as a resident power in the South China Sea, Byers notes that China presents itself in the Arctic as a “near-Arctic state,” focused on resource access and emerging shipping routes — a presence that Arctic nations are watching more closely as its footprint grows.

Despite competing strategic interests, both countries share a clear objective: preventing a governance vacuum in the Arctic. The fisheries accord underscores that even amid rivalry, Washington and Moscow recognize the dangers of unregulated exploitation in fragile waters and the need for baseline rules. As such, the agreement serves not only as a conservation tool, but as a diplomatic signal that pragmatic cooperation in the Arctic remains possible.

At its center is a commitment to joint scientific research. Participating states will collaborate to monitor fish stocks, map Arctic ecosystems and assess climate impacts, generating the shared data needed to determine whether any future fishing can be conducted sustainably.

“The Arctic Council’s 30th anniversary finds its consensus-based structure severely tested. Western states suspended cooperation with Russia in 2022, effectively paralyzing what was once exemplary post-Cold War diplomacy,” said Pavel Devyatkin, a senior associate at the Arctic Institute. He said the council’s experience offers practical lessons for managing contested waters elsewhere, including the South China Sea.

Arctic marine science has long bridged geopolitical divides, including cooperation with China, showing how shared environmental risks can transcend political tension. As Devyatkin noted, the region offers a clear lesson: ecological disruption can outweigh traditional security concerns. When U.S.-Russia fisheries monitoring was suspended, key data gaps emerged just as warming waters pushed fish stocks northward — a cautionary signal for any contested maritime region facing climate-driven change.

China’s Arctic engagement is anchored in scientific diplomacy. Unlike more securitized theaters such as the South China Sea, Beijing has framed its Arctic role around cooperation, climate research and environmental stewardship. Its Yellow River Station in Svalbard has supported long-term research since 2004, while icebreakers such as Xue Long and Xue Long 2, along with polar-capable satellites, have expanded China’s research reach and technological presence in the region.

At the same time, Western policymakers remain cautious about the potential dual-use nature of these activities. Concerns focus on whether data gathered from satellites, seabed mapping or subsea systems could support military applications. U.S. and NATO officials have questioned how China might use its growing Arctic data capabilities.

The model reflects a broader principle of science diplomacy — one that has long shaped cooperation in contested maritime regions. Scientific collaboration provides a low-politics entry point for engagement, allowing rival states to build trust, exchange data and establish working relationships even when political tensions remain high.

“Marine science is an area that can promote international cooperation. That is true in many contexts, including in relation to the next International Polar Year collaborations currently being planned, that will include China,” claimed Evan T. Bloom, polar governance chair at the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.

Collaborative mapping of sensitive habitats could inform conservation planning and risk management. Even the design of Arctic marine protected areas, an issue gaining attention as part of global “30 by 30” conservation goals, could become a platform for coordinated policy development.

From fisheries to shipping and conservation

Shipping governance is emerging as the next test of whether U.S.-China scientific cooperation can translate into operational rules in the Arctic. As sea ice recedes, a transpolar route linking Asia, Europe and North America could reshape global trade, but the region remains poorly charted, remote and environmentally fragile, with high risks of accidents and long-term damage.

Analysts say a cooperative framework on Arctic shipping, covering safety standards, environmental protections, data sharing and emergency response, could reduce those risks. Joint monitoring of ice and vessel traffic, coordinated search-and-rescue protocols and agreed-upon environmental rules for polar operations would form the backbone of such an approach.

Marine conservation offers another pathway for cooperation. The precautionary logic underpinning the fisheries agreement aligns with broader global efforts to expand ocean protection and safeguard biodiversity.

The United States and China have expanded marine protected areas domestically and have endorsed international conservation targets. Extending that logic to the Arctic through coordinated conservation zones or networks of protected areas would reinforce ecological resilience while creating a stabilizing framework for governance.

Such initiatives also would resonate with a wider global trend: the recognition that environmental security and geopolitical stability are increasingly intertwined. As climate change accelerates, the management of shared ecosystems is becoming a central component of international relations. The Arctic, like the South China Sea or the Mediterranean, is emerging as a test case for how science-based stewardship can mitigate strategic rivalry.

The obstacles to deeper cooperation, however, remain substantial. The broader U.S.-China relationship is marked by strategic distrust, trade disputes and military competition. Arctic policy cannot be entirely insulated from tensions in other theaters, including the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s war in Ukraine has also disrupted Arctic diplomacy, limiting the functioning of multilateral bodies such as the Arctic Council and injecting new security concerns into the region.

Trust remains a central obstacle.

Washington remains wary of Beijing’s long-term strategic intentions in the Arctic, particularly the dual-use potential of infrastructure and emerging shipping routes.

Beijing casts itself as a legitimate stakeholder in global commons governance and is pressing for a greater role in shaping the rules of the evolving Arctic order.

At the same time, Russia’s continued isolation from Arctic Council processes since 2022 has pushed Moscow to seek new partners, further complicating the diplomatic landscape and slowing meaningful progress on joint conservation efforts for Arctic flora and fauna.

Against that backdrop, any expansion of cooperation will need to be incremental, transparent and anchored in verifiable scientific collaboration. The fisheries agreement provides a template: begin with a shared risk, rely on joint science, build institutional mechanisms and create habits of cooperation over time. That process is gradual, but it can be durable.

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Russia and China, Tehran’s two most powerful diplomatic partners, have labelled the US-Israeli war on Iran that has killed more than 1,000 people a clear violation of international law.

President Vladimir Putin called the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on Saturday a “cynical violation of all norms of human morals”.

China’s Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi told his Israeli counterpart, Gideon Saar, that “force cannot truly solve problems” as he urged all sides to avoid further escalation.

Russia and China jointly requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council.

The reaction reflects the close relationship between Iran, Russia, and China. Moscow and Beijing have signed bilateral deals and expanded coordination through joint naval drills, projecting a united front against what they describe as a US-led international order that has long sought to isolate them.

Yet despite their sharp rhetoric, neither has indicated a willingness to intervene militarily to support Iran.

Russia-Iran: Strategic partners, not military allies

In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty covering areas from trade and military cooperation to science, culture, and education.

The agreement deepened defence and intelligence coordination and supported projects such as transport corridors, linking Russia to the Gulf through Iran.

The pair carried out joint military drills in the Indian Ocean as recently as late February, the week before the US and Israel attacked Iran.

However, when the war began, Moscow was not obliged to respond as the treaty did not include a mutual defence clause, meaning it stopped short of forming a formal military alliance.

Andrey Kortunov, the former director general of the Russian International Affairs Council and a member of the Valdai Discussion Club, a Russian foreign policy think tank, told Al Jazeera via videolink from Moscow, that Russia’s 2024 mutual defence treaty with North Korea is an example of a “more binding” agreement on military support.

He said that, under that agreement, Russia would be obliged to join North Korea “in any conflict the country might get involved in”, whereas with Iran, “it just mentioned that both sides agreed to abstain from any hostile actions in case the other side is engaged in conflict”.

Kortunov said Russia is unlikely to take direct military action in support of Iran because the risks would be too high.

He added that Moscow appears to be “prioritising the United States mediation in the conflict with Ukraine”, and noted that Russia has previously taken a similar approach by criticising US actions in places like Venezuela after the US military attack and arrest of its President, Nicolas Maduro, in January.

Although the treaty clearly states that Russia is not obliged to intervene, he said some of his contacts in Tehran have expressed a “degree of frustration”, and there had been an “expectation that Russia should somehow do more than just diplomatic moves in the United Nations Security Council or in other multilateral forums”.

China–Iran ties and their limits

In 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement aimed at expanding ties in areas such as energy, while also drawing Iran into China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Jodie Wen, a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University in China, who has travelled frequently to Iran, told Al Jazeera that the relationship is widely viewed in Beijing as pragmatic and stable.

“From the political side, we have regular exchange,” she said over the phone from Beijing, adding, “on the economic side, the cooperation is very deep; many enterprises have investments in Iran.”

Yet she stressed that Beijing has long drawn clear limits around the partnership, particularly regarding military involvement.

“The Chinese government always adheres to not interfering in other countries’ issues … I do not think the Chinese government would send weapons to Iran,” she said.

Instead, Beijing’s role is more likely to focus on diplomacy and crisis management.

“I think China is trying its way to talk with the US side and Gulf countries to keep calm,” she said.

That clarity about the relationship, she added, has helped build trust in Tehran.

Even so, she noted the relationship is not symmetrical.

Vessel-tracking service Kpler estimates that 87.2 percent of Iran’s annual crude oil exports go to China, underscoring how economically significant China is for Tehran, while Iran remains a relatively small partner in China’s global trade.

Dylan Loh, an associate professor in the Public Policy and Global Affairs programme at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, told Al Jazeera that he believes China’s role regarding Iran “has evolved into a protective one, accelerating its mediation effort to prevent a regional collapse that would threaten its own regional economic and security interests”.

“I think there will be some assessment of how to lower the political risks and what sorts of options are available; truth be told, this re-think already started after [the US attack on] Venezuela,” he said.

China’s foreign minister tells Israel to end attacks; Russian FM Lavrov says no sign Tehran seeking nuclear bomb.

Russia and China have criticised the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, with Moscow saying it had seen no evidence that Tehran was developing nuclear weapons, and Beijing demanding an immediate halt to the joint attacks.

Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang ⁠Yi told his Israeli counterpart, Gideon Saar, on Tuesday that the attack on Iran came as negotiations between Washington and Tehran had “made significant progress, including addressing Israel’s security concerns”, China’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

“Regrettably, this process has been interrupted by military action. China opposes any military strikes launched by Israel and the US against Iran,” Wang told the Israeli foreign minister during a phone call, according to the ministry.

“China calls for an immediate cessation of military operations to prevent the further escalation and loss of control of the conflict,” Wang said.

“Force cannot truly solve problems; instead, it will bring new problems and serious long-term consequences,” he added.

According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Saar agreed to a request from Wang to take “concrete measures to ensure the safety of Chinese personnel and institutions” in Iran.

The call on Tuesday with Israel and Beijing’s apparent efforts to stabilise the spiralling regional situation followed calls Wang made on Monday to discuss the conflict with the foreign ⁠ministers of Iran, Oman and France.

‘US doesn’t attack those who have nuclear bombs’

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also criticised the US and Israel on Tuesday, saying their war on Iran could lead to the very outcome they claimed they wanted to prevent: nuclear proliferation.

Lavrov told a news conference that the logical consequence of the US and Israel’s actions could be that “forces will emerge in Iran… in favour of doing exactly what the Americans want to avoid – acquiring a nuclear bomb”.

“Because the US doesn’t attack those who have nuclear bombs,” Lavrov said.

Lavrov also said that Arab countries could now join the race to acquire nuclear weapons, given the experience of recent days and “the nuclear proliferation problem will begin to spiral ⁠out of control”.

Israel is widely seen as the Middle East region’s only nuclear-armed state, which it neither confirms nor denies.

“The seemingly paradoxical declared noble goal of starting a war to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons could stimulate completely opposite trends,” he said.

Lavrov, who said that Moscow had still seen no evidence that Iran was developing ⁠nuclear weapons, spoke with his Iranian counterpart, ⁠Abbas Araghchi, on Tuesday, and said that Russia stood ready to help find a diplomatic solution to the conflict, while rejecting the US and Israel’s use of “unprovoked military aggression” in the region.

As the US and Israel launched their first strikes on Iran on Saturday, Russia’s Foreign Ministry accused the close allies of carrying out a “premeditated and unprovoked act of armed aggression against a sovereign and independent UN member state”.

The two countries had hidden their true intention of regime change in Tehran “under the cover” of negotiations to normalise relations with Iran, the ministry said.

The US and Israel were “swiftly pushing the region toward a humanitarian, economic, and potentially even radiological disaster”, the ministry warned.

“Responsibility for the negative consequences of this manmade crisis, including an unpredictable chain reaction and spiralling violence, lies entirely with them,” the statement added.

Russia has faced its own accusations of aggression against a sovereign state after it launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a war now in its fifth year.

WASHINGTON — Amid the chaos in Kabul, politicians and pundits have declared the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan a defeat from which U.S. influence may never recover.

“Biden’s credibility is now shot,” wrote Gideon Rachman, chief oracle of Britain’s Financial Times.

“A grave blow to America’s standing,” warned the Economist.

But take a deep breath and remember some history.

When South Vietnam collapsed after a war that involved four times as many U.S. troops, many drew the same conclusion: The age of U.S. global power was over.

Less than 15 years later, the Berlin Wall came down, the Cold War began to end, and the United States soon stood as the world’s only superpower.

The lesson: A debacle like the defeat in Kabul — or the one in Saigon two generations earlier — doesn’t always prevent a powerful country from marshaling its resources and succeeding.

I’m not dismissing the tragedy that has befallen the Afghans or the damage that U.S. credibility has suffered. When President Biden told a news conference that he had “seen no questioning of our credibility from allies,” he sounded as if he was in denial — or, perhaps worse, out of touch.

No questioning? How about the question from Tobias Ellwood, chairman of the British Parliament’s defense committee: “Whatever happened to ‘America is back’?”

Or the complaint from Armin Laschet, the German conservative who could be his country’s leader after elections next month: “The greatest debacle NATO has experienced since its founding.”

Whether he likes it or not, Biden has repair work to do.

The first step, already underway, is making sure the endgame in Kabul doesn’t get any worse.

That means keeping U.S. troops on the ground until every American is out, as Biden has promised. It also requires an energetic effort to evacuate Afghans who worked with the U.S. government and other institutions, even if that requires risking the lives of some American troops. Those Afghans trusted us; if we abandon them, it will be a long time before we can credibly ask the same of anyone else.

And, of course, the administration needs to prevent Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from replanting themselves in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. If the United States fails at that — the original reason we invaded the country almost 20 years ago — Biden’s decision to withdraw will justly be judged a fiasco.

There’s repair work to do beyond Afghanistan, too.

“We’ve got to show that it would be wrong to see American foreign policy through the lens of Afghanistan,” Richard N. Haass, president of the nonpartisan Council on Foreign Relations and a former top State Department official, told me.

The United States has more important interests that need attention and allies that need reassurance, he said.

“The most important thing is to deter our major foes,” he said, referring to China, Russia and Iran.

“This is a moment to strengthen forces in Europe, mount more freedom of navigation operations [by the U.S. Navy] in the South China Sea,” he said. “This is a good time to say we’re serious about our commitment to Taiwan,” which China periodically threatens.

Biden took a step in that direction in his recent interview with ABC’s George Stephanopoulos, listing Taiwan along with South Korea and Japan as places where the U.S. “would respond” to an attack.

If anything, Haass and other foreign policy veterans say, the questions about American credibility are likely to make Biden react more strongly to the next few challenges overseas.

“The most intriguing question is what effect this episode has on Biden’s thinking,” suggested Aaron David Miller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Will he think: ‘I’ve got to be tougher with the Iranians now? Do I have to signal to a country like Taiwan that I’m prepared to protect American interests there?’”

But the notion that American influence has been fatally damaged is overblown, he argued.

“There have been many other instances in which U.S. credibility has been diminished, but our phone continues to ring,” Miller said.

Biden and his aides already know most of this. The premises of his foreign policy — reviving U.S. domestic strength, revitalizing U.S. alliances, and focusing on vital interests like China and Russia — provide a foundation for recovery.

“My dad used to have an expression: If everything is equally important to you, nothing is important to you,” the president said last week. “We should be focusing on where the threat is the greatest.”

The test Biden faces now is whether he can execute that strategy — and show that he’s credible where it matters most — more successfully than in his botched withdrawal from an unwinnable war.

In a recent move, China’s top general and a longtime confidant of President Xi Jinping, Zhang Youxia, and Joint Staff chief Liu Zhenli were removed from the Central Military Commission (CMC). An editorial published in Liberation Army Daily described both men as “seriously betraying the trust and expectations” of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the CMC.

Beyond corruption allegations, Zhang was reportedly accused of leaking core technical data on China’s nuclear weapons programme to the United States. In the aftermath, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a Mandarin language recruitment video targeting disaffected Chinese soldiers. Titled “The Reason for Stepping Forward To Save the Future,” portrays a disillusioned midlevel officer choosing to contact American intelligence. The outreach appears aimed at deepening internal doubts and positioning itself as an alternative confidant for officers who may feel exposed. However, this is not the first time the agency has sought to infiltrate the country.

A History of Intelligence Operations and Resets

Intelligence rivalry stretches back to the late 1940s, when the CIA tried to monitor the Soviet nuclear programme by placing listening devices within China and along its Soviet border. Surveillance also extended to the Xinjiang region, tracking uranium, gold, petroleum, and Soviet aid to the CPC during its war with the US backed Guomindang for regional control. Despite these efforts, the intelligence gathered remained minimal at best, from October 1950 to July 1953 the agency also failed to achieve its primary objective of diverting significant resources away from China’s military campaign in Korea.

As Cold War rivalries hardened, the CIA launched Operation Circus in the late 1950s to support Tibetan rebels against the CPC. The CIA supplied guerrilla groups, including the most active Chushi Gangdruk group, with arms and ammunition and trained fighters at Camp Hale. Allen Dulles, then CIA deputy director, saw the effort as an opportunity to destabilize the CPC and counter Communist influence across Asia. The group continued its operations from Nepal until 1974, when funding ended after US-China rapprochement.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the CIA cooperated with Chinese intelligence under Project Chestnut, establishing listening posts in the northwest to monitor Soviet communications. In 1989, as the Tiananmen Square protests rocked the CPC, the CIA provided communications equipment, including fax machines and typewriters to protestors. It also assisted in the escape of protest leaders with the help of sympathizers in Hong Kong under Operation Yellow Bird. Relations deteriorated in 2001, when an aircraft built in the US for General Secretary Jiang Zemin was found to contain at least 27 listening devices, including one embedded in the headboard of a bed, operable via satellite.

However, these gains proved fragile as major setbacks soon followed, with reports that between 2010 and 2012 Chinese authorities dismantled a large CIA network. In total, between 18 and 20 sources were killed or imprisoned, according to two former senior American officials. One asset was reportedly shot in front of colleagues in the courtyard of a government building as a warning to others suspected of working with the CIA.

Espionage in the Xi Jinping Era

Estimates in 2024 suggested the Ministry of State Security (MSS) employed as many as 800,000 personnel, compared with roughly 480,000 at the height of the KGB. After taking power in 2012, Xi further consolidated control over its security apparatus, chairing a high level national security task force.

His approach also followed revelations that an American informant network had infiltrated the MSS. An executive assistant to MSS Vice Minister Lu Zhongwei was discovered in 2012 to have passed sensitive information to the CIA. The ministry was also influenced by former security chief Zhou Yongkang, who was charged with abuse of power and intentionally leaking state secrets in 2014. He was subsequently expelled from the politburo in one of the most consequential purges in the country’s history.

In light of these developments, Xi’s “comprehensive state security concept,” promulgated in 2014, linked internal and external threats and underscored the dangers of destabilization through foreign subversion and infiltration. He also enacted the 2014 Counter Espionage Law, revised in 2023 to broaden espionage definitions, coinciding with detentions of foreign firm employees and tighter data controls.

Under his leadership, another major initiative allowed the MSS to establish direct public contact in 2015 through a hotline and website urging citizens to report threats to national security. In 2017, MSS offered rewards of up to 500,000 RMB for reporting suspected threats. In the same year, counterintelligence services also launched a broad awareness campaign through websites, animations, and television dramas promoting this “special work,” often targeting journalists, academics, and Chinese American and Taiwanese businesspeople.

Chinese courts have also imposed severe punishments in such cases. In April 2025, a former employee of a military research institute was sentenced to life imprisonment for selling secret documents to foreign intelligence agencies. The ruling followed the sentencing of a former engineer to death in March on similar charges.

China also deploys operatives abroad to curb criticism and preserve regime stability. Overseas police stations reportedly directed by provincial MSS offices combine administrative services with intelligence functions. One established in New York by the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau drew headlines in 2023. In fact, the earliest cyber incidents targeting UK government systems in the early 2000s originated not from Russia but from China, and were aimed at gathering information on overseas dissident communities, including Tibetan and Uighur groups.

New Intelligence Order Enters a Decisive Era

As China’s influence grew in the 2000s, Western policymakers were focused on the war on terror and interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, political leaders often preferred that intelligence chiefs avoid publicly naming China. Businesses faced mounting pressure to prioritize access to its vast market, while remaining reluctant to acknowledge that their proprietary information was being targeted.

In 2021, the FBI reported opening a new Chinese espionage case roughly every 12 hours, most involving cyber disruption. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of Justice, and other US bodies repeatedly identified MSS affiliated actors in advisories and indictments. Analysts assess MSS linked groups have surpassed PLA associated actors in both the sophistication and scope of their hacking campaigns. In 2024, authorities announced that Salt Typhoon had breached major US telecommunications companies in one of the most damaging publicly reported cyber campaigns. The National Security Agency (NSA) also noted that China’s reliance on indigenous technology makes its networks harder to track.

Former CIA director William J. Burns, under the Biden administration described these intelligence shortcomings as a “pacing challenge.” The administration created a China Mission Centre and a technology intelligence centre to address it. An executive order was also issued in 2024, prohibiting funding for Chinese semiconductors, microelectronics, quantum computing, and certain AI applications in sectors that are considered capable of enhancing military capabilities.

When the Trump administration returned in 2025, it triggered significant disruptions across the US government. In early May 2025, plans were announced to cut 1,200  positions at CIA and 2,000 at the NSA, with similar reductions reportedly planned for other intelligence bodies as well. Such cuts were expected to disrupt operations and deter long term asset relationships. The “Signalgate scandal” further revealed that senior national security officials had shared classified information in an unsecured Signal group chat. These avoidable lapses posed a serious threat to operational security and heightened the risks faced by intelligence assets worldwide.

As China pursues its vision of a unipolar world while escalating espionage and global security threats, international attention on its actions has intensified. Trump’s planned visit to China in April 2026 will be closely watched to assess whether the recruitment videos are part of a broader strategy targeting Xi’s establishment or merely a pressure tactic.

Introduction

The Arctic has long been known as “high North, low tension”, as its frozen waters and permafrost landscape offered no incentives to the states. However, due to global warming, it is changing. The rate of warming in the Arctic region is four times faster than the globe, resulting in massive ice loss. This anthropogenic anomaly has made the Arctic a region of geopolitical significance.

The Strategic Importance

The strategic importance of any region primarily depends on two factors: The first is Geographical position; which not only emboldens its importance as a trade passage but also defines its fruitfulness as a strategic location in both peace and war. The second; its Resources which offer economic benefits to the states, which can be translated into military might. The Arctic, indeed, has manifested both qualities. Its seas are becoming navigable as the ice recedes. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest passage (NWP) provide the countries in the high latitudes lucrative trade opportunities. Similarly, the geo-economic weight of the Arctic is augmented by its huge reserves of petroleum and minerals. It holds almost 13% (90 billion barrels) of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered gas resources. Moreover, the Arctic has a large amount of mineral resources. For example, Greenland; which comprises almost 15% of the Arctic region and its second largest contiguous landmass, is estimated to possess large deposits of Rare Earths, Copper, Zinc, Iron ore, Gold, Nickel and Uranium. Therefore, the big powers have set eye on the Arctic, including the US; Russia and China, with ambitions to dominate which may be termed as The Arctic Great Game.

Strategic location of the Arctic

“Whoever holds Alaska will hold the world”, General Billy Mitchell was not wrong when he uttered this phrase in 1935. Indeed, during the Cold War, the possession of Alaska for the US, its only in the Arctic, proved fruitful. American early warning satellites and missile defenses were installed in Alaska to detect Soviet infiltration. The Cold War is over now, but the competition over the Arctic has reinvigorated. The US, under Trump administration, is ambitious to dominate

the Western Hemisphere. The Arctic, especially Greenland, can be defined as the head of the Western Hemisphere. The geographical position of the Greenland is indeed enviable. East of it runs the widest gap between the Arctic and the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, America holds the Island in esteem for its strategic location. The 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the US military and commercial access to the Arctic, especially Greenland. It already operates the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in Greenland, in addition to its Alaskan military bases in the Arctic.

Russia, an important stakeholder in the region, enjoys one of the longest coastlines and largest territories in the Arctic. Russian activities in the Arctic are not novice. In the late 18^th century, Russian emperor Peter the Great launched the ‘Great Northern Expedition’ which aimed to search for a northern sea route that could connect the Pacific and Europe. The quest for a such a sea route seems promising now as the Arctic waters become traversable. In 2020, Russia unveiled its Arctic policy till 2035. Among others, it emphasized the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as ‘a national transport communication of the Russian Federation that is competitive on the world market’. However, after Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin adopted a staunch outlook. In Feb 2023, Putin decreed to amend the country’s Arctic policy. The amended document mentioned the prioritization of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. For this purpose, Russia has endeavored to transform NSR into a global trade and energy route. Russia currently operates the largest Icebreaker fleet and thanks to this technology, the transit of trade vessels is expected to increase through the NSR.

Routes through the Arctic Ocean. Source: Author’s creation

However, any unilateral Russian action in the Arctic Ocean would not land off the attention of the other Arctic states. While Russia is ambitious to hew the Arctic Ocean as a “Russian Lake”, the other Arctic countries too deem the Arctic as their ‘number one priority’. The Nordic countries consider the Arctic as a security concern, they also see Russia as a threat in the region while emphasizing sustainable development in the region. Therefore, the strategic competition in the Arctic will, inevitably, shape the European security dynamics.

The strategic importance of GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a body of open water between the three countries, is still relevant. During the Cold War, it provided the Soviet vessels an outlet into the North Atlantic Ocean which conferred optimal range to strike NATO targets. However, in late 2019, Russian submarines surged through the gap into the North Atlantic in what was a large-scale military exercise to which NATO forces counteracted with air missions to gather reconnaissance. Therefore, the Arctic is of strategic significance. It acts as a vanguard for the defenses of the Americas and Europe.

The most interesting case offered in the Arctic security is that of China, which lacks any geographical connection to the region. For Beijing, the Arctic begets new opportunities. China has already declared itself a “Near-Arctic State”  in its Arctic Policy 2018 and seeks to participate in the development of the Arctic shipping routes. China’s growing interest in the Arctic shipping routes can be interpreted as its efforts to diversify its trade routes. Compare the two routes which link China to the Western European markets: First is from the Chinese ports through the East and South China Sea, into the Indian Ocean, then crossing the Suez and reaching Mediterranean, squeezing through Gibraltar strait and reaching destinations. China’s apparition, utilizing this route, is evident in what has been translated as the “Malacca dilemma”. The second runs northerly from the Chinese ports and then cruising along the Arctic reaches Northern and Western Europe. The first is long, time-consuming and precarious in case of conflict given complex maritime features of the region. The second not only cost saving but also relatively more secure and safe. Therefore, the prospects for China to make the Arctic a “Polar Silk Road” are rewarding.

Future Power Politics in the Arctic. Source: Author’s creation

The Race to Secure the Arctic Resources

President Trump, during his first term, had tried to buy Greenland. However, his efforts were reinvigorated after his re-election in late 2024. During his second term, he has repeatedly threatened to occupy Greenland by using military force, the island defined by him as a matter of national security. The strategic importance of the Greenland is evident. Trump’s interest in the Greenland can be defined by two reasons. First to oust China and Russia from the region who have been increasing their influence in the region, as he perceives. Secondly, Trump wants to secure the resources of the Greenland for the US. Greenland, as said earlier, is rich in rare-earth minerals, which have their application in military industries, medical equipment, oil refining and green energy. Currently, China is the largest exporter of the rare earths. US deems ramping up its rare earth’s resources crucial for countering the Chinese monopoly over them. Last year, a global supply chains crisis loomed following China’s restrictions on the exports of the critical minerals. Moreover, to meet the threat imposed by climate change, the real progenitor of the shift in Arctic security, the transition to renewable and smart energy sources demands sufficient mineral resources including the rare earths. These are used in wind turbines and electric vehicles.

Russia extracts a huge amount of its energy and mineral resources from the Arctic. It produces rare earths, nickel and cobalt from its Arctic territory. Russian Arctic also holds almost 37.5 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, 75% of Russia’s gas reserves. As the permafrost thaws and the sea ice melts in the Arctic, Russia will expand its efforts to secure the resources in the region. Therefore, the Kremlin keenly observes changing environmental and political dynamics in the Arctic.

Lastly, the ‘Near-Arctic State’ has also augmented its footholds in the Arctic. China has invested in economic sectors in the Arctic. It is yet to be unveiled whether China’s ambitions in the Arctic are solely for peaceful economic purposes or rather they embody a strategic objective. So far, China has remained innocuous, focusing on economic ties with the Arctic states which benefit all.

Conclusion

The Arctic is going to witness a tense geostrategic competition. Climate Change has transformed this previously unnoticed region into a new stage of strategic competition. Arctic routes and resources invite regional as well as extra-regional powers to vie for dominance in the high north. Therefore, states have shifted their focus to the Arctic. The political and strategic facts imply that in the future the master of the Arctic will decide the matters of the world.

After spending decades criticising China, a succession of leaders from Western countries have been lining up to engage with its leadership.

In recent months, many of them have visited Beijing, seeking business opportunities.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is the latest to land in China.

Merz says Beijing must not be overlooked when tackling the big global challenges.

United States President Donald Trump’s huge tariffs are said to have pushed Western countries closer to China.

But can China be an alternative?

And what does it have to offer?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Jost Wubbeke – Managing partner at Sinolytics and an expert on China’s industrial policy, rare earths and supply chain strategy

Harry Broadman – Former assistant to the US trade representative

Dan Wang – Economist and director on Eurasia Group’s China team

The 2026 Annual Sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), known as the “Lianghui,” are a pivotal event. They will witness the official launch and final adoption of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). This plan serves as a roadmap not only for China but also for countries of the Global South, focusing on the shift from quantitative growth to “new qualitative productive forces” based on innovation and technology. It is worth noting that formulating medium- and long-term plans to guide China’s economic and social development is a crucial method of governance employed by the Communist Party of China.

The “Two Sessions” meetings (National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) in China in 2026 represent a strategic focal point for the Global South, outlining the 15th Five-Year Plan, supporting high-quality development through new productive forces, and strengthening trade partnerships, particularly in the areas of energy, transportation, and the digital economy. Its importance to the Global South lies in China’s leadership of economic integration. China aims to promote openness and cooperation, providing an opportunity for the Global South to benefit from the growth of the world’s second-largest economy. Here, (The Global South’s benefit from China’s innovative development models): During the Two Sessions in March 2026, China will present a model of governance and technological innovation that developing countries and countries of the Global South can utilize to achieve sustainable development and digital transformation. Additionally, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan and the Two Sessions in March 2026 will strengthen the foundations for trade between China and the Global South in particular: These meetings will pave the way for China to enhance trade with countries of the Global South in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, supporting infrastructure and economic growth in the Global South under China’s leadership. Most importantly, the Two Sessions in March 2026 and China’s 15th Five-Year Plan will support the Asia-Pacific region and the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s Vision 2026 focuses on “building a community with a shared future,” promoting investment projects and economic exchanges with developing countries. Therefore, the upcoming two-day meeting in China in March 2026 is crucial in guiding the Chinese economy towards domestic consumption and innovation, opening new markets and opportunities for developing countries in the Global South.

This tenth five-year plan represents China’s economic and social roadmap for the second half of the current decade, emphasizing “high-quality development” and technological innovation that will benefit developing countries in the Global South. Thus, during the 2026 meetings, China will work to “promote the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative with high quality.” This “Chinese-style modernization” will contribute to creating more development opportunities for countries around the world, especially those in the Global South, in accordance with President Xi Jinping’s principles of a shared future for mankind, win-win cooperation, and mutual benefit for all, particularly developing countries. The developing world. It aims to achieve the goal of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping of doubling the size of China’s national economy by 2030. To this end, the State Council of China held a plenary meeting on February 6, 2026, to review the draft government work report and the draft 15th Five-Year Plan before submitting them to parliament during the joint sessions of the two councils in March 2026. The annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) to discuss the draft 15th Five-Year Plan is scheduled to begin on March 5, 2026, while the session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) will commence on March 4, 2026.

The meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2026 are of exceptional importance, as they mark the official launch of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). These meetings, known as the “Two Sessions,” will chart China’s economic and political course for the second half of the current decade, with a focus on transitioning to “new productive forces.” The strategic significance of the Two Sessions in China in 2026 stems from adopting the Decade Roadmap: The 15th Five-Year Plan serves as a crucial link in achieving China’s goal of socialist modernization by 2035. Furthermore, the meetings will address how China will respond to global challenges: These meetings come at a time when China is facing a slowdown in global growth, geopolitical tensions, and internal structural pressures. With a discussion of the (mechanisms and plans for transforming China’s economic model): The upcoming meetings of the Two Sessions in March 2026 aim to shift the Chinese economy from reliance on traditional manufacturing to an innovation- and technology-driven economy. Emphasis will also be placed on further modernizing the state’s governance system and capacity, raising the level of social civilization, enhancing cultural confidence, continuously improving the quality of life for the Chinese people, achieving new progress in providing sufficient and high-quality employment, making significant new strides in building a “beautiful China,” establishing a green lifestyle and production model, strengthening national security, and effectively promoting the construction of a “safe China” at a higher level.

The Chinese political leadership is currently laying the groundwork for the Two Sessions in March 2026, which will determine the contours of the country’s social and economic development over the next five years. Chinese President Xi Jinping held meetings with senior officials to discuss the key priorities of the new Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), while Chinese state media launched a nationwide campaign to gather public feedback. During a symposium held in April 2025 to discuss the 15th Five-Year Plan, President Xi Jinping, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, emphasized that “in planning economic and social development for this period, it is essential to proactively assess the impact of changes in the international landscape on China and adapt to them by adjusting and improving the country’s economic structure.” President Xi highlighted several key areas, including ensuring economic stability by stabilizing employment, supporting businesses, and continuing China’s broad-based economic opening-up. During his speech at the April 2025 symposium to discuss China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, Xi Jinping strongly emphasized scientific and technological development. He specifically called for new, high-quality productive forces to play a more prominent role in the country’s economic revitalization. He also called for strengthening the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, developing emerging industries, and accelerating the construction of a modern industrial system.

In a speech published in the Communist Party’s magazine “Qiushi” in July 2025, President Xi Jinping stated that “the world is undergoing changes unseen in a century, making the technological revolution and competition among major powers increasingly intertwined.” He urged the Chinese nation to consolidate its strategic advantage in the global technology race.

Herein lies the most important strategic dimension of the 15th Five-Year Plan and its impact on the Global South, through leading the technological transformation. The plan aims to achieve “self-reliance” in advanced technology fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and semiconductors. For countries in the Global South, this represents an opportunity to break the Western monopoly on technology and gain access to advanced Chinese technological alternatives. Furthermore, China offers a “high-quality development model” during the 15th Five-Year Plan period, transitioning from labor-intensive industries to smart and green manufacturing. This approach provides the Global South with an inspiring model for integrating environmental sustainability with economic growth, particularly in the areas of solar energy and electric vehicles. Finally, the plan promotes “dual-cycle development” by focusing on reducing dependence on foreign markets and boosting domestic consumption. This transformation could lead to a reshaping of global supply chains, opening new horizons for countries in the Global South to export their products to the massive Chinese market, which is expected to reach $20 trillion by 2026. Furthermore, the timing of the launch and discussion of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan presents an opportunity to enhance regional and multilateral cooperation, coinciding with China’s hosting of the APEC summit.

  In 2026, the 15th Five-Year Plan will focus on (strengthening economic integration with Asia-Pacific and Global South countries), emphasizing the digital economy, transportation, and energy. Beyond its strategic security and resource implications for the Global South, the 15th Five-Year Plan includes new strategies for marine resource exploitation and deep-sea innovation, a vital area for many coastal developing countries seeking to develop their “blue economy,” drawing on China’s experience in this field.

The 15th Five-Year Plan, covering the period from 2026 to 2030, is expected to focus on enhancing economic resilience and strengthening China’s technological and innovative capabilities. It will be adopted during a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Chinese Five-Year Plans are the country’s most important policy blueprints, outlining strategic goals for economic and social development over a five-year period. These plans began with the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. They define national priorities, particularly in the areas of economic growth, industrial development, education, and social development, and serve as binding guidelines for all local, regional, and national governments. China, a leading force and supporter of the Global South, draws upon its experience.

As for the main topics of discussion during the 15th Five-Year Plan, which will take place during the 2026 Two Sessions in China, legislative and political deliberations will focus on several key pillars, most importantly: how China can achieve technological independence and self-reliance. This will be accomplished by discussing mechanisms and plans for achieving “Chinese self-reliance” in critical technologies, such as advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. This will be achieved by studying and discussing ways to strengthen scientific and technological capabilities to achieve self-sufficiency in vital industries through advanced manufacturing and artificial intelligence, transforming the manufacturing sector towards smart technologies to enhance innovation. Emphasis will be placed on China’s firm commitment to the “Made in China policy,” aiming to propel China to the forefront of a range of high-tech industries, including aerospace, electric vehicles, robotics, and communications. The discussions will also explore ways to achieve common prosperity and well-being for the Chinese people by improving living standards and ensuring a more equitable distribution of the fruits of modernization.

The 2026 meetings of the Joint Conference will also focus on structural reforms, implementing over 300 reform measures to enhance the efficiency of the Chinese national economy within a complex international environment. This year’s meetings in China will also address the “green transition,” continuing to support clean technologies such as solar power and electric vehicles, and promoting renewable energy (solar and wind) to achieve peak carbon emissions by 2030. Furthermore, they will discuss boosting domestic demand by exploring ways to encourage household consumption as a primary driver of growth, rather than relying excessively on foreign investment. The meetings will also address strengthening national security, exploring ways to bolster industrial supply chains, and ensuring water and food security for Chinese society, including the modernization of 700,000 kilometers of pipeline infrastructure. Finally, they will discuss achieving maritime development by utilizing marine resources and innovating in deep-sea technology as part of balanced regional growth.

From the preceding analysis, we understand that the two sessions of the Global Summit in China in March 2026 represent a strategic pivotal point for reshaping globalization and the developments of the Global South under China’s leadership. This will lead to a more inclusive and multipolar world, moving away from traditional economic dependence, thus strengthening China’s position as a leader and key driver of development in the Global South in the coming decade.

German Chancellor visits eastern city, home to AI firm DeepSeek and e-commerce giant Alibaba, with business leaders.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has arrived in the tech hub of Hangzhou on the second day of his first official trip to China, flanked by a delegation of business leaders seeking contracts in the eastern city.

Merz travelled from Beijing to the city of some 12 million people on Thursday, where he was due to tour some leading companies, including Germany’s Siemens Energy and Unitree, a Chinese firm producing humanoid robots.

Hangzhou is a major hub in China’s tech sector, home to giants, including artificial intelligence company DeepSeek and e-commerce platform Alibaba.

Before leaving Beijing, Merz, who is being accompanied by a delegation, including executives of German car giants Volkswagen, BMW and Mercedes, visited a Mercedes plant in the Chinese capital where he tested a self-driving vehicle.

‘Improved’ trade relationship sought

Merz’s trip to China, which became Germany’s largest trading partner last year, seeks to deepen decades-old economic ties with the world’s second-largest economy in the wake of tariffs imposed by the United States last year.

But he has also sought to address “challenges” in the relationship, most notably tackling the massive imbalance which saw Germany’s trade deficit with China hit a record 89 billion euros ($105bn) last year, fuelling complaints from German businesses that Chinese competitors are flooding the market with cheaper goods.

In a meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Beijing on Wednesday, before he met Chinese President Xi Jinping, Merz said he wanted “to improve and make fair” the cooperation between the countries.

Following the talks with Xi and top Chinese leaders, Merz said China had agreed to buy up to 120 Airbus aircraft, and said other contracts were in the pipeline.

The two leaders stressed their commitment to developing closer strategic relations, with Xi telling Merz he was willing to take relations to “new levels”.

Ukraine, Taiwan discussed

The talks between Xi and Merz also touched on geopolitical issues, with the German leader saying any “reunification” with Taiwan, the self-ruled island China claims as its territory, must be done peacefully.

Merz also told reporters that he asked the Chinese government to use its influence with Russia to help end the war in Ukraine, amid frustrations among European leaders that Beijing was not doing enough to bring the war to an end.

“We know that signals from Beijing are taken very seriously in Moscow,” Merz said.

Following the meeting, the two countries released a joint statement saying they supported efforts to achieve a ceasefire and lasting peace in Ukraine, emphasising the importance of fair competition and mutual market access, and committing to resolving any concerns through dialogue, Chinese state media reported.

Merz is the latest in a string of Western leaders to visit Beijing in recent months, including the United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer, French President Emmanuel Macron and Canadian PM Mark Carney, amid the fallout from the Trump administration’s tariffs on long-established trade partners.

US Justice Department accuses former Air Force officer Gerald Brown of training Chinese military pilots.

A former United States Air Force officer and “elite fighter pilot” has been arrested and accused of betraying his country for illegally providing training to Chinese military pilots.

The US Department of Justice said ex-Air Force Major Gerald Brown, once known by his pilot’s call sign “Runner”, was arrested on Wednesday in Indiana and charged with a criminal complaint for providing and conspiring to provide defence services to Chinese pilots without authorisation.

Brown, 65, a former F-35 Lightning II instructor pilot with decades of experience in the Air Force, “allegedly betrayed his country by training Chinese pilots to fight against those he swore to protect”, Roman Rozhavsky, assistant director at the FBI’s Counterintelligence and Espionage Division, said in a statement.

“The Chinese government continues to exploit the expertise of current and former members of the US armed forces to modernise China’s military capabilities. This arrest serves as a warning,” Rozhavsky said.

US Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro for the District of Columbia said Brown “and anyone conspiring against our Nation” will be held accountable for their actions.

According to the Justice Department, Brown served in the US Air Force for 24 years, had led combat missions and was responsible for commanding “sensitive units”, including those involved in nuclear weapons delivery systems.

After leaving the US military in 1996, Brown worked as a commercial cargo pilot before working as a defence contractor training US pilots to fly F-35 and A-10 warplanes.

Brown is alleged to have travelled to China in December 2023 to begin his work training Chinese pilots, and he remained in the country until returning to the US in early February 2026.

His contract to train Chinese pilots was negotiated by Stephen Su Bin, a Chinese national who in 2016 pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four years in prison for conspiring to hack a defence contractor in the US to steal military secrets for China, according to the Justice Department.

The department said Brown faces charges similar to those levelled against former US Marine Corps pilot Daniel Duggan, who was arrested in Australia in 2022 and is currently fighting his extradition back to the US, where he faces prosecution for violating the US Arms Export Control Act for providing pilot training to the Chinese armed forces.

Duggan appeared in an Australian court in October 2025 to appeal against his extradition, which was approved in December 2024 by Australia’s then Attorney General Mark Dreyfus.

Duggan, 57, a naturalised Australian citizen, was arrested by Australian police in 2022 shortly after returning from China, where he had lived since 2014.

According to the Reuters news agency. Duggan’s lawyer, Christopher Parkin, told the court that his client’s extradition to the US was “uncharted territory” for Australia.

He argued that his client’s conduct was not an offence in Australia at the time or when the US requested extradition, and so did not meet the requirement for dual criminality in Australia’s extradition treaty with the US.

The governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the US published a notice in 2024 warning current and former members of their armed forces that China was seeking to recruit them and other NATO military personnel in order to harness Western military expertise and bolster its own capabilities.

“The insight the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] gains from Western military talent threatens the safety of the targeted recruits, their fellow service members, and US and allied security,” the notice stated.

“Those providing unauthorized training or expertise services to a foreign military can face civil and criminal penalties,” it added.

China officially announced in late January 2026 its refusal to join the Board of Peace at the “International Peace Council for the Administration of the Gaza Strip.” This council, proposed by the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump, is a new international entity launched by the US president as an alternative to traditional UN mechanisms. China confirmed in January 2026 that it had received a formal invitation from the United States to join the “International Peace Council” for Gaza, launched by President “Trump” as a global initiative to resolve the conflict. China’s stance toward this council is characterized by caution and a demand for further details while adhering to its established principles.

The reasons for China’s rejection of the US-sponsored peace council for the Gaza Strip are based on several strategic and legal justifications, the most important of which is the marginalization of the UN’s role by the International Peace Council, sponsored by Washington. Beijing believes that the council seeks to replace the role of the United Nations and the Security Council, and it affirms its commitment to an international system centered on the United Nations and based on international law. Regarding China’s criticism of the lack of Palestinian representation within the International Peace Council, China criticized the Council’s charter for failing to mention the Palestinians or respect their will, asserting that any arrangements for the future of Gaza must be based on the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine.” Furthermore, (China’s concerns about “American dominance” over the International Peace Council): Beijing warned that the Council could be a tool for Washington to impose “control” or establish military bases in the Gaza envelope area under the guise of reconstruction. Also, (China’s rejection of the financial membership criteria within the International Peace Council): The Council requires substantial financial contributions (up to one billion dollars for permanent membership), which China views as transforming peace into a “deal” driven by financial power rather than the legal rights of the Palestinians.

At the same time, China is demanding structural clarity regarding the resolution establishing the International Peace Council and its actual feasibility. China, through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, “Fu Cong,” expressed concern that the resolution establishing the council lacks essential details, particularly concerning its structure, composition, and terms of reference, as well as the nature of the proposed “international stabilization force” in Gaza. Therefore, Beijing insisted on the UN’s authority in this matter, maintaining that any future arrangements for Gaza must be made under the auspices of UN Security Council resolutions and with broad participation including Palestinian parties and Arab states. China rejected any “closed” or “unilateral” mechanisms that could marginalize the UN’s role. Furthermore, China categorically emphasized the principle of “Palestinian governance of Gaza,” considering the Gaza Strip an integral part of Palestinian territory. China rejects any plans aimed at imposing external trusteeship or control over its administration, affirming that the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine” is the foundation for any post-conflict governance. China has supported Arab initiatives on post-war management of the Gaza Strip, explicitly endorsing reconstruction and peace plans proposed by Egypt and other Arab states, deeming them consistent with the aspirations of the Palestinian people. China firmly adheres to the two-state solution, maintaining that any peace efforts must ultimately lead to a two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Therefore, the motives behind China’s rejection of the American request to join the International Peace Council on Gaza can be summarized as follows: China’s insistence on upholding the international legitimacy of the United Nations and its deep suspicions regarding the security and political objectives behind the council’s formation and Washington’s enthusiasm for it. The main reasons for China’s rejection of the International Peace Council on Gaza are China’s desire to protect the UN system. Beijing believes the proposed council seeks to replace or marginalize the role of the United Nations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry affirmed its commitment to an international system centered on the United Nations and based on its Charter and international law, rejecting any “alternative frameworks” outside of this scope. (Ambiguity in structure and tasks): The Chinese representative to the United Nations, “Fu Cong,” criticized the draft resolution concerning the council (Resolution 2803) for its lack of clear details regarding its structure, composition, and criteria for participation, describing it as “worrying.” In addition to China’s security concerns regarding the Gaza issue: Chinese intelligence reports indicate that one of the hidden objectives of the Washington-sponsored International Peace Council in Gaza is to destroy Hamas tunnels under the guise of “reconstruction,” which Beijing considers a “provocative and extremely dangerous” foreign military intervention. Furthermore, (China rejects American unilateralism in dealing with regional and global issues): China views the American International Peace Council initiative in Gaza as part of Washington’s attempts to impose “unilateralism” and exacerbate confrontation between blocs, which contradicts the “Global Governance Initiative” championed by Chinese President “Xi Jinping. ”.

Herein lies China’s alternative vision to the American initiative to form the International Peace Council: China, in its alternative to joining the Council, calls for the activation of the two-state solution as the only way to guarantee lasting peace in the Middle East and the implementation of the Beijing Declaration to support Palestinian national unity and strengthen the legitimacy of the Palestinian state. (UN Reform): Instead of creating parallel initiatives, Beijing calls for making the Security Council more responsive to the expectations of the world’s people on its 80th anniversary.

China proposes a different vision for managing the Gaza and Middle East issues, based on the following pillars: (Security Council Authority): This involves full adherence to UN Security Council resolutions as the sole basis for international legitimacy in Gaza. The Chinese call for (the principle of self-governance in the Gaza Strip): This involves China’s insistence that post-war administration of Gaza must be in the hands of the Palestinians themselves, rejecting any plans for forced displacement or external trusteeship. The Chinese call for a broad international peace conference on Gaza: Beijing calls for a more inclusive and credible international peace conference under UN auspices, with the aim of concretely implementing the two-state solution within a defined timeframe. With China prioritizing land routes over sea routes or temporary docks, as proposed by the US, China rejects maritime alternatives or “temporary docks” as substitutes for land corridors, viewing them as attempts to circumvent international obligations regarding humanitarian relief in the Gaza Strip.

From the preceding analysis, we understand that China considers itself a “positive stabilizing force” seeking to end the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip through comprehensive dialogue, in contrast to what it describes as the “unilateral” US approach, which it believes could deepen regional divisions. In short, while China does not reject participation in international dialogue on Gaza, it stipulates that the international peace council, sponsored by Washington, should be an instrument for strengthening international legitimacy, not a replacement for it, while preserving full Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza.

Chancellor says he wants to deepen trade relationship while making it fairer during visit that sees signing of several agreements.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has kicked off his inaugural visit to China with a focus on resetting trade relations and deepening cooperation.

Speaking in Beijing on Wednesday, Merz told Chinese Premier Li Qiang that Germany sought to build on the decades-old economic ties with China, while emphasising the need to ensure fair cooperation and open communication.

“We have very specific concerns regarding our ⁠cooperation, which we want to improve and make fair,” said Merz, in an acknowledgement of the strain faced by Germany’s manufacturing sector from Chinese competition.

Li, who met Merz shortly after his arrival in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, called on both sides to work together to safeguard multilateralism and free trade, in a reference to US President Donald Trump’s tariff policy that has upended the global trading system.

“China and Germany, as two of the world’s largest economies and major countries with important ‌influence, should strengthen our confidence in cooperation, jointly safeguard multilateralism and free trade, and strive to build a more just and fair global governance system,” Li said.

During the meeting, representatives from both sides signed several agreements and memorandums, including on climate change and food security.

“We share responsibility in the world, and we should live up to that responsibility together,” Merz said, adding there was “great potential for further growth”.

He added that open channels of communication were essential, as he announced visits by several ministers in the months ahead.

‘More equal playing field’ sought

Reporting from Beijing, Al Jazeera’s Rob McBride said the visit, in which Merz was being accompanied by a large delegation of German business executives, was important for both Europe’s economic powerhouse and the world’s second-largest economy.

Alongside the signing of deals with Chinese companies, a key focus of Merz’s visit would be “looking for a more equal playing field when it comes to trade”, he said.

“There is a real concern in markets like the European Union about cheaper, sometimes subsidised Chinese products that are looking for markets other than the US, suddenly flooding other marketplaces such as Germany … undercutting many domestic manufacturers there,” he said.

Germany’s imports from China increased 8.8 percent to 170.6 billion euros ($201bn) last year, while its exports to China dropped 9.7 percent to 81.3 billion euros ($96bn).

McBride noted Beijing was seeking to pitch itself as a “responsible advocate of free trade compared to the sometimes unpredictable and chaotic tariffing policy of the US”.

He said the visit would also see Merz attend a banquet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and visits to German companies with strongly established presences in China, such as Siemens and Mercedes-Benz.

Geopolitics and human rights would also be on the table, he said, with Germany particularly concerned about Beijing’s support, tacit or otherwise, for Russia amid its war on Ukraine.

Western leaders court Beijing

Merz is the latest in a string of Western leaders to visit Beijing in recent months, including the UK’s Keir Starmer, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Canada’s Mark Carney, amid the fallout from Trump’s tariffs on long-established trade relationships.

The chancellor said on Friday he was going to Beijing in part because export-dependent Germany needs “economic relations all over the world”.

“But we should be under no illusions,” he said, adding that China, as a rival to the United States, now “claims the right to define a new multilateral order according to its own rules.”

China’s Commerce Ministry says the move against Japanese firms will prevent the remilitarisation of Japan.

Japan has strongly protested China’s move to restrict the export of “dual-use” items to 20 Japanese business entities that Beijing says could be used for military purposes, in the latest twist in a months-long diplomatic row between the two countries.

Japanese Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Sato Kei said at a news conference that the move by China’s Ministry of Commerce on Tuesday was “deplorable” and would “not be tolerated” by Tokyo.

Companies affected by China’s export ban on dual-use items, or items that can be used for civilian or military purposes, include Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ shipbuilding group, aerospace and marine machinery subsidiaries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Japan’s National Defense Academy, and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency.

Beijing said restricting the export of dual-use items to the Japanese firms was necessary to “safeguard national security and interests and fulfil international obligations such as non-proliferation”, adding that the companies were involved in “enhancing Japan’s military strength”.

China’s Commerce Ministry said on Tuesday that it would also add another 20 entities to its export restrictions watchlist, including Japanese automaker Subaru, petroleum company ENEOS Corporation, and Mitsubishi Materials Corporation.

Chinese exporters must submit a risk assessment report for each company to ensure “dual-use items will not be used for any purpose that would enhance Japan’s military strength”, according to a statement on the Commerce Ministry’s website.

China has imposed similar restrictions on the US and Taiwan as a form of political protest, particularly over Washington’s ongoing unofficial support for the self-governed island. Beijing claims democratic Taiwan as its territory and has not ruled out using force for “reunification”.

Tokyo and Beijing have a historically acrimonious relationship, but diplomatic ties took a turn for the worse in November, when Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told legislators that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, which could necessitate military action.

Japan has had a pacifist constitution which restricts its use of force, but an attack on Taiwan could legally allow Tokyo to activate its army, the Self-Defence Forces, Takaichi said.

Takaichi’s remarks were some of the most explicit regarding whether Japan could become involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and have been accompanied by a push to expand Japan’s military capability.

Beijing reacted with fury to Takaichi’s remarks, discouraging Chinese citizens from visiting Japan, leading to a major drop in tourism revenue from Chinese visitors.

In January, Beijing also imposed Japanese export restrictions on rare earths like gallium, germanium, graphite and rare earth magnets that could be used for defence purposes, according to the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank.

The CSIS said at the time that “these retaliatory measures underscore rising tensions between Beijing and Tokyo and serve as a pointed warning from China to countries that take explicit positions on cross-strait relations”.

Tokyo does not have official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but several of its outlying islands, including Okinawa, are geographically closer to Taiwan than mainland Japan. Taiwan is also enormously popular with the Japanese public.