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On September 12, 2026, United States President Donald Trump stood in Dublin alongside Irish Prime Minister Micheal Martin and said in a cool tone that the Houthis “called us, and they don’t want to fight us”, adding that the group was “allowing ships to pass” and that the situation would “work out very well”.

His remarks came just as Houthi forces had completed their takeover of the coastal town of Dhubab and Perim (Mayyun) Island, which divides the Bab al-Mandeb strait into two shipping channels, after seizing the strategic port of Mocha. This gave them a direct presence at the entrance to one of the world’s most important waterways.

Trump was speaking against the backdrop of a Houthi announcement that they would blockade Saudi oil supplies to Asia and Saudi commercial shipping, signalling the collapse of the traditional “security-for-oil” formula.

What is happening at Bab al-Mandeb is not an isolated event, but the latest in a long series of US retreats from security commitments that for decades underpinned the “security-for-oil” relationship between Washington and the Gulf states.

This is not a passing political position, but a profound shift in the regional security landscape: the United States is choosing not to intervene militarily against an armed group designated as terrorist that controls one of the world’s most important straits and whose actions go beyond the logic of conventional deterrence.

Trump’s remarks: Substance and strategic context

In Dublin, Trump said the Houthis had contacted the US administration seeking to avoid confrontation with Washington. He said they were “allowing most ships to pass” and that the problem was limited to “one country”, which he did not name – an apparent reference to Saudi Arabia – promising to “take care of fixing that”.

He also said the United States had “tight control” over the Strait of Hormuz and that about 25 ships were passing through it each day on average, despite maritime sources denying this.

On the ground, Trump’s remarks suggested that the Houthis remain wary of US military force and American deterrence, which has already put considerable pressure on their regional backer, Iran. They were therefore prepared to bargain, just as they accepted US conditions in 2025.

At the same time, Trump’s directives – as relayed by US military and civilian officials – revealed a clear hierarchy of priorities: Iran as the principal threat, securing the Strait of Hormuz as the vital artery for oil and gas flows, and avoiding another military front in Yemen.

This reflects a narrow strategic logic. From Washington’s perspective, Bab al-Mandeb is less vital to American oil interests than to flows towards China and other Asian markets that compete with the US economy. And because Trump believes the Houthis “are not targeting American ships”, direct intervention would, in his view, place an unjustified additional burden on US forces already exhausted by the Iranian front.

Trump’s position also cannot be separated from domestic politics. The US-Iran war has eroded his political support after he promised to keep the United States out of Middle Eastern wars.

According to The Los Angeles Times, Trump told Fox News that he “might not do it because of the elections”, referring to avoiding further military escalation before the congressional elections. Opening a new front in Yemen could further complicate matters for Republicans in closely contested House and Senate races.

Meanwhile, Saudi circles denied an Axios report claiming that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had called Trump twice on the eve of the Houthi takeover of the coast on September 10, urging him to strike the Houthis, and that Trump had refused.

The sources pointed to Axios’s own July 29 report on Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman’s visit to Washington, which said he had told the US vice president that the kingdom could manage the confrontation with the Houthis itself and did not need US military intervention. They regarded the two accounts as contradictions in the reporting of Axios’s Barak Ravid.

Observers in Riyadh see the restrained US position as part of a broader policy: the administration currently has no intention of taking direct military action against the Houthis. At the same time, Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command, travelled to Riyadh for urgent coordination talks with Prince Mohammed, indicating that Washington is seeking to “intensify its support” for Saudi Arabia while avoiding direct military involvement – a formula well understood in Riyadh.

Trump sought to reassure Saudi concerns by describing the crown prince as a “good friend” and promising that “everything will work out very well”. But he offered no specific military commitment, and the White House announced no explicit guarantees to protect Saudi energy infrastructure or maritime routes.

This reluctance also follows a series of US decisions that have demonstrated a growing retreat from its security commitments in the Gulf. During his first term, Trump did not respond to the 2019 Aramco attack, for which the Houthis claimed responsibility but which was believed to have originated from Iraqi factions to the north. The attack temporarily knocked out half of Saudi oil supplies.

In February 2026, the United States joined Israel in attacking Iran without consulting its Gulf allies and has since faced growing difficulties defending them against Iranian attacks. US forces are now heavily preoccupied around the Strait of Hormuz, limiting their ability to respond to another front in Yemen.

Paradoxically, Washington, now bogged down in Hormuz, appears to need Saudi help in containing Iranian disruption at Bab al-Mandeb, rather than the other way round.

Since the war began on February 28, Riyadh has resisted all US pressure to become involved in a confrontation with Iran for two reasons. First, it believes such pressure carries an implicit aim of portraying the Saudi front as part of the Israeli front. Second, it was not consulted over the launch of the war and is not prepared to be worn down in a conflict serving Israeli objectives.

The erosion of the US umbrella and the fate of the ‘security-for-oil’ formula

Since the 1970s, the US-Gulf relationship has rested on a clear but implicit bargain: the United States provides a security umbrella protecting the Gulf states and energy routes, while the Gulf states ensure a steady flow of oil to the global economy at reasonable prices.

This was more than a bilateral understanding between Riyadh and Washington. Gulf security meant oil security, and oil security meant the security of the Western economy, making the bargain a pillar of the international energy system for decades.

Today, there are mounting signs that this formula is beginning to collapse.

First, strategic abandonment: Trump’s refusal to defend Bab al-Mandeb, and his response to the Houthis’ request that the US stay out of the conflict in return for allowing American ships to pass – effectively a political deal – marks a watershed. For the first time, the United States is clearly hesitating to defend energy security and a pivotal ally against a direct threat to global energy infrastructure. This is not temporary hesitation, but a redefinition of the US commitment.

Second, the redirection of priorities: Washington’s focus on the Strait of Hormuz and avoidance of a front in Yemen point to a new approach: not a comprehensive security umbrella, but selective protection of direct US interests. Hormuz matters because it carries Gulf oil to markets on which the US economy depends, while Bab al-Mandeb – from Trump’s perspective – primarily serves exports to China and Asia, interests Washington does not consider worth further military investment.

Third, military exhaustion: the US military is exhausted by the war with Iran and its stocks of advanced interceptor missiles have been depleted. This is structural rather than temporary, reflecting a growing inability to manage multiple fronts.

Fourth, domestic politics: the erosion of Trump’s political support because of the Iran war makes further military expansion politically costly. What was once a guarantee of Gulf security – US power – has become hostage to domestic electoral calculations.

Does this mean the end of the “security-for-oil” formula? Not necessarily. But it does point to a fundamental shift from a bilateral US-Gulf arrangement to a more complex, multilateral one.

The US umbrella has not disappeared, but it has contracted. The United States still maintains forces in the region and remains focused on the Strait of Hormuz, but its commitment is no longer comprehensive or unconditional.

Saudi strategic hedging

For years, Riyadh has been pursuing alternatives through strategic hedging. Its announcement of a 14-state multinational defensive maritime alliance – including Turkiye, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan and Djibouti – is an attempt to fill the US security vacuum, while US or European naval forces are also deployed around the strait as part of similar Western coalitions.

Saudi Arabia is also strengthening its air and missile defences, developing its naval capabilities and deepening defence ties with countries including Turkiye and Pakistan. These efforts have included the “Strategic Mutual Defence Alliance” with Pakistan and the Mecca alliance with Turkiye and Pakistan in August 2026.

What we are witnessing is not the end of the US umbrella, but its shift from a “comprehensive guarantee” to “conditional and limited support”, forcing Gulf states to rethink their collective security.

The Saudi position on industrialised countries’ disregard for supply security

Saudi Arabia now faces one of its most serious security challenges: the Houthis control Bab al-Mandeb, are choking Saudi trade and have already launched drone and missile attacks towards Saudi territory.

Saudi oil exports to Asia fell from around 3.4 million barrels a day in June to just 128,000 in August, before partially recovering to 700,000 this month. Oil prices have meanwhile exceeded $107 a barrel, while the price of a gallon of petrol in the United States has risen by 35 percent.

The real danger is the simultaneous disruption of two maritime chokepoints: Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of global oil and gas supplies pass, is almost closed because of the US-Iran war, while Bab al-Mandeb, which accounts for 10-12 percent of global oil, is under Houthi control. Closing both could block about a quarter of global supplies.

Even without complete closure, the continuing threat creates a permanent “risk premium” on prices, according to economic analysts. Although Saudi Arabia benefits in the short term from higher prices, it is strategically harmed by instability because Vision 2030 depends on foreign investment, tourism and stability, not temporary wartime oil revenues.

Riyadh has long played a leading role in stabilising oil markets, frequently using its position as a swing producer to limit volatility. But amid the indifference of industrialised countries to supply security and the threats facing energy sources and routes, Saudi Arabia cannot put aside the dangers to its own security, sovereignty and people for countries that disregard the geopolitics of energy.

For this reason, Saudi Arabia has previously declared that it “will not bear responsibility for any disruptions or shortages in global oil supplies” resulting from Houthi attacks on its oil facilities.

This is more than a warning. It redefines the implicit social contract with its allies: Saudi Arabia is no longer prepared to act as guarantor of last resort for global energy security without something in return.

Its message is that the international community – particularly the major industrialised countries that benefit from oil flows – must share responsibility for protecting maritime routes, rather than leaving Riyadh to bear the cost alone.

‘Collective responsibility’ as a new security doctrine

The Saudi Ministry of Defence reinforced this approach in its statement on the proposed maritime alliance, stressing that “the security of international maritime routes is a collective responsibility that requires effective and sustainable international partnership”.

This is more than a diplomatic appeal. It amounts to a reformulation of the regional security contract: Saudi Arabia is not asking industrialised countries to defend Saudi interests, but to help protect their own interest in the continued flow of oil on which their economies depend.

In July 2026, Saudi Arabia announced a “Multinational Defensive Maritime Alliance” of 14 founding states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkiye, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia.

At least 43 countries and organisations attended the founding meeting in Riyadh. The alliance may mark an important turning point, reflecting an implicit Saudi acknowledgement that the US umbrella is no longer sufficient and that Riyadh must build its own security capabilities with regional allies.

US exposure: A deeper strategic reading

Trump’s statements downplaying the Houthi takeover of Bab al-Mandeb and his refusal to intervene reflect not only a political decision, but a structural weakness in US deterrence.

The United States is unable to manage multiple fronts. Its concentration around the Strait of Hormuz limits its ability to respond in Yemen; fighting has depleted stocks of advanced interceptor missiles; and the unpopularity of the war and approaching congressional elections constrain its freedom of action.

From the perspective of countries in the region, the US military presence in the Gulf is no longer an unconditional security guarantee. The question of whether allies could be abandoned again is pushing decision-makers from Riyadh to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Doha to diversify their security and defence partnerships.

That means deeper defence ties with Turkiye and Pakistan, stronger air and missile defences and naval capabilities, maintaining open channels and seeking risk-reducing understandings with regional powers including Iran, and multinational maritime alliances to protect navigation.

But these alternatives have limits. Can any regional alliance fully compensate for the absence of a major power such as the United States when confronting threats on the scale of Iran and its proxies? US intelligence, logistical and interception capabilities have no regional equivalent, leaving a security gap that cannot quickly be filled.

The new regional order: Towards multipolarity

What we are witnessing is not merely a passing security crisis, but the emergence of a new regional order marked by the decline of unilateral US dominance. The United States is no longer the sole security power in the Gulf, as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkiye and Iran gain weight and Gulf states diversify their partnerships and seek more collective regional security arrangements.

Trump’s response to the Houthi takeover of Bab al-Mandeb is therefore not simply a political position, but a sign of a tectonic shift in the regional security order. The “security-for-oil” formula that governed US-Gulf relations for decades has not formally ended, but it no longer provides the guarantees on which it was built. The US security umbrella remains, but it has become selective, conditional and subject to domestic US calculations unrelated to the interests of the Gulf states.

Saudi Arabia, caught between the hammer of the Houthis at Bab al-Mandeb and the anvil of Iran at the Strait of Hormuz, is pursuing a different approach: insisting that protection of maritime routes become a “collective responsibility” and that it should no longer bear alone the cost of protecting the interests of industrialised countries dependent on its oil.

This position – backed by the announcement of a multinational maritime alliance – marks the beginning of a redefinition of the regional security contract, although significant questions remain over whether ambition can be translated into capability.

Oil prices above $107 a barrel may be only an early sign of what lies ahead. If US exposure continues and regional understandings guaranteeing freedom of navigation remain out of reach, the world could face an energy crisis comparable to those of the 1970s, but without a US security umbrella ready to contain it.

Bab al-Mandeb is therefore more than a maritime strait. It reflects the end of one era and the beginning of another, in which Gulf security is no longer an American gift but a collective responsibility still searching for new arrangements.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, appears to favour a combination of deterrence and avoiding all-out war. Rather than sliding into open-ended attrition, it seeks to support national allies on the ground, enable the Yemeni state to restore its sovereignty, contain the logic of the militia and build a national doctrine that limits external penetration.

Yemen’s stability is no longer a purely Yemeni matter, but a first line of defence for the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb and for the cohesion of the Arab sphere, with Riyadh and Cairo remaining central pillars in confronting projects of disintegration and fragmentation.

Within this emerging order, the Saudi-Egyptian partnership is becoming a cornerstone of regional security. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s expected visit to Cairo and summit with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi give practical expression to the principle of “collective responsibility”.

Riyadh and Cairo recognise that the security of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb is not a local matter: it is vital to the Suez Canal and Egyptian economy, and forms strategic and security depth for Saudi Arabia.

By coordinating diplomatic and military action, supporting the full liberation of Yemen and containing the reach of the militias, the two countries are helping shape an autonomous regional security order intended to fill the vacuums left by retreating international powers, protect international navigation and confront shared threats from a position of parity and capacity.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

MEXICO CITY — He’s been called the “MAGA man” of Latin America, a brash political provocateur whose social media assaults boosted right-wing campaigns from his native Argentina to Central America.

His career as political consultant and co-founder of an ultra-right online outlet made him a rich man and helped elect Trump-aligned politicians across the region. The Economist gave him the “MAGA Man” label, while political commentators gave him another nickname — the “Steve Bannon of Latin America” — a nod to the longtime Trump ally and advisor.

Now, however, Fernando Cerimedo, 45, sits in a maximum-security prison in Bolivia, accused of masterminding a murder-for-hire plot: The attempted femicide of his pregnant mistress, Nadia Beller, 33, a Bolivian lawyer and activist.

It’s a stunning collapse for a onetime ad man with a dodgy reputation who rose to become the go-to digital campaign guru for Latin America’s ascendant right wing. Cerimedo’s signature boasts, exaggerations and peddling of false election-fraud narratives reflected those of his political model, President Trump.

Cerimedo also is another example of how right-wing political operatives outside the United States — as recently in Colombia and Germany — have adopted Trumpian tactics and messaging.

The fall of the “King Midas of the Latin American right,” said Daniel Matamala, a prominent Chilean journalist, stunned “the ecosystem of fake news, bots, trolls and disinformation that has taken this region by storm in recent years.” Speaking on his podcast, Matamala added, “The name of Cerimedo looms like a ghost over the summit of the radical right.”

The Aug. 17 attack on Beller was a seemingly well-planned ambush that was captured by security cameras, the grainy images widely disseminated on social media.

One of two would-be assassins dressed as fast-food deliverymen pulled out a pistol and shot Beller point blank outside a hotel in the eastern Bolivian city of Santa Cruz. She fell to the ground and, according to her account, feigned death. The next day, at dawn, Cerimedo was arrested as he was about to board a plane to Buenos Aires.

Cerimedo set up the hit, prosecutors charge, in a nefarious attempt at damage control. Beller had threatened to expose his alleged criminal behavior and physically abusive behavior toward her while revealing Cerimedo, a married man with two children, as the father of her unborn child.

Cerimedo is also under investigation for alleged illegal enrichment and potential links to cocaine trafficking.

He has denied any wrongdoing.

Even before Cerimedo’s arrest, Latin American journalists had begun unmasking Cerimedo as a prodigious purveyor of fake news — about himself. New reports revealed that his frequent boasts about U.S. connections — that he attended Harvard, trained with U.S. Navy SEALs, worked in the Obama White House — were fanciful.

“He certainly exaggerated things,” said Damian Merlo, a Miami-based consultant who worked with Cerimedo on the 2023 campaign of Argentine President Javier Milei, a Trump favorite. “I never really got the impression that Cerimedo was ‘MAGA’s man in Latin America.’ The guy could hardly speak English! But that’s how he sold himself.”

Many times, the sales pitch worked. It was Cerimedo who helped broker then-candidate Milei’s celebrated 2023 interview with Tucker Carlson, at the time a Trump confidant, an appearance that thrust Milei into the international spotlight.

Like Milei, Cerimedo seemed to relish any proximity to Trump-land.

In February, at the inaugural “Hispanic Prosperity Gala” — a right-wing pep rally held at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate — Cerimedo was honored as “Hispanic Political Consultant of the Year.’” From the podium, he spoke of Latin America’s “culture war” and the need to ensure that “the left never again returns” to governments that have elected conservative leaders.

Switching to heavily accented English, Cerimedo gave a shout-out to Brad Parscale, Trump’s former campaign manager, whom Cerimedo thanked for “believing [in] me all the time and giving me your technology.”

Parscale declined to comment.

Fernando Cerimedo, an advisor to the National Party, points at a map of Honduras on Dec. 1, 2025, one day after voters went to the polls to elect Nasry Asfura president.

(Moises Castillo / Associated Press)

Both Cerimedo and Parscale were involved in last year’s campaign that resulted in the election of Honduran President Nasry Asfura, whom Trump backed publicly.

Last year, Cerimedo was a key player in the election of Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz, the center-right, U.S.-educated son of a former president who transitioned from Marxist firebrand to moderate. The ascension of Paz broke almost two decades of leftist rule by the Movement for Socialism party of ex-President Evo Morales.

Cerimedo had no official capacity in Paz’s government, but he enjoyed insider status. He accompanied Paz in March to Trump’s anti-narco “Shield of the Americas” summit, a confab of mostly conservative leaders at Trump’s Doral resort in south Florida.

Among the items found in searches of Cerimedo-linked properties, authorities say, was a business card listing him as Paz’s “chief adviser” — a nonexistent post.

“Mr. Cerimedo never had the authorization to represent … the presidency, the government or my family,” a deeply discomfited Paz said in Facebook message last month.

How exactly Cerimedo got into politics — and how he became a right-wing rabble-rouser — remains somewhat opaque. According to media accounts, he worked a series of uninspiring jobs — including stints as a taxi driver, a schoolteacher and an employee of insurance and computer firms — before veering into advertising. In 2019, he assisted the campaigns of several leftist Peronist candidates in provincial races in Argentina, and later founded his own consultancy, Numen.

Cerimedo first gained prominence in neighboring Brazil. That’s where he championed false election-fraud narratives following the narrow reelection defeat in 2022 of President Jair Bolsonaro — a MAGA stalwart — in his reelection bid against Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a leftist. Cerimedo’s “Brazil Was Stolen” livestream exacerbated the sense of outrage among Bolsonaro loyalists, who took to the streets in mass protests.

The Brazil exposure helped catapult Cerimedo into successful presidential campaigns in Argentina (Milei), Honduras (Asfura) and Bolivia (Paz). His arrest prompted Chilean lawmakers to create a commission to investigate Cerimedo’s possible role in that nation’s recent electoral shift to the right.

With Cerimedo’s name now toxic, Paz, Milei and other former allies have distanced themselves.

Also ditching Cerimedo was his close partner, Javier Negre, a right-wing Spanish media entrepreneur who, in 2024, purchased 50% ownership of Cerimedo’s La Derecha Diario (The Daily Right), an online, Spanish-language MAGA megaphone. The site strongly backed Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella — who had Trump’s support — during his tight campaign this summer.

Following Cerimedo’s arrest, Negre announced that he had bought out his former partner in La Derecha Diario.

In Bolivia, the Cerimedo scandal has taken on the character of a Latin American telenovela.

A recovering Beller, shot three times in her upper body, granted interviews from her hospital bed, dishing on her lover’s alleged brutality and criminality.

According to Beller’s testimony to authorities, Cerimedo tricked her into the near-fatal rendezvous outside the hotel. He told her that a source was waiting to share details about the purported rape of a 13-year-old, she said. The supposed rapist? Bolivian ex-President Morales — a despised figure on the Latin American right.

The case has seen the once high-flying Cerimedo reduced to a slumping presence in a hoodie as authorities have shuffled the baldish, heavyset figure to hearings and lockups. Last week, he was transferred while awaiting trial to Bolivia’s maximum-security Chonchocoro prison, infamous for its high-altitude, ill-heated confines.

“I want to see my children!” a sobbing Cerimedo declared at one point in earshot of the media.

His legal team has pushed back. A defense lawyer, Margarita Arce, questioned whether Cerimedo had impregnated Beller and asserted to reporters that Beller staged a “self-inflicted attack” to smear Cerimedo and undermine the Bolivian government.

But prosecutors have sided with Beller, who told the Argentine daily Clarín: “Fernando Cerimedo wanted to kill me because I can tell everything that I know.”

Times staff writer Ana Ceballos in Washington and special correspondents Andrés D’Alessandro in Buenos Aires and Cecilia Sánchez Vidal in Mexico City contributed to this report.

The beach has claimed another first-time music festival this year.

Ocean Way, the beachfront Santa Monica music fest, has been canceled just two weeks before debuting. The two-day event was set for Sept. 26-27.

Goldenvoice, the promoter behind Ocean Way as well as the Coachella Valley Music and Arts Festival, announced the news Friday in an email from its ticketing platform AXS.

“Due to the impacts of Hurricane Marie, the City of Santa Monica has canceled the inaugural Ocean Way festival,” organizers said in a statement. “Storm surf and runoff [have] caused significant beach erosion and the festival can no longer be safely held as planned. Plans are already underway to bring the festival back to Santa Monica in 2027.”

Tickets, which ran from $249 to $2,250, will be refunded within five to seven business days, the promoter said.

Hurricane Marie, spurred by the “Super El Niño” weather pattern resulting from warming waters in the eastern Pacific Ocean, severely damaged coastal areas from Malibu to Long Beach and Dana Point

“I am deeply saddened that severe weather and beach conditions have forced the City and Goldenvoice to make this difficult decision. However, the safety of festival-goers, our residents and the Pier must remain our priority,” Santa Monica City Council member Dan Hall said in a statement to The Times. “With Hurricane Marie also causing sinkholes in Malibu and triggering home evacuations in Long Beach due to rising surf, the rapid erosion of the beach near the Sandbox event space over the past few days is deeply concerning. The City is working rapidly to keep the Pico storm drain and shoreline repaired and ready for upcoming weather.”

“While we are all disappointed,” Hall said, “I remain optimistic about bringing Ocean Way back next summer.”

The fest was slated to have headline sets by the Killers and Olivia Dean, along with Khruangbin, Sublime, Jack White and many others.

Goldenvoice announced the festival in July, with high hopes that it would open up the waterfront to more public events and concerts in Santa Monica and establish a new marquee festival on the west side of Los Angeles. Santa Monica’s retail and nightlife scenes have struggled in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the festival, which promoters touted as car-free, would have set a precedent for transit-oriented concertgoing.

“We’ve got to take a chance on new things,” Goldenvoice concert producer Nic Adler told The Times in August. ”There is pressure. I think the city wants it, but that takes a little bit of risk and trying something new.”

“We really cannot keep doing the same things that we’ve always done and expect for Santa Monica to shine,” Santa Monica Mayor Caroline Torosis said in an earlier interview. “We have to invite people back to our city. We have been yearning to get back a big music festival on our beach to showcase the city, because the beach is our best asset.”

The festival is the second major beachside concert to go down this year. The inaugural LA Jazz Festival on Dockweiler Beach was canceled on what would have been its opening day, after its finances and permitting fell through.

Climate change and weather damage have become a major concern for festivals. Bonnaroo, in Tennessee, announced last month that the festival would take 2027 off to repair the grounds, after heavy storms canceled sets and prompted evacuations this year. Stagecoach, the country music festival on the same site as Coachella, also temporarily shut down this year due to strong winds.

U.S. Sen. Ed Markey secured the Democratic nomination in Massachusetts’ Senate primary Tuesday, once again fending off a push for generational change as he seeks a third term.

Markey, 80, defeated U.S. Rep. Seth Moulton, 47, who had attempted to argue that it was time to do away with the “status quo” in his pursuit to oust the octogenarian.

Yet Markey successfully pointed to Moulton’s more moderate positions to argue that it was Moulton — not the older incumbent — who was out of touch with the state’s voters. Perhaps no other issue defined the race more than transgender rights, and Markey repeatedly hit Moulton for previously saying he would not want his daughters to play against transgender athletes.

“Massachusetts needs a senator who stands up and fights back, a senator who never forgets who they are fighting for,” Markey said during his victory speech. “That has been the mission of my life, and it always will be.”

In heavily Democratic Massachusetts, the primary is considered the most critical election hurdle, where Democratic winners are expected to prevail in the general election in November. Markey will face Republican John Deaton, who lost to Sen. Elizabeth Warren by about 20 points in 2024 and was unopposed in his primary Tuesday.

Markey has been a fixture in Massachusetts politics since the 1970s, prompting Moulton to make his “status quo” arguments on the campaign trail and to question Markey’s accomplishments during his lengthy time in office.

“Generational change isn’t about compromising, to do the small things better,” Markey said Tuesday. “It’s about fighting to do the big things best.”

In a concession speech, Moulton said he would now support Markey.

“Challenging the establishment and calling for a new generation of leadership isn’t easy. But it is necessary,” Moulton told supporters. “We started conversations that needed to happen.”

“We didn’t achieve our goal tonight, but I am confident others will be inspired to buck the system when they’re told to wait their turn,” he added.

The Senate race was not the only generational challenge for Democrats on the ballot. Similar dynamics played out in several congressional races, but ultimately, the older incumbents won Tuesday. In the 8th Congressional District, longtime incumbent Rep. Stephen Lynch defeated Patrick Roath. And in the 1st Congressional District of western Massachusetts, Rep. Richard Neal defeated public school teacher Jeromie Whalen to advance to the general election.

During the campaign Markey repeatedly pointed out that Moulton, in 2024, raised eyebrows among some in the party for saying he did not want his daughters playing sports against transgender girls.

Critics said he was echoing President Trump’s talking points against allowing transgender athletes in girls’ and women’s sports.

Moulton later apologized for his remarks, saying it was not his intention to hurt the transgender community and stressing his support for other transgender rights bills.

“If you’re in the trans community or you’re a trans kid feeling the weight of the Trump administration and the Supreme Court, you matter,” Moulton said during an August debate. “You’re valued, and I will always have your back.”

Moulton, who enlisted in the Marines after the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, and served four tours of duty in Iraq, was first elected to Massachusetts’ 6th Congressional District in 2014. He launched a 2020 presidential campaign but dropped it after a few months.

Markey was elected to the Senate in 2013. Before that he represented Massachusetts’ 7th Congressional District from 1976 to 2013.

Markey notably fended off a challenge in 2020 from Rep. Joe Kennedy III, a younger rival from one of the nation’s most famous political families. Markey did so by aligning himself with the liberal wing of the Democratic Party.

Antoine Hilaire, a 76-year-old Democrat who voted for Markey in Brockton on Tuesday, said being older can be a positive because it offers people experience and wisdom.

“If the older one is doing the better job, I don’t know,” he said. “He’s doing a good job. It’s not a big, big, big problem.”

Longtime Democratic House incumbents also defeated younger challengers

Lynch, 71, has held the 8th District seat in south Boston since 2001. He won Tuesday’s primary against Roath, a 39-year-old lawyer who contended that it is time to end “wait-your-turn” politics. Lynch stressed the value of experience inside Congress.

Lynch has fended off other youth challenges in the past, but Roath’s campaign hoped for a boost of excitement after longtime Democratic incumbent U.S. Rep. John Larson was defeated by former Hartford Mayor Luke Bronin in August in neighboring Connecticut. Like Roath, Bronin called for the need for generational change while running against an establishment politician.

In the 1st District Democratic primary in western Massachusetts, Neal, 77, bested Whalen, 39.

Neal, known as the dean of the New England House delegation, was first elected in 1988. Whalen ran to the left of Neal, calling for Medicare for All and questioning whether Neal has done enough to oppose Trump’s agenda.

Whalen was endorsed by Our Revolution, a progressive organization founded by Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont.

Kruesi writes for the Associated Press. AP reporter Leah Willingham in Brockton contributed to this report.