Speedier implementation could boost the country as a regional trade gateway.
Freight rail and port reforms being implemented by South Africa can boost the country’s role as a trade gateway between Africa and the Middle East, a key Southern African export and source market for commodities, including minerals, fertilizers, and fuel.
South Africa launched logistics reforms in 2020 to prop up an economy dragged down by freight rail, port, and electricity supply logjams. President Cyril Ramaphosa’s (pictured) administration recently issued a progress report, noting that reforms in the key freight-rail sector are underway but moving slowly.
Boosting Regional Trade Competitiveness
There’s every reason to speed up the process, said Lerato Mzezewa, senior operational risk analyst at Fitch Group’s BMI advisory. Accelerated and effective implementation of freight rail reforms can “improve the movement of Gulf-sourced inputs into South Africa and the wider Southern Africa region while helping exporters move bulk, refrigerated, and containerized” cargo, she said.
“This would strengthen South Africa’s competitiveness as a trade gateway, particularly for firms that require dependable port logistics and inland distribution alongside maritime capacity,” she added. “South Africa’s revived freight rail and port infrastructure will support South Africa-Middle East trade by improving the domestic movement of seaborne cargo between ports, inland production centers, and end users.”
Gulf markets accounted for about 11% of South Africa’s total imports in 2025, totaling approximately $11.6 billion; the Gulf supplied 60% of the country’s crude and refined petroleum imports.
Private Operators Step In
As part of the reform process, South Africa recently finalized contracts with 11 private rail operators. Opening core rail corridors to third-party private-sector players strengthens “the investment proposition by shifting rail recovery away from sole public-sector dependence toward a more competitive, multi-operator” environment, said Matteo Addonizio, head of infrastructure research at BMI.
The moves aim to attract sustained private capital investment in the freight rail sector and support the medium-term recovery of freight rail volumes. The new operators are expected to move an additional 24 million tons of freight rail capacity across coal, manganese, containers, fuel, and general freight. Freight rail volumes rose to about 168 million tons in 2025 from 160.1 million tons in 2024. However, this remains below the 200 million tons of capacity required to improve transport logistics for South African freight rail users.
South Africa’s freight rail and port inefficiencies have significantly affected heavy freight movers, including bulk commodity miners like Kumba Iron Ore, which ships key steelmaking ingredients to China and the Middle East.
Kumba has had to reconfigure its business to “align production more closely with Transnet’s constrained rail” and port capacity, according to a company spokesperson. “Aging infrastructure and inadequate maintenance practices impact the reliability and efficiency of logistics channels, which directly impacts our operations.”
Logistics inefficiencies are not South Africa’s only vulnerability.
The regional powerhouse is also vulnerable to global fuel price fluctuations stemming from the war in Iran, whose effects continue to ripple through supply chains and cost ecosystems across the continent. An overreliance on imported crude oil and refined fuels, alongside a freight system that moves roughly 80% of goods by road, compounds South Africa’s situation, said Jee-A van der Linde, senior economist at Oxford Economics Africa.
Tawanda Karambo is a contributing writer based in South Africa.
Investors step in to close Africa’s critical $80B infrastructure financing gap.
Gulf investors are rapidly reshaping Africa’s investment landscape, committing billions of dollars to ports, transport corridors, logistics, renewable energy, and critical minerals as governments across the continent seek new sources of long-term development finance.
The shift gathered momentum in June, when sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), commercial banks, development finance institutions, institutional investors, and corporate issuers launched the Africa–Middle East Corridor. Debuted during the Global Banking & Markets Middle East 2026 conference in Dubai, the initiative aims to mobilize capital for infrastructure, deepen Africa’s debt capital markets, and expand cross-border investment between the Gulf and Africa.
The launch comes at a critical moment for the continent. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), Africa requires approximately $170 billion annually to finance infrastructure, yet current investment totals only $80 billion to $90 billion, leaving an annual financing gap approaching $80 billion.
The Gulf is positioning itself to help close the deficit.
Investors from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries announced 73 foreign direct investment (FDI) projects worth more than $53 billion across Africa in 2023, reflecting a decisive shift toward fewer but significantly larger investments concentrated in renewable energy, logistics, critical minerals, transport and digital infrastructure.
China Cuts Back
The changing investment landscape also reflects a broader shift in global capital flows.
For nearly two decades, Chinese policy banks financed much of Africa’s modern infrastructure expansion, underwriting railways, highways, ports, airports and power projects across the continent. Yet, according to the Boston University Global Development Policy Center, Chinese policy bank lending fell from a peak of $28.8 billion in 2016 to $2.1 billion in 2024. Annual lending regularly exceeded $10 billion between 2012 and 2018, but Beijing has increasingly pivoted from sovereign-backed megaprojects to smaller, commercially driven investments.
That retreat has created space for Gulf SWFs, export credit agencies, and commercial banks to expand their presence across Africa.
The United Arab Emirates has emerged as Africa’s fourth-largest foreign investor. Between 2019 and 2023, Emirati investments exceeded $110 billion, including an estimated $70 billion directed at renewable energy.
Several flagship transactions illustrate the scale of that commitment. ADQ’s $35 billion Ras El-Hekma development in Egypt ranks among the largest FDI deals ever concluded on the continent. DP World now operates six African ports and logistics facilities, while Abu Dhabi Ports has secured concessions in Egypt, Angola, and the Republic of Congo, strengthening Gulf influence over strategic maritime trade routes linking Africa with Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
Renewable energy has become a major pillar of Gulf investment in Africa.
Masdar, Abu Dhabi’s state-owned renewable energy company, has committed $10 billion to develop 10 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy capacity across sub-Saharan Africa by 2030. Infinity Power, a joint venture between Masdar and Egypt’s Infinity, is now Africa’s largest pure-play renewable energy company, operating 1.3GW of generation capacity in Egypt, South Africa, and Senegal, with a further 16GW under development. Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power, one of the Middle East’s largest private power developers, continues to expand its renewable energy portfolio in Morocco, Egypt, and South Africa, while Gulf investors are increasingly financing green hydrogen, battery storage, and electricity transmission projects across the continent.
Gulf Capital Steps In
Commercial banks, too, are increasing their African presence.
In March, First Abu Dhabi Bank announced plans to establish its first representative office in Lagos, making Nigeria its West African hub. The lender has already participated in financing the $1.13 billion Lagos – Calabar Coastal Highway, signaling growing Gulf interest in African project finance and structured lending.
“Gulf capital is increasingly vital to Africa because of a strategic alignment of economic needs,” says Phumlani Majozi, senior economist and executive director at the African Markets Institute. “As traditional Western and Chinese funding slows, African countries require enormous investment for infrastructure, energy, and digital transformation, while Gulf states are actively diversifying beyond hydrocarbons. The relationship is evolving from aid-based engagement into long-term commercial integration.”
The trend represents a structural shift rather than a temporary investment cycle, Majozi says, driven by long-term economic diversification strategies such as Saudi Vision 2030 and the UAE’s ambition to become a global investment and logistics hub.
Private-sector advisers see the relationship as rooted in geography and commercial history.
“The Middle East is Africa’s closest neighbor. Trade between the two regions stretches back thousands of years,” said Jacqueléne Coetzer, founder and CEO of Jacqueléne Global Consulting. “Africa and the Gulf do not need to discover entirely new markets; they need to rediscover one another.”
Gulf investors are targeting critical minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, agriculture in Ethiopia, renewable energy in Kenya and South Africa, logistics in Egypt and Nigeria, and financial services through Mauritius, Coetzer says.
Africa’s bargaining position is also strengthening.
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is creating a $3.4 trillion integrated market spanning 54 economies. The continent controls roughly 30% of the world’s critical minerals, including copper, cobalt, lithium, and manganese — resources central to the global energy transition.
Individual countries are strengthening their ties across the regions as well. Kenya’s Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the UAE, signed in January 2025, was the first such agreement between the UAE and a mainland African country. The accord improves business access to both countries’ markets by expanding investment protection and providing a framework for deeper cooperation in trade, logistics, financial services and digital commerce.
“Africa’s leverage has never been stronger,” Majozi argues. “The continent possesses roughly 30% of the world’s critical minerals, the world’s youngest workforce and the AfCFTA’s $3.4 trillion integrated market. The challenge is converting that structural advantage into negotiating power.”
If the Africa–Middle East Corridor succeeds in converting investment commitments into bankable projects, it could become one of the principal channels through which Gulf capital finances Africa’s next generation of infrastructure, industrialization, and capital-market development.
Charles Wachira is a contributing writer based in Kenya.
Across Africa, the ability to defend borders, monitor territory and protect critical infrastructure remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers. Turkish drones patrol borders, Chinese surveillance systems monitor cities and Russian fighter jets form the backbone of several air forces.
For decades, African militaries have turned abroad for critical defence technologies, leaving the continent largely positioned as a buyer rather than a producer.
An Abuja-based start-up is attempting to change that equation.
Terra Industries, founded in 2024 by Nathan Nwachuku and Maxwell Maduka, both in their early twenties, designs and manufactures drones, autonomous surveillance towers and unmanned ground vehicles from facilities in Abuja and Accra.
Unlike companies that primarily assemble imported components, Terra says it develops its own software, airframes, propellers and lithium-ion battery packs, with more than 70 percent of its inputs sourced locally.
The company says its systems are currently used to protect infrastructure valued at approximately $11bn, including power plants, lithium and gold mines, oil refineries and other strategic assets across eight African countries and Canada.
Building capability
The shift from importing security technology to producing it locally has become an increasingly important debate across Africa. Governments facing armed groups, porous borders, maritime insecurity and attacks on critical infrastructure are searching for faster and more adaptable solutions.
Terra’s move from private infrastructure security into engagements with Nigeria’s defence institutions reflects that changing environment. The company says its systems are designed to address challenges ranging from maritime surveillance and border monitoring to the protection of energy and mining assets.
The Archer drone, developed by Terra Industries, is part of a new generation of locally manufactured military technology emerging across Africa [File: Terra Industries]
“Coastal states in West Africa are focused on maritime surveillance because of piracy and illegal fishing in the Gulf of Guinea,” chief executive Nathan Nwachuku told Al Jazeera. “States dealing with insurgency and porous borders want persistent aerial surveillance and a rapid-response capability. Others are looking at protection for pipelines, power and energy infrastructure, and mining assets, the same problems we started solving in Nigeria.”
The company is now preparing for a larger regional footprint. Nwachuku confirmed that Terra’s second production facility in Ghana will become Africa’s largest drone manufacturing hub, with an annual production capacity of 50,000 units by 2028.
“Our long-term ambition goes beyond the continent because the threats our systems are designed to address exist across the Global South,” he said. “Governments in South Asia and South America face them too, and they face the same dependency on foreign suppliers. We intend to serve them as we grow.”
Investor confidence
The scale of investment behind Terra reflects growing interest in Africa’s emerging defence technology sector. The company has raised $34m in seed funding, which it describes as one of the largest early-stage funding rounds in African technology.
The investment was led by 8VC, the venture capital firm founded by Palantir Technologies co-founder Joe Lonsdale, alongside Lux Capital and Valor Equity Partners, investors behind companies such as Anduril and SpaceX.
“The round closed in under two weeks, which is rare even by global standards,” Tage Kene-Okafor, Terra Industries’ director of communications, told Al Jazeera. “But what has been more exciting is our cap table, where we have the likes of 8VC, Lux Capital and Valor Equity Partners, investors that have backed companies shaping the future of defence and advanced manufacturing globally.”
Security imperative
The interest in companies like Terra comes as drones become increasingly central to conflicts across Africa. In the Sahel, inexpensive commercial drones have moved from surveillance tools to weapons used on the battlefield, creating new challenges for militaries that often lack effective counter-drone capabilities.
According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the al-Qaeda-linked coalition operating in Mali and Burkina Faso, has carried out more than 100 drone attacks since 2023, with 2025 recording the highest number to date.
Terra says its Kama interceptor drone was developed in response to this changing threat environment. The company says the system can reach speeds of up to 300kph and is designed to counter hostile drones in environments where traditional air defence systems may be unavailable or too expensive.
Building defence technology, however, is not the same as achieving defence sovereignty.
Sovereignty question
While a country can build manufacturing capacity through investment, engineering talent and industrial policy, defence sovereignty requires institutions capable of managing procurement, ensuring accountability and sustaining strategic industries over the long term.
Janice Greaver, director at the Pan African Sustainable, Innovation and Development Associates (PASIDA), argues that local production alone cannot answer those questions.
“Seventy percent local sourcing means little until we know who controls the intellectual property, who is employed and who is left out,” she told Al Jazeera. “And when private capital arms the state with no visible civil society oversight, we are simply trading one dependency (on foreign suppliers) for another (on unaccountable domestic capital).”
Terra Industries has demonstrated that sophisticated defence technologies can be designed and manufactured in Africa. Its rapid rise reflects both growing technical capability on the continent and the pressure created by worsening security challenges.
Whether that becomes genuine defence sovereignty will depend on what happens beyond the factory floor: how governments buy, regulate and oversee the technologies they increasingly seek to build themselves.
As Greaver cautions: “Its manufacturing capacity is being built, sovereignty requires the accountability structures that do not yet exist”.
Johannesburg, South Africa – Mansa Musa, the 14th-century emperor of the Malian Empire, often comes to mind whenever African gold enters the conversation. Renowned for his immense wealth, he is often described as the richest man in history, largely due to the vast gold resources of his empire.
Yet centuries after Mansa Musa’s reign, Africa’s relationship with gold remains paradoxical. The continent possesses some of the world’s richest gold deposits, but much of the wealth generated by the industry continues to be captured elsewhere. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Africa holds about 40 percent of the world’s gold reserves.
Although Africa remains one of the world’s most gold-rich regions, it continues to occupy the lower end of the global value chain. Gold extracted across the continent is largely exported, mainly to the United Kingdom, where it is refined, traded and priced. As a result, the most profitable stages of the industry remain concentrated elsewhere, creating a persistent gap between extraction and value capture.
“Africa’s position reflects structural constraints, including limited refining capacity, capital bottlenecks and historical trade patterns that favour exporting unrefined gold, allowing offshore markets to capture the highest-value margins in refining and trading,” Kate Collett, insights analyst at Africa Practice, told Al Jazeera.
Increasingly, African governments are not only seeking to extract more gold but also to retain greater control over it. That ambition extends beyond mining policy. Across the continent, policymakers are increasingly viewing gold as a strategic financial asset that can strengthen reserves, reduce external vulnerabilities and support greater economic sovereignty.
A shift in global reserves
Gold has re-emerged as a strategic reserve asset in an increasingly fragmented global economy. Unlike fiat currencies, it is widely seen as retaining value during periods of inflation, geopolitical tension and financial uncertainty.
Across the Global South, central banks have increased gold accumulation in recent years as part of efforts to diversify reserves and reduce exposure to external financial systems. This trend is visible in major emerging-market economies, including China, Russia, India and Turkiye, according to data from the World Gold Council.
An artisanal gold miner holds up a rock recovered from inside a gold mine before it is ground down for processing at the site of Nsuaem-Top, Ghana [Zohra Bensemra/Reuters]
By accumulating gold, central banks reduce reliance on foreign currencies and hold reserves outside the direct control of any single financial system.
African countries have joined this shift in an effort to strengthen economic stability, build reserve buffers and increase financial sovereignty.
Within Africa, Ghana, one of Africa’s leading gold producers, has increased the proportion of locally produced gold purchased by the central bank under its domestic gold accumulation programme, according to Bank of Ghana reporting and policy communications.
Nigeria has pursued broader reserve diversification strategies, including increased interest in gold as part of efforts to strengthen the composition of its external reserves, according to central bank statements and analysis by international financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Gold Council.
Tanzania requires approximately 20 percent of gold output from mining companies and traders to be allocated for sale to the central bank under its reserve-building framework, according to Bank of Tanzania regulations. Guinea has tightened licensing and export controls in its mining sector, part of wider efforts to increase state oversight and capture more domestic value.
According to analyst Thea Fourie, head of regional analysis for the Middle East and Africa at S&P Global Market Intelligence, rising gold prices have reinforced these shifts. “This trend aligns with a broader geopolitical shift towards de-dollarisation … including the development of alternative payment systems and increased use of local currencies in trade,” she told Al Jazeera.
For African producers, this changing global financial environment has accelerated the use of gold as a tool of economic sovereignty, analysts say.
Capturing more of the value chain
Across the continent, governments are also trying to retain more value from domestic production by tightening oversight of mining and reshaping how gold moves from extraction to export.
Ghana has expanded its central bank gold purchasing programme. Tanzania has strengthened regulatory control linked to domestic sales and reserve-building requirements, while Guinea has tightened licensing enforcement and export rules aimed at improving domestic processing and value retention.
An artisanal gold miner digs at the Bantakokouta gold mine, one of the largest artisanal gold mining sites in southeastern Senegal, near the Mali border [John Wessels/AFP]
In Guinea, authorities have also cancelled mining licences deemed unproductive and restricted exports of unprocessed gold in an effort to encourage local refining. Namibia continues to restrict the export of unprocessed minerals, reinforcing efforts to increase domestic value capture.
Artisanal mining, often operating outside formal systems, is increasingly being treated as part of the formal gold economy rather than a parallel informal sector. Governments are seeking to formalise production, reduce smuggling and increase tax and export revenues.
“These programmes can help countries retain more value from their mineral resources by reducing smuggling, formalising artisanal mining and creating incentives for local refining and downstream industries,” Collett said.
But integration remains uneven. Many small-scale miners still operate outside formal channels due to limited access to finance, markets and technical support.
“As commodity prices rise, this gap between legal status and how the sector operates on the ground is widening, with value still flowing outside formal systems,” she added.
Resource nationalism in the Sahel
In the Sahel, military-led governments in Mali and Burkina Faso have pushed further towards state control of mining assets, framing reforms as part of a broader effort to reduce economic dependence on former colonial partners.
Mali’s President Assimi Goita has overseen a restructuring of the mining sector, expanding state involvement and promoting domestic processing capacity. With Russia emerging as a key partner after a break with France, the government is also developing a state-controlled gold refinery in Bamako.
Gold miners scratch a living by digging in primitive mines and panning for flecks of gold for a licensed supervisor on the outskirts of Bulawayo, Zimbabwe [John Moore/Getty Images]
Burkina Faso has increased state participation in mining and sought to expand national gold reserves. Alongside Mali and Niger under the Alliance of Sahel States, it has pursued deeper economic coordination. Plans for closer monetary cooperation have been discussed, though they remain in development.
However, most large-scale mines in the region remain operated by foreign companies due to limited domestic technical capacity.
According to Fourie, of S&P Global Market Intelligence, this shift reflects a broader wave of resource nationalism driven by fiscal pressures and security challenges.
“These governments have also deepened ties with non-Western partners, reshaping longstanding trade and diplomatic relationships,” she said.
But analysts caution that tighter state control can deter investment if regulatory frameworks are unclear or not consistently applied.
“The quest for African resource sovereignty should not be reduced to the Sahel juntas’ spectacular enforcement, with executives locked up in jail, and inflammatory narratives,” Collett said.
A long road to control
Despite growing policy momentum, full control over the gold value chain remains distant. Moving from extraction to refining and pricing within African economies requires sustained investment in infrastructure, skills and industrial capacity.
Building internationally certified refineries and attracting long-term capital will take time, even as governments push for greater oversight.
For now, much of the value generated by African gold continues to flow abroad [John Wessels/AFP]
“When the measures are introduced in an opaque manner, when there is no stakeholder engagement, is when investor confidence starts to slip,” said Beverly Ochieng, senior analyst at Control Risks.
Some governments have managed to balance tighter control with investor confidence by maintaining clearer regulatory engagement and consultation with industry stakeholders.
For now, much of the value generated by African gold continues to flow abroad.
“The experiment with the state mining operators will be one to watch … whether they are able to meet international standards, sell the gold and set prices,” Ochieng said. “And ultimately, at the back of it is whether this government will be stable enough to see through this process.”
Still, many analysts believe the direction of travel is set.
“I think in the long run, we are seeing more African governments taking steps to ensure the entire value chain remains in-country … Maybe in a couple of decades, we might see a sort of gold OPEC emerging from African countries,” she said.
Ecobank is betting that saving African biodiversity is good business — and investors are all in.
In May, Togo’s Ecobank became the first commercial bank in Africa to issue a nature bond, mobilizing $450 million that will primarily be utilized to finance sustainable agriculture, biodiversity, and water infrastructure across sub-Saharan Africa. Floated at the main market of the London Stock Exchange, it is being touted as the world’s first commercial bank-issued nature bond that meets standards set by the International Capital Market Association (ICMA).
The ICMA last year introduced the nature bond label as a secondary designation under its Green Bond Principles framework. Ecobank thus becomes the first commercial bank to issue a green bond with the nature bond label.
The offering creates a new route for investors who want to help protect the continent’s biodiversity. Home to 1.5 billion people — about 20% of the global population — Africa hosts 25% of global biodiversity, although it has lost nearly a quarter of its pre-industrial total, according to a study by the Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC).
Conflicts, perennial food insecurity, economic instability, and stunted development are among the culprits, and action is only becoming more urgent as the climate crisis worsens, yet Africa receives less than 3% of global nature finance.
Given the challenge, the Ecobank bond has generated unprecedented excitement. The 10.25-year, Tier 2 eurobond was oversubscribed nearly four times, attracting order books in excess of $1.36 billion against an initial target of $350 million. Owing to the overwhelming demand, Ecobank decided to increase the transaction by $100 million and tighten pricing by 50 basis points. Moody’s awarded the transaction its SQS1 Excellent score, the highest possible sustainability quality mark.
“This transaction is a defining moment for African sustainable finance,” said Jeremy Awori, Ecobank CEO. “Investors did not just support this bond. They demanded more of it, allowing us to increase the size and tighten pricing.”
Biodiversity Investors
FMO, the Dutch entrepreneurial development bank, was the anchor investor with a $50 million participation, noting that the bond aligns with its strategy of supporting green and sustainable finance that contributes to biodiversity in sub-Saharan Africa. It was the second time FMO has served as anchor investor for an Ecobank transaction. In 2021, it invested a similar amount in the bank’s inaugural $350 million Tier 2 sustainability notes.
Finnfund was another major investor, with a $15 million ticket; the bond falls in line with the Finnish development financier and impact investor’s broader focus on safeguarding biodiversity.
“By supporting investments that promote sustainable land use and protect natural resources, Finnfund aims to contribute to preserving the natural capital that economies and livelihoods depend on,” said Ulla-Maija Rantapuska, Finnfund’s senior investment manager, in a prepared statement.
For Ecobank, the nature bond’s debut was timely, enabling it to refinance its outstanding $350 million of 8.75% notes, which are due to mature in June 2031. The proceeds of the transaction will be ring-fenced to support smallholder farmers adopting sustainable agricultural practices. Additionally, the funds will back agri-processors with verified deforestation-free supply chains. Funding will also target water infrastructure protecting freshwater ecosystems that millions of people rely upon.
Ecobank operates in 34 sub-Saharan African countries, where it boasts 32 million customers and $801 million in pre-tax profits as of last year; it has identified 24 markets as key for biodiversity lending. Critical lending criteria favor countries where agricultural land-use change is the primary driver of biodiversity loss.
John Njiraini is a contributing correspondent based in Nairobi, Kenya.
President Donald Trump, pictured meeting with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in May 2025, plans to end U.S. funding for HIV programs in South Africa over political differences, State Department officials said on Friday. File Photo by Jim Lo Scalzo/UPI | License Photo
June 19 (UPI) — The Trump administration plans to stop funding HIV programs in South Africa under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief over policy differences.
The U.S. State Department is winding down the funds South Africa receives from PEPFAR to care for the roughly 8 million people there who are living with HIV, Semafor, Politico and The BBC reported.
PEPFAR was launched in 2003 by former President George W. Bush and, over the last two decades, has partnered with health authorities in more than 50 nations to save 25 million lives and prevent millions of new HIV infections, State Department figures show.
President Donald Trump in a February 2025 executive order accused South Africa of permitting discrimination against white Afrikaners and has slowly pulled back U.S. funding for its HIV programs over the last year.
“The United States has decided to initiate a phased drawdown of PEPFAR programming in South Africa following South Africa’s failure to make demonstrable progress on policy requests by the administration,” State Department officials told Semafor.
Upon retaking office in 2025, President Donald Trump took aim at the program as part of his administrations efforts to slash federal government spending, with specific attention paid to South Africa, which has the largest number of people living with HIV in the world.
Since 2003, more than $8 billion has been sent to South Africa to both care for people living with HIV and distribute medications that can prevent spread of the virus, though funds sent there have been halved in each of the last two years.
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa earlier this month announced that the country was working Gilead to launch the company’s twice-yearly HIV prevention drug Lenacapavir, generic versions of which are set to be manufactured and sold there.
Experts have raised concerns that ending support for PEPFAR programs could lead to millions more HIV infections globally, potentially canceling out 20 years of progress against the virus.
The Trump administration and some of its Republican allies in Congress have said, however, that the program was never meant to be permanent and should be wound down.
Bafana Bafana’s departure was delayed due to non-issuance of visas for several players and support staff.
Published On 2 Jun 20262 Jun 2026
The South African national team members have left for their World Cup training base in Pachuca, Mexico, in advance of their opening game against the tournament cohosts on June 11.
The delegation that left on Monday did not include assistant coach Helman Mkhalele, who has yet to obtain a United States visa.
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The charter flight departed Johannesburg following a frantic 24 hours after the squad was originally scheduled to leave on Sunday, but was held back by a delay in obtaining visas in what was described as an administrative bungle by the South African Football Association (SAFA).
Mkhalele, a former international winger who played 66 times for Bafana Bafana, including at their World Cup debut in France in 1998, will have to travel later after his visa application was initially denied.
Blaming the US Consulate General in Johannesburg for the delay, SAFA president Danny Jordaan told the South African Broadcasting Corporation, “They refused the visa, but gave no reasons. It is very difficult to deal with the process where you get no information.”
“We don’t know [why it was denied], we are clutching in the dark, but we hope the matter will be resolved [soon]. All of the players are [on the flight] and 99 percent of the technical staff.”
South Africa are due to play Jamaica in a friendly on Friday before taking on Mexico in the showpiece opening match in Mexico City.
“Now we are very happy that we can go to Mexico,” South Africa coach Hugo Broos said. “The past days have been a little bit stressful with all the problems we had, but those problems are behind us now, and we can focus on what’s coming.”
“These 10 days go very fast. Once we get there, we will start working, focusing on the first game against Mexico, so time will pass very quickly. I think everybody is looking forward to starting the World Cup.”
South Africa are in Group A and will face Czechia in Atlanta on June 18 and South Korea in Monterrey, Mexico, six days later.
They are appearing in their fourth World Cup and looking to advance from the group stage for the first time.
Foreign workers in South Africa are yet again facing violence and protests by anti-immigrant groups. They accuse them of residing and working in the country illegally and are demanding that they leave by June 30.
South Africa has seen recurrent waves of anti-immigrant violence in the past decade – often directed at other African nationals.
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Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the country has become a destination for thousands of workers from neighbouring countries. But many South Africans say the government is not upholding its immigration laws.
So, does South Africa still need foreign workers?
Presenter: Tom McRae
Guests:
William Gumede – Associate professor, School of Governance at the University of the Witwatersrand
Lindiwe Zulu – Member of the ANC Committee on International Relations and a former South African minister of social development
Africa’s Payments landscape is undergoing a significant transformation, fueled by advanced technologies and a surge in Cross-Border Trade. With AI and modular financial solutions taking root, African markets are quickly adopting faster, more secure, and seamless Payment experiences. But this shift isn’t just about digitisation—it’s about building a more resilient and inclusive financial ecosystem that empowers both businesses and individuals.
Embracing Complexity: The Catalyst for Modular Design
Africa’s Payments ecosystem isn’t a single, uniform market—it’s a complex tapestry of 54 countries, each with unique currencies, regulatory standards, and varying financial infrastructures. For corporates and financial institutions, this diversity presents challenges, but it also creates fertile ground for innovation.
The very intricacies that complicate Cross-Border Payments also encourage creative, technology-driven solutions that are tailored to local needs. This dynamic landscape invites forward-thinking approaches, making Africa a proving ground for Payment innovations with the potential to transform how value moves across the continent and beyond.
Africa’s diverse regulatory landscape demands adaptability in Cross-Border Payments. With each nation enforcing unique licensing, settlement, and risk rules, achieving a unified platform remains a significant challenge. Adding to the complexity is the growing insistence on local data storage to meet data sovereignty requirements, making compliance and technology integration even more intricate.
Instead of allowing regulatory hurdles to impede progress, industry leaders are using these complexities to build more adaptable and resilient systems. They’re advancing modular, “plug-and-play” platforms with strong governance, clear data separation, and flexible hybrid cloud infrastructure. This approach turns obstacles into opportunities for real innovation and growth.
This drive toward modularity has accelerated the adoption of Banking as a Service (BaaS), recasting Payments from a cost center into a strategic growth lever. Where corporates once saw Cross-Border Payment infrastructure as a burdensome expense, BaaS now allows secure, compliant Payment capabilities to be embedded directly into business platforms.
With a single integration, companies can navigate regulatory complexity, unlocking new revenue streams and harnessing Payment data to refine operations, understand customers, and deliver tailored services. Payments have become more than transactions—they’re a source of insight and innovation, fueling growth and competitive advantage.
AI as a Strategic Accelerator
Artificial Intelligence is transforming Transaction Banking in Africa, acting as a catalyst that enhances human expertise to improve efficiency and transparency. Rather than relying on the traditional first-in, first-out approach, AI now enables financial institutions to sort and route queries by urgency and complexity, streamlining exceptions and prioritising immediate needs. This reduces manual intervention and turnaround times, freeing teams to focus on deeper client relationships and higher-value tasks that improve service quality and satisfaction.
But AI’s impact goes far beyond boosting efficiency—it is transforming security and fraud detection across Africa’s digital Payments. As digital adoption rises, so does financial crime. AI uses real-time, behavior-based analytics to monitor transactions and learn each client’s typical patterns. This allows quick detection of anomalies and proactive fraud prevention, improving accuracy and reducing unnecessary disruptions while safeguarding customer trust.
As financial institutions adopt advanced AI systems, strong governance becomes critical. Without careful oversight, AI models built on limited or skewed data can unintentionally reinforce biases—delaying Payments or impacting service for certain groups. To maintain trust and fairness, banks must ensure they have strong accountability, transparent training of AI models and proactive monitoring so algorithms serve all customers equitably and uphold the highest industry standards.
The Rise of Regional Payment Rails
Intra-African trade is experiencing unprecedented growth. As more businesses look beyond national borders, the demand for fast, accessible, and reliable Payment systems has never been greater. This surge in regional commerce is prompting the development of innovative Payment infrastructures that make Cross-Border transactions more seamless and inclusive.
Moving beyond the confines of Domestic Mobile Money networks, Telecom companies are developing Payment rails to enable real-time Payments that cross African borders with ease. This shift is especially transformative for small and medium-sized enterprises, opening fresh opportunities for growth and Cross-Border collaboration. By promoting interoperability and removing costly intermediaries, these regional networks make Payments faster, more affordable, and increasingly accessible.
As these Telecom-driven platforms continue to expand, they are enabling Africa’s Multi-Rail Payments ecosystem. Their ability to foster resilience, scalability, and efficiency is setting the stage for a future where regional Trade is not just possible, but practical for businesses of all sizes. This wave of innovation is redefining the landscape, ensuring that regional Payment Rails support and propel Africa’s economic growth for years to come.
Global Trade Dynamics and the Currency Shift
Africa’s Cross-Border Trade is being reshaped by ongoing US dollar shortages and shifting macroeconomic forces. For import-dependent markets, these scarcities delay settlements, increase transaction costs, and tie up vital working capital. This environment demands new solutions and is pushing businesses to seek more efficient, reliable ways to move value across borders.
Concurrently, the region is experiencing rising Trade flows with Asia, and African businesses are rapidly adopting alternative Payment infrastructures. Platforms like the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and greater use of the Chinese Renminbi offer new settlement options and critical flexibility. This shift reduces reliance on established networks such as Swift, giving companies more robust and diversified Payment infrastructure. As a result, importers and exporters can count on greater predictability, faster settlements, and lower intermediary costs—ultimately accelerating and scaling Cross-Border Trade across Africa.
Orchestrating the Future
Africa’s financial future is emerging as an ecosystem that is intelligent, instant, and seamlessly connected. Thriving in this landscape will require more than just advanced technology. It demands a clear understanding of local realities and global shifts. The leaders will be those who turn Africa’s complexity into intuitive, secure, and streamlined client experiences—setting new standards for growth, resilience, and trust in the continent’s rapidly evolving Payments Sector.
BRITS could soon be able to fly to a destination in Africa with winter highs of 30C, beautiful beaches and beers for 71p.
Air Tanzania has revealed it’s planning to launch direct flights, for the very first time, between the UK and Tanzania next year.
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Air Tanzania could start direct flights to Tanzania and Zanzibar next yearCredit: BoeingTanzania has pretty beaches, islands and resortsCredit: Alamy
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The airline’s CEO Peter Ulanga announced the flights will operate from London Gatwick to Kilimanjaro International Airport and wants to start the route from July 2027.
Talking to Africa Travel & Tourism Association (ATTA), Peter Ulanga said there be a ‘minimum’ of three flights a week to Tanzania.
Not only that, but he also said they want to run flights to its well-known archipelago as well.
He added: “We will also run direct flights to Zanzibar, expanding the tourism potential of that destination from the UK, too.”
Currently there are no direct routes to Tanzania or Zanzibar – and historically there haven’t been any from the UK.
Airlines from the UK currently have to stopover at the likes of Nairobi to get there.
The new route would make travel for Brits much easier and reduce flight time that is currently between 11 and 15 hours.
The most popular part of Tanzania for Brits is Zanzibar which lies just of the coast, thanks to its white-sand beaches, winter highs of 30C and pretty resorts.
Despite its luxury feel, Zanzibar is cheap too with meals costing around £3.54 and beer can be from 99p.
The Zanzibar archipelago is a popular winter sun spot with beautiful beaches like NungwiCredit: Alamy
Zanzibar has an incredible coastline, some of the best beaches include Nakupenda, Nungwi and Paje which have powder-like sand and are lined with palm trees.
Tanzania is also home to the Serengeti National Park and a popular activity is to book a safari tour to see the Great Migration of wildebeest and zebras.
South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa has refused to resign over a “cash-in-sofa scandal” that continues to haunt his presidency.
Ramaphosa, who addressed the nation on Monday to declare his intention to remain in his post, is set to face a multi-party impeachment committee, which will investigate allegations that he covered up a 2020 break-in at his private ranch and the theft of more than $500,000, concealing the incident from police and tax authorities.
The committee’s findings could spell his impeachment; however, parliament has not provided a timeframe for the investigation, which has yet to commence.
Analysts say the scandal, which has been dubbed “Farmgate”, has been particularly damaging for a president who rode to power in 2018 on an anticorruption mandate, after the much-criticised presidency of Jacob Zuma. Now, eight years later, the case of the cash found stuffed in a sofa at his game ranch could be what takes Ramaphosa down.
Can the South African president survive? Here is what we know.
Supporters of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) carry placards outside South Africa’s Constitutional Court, after the court ruled on whether the parliament failed to hold President Cyril Ramaphosa to account over the ‘Farmgate’ scandal, involving allegations that foreign currency was hidden at his Phala Phala game farm, in Johannesburg, South Africa, on May 8, 2026 [Siphiwe Sibeko/Reuters]
What’s the scandal all about?
In February 2020, burglars allegedly broke into Ramaphosa’s luxury private ranch, Phala Phala, in Limpopo province, South Africa, and stole $580,000. The cash was said to have been hidden inside furniture at the farm – hence the “Farmgate” label.
Ramaphosa has been accused of covering up the theft and keeping private efforts to trace the burglars a secret to avoid an investigation into where the money had come from – and why it was hidden in a sofa.
Corruption allegations surfaced when a former head of South Africa’s state security agency walked into a police station in 2022 and accused the president of money laundering in relation to the stolen cash.
Later that year, an independent parliamentary committee found that Ramaphosa “may have committed” serious violations and misconduct. In particular, the panel found he had failed to properly report a theft to police as required under anticorruption laws and “acted in a manner inconsistent with his office”.
At the time, the African National Congress (ANC) had a strong majority in parliament – with 230 seats out of 400. It was therefore able to reject the report and refused to open impeachment proceedings.
But the left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) challenged this at the Constitutional Court in Cape Town, which, last week, overturned the government’s rejection of the 2022 parliamentary report and referred it to a multi-party impeachment committee for a full investigation.
South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa addresses the nation, after a court last week revived proceedings against him over a scandal in which thieves stole bundles of foreign cash from a sofa on his ranch, in Johannesburg, South Africa, May 11, 2026 [Siphiwe Sibeko/Reuters]
What has Ramaphosa said?
Ramaphosa has always denied allegations of corruption and maintains that the stolen cash came from selling buffalo.
Since the constitutional court’s ruling last week, Ramaphosa has been facing renewed calls for his resignation, mostly from opposition leaders. In a televised address on Monday, the president refused to step down.
“While there have been calls in some circles that I should resign, nothing in the Constitutional Court judgement compels me to resign my office,” he said.
“Since a criminal complaint was laid against me in June 2022, I have consistently maintained that I have not stolen public money, committed any crime, nor violated my oath of office,” Ramaphosa said in his address, adding that he has cooperated in all investigations.
The president rejected the 2022 report from the independent panel again, saying: “The complaints against me are based on hearsay allegations. No evidence, let alone sufficient evidence, has been presented to prove that I committed any violation, let alone a serious violation of the Constitution or law, or serious misconduct as set out in the Constitution.”
If the committee does find enough evidence against him, it could direct him to be impeached.
It is unclear how long this will take, however. Ramaphosa has pledged to seek a judicial review of the report’s contents, which, in turn, could delay the investigation of the impeachment committee.
Judges take their seats at South Africa’s Constitutional Court before the ruling on whether the parliament failed to hold President Cyril Ramaphosa to account over the ‘Farmgate’ scandal, involving allegations that foreign currency was hidden at his Phala Phala game farm, in Johannesburg, South Africa, May 8, 2026 [Siphiwe Sibeko/Reuters]
What is the process for impeachment?
If a president is found to have violated the constitution or the law, or is unable to perform the duties of office, South Africa’s National Assembly has the constitutional authority to remove him or her.
Beyond the parliamentary investigation that will now begin into the Farmgate scandal, and which can trigger a vote on impeachment, as well, any member of parliament may introduce a motion seeking the president’s removal. The speaker of the National Assembly would then refer the motion to an independent panel of legal experts to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to proceed.
If this panel decides there is a case against the president, lawmakers must vote on whether to begin impeachment proceedings. After this, a specially constituted impeachment committee is established to carry out a detailed investigation into the allegations. This is separate from the investigation beginning now and could take several months.
Once that committee recommends the removal of the president, parliament holds a final vote to impeach the president. Under Section 89 of the constitution, a two-thirds majority is required – meaning at least 267 lawmakers must vote in favour of removal in the 400-seat National Assembly.
Supporters of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) carry placards outside South Africa’s Constitutional Court, on the day the court ruled that parliament failed to hold President Cyril Ramaphosa to account over the ‘Farmgate’ scandal, in Johannesburg, South Africa, May 8, 2026 [Siphiwe Sibeko/Reuters]
Are there other ways to remove Ramaphosa?
Yes, the South African president can be removed from his job via a no-confidence vote in parliament.
Any member of the assembly can propose the no-confidence motion, and it only requires a simple majority of more than 50 percent.
Ramaphosa would need support from coalition partners to survive a no-confidence vote, however. This has already been proposed by at least two opposition parties in parliament.
Another way could be if his ANC party turns against him, as it did with the last president, Zuma, who came in for years of corruption allegations and was finally forced to resign in 2018.
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa raises his hand as he is sworn in as a member of parliament before an expected vote by lawmakers to decide if he is re-elected as leader of the country, in Cape Town, South Africa, June 14, 2024 [Jerome Delay/AP]
How strong is Ramaphosa’s position?
Ramaphosa is not only the president of South Africa, but also the leader of its most popular party, the ANC. Nelson Mandela was the ANC’s first Black president after apartheid ended in 1994.
In 2024, the ANC stunningly lost its majority in parliament for the first time following more than three decades in power. Today, the ANC holds 159 of 400 seats in the national assembly, or about 40 percent of seats – and Ramaphosa is governing in a coalition with the Democratic Alliance, which has 87 seats, along with other smaller parties.
But Chris Ogunmodede, an independent analyst of African politics, security, and international affairs, based in Lagos, Nigeria, said Ramaphosa would likely survive any impeachment attempts, “simply because of the arithmetic”.
“His numbers in the parliament virtually guarantee that impeachment will not happen,” Ogunmodede told Al Jazeera.
“It hasn’t been easy, but there is a government that seems to be functional and is showing some signs of reinvigoration,” Ogunmodede added. “There’s a lot of uncertainty on the part of the other coalition parties that suggests that they would much rather be on the side of caution and go with the devil they know, and preserve the government by keeping Ramaphosa in power.”
Despite this, the cash-in-sofa scandal has been damaging, he said.
And, under Ramaphosa, the ANC’s popularity has continued to slide. The party’s national vote share fell from 57.5 percent in the 2019 election to 40.2 percent in the 2024 election, marking its worst performance since the end of apartheid.
The South African economy has shown some signs of improvement, however, and given the Ramaphosa government “something to show for the time that it’s been in power”, said Ogunmodede.
Yet the South African government still faces long-term structural concerns about the economy, the country’s institutions, corruption, crime and other issues, the analyst added.
On the back of underlying anti-incumbency, Ogunmodede said the top court’s ruling on the cash-in-sofa scandal “has resurrected many concerns that South Africans have had about the president and his party, and the political institutions of the country more broadly”.
After successfully launching Nigeria’s only operational oil refinery in 2024, billionaire businessman Aliko Dangote has set his sights on East Africa as the next location for another mega refinery project, according to recent reports.
It comes as African countries are actively seeking ways to make energy more secure, following huge global disruptions amid the US and Israel’s war on Iran and Tehran’s subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of the world’s oil and natural gas is shipped.
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Dangote, Africa’s richest man, appeared to be one of the winners from this fallout when his newly operational refinery, located in Nigeria’s commercial Lagos State, began selling large volumes of crude oil across the continent as the war on Iran escalated in March and global oil prices soared.
At present, West, South and East Africa rely primarily on importing refined petroleum products from the Middle East, meaning they are highly vulnerable to disruptions there.
Neighbours of Nigeria – Cameroon, Togo, Ghana and even Tanzania, further to the east – are among the countries that have turned to Nigeria as supplies from the Middle East dry up.
By the end of March, the refinery, which has the capacity to produce 650,000 barrels per day (bpd), reported it was also receiving orders from beyond the continent, especially for severely scarce jet fuel as hundreds of flights were cancelled across regions.
Supply from Dangote’s refinery has cushioned the impact of the war in terms of fuel supply for Nigeria and neighbouring countries, analysts say.
Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer, and the $19bn project in Lagos is currently the world’s largest single-train refinery, meaning it employs a single processing line rather than multiple units. But it hit full production capacity in February 2026, the same month the war with Iran started.
Nigeria has no functional state-owned refinery, so Dangote’s refinery is now positioning the country to be a net exporter of jet fuel and diesel.
Here’s why more refining capacity in Africa matters for the continent:
Petroleum trucks line up at the gantry inside the Dangote Industries oil refinery and fertiliser plant site in the Ibeju Lekki district of Lagos, Nigeria, March 2, 2026 [Sodiq Adelakun/Reuters]
What is Dangote’s plan for an East Africa refinery?
In April, Kenya’s President William Ruto announced that East African countries were in talks to build a joint oil refinery at Tanzania’s Tanga port, which would have a similar capacity to Dangote’s Lagos operation.
“We do not want to be held hostage any more by the Strait of Hormuz,” Ruto said at a Nairobi business event in April, which Dangote was present at.
“We do not want to be held hostage by wars that are started by other people. We have our resources here, and we are saying we are going to use our African resources to industrialise our region.”
In an interview with the Financial Times on Sunday, however, Dangote said he would prefer to build the new operation in Kenya rather than Tanzania.
“I’m leaning more towards Mombasa because Mombasa has a much larger, deeper port,” the billionaire told the UK newspaper.
“Kenyans consume more. It’s a bigger economy,” he said, adding that “the ball is in the hands of President Ruto … Whatever President Ruto says is what I’ll do.”
He has projected construction costs of between $15bn and $17bn.
But venturing into East Africa, which has a very different commercial landscape from West Africa, could prove a challenge, analyst Dumebi Oluwole of Lagos-based intelligence firm Stears told Al Jazeera.
“Dangote has proven it [his operation] can build at scale,” she said. “The East African test will be whether it can also navigate the political and logistical landscape of a fragmented, multi-country market.”
Why aren’t African countries already producing more oil?
Despite having sizeable crude reserves, African countries only refine about 44 percent of the total oil consumed themselves, with imports making up the rest, according to a 2022 African Union report.
The top producers of refined oil are Algeria, Egypt and South Africa. There are about 21 refineries in North Africa.
Southern Africa has another seven, while West Africa has 14. However, most refineries in the two regions are either not operating or are producing below the capacity they are equipped to.
East Africa’s only existing refinery is in Mombasa, but it stopped operating in 2013 due to a combination of slow government policies and exiting investors, who deemed it commercially unviable as a result.
There is currently no refining capacity at all in East Africa, despite the region having about 4.7 billion barrels of crude reserves, according to the African Union, mainly in Uganda, South Sudan, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Kenya imported 40 million barrels of petroleum in 2025. It regularly buys oil from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, India and Oman, all of which have been hampered by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Nigeria itself is Africa’s biggest net crude producer with a 1.5 million to 1.6 million bpd capacity. The country has not refined meaningfully since 2019.
What difference will local refineries make for African countries?
Exporting most of its crude to then import refined products is expensive and puts Africa on the back foot, analyst Oluwole said.
More oil refined on the continent would mean lower petrol pump prices, lower transport costs, and more energy available for people and businesses, in theory. It would also mean greater access to by-products like fertilisers for farmers, for example, or petrochemicals for manufacturers.
“Dangote has demonstrated that a viable, scalable, intra-African energy supply option is possible – that proof of concept matters enormously,” said Oluwole.
“It reflects a growing continental conviction that Africa can provide for itself, and that this is no longer wishful thinking,” she added.
In Nigeria’s case, Dangote’s refinery is yet to ease pressures, though. Local airlines, for example, have complained about having to pay high prices for jet fuel even with improved local supplies. Analysts say that could be because Nigeria’s government removed fuel subsidies in 2023. Bureaucracy within the state oil company also forced Dangote’s refinery to import crude.
Still, the refinery is contributing to “a more transparent and competitive market”, Oluwole said, adding that results should eventually show.
Other countries are stepping up. Last week, Angola’s $470m Cabinda refinery began supplying domestic as well as foreign markets. The project is owned primarily by the United Kingdom’s Gemcorp Capital and has a capacity of 30,000bpd, with plans to double by the end of 2026.
Dangote’s planned refinery in Kenya, if completed, could also help to reduce East Africa’s reliance on the Middle East.
A separate, government-funded refinery project in Uganda’s Hoima region is also in the works. Authorities expect the project to be able to refine 60,000bpd when it starts operations in 2029. It will be fed by the joint Uganda-Tanzania East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), an ongoing project which will transport crude from Uganda’s Lake Albert to Tanzania’s Tanga Port.
Uganda also plans to produce diesel, jet fuel, kerosene and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG).
With big plans in place, Oluwole says it’s now left to African governments to create enabling business environments for the private sector.
“Dangote has opened the door,” she said. “The question now is whether African institutions and governments will walk through it.”