bases

Fielding more hardened shelters to better protect U.S. forces at bases in the Middle East is now a top priority in the face of Iranian attacks, according to Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. At the same time, this underscores questions about why more investments in physical hardening were not made in the region well before the current conflict. This is especially true given months of planning leading up to this and the clear threats that Iranian drones and missiles posed.

For years now, TWZ has been highlighting how the lack of hardened infrastructure at American military facilities abroad and at home creates worrisome vulnerabilities. This is especially concerning when it comes to aircraft parked in the open, like the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) that was destroyed in an Iranian attack last week.

Hegseth talked about U.S. defensive posture in the Middle East at a press conference today at the Pentagon. The Secretary also announced that he had made a previously undisclosed visit to the region to meet with American service members.

“I’ll say, what I witnessed, where I went, was a completely locked-in discipline of bunker use and bunker improvement. So, from the beginning, as we stated very clearly, the first thing we did was set up a defense and make sure our defensive capabilities were maxed out before any of this even started,” Hegseth said. “That included fortifications, as much as possible, but it also included dispersement [sic]. If all of our people are in one place, you can imagine why that’s a big problem.”

“Alongside that dispersement [sic] is more and more bunkers. And I can tell you, talking to base commanders, talking to our allies in Israel, talking to others, rapidly fielding that and then improving those positions is a theater priority, no doubt, as are the air defenses and the layered air defenses,” he continued. “It’s not just Patriots and THAADs [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems]. It’s fighters and defensive CAPs [combat air patrols]. It’s other kinetic defeat systems. It’s electronic warfare. So the defense of our troops and our assets is max [sic].”

“I will say, on some of those other assets you talked about, air wings, airframes, there’s some things adversaries are doing to provide info and intel that they shouldn’t. We’re aware of it, and ultimately, we move things around,” he added. “One of the biggest principles you learn in the military is to not set patterns, predictable patterns, and so we’re – commanders are working hard to adjust in real time with those systems and make sure they’re in the right places and not easily targetable.”

Hegseth was responding to a two-part question about the status of efforts to establish additional bunkers at bases in the region and what other measures were being taken to better protect high-value assets, including aircraft like the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). On March 27, an Iranian attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia succeeded in destroying one of these prized AWACS jets, as well as damaging other aircraft and injuring several American service members, as you can read more about here.

Separately, on March 23, the U.S. Space Force had put out a contracting notice to identify “potential sources” of “prefabricated, transportable, hardened shelter systems” that could be delivered to Jordan within weeks or even days of a contract award. The U.S. military has a major presence in Jordan, particularly at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, which has been a key hub in the current campaign against Iran. Muwaffaq Salti has, in turn, also come under Iranian attack, with an AN/TPY-2 missile defense radar there having been notably targeted.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also put out another contracting notice regarding planned new hardened underground facilities at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar on March 25, which TWZ was first to report. This is a longer-term project, with work not expected to start until 2028.

Though Hegseth says more bunkers for bases in the Middle East are now a priority, it remains unclear why this was not already the case years ago. There has been no shortage of examples in the region of the threats posed by Iran’s drone and missile arsenals, as well as those employed by Iranian-backed proxies. This includes numerous instances of direct and sometimes fatal attacks on U.S. forces, as well as on allies and partners. Drone threats, in general, are not new and have only continued to grow, something TWZ has been sounding the alarm on for nearly a decade now. In turn, we have also highlighted the curious lack of investment in hardened infrastructure, especially to better protect aircraft, which are especially vulnerable when parked out on open flight lines.

In recent years, U.S. military officials have often pushed back on calls for more physical hardening, having questioned the cost-effectiveness and general utility of doing so. More emphasis has generally been put on expanding active defenses, such as surface-to-air missiles, as well as employing concepts of operations centered on dispersion of forces and camouflage, concealment, and deception. In addition to talking about the importance of bunkers, Hegseth hit these same general talking points himself just this morning.

The destruction of the E-3 at Prince Sultan Air Base raises additional questions about the limits of dispersal and other operating concepts, which the U.S. Air Force has codified under the banner of Agile Combat Employment (ACE). Satellite imagery makes clear that E-3s and other aircraft have continued to be parked out in the open at well-established points on the taxiways at the base in Saudi Arabia. More broadly speaking, American forces in the region continue to operate primarily from a small number of large bases, the locations of which are well known.

Visualizing ACE

Furthermore, in his remarks today, Hegseth alluded to reports that Russia and China have been helping Iran target key assets at bases in the Middle East, including through the provision of satellite imagery. In the past decade, the Chinese have dramatically expanded their space-based surveillance capabilities. The commercial satellite imagery sector in that country has also grown.

At the same time, while additional information from those sources would help refine Iranian targeting processes, it would not be necessary to launch attacks on key assets and facilities, especially larger ones, at locations like Prince Sultan or Muwaffaq Salti in Jordan. Iran has its own intelligence streams in the region that it could leverage, as well. We have seen numerous examples of very deliberate targeting on the part of Iranian forces, especially when it comes to prized air and missile defense radars and communications arrays, many of which are fixed in place, from the start of the current conflict.

And they VERY likely had recent intel from satellite imagery (China and Russia)

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) March 30, 2026

There are ways to provide targeting data beyond near real time satellite imagery. And even then, who knows how often they are moving them. It would be worth a BM and definitely worth a hopeful shot of a one-way attack drone.

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) March 29, 2026

In the past few years, there has been some signs of a tonal shift across the U.S. military when it comes to physical hardening, especially against drone attacks. Just last week, authorities at Shaw Air Force Base in California put out a contracting notice regarding plans to put up counter-drone nets around non-hardened sunshade-type shelters on the flightline, a defensive measure that other Air Force facilities have been exploring, as well. In addition to seeing more pushes for additional passive defenses at established bases, work has been touted on more rapidly deployable capabilities to support expeditionary and distributed operations.

At the same time, the U.S. military is clearly still playing catch-up in this regard. These are issues that extend well beyond the Middle East and the current conflict with Iran, too. Though Iran’s drones and missiles clearly present real dangers, the scale and scope of those attacks pale in comparison to the volume and diversity of incoming threats U.S. forces would expect to face in a large-scale conflict in the Pacific against China.

It is true that you cannot protect everything from every threat, but physical hardening can help lessen the impacts. It also limits the overall options an enemy has for attacking a particular target and imposes additional costs to achieving the desired level of destruction. Paired with other tactics, it can drastically improve the survivability of a combat air force on the ground.

Hopefully there will FINALLY be a real wake up call here on hardened infrastructure for air bases. They (DoW leadership) have and are living in a fantasy land with this. It’s maddening. It’s easier to kill your most potent combat aircraft on the ground, where they sped the vast…

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) March 29, 2026

And this is at home and overseas. You can’t protect everything, not even close, but you can protect a portion of your fleet and plan around that capacity.

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) March 29, 2026

The current conflict with Iran has clearly put new emphasis on expanding the hardened infrastructure at air bases and other facilities in the Middle East, but it remains to be seen whether this latest wakeup call will be heard more broadly.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Italian press reports that the government has refuse to authorise US to land bombers at a base in Sicily for transit to the Middle East, where they could be used to strike Iran.

Multiple recent drone incursions over U.S. bases housing strategic military assets amplify concerns The War Zone has been documenting for years about highly worrisome drone flights over these installations and critical capabilities. These incidents, as we’ve noted, present a risk to national and local security.

One of the drone overflights took place earlier this month at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, home of B-52 Stratofortress bombers and nuclear weapons storage facilities, and a key part of the airborne leg of America’s nuclear triad. Another was at an unspecified installation last month, the commander of U.S. Northern Command mentioned in recent written testimony for the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). Both situations took place after the U.S. began bombing Iran in a campaign that has included B-52, B-1 Lancer and B-2 Spirit bombers. It is unknown at this point if there is a connection, however, as we have frequently reported, the military is highly concerned about drones operating with near impunity over its facilities. In addition to interfering with flights and their potential use as weapons, drones can surveil and map the electronic emissions throughout a base, gaining insight into vulnerabilities. They can also photograph key areas and operations, providing additional valuable intelligence for any adversary.

One of these incidents spurred NORTHCOM to deploy its new counter-drone fly-away kit, designed to give installation commanders the ability to detect, quantify, and defeat small drones that they cannot defend against on their own. We’ll discuss that in greater detail later in this story.

The incursions at Barksdale began the week of March 9, a spokesperson for the 2nd Bomber Wing at the base told us, offering few details about what happened beyond saying “we are working closely with federal and local law enforcement agencies to investigate these incursions.”

The incident sparked a shelter-in-place order lifted later that day.

According to ABC News, a confidential briefing document dated March 15 stated that the “drones came in waves and entered and exited the base in a way that may suggest attempts to ‘avoid the operator(s) being located,’” the network reported. “Lights on the drones suggested the operators ‘may be testing security responses’ at the base.”

“Between March 9-15, 2026, BAFB Security Forces observed multiple waves of 12-15 drones operating over sensitive areas of the installation, including the flight line, with aircraft displaying non-commercial signal characteristics, long-range control links and resistance to jamming,” the document stated. “After reaching multiple points across the installation, the drones dispersed across sensitive locations on the base.”

The document added that more drone incursions could be expected and that they “pose a significant threat to public safety and national security since they require the flight line to be shut down while also putting manned aircrafts already inflight in the area at risk.”

It is not publicly known if there have been any additional incursions since the document was issued. Base officials declined to tell us.

Another incident took place at an unspecified location in February as the U.S. was beginning to attack Iran.

“In the early hours of Operation EPIC FURY last month, a deployed [fly-away kit] successfully detected and defeated sUAS operating over a strategic U.S. installation,” Air Force Gen. David M. Guillot, the commander of NORTHCOM, explained in a written statement to SASC on March 19.

Guillot did not say which base or provide any other details. On Tuesday, a NORTHCOM spokesperson declined to specify which base Guillot was referring to but confirmed there were multiple incursions and personnel used the flyaway kit’s “jamming protocol.”

“We will not name the base nor the type of installation where our Flyaway Kit is deployed in order to preserve operational security,” NORTHCOM added. “Specifically, connecting the Flyway Kit to a specific base can potentially illuminate that base’s vulnerabilities to an adversary. Additionally, by confirming a specific Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System (C-sUAS) platform, we would potentially give an adversary an advantage in circumventing our C-sUAS capabilities at that location.”

So far, NORTHCOM has only one fly-way kit, but more should be delivered “in the Spring of 2026,” Guillot added in his written statement.

The kit currently deployed is produced by Anduril. The company describes it as a “rapidly deployable, modular, and battle-tested counter-UAS system designed to detect, track, identify, and defeat Group 1-3 drones.” It uses Anduril’s Pulsar system for radio-frequency detection and electromagnetic effects to jam radio signals controlling drones. There are also drone-on-drone interceptors. You can read more about that in our story about the system here. 

While Guillot offered scant details in his written testimony, he provided some additional insights into the military’s efforts to counter drones over the homeland. His command is tasked with coordinating those efforts.

“We’ve seen an increase from last year in the number of detections over military installations over the course of the year.,” he said in response to a question from Sen. Eric Schmitt (R-MO), who represents Whiteman Air Force Base, home of B-2s used in Epic Fury. “Some of that might be due to the fact that we have more detection capability now than we did in the past, and then our ability to defeat them has improved. Whereas a year ago, almost every one that was detected was not defeated, now about a quarter of the ones that we detect we’re able to defeat. I pay particular attention to Whiteman and other strategic bases, whether submarine silos or aircraft, and work very closely with Admiral [Richard. A] Correll at STRATCOM to make sure that either through the services or through our own capabilities at NORTHCOM, we are protecting those vital locations from UASs.”

Northcom, Southcom Commanders Testify Before Senate Armed Services Committee 03.19.2026

Whiteman declined to comment about whether that base has seen any drone incursions, citing operational security concerns.

The incursions over Barksdale are reminiscent of those that took place over Langley Air Force Base in December 2023 that The War Zone was the first to report. It remains publicly unknown who operated those drones, which has been the case with incursions at military installations across the U.S. and Europe as well that we also were the first to write about.

That these latest drone flights took place in the wake of Epic Fury is alarming. Iran’s drone capabilities loom large in the mind of U.S. intelligence even here in the homeland. Also, it’s worth noting that B-52s at Barksdale sit almost entirely out in the open and, with just 76 of these airframes available across the force, they are extremely valuable assets and thus potentially very high-value targets. This is especially true since there are just a few that could be regenerated if any are lost. Moreover, Stratofortresses are expected to provide a large portion of U.S. conventional and nuclear aerial strike capabilities for decades to come.

We have been warning about the threat to American aircraft on flightlines from even the lowliest of drones for many years. These warnings have taken on new urgency after last year’s Ukrainian near-field attacks on Russian long-range aviation, dubbed Operation Spider Web. This operation alone suddenly turned what were once theoretical nightmares into very real possibilities.

We will continue to monitor this situation and provide updates when warranted.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

“If they rebuild and you return, we will kill you.” 

That was the threat Abubakar Dalwa received before fleeing to Maiduguri, Borno State’s capital in northeastern Nigeria, on the night of March 8. Abubakar was sitting in the compound of his home in Dalwa, a recently resettled community in Konduga, a few kilometres from Maiduguri, with his children and wife. The children slept curled together on a plastic mat while his wife tended a pot over the fire. It was during Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, and she was preparing the meal they would eat before dawn.

Then the gunfire came in rapid succession around 10:20 p.m. The children woke up as Abubakar and his wife rushed them inside the room. Moments later, someone began knocking impatiently on the door.

“Open this door,” the person shouted. Abubakar’s wife clung tightly to him. He stepped outside and opened the door. About ten armed men stood in the darkness. Most wore military camouflage. Others were dressed in black uniforms. Belts of ammunition hung across their shoulders, some trailing toward the ground.

“They told me, ‘Get out and leave for Yerwa [Maiduguri],’” Abubakar recalled. The terrorists said they had come to burn the buildings. “They told me the buildings belonged to the government,” he added. “They said their fight was with the government, not us.”

Abubakar did not argue. By then, it was nearly midnight. He gathered his wife and children and fled into the darkness. “We left without taking anything,” he said.

Behind them, the town burned, and three people were killed: a man, a woman, and her baby. The man’s daughter survived but was shot in the leg. She was later taken to the Maimalari Cantonment Hospital in Maiduguri.

By 2 a.m., Abubakar and his family had reached the city. Soldiers received them at a military checkpoint. They were displaced again. 

The assault on Dalwa was not an isolated raid. On the same night, another attack was unfolding hundreds of kilometres away in Kukawa. A member of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) stationed there said the terrorists attacked around midnight.

“They killed our men, including our Commanding Officer, carted away weapons and vehicles, burnt one building,” he said.

The seizure of weapons and vehicles during these attacks has become a recurring feature of recent raids across Borno, weakening security formations in rural areas and forcing some forces to consolidate around larger bases closer to Maiduguri.

How the attacks unfolded

In Dalwa, the attack lasted about an hour. A frontline member of the NFSS said the terrorists entered the town after overpowering the security units stationed there. “We knew they would overpower us from the first sounds of their gunfire,” he said.

Many of the terrorists carried heavy weapons, including PKT machine guns capable of sustaining rapid fire; others carried rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

The terrorists strategically positioned themselves in Dalwa. “They went from house to house,” the NFSS member said. “They ordered residents to leave the town.” Then they began setting buildings on fire.

Security officers attempted to resist the attack. They sought reinforcements from Maiduguri, but the vehicles sent to support them ran into buried landmines. Two soldiers were killed in the explosions. “And so we retreated,” the NFSS member said.

According to the volunteer security operative, the attackers approached Dalwa in coordinated groups. One group blocked the road leading to Damboa. Another positioned itself at the entrance of the town near a cemetery on the outskirts. A third group advanced directly into the town to engage the security forces.

“They came through the eastern side,” he said. “That used to be the original Dalwa before the first displacement.”

The security volunteers estimated the number of attackers to be between 80 and 100. Most of them arrived on foot, while others rode on motorcycles, they said.

During the March 8 attack, only about 20 soldiers were stationed in the town. Volunteer forces, including members of the NFSS, CJTF, and repentant terrorists known locally as “the hybrid”, numbered fewer than 100. Five days before the raid, surveillance drones had spotted terrorists gathering in nearby areas. “We anticipated the attack,” the NFSS member said.

But anticipation did not stop it. “The attacks keep increasing,” he added. “More than the previous year.”

In Kukawa, the insurgents used similar tactics. A CJTF member stationed there said the attackers arrived in three coordinated groups. One advanced toward the military base. Another waited on the outskirts of the town. A third group positioned itself along the road leading to Cross Kauwa to ambush reinforcements. He claimed that more than 200 fighters participated in the assault.

“They came mostly on foot,” he said. “They were all wearing military camouflage.”

The fighting lasted about three hours. After the terrorists withdrew, the commanding officer of the base, Umar Farouq, pursued them with a convoy, which was later ambushed, and most of his men were killed.

A pattern of attacks on rural security

The recent attacks on Dalwa and Kukawa are part of a broader pattern. Across Borno State, terrorists have increasingly targeted military bases, convoys, and resettled communities, often ambushing reinforcements and seizing weapons and vehicles during the attacks. Security volunteers say these raids are gradually weakening smaller rural security formations and concentrating forces around larger garrison towns closer to Maiduguri, leaving many outlying communities increasingly exposed.

The incidents suggest a deliberate campaign by terrorist groups, particularly the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Their strategy appears to involve weakening security forces, isolating rural communities, and driving civilians out of resettled towns. These attacks are occurring against the backdrop of a significant government policy.

Over the past years, the Borno State government has implemented a resettlement programme to close camps for internally displaced persons and return families to their hometowns.

The resettlement schemes started in 2020 when the state government began rebuilding homes, schools, clinics, and public facilities in previously abandoned communities as part of what was described as a transition toward a “post-conflict recovery phase”. Thousands of displaced residents have been moved out of camps in Maiduguri and returned either to their original communities or to nearby host settlements considered relatively secure.

But the recovery effort depends heavily on movement. Contractors, labourers, and materials must travel from Maiduguri into rural areas. That movement has increasingly become a point of vulnerability. Roads leading to resettled communities have suffered damage or been mined, isolating towns and delaying military reinforcements. When security forces attempt to respond, they often encounter roadside bombs or ambushes along the routes connecting rural communities to larger bases. Military installations themselves have also become targets. Such attacks on bases allow terrorists to seize weapons, vehicles, and ammunition that can be used in subsequent operations while weakening already thinly stretched security formations in rural areas.

On March 5, terrorists attacked a military base in Konduga, burning several buildings. A member of the Nigerian Forest Security Service (NFSS) told HumAngle that several soldiers were killed, and vehicles and weapons were stolen. Two days earlier, on March 3, the insurgents attacked Ngoshe, a town under the Gwoza Local Government Area (LGA) that had been resettled since 2020. The attackers first targeted a military base before spreading through the town and setting houses ablaze. Local sources and survivors said the attack lasted several hours and forced thousands to flee. Nigeria’s President, Bola Tinubu, condemned the attack on March 6, describing it as a “heartless assault on helpless citizens” and directing security agencies to rescue those abducted.

Earlier attacks followed a similar pattern.

On Feb. 14, terrorists attacked a military base in Pulka, about ten kilometres from Ngoshe. On Feb. 5, another attack targeted a base in Auno along the Maiduguri-Damaturu road, according to a military source who asked not to be named. Several soldiers were killed, and vehicles were taken.

On Jan. 28, about 30 construction workers were killed in Sabon Gari in Damboa. The same day, terrorists attacked an army base in the town, killing nine soldiers and two members of the CJTF. A military base in Damasak was also overrun by terrorists, who killed seven soldiers, captured 13 others, including their commanding officer. 

Earlier incidents also targeted reconstruction efforts and security infrastructure. On Dec. 25, 2025, a suicide bomber detonated at a mosque in the Gamboru Market area of Maiduguri. Five people were killed, and 35 others were injured. On Nov. 17 of the same year, workers fled after terrorists stormed a construction site in the Mayanti area of Bama. In the same town, terrorists attacked the Darajamal community in September last year, killing at least 63 people, including five soldiers, and burning about 24 houses.

On Nov. 20, the attackers invaded a CJTF base in Warabe, killing eight people and leaving three others missing. On Nov. 14, terrorists ambushed a military convoy along the Damboa-Biu road. Two soldiers and two CJTF members were killed. Brigadier General M. Uba, the Brigade Commander of the 25 Task Force Brigade, was abducted and later killed.

HumAngle has previously reported that terror groups have undergone several technological shifts that have expanded their attacks and operations, including the use of drones. Despite the violence, the resettlement programme continues. On Jan. 28, the Borno State government received about 300 Nigerian refugees from Cameroon and resettled them in Pulka. The government later received 680 more refugees on Feb. 8.

Why are the attacks happening?

Umara Ibrahim, a professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Maiduguri, said the attacks may be aimed at constraining the government’s resettlement efforts.

“Because their movements are observed and monitored, and perhaps challenged, it is not in their interest for resettlement to proliferate,” he told HumAngle during a February interview.

The attacks also serve a logistical purpose.

“Some of their tactics include ambushing and carting away weapons and supplies from peripheral bases in unfortified areas,” the professor said. “It also includes attacks on bases, especially in places where backup might take time to arrive.”

As attacks on rural bases continue, residents and volunteer security operatives say the shrinking presence of security forces in some outlying communities is raising fears that large parts of rural Borno may again become vulnerable.

Many of these families, now fleeing towns like Dalwa, had already experienced displacement. Some years ago, insurgent violence forced them to abandon their homes and seek refuge in camps around Maiduguri. When the government announced resettlement plans, they returned. They rebuilt their lives slowly. Children went back to school. Farmers returned to their fields.

Now they are running again, and the promise of returning home is once again slipping out of reach.