Brazil

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva is running in October’s election for a fourth non-consecutive mandate as Brazil’s president.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Senator Flavio Bolsonaro remain deadlocked in the latest polls, with the first round of Brazil’s election less than two weeks away.

Two new polls on Monday showed that the pair are statistically tied in simulated runoffs ahead of next month’s election. If no candidate wins more than 50 percent of valid votes in the October 4 first round, the two frontrunners advance to a runoff on October 25.

Lula is seeking a fourth non-consecutive term as Brazil’s president, but faces a challenge from the political right in Flavio Bolsonaro, the son of former far-right President Jair Bolsonaro, an ally of US President Donald Trump.

The elder Bolsonaro was ruled ineligible for office after Brazil’s top electoral court found he had abused his power while in office. He was later convicted separately over a plot to overturn his 2022 election loss to Lula.

A Quaest poll released on Monday showed Bolsonaro with 42 percent of voter support in a potential runoff, versus 41 percent for Lula.

Meanwhile, a BTG Pactual/Nexus poll has Lula receiving 46 percent of voter support, compared with 45 percent for Bolsonaro in a potential runoff.

The latest polls mark a narrowing from an earlier Quaest poll on August 5, which put Lula ahead by a wider five-point margin, 44 percent to 39 percent.

US pressure looms over election

Lula launched his re-election bid on August 2 at the Workers’ Party convention in Sao Paulo, casting himself as a defender of Brazilian “sovereignty” as pressure from the US administration looms over the race.

The US imposed two fresh rounds of tariffs on Brazilian products in July, which Lula denounced as an attempt to influence the elections through economic pressure.

The Brazilian leader is currently in New York, where he is preparing to address the United Nations General Assembly.

Lula met New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani for the first time on Monday. In a brief statement to reporters after the meeting, the Brazilian president said the two had talked about problems common to both Brazil and the United States, particularly the rising cost of living.

Leopardus tilcayo is the first new living cat species named and described in more than a century.

A tiny wild cat that lives in Bolivia’s lush cloud forests has been identified as a previously unknown species, marking the first time in more than a century that a new living feline species has been formally named and described.

Called “tilcayo” by local communities, the cat is part of a group called tiger cats, which are found across much of South America.

It was discovered in the Yungas forest, a mountainous region where forests are often covered by clouds and surrounded by high humidity, according to the researchers.

Given the scientific name Leopardus tilcayo, the cat measures 46cm (18 inches) long and weighs about 1.4kg (3 pounds), making it smaller than an average domestic cat.

“Its fur is light brown … with irregularly shaped rosettes across its body,” according to Paola Nogales-Ascarrunz, a National Geographic Explorer and one of the authors of the study describing the newly identified species published on Thursday in the journal Current Biology.

Little is known about the cat’s biology and lifestyle. Remains of small rodents in scat samples suggest they may form part of its diet, while camera-trap evidence indicates it could be more active at night, Nogales-Ascarrunz said.

Tiger cats are so-called cryptic species, meaning they cannot easily be distinguished merely by appearance, evolutionary biologist and study co-lead author Jonas Lescroart of the University of Antwerp in Belgium said.

Observing the Bolivian cat drew interest because “its characteristics did not match the descriptions, most of them based on Brazilian cats”, Nogales-Ascarrunz said. “This made us wonder, what tiger cat do we actually have in Bolivia?”

The team analysed DNA from 38 cats sampled across several South American countries, including eight museum specimens. The study found that tiger cats are in fact five genetically distinct species.

“We never expected this Bolivian tiger cat to be a separate species, and no one had ever proposed it as a different animal, subspecies or otherwise,” Jonas Lescroart said.

Genetic analysis suggested that the tilcayo lineage separated from other tiger cats about 1.4 million years ago.

The research team also described a new tiger cat subspecies in Peru’s Yungas, naming it Leopardus tigrinus antisuyo, after Antisuyu, the region of the old Inca Empire that included the area it inhabits.

United States President Donald Trump has made no secret of his hostility towards BRICS.

Last year, he threatened an additional 10 percent tariff on any country aligning itself with what he called the bloc’s “anti-American policies”. Since then, his administration has continued to wield tariffs aggressively against trading partners, including BRICS members such as Brazil, India and China.

The message appears straightforward: Countries that challenge US economic power should expect to pay a price.

But coercion has consequences. And as BRICS leaders meet in New Delhi today, Trump may be strengthening the very incentives that made the bloc attractive in the first place. The more Washington demonstrates its willingness to use access to its markets, its financial system and the dollar as instruments of political leverage, the more reason other countries have to reduce their exposure to them.

This does not mean BRICS is becoming an anti-US alliance. Far from it.

The bloc’s 11 members – Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates – have enormous political and economic differences. Together, they account for nearly half the world’s population and about 40 percent of global gross domestic product, but they do not share a common ideology, security policy or even geopolitical orientation.

Recent events have made those divisions impossible to ignore. Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE find themselves on opposite sides of a growing regional conflict. In May, Iranian and Emirati representatives clashed during a foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi. India and China have had a heated border dispute that led to deadly skirmishes in 2020-2021; only in the past two years have their relations gradually stabilised.

So Trump is not producing a united geopolitical front against Washington.

He may, however, be giving countries with otherwise divergent interests a common reason to cooperate economically: Protection against vulnerability to US power.

For countries outside the Western core, dependence on US-centred economic infrastructure carries risks.

The dollar’s centrality gives the US enormous structural advantages. International transactions pass through financial institutions subject to US jurisdiction; access to US markets can be restricted; sanctions can isolate governments and companies from parts of the global financial system.

BRICS’s efforts to diminish dependence on the US financial system do not mean the dollar is about to lose its position as a global reserve currency. This claim is often made around BRICS summits, usually accompanied by breathless predictions of a new BRICS currency. The evidence does not support it.

The dollar remains overwhelmingly dominant. According to the International Monetary Fund, it accounted for 57.1 percent of global foreign-exchange reserves in the first quarter of 2026. The Chinese renminbi accounted for just 2 percent. Indeed, the dollar’s share rose slightly during the quarter.

But replacing the dollar and reducing dependence on it are two very different things.

BRICS countries are already experimenting with the latter. South Africa has connected to China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, allowing transactions with China to be settled directly in renminbi. Brazil and China are increasingly using their own currencies in bilateral trade, while India and the UAE have settled transactions in rupees and dirhams. China and Russia have shifted much of their bilateral trade into their national currencies.

BRICS itself is also moving cautiously towards greater financial connectivity.

Last year, its leaders called for continued work on a cross-border payments initiative and greater interoperability among members’ payment systems. In August, Reserve Bank of India Governor Sanjay Malhotra confirmed that BRICS countries are discussing linking their fast-payment networks and potentially their central bank digital currencies. India itself is also encouraging greater use of the rupee in international trade.

The New Development Bank offers another example. Established by the original BRICS countries as an alternative source of development finance, it has made lending in members’ currencies an explicit strategic objective. Its current strategy targets 30 percent of financing in local currencies, partly to reduce borrowers’ exposure to foreign-exchange risks and costly currency swaps; the number could increase to 40-50 percent for the next cycle, 2027-2031.

None of this amounts to a rival global financial system. Much of it remains experimental, bilateral or limited in scale.

But that is precisely why the fixation on whether BRICS can “replace” the dollar misses what is happening. The more significant development is the gradual construction of options that allow governments and businesses to conduct a number of transactions without relying on the dollar and Western-dominated financial infrastructure.

Trump’s policies give this process additional urgency.

Consider Brazil. Washington imposed a new 25 percent tariff on a range of Brazilian products in July, affecting billions of dollars in exports, despite running a trade surplus with the country. The Trump administration has also scrutinised Brazil’s hugely successful Pix instant-payment system, which competes with established card-payment networks.

Sanctions demonstrate the same vulnerability more dramatically. Russia and Iran have been pushed towards alternative payment and trading arrangements precisely because their access to Western financial networks has been restricted. Washington is now considering further measures that could penalise countries heavily reliant on Russian energy, including China and India.

No BRICS member needs to sympathise with Moscow or Tehran to understand what this implies.

US financial power depends not simply on possessing the world’s largest economy or issuing its dominant currency. It also depends on other countries continuing to regard participation in a US-centred system as more advantageous than the alternatives.

The more frequently Washington turns that system into an instrument of coercion, the stronger the incentive to construct escape routes from it.

That said, most BRICS countries do not appear eager to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing.

India maintains extensive relations with the US while buying Russian energy and pursuing closer economic cooperation within BRICS. Brazil has long sought greater autonomy without becoming a Chinese satellite. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain deeply intertwined with Western economies while expanding their relationships with China.

Their objective is less likely to be replacing one hegemon with another than increasing their ability to manoeuvre between competing centres of power.

That distinction matters. A trade transaction settled in rupees, a loan denominated in renminbi or rand, or a payment made through a system that does not depend on the same Western intermediaries will not overthrow dollar dominance.

But multiply such arrangements across countries and over time, and they begin to reduce the costs of saying no to Washington.

This is why portraying BRICS simply as an anti-US threat risks becoming self-defeating. Punishing countries for seeking alternatives gives them another reason to develop those alternatives.

Trump wants to make challenging US power costly. Instead, he may be making dependence on US power costlier still.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

BRASILIA: Revelations that Brazilian presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro is under investigation for alleged corruption and money laundering rocked his right-wing campaign Friday, weeks before elections.

Bolsonaro, the son of former leader Jair Bolsonaro, is vying for the presidency against leftist incumbent Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in the October ballot.

A newly released court document revealed that police have been investigating Flavio Bolsonaro since July regarding possible crimes “in the context of financing the production” of a forthcoming film about his father.

Police conducted dozens of raids Thursday over the alleged embezzlement of public funds by the company that produced the flattering biopic.

“Dark Horse” — starring US actor Jim Caviezel as Jair Bolsonaro — has been under scrutiny as part of a widening corruption scandal that has loomed over the election.

“I have nothing to hide. The film is completely legal,” Flavio Bolsonaro said at a campaign event on Friday.

An investigation of this kind does not prevent someone from running for office in Brazil.

Voters in Latin America’s largest economy head to the polls on October 4, deeply polarized and with a weary sense of deja vu as Lula takes on Bolsonaro.

The 45-year-old senator Flavio Bolsonaro was thrust into the electoral race after his father was jailed for attempting a coup in 2022.

He has styled himself as a “more moderate” version of his firebrand father.

Neck and neck

The right-wing candidate has vowed to “rescue” Brazil from corruption, crime, high food prices and soaring public debt. His speeches are woven through with references to “God, country, family and freedom.”

He has also pledged a heavy hand on crime, which polls show is voters’ main concern.

While Lula has promised to prioritize the fight against organized crime, his challenger blames him for not taking violence seriously enough.

Bolsonaro’s campaign has been hit by disclosures that he approached notorious fraud-accused banker Daniel Vorcaro — head of the collapsed private bank Banco Master — for money, which Bolsonaro said was to finance “Dark Horse.”

According to court documents obtained by AFP, investigators believe Flavio Bolsonaro personally met with Vorcaro and discussed the film’s financing with him on several occasions.

The documents also point to the transfer of $12.3 million from a company indirectly linked to Vorcaro to another tied to an attorney for Eduardo Bolsonaro, Flavio’s younger brother.

A police source told AFP that the targets of Thursday’s raids included Karina Gama, head of the company that produced “Dark Horse,” and Mario Frias, a pro-Bolsonaro congressman listed as the film’s executive producer.

Both have been banned from leaving Brazil pending the investigation’s outcome. Frias has said he is innocent, denouncing the “smoke screen” probe.

Police officials said the money came from parliamentary funds available to lawmakers to finance special projects, usually in their electoral strongholds.

Vorcaro’s alleged interactions with Supreme Court Judge Alexandre de Moraes, whom he apparently asked for legal help days before his arrest, have meanwhile triggered a crisis in Brazil’s top court.

“The impact of corruption scandals is much greater for Lula’s campaign than for Flavio’s,” said political scientist Mayra Goulart from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.

However, new evidence against Bolsonaro closer to the election could influence “voters whose choice is less clearly defined,” she told AFP.

Lula was imprisoned for 580 days on corruption charges in 2018 and 2019, but his conviction was later overturned.

He and Flavio Bolsonaro are neck-and-neck in voting intentions ahead of the first round.

If, as expected, no one wins an outright majority, a runoff will be held on October 25.

Members of the high court have exchanged accusations after one justice was accused of involvement in a bank scandal.

Brazil’s Supreme Court has cancelled a second straight day of deliberations as suspicions of corruption, political bias and police interference loom over several of its members.

Cancellations are rare at the high court. But on Thursday, Chief Justice Luiz Edson Fachin nixed a second consecutive session, calling for the court to reconvene on Tuesday instead.

The decision was spurred by an ongoing crisis among the court’s members.

The divisions emerged on September 1, when one justice, Andre Mendonca, unsealed a series of federal police documents that appeared to show a disgraced banker, Daniel Vorcaro, seeking advice from another justice, Alexandre de Moraes.

De Moraes has rocketed to prominence in recent years for his roles in high-profile cases.

He presided over the trial of former President Jair Bolsonaro after prosecutors accused the far-right leader of plotting a coup following his 2022 election defeat. De Moraes also oversaw suspensions of platforms like X and Rumble for failing to abide by court orders, making him a target for Brazil’s right wing.

The document release authorised by Mendonca, a Bolsonaro appointee, contains roughly 30 text messages sent to a phone number associated with de Moraes, allegedly from Vorcaro.

In response, de Moraes has accused Mendonca of abusing his authority on the court for political gains. He requested a probe into whether Mendonca interviewed Vorcaro without the presence of police or prosecutors.

Tuesday’s session will involve the full Supreme Court bench, and 10 of the justices will discuss whether the 11th member, de Moraes, should be investigated over the text messages.

The tit-for-tat on Brazil’s high court is the latest fallout from the Banco Master corruption scandal.

Vorcaro, the head of the Banco Master financial institution, was arrested in November 2025 on accusations he defrauded investors of billions in lost funds, in one of the biggest banking scandals in the country’s history.

The collapse of Banco Master’s private banking arm left behind more than $7bn in debt.

Lawmakers from across the political spectrum have become embroiled in the unfolding scandal as new details emerge.

The turmoil risks affecting October’s general elections, including a pivotal presidential election.

Left-wing incumbent Lula Inacio Lula da Silva is set to compete for the presidency against Jair Bolsonaro’s eldest son, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro.

Both Lula and Senator Bolsonaro have called for investigations into the Supreme Court justices.

The Bolsonaro family itself has been dragged into the Banco Master scandal. In May, the publication Intercept Brasil released a report showing that Senator Bolsonaro petitioned Vorcaro for funds to finance a film about his ex-president father, who is now serving a 27-year prison sentence.

Senator Bolsonaro has denied wrongdoing, claiming he did nothing more than seek private sponsorship for the film, entitled Dark Horse.

But on Thursday, Brazilian police executed dozens of raids related to the Banco Master scandal, including some that targeted two figures involved in the film: Karina Gama, the head of a production company, and Congressman Mario Frias, who served as executive producer.

Senator Bolsonaro has called the probes “attempted political interference” ahead of the elections.

BRASILIA: A judge ordered the reinstatement of Brazil’s federal police chief on Wednesday after another judge ordered his suspension amid a deepening crisis in the nation’s top court.

Supreme Court Justice Flavio Dino ordered police director-general Andrei Rodrigues to return to his duties, overturning a decision Tuesday by Justice Andre Mendonca, who had suspended him after accusing the police of illegally spying on him.

Scandal has engulfed the court ahead of October presidential elections after it emerged last week that a disgraced banker charged with fraud apparently asked one of its judges for help, days before his arrest.

Allegations of misconduct between two justices threaten to pull court into political battles ahead of upcoming election.

Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Andre Mendonca has ordered the suspension of federal police chief Andrei Rodrigues and the force’s intelligence chief Leandro Almada amid growing divisions that have tested the credibility of the country’s highest court.

The suspensions were announced on Tuesday. Mendonca, appointed by former right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro, has accused Rodrigues and Almada of producing six illegal reports on the activities of justices.

The move was backed by a majority on one of the high court’s five-member panels.

But it is likely to be challenged by the government, possibly pulling the administration of leftist President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva into a political battle ahead of October’s presidential election.

“Investigating possible evidence of crimes is correct,” Institutional Relations Minister Jose Guimaraes, a top aide to Lula, said in response to the decision on social media. “But this measure smells electoral to me. That cannot happen.”

Polls show Lula and Jair Bolsonaro’s eldest son, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro, in a tight race ahead of the first round of voting on October 4.

The Supreme Court has been roiled by mutual accusations of wrongdoing between Justice Alexandre de Moraes, appointed under centre-right President Michel Temer, and Mendonca, a Bolsonaro appointee.

De Moraes has become a prominent target of right-wing criticism, particularly after he oversaw the case against Jair Bolsonaro for plotting a coup after the 2022 election.

A report detailing possible links between de Moraes and disgraced banker Daniel Vorcaro was made public by Mendonca last week.

De Moraes, however, responded by accusing Mendonca of abusing his power, citing federal police intelligence reports and urging the court to investigate him. Mendonca has now challenged the legality of those reports.

The Vorcaro corruption scandal has widened to include powerful political figures on both the left and right.

Vorcaro was arrested in 2025 for allegedly overseeing one of the largest bank fraud schemes in the history of Brazil, leaving billions in owed money.

Flavio Bolsonaro has also faced scrutiny for his ties with Vorcaro, after he approached the banker for assistance in funding a film about his father. Jair Bolsonaro is currently serving a 27-year prison sentence.

The right-wing senator used Tuesday’s suspension to push his claim that the prosecution of his father was a political “witch-hunt”. The Federal Police had recommended charges be brought against the elder Bolsonaro in November 2024.

“Lula’s special group in the Federal Police officially unmasked,” Senator Bolsonaro wrote in a social media post. “May the honourable and glorious Federal Police regain its autonomy to go after criminals, and not Lula’s political adversaries.”

William Marcel Murad, the federal police’s executive director, released a statement saying that Rodrigues has the agency’s “full confidence” and that agents “will not be shaken by attacks”.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek this week, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian received precisely the kind of political support he had hoped for. The SCO condemned the military attacks against Iran, described them as violations of international law and the UN Charter, reaffirmed Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for the conflict to be resolved through political and diplomatic means.

But the organisation did not offer to defend Iran. That distinction between political solidarity and collective defence is important. It tells us something not only about the Iranian experience with the SCO, but about the international order that is emerging around it.

For years, discussions about multipolarity have often suggested that the US-led international system would gradually be challenged by an alternative bloc centred around China, Russia and organisations such as BRICS and the SCO. From the perspective of middle powers, joining both institutions seemed to fit neatly into this transformation. Integration into non-Western organisations was supposed to make them less vulnerable to Western isolation and pressure.

The US-Israeli war on Iran has made clear that none of these alternative relationships can produce a security guarantee comparable to those provided by formal military alliances. The lesson is not that multipolarity has failed middle powers. It is that the emerging multipolar order may work differently from what many expected.

Rather than replacing one alliance system with another, it is producing an increasingly dense network of overlapping partnerships in which states gain diplomatic and economic options without necessarily acquiring new security guarantees.

For middle powers, this may be one of the defining characteristics of the emerging order: more room for manoeuvre, but less certainty about who will stand beside them when their security is threatened.

Turkiye provides a particularly revealing example. It has been a member of NATO for more than seven decades and remains embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet Ankara has increasingly demonstrated that alliance membership does not require automatic political alignment with Washington. Turkiye has maintained relations with Russia despite the war in Ukraine, expanded its engagement with China and participated in the SCO as a dialogue partner. At the same time, its differences with the US and Israel over the future regional order in the Middle East have become increasingly visible.

This does not mean Turkiye is abandoning NATO or moving into a Chinese- or Russian-led bloc. Quite the opposite. Ankara’s strategy depends precisely on avoiding such a binary choice. Its NATO membership provides security benefits that the SCO could not replicate. Its relationships with Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf states and other regional actors, meanwhile, expand its diplomatic and economic options.

Brazil represents another good example. Unlike Turkiye, Brazil is not bound to the US through a formal military alliance. But it has traditionally operated within a US-dominated hemisphere where Washington has expected considerable political alignment from regional governments.

Brazil’s refusal to join the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), together with its positions on the Iran war and other recent international crises, reflects its reluctance to accept that regional proximity should translate into automatic strategic alignment.

Yet Brazil is not simply switching sides. Its participation in BRICS, its extensive economic relationship with China and its calls for reform of the international system coexist with important political and economic relations with the US and Europe. Brasília’s objective is not to exchange dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing, but to preserve the ability to cooperate with both, and disagree with either.

This may be one of the most consequential opportunities that multipolarity offers middle powers. The rise of alternative centres of economic and political influence reduces the cost of saying no. For decades, weaker states often confronted a difficult choice when facing pressure from a dominant power: comply, resist and risk isolation, or seek protection from a rival bloc.

The proliferation of partners and institutions complicates that calculation. A government that disagrees with Washington may deepen relations with Beijing without becoming a Chinese ally. A state dependent on China economically may strengthen security ties with the US without fully aligning with Washington. Membership in BRICS does not prevent cooperation with Western institutions, just as membership in a US-led security framework does not necessarily preclude engagement with China or Russia.

India has made this logic almost an organising principle of its foreign policy. New Delhi participates in the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia while simultaneously belonging to both BRICS and the SCO. At Bishkek, India supported the SCO declaration defending Iranian sovereignty while Prime Minister Narendra Modi also stressed to Pezeshkian the importance of preserving freedom of navigation and commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

The Gulf Cooperation Council member states are pursuing their own version of this diversification. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, for example, continue to depend heavily on their relationships with the US for security, while simultaneously expanding economic and diplomatic ties with China, India and other Asian powers and participating in new regional and international arrangements.

None appears eager to replace Washington with Beijing. They want relationships with both. This suggests that the most significant consequence of multipolarity for middle and smaller powers may not be the emergence of a new bloc to which they can attach themselves. It may be the declining necessity of attaching themselves exclusively to any bloc at all.

But greater autonomy comes with a cost. The same flexible arrangements that allow states to avoid choosing sides also provide fewer guarantees when crises become existential. BRICS does not have an Article 5. Neither does the SCO, which explicitly defines itself as a non-military organisation.

Strategic partnerships can provide weapons, investment, diplomatic backing and political support without obligating partners to go to war for one another.

The emerging international system is therefore unlikely to resemble a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, or even a confrontation between two clearly defined blocs. The older alliance system is not disappearing.

NATO remains central to European and Turkish security, while US security relationships remain indispensable across much of Asia and the Gulf. What is emerging alongside it is another layer, a more fluid landscape of overlapping institutions, selective partnerships and transactional relationships.

Multipolarity, in other words, may not require states to choose a new camp. That gives middle and smaller powers greater agency. But it also places greater responsibility for their own security upon them. The world they are entering may offer more partners, more bargaining power and more freedom to say no. What it may offer less frequently is certainty about who will say yes when they ask for protection.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Published on
04/09/2026 – 14:51 GMT+2

Brazil’s EU ambassador, Pedro Miguel da Costa e Silva, told Euronews on Friday that an inspection of Brazilian meat was unnecessary, and threatened to retaliate against the EU ban on imports.

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The European Commission’s decision came into force this week, after Brazil was removed from a list of countries complying with EU food safety rules over its use of antibiotics to stimulate animal growth.

An EU audit of Brazilian poultry and honey is ongoing, but the Commission said that Brasília had not provided guarantees that would allow for an audit of its beef.

The EU ban prompted anger from the Brazilian government on Thursday, which threatened to adopt countermeasures.

“Sufficient guarantees”

“There wasn’t a need for an audit, not for poultry, not for honey, not bovine meat, because no audits were conducted for the other countries,” da Costa e Silva said. “We have provided sufficient guarantees.”

The ambassador added that while Brazil will continue discussing the issue with the Commission, “all options were on the table” if the imports did not resume and that Brazil could be “creative” when it comes to countermeasures.

The Commission pushed back on Friday against Brasília’s accusation of unfair treatment, with the Commission’s deputy Chief spokesperson Olof Gill saying: “Our approach is non-discriminatory, and we’ve given our partners sufficient time and all the information they need to adjust.”

The dispute comes as a free trade deal between Mercosur countries — Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay — and the EU provisionally came into force in May, despite strong opposition from EU farmers, who fear that Latin American products that do not comply with the bloc’s phytosanitary and food safety standards will be dumped in Europe.

“Food safety rules are a matter of the highest priority for EU citizens,” Gill added. “These rules have been well known for a long time, with third countries having been informed going back many years.”

The EU introduced new rules to combat antimicrobial resistance in 2018, which have been applied to EU producers since 2022 and to foreign importers since Thursday.

Published on
03/09/2026 – 16:54 GMT+2

The European Commission suspended imports of meat from Brazil on Thursday over concerns about antibiotic use, after Brasília failed to convince the EU executive that its products comply with European standards.

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The move comes as Brazilian meat imports lie at the heart of opposition to the free trade agreement signed in January 2026 by the Commission with Mercosur countries — Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.

EU farmers accuse Latin American producers of failing to comply with the bloc’s phytosanitary and food safety standards, arguing that this gives Latin American products an unfair advantage on the EU market.

“We have rules that ban antimicrobials or using antimicrobials for growth,” Commission spokesperson Eva Hrncirova said. “On the 3rd of September, the list of countries that basically comply with our rules on antimicrobials comes into application.”

The spokesperson added that Brazil was not currently on the list, meaning its imports were suspended as of Thursday.

No guarantees for beef

The suspension, which resulted from a vote by national experts in May, covers beef, poultry, eggs and honey.

Imports of some products could resume following an audit of poultry and honey, launched on the basis of written guarantees of compliance provided by Brasília. The audit is expected to run until the end of the week, although the conclusions will take longer.

Hrncirova said no such guarantees had been provided for beef, adding that they must cover the animals’ entire life cycle, which is naturally longer for cattle.

Brazil’s ambassador to the EU, Pedro Miguel da Costa e Silva, told Euronews ahead of the summer that technical discussions with the Commission were ongoing. However, Brazil ultimately failed to prevent the suspension from taking effect.

Trade in agricultural products was the most contentious issue throughout the 25-year negotiations over the Mercosur agreement.

The deal was provisionally applied in May after the European Parliament suspended the ratification process with a legal referral to the European Court of Justice.