Air

The loss of three U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles to apparent friendly fire over Kuwait earlier today underscores an enduring reality of conflict: despite advances in technology, high levels of training, and the most carefully prepared plans, casualties inflicted by the same side are always a hazard. Indeed, these are not the first blue-on-blue incidents involving U.S. and allied combat aircraft in the various campaigns since the end of the Cold War. Two of those, in particular, both dating from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, appear eerily similar to the incident over Kuwait today.

While we are still awaiting detailed information as to what happened over Kuwait today, U.S. Central Command has confirmed that the six crew members involved are all safe. You can meanwhile get up to date with what we know about the incident in our report here.

In light of that, we now look back at the previous, high-profile friendly-fire incidents in which the U.S. military has been involved in recent decades.

U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawks, 1994

In terms of overall loss of life, the costliest fratricide incident involving U.S. military aircraft since the end of the Cold War was the April 14, 1994, shootdown by U.S. Air Force F-15 Eagle fighters of two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters over Iraq, in which 26 individuals died.

On that date, the two Black Hawks and their crews were assigned to Operation Provide Comfort, a multinational relief effort to aid Kurdish refugees in southern Turkey following the 1991 Gulf War. The helicopters were transporting U.S., British, French, and Turkish military officers; Kurdish representatives; and a U.S. political advisor in northern Iraq. Operating over Turkey was a U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, to offer airborne threat warning and control for the Provide Comfort aircraft, including the Black Hawks. Despite this, the pilots of two U.S. Air Force F-15 fighters patrolling the area misidentified the Black Hawks as Iraqi Mi-25 Hind helicopters (export versions of the Mi-24) and shot them down.

A subsequent investigation into the incident revealed that, despite the AWACS crew being aware that the Black Hawks were in the area, the two F-15 pilots were not. The Eagle pilots received two radar contacts (indicating helicopters) and stated that they attempted unsuccessfully to identify them by electronic means. They twice reported their unsuccessful attempts to the AWACS, but were still not informed of the presence of the friendly Black Hawks. The F-15 pilots attempted a visual identification, making a single pass each of the helicopters, but this was later deemed insufficient for a positive ID. Instead, the lead pilot misidentified the helicopters as hostile Hinds. The pilot’s confusion was compounded by the fact that the UH-60s were carrying fuel tanks on their external pylons, making them look more like Hinds, with their characteristic stub-wing weapons stations.

The F-15C flight lead fired a single missile and shot down the trailing Black Hawk helicopter. At the lead pilot’s direction, the F-15 wingman also fired a single missile and shot down the lead helicopter. All 26 individuals aboard the two Black Hawks were killed.

After the investigation, which described a catalog of failures, both human and technical, the two F-15 pilots were disqualified from aviation service for three years. Similar punishments were faced by three members of the AWACS crew.

U.K. Royal Air Force Tornado GR4A, 2003

The pilot and navigator of this Tornado reconnaissance jet were both killed when they were targeted by a U.S. Army Patriot air defense missile during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Flying as part of a package of Coalition aircraft, the Tornado was returning to Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait on March 22, 2003, when the Patriot battery wrongly identified it as an Iraqi anti-radiation missile. The suspected hostile track was interrogated by the identification friend or foe (IFF) system, but there was no response. The Patriot crew launched the missile, and the Tornado began self-defense actions.

Both Tornado crew members were killed instantly when the missile hit their aircraft.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense’s investigation into the incident concluded that a number of issues had contributed. Some of these related to the Patriot system and included the threat classification criteria, rules of engagement, firing doctrine, crew training, IFF procedures, and the nature of autonomous battery operation. The Tornado’s IFF serviceability was a contributing factor, and investigators also found issues with aircraft routing and airspace control measures, as well as overall orders and instructions.

U.S. Navy F/A-18C Hornet, 2003

The F/A-18C flown by Lt. Nathan Dennis White of Strike Fighter Squadron 195 was another victim of a Patriot missile during the war in Iraq in 2003.

According to U.S. Central Command, on April 2, 2003, Lt. White was flying one of two Navy F/A-18s near Karbala in central Iraq, which were heading back to their aircraft carrier, the USS Kitty Hawk. As in the Tornado incident the previous month, a Patriot missile battery mistakenly identified the Hornet as an Iraqi missile. The notification was passed on to the Information Coordination Center, responsible for coordinating air defense. The center mistakenly designated the flight path of the Navy jet as a missile track.

Seconds later, a second Patriot battery located closer to the front line also detected the F/A-18C and also mistook it for an Iraqi missile. The second battery concluded that it was being targeted by the missile. The air defense batteries were reportedly both assigned to defend the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, which was driving north near Karbala and about 50 miles from the Iraqi capital.

Since the erroneous reports aligned, the operators at the two Patriot batteries and at the command center became “increasingly confident that they were all detecting the same hostile missile, that their detection was accurate, and that this missile was a direct threat to U.S. forces,” according to a summary of the report into the incident.

The command center ordered that two Patriot missiles be launched, shooting down the F/A-18C and killing Lt. White.

The personnel involved did not face punishment. “It was determined … that no disciplinary action was warranted,” said Marine Capt. Kelly Frushour, a spokeswoman for Central Command.

U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet, 2024

Most recently, a U.S. Navy F/A-18F belonging to Strike Fighter Squadron 11 was involved in a friendly-fire incident with a U.S. Navy Ticonderoga class cruiser in the Red Sea on December 22, 2024.

As we detailed in our previous coverage of the incident, the F/A-18F was returning to the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman, after conducting a refueling mission. The Carrier Strike Group had been busy fending off a sustained Houthi drone and missile attack in the run-up to the incident. Indeed, a series of errors and misjudgements meant that the Super Hornet had been identified by the warship as a Houthi anti-ship cruise missile, like others fired at the strike group.

“After successfully returning from its initial mission, an F/A-18F launched again to provide air defense support from OWAs and ASCMs [one-way attack drones and anti-ship cruise missiles] that were inbound to the force,” a U.S. official told TWZ at the time. “They were shot down while recovery of remaining aircraft was underway.”

The F/A-18F was downed by a Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) from the cruiser USS Gettysburg. Both crew members ejected from their jet and were recovered. Initial reports indicated that one of the crew members had minor injuries.

A myriad of issues, some systemic, contributed to the shootdown and the near miss, as we discussed once the report into the incident was published. How all these factors combined to cause the friendly-fire incident is something we previously examined in a study about the stresses the Red Sea deployments were putting on Navy surface combatants’ Combat Information Center (CIC), the nerve center and tactical brain of those vessels.

During the same operation in the Red Sea, Gettysburg also almost shot down another Super Hornet, too.

What all these incidents have in common is the fact that the complexities of aerial warfare make this an unpredictable and hazardous business, especially when split-second decisions have to be made. The proliferation of varied threats, as well as the fact that U.S. forces may have to fight alongside allies using different weapons, doctrines, and operating procedures, only adds to the challenge.

In all of these cases, the incidents occurred in high-threat environments with multiple layers of hazards, some of which can be very hard to detect and categorize, and which increasingly arrive simultaneously. As well as more traditional threats, like cruise and ballistic missiles, and aircraft, these increasingly include (and are enhanced by) electronic warfare and other emerging threats.

It is a sometimes-cruel irony that, while U.S. and allied forces are optimized to suppress and destroy hostile threats, this sometimes makes the positive identification of non-threat assets harder. Moreover, while technology, such as enhanced IFF and datalink systems, aims to decrease the chances of a blue-on-blue incident, these systems don’t always work as advertised, especially in a coalition environment.

Even the close-to-reality nature of combat exercises provides a risk of friendly fire. A case in point that we have looked at in the past involved the shootdown of a U.S. Navy A-6E Intruder on June 4, 1996, during the Rim of the Pacific maneuvers, or RIMPAC. The strike jet was flying off the Forrestal class aircraft carrier USS Independence when it was accidentally shot down by a Mark 15 Phalanx close-in weapons system, or CIWS, aboard the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Asagiri class destroyer Yugiri.

A much more confused situation exists over the battlefields in the Ukraine war. Here, a much more diverse collection of air defense assets is at work, of both Soviet and Western origin. An even greater potential for blue-on-blue exists since many of the same (or very similar) air defense systems and combat aircraft are facing off against each other. Aircraft missions are also regularly flown much closer to the ground, and in proximity to ground forces, meaning the reaction times are even more limited. Both Russia and Ukraine have experienced friendly-fire incidents, bringing down fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and drones. In one of the most prominent such incidents, it was claimed that one of the first F-16s delivered to Ukraine was shot down by a Patriot missile due to a lack of coordination between the units.

Just as we expected, B-2 Spirits have entered the air campaign against Iran last night. Flying global airpower missions from their home base in Whiteman, Missouri, America’s stealth bombers arrived over Iranian airspace in the early morning hours and targeted Iran’s missile caves. These facilities are built deep under mountains and are primarily used for storage, but some of them actually have the ability to launch ballistic missiles through fissures in their ceilings.

Yesterday, I wrote on X what was to come for the B-2 and the air war, stating:

B-2s will likely show up tonight, making direct attacks on key targets in a way no other platform can. Yes this could include MOPs, but also lots of JDAMs against less fortified targets. They can achieve massive effects in a single sortie. One B-2 can carry 80 500lb JDAMs. Entire airfield’s infrastructure gone on a single pass. They would not be employed until the night and they now have the benefit of highly degraded air defenses and disrupted command and control. This is when the air campaign will change.

There were some indications that B-2 movements were underway, including tanker sorties from the Azores that didn’t have a visible ‘customer.’

Prioritizing missile cave complexes as a target for America’s ‘silver bullet’ stealth bomber force is an obvious decision. As we have stated for years, destroying these complexes is challenging. They are made up of different chambers that can be sealed off from one another. So very complex weaponeering and a large quantity of specialized munitions would be needed to even attempt destroying them completely.

Iran military shows footage giving tour of underground ‘missile city’

On the other hand, these facilities have a massive vulnerability. You don’t need to destroy them to put the missiles and launchers stored inside totally out of action. You just need to seal them off and keep them sealed off during a conflict. This can be done by striking near the entrances to the fortified caverns. By keeping an eye on these openings using remote sensing after initial strikes, deciding if and when further strikes are needed can be done with high confidence, as efforts to open the entrances back up can be seen and responded to.

So, just by bottling these facilities up, you make the arsenals held within them useless. In addition, some of the entrances have rock formations that climb more gradually above them, meaning penetrators can actually burrow to a depth where the tunnels themselves exist, not just entrance areas. Striking here makes reopening the caverns even more challenging.

There is one complicating factor when trying to put these facilities out of action — some of them have apertures in their ceilings that allows ballistic missiles to be launched without them leaving the facility. Some even have automated rapid-loading systems to fire the missiles off quickly. This means that missiles can still be fired from them even if the entrances are temporarily sealed. The good news is that the overhead doors that protect the launch bays can be penetrated, and the bays themselves destroyed. This would specifically be a good job for the B-2.

By going after these cave complexes, scores of launchers and missiles can be taken off the table. That means fewer missiles to hunt for in the open, which is a very challenging and resource-consuming kind of interdiction mission, to say the least. As such, these installations would be among the highest priority of targets, along with Iranian command and control capabilities. There is currently a race on when it comes to the supply of missiles and counter-missile capabilities. As we have discussed at length, interceptor stocks are not in a good place. For every missile kept out of the fight, that is one (or more) less interceptors that does not need to be expended.

The B-2 has unique conventional weapons capabilities that have become famous. A single Spirit can carry 80 500-pound JDAMs that can all fly miles from their launch point and hit individual targets with exacting precision. A single pass from one B-2 over an airfield can destroy all of the base’s non-hardened infrastructure, for instance. But it’s the B-2’s bunker-busting capabilities that get the most attention.

The Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOP) used to attack Fordow in June are the ultimate non-nuclear bunker buster. But these 30,000-pound weapons are very few in number, and only two can be carried by each B-2. Because of the compartmentalized nature of some of the missile caves, just how effective they would be at destroying the complexes is questionable. If intelligence existed that would allow for perfect weapons placement, it’s possible they would have been used.

More likely, the B-2s would have used more common bunker busters for this kind of mission. These include 2,000-pound-class BLU-109-warhead equipped GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). The BLU-109-equipped JDAMs are common across American combat aircraft, but the B-2 can carry 16 of them, not a couple like a fighter would, on a typical mission. The B-2’s arsenal may also now include new GBU-72 5,000-pound-class bunker busters, a bomb developed to bridge some of the gap between the BLU-109 and the MOP. A mix of these weapons can be carried in order to tailor the damage to different areas of a missile cave complex.

The smaller weapons would likely have been capable of collapsing runner entrances and destroying the missile launch apertures at the limited number of sites equipped with them.

Then there is another question some are bound to ask, why use a B-2? Why not a B-52 or B-1? The answer there is multi-fold, but the biggest driver in this regard is the B-2’s stealth capabilities. The airspace over Iran is not fully secured. There are still threats, some of which are novel to Iran, and others are road mobile and can pop up at any time. Taking every advantage — careful mission planning based on the latest intelligence, electronic warfare, and cyber support, and escorts that can take out counter-air threats in real time — is still a necessity. Also, the B-2 crews train for just this type of mission and likely have familiarity with the target sets in mind. So they will be used for direct bomber attacks for the foreseeable future.

As to why the B-2s flew such a long mission instead of operating from a forward location, the answer there is relatively clear. As we reported last week, the United Kingdom has not allowed the U.S. to launch strikes from its bases against Iran. This includes two locations that are fully equipped to sustain bomber operations and are relevant in proximity to the Iranian mission — RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. While the B-2 community has been training to launch limited operations from other forward locations in recent years, these locales are not equipped to sustain sorties. So, flying from home, at least at this point, was clearly the best option.

We will likely be seeing more of the B-2s in the coming days, especially as the air war moves from targeting immediate threats and focuses on destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and its military industrial complex — especially the parts of it that develop and construct ballistic missiles and other standoff weaponry that threaten Israel and Iran’s neighbors.

UPDATE: 4:47 Eastern –

The U.K. government has more details about the revised level of support it is willing to provide the United States in its campaign directed against Iran. The United Kingdom is now offering the U.S. military use of its bases for strikes targeting Iranian missile sites. You can read more about why this became an issue in our story about the controversy here.

In a video shared on social media Sunday, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said: “Our partners in the Gulf have asked us to do more to defend them, and it’s my duty to protect British lives.

“We have British jets in the air as part of coordinated defensive operations which have already successfully intercepted Iranian strikes.

“But the only way to stop the threat is to destroy the missiles at source — in their storage depots or the launchers which used to fire the missiles. The United States has requested permission to use British bases for that specific and limited defensive purpose.

“We have taken the decision to accept this request — to prevent Iran firing missiles across the region, killing innocent civilians, putting British lives at risk and hitting countries that have not been involved.”

Given Starmer’s new stance, it is possible we could see movements of B-2s and other bombers to either or both of the bases at the center of the controversy. As we have already noted, the U.S. has beefed up Diego Garcia with F-16 Fighting Falcons.

However, we don’t know the timeline for Operation Epic Fury. If it only lasts a few days, it is possible that the B-2s and other bombers could continue to fly from bases in the U.S. We just don’t know yet. 

A flight of four B-2 Spirit stealth bombers returning to Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri after bombing Iran had to divert to Dyess Air Force Base in Texas. The aircraft — PETRO41, PETRO42, PETRO43 and PETRO44 — reportedly altered their course due to weather issues at Whiteman.

You can see some of the jets landing in the following video.

Multiple airlines have made the decision to suspend services across the Middle East, which is also affecting other routes.

Airlines from across the world have continued to cancel flights across the Middle East after the US and Israel launched “major combat operations” across Iran. It prompted retaliatory strikes across the Middle East – hitting Dubai, Doha, Bahrain and Kuwait, all home to US bases, as well as Israel.

Airspace across the countries has remained virtually empty. Major Middle Eastern airports, including Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha have been shut or severely restricted as a result.

Many Brits enjoy holidaying in the likes of Dubai and have faced delays to their scheduled plans. The UK Foreign Office has told Brits not to travel to Israel or Palestine, and is advising people already in destinations such as Dubai, Bahrain and Kuwait to seek shelter.

In a statement on its website the Foreign Office said: “Due to the threat posed by escalation in the region, we recommend against all travel to Israel and Palestine. On 28 February 2026, the US and Israel commenced joint military action in Iran, Israeli airspace has now closed.”

The Foreign Office has also updated its advice for British citizens currently in destinations including Dubai, Bahrain and Kuwait. It said: “Remain indoors in a secure location, avoid all travel and follow instructions from the local authorities.”

The situation is quickly changing, so anyone due to fly in the coming days should also seek advise from their flight operator.

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Cancelled flights to the Middle East

Aegean Airlines – Greece’s largest airline has suspended flights to Tel Aviv in Israel, Beirut in Lebanon and Erbil in Iraq until March 2.

Air Astana – All flights to the Middle East have been cancelled until March 3.

Air Canada – All flights from Canada to Israel have been cancelled until March 8. All flights to Dubai have been cancelled until March 3.

Air Europa – The Spanish airline has cancelled flights to Tel Aviv and is monitoring the situation to assess operations on Tuesday.

Air France KLM – All flights to and from Tel Aviv and Beirut cancelled for Saturday. Dutch KLM weekend flights to and from Dubai, Dammam and Riyadh have been cancelled.

Azerbaijan Airlines – All flights to and from Dubai, Doha, Jeddah and Tel Aviv suspended.

British Airways – Flights to Tel Aviv and Bahrain cancelled until March 3.

Cathay Pacific – Flights to and from Dubai and Riyadh suspended.

Emirates – All flights to and from Dubai suspended until March 2.

Etihad – Flights from Abu Dhabi suspended until 2pm local time on Sunday.

FlyDubai – All flights to and from Dubai suspended until 3pm local time on Sunday.

ITA Airways – Flights to and from Tel Aviv and not using airspace of Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Iran until March 7.

Lot Polish Airlines – Flights to Tel Aviv suspended until March 15. Flights to Dubai and Riyadh cancelled until March 2.

Lufthansa – Flights to and from Tel Aviv in Israel, Beirut in Lebanon and Oman suspended until March 7. Flights to and from Dubai on Saturday and Sunday suspended.

Norwegian Air – All flights to and from Dubai suspended until March 4.

Pegasus Airlines – Flights to Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon were cancelled up to and including March 2.

Qatar Airways – Flights suspended due to closure of Quatari airspace. Update coming by 9am local time on Monday.

Turkish Airlines – Flights to Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Oman cancelled on Saturday. Flights to Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Jordan cancelled until March 2.

Wizz Air – Flights to and from Israel, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Amman halted with immediate effect until March 7.

Knock-on effect

Air India – Flights from Delhi, Mumbai and Amritsar to London, New York, Chicago, Toronto, Frankfurt and Paris on Sunday have been cancelled. More flights to London, Birmingham, Amsterdam, Zurich, Milan, Vienna, Copenhagen and Frankfurt had been cancelled.

IndiGo – Temporary suspension of international flights using Middle Eastern airspace until Monday.

Japan Airlines – Cancelled flight on Saturday from Tokyo Haneda to Doha and return flight on March 1.

Lufthansa – Will not fly through Israeli, Lebanese, Jordanian, Iraqi and Iranian airspace until March 7.

Virgin Atlantic – Will avoid Iraqi airspace, resulting in some pre-planned rerouting of flights.

Feb. 28 (UPI) — Firefighters in East Texas rescued two people after the hot air balloon they were traveling in struck a cell phone tower and left them stranded, local officials said.

In a Facebook post, the Longview Fire Department said the incident happened around 8:15 a.m. in north Gregg County. Neither of the occupants were injured.

After the balloon hit the cell tower, it became stuck about 920 feet in the air.

“Climbing operations began around 8:50 a.m. using multiple rope systems due to the extreme height and complexity of the incident,” the post said.

The rescuers reached the balloon occupants around 10 a.m. and both were brought to the ground.

Longview is about 130 miles east of Dallas and 65 mile west of Shreveport, La.

Amid the apparent movement of U.S. Air Force refueling aircraft from an airbase in Qatar, the United States has urged its citizens to leave Israel immediately as the threat of a strike on Iran looms ever larger. U.S. President Donald Trump has assembled two carrier strike groups in the region as part of a significant military build-up and has continued to express doubt that Iran is serious about ending its nuclear program.

You can get a good sense of the state of play and the possible questions surrounding possible military action in our previous story here.

Available satellite imagery from yesterday indicates that the aerial refueling aircraft formerly present at Al Udeid, the major U.S. Air Force hub in Qatar, have been moved. In previous days, imagery had revealed between seven and 15 KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft at the base. However, C-17A Globemaster III transports can still be seen at the base, which would be consistent with supplies flowing in ahead of a contingency. C-130 Hercules-series transports also seen on the tarmac are likely part of the special operations presence at the airbase. Moving assets out of Al Udeid, which would be among the highest-priority targets for Iran if hostilities break out, would be expected ahead of a major U.S. operation against Tehran, as was the case last year.

US Justice Department accuses former Air Force officer Gerald Brown of training Chinese military pilots.

A former United States Air Force officer and “elite fighter pilot” has been arrested and accused of betraying his country for illegally providing training to Chinese military pilots.

The US Department of Justice said ex-Air Force Major Gerald Brown, once known by his pilot’s call sign “Runner”, was arrested on Wednesday in Indiana and charged with a criminal complaint for providing and conspiring to provide defence services to Chinese pilots without authorisation.

Brown, 65, a former F-35 Lightning II instructor pilot with decades of experience in the Air Force, “allegedly betrayed his country by training Chinese pilots to fight against those he swore to protect”, Roman Rozhavsky, assistant director at the FBI’s Counterintelligence and Espionage Division, said in a statement.

“The Chinese government continues to exploit the expertise of current and former members of the US armed forces to modernise China’s military capabilities. This arrest serves as a warning,” Rozhavsky said.

US Attorney Jeanine Ferris Pirro for the District of Columbia said Brown “and anyone conspiring against our Nation” will be held accountable for their actions.

According to the Justice Department, Brown served in the US Air Force for 24 years, had led combat missions and was responsible for commanding “sensitive units”, including those involved in nuclear weapons delivery systems.

After leaving the US military in 1996, Brown worked as a commercial cargo pilot before working as a defence contractor training US pilots to fly F-35 and A-10 warplanes.

Brown is alleged to have travelled to China in December 2023 to begin his work training Chinese pilots, and he remained in the country until returning to the US in early February 2026.

His contract to train Chinese pilots was negotiated by Stephen Su Bin, a Chinese national who in 2016 pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four years in prison for conspiring to hack a defence contractor in the US to steal military secrets for China, according to the Justice Department.

The department said Brown faces charges similar to those levelled against former US Marine Corps pilot Daniel Duggan, who was arrested in Australia in 2022 and is currently fighting his extradition back to the US, where he faces prosecution for violating the US Arms Export Control Act for providing pilot training to the Chinese armed forces.

Duggan appeared in an Australian court in October 2025 to appeal against his extradition, which was approved in December 2024 by Australia’s then Attorney General Mark Dreyfus.

Duggan, 57, a naturalised Australian citizen, was arrested by Australian police in 2022 shortly after returning from China, where he had lived since 2014.

According to the Reuters news agency. Duggan’s lawyer, Christopher Parkin, told the court that his client’s extradition to the US was “uncharted territory” for Australia.

He argued that his client’s conduct was not an offence in Australia at the time or when the US requested extradition, and so did not meet the requirement for dual criminality in Australia’s extradition treaty with the US.

The governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the US published a notice in 2024 warning current and former members of their armed forces that China was seeking to recruit them and other NATO military personnel in order to harness Western military expertise and bolster its own capabilities.

“The insight the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] gains from Western military talent threatens the safety of the targeted recruits, their fellow service members, and US and allied security,” the notice stated.

“Those providing unauthorized training or expertise services to a foreign military can face civil and criminal penalties,” it added.

So, here we are, once again. The United States has flooded the Middle East with combat capabilities. A massive investment has already been made in airframe hours, manpower, and naval resources in preparation for what could be the biggest initial military action America has taken in more than 20 years. Such an operation is not without absolutely massive risks. Iran has prepared for this day for many decades, and so many questions remain outstanding. Glaring ones. Ones that impact the globe and especially those tasked with fighting what could very well be a bloody war that has, at least at this time, highly opaque goals.

Let’s talk about those questions.

What is the goal?

This is the biggest unknown. What are we getting into here? Aside from the possibility that this is a giant feint — a hammer and anvil tactic to force a diplomatic outcome — there have to be clear military goals. Would an air campaign be focused on destroying Iran’s nuclear program alone? There are limitations to achieving that goal with airpower. Israel, too, is well aware of this. Is this goal to be paired with absolutely neutering Iran’s military-industrial base, along with its existing combat capabilities? That would seem more likely, but doing so would require a much larger, sustained operation.

There have also been reports that the White House is eyeing a limited operation in order to force Iran to make a deal. This seems wildly reckless both on a military and diplomatic level, and I doubt these reports are true. The Pentagon would never recommend this. It would ruin any element of surprise and the cumulative impact of using everything at its disposal to shock, blind, and deafen Iran’s command and control. It would also likely result in Iran counter-attacking, which sets off a chain of events that will be hard to pull back from.

Then there is regime change. That term comes with immense baggage for obvious and totally relevant reasons. Even if this goal is achieved — the collapse of the current regime — mainly through strikes, what comes next? Is there a plan in place for who will succeed Khamenei, and what would that group’s own goals be? How would they seize power when the power vacuum appears? Or will decapitating the regime throw Iran into civil war or even worse, a country controlled by the fanatical IRGC, which, on paper, would seem to be a prime candidate with the might and infrastructure to assume control.

In other words, could lopping off the head of the snake just see another, even more gruesome serpent take its place?

We don’t know the intelligence or what is going on clandestinely to see that such a risky operation has any chance of long-term success. Without a solid plan, such a move would seem to only invite more risk.

And once again, obtaining this level of transformation largely via airpower is a highly questionable proposition, at best. There is absolutely no appetite domestically to engage in another ground war in the Middle East, so that option is a non-starter, which is a good thing, as America’s track record in this regard is terrible.

Finally, as we have mentioned before, the U.S. military has a lot of combat capability now in the region, and more that can strike from afar, but there doesn’t appear to be enough to sustain a long campaign with a wider set of objectives. So this may limit what can be achieved.

That brings us to the next question.

What will Israel’s role be?

I think it’s safe to assume that Israel will be involved deeply in any major military operation the United States executes against Iran. Frankly, for any sustained campaign, based on the airpower capabilities in the region, America will need Israel’s help, and for that to be en masse.

Israel brings hundreds of fighter aircraft, unique munitions, and more to the fight. Supported fully by America’s tanker force, Israel’s tactical airpower will be far more effective than it was during the 12 Day War less than a year ago. Combining forces fully to achieve a common outcome is more powerful than the sum of its parts in this case.

Beyond traditional airpower, leveraging Israel’s intelligence would be critical. Traditional intelligence products from Israel will be key in achieving any outcome faster in an air war. The same can be said for the flow of U.S. information in Israel’s direction. Still, operating seamlessly is very tough in such a complex, long-range combat scenario. While Israel and the United States have repeatedly trained on smaller scales for this type of operation, doing it on a massive scale is a different story. How the tasking orders would be assigned and deconflicted would be very interesting to watch.

But even above the traditional combat power and intelligence Israel can offer such a mission, Israel’s deep presence on the ground in Iran will be arguably of the greatest value. Nobody is anywhere as deeply embedded inside Iran as Israel. And this will impact the full gamut of potential operational scenarios.

Case in point is the Mossad’s novel operation to take out Iran’s air defenses in key areas using operatives on the ground equipped with one-way attack drones and loitering anti-tank guided missiles. While suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses is largely thought to be relegated to the role of airpower, it is anything but limited to just this domain. And Israel proved this on an unprecedented level in the opening stages of the air war in June. Those near-field attacks on Iranian air defense sites allowed standoff munitions, drones, and eventually manned aircraft to make it to their targets, firmly setting the momentum in Israel’s favor during the opening parts of the campaign. It wouldn’t be that surprising if this is repeated, at least in some altered fashion, during whatever could happen in the coming days.

Mossad operatives on the ground also worked to assassinate the cream of Iran’s nuclear scientist corps during the operation, mainly using drones launched from near their targets. We would likely see a similar operation take place against military and regime leadership in the opening stages of the looming conflict, if it comes to pass. There are no indications that the United States has anywhere near this capability working inside Iran.

As we have discussed for years, Israel would likely be willing to put special operations units on the ground to seize and destroy absolutely critical hardened targets, such as nuclear sites or possibly individuals hidden within regime bunkers, that are not capable of being destroyed from the air. The United States could as well, but the political risks would be far higher if such an operation went awry.

Finally, it is worth noting that going to war alongside Israel against Iran brings additional diplomatic risks in the region, although these have waned in recent years as Arab countries have become far less hostile to the Jewish State. These Arab states also could see a massive benefit from a successful campaign that rejiggers the status quo in the region and ends Iran’s troublesome influence throughout it. Still, the economic disruption alone could be large, especially if the war carries and if Iran actively works to deny access to the Persian Gulf.

Real dangers

We have not seen modern Iran fight for its very life against the United States or even Israel. On paper, Iran can do immense damage to the region. Yes, it can close and mine the Strait of Hormuz, causing massive repercussions that could last long after the war ends, a possibility which you can read about here. This is a well-understood danger. But above even that, Iran has an absolutely huge inventory of standoff weapons — specifically cruise missiles, long-range one-way attack drones, and most importantly, ballistic missiles. On the latter, there is a broad misconception that Israel wiped out Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities. This couldn’t be further from the truth.

During the 12 Day War, Israel was concerned with Iran’s long-range ballistic missiles — MRBMs and IRBMs. These are also the easiest to find, fix, and destroy. They are large and their launchers are vulnerable because of it, especially during the pre-launch fueling stage. The location of the storage areas for these missiles is well known, including the missile cave complexes, some of which have the ability to launch the missiles through apertures in launch room ceilings. By hitting the entry and exit points of these facilities, these weapons are not destroyed but they are trapped inside.

In addition, Israel focused their interdiction ‘missile hunting’ efforts on these long-range weapons that threaten its homeland. They were also the weapons that had to be exposed as they were employed in retaliatory strikes during the war. The shorter-range stuff didn’t need to be as it was largely not used.

To make this clear, Iran’s far more plentiful short-range ballistic missiles that threaten American bases in Gulf Arab allied states were not heavily targeted. The same can be said for the shorter-range drones and cruise missiles.

So no, these capabilities were not knocked out by any means, and they are also by far the easiest for Iran to disperse and hide. This makes hunting for them from the air extremely problematic. This is especially true when Iran enters into a combat state, where it distributes these missiles, which are largely loaded onto common truck platforms, into population centers and hidden under pretty much anything. They can also shoot and scoot much faster than their long-range counterparts.

The IRGC-N took a massive delivery of anti ship missiles for coastal defense

Note the dual tube launcher in the pics, which we’ve never seen before. Seems to be a new anti ship new cruise missile. Sadly no information was given besides pics

My guess is possible supersonic AShM pic.twitter.com/i7i0z8uFc0

— Iran Defense commentary (unofficial) (@IranDefense) August 9, 2024

With all of America’s intelligence capabilities, finding and destroying these weapons from the air will be extremely challenging. Even the relatively meager arsenal belonging to Yemen’s Houthis proved vexing for the U.S. military after many months of sustained ‘hunting.’ The Houthis continued to get off successful coastal launches throughout these operations. The scale of the Iranian threat is exponentially larger, and the country has more complex terrain to hide these weapons.

Iran’s shorter-range standoff weapons number in the thousands. They have the ability to saturate the best defenses on earth and lay waste to prized targets across the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, and deeper into allied Arab nations. This not only makes nearby basing of U.S. aircraft and personnel problematic, but it greatly increases the cost of any war the United States could execute against Iran.

We have seen what it took to defend against just one volley of Iranian short-range ballistic missiles. It resulted in the largest volley of Patriot interceptors in history. Even that defensive action wasn’t entirely successful at rebuffing the attack, let alone repeated ones that would include layers of drones, as well as cruise and ballistic missiles.

Footage of a US/Qatari PATRIOT surface to air missile system conducting a large ballistic missile engagement over Al-Udeid this evening, salvoing out dozens of PAC-3 interceptors at incoming Iranian ballistic missiles. pic.twitter.com/a7OHrs9svr

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 23, 2025

There is also a risk to American warships, even those that are operating far out to sea. Iran has shown it has the ability to launch long-range anti-ship weaponry not just from its coasts and warships, but from unassuming seaborne platforms, including using containerized missiles and drones. The farther U.S. Navy vessels have to operate from Iranian territory also means their missiles won’t be able to penetrate as far into the country. A carrier’s air wing will need additional tanking support to get to its targets, and sortie rates will be lowered.

These capabilities, along with the possibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz, drastically increase the chances of expanding the conflict by pulling Arab countries into it, as well, which would complicate, not help the cause, at least in many respects.

Iran knows full well where American aircraft are currently based, and they will throw everything they have at these sites. This includes America’s sprawling airbase in Jordan that is packed with tactical airpower. They know what defenses are there and have an understanding of what it will take to overwhelm them if they get the chance to do so. So the idea that we could not see mass losses of aircraft and other materiel, and even lives, on the ground, even when striking from afar, is not reality.

The same can be said about an air war. The U.S. has the most advanced air combat capabilities on earth, but ‘shit happens,’ especially during war. Even the Houthis nearly downed U.S. fighter aircraft optimized to destroy enemy air defenses. But regardless of defenses and the state of Iran’s air defense overlay, putting Americans over Iran, and repeatedly over days and weeks, is a risk. Aircraft can malfunction and mistakes can be made. When that happens, it will require even more risk to push combat search and rescue assets into the area to try and recover the crew. In other words, regardless of America’s outstanding air warfare capabilities, there is still a real risk involved in any operation over Iran.

Finally, if Iran is really backed into a corner, and especially if its most extremist elements remain in play, it could resort to weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, chemical weapons and rudimentary radiological ones (dirty bombs) could be used in a dying gasp of the regime. If they did this, it would mean a certain end for the sitting power structure in the country, but if that is going to happen anyway, they could lash out in horrible ways. There is debate as to whether Iran would, or even could, actually do this, but historically, the regime in Tehran is no stranger to the use of chemical weapons.

Defending Israel again

Iran did not run out of long-range ballistic missiles during the 12 Day War, either. They ran out of ones available for launch, and they likely saw real degradation in their ability to launch those accessible due to Israel’s interdiction efforts and disarray in Iranian command and control after nearly two weeks of being bombarded. Since that war, Iran has been pumping out more of these missiles at a high rate, despite Israel’s attacks on missile production-related targets. Some of these weapons are quite advanced, proving their ability to penetrate the IDF’s multi-tier integrated air defense system, the most advanced one on Earth, an air defense capability you can read all about here.

At the same time, the 12 Day War saw the United States and Israel burn through stocks of advanced interceptors, especially the mid-course or near mid-course intercept-capable ones. These weapons take years to produce and cost many millions of dollars each. Israel’s coveted Arrow system was reported to be running low on interceptors towards the end of the war, although how accurate those reports were is in question. The U.S. military burned through a large portion of its THAAD interceptors and many of the U.S. Navy’s prized SM-3 interceptors. This is on top of Israel ripping through countless Stunners fired by David’s Sling. The U.S. also fired a considerable number of PAC-3 Patriots and air-to-air missiles during the conflict while defending in areas outside of Israel from missile and drone attacks. But it’s the stockpile of the upper tier of missile defense interceptors that is most concerning.

If Iran was truly fighting for its life and knowing the end could be near, how many missiles will it send at Israel, and how many interceptors are available to defend against those barrages? Iran also has become increasingly savvy on what tactics to employ and where in order to overwhelm Israel’s defenses. While targeting has focused, at least to a degree, on military and governmental targets, if this was an all-out conflict, it’s likely Iran would just concentrate on population centers with whatever it has to throw at the cause.

The U.S. stockpile of advanced munitions is already a real concern after multiple campaigns to defend Israel, the long and violent standoff in the Red Sea, and the war in Ukraine. This is especially true for its more advanced interceptors, which are also in extreme demand among allies globally. This is all happening as the threat from China is growing more concerning by the day. A war in the Pacific will consume stocks of these weapons at a vastly higher rate than anything we have seen before. If those magazines run dry, it could mean the difference between winning and losing in that critical theater. And remember, these weapons take years to produce and cost many millions of dollars each. So it’s not like you can just say, ‘we’ll buy more.’ Of course, we will, but we won’t get those weapons for years, even as expansion of production is now underway across the DoW’s munitions portfolio.

So the cost of taking on Iran is not just in money and assets, and especially blood, it’s the opportunity cost of expending precious weapons in a war of choice that would be essential in a war of necessity that could erupt at any time.

Wild cards

There are capabilities and war plans we know nothing about. It may be possible that the United States thinks it can break Iran’s command and control capabilities so quickly that it can preempt many of its most dangerous weapons from being used in large quantities. This could come in the form of cyber attacks, other forms of espionage, electronic warfare, and exotic weaponry — and more likely a combination of the above. It could also be the orchestration of an insider coup-like scenario.

There is also the possibility that the United States thinks Iran’s military apparatus would simply collapse under a full combined aerial assault by the U.S. and Israel. A possible decapitation of the regime is another factor here.

If this is the case, and Iran’s warfighting capabilities can be left largely unused, then the risk equation changes. But this is a massive bet to make, and just how certain whatever measures are used will have the exact crippling effects intended could mean the difference between go and no-go for a major campaign.

In other words, we really don’t know what the United States and Israel still have up their sleeves. And maybe they have nothing that would cause such a dramatic effect at all. Instead, hitting them traditionally fast and hard, along with cyber, espionage, electronic warfare, and everything else, will be needed to erode Iran’s ability to fight back over time.

Regardless, the United States and Israel have prepared for exactly this eventuality for decades, so there certainly are bound to be some surprises. Of what magnitude is the question.

What if a deal is made, but Israel doesn’t think it’s good enough?

It’s possible that the game tree could expand in such a way that the United States makes a nuclear deal with Iran, but it does not address the long-range missile threat, or even the nuclear program, to a sufficient degree in Israel’s eyes. If this occurs, there is still the chance that Israel goes it alone and tries to do as much damage as possible to both of these elements. In some ways, this could be played to America’s advantage as it could deny being involved in the conflict and work to see if the deal sticks even after Israel’s kinetic action. In this case, American resources would be used to defend Israel, but not participate in the attack.

This may sound far-fetched, but it really isn’t an impossibility. Especially if Trump realizes how much of a commitment achieving something meaningful via an air campaign could become, as well as the risks of what comes after on the ground in Iran.

Whether a nuclear deal would even survive such a situation is unclear, but it’s possible.

Why now?

In the end, these are the fundamental questions Trump has to be asking himself and his aides: Is going to war with Iran really worth the risks, both the known ones and unknown ones, and what is the goal in doing so? Is that goal readily attainable and at what cost?

These questions also bleed directly into the political arena. Trump claimed to be the President that would get America out of wars, not start them, and especially ones that seem like they could spiral out of control relatively easily, resulting in much longer-term commitments. While he has had some stunningly successful military victories as of late, and there is a danger for politicians to think it will always turn out a similar way, that can change very quickly. If America wakes up to seeing a U.S. pilot being dragged through the streets of Tehran, any support for this conflict could quickly evaporate.

Above all else, the question has to be asked, why now? What has prompted the idea of declaring war on Iran at this moment? Yes, the protests and the brutal deaths of thousands at the hands of the regime seemed to have moved Trump, but that was subsequently used as a pretext for nuclear negotiations, not to correct human rights abuses.

In addition, Trump has declared repeatedly that he destroyed Iran’s nuclear program after the B-2 strikes in June. So why, just eight months after that action took place, is the United States about to go all-in against Iran over its nuclear program? We have heard anecdotes about possible threats of Iran starting the nuclear program back up, the threat posed by the enriched uranium they already have, and the possibility that they could develop new, longer-range missiles that could hit the U.S. one day, maybe. Yet nothing has been presented in a concrete manner as to why doing this right now is essential. It doesn’t match Trump’s long-standing political rhetoric at all.

There is obviously much the public doesn’t know, but the risk-reward equation seems like a uniquely puzzling one with this crisis, at least at this time.

If Iran doesn’t make a deal, it seems clear that Trump has put himself in a position where he will either have his bluff called or he will need to commit to an air war against Iran.

What happens from that historic split in the road is really anyone’s guess.

Including the Pentagon’s.

Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com

The commander of Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) has said that he would like to field F-15E Strike Eagle and F-15EX Eagle II combat aircraft to help the command meet its commitment to supporting the overall Air Force mission. AFRC commander Lt. Gen. John P. Healy was speaking at the Air & Space Forces Association’s annual Warfare Symposium, where TWZ is in attendance.

Headquartered at Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, the AFRC is responsible for three numbered air forces, 34 flying wings, 10 flying groups, a space wing, a cyber wing, and an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance wing. It also has other subordinate units that help to accomplish its total-force missions.

Healy was addressing how AFRC is grappling with how best to contribute to the Air Force’s 10-year fighter jet plan, which calls for purchasing more F-15EXs, F-35s, and F-47s, as it aims to have nearly 1,400 combat-coded tactical aircraft in service by 2030. The commander noted that the plan is not only “pretty ambitious” but also that, while it has been submitted to Congress, it is still very much a work in progress.

Nevertheless, Healy said that, whatever happens, the Air Force’s future fighter plans will rely heavily on the AFRC. At the same time, this organization is facing upcoming combat aircraft retirements, including the A-10 attack jet, which the Air Force wants to withdraw entirely.

“As the commander of Air Force Reserve Command, I am keenly aware that some of my units are scheduled to divest without any plan of recapitalization,” Healy said. “Some could say I am loud and annoying when it comes to how we can ensure that we can maintain this fighting force,” he added, noting that in certain AFRC units, 100 percent of the airmen are combat veterans, and that he wants to ensure “that talent, that experience, doesn’t walk out the door during a normal, planned divestment.”

Healy is hopeful that the historic practice of aircraft divestment without recapitalization, something he said has existed over the last 14 years, is now on the way out.

“I think we’re finally at a point where we’re putting a stop to that,” Healy said. “We’re looking at maintaining our classic associations where we have them and recapping as the active duty can. For the remaining fighter units that we have that are divesting or scheduled for divestment, our full expectation is that we’re going to recap those with new weapons systems.”

There’s no doubt that many of the AFRC’s planned divestments are badly needed, with upward of 80 percent of the command’s fleet now being considered “legacy.” Healy continued: “You know, it’s code for old. Some of these airplanes need to be divested, but we also need to ensure that we are proportionately, concurrently fielded with new equipment.”

That’s where the F-15E and F-15EX could come into play.

“For every one of these A-10 units that are going away, I’m looking at if there’s a means by which we can get an F-15 unit behind it, whether it’s a Strike Eagle or an EX.”

Meanwhile, Healy said he’s also “pressing hard” to ensure that ARFC units divesting from the F-16 will be backfilled with F-35 stealth jets.

“We’ve got that combat capability,” Healy added. “We’ve got that combat experience. We need to leverage that.”

The AFRC boss also made the financial case for continuing to re-equip his command’s squadrons with new (or, failing that, newer) equipment.

According to the Air Force’s own factsheet, the AFRC provides around 14 percent of the total force within the service, while consuming only around four percent of the total manpower budget.

“My job is to constantly remind the programmers and remind the chief and the secretary of the value proposition, the advantage of the Reserve, because at the end of the day, we’re providing a little bit more money that we can reinvest into other things as well.”

Healy said that, when it comes to operating the F-16, an AFRC squadron does that “$12 million cheaper than the active duty can.”

The savings on F-15 units would be even more compelling, Healy argued, with an AFRC Strike Eagle squadron working out as $28 million cheaper than the active-duty equivalent, or $24 million in the case of the F-15EX.

There remains a question, however, around just how feasible it might be for the ARFC to get the F-15E or F-15EX. For all their undoubted capabilities, these types are both in short supply and high demand.

The Air Force’s planned F-15EX numbers have fluctuated repeatedly over the last few years. Under the Fiscal Year 2026 budget proposal, the Air Force’s program of record is now set to grow from 98 to 129 aircraft, with the addition of at least one more squadron, which will be converting from the A-10.

Originally, the Air Force had a minimum number of 144 F-15EX aircraft to replace the F-15C/D force. Some of the Eagle units have switched to other platforms since then, but units that fly A-10s, F-16s, and even F-15Es could end up getting F-15EX if the service chooses to go such a route. It seems quite possible that further growth of the program could occur, and that would seem to be a prerequisite if the ARFC is to get the Eagle II as well.

When it comes to the F-15E, the Air Force inventory numbers 218 aircraft, of which 119 are powered by the older F100-PW-220 turbofan engines that produce some 23,500 pounds of thrust each. The other 99 have the F100-PW-229s, each of which is rated at 29,000 pounds of thrust.

The Air Force previously aspired to retire the Dash-220-powered jets by the end of Fiscal Year 2028.

The Air Force has argued that it needs to retire its older F-15Es to help free up resources for its future modernization plans, but lawmakers have been concerned about dwindling numbers of available tactical aircraft if this were to happen.

The possibility of transferring F-15Es from active-duty units to Air National Guard (or AFRC) units is something that TWZ has discussed in depth in this previous feature.

As far as the AFRC is concerned, the best chance of getting its hands on F-15Es will almost certainly be provided by the return stateside of the two squadrons of Dash-229-powered Strike Eagles currently at RAF Lakenheath in England. These are due to be replaced by F-35s in the future. For the time being, they are the only permanently forward-deployed F-15Es, which remain the service’s first choice for a wide variety of critical missions around the globe.

Another option, and one we have explored in the past, would be to pass on the Dash-220-powered jets to the AFRC, and it is somewhat surprising the Air Force hasn’t floated this idea before when it has sought to offload the older, less-powerful Strike Eagles.

Asked by TWZ about the likelihood of F-15Es making their way to his command, the AFRC commander responded: “I am optimistic that we’ve at least got people listening to the value that we provide, the combat capability we provide, the experience that we provide. We’ve proven it over and over again. We’re efficient, we’re experienced, we’re 100 percent accessible as a reserve force, and we’re lethal in all these mission sets. I think our message is sounding in a positive way with senior leadership within the Air Force. I’m not going to cash the check yet, but I’m optimistic about our future in terms of recapitalizing some of our units.”

Many of the savings that the AFRC makes are a result of the efficiencies that are baked into its ‘business’ practices. Of the 67,000 airmen that make up the command, 14,000 are full-timers.

“Those full-timers are the ones that keep the lights on day-to-day,” Healy continued. Our business model is such that a typical unit will have 25 percent full-timers, and they run that unit for 28 days of the month. It’s only that one weekend a month that we’re at 100 percent — full strength. So those cost savings, right there, are what allow us to realize benefits. It adds up when we start putting it into big numbers like that.”

Whether examples of the F-15E Strike Eagle or F-15EX Eagle II end up on Air Force Reserve Command ramps remains to be seen, but in Lt. Gen. John P. Healy, that component has a strong advocate for making that happen.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The U.S. buildup of forces in the Middle East ahead of a possible attack on Iran relies very heavily on the performance of the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC). Hundreds of its cargo jets and aerial refueling tankers have moved materiel into theater and helped tactical jets, radar planes and other aircraft deploy across oceans to places like Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, among many other locations. At the same time, the current crisis in the Middle East pales in comparison to the massive spike in demand for airborne logistics that would occur during a Pacific fight against China. Regardless, ever greater demand is being placed on an increasingly aging AMC fleet.

Few people know the nuts and bolts of AMC and its mission better than Michael “Mini” Minihan, a retired Air Force general who led the command from October 2021 to November 2024. In a 45-minute interview, Minihan offered his insights on that and a whole host of other topics. They include the current crisis and its airlift demands, challenges from China, future airframes, arming airlifters and refuelers, the connectivity issues he championed, AI and the leaked memo that put a cap on his career.

Since retiring, Minihan serves as a strategic advisor and board member to defense and technology companies, non-profits, and think tanks while continuing to write and speak on leadership, national security, and the future of air mobility and global power projection.

Some of the questions and answers have been edited for clarity.

Q: The C-17 Globemaster III heavy lifters have been supporting one crisis after another it seems. Have the hours accumulated faster on those airframes? What do you think should replace them and when? 

A: All the things I was concerned about while I was in uniform, I remain concerned about right now. The options on the table are service life extension programs [SLEP] that the C-17 is already a candidate for. There was talk late last year about the KC-135 Stratotanker receiving another [SLEP]. You know, those types of things are concerning to me. At the end of the day, I think this nation needs to pay for the Air Force it needs, and the Air Force that it needs has a modern, capable mobility fleet. It’s not just old stuff that keeps getting patched up to get older. That’s the reality. So I’m concerned.

Q: Right now, a massive buildup is underway in the Middle East. AMC is doing the heavy lifting there as always. But in a crisis in the Pacific, would we have enough airlift aircraft to support moving quick enough across that vast theater, especially to respond to an invasion of Taiwan? 

A: What you’re talking about is always a concern, regardless of the scenario. The reality is that America relies on the mobility fleet to project its power… So there’s not any scenario, even in the day-to-day competition, where you’re happy with the supply-demand intersection. So I think that we’ve got to work on capacity, certainly out of the entire mobility fleet, when it comes to the airlift and the air refueling. And then if you overlay that in contested environments, the concern gets bigger.

Q: Considering how long it has taken to build up forces in the Middle East, where tankers and cargo jets are flying over uncontested airspace, how concerned are you about being able to project enough power over long distances to protect Taiwan from an attack by China?

A: The alarm that I had when I was active duty exists today… So the reason I’m a civilian right now is because I was ringing the bell on the exact questions that you’re asking right now and that concern still remains. The reality is against a China or against a Russia, they’re going to challenge you in all domains, from great distances. They absolutely understand that the mobility fleet is America’s capability to project power quickly. So there’s going to be a focus on it. But once again, you’re describing concerns that I had and expressed when I was active duty, and I still have those same concerns.

Inside Taiwan’s Strategy to Counter a Chinese Invasion | WSJ

Q: What response did you receive when you expressed those concerns in a memo that was leaked to the public in 2023?

A: Well, I’m a civilian right now.

Q: Is that the reason why?

A: The leak created antibodies that would want me in another job. That memo was getting after all the things that you’re asking about right now. It was getting after capability and capacity. It was getting after readiness. It was getting after explode into theater. It was getting after the mobility fleet being able to do what it’s asked to do, despite being extremely vulnerable, despite it being extremely antiquated – all those things. 

I believe that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force [Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach] now is focused on modernization and readiness. Those were 100% things that I was championing very early. And I think those things exist now, and I think we need to continue to put pressure on [those things] to get the resourcing, to get not just the Air Force, but America’s mobility fleet, to the capability and capacity that it needs to be at, so that we can not have concerns about China and not have concern about [deploying] to Europe when needed.

Q: Were you fired over the memo?

A: I was not fired. I thought for two weeks that I was going to be fired, but I was thankfully allowed to serve out the rest of my command tour. But I was asked to retire.

Q: What were the biggest lessons learned by Mobility Guardian and our readiness to meet the challenge China poses in the Pacific? 

A: We’ve got to explode into theater very quickly. We’ve got to be able to explode into theater in numbers and volumes and challenges that we’ve not experienced in any of the modern…operations. We’ve got to put the entire joint force in place. We’ve got to do it quick enough that it gives an enormous deterrent value and also be able to provide that decisive victory, should it get to that.

We’ve got to transition from a deploy to an employ phase very quickly. So that’s establishing hubs and spokes. And then the last thing I’ll say – this is about maneuver. We have got to maneuver at a tempo required to win. So we got to put America’s unique and amazing capabilities in a position of advantage, and then once they’re in that position of advantage, we’ve got to be lethal, and that requires logistics, sustainment, supply maneuver, all the things that have to come together in the joint force to be lethal have to be there, and we need to work extremely hard to do that. 

So Mobility Guardian was really a rehearsal, and we demonstrated that we couldn’t explode into theater. We demonstrated that we could go from deploy to employ. But we also learned some hard lessons, and to get it to the scale and the volume of the tempo that we needed to be, we’ve got work to do.

Mobility Guardian 2023

Q: What were some of these lessons?

A: The lessons are connectivity. You probably heard me say that a bunch both in uniform and out of uniform, but connectivity became my number one thing. I testified before the House Readiness Committee on that. I came up with a concept called 25% of the fleet by 2025, but the reality is that the car I rented right now driving from the airport to my hotel room has more connectivity in it than the overwhelming majority of the mobility fleet. So connectivity matters. 

We’ve got to operate at a tempo required to win, which means we need to do extremely long missions. We need to have exquisite situational awareness. We need to understand the changing dynamic of the operational environment. When it comes to red forces, blue forces, threats, priority receivers, priority users. We’ve got diffuse information and logistic priorities across services, so there’s almost an unlimited amount of lessons learned. And then command relationships matter as well as command and control. All those things matter too. So plenty of lessons learned. I don’t think any of those are surprising. I think they’re accounted for in the Air Force’s readiness and modernization. But we also need to get resources so that we can be the Air Force this country needs.

Q: How would you peg our overall readiness, realistically, to confront China in the Pacific militarily? 

A: We’re ready. I like the way that [IndoPacific Command leader] Adm. [Sam] Paparo uses it. He says we’re ready, but he’ll never admit to being ready enough. This is kind of like the coaches that you love to play for – they are never satisfied. I would broaden it beyond readiness. I would say readiness, integration and agility of the joint force is what matters. And as ready, integrated and agile as we are, we need to be more. And those things have a deterrent value in themselves, and they’re also the essentials to decisive victory. So China enjoys positional advantage, but America enjoys extreme warfighting capabilities that can always get better, and it starts with readiness, integration and agility. We want to get to the point where we’re so ready that they don’t want to take us on.

Q; What were the three biggest problems you faced in your job and how did you go about solving them? Were you successful?

A: The three biggest problems I faced during my command tour at Air Mobility Command was resourcing, resourcing and resourcing – articulating the state of the mobility platforms and securing the resources necessary to get them on step to where they need to be. And so I said resourcing three times, and I mean it.

This is all about money. You can say everything you want. You can say all the things are important. You can say ‘you’re right, General Minihan, we agree with you,’ but if it’s not followed up with resourcing, then it’s meaningless, you know? So at the end of the day, this is all about resourcing. Can we decide to be the Air Force, the joint military that puts the resourcing behind what it means to decisively defeat a near peer adversary? Or do we wait until another December 7, or another September 11 event to finally get all the things pulled together that we need to pull together. So I get it. This is expensive. 

We’ve got a chance of a century right now, I believe, with this administration. When you line up the executive orders, when you line up the acquisition reform, when you look up the possibility of a $1.5 trillion defense budget, you know those things come together means that we can move faster and move differently than we’ve ever done but we’ve got to be ready to do it.

We can’t apply all the opportunities over the same template of how we acquire, how we take risk, how we get our warfighters the things that they need and expect a different outcome at the end of the day. The overall statement for this, and this is big into problem statements. If I were to describe the problem statement we’re trying to solve is, can we get critical war-winning capabilities to our warfighters faster than China? At the end of the day, if we can answer yes to that question, then we’re going to be okay. If it’s a maybe or a no, then we’re going to have some significant concerns moving forward.

Trump Calls For Massive Increase To Defense Spending: $1.5 Trillion For 2027

Q: Were you successful in your efforts to solve those problems?

A: Was I successful? I would say I was successful at ringing the bell. I needed three more years to get it across the line. And I’m not comparing myself to a Gen. [Curtis E.] LeMay or a Gen. [Wilbur L.] Creech, but those two [Major Command] MAJCOM commanders – who are the fathers of the modern strategic bomber force and the father of the modern fighter force –  were both MAJCOM commanders for over six years. So if I had to give myself a grade, I would say me and my teams were A-plus for effort and articulation and at the end of the day, getting the system to react quickly within three years proved extremely challenging.

Q: What was your grade for that?

A: It’s to be determined. You know, the money process takes a little time. I think there’s money for connectivity coming up in the current and the next few years, which is a great sign and a big change. If I were to grade it for what I wanted, I would have given myself a C, but I think it’s a higher grade than that, due to the circumstances, due to the realities of the budgeting and the resourcing process.

Q: What are the three biggest problems facing current interim AMC Commander Lt. Gen. Rebecca Sonkiss (formerly deputy AMC commander until Gen. John D. Lamontagne was named Air Force Vice Chief of Staff earlier this month). 

A: The problems are getting resourcing across the line. Can you deliver them? Money. You know, at the end of the day, MAJCOMs don’t have the money to get the things that they need and under the current process. So how do you affect the organizations and entities above you, so that you can align the resourcing to do the things that it needs to do, and the timelines that you need to do it when that’s always a challenge for everybody. 

Air Mobility Command (AMC) Change of Command Ceremony – Scott AFB

But if you’re asking what [Lamontagne] needs to worry about…if you look at the first Iran operation, if you look at the Venezuela operation, whatever is going to happen over the next short-term future for the Middle East, you can walk away saying, ‘we’re just fine.’ You can walk away saying, ‘Hey, we can project power over long distances. We can impose America’s will. We can do the things that our president and our nation asked us to do.’ And that’s right, you can do it under those circumstances. 

The courage of the joint team is phenomenal. The capability of the joint team is phenomenal, but it does not compare to what will happen in a near-peer fight in the Pacific or in Europe. We are going to be contested from long distances in all domains, and the fleet that we have now is not going to be successful in that environment unless we take quick action and fix things.

Q: There is a lot of hype around Rapid Dragon and giving the airlift community a ‘shooter’ role. But in a major conflict, won’t the fleet be tasked to the max just with its core logistics mission? Do we need more airframes to really do the Rapid Dragon concept justice?

A: I hear this one a lot. So here’s the reality. I’ve got to carry the missile, the bomb anyway. Okay, I’m not trying to be Global Strike. I’m not trying to be a fighter. I’m not trying to compete with capabilities that are legit and high-end when it comes to delivering kinetic effects. But if I have to carry it anyway, and there’s an ability for C-130s, C-17s  and other airlift platforms, why would you not want that capability? 

So I’m not saying it can go into the high-threat areas or the medium-threat areas. I’m not saying that it needs to be a primary mission. But let’s really look at the thing – at the entire process here. I’ve got to carry that stuff anyways, so I am either gonna stop and drop it off for someone else to shoot, or I could have the ability to do it. If a combatant commander needs a demand signal, there’s a ton of C-130s. Our foreign partners and allies operate them. These aren’t complex systems. The munitions already exist. It’s essentially air-dropping it out of the airplane. And I think it has enormous viability in the Pacific. It can service medium- to low-[threat] targets all day long that need servicing and free up the other sets to get after the high-end threat environments where they need to be focused. So I think it’s something we need to consider.

Rapid Dragon

Q: That segues nicely to my next question. What are the biggest threats China poses to our tankers and airlifters during a time of war?

A: The ability to get out of town by dropping electrical grids and navigation signals. This is true for all the platforms. This is why I say we’ll be contested at great distances in all domains. Critical infrastructure matters and getting out of town – we already talked about what it means to explode into theater. So it’d be silly to think that they’re going to not take a very inexpensive way to disrupt our ability to do that. And then, the farther you get to the threat, regardless of which way you’re heading around the ocean, you know is going to increase their ability to reach out with long-range effects and stop mobility. 

If you stop one tanker, you stop six fighters. That sounds like a good return on investment if you’re an adversary trying to prevent us from projecting power. I don’t think I’m saying anything I haven’t said before, and I don’t think I’m saying anything that’s inconsistent with others [are saying] about what the real environment is going to look like. 

They’re students of us. They have unimpeded access to our critical infrastructure for a decade or more, and we’re going to expect them to call in on their investment and impose a cost on us a great distance.

Q: Is there any particular Chinese system or munition that worries you the most?

A: What worries me the most? I’m worried, just like I was in uniform, about the multi-domain aspect for which they’re going to go after us. I’m worrying about how those all come together. Certainly, without connectivity in the mobility fleet, it’s hard for mobility aircraft to understand where the threats are, especially the kinetic threats. So our ability to understand if you’re in a threat ring or a dynamic threat environment is extremely handicapped. And certainly the kinetic ones are of the biggest concern. Like they are in any war. 

Q: We have seen interest from the DoW in multiple fronts on how to give our existing tankers better defenses, from better situational awareness to giving them mini interceptors to pairing them with [collaborative combat aircraft] CCA-like companions. What do you think the best cocktail of solutions is here?

A: The single biggest contributor to survivability in a big airplane is connectivity. The biggest contributor is not having a 12-hour-old Intel brief that you’re relying on to get you through the mission. So real-world updates, real-time updates, just like our fighters and our bombers enjoy. Battle management that gets after maneuver and not just kill chain. Those things matter. 

If you were to ask me what I would want most when it comes to survivability, it would be connectivity that gives me the situational awareness to let our young crews – our captains, our lieutenants, our NCO – go out there and make great decisions as they’re operating under delegated authorities. Connectivity matters most. No doubt. Connectivity is why I put the priority on it when I was in uniform, because it’s the single biggest contributor to survivability. I just don’t think because of the size of these airplanes, in the maturity of the threat, that we’re going to be able to rely on traditional means of survivability.

Q: What about mini interceptors, or pairing these aircraft with CCA-like companions? Would that work?

A: I mean, I love it. The whole concept we came up with, the next-generation air lift [NGAL] and next-generation air refueling systems [NGAS]. I definitely see a role for CCA beyond just loyal wingman to fighter. So we can do this with everything from a CCA version of a tanker. We can do it with a stealth version of a tanker. I don’t think we need huge numbers of those. We can do stealth-like characteristics, like blended wing. 

We can certainly have aircraft that are multirole, both cargo and air refueling. And so then you can have a lot of tankers that look like the tankers that we have now, the ability for small CCA and drones and other things to do electronic warfare and spoof and jam and other things like that are all on the table in my book and things that we should be exploring.

Q: What about a stealth tanker? Would we be able to afford it? Has adapting the B-21 Raider stealth bomber been looked at? What are your thoughts on that?

A:  I think that we’ve got to have a family approach to air refueling, and that’s where the NGAS concept came up. It’s hard for me to believe, to think that you’re going to be able, in a highly contested environment, to get our highest capabilities into the high-threat environments without having some sort of stealth-like CCA air refueling capability. I don’t think we need big numbers of them. I understand completely that they’re expensive, but we’ve got to work through that process, and we’re doing it with NGAS. So everything I’m telling you, I’ve said for years, and I’ve got a lot on the record out there that’s getting after the questions you’re asking, and I’ve not changed since I got out of uniform. 

The announcement by Northrop Grumman, the partnership with Embraer gets after this. If you go tackle that announcement, it gets after creating a family-of-systems approach to the problem, as opposed to we’re just going to field one piece of the problem at a time. We’re not going to work the integration in advance. We’re not going to work the readiness in advance. We’re not going to work the agility in advance, and I was happy to see in that announcement that they’re approaching the problem differently, because that’s the kind of approach I think we need to be successful.

Q: Have you looked at adapting the B-21 for this kind of stealth tanker role?

A: I don’t know what they’re looking at adapting, but I think there’s eloquence in the solutions that exist and that they’re working on, and then broadening their missions to beyond just the original intent for which they were designed. So I think that there’s great value in looking at those opportunities.

Q: What about an Agile Combat Employment (ACE) tanker capable of supporting small numbers of fighters from forward airfields? The KC-390 is being pitched for such a role. Do we need smaller tankers capable of operating from shorter fields?

A: We need a family of tankers that can address all the warfighter needs in all the warfighter environments. So we need tankers that look a lot like the ones we have now, that can handle the low-threat environments. We need tankers that can push into the medium-threat environments and service the big volume offloads in the abundant amount of receivers that will be out there. We need tankers that can operate in a medium- to high-threat with blended wing and stealth characteristics. And then we need stealth like tankers that can go into a higher-threat environment, as well as unmanned and CCA. 

I believe there’s room in the Air Force for all in that capability. Let’s be clear, it’s what the kinetic force needs, you know. So the strike force and the bomber force are [fifth-generation] fifth-gen and [sixth-generation] sixth-gen, and yet we still operate a mobility force that’s on its best day, 2.5 Gen and in some cases, second generation. So we’ve got to catch up, not because of ego, but because of capability. At the end of the day, this is about equilibrium of the enabling force to actually do what it needs to do, so that the strike force can carry out its missions in all environments. That’s what needs to happen.

Q: Is there money to do that? Is there a will from higher headquarters and then the administration to make that happen?

A: Well, there needs to be. Like I said, I think the opportunity is here with this administration. Its executive orders, its acquisition reform, and the possibility of a significant increase in the budget. But this gets back to, are we going to pay for the Air Force that this country needs? It’s been under-invested in, especially in mobility, and we need to ensure that this president and every future president, when they call on the Air Force to support the joint force, to project America’s power to serve the national interests and impose our will when needed, that we need to develop these kind of things. We have to do this if we want to be the Air Force that this country needs.

Q: Have you talked to anybody in the current administration or the current Department of War about this, and what’s your sense of the interest there?

A: I think the conversation is turning where it needs to go. I have not talked to the current administration about this specifically, but I think there’s an appreciation, when you line up the talking points that align the priorities of where the department is going, I think that there is 100% alignment with what my priorities were when I was in uniform, what my priorities are now that I’m out of uniform, with the priorities of where this administration is going.

I realize it’s still hard. I realize there are still challenges. I realize there are no easy answers to any of this, and I realize that there’s more to modernization and readiness than just the mobility fleet. And I also realize that these are the things that we need to do.

Q: Low-end drones are a big problem, especially for big airplanes sitting idle on the ground. What do you think should be done to defend our airlift assets against lower-end drones?

A: Just like everyone else, I watched the [Operation Spider Web] attack that Ukraine carried out on Russia’s strategic forces. And the only thing that surprised me about that is that people were surprised and that it took so long for them to do it. This is a real threat. It gets down to air base defense. It’s something that we championed in Air Mobility Command during my time there, because of the drone incursions that were happening over multiple Air Mobility Command bases and multiple Air Mobility Command missions. So this isn’t a surprise to me. 

This is going to have to be a joint solution, and I know the Army is working very hard on this, but there’s also going to have to be a capability of the Air Force and wings that are deploying to be able to do this on their own as well. So no easy answers here. 

I feel like we’re behind, but catching up. I think it nests nicely into the Golden Dome opportunity as well. But you know, you gotta be able to handle everything from the low-cost drones all the way up to the highest capability missiles that could attack the homeland. This all fits in a spectrum of threats that we need to be concerned about. 

Q: You brought up drone incursions. When and where did they happen and was the source ever found?

A: The incursions took place in late 2021 and early 2022 for Joint Base Andrews in Maryland and constantly at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst in New Jersey throughout my command. I’m not tracking that the source of those incursions was identified. It doesn’t mean that they weren’t. To my knowledge they weren’t. But, you know, at the end of the day, if you can’t control the airspace, including the airspace that drones are using, that’s a problem. It doesn’t matter if you’re in garrison or deployed. We’ve got to have the ability to defend at a greater capability than we have. 

Q: How are the C-5M Galaxy cargo jets doing? Are readiness rates improving? Will we need a direct replacement of something its size when their time finally comes to head to the boneyard? Was the M upgrade program successful?

A: I’m a year and a half out of the conversation. The last data point I got was from U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) commander Gen. [Randall] Reed‘s congressional testimony, where he said that the mission reliability rate, I believe, had fallen to 46%. So, if that’s true, then it’s still an enormous concern. I don’t know any part of your life where you tolerate a critical capability operating less than half the time when you need it. So C-5s are an enormous concern for me. 

I think there are options out there when it comes to large-volume aircraft that exist, that are being worked now, that can help us get capability quickly. And then I think there are concepts out there, like the commercialization of the C-5 fleet, that need to be taken seriously as well and apply commercial standards, commercial supply chain to increase the readiness of it. And between a combination of those two, I think that you can sustain what America needs to project large volume lift, but also get much higher than a 46% mission reliability rate.

Q: Do you see the need for a similar sized cargo aircraft to replace the C-5 when it’s finally time for them to retire?

A: I do. I think building large, colossal aircraft is one of the hardest things to do on the planet, when you think about it. I need someone to help fact check me on this, but I don’t think more than 250 large aircraft have ever been built. You know, when you include the Hughes aircraft, include the C-5, include the Russian Antonovs, the fleet has been small because it’s hard. At the same time, it does things that nothing else can do. You don’t have to condemn your cargo to sea lift only. You can move things very quickly – large volume things, critical capabilities. And so we need to have this capability. 

But I don’t see the Air Force buying C-5 replacements. I see them transitioning C-5s to a different model, like commercialization. And I see the manufacturer of a large aircraft that can handle the volume being in the CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet], and being a service concept that can get America the stuff we need when we need it. As opposed to developing another C-5 replacement, in addition to what’s going to have to eventually replace the C-5…

Q: Was the M upgrade on the C-5 successful?

A: I wasn’t there for when it was done, but … I would love to see what the original predictions were. When you spend all that money on that airplane and then still have a 46% mission reliability rate, it sounds like it is still challenged, like it used to be.

Q: Why hasn’t the Air Force gone big into uncrewed smaller logistics aircraft like China has? Especially considering dispersed ops in the Pacific?

A: Aviation right now is at a point of affordability and simplicity that we have got to distribute capability down to more tactical levels and have less centralization. Drones, automated aircraft 3,000 pounds or less, need to be a part of that equation. They need to be a part of the equation. 

I am a big fan of drones…The problem we’re trying to solve is getting winning capabilities to our warfighters faster than China. That’s what we need to be focused on. We have got to be infatuated with automation and connectivity. We have to be infatuated with drones and automated aircraft from small to medium to large capabilities. 

China’s unmanned transport aircraft completes maiden test flight

The biggest question I hear about why people don’t want small- and medium-capability is because they’re concerned about who commands and controls it and in my mind, that’s the point. You don’t have to command and control it. This is like a distributed maneuver pool, like a Jeep used to be in the Army. It’s inexpensive, it’s easy to operate, and we give it to maneuvering commanders in the field. We get TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command out of the command and control of it. We let commanders determine their own priorities and service them, and then all we have to do is integrate them into the critical capabilities that Air Mobility, Command and TRANSCOM provide. You know those and we actually free up more of their assets to do that strategic and operational lift, as opposed to always having to get down into the capabilities that can be served by something much smaller. Does that make sense?

Q: Yes. Single pilot tanker operations, what’s your final thought on that?

A: Final thought on that is, we need to do more of it. I’m not saying we need to do more testing, but when it comes to automation, when it comes to concepts, when it comes to the tempo, the things we’re going to be required to do, we have to set ourselves up to be successful in an extremely deadly and demanding operational environment. 

And to think that we’re going to apply the old dogma over this new operational environment, it’s just going to put us in a really challenging place to be successful in. So single tanker pilot ops made a comment on autonomy. It made a comment on what we need to do to win in the Pacific. It made a comment on risk taking, and it made a comment on, I think, a command team that understood how to apply real concepts over real problems and come out with an informed way forward. So there was a larger message than just single pilots in tankers.

Q: Finally, how did you see the rise of AI influencing AMC and how do you see it being used by the command in the future?

A: I’m a big fan of AI as long as commanders maintain the risk and the priority settings. You know I tried hard to get AI incorporated in Air Mobility Command, but the entire ecosystem wasn’t ready to have that conversation yet. I think AI and data are its own domain. 

Like other domains we’re going to need supremacy and superiority in it. We’re going to need to fight for it and fight from it. It’s going to benefit from the other domains, but I think disproportionately it’s going to benefit the other domains. More so our ability to sense and seize opportunity, our ability to simplify, our ability to reduce variables, our ability to gain decision advantage, our ability to make better decisions, quicker, at a higher tempo than the adversary. I think all those things are AI- and data-oriented, and I’m still not certain that we see it that way. We have got to get first mover advantage in the AI domain, and that’s going to take some work. I think that we’re starting to get there, but I think we have a long way to go on it.

Boeing KC-46A Tanker Refuels Military Aircraft Using 3D

Q: Why do you think that there’s been such resistance to AI?

A: I’m not certain most people actually use it. It’s new. Certainly there’s a newness to it. But at the end of the day, this is about data. Can you trust the data? It really flips the script, if you think about it as its own domain, because then you understand the magnitude of its importance, and you understand that this is about decision making and trust, and that you’re actually not off-shooting that to the machine to do. That you’re asking the machine and the AI to reduce variables and increase simplicity.

Then you really think about, how does a commander be able to set priorities, set risk tolerances, adjust those as required, and then, at the end of the day, this is about better decision making. I think that there’s a complexity to this that just needs to play out a bit, but I know one thing, I don’t think our adversaries are downplaying AI and data as a domain. I think that they’re 100% embracing it, and I think we need to do the same. And of course, it’s American ingenuity. We’ll get better at it and dominate.

Q: Any final thoughts you want to share? Any questions I didn’t ask?

A: No, I appreciate the opportunity here. I think that the Air Force has it right when it comes to modernization and readiness. I think that the Air Force has it right, and we need to have the resourcing to be their Air Force that this country needs. I think mobility has a longer way to go than most within the Air Force. So I continue to champion that. Those things I cared about in uniform, I care about out of uniform, and I didn’t wait to retire to have an opinion on these things. So I want to be the generation of Americans that gets this straight before we get slapped like we did on December 7th and September 11th. Let’s not wait till we get slapped to get the act together. Let’s go now hard, because our sons and daughters deserve it.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Pakistan says it has launched strikes on armed groups in Afghanistan after blaming recent suicide bombings, including attacks during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, on fighters it says are operating from its neighbour’s territory.

Kabul has repeatedly denied allowing armed groups to use Afghan territory to stage attacks in Pakistan.

Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence on Sunday said “dozens of innocent civilians, including women and children, were martyred and wounded” when strikes hit a school and homes in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Paktika.

Nangarhar police told the AFP news agency the bombardment started about midnight (19:30 GMT on Saturday) and hit three districts.

“Civilians were killed. In one house, there were 23 family members. Five wounded people were taken out,” police spokesperson Sayed Tayeeb Hammad said.

The Afghan Defence Ministry said it will “deliver an appropriate and calculated response” to the Pakistani strikes.

The two countries have been locked in an increasingly bitter dispute since the Taliban authorities retook control of Afghanistan in 2021.

Pakistani military action killed 70 Afghan civilians from October to December, according to the United Nations mission in Afghanistan.

Several rounds of negotiations followed an initial ceasefire brokered by Qatar and Turkiye, but they have failed to produce a lasting agreement.

Saudi Arabia intervened this month, mediating the release of three Pakistani soldiers captured by Afghanistan in October.

The deteriorating relationship has had repercussions for people in both countries with the land border largely closed for months.

Chasing a Killer: Gary Allen is set to premier on Prime Video this weekend.

A killer’s harrowing admission is set to be heard in a brand new true crime documentary premiering this weekend.

Chasing a Killer: Gary Allen will be released on Prime Video in a matter of days, on Sunday, February 22 spanning across two episodes, each 45 minutes long.

Plunging viewers into the chilling investigation into the suspect who was “known for decades as the man who got away with murder”, fans will see how the investigation unfolded.

The series follows the long pursuit of murderer Gary Allen by detectives determined not to let the case go cold, featuring firsthand accounts from investigators, journalists, and survivors.

Prime Video teases: “In February 2000, Gary Allen walks free from Sheffield Crown Court, acquitted of murdering 29-year-old Samantha Class. But detectives are convinced it’s only a matter of time before he strikes again.

“What follows is a two-decade pursuit by detectives who refuse to let the case go cold. A change in UK law, a covert operation, and the tragic murder of another woman lead detectives to hope they will finally bring Allen to justice – ‘You can’t get away with murder twice, surely?’ journalist Lisa Welton asks.”

Following another murder investigation in 2018, the streaming platform adds: “Featuring firsthand accounts from detectives, journalists, and survivors, this two-part documentary highlights the tireless efforts of South Yorkshire and Humberside Police to bring down Gary Allen, a man who believed he was above the law.

“Known for decades as the man who got away with murder, will he finally be brought to justice?”

In an exclusive first look ahead of the Prime Video release, a chilling confession can be heard.

The short clip hears from Chris Calvert who reads out part of a probation report revealing some of Allen’s troubling behaviour and disturbing thoughts, with Chris later branding him as a “psychopath”.

She says: “The extract I’m about to read is from the report that I found in one of the boxes from the probation officers who interviewed Gary Allen in 2003.”

Reading from the report, Chris added: “In the report they write he spoke openly about his strong dislike of prostitutes.

“Gary admitted to me that he planned and subsequently committed the attacks on the prostitutes in Plymouth he stated that the pleasure of hurting builds from the planning stage.

“Prostitutes are easy targets, I just want to hurt people, I enjoy thinking about it, I get pleasure from thinking. I just really enjoy different types of violence.”

After reading the extract, Chris continued: “It’s the words of a psychopath isn’t it.”

Chasing a Killer: Gary Allen is available to stream on Prime Video from February 22.

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