China

As Epic Fury grinds into a second month, the Air Force continues to rely heavily on its fleet of aerial refueling tankers, the majority of which are over 60 years old, to gas up aircraft attacking Iran and those still pouring into the Middle East. The strain on the force has been exacerbated by the loss of a KC-135 Stratotanker and damage to another after a collision over Iraq and several more tankers being destroyed and damaged on the ground by Iranian long-range weapons. Meanwhile, given this large commitment of aircraft and personnel, there are questions about how the U.S. tanker fleet can respond to a fight in the Pacific should one break out tonight. To get a better sense of that, we spoke to retired Air Force Col. Troy Pananon, who flew tankers and commanded a tanker wing.

In the second installment of our two-hour, wide-ranging exclusive interview – the first centering on Epic Fury’s strain on the force – Pananon offers insights into whether there are enough tankers and crews to sustain combat in two theaters more than 4,000 miles apart, the challenges of flying long distance over contested airspace and what, if any, countermeasures tankers should be given to survive.

Some of the questions and answers have been lightly edited for clarity. 

Q: Given the heavy use of aerial refueling for Epic Fury, how concerned are you about the ability to fuel a fight in the Pacific, if one should break out tonight or in the near term?

A: There is a high demand on the tanker community. We retired the KC-10s, so that is a void that can’t be filled as quickly as we would like. But the tanker force is robust, and even though we have a contingency of aircraft in the Middle East region and parts of Europe, we still have tankers that are all over the world, to include the Pacific. Kadena has its own wing of tankers there. And so the ability for our tanker fleet to pivot or to surge and scale to another region – there is not another military out there that can do it – but it puts that demand on the total force.

I think that we could do it, sure, but it would put a significant strain if we were trying to operate in two different parts of the globe, especially if it was involving major combat operations. And not to mention, there’s an element of protecting the homeland as well. Tankers are required to do that too. So you can’t just say, ‘Oh well, we’ll deplete the entire force and focus abroad.’ There’s an element required to support homeland operations as well.

Q: Does the need to do all those missions at once worry you?

A: At my level, when I was at the tactical level or the operational level, I always felt that we were adequately supported. There was certainly a stressor involved with trying to manage all that. But whenever there was a concern, you always would go up to your higher headquarters, and say, ‘Hey, here’s the current situation. We don’t need help now, or we do need help, and this is how you can help.’

It was their ability to resource those needs that really made my job easier and made the jobs of those who worked with me easier, knowing that they had support from above. But it’s not an unlimited resource. It’d be hard for me to say what would be required if we needed to pivot, or if we needed to support two operations in different parts of the world. But I would say that we were certainly capable of doing it. 

I just don’t know the duration of that, and unfortunately we always tend to think of these things in short-term snippets. But there are long-lasting impacts to things where high operations tempo means higher strain on the resources, higher strain on the aircraft.

Looking at the long view, if you have to increase your operational tempo on a particular platform versus what you had planned for that, it is going to put a strain on the acquisition process. It’s going to put a strain on the supply system. All these things, they do have an impact, not only in the short, but in the long-view as well.

Q: Considering how long it took to build up forces in the Middle East, how concerned are you about being able to fly long distances to protect Taiwan from attack by China? Can the current fleet sustain a major conflict with China, where fighters will need to fly thousands of miles on each sortie just to get to the effective fighting range?

A: I can’t completely comment on this for various reasons. There are certainly war plans in place. There have been studies that have taken place that are certainly higher classification levels, and we can’t discuss in this session or in public, right? It’s been looked at. I would say that there are plans in place that would prove that we could support operations in the Pacific region.

Is it complex? Yes. Does it require certain things to be successful? Yes, There are certain dominoes that need to fall into place in support of an operation like that. 

Q: But from a tanker pilot and wing commander perspective, what are the challenges of flying over these long distances through a very robust Chinese anti-aircraft, area denial environment?

A: I like to use the term, it’s a young man’s or woman’s game. It’s fatigue that is the enemy here, because when you have to operate at these distances and for the duration that is involved, it is certainly a physical stressor. Often, we’re operating in multiple time zones, and we’re not probably getting adequate rest, and that’s a cumulative effect, as you are asked to operate for these long durations. 

I’ve been on a cruise where we operated for 24 hours straight, and to do that over a sustained length of time – I don’t know that you can do it. In order to do that, it means you need more personnel. And so where an operation might be successful with – and I’ll just use easy numbers here – with 100 personnel that don’t have to range like you would in the Pacific or in Europe or even in the Middle East, depending on basing. Well, you’re probably going to need maybe twice as many to operate in the Pacific, because of the human element. You don’t want personnel to be fatigued to the point where they are not operating in a safe manner, and so you need to give them the appropriate rest. 

It goes all the way down the line, from air traffic control to ground personnel to maintenance to logistics. You need more personnel to support that effort at the distances and the range that you’re talking about. And the Pacific is a challenge, and it would require more personnel to just operate the aircraft, let alone the logistics tail required to support those aircraft. It is a significant challenge. And I’ve certainly endured operations where you bring in multiple energy drinks or keep the coffee brewing for long periods of time.

Q: What about the addition of robust Chinese air defenses into that equation? How much additional concern does that raise?

A: Tanker aircraft are not inherently survivable from enemy aircraft or missiles. There are upgrades or updates that could help in certain ways. The [AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure] LAIRCM is one of those technologies that would certainly help some of those aircraft. But, again, that means that we’ve got to stay out of harm’s way. Typically, we’ve got to set our tanker orbits up further away from the enemy’s reach and their engagement zone. 

It is a team effort, right. The role of our strike aircraft and joint partners to eliminate that threat is probably more important than our ability to add protection to these aircraft. I think they go hand in hand. It would be nice for tankers to have protective measures in place to make sure that they are survivable if we need them to operate in a contested environment, but in their current state, I would be definitely worried about pushing tankers closer to that engagement zone, because they don’t have the survivability or protections that maybe even aircraft like the F-22 or F-35 might have. 

We don’t have chaff or flares. We don’t have other measures that would protect our fleet, and so I think it’s the role of the warfighting commander to protect those assets and to ensure that they’re operating in a safe zone. And if they’re moved closer to that Weapon Engagement Zone, then they have the ability to retrograde or the connectivity and communication ability to ensure that those tankers can move back or retrograde away from the threat. There are some technology solutions out there, but I don’t know if that’s the sole solution. It is a comprehensive solution that is required to kind of go after that challenge.

Q: How difficult is to get, say, an F-35 into effective combat range and to fuel them up outside of the Chinese Weapons Engagement Zone?

A: It’s layers, right? In order for those aircraft to move into those high threat areas, it will probably require preparation of that environment. I think there are other elements of our military that would go to great lengths to create lanes or passageways to allow those aircraft to move closer to wherever they’re trying to get to their objective. 

The preparation of the environment that’s required probably is not the F-35 – the shorter range aircraft. There are other elements that would be used to prepare certain areas to allow our aircraft to move closer. There are other aircraft that would probably be capable of penetrating those air defenses and eliminating some of those threats.

Q: Which aircraft?

A: You have highly capable B-2A Spirit bombers and maybe in the future, B-21 Raider aircraft. There’s other non-manned platforms that I would assume could be used to help eliminate some of the threat, but not all of it.

The Chinese have a very, very robust air defense environment and system of systems in place. But I think that we as a military certainly have capabilities that could give us moments of opportunity. And I think once we find an opportunity, our trained airmen and joint force can leverage that. I don’t think that we want to go toe-to-toe right now. I don’t think we ever want to go toe-to-toe with an adversary like China. I hope that we don’t have to do that, but I know that our joint force is preparing for that if it ever happens.

Q: What about giving tankers self defenses? We have heard about everything from just better situational awareness to providing electronic warfare pods to having their own collaborative combat aircraft (CCAs) to putting mini-interceptors under their wings capable of taking down incoming threats. What is the best avenue for making the current tankers we have more survivable? 

A: Prevention is the best cure here. Not putting them in harm’s way would be the best way for them to survive. But I think it would be certainly comforting to know that they have onboard systems or bolt-on systems that would help them at least have a chance against some of these threats. There are certainly a lot of opportunities out there. I’ve heard of efforts where you would outfit certain aircraft with certain defensive measures. 

If you got into a situation and we needed to do it, I think the KC-46 Pegasus is a great platform to utilize for this, because it has so much advanced avionics architecture already on board. Trying to do it on the KC-135? That is because you’re trying to answer a scale problem. We don’t have enough KC-46s and we need more. And I know that they’re trying to procure more and and they’re coming, but they’re not to the scale that we have with the KC-135. And so the problem with trying to work with that is that now we’ve got an older airframe, and we’re trying to bolt on new technology that may or may not be compatible, and so we’re gonna have to upgrade other elements on board the aircraft, just to make sure that it can work.

We have an old aircraft. We have some things that have been updated, like the avionics have been updated. But is it the same technological advancement as what is going to be required to bolt on to protect that particular aircraft? Well, no, because it probably – from a data infrastructure set – is not going to operate at the same speed. It’s not going to operate in a similar fashion. There’s some latency that gets introduced if you’re trying to onboard new technology with older technology.

Q: What about adding electronic warfare pods, CCAs or mini interceptors?

A:  I think nothing is off the table. I think those are fantastic ideas, and I know that there are people that have probably experimented or modeled to and then probably proven that it’s a successful option. But you have to resource it. We have a lot of mouths to feed here – it’s not a limitless pot, and there’s the research and development and then product production of that. 

It doesn’t happen overnight and with every new technology that is offered to the warfighter, it is a challenge to make sure that all the personnel are trained and learn how to leverage these resources, not just individually, but collectively, as a team, as an organization, to really harness that and make sure that anything that’s introduced is successful.

You can’t just say, ‘Oh, well, look, I got this bright, shiny object. I’m just going to bolt it onto this aircraft, and everything is going to be working beautifully.’ No, there’s a whole host of problems that creates because you don’t have personnel that are all collectively trained, that have all operated with it, that have all that is integrated with it, that ensures that when you add this to that platform, that it is operating the way it was designed or intended to be operated. You can’t just snap your fingers and think that it’s gonna work right away.

Q: As a flight commander, would you like to have been able to have air-to-air interceptors under the wings of your tanker?

A: The one thing about airmen, and I would say Air Force in general, is that we tend to like new technologies. We’re not afraid of technology in general. We embrace it. The people that we attract into our service are people that embrace technology, that are innovative themselves. So, yeah, sure if I could roll back time, and that technology was introduced to me, I’d be first in awe. And two, I’d say, ‘Okay, well, how can we make this work? How can I integrate? How can I be able to leverage that and exceed expectations, and ensure that we meet the potential for that new technology?’ 

Q: There’s been a great deal of discussion about the importance of improving communications connectivity on the tanker fleet. We’ve already talked a little about it. Why is connectivity an issue? And what’s your advice to improve it?

A: Connectivity provides us situational awareness, and that situational awareness improves our ability to operate. It’s a team effort, and in order to do things collectively as a team, we have to be connected. And then the challenge is deciding, well, how should we connect? What sole-source platform should we be all collectively using because it does us no good to be connected as an Air Force, but not be able to talk to a Marine Corps or Navy, or Army or a coalition partner. 

And so the challenge is not only do we need to find the right technological solution, we have to ensure that it is able to integrate and communicate harmoniously with all our other partners, because it is not just an Air Force by itself, game. It is a joint force coalition game in terms of what we’re doing right now and what we’ll do in the future. 

I know that it’s a huge discussion about, okay, what platform do we use? How do we get it to our airmen right away? How do we make sure that it can integrate with the joint force? And then, ok, now we’ve got the solution. Where’s the money, right? There are so many elements to ensure that we can do this at scale and at speed. I trust that our leadership has been advocating with Congress and with other elements of the administration to get this in place. I don’t know how long it’ll take, but it certainly will help from a situational awareness perspective.

Q: Is there any particular system that you think would help improve situational awareness?

A: I think there are some age-old systems that have been in place. Link 16 architecture comes to mind. There are probably other modern solutions out there, but I don’t want to say that ‘this is the right system,’ because I’m not in the position to really argue for that. There are some systems out there that help, that are already in place, that would help us immensely, if we were to have that particular system across all platforms, right where the AOC [air operations center] can talk directly to the tanker element, who is also receiving data from other elements in the air, whether it be fighter aircraft, bomber aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and then, feeding that through our platform – maybe a KC-46 – back to the AOC, instantaneously. I know there are efforts out there to enhance that pipeline, but it’s not my place to say one system’s better than the other.

I just know that’s the panacea. That’s where you have to get to. You have to get to where the shooter is, all the way back to where the decisions are being made, and harness that data and then allow that data to help inform a decision, so that now you can give that decision over to the activity that’s operating. And so this constant cycle, and they use the term OODA loop, right? This constant cycle of observe, orient, decide, act – it’s got to happen faster than the enemy cycle for us to be successful. Connecting those points with technology can help us do that faster.

Q: You’re in the aircraft, you’ve got a receiver coming up. You don’t necessarily know where everything is. How does it help a pilot and the crew to have better connectivity?

A: Let me just put a hypothesis out there as an example. Say we have a receiver that was coming up, and they’ve got a really good understanding of where the threat rings are, what enemy positions are, where our friendly forces are, and that’s all in a data packet on board their aircraft. And if you don’t have a secure connection over the air, but you do have a secure connection once you’re connected with the boom, that data packet can then be uploaded to our aircraft and then displayed for our airmen to see, right? Because now, it’s like that whole moving map idea, like you may have a navigation system in your car that says, ‘hey, where’s the nearest gas station?’ and then it pops up and it tells you where the nearest gas stations are.

Same thing can be said if you’re operating a tanker aircraft, and now you get a data packet that gives you the full display of what the battlefield looks like in front of you. You now know, okay, here’s where I want to go, and here’s where I don’t want to go. So, if the technologies in place or are available now, it’s just a matter of connecting the dots. And this is a huge situational awareness improvement, if we can get to the point where the tanker crew on board has the ability to see exactly what is taking place, where the threats are, where the green zones are, where it’s safe to operate. And if they can do this in a secure manner that’s impenetrable by enemy forces, that is where we need to get to.

In our next installment, Pananon talks about drone incursions, the challenges of creating a new tanker fleet and whether single-pilot operations are a good idea.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

South Korea will remove the “China (Taiwan)” label from its e-arrival system, a foreign ministry official said Tuesday, after Taiwan changed South Korea’s name in its immigration system from “Korea” to “Korea (South)” in protest.

Seoul plans to remove the “last point of departure” and “next destination” fields from e-arrival cards, where the island nation had been listed as “China (Taiwan),” the official told reporters. It will remain listed as Taiwan in the country and region field.

“We have reviewed the matter and are moving forward with plans to remove the ‘last point of departure’ and ‘next destination’ fields from the electronic arrival card,” he said.

The official said the paper arrival cards already do not include those fields, and that the move is part of efforts to streamline the system, improve convenience for visitors from Taiwan, and align the paper and electronic arrival formats.

The Ministry of Justice is handling the matter in line with relevant procedures, the official said.

Seoul’s decision came after Taiwan called for a “correction” in its labeling as “China (Taiwan)” on e-arrivals, saying it has changed South Korea’s name in its immigration system from “Korea” to “Korea (South)” in a reciprocal measure.

Taipei had warned that it would take further corresponding steps if it sees no positive action from Seoul by the end of this month.

Taiwan’s foreign ministry said Tuesday that it has learned Seoul was under an “internal administrative and technical review” to update its e-arrival card system. It said Taiwan will temporarily suspend its own change to the e-entry registration.

Seoul noted that the decision was not made in response to Taiwan’s stated March 31 deadline for possible additional measures over the labeling, but was intended to address the issue in a way that promotes practical, unofficial cooperation with Taiwan.

Taiwan is also reportedly expected to take reciprocal steps to restore “Korea” in its foreign residents’ certificates.

Seoul’s decision to remove the two fields will be applied to all countries.

South Korea severed official diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1992, when it established formal relations with mainland China. Since then, the two sides have maintained practical ties in an unofficial manner.

China considers Taiwan, self-governed since it broke away from the mainland in 1949, as part of its territory that must be reunified by force if necessary, and it has strongly objected to any country that challenges this stance.

“We maintain necessary communication with China on matters of mutual interest,” the Seoul official added.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

March 29 (Asia Today) — China intensified an online influence campaign targeting Japan during the country’s February general election, sharply increasing English-language messaging aimed at shaping international opinion, according to a joint analysis cited by Japanese media.

The Yomiuri Shimbun reported Sunday that the findings were based on a joint study with AI firm Sakana AI, which examined social media posts, including on X, from Jan. 19 through mid-February.

The analysis tracked what researchers described as the “flow of narratives” in China-linked criticism of Japan. It found that English-language posts outnumbered Japanese-language content by as much as four to one, indicating a strategic shift toward influencing global audiences rather than domestic Japanese opinion.

The surge followed remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in November, when she described a potential Taiwan contingency as a “crisis threatening Japan’s existence.” After several days of relative silence, China-linked accounts escalated criticism of Japan.

The volume of such posts rose steadily during the election period. Researchers estimated roughly 1,400 posts on Jan. 19, increasing to about 1,700 by Jan. 23 and 1,800 by Jan. 27. On Feb. 8, the day of voting, the number surged to around 4,000, though still below levels seen during a larger campaign in November.

The messaging themes also shifted. Earlier narratives focused on criticizing Japan’s leadership and accusing Tokyo of interfering in Taiwan-related issues. During the election, however, posts increasingly framed Japan in terms of “militarization,” “revival of militarism,” and economic decline. As voting approached, criticism of political leadership again became more prominent.

A Japanese government official said the messaging may have been designed to influence voter behavior through pressure or intimidation.

Separate analysis of posts from November through January showed a sharp rise in English-language output from accounts linked to the Chinese Communist Party. During a peak period in mid-November, English-language criticism reached roughly four times the volume of Japanese posts. In December, about 560 of roughly 900 posts were in English, and in January, more than half of approximately 300 posts were written in English.

Officials in Japan suggested the shift reflects a strategic recalibration. With the Takaichi administration maintaining relatively strong approval ratings despite earlier criticism, Chinese efforts may have pivoted toward shaping international narratives rather than domestic opinion.

A Chinese official was quoted as saying the campaign would continue to apply “tactical pressure” on Takaichi while seeking to prevent countries from aligning with Japan.

The report concluded that China’s social media operations during the election represented a coordinated effort to influence both domestic and global perceptions by leveraging political and security narratives.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260329010008715

March 29 (Asia Today) — Japan will establish a new Pacific-focused defense unit and expand surveillance and infrastructure in remote island areas as part of efforts to counter China’s growing military presence, officials said.

Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi announced Saturday that the Defense Ministry will create a “Pacific Defense Planning Office” in April, citing what he described as gaps in Japan’s current defense coverage across vast Pacific air and maritime zones.

Speaking after attending a joint U.S.-Japan memorial ceremony on Iwo Jima, Koizumi said strengthening Pacific defenses was an urgent priority.

Japanese media, including the Yomiuri Shimbun, reported that Tokyo plans a comprehensive review of the structure and deployment of the Self-Defense Forces. The initiative will be reflected in planned revisions to key national security documents, including the National Security Strategy, later this year.

The government also plans to expand port facilities and radar networks across the Pacific, particularly in the Ogasawara Islands, which officials view as strategically vulnerable.

About 400 Self-Defense Forces personnel are currently stationed on Iwo Jima, but shallow coastal waters limit the ability of large vessels to dock. Authorities plan to begin feasibility studies next year to upgrade port infrastructure and establish supply systems for fuel and ammunition to support rapid fighter jet deployments. Runway reinforcement and measures to address volcanic risks are also under review.

Japan is also considering establishing an air defense identification zone over the Ogasawara Islands, where no such zone has been formally set since World War II, leaving what officials describe as a surveillance gap. The Defense Ministry plans to deploy mobile radar systems and build a permanent monitoring network in the area.

The moves come amid increased Chinese naval activity in the Pacific. China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning entered the Pacific beyond the so-called second island chain for the first time last year, and there have been instances of simultaneous carrier deployments. Japanese officials have also cited incidents involving Chinese aircraft tracking Japanese military planes near Okinawa.

Koizumi said deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance would be key to maintaining regional stability, adding that the new office would serve as a central hub for reorganizing Japan’s Pacific defense posture.

Iwo Jima, the site of one of the fiercest battles of World War II, remains a strategic location. Nearly 29,000 casualties were recorded there during the 1945 battle between U.S. and Japanese forces. Today, it is being repositioned as a key forward base in Japan’s evolving defense strategy.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260329010008723

March 27 (UPI) — Uruguayan Minister of Economy and Finance Gabriel Oddone said the United States is exerting “unimaginable” and “unsustainable” pressure on his South American country to break its trade relationship with China, according to remarks made at a private meeting.

The comments during a session with business leaders were reported by the local weekly Búsqueda.

With about 3.5 million inhabitants and a territory comparable to the state of Florida, Uruguay has had China as its main trading partner for more than 14 years, accounting for about 26% of its exports.

Oddone said the pressure is applied daily and channeled through different areas of the bilateral relationship.

According to attendees at the meeting with the Confederation of Business Chambers, the minister said that if Uruguay does not comply with Washington’s demands, its trade relationship with the administration of President Donald Trump “will not improve and could get worse.”

The remarks came Tuesday during a meeting at the Technological Laboratory of Uruguay, attended by more than 20 business representatives, along with the director of the Office of Planning and Budget, Rodrigo Arim.

The meeting lasted more than two hours and addressed economic and trade issues in a context described as “very complex.”

China is the main destination for key exports, such as beef, soybeans and cellulose. The pressure from the United States comes amid growing geopolitical rivalry between Washington and Beijing, which is affecting countries with trade ties to both powers.

According to attendees cited by Búsqueda, Oddone acknowledged that the government has “little room for maneuver” due to the fiscal situation inherited from the previous administration and internal differences within the ruling coalition over advancing economic reforms.

On the domestic front, the minister defended the country’s economic performance despite lower-than-expected growth.

Uruguay’s gross domestic product grew 1.8% in 2025, below the official projection of 2.6%, while analysts have already cut expectations for 2026 to around 1.6%.

Facing criticism from the private sector over the size and slow pace of the state, Oddone urged business leaders to also consider positive aspects.

“We should not only see the glass as half-empty,” he said, noting that the economy continues to grow despite an adverse international environment in which Uruguay is “swimming in dulce de leche,” a colloquial phrase interpreted as meaning it is difficult to move quickly.

The minister also ruled out improving competitiveness through a depreciation of the exchange rate.

“Uruguay is not going to become a cheap country,” he said, adding that improvements will come from microeconomic changes to reduce costs and streamline foreign trade.

Asked by Búsqueda, the minister declined to comment publicly on the meeting, as it was a private event. Some participants described it as useful, but with “mixed” feelings, while others said they valued explanations from the economic team.

At the close, Oddone adopted an optimistic tone.

“Believe me, we will do well,” he said, highlighting the country’s institutional and economic strengths to face an international scenario marked by trade tensions and regional slowdown.

As the United States-Israeli war on Iran enters its fourth week this weekend, pressure on oil and gas markets continues to mount due to severe disruption to shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz as well as attacks on and around key energy facilities in the Gulf.

In peacetime, 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas is shipped from producers in the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz – the only route to the open ocean – including 20 million barrels of oil per day.

To bridge the shortage its closure has caused, countries in the Middle East are exploring alternative routes to get energy exports out.

In this explainer, we look at three major pipelines in the Middle East that producers may be pinning their hopes on, and whether they can fill the gap.

What has happened in the Strait of Hormuz?

On March 2 – two days after the US and Israel began strikes on Iran – Ebrahim Jabari, a senior adviser to the commander-in-chief of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), announced that the strait was “closed”. If any vessels tried to pass through, he said, the IRGC and the navy would “set those ships ablaze”. Since then, traffic through the strait has plunged by more than 95 percent.

Iranian officials have most recently stated that the strait is not completely closed – except to ships belonging to the US, Israel and those who collaborate with them – but have also laid down new ground rules. Any vessel must secure Tehran’s approval to transit through the narrow waterway.

As a result, over the past fortnight, countries have been scrambling to do deals with Iran to secure safe passage and a few, mostly Indian, Pakistani and Chinese-flagged tankers have been allowed to pass.

On Thursday, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim thanked Tehran for granting Malaysian vessels “early clearance” through the strait.

Meanwhile, about 2,000 ships flying the flags of other nations are stuck on either side of the strait.

Which oil pipelines could serve as alternate routes?

The only alternative to shipping oil is piping it across land or under the sea. Three oil pipelines could work as ways around the Strait of Hormuz, including:

Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline

The East-West pipeline is also known as the Petroline and is operated by Saudi oil giant Aramco. Aramco is one of the world’s largest companies, with a market capitalisation exceeding $1.7 trillion and annual revenues of $480bn. The oil giant controls 12 percent of global oil production, with a capacity of more than 12 million bpd.

It is a 1,200km (745-mile) pipeline which runs from the Abqaiq oil processing centre close to the Gulf in Saudi Arabia to the Yanbu port on the Red Sea, on the other side of the country.

However, the pipeline does not have the capacity to fully make up for the Hormuz closure.

In 2024, about 20 million barrels per day (bpd) passed through the Strait of Hormuz, according to data from the United Nations. Crude oil and condensate made up 14 million bpd of this, while petroleum was the remaining 6 million bpd.

The East-West pipeline has the capacity of transporting up to 7 million bpd. On March 10, Aramco said about 5 million bpd could be made available for exports, while the rest could supply local refineries.

Since the US-Israeli war on Iran began at the end of February, Saudi Arabia has ramped up its oil flow through this pipeline. In January and February, an average of 770,000 bpd flowed through the pipeline, according to data from Kpler, a data and analytics company. By Tuesday this week, this had increased to an average of 2.9 million bpd.

However, using the Saudi pipeline still carries a risk.

The Houthis, an Iran-backed Yemeni armed group whose attacks on ships in the Red Sea caused global shipping chaos during Israel’s genocidal war in Gaza from 2023 to 2025, could target the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean beyond.

An unnamed Houthi leader told the Reuters news agency that the Houthis remain ready to attack the Red Sea again in solidarity with Tehran, the agency reported on Thursday.

“We stand fully militarily ready with all options. As for other details having to do with determining zero hour they are left to leadership and we are monitoring and following up with the developments and will know when is the suitable time to move,” the Houthi leader said.

The Bab al-Mandeb is the southern outlet of the Red Sea, situated between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti and Eritrea on the African coast.

It is one of the world’s most important routes for global seaborne commodity shipments, particularly crude oil and fuel from the Gulf bound for the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal or the SUMED pipeline on Egypt’s Red Sea coast, as well as commodities bound for Asia, including Russian oil.

The Bab al-Mandeb is 29km (18 miles) wide at its narrowest point, limiting traffic to two channels for inbound and outbound shipments.

Iran could open a new front in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait if attacks are carried out on Iranian territory or its islands, Iran’s semiofficial Tasnim cited an unnamed Iranian military source as saying on Wednesday.

UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline

The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline is also called the ADCOP or the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline.

The 380km pipeline runs from Habshan, an oil and gasfield in the southwestern area of Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman.

The pipeline, which became operational in 2012, has a capacity of about 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd). It is unclear how much is now being transported through the pipeline.

However, oil exports from Fujairah do appear to have risen in the past month despite the closure of the strait, averaging 1.62 million bpd in March compared with 1.17 million bpd in February, according to Kpler analyst Johannes Rauball, who spoke to Reuters.

Iraq-Turkiye Crude Oil Pipeline

The Iraq-Turkiye Crude Oil Pipeline, also called the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline, links Iraq to the Mediterranean coast of Turkiye.

The pipeline, which has the capacity of 1.6 million bpd, currently carries about 200,000bpd.

Iraq is among the top five global producers of oil and is the second largest within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), exceeding 4 million bpd.

Can these pipelines replace the Strait of Hormuz?

No. While these pipelines can take on some of the capacity of Hormuz, their combined capacity is only about 9 million bpd, compared with about 20 million bpd for the strait.

Additionally, these pipelines are land-based and within the range of Iranian missiles and drones, which makes them just as vulnerable to attacks and damage in the ongoing conflict as ships travelling through the strait. Throughout the war, energy infrastructure all over the Gulf has suffered strikes.

Are there other options?

Theoretically, oil can be transported on trucks, but this is costly, slow and inefficient.

A standard truck can carry anywhere between 100 to 700 barrels per day, depending on the number of trips. Hundreds of thousands of barrels would be needed to meet needs, requiring thousands of trucks, which could also be targeted in strikes.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko gifted North Korean leader Kim Jong Un a gun after the two countries signed a friendship treaty during the Belarusian’s first official state visit.

WASHINGTON — President Trump will travel to Beijing for a rescheduled summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping on May 14 and 15, the White House announced on Wednesday.

Trump had been scheduled to travel to China later this month but previously announced he was delaying the trip so he could be in Washington to help steward the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran. The Republican president had announced a rescheduled trip even though the war in Iran continues and the U.S. is pressing Tehran to accept a ceasefire proposal.

The president and First Lady Melania Trump also plan to host Xi and his wife, Peng Liyuan, for a White House visit later this year, press secretary Karoline Leavitt said.

Leavitt, when asked if the new dates for Trump’s trip could suggest he believes the Iran war could end soon, offered an optimistic tone that the conflict could reach an endgame before he travels.

“We’ve always estimated four to six weeks,” Leavitt responded. “So you could do the math on that.”

The United States and Israel launched the attacks against Iran on Feb. 28.

The China trip had been planned for months but began to unravel as Trump pressured Beijing and other world powers to use their military might to protect the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for the flow of oil. The strait has been effectively closed as Iran targets energy infrastructure and traffic through it.

Trump said last week while meeting with Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin in the Oval Office that he would be going to China in five or six weeks’ time instead of at the end of the month. He said he would be “resetting” his visit with Xi.

“We’re working with China — they were fine with it,” Trump said then. “I look forward to seeing President Xi. He looks forward to seeing me, I think.”

Trump’s visit to China is seen as an opportunity to build on a fragile trade truce between the two superpowers, but it has become tangled in his effort to find an endgame to the war in Iran. Soon after pressing China and other nations to send warships to secure access to Middle Eastern oil, Trump indicated last week that his travel plans depended on Beijing’s response, though he added then that the U.S. didn’t need help from the allies that rebuffed his request.

Madhani writes for the Associated Press.

Iran’s paralysis of the Strait of Hormuz has led to major disruption in global oil and gas supply and many countries have begun tapping into their strategic oil reserves to evade an economic crisis.

Since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28, Tehran, whose territorial waters extend into the Strait, has blocked the passage of vessels carrying 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) from the Gulf to the rest of the world. The strait is the only waterway to open ocean available for Gulf oil and gas producers.

Last week, the price of Brent crude topped $100 a barrel compared to the pre-war price of around $65.

The United States Trump administration has tried and failed to re-open the strait. First, it called on Western nations to send warships to help escort shipping through the strait – an option all have declined or failed to respond to. Then, on Sunday, Trump gave Iran 48 hours to reopen the strait or face US attacks on its power plants.

However, on Sunday, Iran said it would hit back at power plants in Israel and those in the region supplying electricity to US military assets. And, on Monday, Iran said it would completely shut the Strait of Hormuz if US attacks on its energy infrastructure continue.

Following Iranian attacks on energy infrastructure across the Gulf over the past three weeks, countries including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq and Kuwait have also cut their oil output, raising further concerns about global oil and gas supply.

On Monday, Trump appeared to backtrack on his Hormuz ultimatum when he ordered all US strikes on power plants in Iran to be paused for five days and claimed the US was holding talks with Iran. Iran has denied this.

In the face of chaos, on March 11, the 32 member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA) agreed to release 400 million barrels of oil from their strategic emergency reserves – the largest stock draw in the agency’s history. It is far higher than the 2022 release of 182 million barrels of oil by the group’s members after Russia invaded Ukraine.

What are strategic oil reserves and which countries hold them?

What is a strategic oil reserve?

A strategic oil reserve or strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) is an emergency stockpile of crude oil which is held by the government of a country in government facilities.

This oil reserve can be drawn on in cases of emergencies like wars and economic crises. Governments generally buy the oil through agreements with private companies in order to keep their reserves filled.

According to the IEA, its members currently hold more than 1.2 billion barrels of these public emergency oil stocks with a further 600 million barrels of industry stocks held by private organisations but under government mandate to be available to supplement public needs.

Other reserves are also held by non IEA members like China.

Which countries have strategic oil reserves? Can they withstand the war in Iran?

China

Beijing is not an IEA member, but holds the world’s largest strategic oil reserve.

According to China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment, Beijing “started a state strategic oil reserve base programme in 2004 as a way to offset oil supply risks and reduce the impact of fluctuating energy prices worldwide on China’s domestic market for refined oil”.

“The bases are designed to maintain strategic oil reserves of an equivalent to 30 days of imports, or about 10 million tonnes,” according to a 2007 report from Chinese state news agency Xinhua.

These strategic oil reserves are primarily located along China’s eastern and southern coastal regions such as Shandong, Zhejiang and Hainan.

China does not officially publish information about its crude inventories so it is not clear how much oil the country has in reserve. However, according to energy analytics firm Vortexa, in 2025, “China’s onshore crude inventories (excluding underground storage) continued to rise… reaching a record 1.13 billion barrels by year-end”.

According to data from Kpler, China bought more than 80 percent of Iran’s shipped oil in 2025. As the war in Iran escalates, therefore, Chinese companies such as refiner Sinopec have begun pushing for permission to use oil from the country’s reserves according to a Reuters report on Monday.

“We basically won’t buy Iranian oil, this is pretty clear,” Sinopec President Zhao Dong told a company results briefing in March, according to Reuters.

“We believe the government is closely monitoring crude oil and refined fuel inventories and market situations, and will advance policies at the appropriate ⁠time to support refinery productions,” he added.

US

Of the IEA members, the US holds one of the largest strategic oil reserves with 415 million barrels of oil. The stores are maintained by the US Department of Energy. It has confirmed that it will release 172 million barrels of oil from its SPR over this year as its contribution to coordinated efforts with the IEA.

On Friday, the Trump’s administration announced that it has already lent 45.2 million barrels of crude from the SPR to oil companies.

The US created its SPR in 1975 after an Arab oil embargo triggered a spike in gasoline prices which badly affected the US economy.

The reserves are located near big US refining or petrochemical centres, and as much as 4.4 million barrels of oil can be shipped globally per day.

The SPR currently covers roughly 200 days of net crude imports, according to a Reuters news agency calculation.

US presidents have tapped into the stockpile to calm oil markets during war or when hurricanes have hit oil infrastructure along the US Gulf of Mexico.

In March 2024, US President Joe Biden announced oil would be released from the reserve to ease pressure from oil price spikes following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and amid subsequent sanctions imposed on Russian oil by the US and its allies.

Japan

An IEA member, Japan also has one of the world’s largest strategic oil reserves.

According to Japanese media Nikkei Asia, at the end of 2025, the country held about 470 million barrels of in emergency reserves which is enough to meet 254 days of domestic consumption. Out of this amount, 146 days worth of oil are government-owned, 101 days are owned by the private sector, and the remainder is jointly stored by oil-producing countries.

Japan set up its national oil reserve system in 1978 to prevent future economic disruptions following the global oil crisis in 1973. That oil crisis heightened Japan’s vulnerability and dependence on oil from abroad. The country remains one of the world’s largest oil importers, relying on fossil fuels from overseas for about 80 percent of its energy needs.

Japan’s reserves are primarily located in 10 coastal national stockholding bases with major storage sites in the Shibushi base in Kagoshima in southern Japan.

On March 16, Japan announced that it had begun releasing oil from its emergency reserves amid the global energy crisis sparked by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told journalists the country would unilaterally release 80 million barrels of oil from stockpiles amid supply concerns.

UK

As of February 26, according to the UK Department of Energy Security and Net Zero, the UK holds about 38 million ⁠barrels of crude oil and 30 million barrels of refined products, as strategic reserves. The reserves are thought to be able to last around 90 days.

The country established its reserves in 1974 following the oil crisis of the 1970s and also to meet its IEA obligations. Members of the organisation are required to maintain at least 90 days of net imports in reserve.

The UK’s strategic reserves are largely held by private oil companies, but are regulated by the government. Milford Haven in South Wales and Humber in northeast England are key locations of reserves.

The country is among the 32 IEA nations releasing oil from its reserve to address the oil crisis amid the war in Iran. The UK government will be contributing 13.5 million barrels as a part of the release.

EU

EU member nations including Germany, France, Spain and Italy, all IEA members, also hold strategic oil reserves.

Germany has 110 million barrels of crude oil and 67 million barrels of finished petroleum products which are held by the government and can be released in a matter of days, according to Germany’s economy ministry.

France reported about 120 million barrels’ worth of crude and finished products in reserve at the end of 2024, the most recent data publicly available. About 97 million barrels of that is held by SAGESS, a government-mandated entity, with ‌a breakdown ⁠of about 30 percent crude oil, 50 percent gasoil, 9 percent gasoline, 7.8 percent jet fuel and some heating oil. Another 39 million barrels are held by the country’s oil operators.

On March 16, Spain approved the release of around 11.5 million barrels of oil reserves over 90 days to counter ⁠supply shortages caused by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Energy Minister Sara Aagesen told reporters. This is the country’s contribution to the IEA release. The country has around 150 million barrels of crude oil reserves in total.

Italy, by law, was holding about 76 million barrels of reserves, representing 90 days of Italy’s average net oil imports, in 2024.

Russian oil is emerging as a key beneficiary of the US-Israeli war on Iran, as countries scramble to charter tankers following United States President Donald Trump’s decision to temporarily ease sanctions, analysts say.

Following a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 10, Trump said the US would waive Russian oil-related sanctions on “some countries” to ease the shortage caused by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which in peacetime carries 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas from producers in the Gulf.

This week, it was reported that a number of tankers carrying Russian oil bound for China had changed course and were heading for India instead.

According to figures from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), Russia earned an additional 672 million euros ($777m) in oil sales in the first two weeks of the war on Iran, which began on February 28 when Israel and the US launched strikes on Tehran, killing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials.

Iran has since struck back, launching thousands of missiles and drones towards Israel as well as US military assets and infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf countries. The war stepped up a level this week, when Israel bombed Iran’s critical South Pars gasfield, and Iran hit back with strikes on Gulf energy assets, including Qatar’s Ras Laffan Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility – the world’s largest.

This week, the average price of Urals oil – the Russian benchmark – was significantly higher than the pre-war price of less than $60, at around $90 per barrel.

Here’s more about who is buying Russian oil and which other nations might benefit from the oil crisis.

Why is Russian oil benefitting from the Iran war?

Iran’s effective closure of the Hormuz Strait, which is the only sea route from the Gulf to the open ocean, has “walled in” 20 million barrels of Gulf oil per day, George Voloshin, an independent energy analyst based in Paris, told Al Jazeera.

This has prompted the US to, at least temporarily, ease sanctions on shipped Russian oil to slow the ensuing energy crisis and potential global price collapse. The price of Brent crude, the international benchmark, has risen to above $100 a barrel since the closure of the strait, compared with about $65 before the war began.

Many analysts say a price of $200 is no longer “far-fetched”.

“Russia has emerged as a primary beneficiary of the Middle East conflict due to the massive supply vacuum created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz,” Voloshin said. “Global refiners are desperate for alternative medium-sour crudes, a need that Russia’s Urals grade specifically meets.”

He added that the US decision to grant a temporary reprieve for shipped Russian oil “has provided Moscow with a critical window to maximise export volumes and oil revenues, essentially allowing Russian crude to act as the world’s primary swing supply during the Iranian blockade”.

How has the price of Russian oil been affected so far?

The price of Russian Urals has surged significantly, experts say. As a result of US sanctions, the oil had been trading at below $60 a barrel for some time. However, while “Urals historically traded at a significant discount to Brent due to Western sanctions”, Voloshin said, “that gap has narrowed as demand outstrips supply”.

“Since the beginning of the year, the price of Russian oil is estimated to have risen by nearly 80 percent – most recently close to $90 per barrel – and consistently trading well above the G7 price cap of $60 as buyers prioritise energy security over regulatory compliance in a high-volatility environment,” he added.

Are ships changing course to deliver Russian oil to new buyers?

Earlier this week, Bloomberg reported that at least seven tankers carrying Russian oil had changed course mid-voyage from China to India, citing data from Vortexa, the data analytics group.

Then, Indian media quoted Rakesh Kumar Sinha, special secretary in the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, confirming that the Aqua Titan, a Russian oil-laden tanker originally destined for China, is now expected to arrive at New Mangalore port on March 21 having been chartered by Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited (MPCL).

India was the first country to receive a time-limited exemption from the US Treasury to import Russian oil that is already at sea, Voloshin said.

“There is clear evidence of a massive logistical redirection of Russian oil cargoes mid-voyage. Several tankers originally bound for Chinese ports have, indeed, switched trajectory to India. This shift is driven by India’s aggressive pursuit of discounted distressed cargoes to fill its strategic reserves and meet domestic demand, as well as the increased risk and insurance costs associated with long-haul shipments to East Asia via contested waters.”

Until recently, Trump had been strongly pressuring India to stop buying Russian oil, even slapping additional 25 percent trade tariffs on India last year in punishment for doing so. This was lifted earlier this year when Trump claimed he had received assurances from India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi that India would start buying US oil, or even Venezuelan oil seized by the US, instead.

Which countries are buying Russian oil now?

Indian media has reported that India’s purchases of Russian crude have surged in the past three weeks, since the war on Iran began and the Strait of Hormuz was closed.

“The primary buyers of Russian oil continue to be India and China, who together now account for the vast majority of Russia’s seaborne exports,” Voloshin said.

Turkiye is also a significant buyer, he added, now using Russian crude to stabilise its domestic market amid the gas shortages caused by the Israeli strikes on Iran’s South Pars field.

“Additionally, a shadow fleet of ageing tankers continues to move Russian oil to smaller, less-regulated refineries across Southeast Asia and the Middle East, often through complex ship-to-ship transfers designed to obscure the origin of the crude,” he added.

He said this shadow fleet is becoming the primary delivery mechanism for oil in several contested regions, meaning more buyers could appear. “Additionally, the degree of cooperation between the US and its European allies remains a wild card. If the EU continues to refuse participation in military operations near Iran, the diplomatic and economic pressure on the US to maintain the Russian oil reprieve will likely increase.”

Will Russian oil remain in demand if the US re-imposes sanctions?

If there is nowhere else to readily source oil, countries may continue to seek Russian crude even if the US reimposes sanctions, Voloshin said. The International Energy Agency (IEA) says the closure of the Hormuz Strait has caused a shortage of 8 million barrels of oil per day.

If that persists, “major importers like India may feel they have no choice but to continue buying Russian oil to prevent domestic economic collapse”, Voloshin said.

If secondary sanctions on Russian oil are reintroduced, he added, buyers may demand much lower prices to compensate for the increased legal and financial risks of dealing with Moscow. “At the same time, in the presence of a continued severe market disruption, the US is very likely to roll over [extend] current exemptions,” Voloshin said.

Which other energy-producing nations could benefit?

Two other major non-OPEC energy producers that could benefit are Norway and Canada, experts say. However, this will largely depend on their capacity to increase production.

“Norway has already signalled its intent to maintain maximum gas and oil production to support European energy security, primarily selling to EU nations seeking to replace lost Iranian and Russian volumes,” Voloshin said. “Canada is exploring ways to increase its export capacity to the US Gulf Coast. However, like Russia, its ability to significantly ramp up production in the short term is constrained by pipeline throughput and infrastructure bottlenecks.”

TOKYO — Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is traveling Wednesday to the United States for what she expects to be a “very difficult” meeting with President Trump after he called on Japan and other allies to send warships to secure the Strait of Hormuz.

The three-day visit to Washington was originally expected to focus on trade and strengthening the U.S.-Japanese alliance as China’s influence grows in Asia. It is now expected to be overshadowed by the war the United States and Israel launched against Iran on Feb. 28.

”I think the U.S. visit will be a very difficult one, but I will do everything to maximize our national interest and to protect the daily lives of the people when the situation changes daily,” Takaichi told parliament on Wednesday, hours before her departure.

Takaichi held her first meeting with Trump in October in Tokyo, days after becoming Japan’s first female prime minister. A hard-line conservative, Takaichi is a protege of former leader Shinzo Abe, who developed a close friendship with Trump.

Her initial plan was to focus largely on China and strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance ahead of Trump ‘s highly anticipated diplomatic trip to China that had been planned for months. The White House announced Tuesday that it is being delayed due to the war in the Middle East.

Takaichi will be in the hot seat figuring out what best to offer to Trump. Experts say showing commitment and progress in investment deals is key to a successful summit.

Japanese officials say the two sides will work to deepen cooperation in regional security, critical minerals, energy and dealing with China.

No plan to send warship to the Strait of Hormuz

A key U.S. ally in Asia, Japan has carefully avoided clear support for the U.S.-Israel strikes on Iran or a decision over a warship deployment. That’s mainly because of Japan’s constitutional constraints but also due to a legal question over the U.S. action and strong public opinion against it.

She told parliament that Japan hopes to see a de-escalation of the war, which has disrupted deliveries of oil and gas that Japan is highly dependent on.

“Without early de-escalation of the situation, our economy will be in trouble,” she said. “Early de-escalation is important for both the U.S. and global economy.”

Japan also hopes to secure its traditional ties with Iran, where most of Japanese oil imports come from.

Takaichi and her ministers have denied that Washington officially requested Japanese warships sent to the Strait of Hormuz. Trump on X asked a number of countries, including Japan, to volunteer. He then said he no longer needs them, complaining about a lack of enthusiasm.

That takes some pressure off Takaichi.

“We have no plans to send warships right now,” Takaichi told the parliamentary session Wednesday. A dispatch for survey and intelligence missions are possible but only after a ceasefire, she said. Some Japanese experts have commented that minesweeping would be a mission that the country could carry out when hostilities end.

“I will clearly explain what we can do and cannot do based on the Japanese law,” Takaichi said. “I’m sure (Trump) is fully aware of the Japanese law.”

China and security

Takaichi wants to discuss China’s security and economic coercion and ensure the U.S. commitment in the Indo-Pacific region, especially as some U.S. troops stationed in Japan are being shifted to the Middle East — a change seen by Japan as a potential risk for Asia as China’s clout grows.

Takaichi plans to reassure Trump of Japan’s military buildup, emphasizing the acceleration of long-range missile deployment to enhance offensive capabilities. This breaks from Japan’s postwar self-defense-only principle and reflects closer alignment with the U.S.

At the summit, Takaichi is expected to convey Japan’s interest in joining America’s “ Golden Dome “ multi-billion dollar, multi-layered missile defense system.

Japan considers China a growing security threat and has pushed a military buildup on southwestern islands near the East China Sea.

Takaichi has pledged to revise Japan’s security and defense policy by December and seeks to further bolster Japan’s military with unmanned combative weapons and long-range missiles.

Her government is to scrap a lethal arms exports ban in the coming weeks to promote Japan’s defense industry and cooperation with the United States and other friendly nations.

Oil in Alaska, rare earths in Japan

A resource-poor nation, Japan is seeking to diversify oil suppliers and is finalizing a Japanese investment for increased oil production in Alaska and stockpiles in Japan, according to media reports. A Japanese investment in small modular reactors and natural gas in the U.S. is also a possibility.

If agreed, the projects would be part of a $550 billion investment package that Japan pledged in October. In February, the two sides announced Japan’s commitment to the $36 billion first batch of projects — a natural gas plant in Ohio, a U.S. Gulf Coast crude oil export facility and a synthetic diamond manufacturing site — whose progress is also to be disccused with Trump.

Japan reportedly plans to propose a joint development of rare earths discovered in undersea soil around the remote Japanese island of Minamitorishima as part of the investment package.

Diplomatic and trade disputes have escalated further since Takaichi’s comment that any Chinese military action against Taiwan could be grounds for a Japanese military response.

Yamaguchi writes for the Associated Press.

March 17 (UPI) — President Donald Trump told reporters Tuesday that he has delayed his trip to China for “five or six weeks” to focus on the war against Iran.

Trump told the Financial Times Sunday that he would postpone the trip if Chinese President Xi Jinping wouldn’t help secure the Strait of Hormuz.

“It’s only appropriate that people who are the beneficiaries of the Strait will help to make sure that nothing bad happens there,” Trump said. He said that 90% of China’s oil comes from the Middle East.

“We’re resetting the meeting, and it looks like it’ll take place in about five weeks,” Trump said. “We’re working with China. They were fine with it.”

The trip was scheduled for March 31 to April 2 and focused on trade.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Monday that “we will see whether the visit takes place as scheduled,” adding that if the trip were delayed, “it wouldn’t be delayed because the president’s demanded that China police the Straits of Hormuz,” NBC News reported.

After Bessent’s comments, White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt told Fox News that the president’s “utmost responsibility right now as commander in chief is to ensure the continued success of Operation Epic Fury, as he’s doing 24/7 here at the White House and here at home.”

Official Chinese customs data show that in 2025, China got less than half of its oil from the Middle East. Russia supplied just under one-fifth of China’s oil, and sanctioned Iranian oil accounted for 11.5 %.

All eyes are on the Strait of Hormuz.

The longer it remains closed, the greater the damage to the global economy.

Iran continues to block tankers from shipping close to 20 percent of the world’s oil supply.

That is roughly twice the disruption the world suffered during the energy shock of the 1970s.

Big oil shocks have historically led to considerable economic turmoil, high inflation, stagnation and recession.

Oil and gas prices are already surging, and economies are expected to slow.

From American consumers to Chinese factories and European households, people across the world are already feeling the effect.

All the build-up and live updates from the first 2026 Women’s Asian Cup semifinal between China and Australia.

March 15 (UPI) — Taiwan’s defense ministry on Sunday said that more than two dozen Chinese military aircraft and several naval vessels were detected near the island, which comes after a period with relatively few such incursions.

After decreased presence of Chinese incursions into the island’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) during the last two weeks, China sent 26 aircraft that were spotted around the island – 16 of which violated the ADIZ – and seven naval vessels sailed toward it, The Independent and The Wall Street Journal reported.

China considers Taiwan to be its territory. On a regular basis, it sends military aircraft and naval vessels toward the island, but during 10 of the last 16 days — from Feb. 27 to March 5 and March 7 to 10 — no flights near the island were reported.

On the other days, there were as few as two flights detected.

Taiwan regards the incursions into its airspace and waters as routine harassment, for the most part, but China also has held military exercises close to what Taiwan considers its territory and has threatened to take the island by force if it deems it necessary.

Wellington Koo, Taiwan’s defense minister has said that although there has been a noticeable decrease in aircraft nearing or crossing the ADIZ, the island nation’s military planned to stay on guard.

“We cannot rely on a single indicator like the absence of aircraft,” Koo told The Journal, because naval vessels still circle the island daily.

Analysts have suggested that the decrease in incursions is timed to a meeting of the Chinese legislature, which has happened previously, or be part of a diplomatic or strategic play before U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet in Beijing at the end of the month.

WASHINGTON — The Trump administration is stepping up its ambitious effort to replace about $1.6 trillion in lost tariff revenue that was eliminated by the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a range of the president’s import taxes.

Recovering that lost revenue, which the White House was counting on to help offset the steep, multitrillion-dollar cost of its tax cuts, is possible but will be challenging, experts say. The administration has to use different legal provisions to impose new import taxes, and those provisions require longer, complex processes that U.S. companies can use to seek exemptions. It could be months or more before it is clear how much revenue the replacement tariffs will yield.

“I wouldn’t bet against this administration being able to get back on paper the same effective tariff rate they had before,” said Elena Patel, co-director of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center. But the new approach will “make it easier for people to contest the tariffs, which is going to put a big asterisk on the revenue until all that is settled.”

On Wednesday, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said the administration will investigate 16 economies — including the European Union — over whether their governments are subsidizing excessive factory capacity in a way that disadvantages U.S. manufacturing. The investigation will also cover China, South Korea and Japan, Greer said.

In addition, he said, there would be a second investigation of dozens of countries to see whether their failure to ban goods made by forced labor amounts to an unfair trade practice that harms the United States. That investigation will also cover the EU and China, as well as Mexico, Canada, Australia and Brazil.

Both investigations are being conducted under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which requires the administration to consult with the targeted countries, as well as hold public hearings and allow affected U.S. industries to comment. A hearing as part of the factory capacity investigation will be held May 5, while a hearing on the forced labor investigation will occur April 28.

It’s a far cry from the emergency law that President Trump relied on in his first year in office, which allowed him to immediately impose tariffs on any country, at nearly any level, simply by issuing an executive order.

Moments after the Supreme Court’s ruling, Trump imposed a 10% tariff on all imports under a separate legal authority, but that duty can only last for 150 days. The president has said he would raise it to 15%, the maximum allowed, but has yet to do so. Some two dozen states have already challenged the new taxes. The administration is aiming to complete its Section 301 investigations before the 10% duties expire.

The effort underscores the importance that the Trump White House has placed on tariffs as a revenue-raiser at a time when the federal government is facing huge annual budget deficits for decades into the future. Previous administrations, by contrast, used tariffs more sparingly to narrowly protect specific industries.

Erica York, vice president of federal tax policy at the Tax Foundation, noted that the first investigation covers roughly 70% of imports, while the second would cover nearly all of them.

“That breadth suggests the goal isn’t to address the issues at hand, but instead to re-create a sweeping tariff tool,” she said.

Trump portrays tariffs as a way to force foreign countries to essentially help pay the cost of U.S. government services, even though all recent economic studies find that American companies and consumers are paying the duties, including analyses by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and economists at Harvard University. In his State of the Union address last month, Trump even touted his tariffs as a potential replacement for the income tax, which would return the United States’ tax regime to the late 19th century.

Trump also wants tariffs to help pay for the tax cuts he extended in key legislation last year. The tax cut legislation is expected, according to the most recent estimates by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, to add $4.7 trillion to the national debt over a decade, while all Trump’s import taxes, including ones not struck down by the court, were projected to offset about $3 trillion — or two-thirds of that cost.

The high court’s ruling Feb. 20 that he could no longer impose emergency tariffs eliminated about $1.6 trillion in expected revenue over the next decade, according to the CBO.

Some of Trump’s import taxes remain place, including previous tariffs on China and Canada that were imposed after earlier 301 investigations. The administration has also imposed tariffs on some specific products, including steel, lumber and cars. Those, combined with the 10% tariff for part of this year, should yield about $668 billion over the next decade, the Tax Foundation estimates.

“It’s going to take a really big patchwork of these other investigations to make up for the [lost] tariffs,” York said.

The administration’s efforts are also unusual because they reflect an overreliance on tariffs to bring in more government revenue. Trump has also said the import taxes are intended to return manufacturing to the United States — manufacturing jobs, however, are down since he returned to office — and he has used the tariffs to leverage trade deals.

“What makes this really different,” said Kent Smetters, executive director of the Penn Wharton Budget Model, “it is really the first time tariffs have been mainly used as a revenue raiser.”

Patel, meanwhile, argues that raising revenue can be done more reliably and straightforwardly by Congress. Laws like Section 301 are traditionally intended to be used to address specific trade policy concerns in particular countries.

“It’s not supposed to be there to raise revenue,” she said. “If we want to raise revenue through tariffs, then Congress should impose a broad based tariff.”

Rugaber writes for the Associated Press.

The 19-year-old converts his pole position into a historic win to consolidate Mercedes’s hold early in the F1 season.

An emotional Kimi Antonelli has won a Formula One grand prix for the first time in China ahead of Mercedes teammate George Russell and Lewis Hamilton, who made his maiden podium for Ferrari.

The 19-year-old Antonelli converted being the youngest pole-sitter in Formula One history into victory on Sunday after both McLarens dramatically failed to start the Shanghai race.

“Thank you, everyone. Thank you so much. You made me achieve one of my dreams,” Antonelli said over the radio after taking the chequered flag.

“I’m speechless. I’m about to cry to be honest,” he said in his first interview as a winner in ⁠front of the Shanghai circuit crowd before doing just that.

It was ⁠a nervous finish for the Italian, who locked up and went wide with three laps to go, cutting his lead over Russell to 7.4 seconds and finishing 5.515 clear.

It was Mercedes’s second successive one-two after Russell led Antonelli in the Australian opener last weekend.

“I gave myself a little bit of a heart attack ⁠towards the end with the flat spot [on his tyres],” ⁠said the first Italian winner since Giancarlo Fisichella for Renault in Malaysia in 2006. “It was a good race.”

Formula One Chief Executive Stefano Domenicali, also Italian, congratulated Antonelli before the podium celebrations and the playing of the Italian ‌national anthem.

Antonelli briefly lost the lead at the start, but once he got back in front, the teenager controlled the pace to cruise home to the chequered flag. Charles Leclerc was fourth in the second Ferrari.

Hamilton, as he had done in Saturday’s sprint, got a great start and had taken the lead by the time the teams emerged from the first complex of turns.

Leclerc also launched brilliantly and managed to get past Russell, who started second on the grid.

The top four swapped places multiple times before a safety car on lap 11 brought them all into the pits.

Once the dust settled and they were racing again, Antonelli led Hamilton with Leclerc third and Russell fourth.

By lap 29, Russell had got past both Ferraris and up to second and set off trying to catch his young teammate, who was by that time more than seven seconds up the road.

Four-time world champion Max Verstappen continued Red Bull’s poor start to the new season when he was told to retire his car on lap 46.

McLaren’s reigning world champion, Lando Norris, and teammate Oscar Piastri both failed to start due to problems with their cars.

Oliver Bearman was fifth for Haas ahead of Alpine’s Pierre Gasly and Racing Bulls’ Liam Lawson.

Isack Hadjar took eighth for Red Bull after teammate Verstappen retired. Carlos Sainz was ninth for Williams, and Franco Colapinto was finally back in the points for Alpine in 10th after failing to score last year.

Contradicting his secretary of State and other top officials, President Trump on Saturday suggested without evidence that China — not Russia — may be behind the cyberattack against the United States and tried to downplay its impact.

In his first comments on the breach, Trump scoffed at the focus on the Kremlin and minimized the intrusions, which the nation’s cybersecurity agency has warned posed a “grave” risk to government and private networks.

“The Cyber Hack is far greater in the Fake News Media than in actuality. I have been fully briefed and everything is well under control,” Trump tweeted. He also claimed the media are “petrified” of “discussing the possibility that it may be China (it may!).”

There is no evidence to suggest that is the case. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo said late Friday that Russia was “pretty clearly” behind the attack.

“This was a very significant effort and I think it’s the case that now we can say pretty clearly that it was the Russians that engaged in this activity,” he said in the interview with radio talk show host Mark Levin.

Officials at the White House had been prepared to put out a statement Friday afternoon that accused Russia of being “the main actor” in the hack, but were told at the last minute to stand down, according to one U.S. official familiar with the conversations who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss private deliberations.

It is not clear whether Pompeo got that message before his interview, but officials are now scrambling to figure out how to square the disparate accounts. The White House did not immediately respond to questions about the statement or the basis of Trump’s claims.

Throughout his presidency, Trump has refused to blame Russia for well-documented hostilities, including its interference in the 2016 election to help him get elected. He blamed his predecessor, Barack Obama, for Russia’s annexation of Crimea, has endorsed allowing Russia to return to the Group of 7 of nations and has never taken the country to task for allegedly putting bounties on U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.

Pompeo in the interview said the government was still “unpacking” the cyberattack and some of the details would likely remain classified.

“But suffice it to say there was a significant effort to use a piece of third-party software to essentially embed code inside of U.S. government systems and it now appears systems of private companies and companies and governments across the world as well,” he said.

Though Pompeo was the first Trump administration official to publicly blame Russia for the attacks, cybersecurity experts and other U.S. officials have been clear over the past week that the operation appears to be the work of Russia. There has been no credible suggestion that any other country — including China — is responsible.

Democrats in Congress who have received classified briefings have also affirmed publicly that Russia, which in 2014 hacked the State Department and interfered through hacking in the 2016 presidential election, was behind it.

It’s not clear exactly what the hackers were seeking, but experts say it could include nuclear secrets, blueprints for advanced weaponry, COVID-19 vaccine-related research and information for dossiers on government and industry leaders.

Russia has said it had “nothing to do” with the hacking.

While Trump downplayed the impact of the hacks, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has said it compromised federal agencies as well as “critical infrastructure.” Homeland Security, the agency’s parent department, defines such infrastructure as any “vital” assets to the U.S. or its economy, a broad category that could include power plants and financial institutions.

One U.S. official, speaking Thursday on condition of anonymity, described the hack as severe and extremely damaging.

“This is looking like it’s the worst hacking case in the history of America,” the official said. “They got into everything.”

Trump had been silent on the attacks before Saturday.

Deputy White House Press Secretary Brian Morgenstern told reporters Friday that national security advisor Robert O’Brien has sometimes been leading multiple daily meetings with the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence agencies, looking for ways to mitigate the hack.

He would not provide details, “but rest assured we have the best and brightest working hard on it each and every single day.”

The Democratic leaders of four House committees given classified briefings by the administration issued a statement complaining that they “were left with more questions than answers.”

“Administration officials were unwilling to share the full scope of the breach and identities of the victims,” they said.

Pompeo, in the interview with Levin, said Russia was on the list of “folks that want to undermine our way of life, our republic, our basic democratic principles. … You see the news of the day with respect to their efforts in the cyberspace. We’ve seen this for an awfully long time, using asymmetric capabilities to try and put themselves in a place where they can impose costs on the United States.”

What makes this hacking campaign so extraordinary is its scale: 18,000 organizations were infected from March to June by malicious code that piggybacked on popular network-management software from an Austin, Texas, company, SolarWinds.

It’s going to take months to kick elite hackers out of the U.S. government networks they have been quietly rifling through since as far back as March.

Experts say there simply are not enough skilled threat-hunting teams to identify all the government and private-sector systems that may have been hacked. FireEye, the cybersecurity company that discovered the intrusion and was among the victims, has already tallied dozens of casualties. It’s racing to identify more.

Many federal workers — and others in the private sector — must presume that unclassified networks are teeming with spies. Agencies will be more inclined to conduct sensitive government business on Signal, WhatsApp and other encrypted smartphone apps.

“We should buckle up. This will be a long ride,” said Dmitri Alperovitch, co-founder and former chief technical officer of the leading cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike. “Cleanup is just Phase 1.”

Florida became the first state to acknowledge falling victim to a SolarWinds hack. Officials told the Associated Press that hackers apparently infiltrated the state’s healthcare administration agency and others.

SolarWinds’ customers include most Fortune 500 companies, and its U.S. government clients are rich with generals and spymasters.

If the hackers are indeed from Russia’s SVR foreign intelligence agency, as experts believe, their resistance may be tenacious. When they hacked the White House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department in 2014 and 2015 “it was a nightmare to get them out,” Alperovitch said.

The Pentagon has said it has so far not detected any intrusions from the SolarWinds campaign in any of its networks — classified or unclassified.

Italian teenager breaks an 18-year-old record in China to become the youngest pole sitter in Formula One history.

Italian ⁠teenager Kimi Antonelli said it was “just the beginning” after he set a pole record in China with Mercedes predecessor and seven-times world champion ⁠Lewis Hamilton lavishing praise on him.

At 19 years, six months and 17 days Antonelli became the youngest Formula One driver ever to take pole position for a full Grand Prix on Saturday.

“A great record. ⁠It’s going to take a while for someone to ever get close to that one,” Ferrari driver Hamilton, whose seat Antonelli took in 2025, told a news conference after qualifying third.

The previous record was set by now-retired German driver Sebastian Vettel when he put Red Bull-owned Toro Rosso (now Racing Bulls) on ‌pole at the age of 21 and 72 days at the 2008 Italian Grand Prix.

Big question marks hung over Antonelli when he arrived at Mercedes as a rookie alongside George Russell, the current championship leader, after Hamilton shocked the sport by moving to rivals Ferrari.

Pundits questioned whether the then-18-year-old could live up to Hamilton’s legacy, even as Mercedes team boss Toto Wolff consistently touted the Italian as a top-tier talent.

“He took my seat! And he hit ⁠it hard from the get-go, so it’s really great to see him ⁠progressing and he really deserves it,” a beaming Hamilton said while sat next to Antonelli.

The Italian was his country’s first pole sitter since Giancarlo Fisichella for Mercedes-powered Force India, the team that is now Aston Martin, in Belgium in 2009.

“I’m ⁠very happy because at the end, you know, it’s just the beginning,” said Antonelli, who had a sprint pole in Miami last year but ⁠has yet to win a race.

“Obviously there’s a lot more ⁠to come. And, yeah, really looking forward to tomorrow … the car is feeling really good, the car is strong so, yeah, a lot to play for tomorrow.”

Antonelli was helped by Russell having no battery and getting stuck in gear at ‌the start of the final phase and then getting only one flying lap for pole, which he converted into second place on the grid.

“Many said the kid was too young to be ‌in ‌a Mercedes, we should have prepared him otherwise. He did good today,” said Mercedes team boss Toto Wolff.

“It’s a shame that George couldn’t do the lap.”

Former champion Max Verstappen was only eighth fastest, continuing an unhappy weekend in a clearly struggling Red Bull.

Sunday’s Grand Prix will be raced over 56 laps of the 5.451km (3.387-mile) Shanghai International Circuit.

North Korea and China resumed an international passenger train service linking their capitals Thursday for the first time in six years, with a train spotted crossing the border bridge between the two countries.

A nine-car train traveling from Pyongyang to Beijing was seen by Yonhap News Agency passing over the Amnok River bridge, also known as the Yalu River bridge, connecting North Korea’s Sinuiju and China’s Dandong, at around 4:23 p.m.

Some train cars had closed curtains, while passengers were visible in others.

According to China’s Xinhua News Agency, a five-car passenger train departed from the Chinese border city of Dandong at 10 a.m. and was scheduled to arrive in Pyongyang at 6:07 p.m.

The Dandong-Pyongyang passenger line will operate daily in both directions, Xinhua said, quoting a Chinese official as saying the service will serve as a “dynamic link strengthening the friendship between these two nations.”

Also on Thursday, North Korea and China were set to resume a rail route connecting their capitals, Pyongyang and Beijing.

The resumption marks the first cross-border passenger train service between the two countries since operations were suspended in 2020 following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Last year, North Korea resumed direct flight and train services between Pyongyang and Moscow, Russia’s capital.

The reopening of the North Korea-China rail services comes as the two countries appear to be aligning more closely as they seek to repair relations frayed by Pyongyang’s military cooperation with Russia, amid speculation that the United States may seek to reengage Pyongyang for talks.

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The National People’s Congress signals firm stance against corruption as China’s 15th five-year plan is approved.

China’s annual legislative meeting is wrapping up after setting the country’s lowest economic growth target in nearly 30 years, excluding during the COVID-19 global pandemic.

Nearly 3,000 delegates participating in the National People’s Congress (NPC) were due on Thursday to formally approve an economic growth target of “4.5 to 5 percent”, as set out in China’s latest five-year plan.

The 15th iteration of the five-year plan, an economic roadmap for 2026 to 2030, also set targets for inflation, the fiscal deficit ratio and urban unemployment.

China has set the longterm goal of becoming a “moderately developed” country by 2035 and raising gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to $20,000. The figure was $13,303 in 2024, according to the World Bank.

Planners in Beijing also continue to grapple with deep economic problems driven by the collapse of the property sector, low consumer confidence and a prolonged period of deflation.

China’s targets for the next five years include industrial self-reliance and increased state support for industries such as AI, aerospace, aviation, biomedicine and integrated circuits, as well as the development of “future energy, quantum technology, embodied artificial intelligence, brain-computer interfaces, and 6G technology”, according to China’s state-run Xinhua news agency.

Beijing also aims to expand the use of the digital yuan, known as the e-CNY, to improve cross-border payments, according to the Reuters news agency. The digital currency is currently under development by the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central bank.

Among the most closely watched elements of the NPC over the past week has been the release of government “work reports” from China’s many government ministries, which give insight into China’s progress in meeting its goals and the direction of its future policy.

The NPC’s Standing Committee released a work report indicating that China will soon pass a law on combatting cross-border corruption, Xinhua said.

The measure is seen as an extension of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s long-running anticorruption drive across the Chinese state, military and private sector.

The campaign appears to be gaining momentum as the Supreme People’s Court, China’s highest court, reported a 22.4 percent increase in corruption cases last year involving 36,000 individuals, according to Xinhua.

The state also recovered 18.14 billion yuan ($2.63bn) as part of its anticorruption crackdown in 2025, Xinhua said.

China’s military also identified combatting corruption as an important target in its annual work report, as well as ensuring political loyalty to Xi and the Chinese Communist Party.

The NPC typically runs for a week, and it is held alongside the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a political advisory body.

The meetings are known as the “Two Sessions”, and they bring thousands of delegates to Beijing to approve short- and mid-term policy measures.

Middle Eastern crises seldom stay localized. They frequently go well beyond the battlefield in terms of politics, strategy, and psychology. Officials in Beijing, Moscow, Taipei, and Kyiv will be keeping a tight eye on events surrounding Iran today, in addition to those in Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv. Power perceptions are shaped by situations like this, and in international politics, perception can be almost as important as actual power.

The current state of affairs presents an unsettling question for China and Russia. A large-scale military operation against a prominent regional actor will unavoidably send signals about the balance of power in the international system if it continues without significant opposition from other big states. The Middle East is not where those signals will end. They will visit other geopolitical hotspots, like Taiwan and Ukraine, where credibility is crucial to deterrence.

Iran has progressively evolved into more than simply another diplomatic friend in Beijing’s eyes. It now plays a part in China’s larger Eurasian economic and strategic strategy. Beijing has been building energy and transportation networks that connect western China to the Arabian Sea through projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Chinese planners considering long-term energy security have taken note of the geographical proximity of the Pakistani port of Gwadar to Iran’s Jask Oil Terminal.

Beijing has long sought variety, which these lines provide. Chinese strategists have been concerned about dependence on maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca for decades. The energy lifelines of the second-largest economy in the world could be threatened by any interruption there. Iran fits into China’s attempt to lessen that vulnerability because of its location and resources. Trade in energy has already strengthened ties between the two nations. Iran has quietly emerged as a major supplier of cheap crude to China in spite of U.S. sanctions. Both nations are able to avoid some aspects of the Western financial architecture since many of those transactions go through China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System and are settled in renminbi.

However, the partnership has grown beyond oil. Beijing and Tehran signed a long-term strategic agreement in 2021 with the goal of working together on infrastructure, energy, and technology for decades. Later, China backed Iran’s admission to groups like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Then came a diplomatic surprise: Beijing assisted in mediating the reestablishment of ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, a development that surprised many Western observers.

Taken together, these actions indicated a significant development. China was starting to portray itself not only as a regional economic force but also as a diplomatic player with the ability to influence its political environment.

That ambition makes the current moment particularly sensitive for Beijing. Governments in the Middle East and a large portion of the Global South frequently evaluate great powers based on their actions during times of crisis rather than their words during times of peace. Some capitals may discreetly reevaluate how reliable such support would be in an actual security crisis if China seems unwilling to protect the strategic environment surrounding its alliances.

The ramifications go well beyond Iran. Chinese officials have made it clear time and time again that they would not support Taiwan’s formal independence efforts and will not allow outside meddling in the Taiwan Strait. The legitimacy of those warnings is just as important to deterrence as military prowess. Some Washington policymakers may assume that China is unlikely to take more aggressive action in other areas if Beijing’s response to significant geopolitical shocks involving its partners primarily consists of diplomatic criticism.

Russia faces a different—but no less consequential—set of calculations. Moscow has positioned itself as a major Middle Eastern political mediator for the majority of the last ten years through its military engagement in Syria. Russian soldiers established a key base on the Mediterranean coast and assisted in stabilizing Bashar al-Assad’s regime starting in 2015. From such a vantage point, Moscow participated in almost all meaningful discussions regarding the future of the area.

However, that impact has been diminished. The political landscape has drastically changed as a result of the fall of the Syrian government and the growing power of actors supported by the West in Damascus. In addition to losing a strategic ally, Russia has also lost a significant portion of the regional clout it developed over the course of almost 10 years of diplomatic and military engagement.

In that context, Iran now occupies a far more important place in Moscow’s strategic thinking than it once did. Defense and energy cooperation are two areas where the two nations’ relationship has grown. Iranian drones have contributed to Russia’s military actions in Ukraine, establishing a clear connection between the conflict in Eastern Europe and events in the Middle East. The message would reverberate much beyond the immediate battlefield if Iran were to sustain a significant military defeat at the hands of a concerted operation by the United States and Israel. While opposing major powers stayed mostly on the sidelines, observers from all around the world would see that Washington still had the capability to change regional dynamics.

These impressions build up in geopolitics. Credibility develops gradually, frequently over years, but it can deteriorate rapidly. Some governments may start to doubt the geopolitical benefit of aligning with Moscow if Russia seems incapable—or unwilling—to react when a close ally is under severe strain. However, competing nations might feel more confident to test Russian interests in other disputed areas, such as the Black Sea or Ukraine. However, Moscow’s choices are far from straightforward. In order to lessen the impact of Western sanctions, Russia has been fostering stronger commercial connections with a number of Gulf governments in recent years. Openly supporting Iran might make those relations more difficult. But staying completely silent runs the danger of conveying a contrary message: that when tensions rise, Russian alliances provide little strategic defense.

It seems unlikely that either China or Russia will move quickly to engage in direct combat. There would be significant risks of escalation. However, great-power competition seldom relies solely on choices made on the battlefield. There are plenty of other ways to be influential. Both nations have permanent seats in the UN Security Council. They can guarantee that any military action is politically disputed on the international scene by imposing debates, contesting legal justifications, and introducing resolutions, even symbolic ones. Beyond the Security Council, diplomacy is also important. Sovereignty and non-intervention have long been valued in nations like South Africa, Brazil, and India. Even if it doesn’t instantly change the situation on the ground, coordinated pressure from a larger group of states could influence how the issue is portrayed worldwide.

Another option is economic levers. The energy markets continue to be extremely vulnerable to geopolitical shocks. Major exporters continue to have the power to affect supply and pricing decisions by working with producers in organizations like OPEC+. Even little changes can serve as a reminder to the globe that regional conflicts have far-reaching economic repercussions. Great powers are also capable of sending quieter signals. Regional balances are not changing in isolation, as seen by intelligence collaboration, defensive technology transfers, and conspicuous naval deployments in nearby waterways. These actions convey that other important actors are keeping a close eye on them even while they avoid open confrontation.

Ultimately, this moment’s significance goes well beyond Iran. Expectations about how power functions in the international system are gradually shaped by incidents such as these. The precedent starts to take hold if armed action consistently reshapes regional orders without significant opposition from opposing nations. That precedent unavoidably affects Taiwan’s future for China. For Russia, it relates to both the larger security balance throughout Europe and the continuing conflict in Ukraine. Credibility is crucial in both situations.

Moments like this become inevitable tests if Beijing and Moscow want to maintain an international system where power is more widely spread. It is not always necessary to escalate conflict in order to respond. It often involves proving that significant changes in regional power will not happen completely unchallenged through diplomacy, economic pressure, and strategic signaling. There is meaning in silence as well. In places far from the Persian Gulf, how Tehran interprets that silence now could influence strategic decisions tomorrow.