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The latest tranche of documents released by the United States Department of Justice on the convicted sex offender and financier Jeffrey Epstein has caused an uproar and a slew of resignations by senior officials and businesspeople across the US and Europe.

In Africa, the more than three million emails, photos, and videos released on January 23 are also causing some aftershocks as they reveal the extent of Epstein’s connections with prominent African figures, though appearing in the Epstein files does not automatically indicate a crime or wrongdoing.

According to the documents, Epstein had ties with former South African President Jacob Zuma; Karim Wade, a politician and son of Senegal’s ex-president Abdoulaye Wade; and deceased Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe.

The new files also shed more light on Epstein’s connections to a relative of Ivory Coast President Alassane Ouattara, who appeared to connect the two men. This connection reportedly opened the door for a friend of Epstein’s, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, to propose a mass surveillance system to Ouattara that would work in the West African country. It is unclear if such a system is in place now.

Epstein’s possible fixing role culminated in a formal 2014 security deal between the two countries, although the details of it are scant.

The revelations, in general, underscore the range of Epstein’s influence on powerful figures across continents.

Epstein, who was first convicted in 2008 on charges of sex trafficking, was found dead by suicide in his prison cell in 2019 while awaiting a trial on sex trafficking charges. His ex-girlfriend and co-conspirator, Ghislaine Maxwell, was convicted and sentenced in 2021.

Here’s what we know about the Ivory Coast deal and his ties to Africa’s political elite:

Israel and Ivory Coast: The context

Discussions between Ouattara and Barak appeared to start in mid-2012, after the Ivorian president travelled to Jerusalem for talks with Israeli leaders, presumably in hopes of striking a security agreement. Ouattara met Barak, who was then the Israeli defence minister, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Five days before the trip, on June 12, 2012, exiled military officials linked to the Ivory Coast’s former president had attempted to overthrow Ouattara’s government.

Ouattara’s predecessor, Laurent Gbagbo, had refused to hand over power to Ouattara, and a civil war that killed at least 3,000 people ensued. The fighting had only ended about a year before when UN and French forces intervened and arrested Gbagbo.

Ouattara’s son, Dramane, and niece, Nina Keita, also met Epstein in New York on the same day, according to the Epstein files. It’s unclear what the parties discussed.

Keita, a former model, was friends with Epstein and travelled regularly on his private jet, according to the documents. She appeared to have connected Epstein with her uncle, as well as other highly placed Ivorian politicians, according to the documents.

The files showed that on September 12, three months after Epstein met Ouattara’s son, he again met Keita in New York.

He met Barak immediately after in a private meeting at the Regency Hotel in New York, according to a schedule published in the files. It’s not known what was discussed.

In November, Drop Site News reported that Epstein referred to a trip to the Ivory Coast, Angola and Senegal in a note to his assistant, but that there are no flight records to confirm the travels.

What did Israel propose to Ouattara?

A month after Ouattara’s travel to Jerusalem, an Israeli delegation visited Abidjan.

At the meetings, Ouattara reportedly asked about Israeli defence systems to overhaul security in his country, according to reporting by Calcalist, an Israeli publication that covered the exchanges at the time.

In late 2012, Ivorian Interior Minister Hamed Bakayoko travelled to Tel Aviv for a meeting with Barak, where they discussed a cybersecurity deal, Drop Site News found.

Then, in spring 2013, Barak, who had now left office as defence minister, travelled to Abidjan himself to converse with Ouattara in what would be their second meeting.

Barak presented an expensive security defence plan to the president, Calcalist reported. The $150m proposal encompassed border security, army training, and strategic military consulting, the publication said.

Drop Site News, in an investigation in November, added that the proposal included a mobile and internet surveillance centre, as well as a video monitoring centre.

The publication cited two sets of documents: an archive of leaked emails released by the Handala hacking group and hosted by nonprofit whistleblower site, Distributed Denial of Secrets, as well as earlier Epstein-linked documents released by the US House Oversight Committee in October 2025.

Barak’s surveillance centre was to be developed by the French-Israeli private security company, MF-Group, which specialises in surveillance systems, and was to be located in Abidjan, Drop Site News reported.

Email logs showed Epstein introduced Barak to Ouattara’s chief of staff later in September 2013, and planned a meeting in New York where the two men met.

Although Ouattara was pleased with the plan, he ultimately did not sign the deal because of the price tag, Calcalist reported.

Barak, in a response to Calcalist at the time, denied that he offered to build the Ivory Coast an intelligence apparatus. “The claims about establishing an intelligence apparatus and price offers are incorrect. These are private conversations, and the public has no interest in them,” he was quoted as saying.

What was the final agreement?

Although the plan appeared to be rejected, both countries continued to forge friendly ties.

In June 2014, then-Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman was welcomed in Abidjan on a state visit.

Liberman had travelled to the country along with 50 Israeli businesspeople who were interested in investing in the Ivory Coast.

In a news release at the time, the Ivorian government said two agreements were signed: “One concerning regular consultations between the two countries and the other on defence and internal security.”

No details were provided. It is not known if Abidjan is using Israeli surveillance security systems.

Nevertheless, the Israeli-Ivorian security relationship has continued, with the latter buying military vessels, aircraft, and armoured tanks from Israeli weapons companies.

In 2016, a United Nations report found that Israeli firm Troya Tech Defence had sold weapons and night vision goggles to Ivory Coast in 2015, violating a UN arms embargo that was in place at the time.

In 2018, an investigation into Israeli spyware Pegasus, developed by the NSO Group, revealed that the malware had targeted journalists’ phones in the Ivory Coast. Pegasus, believed to be used by governments, was found to be operating in 45 countries.

In March 2023, privately owned Israel Shipyards, which builds naval vessels, delivered two offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) to Abidjan.

Critics of President Ouattara say the Ivory Coast has slid further from democracy under his rule and point to incidents like the Pegasus scandal, among other issues.

Did Epstein and Barak strategise about other African countries?

Barak also tried to leverage the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria for a security deal, according to Drop Site News, citing the new documents.

Epstein was aware of Barak’s business deals and advised him on doing business in Nigeria between 2013 and 2020, according to email exchanges.

Both saw the escalating violence in the West African nation not as a humanitarian crisis, but as a business opportunity, the publication found.

In June 2013, Barak attended a cybersecurity conference in Abuja, which organisers said privately was a pretext to meet Nigeria’s then-President Goodluck Jonathan.

It came after Nigeria awarded Israeli firm, Elbit Systems, a controversial contract to surveil digital communications in the country. Public outrage caused Jonathan to consider cancelling the project, but the government never announced that it was withdrawn.

Barak continued leveraging his access in Nigeria to promote Israeli products and services. In 2015, he facilitated the sale of Israeli biometric surveillance equipment to a private Christian university in Nigeria, Drop Site News found. The university, in a statement, denied the sale.

In 2020, the World Bank selected Barak’s intelligence firm, Toka, and the Israeli National Cyber Directorate to advise Nigeria on designing its national cyber-infrastructure.

Epstein, meanwhile, also facilitated high-level access for Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, ex-chairman of the Emirati firm DP World. In 2018, Epstein connected bin Sulayem with Jide Zeitlin, then-chair of Nigeria’s sovereign investment fund, for discussions on securing port ownerships in Lagos and Badagry.

Bin Sulayem, last March, visited Nigeria and proposed that DP World establish industrial parks at Nigerian ports. The proposal has not been approved.

Which other African leaders had links to Epstein?

Jacob Zuma

The new files revealed that Epstein had some relations with former South African President Jacob Zuma, who led the country from 2009 until 2018.

Epstein appeared to arrange a “small dinner” on behalf of Zuma in March 2010 at the Ritz Hotel in London.

It’s unclear what the purpose of the dinner was, but emails released as part of the Epstein files seemed to show that a Russian model was invited. The model was told her presence would “add some real glamour to the occasion”, according to emails sent by Epstein’s planner, whose name was redacted in the files.

In a different email, Epstein appeared to share that information with British politician Peter Mandelson, who is now under investigation for his links to Epstein. A host, whose name was redacted “is having dinner for zuma tomorrow night at the ritz„ i have invited a beautiful russina named (redacted) to attend,” he wrote.

It’s unclear if Mandelson responded.

After the dinner appeared to have taken place, one email sender whose name was redacted wrote to Epstein: “(Redacted name) was a delight last night and enchanted all those she met…By the way, Jacob Zuma was much more impressive and engaging than I thought he would be!”

Karim Wade

Politician and son of Senegal’s ex-President Abdoulaye Wade, Karim Wade’s name appeared 504 times in the released files.

Wade, under his father, was a minister with an open-ended portfolio, and was so powerful that he was nicknamed “minister of heaven and earth”.

His relationship with Epstein began in 2010, according to an investigation by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), which cited the newly released files.

In an email to an unnamed contact in November of that year, Epstein wrote: “the President of Senegal is sending his son to see me in paris,” the publication noted. Over the years, they planned trips in Africa along with Emirati businessman, bin Sulayem. They also discussed business ideas, the files showed.

In 2015, after Wade was convicted on corruption charges by a new administration, records show Epstein approaching Norwegian leader of the Council of Europe, Thorborn Jagland, to ask about possibly filing an appeal at the European Court of Human Rights. Wade’s lawyers regularly updated Epstein on efforts to free him, according to OCCRP.

Senegal pardoned Wade in 2016, after which he went into exile in Qatar. Keita, niece to Ivory Coast’s President Ouattara, who appeared to play some role in the efforts to free Wade, texted Epstein: “Thank you for everything you have done for him!!!!”

Robert Mugabe

The Epstein documents revealed that the sex trafficker planned to meet then-President Mugabe to propose a new currency for Zimbabwe amid that country’s hyperinflation crisis.

In email exchanges back in 2015, Japanese financier Joi Ito recommended to Epstein that they both approach Mugabe to discuss the currency after the Zimbabwean dollar lost its value. It’s unclear if the meeting ever took place.

Released along with the emails were FBI documents from 2017, which appeared to show unverified testimony from a “confidential source” who said Epstein was a wealth manager for Russian President Vladimir Putin, as well as Mugabe.

Though no deal was reached to end Iran’s nuclear arms ambitions, U.S. and Iranian officials both expressed cautious optimism after the third round of negotiations between the two nations concluded today. Even as the talks were underway in Geneva, more American military assets pushed toward the Middle East. On Thursday, the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford left Souda Bay on the Greek-owned island of Crete and will reportedly arrive off the Israeli coast as early as Friday. In addition, more F-35A Lighting II stealth fighters and F-15E Strike Eagle multirole fighters are on their way across the Atlantic for likely deployment to the region.

You can get a good sense of the state of play in this situation in our deep dive here.

The third round of indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran in Geneva ended inconclusively Thursday. 

“We have finished the day after significant progress in the negotiation between the United States and Iran,” Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi, who is moderating the talks, stated on X. “We will resume soon after consultation in the respective capitals. Discussions on a technical level will take place next week in Vienna. I am grateful to all concerned for their efforts: the negotiators, the IAEA, and our hosts the Swiss government.”

U.S. and Iranian officials offered positive assessments of the negotiations.

Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi:

Today’s round was the best among the rounds so far. We clearly presented our demands to the American side.

Technical talks will be held on Monday to discuss detailed specifics.

We achieved good progress on the nuclear file and sanctions… pic.twitter.com/r5dEvvmYJn

— Clash Report (@clashreport) February 26, 2026

At issue is the future of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, but the negotiations do not involve Iran’s ballistic missile program, which the Trump administration is now saying could threaten the U.S. homeland in the near future. More about that later in this story. The U.S. is reportedly demanding that Iran destroy its Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan nuclear sites, deliver all enriched uranium to the U.S., agree to zero enrichment of its uranium, but can keep the Tehran reactor. In addition, the Trump administration is demanding that any deal be permanent and is offering Iran minimal sanctions relief, with more if the country is compliant with these demands. 

Here the demands US brought to Iran in Geneva:

1) Destroy all 3 nuclear sites: Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan

2) Deliver all enriched uranium to US

3) No sunset clauses

4) Zero enrichment, but can keep Tehran reactor

5) Minimal sanctions relief up front; more if Iran compliant

— Alex Ward (@alexbward) February 26, 2026

For its part, Iran “is unwilling to transfer any enriched uranium outside the country,” the official Iranian Press TV news outlet reported on Thursday. While the U.S. delegation demands all existing stockpiles be handed over, Iran insists that the enriched uranium should remain safeguarded within its borders.

“Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said Iran remained ‘crystal clear’ that it would ‘under no circumstances ever develop a nuclear weapon,’ while also recognising the right of Iran’s people to the benefits of ‘peaceful nuclear technology,’” Al Jazeera reported.

The negotiations are taking place in the wake of statements by Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio laying out the administration’s case against Iran. Both warned that Iran is developing weapons that can strike the U.S. and has the means and intent to strike its assets, and those of allies, in the Middle East.

PRESIDENT TRUMP on IRAN: My preference is to solve this problem through diplomacy, but one thing is certain: I will NEVER allow the world’s number one sponsor of terror to have a nuclear weapon.

We have to be strong. It’s called peace through strength. pic.twitter.com/0CPKHtvQDt

— Department of State (@StateDept) February 25, 2026

SECRETARY RUBIO on IRAN: For a country facing sanctions, whose economy is in tatters, whose people are suffering, somehow they still find the money to invest in missiles of greater capacity every year. This is an unsustainable threat. pic.twitter.com/LGZJxPG33w

— Department of State (@StateDept) February 26, 2026

Meanwhile, the Trump administration reportedly would like to see Israel attack first to give the U.S. political cover.

“There’s thinking in and around the administration that the politics are a lot better if the Israelis go first and alone and the Iranians retaliate against us, and give us more reason to take action,” Politico stated. 

“The argument in Israel is that this would be a terrible strategic mistake, as it creates a lose-lose situation: if the strike fails, Israel would be blamed for dragging the United States into the conflict,” a high-ranking IDF official told us. “Israel would be accused of being a warmonger, a source of destruction and regional war, rather than a country seeking to reach an agreement. Israel could find itself completely isolated. This reflects the general discourse on the issue.”

This issue should be taken with a degree of skepticism since much of the behind-the-scenes reporting has been highly inaccurate.

Report: White House insiders say a first strike by Israel on Iran might create the optics needed to justify US military action.https://t.co/EszY1krx5r

— Jerusalem Post (@Jerusalem_Post) February 26, 2026

“Many actions are being carried out on the home front, among civilians, in order to protect them from missile strikes,” the IDF official added. “At the same time, there is very significant military readiness along the borders.”

While the Trump administration is pushing Iran to accept the deal or risk an attack, Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives pledged Thursday “to force a vote next week on legislation to restrict President Donald Trump from attacking Iran without congressional approval,” Politico pointed out, adding that “the White House is already mobilizing to try and defeat it.”

The move by Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries and his leadership team “will compel a tough and close vote for lawmakers as the Trump administration ramps up pressure on Tehran,” the outlet added.

JUST IN: House Dem leaders say the plan to force a vote on bipartisan Iran war powers legislation from Ro Khanna and Thomas Massie “as soon as Congress reconvenes next week.” pic.twitter.com/IxO7DSwQAT

— Connor O’Brien (@connorobrienNH) February 26, 2026

The sabre rattling and internal political machinations come as the U.S. has built up a massive force that includes two aircraft carrier strike groups and several other warships.

There are reports that the Ford, on a twice-extended deployment that has seen it enter the Mediterranean for the second time since departing Norfolk on June 24, 2025, will dock in Haifa, Israel. However, that seems dubious given that placing an aircraft carrier at a fixed location like that would make it a very attractive and high-volume target for an Iranian attack. The carrier would not benefit from its own defenses, and to a lesser degree, that of its escorts, when in port, as well.

There have been suggestions that the Ford’s Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer escorts will help provide protection for Israel against anticipated Iranian barrages. The Ford’s F/A-18E-F Super Hornets and E/A-18G Growler electronic warfare jets could also be used to attack Iran, but would have to fly across Israel or Lebanon, Syria or Jordan, and Iraq, to reach Iranian territory.

Haifa “suffered significant damage” during the 12-Day War in June, “with dozens injured from missile fire and structural damage to homes and municipality buildings,” the Jerusalem Post reported. “Haifa is home to the Israel Navy headquarters and the largest oil refinery in Israel, which was hit during the war, forcing a partial, temporary shutdown of some secondary facilities.”

The Pentagon’s first kamikaze drone unit is ready to participate if Trump decides to launch strikes on Iran, Bloomberg News reported, citing U.S. officials and analysts. The drone unit is known as Task Force Scorpion. It’s now ready for operations, U.S. Central Command spokesman Capt. Tim Hawkins told the news outlet in an emailed statement.

“We established the squadron last year to rapidly equip our warfighters with new combat drone capabilities that continue to evolve,” he said.

The U.S. military set up Task Force Scorpion late last year as the first operational unit armed with Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS) kamikaze drones, a design reverse-engineered from the Iranian-designed Shahed-136, in the Middle East. The establishment was seen as a major development, and offers a way “to flip the script on Iran,” according to a U.S. official. Last year, TWZ laid out a detailed case for why America’s armed forces should be investing heavily in rapidly-produced Shahed-136 clones as an adaptable capability that could be critical in future operations globally, as you can read here.

Just in: The Pentagon’s first kamikaze drone unit is ready to participate if President Donald Trump decides to launch strikes on Iran, according to US officials and analysts. https://t.co/DOPGwxi339

— Anthony Capaccio (@ACapaccio) February 26, 2026

In addition to the ships, scores of tactical jets, refuelers, airborne control planes, and other aircraft have already surged to the Middle East and Europe, with more on the way. At least another 12 F-35As from Hill Air Force Base in Utah, and six F-15Es each from Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho and Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in North Carolina are heading to Europe. That’s ahead of a likely deployment to the Middle East.

Aviation photographer Acr Explorer was kind enough to share images of F-35As and F-22s seen at Lakenheath Air Base in the U.K. on Thursday.

The large influx of U.S. airpower has left U.S. bases in the region crowded and is one reason that F-22 Raptor stealth fighters have been deployed to Israel. Another is the likelihood that Israel will be fully integrated into any U.S. attack on Iran.

Beyond the Middle East and Europe, the U.S. is also building up forces at Diego Garcia, its Indian Ocean island outpost, which has been used as a bomber base in previous conflicts. As we noted yesterday, F-16CM fighters from the 35th Fighter Wing recently arrived on the island from Misawa Air Base in Japan. These would be key assets in defending the island from a possible Iranian attack. There is also indications that a bomber deployment to the base could be imminent. However, there are political questions to be solved before the base can be used for a strike on Iran. As we reported last week, the United Kingdom has apparently said it would not allow the use of the island for strikes on Iran, although Prime Minister Keir Starmer could still change his mind. You can read more about the force-protection mission at Diego Garcia — increasingly threatened by Iranian long-range attack drones and missiles — in our previous reporting.

While the talks between Washington and Tehran are scheduled to resume next week, remember that three days before the Operation Midnight Hammer strike on Iranian nuclear facilities last June, the White House said Trump would decide “within two weeks” about whether to strike or keep negotiating.

Though more negotiations are scheduled, Trump has acted militarily ahead of planned talks in the past. Regardless, with the Ford arriving very soon and other assets trickling into place, and fitting our own stated timeline, the window for strikes appears to be cracking open now, and will only get wider with each passing day.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Artificial intelligence could deliver the productivity surge policymakers have been hoping for since the global financial crisis. But even if it does, economists caution that faster growth will not be enough to solve the mounting debt burdens weighing on advanced economies.

Public debt already exceeds 100% of GDP across most rich nations and is projected to rise further as ageing populations strain pension and healthcare systems, interest bills climb and governments ramp up defence and climate spending. Against that backdrop, AI is increasingly being framed as a potential fiscal lifeline.

The reality is more complicated.

Productivity: The “Magic” Ingredient-With Limits

Economists broadly agree that sustained productivity growth can dramatically improve fiscal dynamics. Higher output boosts tax revenues without raising tax rates, makes existing debt easier to service and reassures bond investors worried about long-term solvency.

At the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), modelling suggests that if AI meaningfully raises labour productivity and if employment also expands public debt across member countries could be about 10 percentage points lower by the mid-2030s than otherwise projected. Even then, debt would still climb to roughly 150% of GDP on current trajectories, up from around 110% today.

In the United States, best-case projections from several economists suggest debt could rise more gradually, to roughly 120% of GDP over the next decade rather than accelerating more sharply. But that still represents historically elevated levels.

As one economist put it, productivity is “like magic” for fiscal sustainability yet today’s debt challenges are too large for productivity gains alone to offset.

Demographics: The Structural Headwind

The fundamental constraint is demographic.

Ageing populations mean fewer workers supporting more retirees, pushing up pension and healthcare costs. In the United States, Social Security alone accounts for roughly one-fifth of federal spending, and benefits are indexed to wages. If AI lifts wages, it may simultaneously increase future benefit obligations.

Slowing immigration in some countries, particularly the U.S., compounds the issue by limiting labour force growth. If AI boosts output per worker but the total number of workers stagnates or declines, overall fiscal relief may be limited.

In short, AI may buy time but it does not reverse the demographic arithmetic driving long-term deficits.

Growth vs. Interest Rates: A Delicate Balance

For debt sustainability, what matters is not just growth, but the relationship between growth and borrowing costs.

If AI-driven productivity pushes economic growth above interest rates for a sustained period, governments can stabilise or even reduce debt ratios more easily. But if faster growth also lifts real interest rates for example, because higher productivity raises returns on capital then debt servicing costs could rise in parallel.

This debate is already unfolding among policymakers at the Federal Reserve, where officials are assessing whether AI could permanently raise the economy’s potential growth rate.

Bond markets will be decisive. Since the pandemic, investors have shown a willingness to punish governments perceived as fiscally profligate. Higher yields can quickly offset any growth dividend from technological gains.

Employment and Wages: The Distribution Question

Much depends on how AI reshapes labour markets.

If AI complements workers and creates new categories of employment, tax revenues may rise meaningfully. But if automation displaces workers faster than new jobs are created, or if profits accrue disproportionately to capital rather than labour, fiscal gains could disappoint.

Capital income is often taxed more lightly than wages. A productivity boom concentrated in corporate profits rather than payrolls may widen inequality without generating proportionate public revenue.

On the spending side, governments might benefit from efficiency gains in public administration. Yet history suggests higher growth can also lead to higher spending demands from infrastructure upgrades to social transfers.

No Substitute for Fiscal Reform

Even in optimistic scenarios where AI lifts U.S. growth closer to 3% annually for an extended period, debt ratios are projected to stabilise at elevated levels rather than return to pre-crisis norms.

In pessimistic scenarios where AI disappoints or a recession strikes before productivity gains materialise debt trajectories could worsen significantly, potentially reaching levels that trigger market instability.

The consensus among economists is clear: AI can ease fiscal pressure, but it cannot substitute for structural reforms. Addressing entitlement sustainability, improving tax efficiency and managing spending priorities remain central.

A Race Against Time

There is also a sequencing risk. If financial markets grow nervous about fiscal trajectories before AI-driven gains are realised, borrowing costs could spike. In that case, the productivity dividend may arrive too late to calm bond investors.

Technological revolutions historically take time to diffuse across economies. Infrastructure, regulation, workforce training and corporate adoption all shape how quickly productivity benefits materialise.

For debt-laden economies, the gamble is that AI’s boost will be large, broad-based and timely. That is possible but far from guaranteed.

AI may help governments breathe easier. It will not absolve them of the harder political choices required to put public finances on a sustainable path.

With information from Reuters.

Reform UK’s Matt Goodwin came second with 10,578, while Labour’s Angeliki Stogia was third with 9,364. The Conservative’s Charlotte Cadden came fourth with 706 votes – the party’s worst ever by-election result – and the Liberal Democrats’ Jackie Pearcey had 653. No other parties got more than 200 votes.

Development agendas borrow a term common in the study of global governance that is shaped not only by policy, but also by the decision-making structures that determine who speaks, who is heard, and who ultimately adapts. In the contemporary multilateral landscape, the tendency of weaker actors to align their positions with dominant powers for the sake of security or accessibility has evolved beyond its classical definition in realist theory. It now operates as a subtle but consequential social mechanism, systematically reducing the diplomatic boldness of the Global South countries in international forums.

The bandwagon effect is not just a phenomenon of individual behavior, but a reflection of an institutionalized architecture of structural inequality. Under these conditions, the countries of the Global South often hide their authentic preferences. Not because of argumentative incompetence, but rather because of the incentives created by financial dependence, representation asymmetry, and limited diplomatic capacity. The consequence is a direct contradiction to Sustainable Development Goal 16, which mandates the building of strong, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.

The Bandwagon Effect in the Context of Global Governance

From a realist perspective, countries that have identical votes in UNGA resolutions reflect similar preferences within the framework of the protection of sovereign norms. But empirical research shows a more complex reality. Khan’s (2020) study of Bangladesh’s voting patterns at the UNGA for the period 2001–2017 revealed that vote alignment does not always reflect the proximity of substantive preferences, but is often a product of geopolitical contexts and dependency relationships. Realists themselves recognize that this kind of voice alignment tends to collapse in crisis situations when countries are encouraged to self-help that makes it clear that a seemingly consensus-like may never really exist.

More direct evidence comes from a panel of 123 developing countries in a study of U.S. economic sanctions and UNGA voting patterns for the 1990–2014 period. The study, which limited its analysis to non-OECD countries because foreign aid was not considered to affect the voting behavior of rich countries, confirmed that external pressures, both in the form of incentives and sanctions, significantly shaped developing countries’ voting preferences on important issues. It further states that receive budget support and unconditional assistance from the US tend to vote in line with US interests. A correlation that is difficult to explain solely by the similarity of values.

This pattern was also identified structurally through the analysis of the UNGA voting network. Magu and Mateos (2017) found that the empirical distribution of voting similarity scores is right-skewed towards a value of 1, which means that clusters of countries with a high degree of alignment are much more common than can be explained by pure similarity of interest. This is consistent with the hypothesis that structurally weak states tend to move toward dominant power positions, not because of belief, but because of survival calculations.

The Inequality Architecture That Creates Bandwagon Incentives

Understanding why the bandwagon effect is so entrenched among the Global South requires a reading of the existing global governance architecture. At the International Monetary Fund, the United States holds 16.9 percent of the vote and has an effective veto since major decisions require an 85 percent majority. Meanwhile, Africa, which consists of 54 member states and accounts for most of the IMF’s 2026 active loan portfolio, only controls about 6.5 percent of the vote. On the UN Security Council, not a single African country holds a permanent seat, although more than 60 percent of the Council’s agenda is related to conflicts on the continent.

This representational inequality creates the conditions in which joining a majority position or with a certain power bloc becomes an administratively rational strategy, even when it is contrary to the long-term interests of a country.

The factor of dependence on military suppliers is also relevant. A study of the determinants of developing countries’ voting at the UNGA identified that the choice of military suppliers that placed countries in the orbit of Western, Russian, or Chinese influence also influenced voting tendencies. This provides important context for India’s abstaining position in the UNGA resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which is an inseparable decision from the fact that about 70 percent of India’s military equipment comes from Russia. This is not a moral inconsistency but rather a rationality imposed by the architecture of dependence.

Contradictions with SDGs 16: Measuring What Is Not Measurable

Sustainable Development Goal 16 mandates the development of institutions that are ‘peaceful, equitable, and inclusive at all levels’ is a mandate that explicitly encompasses global, not just domestic, governance. The SDG 16 Global Progress Report (UNDP/UNODC/OHCHR, 2023) describes an alarming situation where progress towards SDG 16 is very slow and in some cases even moving in the wrong direction. Violence is on the rise, inequality is hampering inclusive decision-making, and corruption is undermining the social contract.

On a broader level, the Sustainable Development Report 2024 (SDSN), which covers all 193 UN member states, found that on average only 16 percent of the SDG targets are on track to be achieved by 2030. SDG 16 is specifically mentioned as one of the goals that are furthest from the target. More significantly, among the five SDG targets that showed the most regression since 2015, press freedom, which is an indicator under SDG 16, is also included.

The connection between the bandwagon effect and the setback of SDG 16 is not just correlative. It is mechanistic. When countries are unable to express their authentic preferences in the multilateral negotiation process due to structural pressures, the three key pillars of SDG 16 inclusivity, accountability, and effectiveness are degraded simultaneously. Inclusivity is degraded as voices that are supposed to represent the global majority are eroded into a consensus designed by and for minorities. Accountability is degraded because countries that choose to go against the interests of their people in order to maintain relations with donors or trading partners cannot be held coherently accountable by their constituents. Effectiveness is degraded because resolutions born of pseudo-consensus will never be implemented with sincere commitment.

The Bandwagon Effect as a Social Phenomenon, Not an Individual Failure

It is important to emphasize that the bandwagon effect in this context is not a failure of diplomatic character or moral inconsistency. It is a rational response to unequal structural incentives. A quantitative analysis of UNGA voting in the period 1946–2014 shows that the voting patterns of developing countries consistently shifted to the dominant power configuration in that period not because of the convergence of values, but because of changes in the distribution of power and dependency.

This makes the bandwagon effect a social phenomenon in the strictest sense. It is not behavior that is freely chosen by individuals or states, but behavior that is conditioned by the structure of the system. As the literature on public voting behavior and foreign policy shows, public opinion and domestic pressures do influence foreign policy but in countries with low state capacity, external factors such as aid dependence and pressure from international financial institutions are often more decisive.

The consequences of this framing are very important in policy. The solution is not moral persuasion, but in the transformation of structural incentives. The countries of the Global South do not need to be educated to be braver, they just need to be given conditions where diplomatic courage does not mean financial suicide or geopolitical isolation.

Implications and Directions of Reform

If the bandwagon effect is understood as a product of the architecture of inequality, then meaningful reform must target that architecture. First, reform of representation in the Bretton Woods institutions remains a prerequisite that cannot be postponed. As long as the quota formula remains biased towards advanced economies and as long as the U.S. retains its veto, the structural incentives for the bandwagon will continue to exist. The SDSN Sustainable Development Report 2024 itself identifies strengthening UN-based multilateralism as one of the urgent needs of a recommendation that presupposes a more equitable representation architecture reform.

Second, transparency in the multilateral negotiation process must be expanded. If negotiating positions could be monitored more openly by civil society and the media, the space between publicly stated positions and actual behavior at the negotiating table would become narrower. This is especially relevant for the negotiation process in international financial institutions that have been operating with a high level of secrecy.

Third, strengthening a substantive south-south coalition that should go beyond solidarity rhetoric can also provide a buffer against external pressure. But this requires that the countries of the Global South build real policy coordination mechanisms in multilateral forums, not just in bilateral meetings. Without this kind of mechanism, Global South solidarity will continue to be an aspiration that is defeated by the calculation of bilateral dependency in critical moments.

Conclusion

The bandwagon effect in global governance is a manifestation of institutionalized inequality. It works discreetly, through incentives and dependencies, to produce consensuses that look strong on the outside but fragile on the inside. SDG 16 which mandates inclusive, accountable, and effective institutions cannot be realized as long as the global decision-making mechanisms themselves continue to produce conditions that encourage countries to hide their true preferences.

As UNDP affirms in its latest SDG 16 progress report, peace and prosperity for all people and the planet is only possible with decisive and innovative action on SDG 16. Such actions cannot be limited to the domestic realm alone, they must include a fundamental transformation in the global governance architecture that currently systematically penalizes diplomatic courage and incentivizes compliance.

Effective global governance is not built on consensus imposed by dependencies. It is built on genuine participation and genuine participation requires conditions in which authentic choices are not punished by structures that are supposed to serve all.

Hamas says latest attacks show Israel’s ‘blatant disregard for the efforts of mediators, and its complete disregard for the Peace Council and its role’.

At least five Palestinians have been killed in Israeli drone attacks targeting two police posts in the Bureij refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip and the al-Mawasi area in Khan Younis in the south, as Israel presses on with its more than two-year genocidal war on the devastated enclave.

The attacks overnight into Friday were condemned by Hamas as undermining mediator efforts during a “ceasefire” phase that Israel has violated almost daily since October 10.

Medical sources at Nasser Medical Complex in Khan Younis reported the arrival of three bodies and several wounded individuals following an Israeli military strike on a police checkpoint at the al-Maslakh intersection in al-Mawasi. The sources said that the strike occurred in an area outside the Israeli military’s control, and described the condition of some of the wounded as critical.

In the central Gaza Strip, two Palestinians were killed and others were injured in a similar Israeli drone strike that targeted a police post at the entrance to the Bureij refugee camp.

Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said that the rising number of deaths as a result of the ongoing Israeli bombardment across the Gaza Strip reflects “the Zionist occupation’s blatant disregard for the efforts of mediators, and its complete disregard for the Peace Council and its role”.

Qassem added, in a statement, that Israel is continuing its war of extermination against the Palestinian people, despite some changes to form and method, indicating that “the talk of the guarantor states about stopping the war lacks any real substance on the ground”.

Gaza City – Amid the buzz of customers in the Remal neighbourhood in Gaza City, Samar Abu Harbied stops at a small, makeshift roadside stall to buy groceries to prepare an Iftar meal for her family, to break their fast during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

With no cash in her purse, the 45-year-old housewife asks the grocer if she could put the bill on credit, until her husband or son could wire the money to him.

“I have not touched a paper note for months. I don’t even have money to pay for a taxi. Now we walk a lot, for long distances,” Abu Harbied said.

Najlaa Sukkar, 48, was trying to catch her breath at the same stall, which is run by her son Abdallah, after a failed journey on foot to see a doctor for a post-surgery check-up and to buy medication.

Najlaa said she did not have enough money to pay the 30 shekel (US$9.5) check-up fees, and the only banknote she had, a 20-shekel bill, was so worn out that the pharmacist turned it down.

“I returned without receiving medical care,” she told Al Jazeera.

“At the pharmacy, they didn’t accept the banknotes as they were frayed. The taxi driver didn’t accept a banknote, only small change, which I don’t have. It is very difficult to get by. What a mess, we don’t know what to do!”

Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are struggling to conduct their daily lives amid a severe cash flow problem imposed by Israel immediately after it embarked on its genocidal war on Gaza in October 2023.

A US-brokered ceasefire that went into effect in October has brought little reprieve to Palestinians, who are still using worn-out currency they had from before the war, or must rely on a new system of electronic payments conducted through smart telephones amid limited internet coverage.

Palestinians in Gaza use the Israeli currency, the shekel, in their daily transactions, and depend on Israel to supply banks with new banknotes and coins.

Electronic payments

Palestinians were forced to turn to a digital payment system as a way to get around a severe shortage of Israeli shekel banknotes, a problem that has been exacerbated by the destruction of an estimated 90 percent of bank branches and cash machines.

The Palestinian Monetary Authority, working with internet service providers, has pushed for mobile-based electronic payments, including PalPay and Jawwal Pay, to help Palestinians overcome the liquidity problem.

Abu Harbeid said her son switched to electronic payments after he faced many problems using the 50 shekels per shift he was receiving while working as a night guard.

“My son, Shady, was receiving his daily wage in cash, which was worn and torn. We could hardly break it into smaller change or buy anything, as sellers don’t accept overused paper bills,” she told Al Jazeera.

“Moreover, the seller doesn’t accept it unless I spend it all, as they don’t have change. Now, as he is paid into his bank account, we buy everything through bank apps,” she added.

But digital payments have added another layer of hardship to a large segment of the population.

Most Palestinians still do not receive bank-transferred salaries, many lack access to smartphones, and those who have phones struggle to keep them charged in an area where electricity services are in severe crisis.

To add to that, there is still the problem of finding a good internet connection for the transfer process.

Abu Harbeid said a proper trip to the market requires her to have her husband or son with her to pay for goods. But neither can leave work to join her.

“I prefer cash in my hand; I could buy anything on the go,” Abu Harbied said.

Not only a liquidity shortage issue

Analysts say Gaza’s current economic reality started as a liquidity crisis, but has become an issue of transition from a regulated financial system to a fragmented survival economy shaped by scarcity, informality, and political constraints.

“However, as the months passed, the crisis evolved into something far more structural,” Ahmed Abu Qamar, member of the board of directors of the Palestinian Economists Association, told Al Jazeera.

“The black market now plays a dominant role in determining liquidity conditions. A small group of traders effectively manages cash circulation through high-commission cashing operations.”

He said that when money itself becomes a traded commodity, it signals severe distortion in the monetary system. “Cash, like any commodity, becomes subject to supply and demand dynamics. When it becomes scarce, its value increases beyond its nominal worth. From an economic perspective, this represents a structural disruption of the monetary system.

“The formal banking sector and the Palestinian Monetary Authority were sidelined. What we are seeing is the neutralisation of the formal monetary system,” he said.

Abu Qamar said the deeper issue was confidence – not just in cash, but in the financial system as a whole. “Cash is inherently difficult to track, whereas electronic payments are traceable and can be frozen or restricted. Implementing such a transition abruptly produces severe economic and social distortions,” he warned.

“Widespread selling on credit is not a sign of market stability – it is an indicator of declining incomes and weakened purchasing power. When debt expands rapidly without a parallel increase in income, the result is social fragmentation. Approximately 95 percent of households in Gaza depend on aid,” he added.

Profiteering from Gaza’s woes 

The war has paved the way for middlemen to cash in illegally on the financial woes of Gaza, residents said.

Sukkar said that when her husband or sons needed cash, they were often forced to deal with brokers who charge a hefty commission that could reach 50 percent.

“We lose our money to them for nothing; they steal from us under our full consent,” she said.

Many residents, like Abu Harbeid, also do not trust bank transfers, saying they prefer physical cash in hand.

“I ask my sons, where does that money in the account appear?” said Sukkar.

“Who holds our money in their hands? I used to see money and count it, the banknotes and the change. On some days, when there are technical problems with the bank applications, we get nervous about the possibility of losing the money in their accounts,” she added.

Abdallah Sukkar, whose family ran a well-known family store in the Shujayea area in eastern Gaza before the war, said families who receive direct deposit salaries often buy with bank transfers.

“But I don’t like this method; I prefer cash,” he said.

He said he accepts all banknotes, whether new or worn-out ones, and allows people to buy on credit, but admitted that all of that affects his ability to make improvements to the roadside stall he now runs in place of his family’s old business.

He also complained of unpaid debts, adding that debts had soared by more than 500 percent during the war, while his profits barely reach 2 percent. He said he had given out 20,000 shekels’ worth of goods to new customers, “all of [whom] have become customers during the war”.

“People don’t have money; I can’t turn them away when they come to buy food on credit. It’s already catastrophic in Gaza,” he said.

“From the beginning of Ramadan till now, I haven’t had banknotes and change, which affects the sales. I don’t have small change to give to people who have cash, so they turn to other stalls or shops.

“Yesterday, when the bank application stopped, we were terrified that we might lose our money in the bank,” he said.

Last December, Warner Bros agreed to a takeover offer from Netflix for some of its assets. But Paramount, which is backed by tech billionaire Larry Ellison and led by his son David, made a rival offer as it looks to transform itself into a Hollywood heavyweight. But it had been rebuffed by Warner Bros.

And while grid physics remains the starting point, the innovations shaping the 2030 landscape extend far beyond conductors and transmission lines. The energy transition of the early 2020s was framed as a moral and political imperative. But from 2026 onward, the debate shifts decisively. The center of gravity moves from ideological declarations to hard technical realities, material constraints, and industrial competitiveness. The path to 2030 is no longer about announcing targets; it is about solving the physical, economic, and infrastructural parameters that will determine whether decarbonization can advance without destabilizing grids or bankrupting entire sectors.

EU deserves a clear reminder. LNG corridors from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean are helpful, but they cannot resolve Europe’s energy challenges. They remain complementary measures. They do not correct the structural difficulties created over decades. A persistent green ideological rigidity limited the role of firm capacity. Domestic hydrocarbon production was phased out. Permitting essential infrastructure slowed significantly. These choices had predictable effects. They overlooked grid physics, materials, storage, reliability, and industrial policy. They weakened the system Europe now relies on. Three forces now shape the landscape. Grids must remain stable under very high RES penetration. Critical materials, from copper and aluminum to gallium, are becoming scarce and expensive. Existing fossil infrastructure must be used strategically to avoid premature asset stranding. Innovation is adjusting to these realities. New conductors, new storage solutions, new fuels, and updated regulatory frameworks are emerging because the previous assumptions no longer hold.

Materials and Conductors: The Silent Revolution in Grid Reinforcement

The rapid expansion of data centers and large RES clusters has exposed the limits of traditional copper‑based infrastructure. Prices, weight, and installation requirements make the full network reconstruction prohibitive. Aluminum, meanwhile, cannot handle the required current densities. This is where copper‑clad aluminum (CCA) becomes critical: it offers higher conductivity than aluminum, lower cost and weight than copper, and reduced thermal load in dense electrical environments. By 2030, CCA will be widely deployed in data centers, EV fast‑charging networks, and medium‑voltage grids across Europe and North America. Instead of rebuilding entire networks, operators turn to targeted CCA upgrades to ease congestion and unlock dormant capacity. Yet another constraint emerges: transformer shortages and slow permitting, now as acute as the bottlenecks facing RES deployment.

Hydrogen and Methane Pyrolysis: The End of the Universal Green Solution

The myth of the early transition collapses in the 2020s. Hydrogen is no longer viewed as a universal green solution. Life‑cycle analyses show that green hydrogen is only as clean as the electricity feeding the electrolyzers, while methane leakage undermines the value of blue hydrogen. This opens the door to methane pyrolysis, which produces hydrogen and solid carbon with lower emissions, provided methane leakage is tightly controlled. Yet its economic viability depends on stable, low‑cost methane supply. The shift from blue to pyrolytic hydrogen changes the chemical approach, and the geopolitics. Pyrolysis does not free Europe from geopolitical exposure because the continent still depends on external methane suppliers, such the US, Qatar, Algeria, East Med producers, and African exporters. Europe’s pursuit of low‑carbon hydrogen therefore intersects with the strategic interests of actors whose priorities do not always align with EU climate policy.

Hard Carbon and Sodium‑Ion Batteries: The New Geopolitics of Storage

As hydrogen is reconsidered, another development is quietly reshaping the storage landscape. Research from 2024–2025 shows significant advances in sodium‑ion batteries (SIBs). They use hard‑carbon anodes and improved electrolytes that extend performance, safety, and lifespan. Their cost structure is attractive, and their reliance on abundant materials makes them resilient to supply‑chain shocks. They remain short‑duration technologies, typically up to 10 hours, but they offer a robust alternative for stationary applications where energy density is less critical. Lithium keeps its lead in mobility and high‑power applications, yet it gradually loses its monopoly in grid storage.

The absence of lithium, cobalt, and nickel drastically reduces dependence on unstable or concentrated supply chains. Sodium, abundant and low‑cost, makes SIBs ideal for stationary applications. By 2030, SIBs will be deployed across industrial sites, distribution grids, substations, and hybrid long‑duration systems, often combined with hydrogen or thermal storage. China leads production, while Europe attempts to build its own supply chain to reduce import dependence. Sodium‑ion technology is emerging as a strategic counterweight to China’s dominance in lithium refining and cathode materials. By shifting to sodium, a resource with no geopolitical constraints, Europe and India seek to dilute China’s leverage over global battery supply chains. Storage is no longer just a technical field; it is a geopolitical chessboard.

Long Duration Storage Beyond Lithium

Lithium batteries remain essential for short‑duration storage, but the 2030 system increasingly depends on Long Duration Energy Storage (LDES). The cause is simple: high RES penetration creates multi‑day and multi‑week imbalances that no battery chemistry can economically cover. Hydrogen becomes the backbone of these long‑duration needs, not because of efficiency, but because it provides security of supply and seasonal flexibility. In shipping, e‑methanol emerges as the most practical ambient‑temperature hydrogen carrier, balancing energy density, safety, and infrastructure readiness.

The LDES ecosystem expands rapidly. Iron‑air and zinc‑air systems offer multi‑day discharge at low cost. Flow batteries provide long cycle life and deep‑discharge flexibility. Thermal storage and mechanical systems add further diversity. Together, these technologies form a portfolio that complements lithium and sodium‑ion, each serving a different segment of the duration curve.

Hydrogen‑Ready Infrastructure and the Management of Stranded Assets

This shift toward hydrogen‑compatible combined‑cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) is not ideological but economic. It allows investors to continue amortizing fossil infrastructure while gradually reducing emissions. Technical challenges such as, flame speed (much higher than natural gas), NOₓ formation, and material stress, are significant. By 2030 many such units will operate with 20–30% hydrogen blends. They will not eliminate emissions but provide a transition bridge and prevent massive asset write‑offs while stabilizing the grids during low‑RES periods. In fact, dispatchable capacity is becoming a strategic asset in a world where energy security is increasingly weaponized. From Russia’s pipeline leverage to Middle Eastern LNG politics, the vulnerabilities are unmistakable. In this environment, hydrogen‑ready CCGTs are not merely engineering choices; they function as geopolitical insurance policies.

SMRs and the Return of Firm Power

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) will move from concept to implementation in the late 2030s. Their value lies not only in nuclear physics but in industrial standardization, factory manufacturing, harmonized licensing, and integration into industrial heat networks. By 2030, the first SMRs will operate as firm‑power anchors for mining regions, isolated grids such as data centers, and large industrial sites. In a world of tightening supply chains and rising geopolitical competition, their role becomes both technological and strategic.

CBAM and the New Era of Tariff Diplomacy

As the transition moves from engineering constraints to system‑wide restructuring, the pressures are no longer purely technical. Materials, grids, storage, and firm capacity define what is physically possible and the global environment in which these technologies operate is increasingly shaped by trade policy, industrial strategy, and geopolitical competition. This is where the next layer of the transition emerges: the regulatory and commercial instruments. They determine who captures value, who bears cost, and how global supply chains realign. Among these instruments, none is more consequential than the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. This mechanism does not offer technical solutions, it turns decarbonization from a voluntary commitment to a tool of trade. Exporters of steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizers, and electricity must prove low carbon intensity or pay tariffs that erase their competitiveness. For the European Union, CBAM is expected to accelerate investment in low‑carbon processes, often supported by IPCEI programs. Yet the counter‑argument gains weight: CBAM relies on ideological rather than technocratic CO₂ accounting. It ignores life‑cycle emissions, methane leakage outside the EU, the energy intensity of European grids, and emissions embedded in imports. Instead of reducing global emissions, it risks creating carbon leakage under another name.

CBAM sits at the intersection of great‑power competition and the emerging fracture lines of the global economy. For the United States, it is both challenge and opportunity. First, a challenge because European border carbon pricing can collide with U.S. industrial and trade interests. Secondly, an opportunity because, together with the Inflation Reduction Act, it can support a transatlantic low‑carbon industrial block capable of setting de facto global standards. Whether Washington and Brussels coordinate or drift into regulatory rivalry will shape investment flows for decades.

For China, CBAM is more than a tariff, it signals that the EU is prepared to weaponize market access in the name of climate policy. Beijing reads it alongside export controls on critical technologies and restrictions on Chinese clean tech in Europe. In response, China accelerates its own standards, consolidates its dominance in batteries, solar and critical materials, and secures long‑term offtake agreements with countries that feel penalized by European rules. CBAM thus reinforces Beijing’s narrative of Western “green protectionism” aimed at containing China’s industrial rise.

The BRICS expansion adds another layer. Many BRICS and “BRICS‑plus” countries, from India and Brazil to Gulf and African states, view CBAM as a unilateral imposition of European norms on their development paths. As they deepen South‑South cooperation, build alternative financial mechanisms, and explore their own carbon accounting systems, CBAM risks catalyzing parallel regulatory ecosystems: one centered on the EU, another around a looser BRICS‑led bloc rejecting externally imposed climate conditionality.

For much of the Global South, CBAM reinforces a long‑standing grievance: that advanced economies, having built their prosperity on cheap fossil energy, now deploy climate policy in ways that restrict others’ industrial development. Many fear it will confine them to raw‑material roles while eroding the competitiveness of their energy‑intensive sectors. This perception fuels diplomatic pushback, draws some countries closer to China or BRICS frameworks, and complicates Europe’s attempt to position itself as a partner in a “just transition. In this sense, CBAM is more than a tool of market protection or climate ambition. It is a lever that can either place Europe at the center of a rules‑based low‑carbon trade system or accelerate the fragmentation of the global economy into competing regulatory and geopolitical blocks.

Conclusion

The energy transition is not a single technological narrative. Some innovations concern grid physics, conductivity, stability, and thermal management; others shape the energy mix, storage, and industrial architecture of the coming decade. The energy system of 2030 will not be shaped by slogans but by physics, materials, and economics. The question is whether Europe will adapt in time, or whether reality will violently adjust its ambitions.

In a recent move, China’s top general and a longtime confidant of President Xi Jinping, Zhang Youxia, and Joint Staff chief Liu Zhenli were removed from the Central Military Commission (CMC). An editorial published in Liberation Army Daily described both men as “seriously betraying the trust and expectations” of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the CMC.

Beyond corruption allegations, Zhang was reportedly accused of leaking core technical data on China’s nuclear weapons programme to the United States. In the aftermath, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a Mandarin language recruitment video targeting disaffected Chinese soldiers. Titled “The Reason for Stepping Forward To Save the Future,” portrays a disillusioned midlevel officer choosing to contact American intelligence. The outreach appears aimed at deepening internal doubts and positioning itself as an alternative confidant for officers who may feel exposed. However, this is not the first time the agency has sought to infiltrate the country.

A History of Intelligence Operations and Resets

Intelligence rivalry stretches back to the late 1940s, when the CIA tried to monitor the Soviet nuclear programme by placing listening devices within China and along its Soviet border. Surveillance also extended to the Xinjiang region, tracking uranium, gold, petroleum, and Soviet aid to the CPC during its war with the US backed Guomindang for regional control. Despite these efforts, the intelligence gathered remained minimal at best, from October 1950 to July 1953 the agency also failed to achieve its primary objective of diverting significant resources away from China’s military campaign in Korea.

As Cold War rivalries hardened, the CIA launched Operation Circus in the late 1950s to support Tibetan rebels against the CPC. The CIA supplied guerrilla groups, including the most active Chushi Gangdruk group, with arms and ammunition and trained fighters at Camp Hale. Allen Dulles, then CIA deputy director, saw the effort as an opportunity to destabilize the CPC and counter Communist influence across Asia. The group continued its operations from Nepal until 1974, when funding ended after US-China rapprochement.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the CIA cooperated with Chinese intelligence under Project Chestnut, establishing listening posts in the northwest to monitor Soviet communications. In 1989, as the Tiananmen Square protests rocked the CPC, the CIA provided communications equipment, including fax machines and typewriters to protestors. It also assisted in the escape of protest leaders with the help of sympathizers in Hong Kong under Operation Yellow Bird. Relations deteriorated in 2001, when an aircraft built in the US for General Secretary Jiang Zemin was found to contain at least 27 listening devices, including one embedded in the headboard of a bed, operable via satellite.

However, these gains proved fragile as major setbacks soon followed, with reports that between 2010 and 2012 Chinese authorities dismantled a large CIA network. In total, between 18 and 20 sources were killed or imprisoned, according to two former senior American officials. One asset was reportedly shot in front of colleagues in the courtyard of a government building as a warning to others suspected of working with the CIA.

Espionage in the Xi Jinping Era

Estimates in 2024 suggested the Ministry of State Security (MSS) employed as many as 800,000 personnel, compared with roughly 480,000 at the height of the KGB. After taking power in 2012, Xi further consolidated control over its security apparatus, chairing a high level national security task force.

His approach also followed revelations that an American informant network had infiltrated the MSS. An executive assistant to MSS Vice Minister Lu Zhongwei was discovered in 2012 to have passed sensitive information to the CIA. The ministry was also influenced by former security chief Zhou Yongkang, who was charged with abuse of power and intentionally leaking state secrets in 2014. He was subsequently expelled from the politburo in one of the most consequential purges in the country’s history.

In light of these developments, Xi’s “comprehensive state security concept,” promulgated in 2014, linked internal and external threats and underscored the dangers of destabilization through foreign subversion and infiltration. He also enacted the 2014 Counter Espionage Law, revised in 2023 to broaden espionage definitions, coinciding with detentions of foreign firm employees and tighter data controls.

Under his leadership, another major initiative allowed the MSS to establish direct public contact in 2015 through a hotline and website urging citizens to report threats to national security. In 2017, MSS offered rewards of up to 500,000 RMB for reporting suspected threats. In the same year, counterintelligence services also launched a broad awareness campaign through websites, animations, and television dramas promoting this “special work,” often targeting journalists, academics, and Chinese American and Taiwanese businesspeople.

Chinese courts have also imposed severe punishments in such cases. In April 2025, a former employee of a military research institute was sentenced to life imprisonment for selling secret documents to foreign intelligence agencies. The ruling followed the sentencing of a former engineer to death in March on similar charges.

China also deploys operatives abroad to curb criticism and preserve regime stability. Overseas police stations reportedly directed by provincial MSS offices combine administrative services with intelligence functions. One established in New York by the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau drew headlines in 2023. In fact, the earliest cyber incidents targeting UK government systems in the early 2000s originated not from Russia but from China, and were aimed at gathering information on overseas dissident communities, including Tibetan and Uighur groups.

New Intelligence Order Enters a Decisive Era

As China’s influence grew in the 2000s, Western policymakers were focused on the war on terror and interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, political leaders often preferred that intelligence chiefs avoid publicly naming China. Businesses faced mounting pressure to prioritize access to its vast market, while remaining reluctant to acknowledge that their proprietary information was being targeted.

In 2021, the FBI reported opening a new Chinese espionage case roughly every 12 hours, most involving cyber disruption. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of Justice, and other US bodies repeatedly identified MSS affiliated actors in advisories and indictments. Analysts assess MSS linked groups have surpassed PLA associated actors in both the sophistication and scope of their hacking campaigns. In 2024, authorities announced that Salt Typhoon had breached major US telecommunications companies in one of the most damaging publicly reported cyber campaigns. The National Security Agency (NSA) also noted that China’s reliance on indigenous technology makes its networks harder to track.

Former CIA director William J. Burns, under the Biden administration described these intelligence shortcomings as a “pacing challenge.” The administration created a China Mission Centre and a technology intelligence centre to address it. An executive order was also issued in 2024, prohibiting funding for Chinese semiconductors, microelectronics, quantum computing, and certain AI applications in sectors that are considered capable of enhancing military capabilities.

When the Trump administration returned in 2025, it triggered significant disruptions across the US government. In early May 2025, plans were announced to cut 1,200  positions at CIA and 2,000 at the NSA, with similar reductions reportedly planned for other intelligence bodies as well. Such cuts were expected to disrupt operations and deter long term asset relationships. The “Signalgate scandal” further revealed that senior national security officials had shared classified information in an unsecured Signal group chat. These avoidable lapses posed a serious threat to operational security and heightened the risks faced by intelligence assets worldwide.

As China pursues its vision of a unipolar world while escalating espionage and global security threats, international attention on its actions has intensified. Trump’s planned visit to China in April 2026 will be closely watched to assess whether the recruitment videos are part of a broader strategy targeting Xi’s establishment or merely a pressure tactic.

Introduction

The Arctic has long been known as “high North, low tension”, as its frozen waters and permafrost landscape offered no incentives to the states. However, due to global warming, it is changing. The rate of warming in the Arctic region is four times faster than the globe, resulting in massive ice loss. This anthropogenic anomaly has made the Arctic a region of geopolitical significance.

The Strategic Importance

The strategic importance of any region primarily depends on two factors: The first is Geographical position; which not only emboldens its importance as a trade passage but also defines its fruitfulness as a strategic location in both peace and war. The second; its Resources which offer economic benefits to the states, which can be translated into military might. The Arctic, indeed, has manifested both qualities. Its seas are becoming navigable as the ice recedes. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest passage (NWP) provide the countries in the high latitudes lucrative trade opportunities. Similarly, the geo-economic weight of the Arctic is augmented by its huge reserves of petroleum and minerals. It holds almost 13% (90 billion barrels) of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered gas resources. Moreover, the Arctic has a large amount of mineral resources. For example, Greenland; which comprises almost 15% of the Arctic region and its second largest contiguous landmass, is estimated to possess large deposits of Rare Earths, Copper, Zinc, Iron ore, Gold, Nickel and Uranium. Therefore, the big powers have set eye on the Arctic, including the US; Russia and China, with ambitions to dominate which may be termed as The Arctic Great Game.

Strategic location of the Arctic

“Whoever holds Alaska will hold the world”, General Billy Mitchell was not wrong when he uttered this phrase in 1935. Indeed, during the Cold War, the possession of Alaska for the US, its only in the Arctic, proved fruitful. American early warning satellites and missile defenses were installed in Alaska to detect Soviet infiltration. The Cold War is over now, but the competition over the Arctic has reinvigorated. The US, under Trump administration, is ambitious to dominate

the Western Hemisphere. The Arctic, especially Greenland, can be defined as the head of the Western Hemisphere. The geographical position of the Greenland is indeed enviable. East of it runs the widest gap between the Arctic and the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, America holds the Island in esteem for its strategic location. The 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the US military and commercial access to the Arctic, especially Greenland. It already operates the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in Greenland, in addition to its Alaskan military bases in the Arctic.

Russia, an important stakeholder in the region, enjoys one of the longest coastlines and largest territories in the Arctic. Russian activities in the Arctic are not novice. In the late 18^th century, Russian emperor Peter the Great launched the ‘Great Northern Expedition’ which aimed to search for a northern sea route that could connect the Pacific and Europe. The quest for a such a sea route seems promising now as the Arctic waters become traversable. In 2020, Russia unveiled its Arctic policy till 2035. Among others, it emphasized the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as ‘a national transport communication of the Russian Federation that is competitive on the world market’. However, after Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin adopted a staunch outlook. In Feb 2023, Putin decreed to amend the country’s Arctic policy. The amended document mentioned the prioritization of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. For this purpose, Russia has endeavored to transform NSR into a global trade and energy route. Russia currently operates the largest Icebreaker fleet and thanks to this technology, the transit of trade vessels is expected to increase through the NSR.

Routes through the Arctic Ocean. Source: Author’s creation

However, any unilateral Russian action in the Arctic Ocean would not land off the attention of the other Arctic states. While Russia is ambitious to hew the Arctic Ocean as a “Russian Lake”, the other Arctic countries too deem the Arctic as their ‘number one priority’. The Nordic countries consider the Arctic as a security concern, they also see Russia as a threat in the region while emphasizing sustainable development in the region. Therefore, the strategic competition in the Arctic will, inevitably, shape the European security dynamics.

The strategic importance of GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a body of open water between the three countries, is still relevant. During the Cold War, it provided the Soviet vessels an outlet into the North Atlantic Ocean which conferred optimal range to strike NATO targets. However, in late 2019, Russian submarines surged through the gap into the North Atlantic in what was a large-scale military exercise to which NATO forces counteracted with air missions to gather reconnaissance. Therefore, the Arctic is of strategic significance. It acts as a vanguard for the defenses of the Americas and Europe.

The most interesting case offered in the Arctic security is that of China, which lacks any geographical connection to the region. For Beijing, the Arctic begets new opportunities. China has already declared itself a “Near-Arctic State”  in its Arctic Policy 2018 and seeks to participate in the development of the Arctic shipping routes. China’s growing interest in the Arctic shipping routes can be interpreted as its efforts to diversify its trade routes. Compare the two routes which link China to the Western European markets: First is from the Chinese ports through the East and South China Sea, into the Indian Ocean, then crossing the Suez and reaching Mediterranean, squeezing through Gibraltar strait and reaching destinations. China’s apparition, utilizing this route, is evident in what has been translated as the “Malacca dilemma”. The second runs northerly from the Chinese ports and then cruising along the Arctic reaches Northern and Western Europe. The first is long, time-consuming and precarious in case of conflict given complex maritime features of the region. The second not only cost saving but also relatively more secure and safe. Therefore, the prospects for China to make the Arctic a “Polar Silk Road” are rewarding.

Future Power Politics in the Arctic. Source: Author’s creation

The Race to Secure the Arctic Resources

President Trump, during his first term, had tried to buy Greenland. However, his efforts were reinvigorated after his re-election in late 2024. During his second term, he has repeatedly threatened to occupy Greenland by using military force, the island defined by him as a matter of national security. The strategic importance of the Greenland is evident. Trump’s interest in the Greenland can be defined by two reasons. First to oust China and Russia from the region who have been increasing their influence in the region, as he perceives. Secondly, Trump wants to secure the resources of the Greenland for the US. Greenland, as said earlier, is rich in rare-earth minerals, which have their application in military industries, medical equipment, oil refining and green energy. Currently, China is the largest exporter of the rare earths. US deems ramping up its rare earth’s resources crucial for countering the Chinese monopoly over them. Last year, a global supply chains crisis loomed following China’s restrictions on the exports of the critical minerals. Moreover, to meet the threat imposed by climate change, the real progenitor of the shift in Arctic security, the transition to renewable and smart energy sources demands sufficient mineral resources including the rare earths. These are used in wind turbines and electric vehicles.

Russia extracts a huge amount of its energy and mineral resources from the Arctic. It produces rare earths, nickel and cobalt from its Arctic territory. Russian Arctic also holds almost 37.5 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, 75% of Russia’s gas reserves. As the permafrost thaws and the sea ice melts in the Arctic, Russia will expand its efforts to secure the resources in the region. Therefore, the Kremlin keenly observes changing environmental and political dynamics in the Arctic.

Lastly, the ‘Near-Arctic State’ has also augmented its footholds in the Arctic. China has invested in economic sectors in the Arctic. It is yet to be unveiled whether China’s ambitions in the Arctic are solely for peaceful economic purposes or rather they embody a strategic objective. So far, China has remained innocuous, focusing on economic ties with the Arctic states which benefit all.

Conclusion

The Arctic is going to witness a tense geostrategic competition. Climate Change has transformed this previously unnoticed region into a new stage of strategic competition. Arctic routes and resources invite regional as well as extra-regional powers to vie for dominance in the high north. Therefore, states have shifted their focus to the Arctic. The political and strategic facts imply that in the future the master of the Arctic will decide the matters of the world.

With the U.S. Air Force now in the process of transitioning from the aging EC-130H Compass Call to the brand-new, bizjet-based EA-37B Compass Call, TWZ caught up with top executives from the two co-primes on the electronic attack aircraft program. In the process, we learnt more about its capabilities, related platforms, and other prospects for the future. We spoke with Jason Lambert, president of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sector (ISR) at L3Harris Technologies, and Dave Harrold, who leads the Countermeasure & Electromagnetic Attack (CEMA) Solutions business area at BAE Systems.

TWZ: Can you give us a better understanding of what the EA-37B Compass Call does conceptually? There are clearly a lot of different parts to its mission, so I am just interested to hear that in your words.

Dave Harrold: This aircraft is the Department of War’s only long-range, electromagnetic spectrum aircraft. Interestingly enough, it used to be called the EC-37B until it was formally changed to the EA-37B, signifying that it is a dedicated electronic attack platform.

When I say electronic attack, what we’re talking about is really degrading, denying, and disrupting adversary communications. It’s about causing havoc in their command-and-control system, so that adversary leaders are unable to make clear decisions. So that’s about integrated air defense systems [IADS] and disruptions there. It’s about [disrupting] different communication nodes. This really is a dedicated counter-C5ISRT [command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting] platform. We’ve been doing this mission set for over 40 years with the EC-130H workhorse starring in every conflict since it was put in the inventory, particularly in the Global War on Terror.

We saw the need to be able to do that at a higher altitude, longer range, higher speed, if we were going to turn this capability toward other regions. And so the challenge was really around: how do you take all of that stuff on an EC-130H and package it down to an EA-37B? That has been a challenge of innovation and technology, for us to reimagine: how do you take that size and weight and reduce it, but not reduce the power? Because we need that power to be able to execute the kinds of techniques that we’re doing on the system. So really, it’s about controlling the electromagnetic spectrum, making sure we can enable our side and disable the other side.

Electromagnetic warfare, evolved

Jason Lambert: The EA-37B does that really on a theater level. There are other capability sets that the Department of War has in their inventory that are more of a point solution, whereas this is really a theater-level, strategic solution, dominating the electromagnetic spectrum and being able to defeat what’s happening on our adversary’s side, while our forces continue to operate in full, with what they need to do for their communications, with what they need to do with their command and control systems. Other systems out in the world are broad jammers. This is not that; this enables our assets to be able to continue to do their job in a non-degraded manner.

Dave Harrold: Yeah, this is really important. One of the strengths of the EA-37B is the simultaneity. What that means is we’ve got the power and the capability. We’re not in a one-versus-world anymore, or using a point solution: here’s a threat, here’s a technique. The threat environment is getting more and more sophisticated and challenging, and so it’s really about how many different techniques can you run at one time to neutralize or disrupt or deny how many different threats that are out there? That’s what’s important about the power and what distinguishes this platform from point solutions.

Jason Lambert: And it is all software-defined, which is a very important thing. The threats are evolving, and we’ve got the capability, and our Department of War has the capability, for some of our other platforms, our ISR platforms, specifically, to go out and collect on what those potential threats might look like and how those threats evolve over time. That information is able to be configured within the mission system that BAE Systems produces to be able to go and defeat those threats. It’s not like a one-off solution that’s going to be made obsolete. It’s a solution today that’s built for tomorrow and beyond, because it can continue to evolve based on the threats.

TWZ: Can you kind of indulge us in terms of what could it do? What’s a tangible thing this could actually go and do? Could it go and shut down a big part of an integrated air defense system [IADS] for example?

Jason Lambert: I’m gonna go back to one of the things I’ve already said: sophisticated comms networks. Our enemy adversaries have more and more sophisticated comms networks. We have to affect those comms networks in order to affect their overall capability. And, you know, you mentioned IADS, that is an original mission of the Compass Call platform, to disrupt the IADS.

Dave Harrold: Exactly, this is designed to break the kill chain. If there’s no command and control system to process the information for the kill chain, it won’t work. And you can do that significant range. That’s what it does.

TWZ: Can you explain a bit more about what you have to do to port these systems and capabilities from the EC-130H into the EA-37B?

Jason Lambert: L3Harris is the integrator. We purchase the aircraft either directly from Gulfstream or from the VIP market. Then we work with Gulfstream to do the conversion of the aircraft. We essentially time it back to what the plane was when it initially left the production line. Then we go and do the outer mold line shape; Gulfstream provides that to us at our facility in Waco, Texas. Then we do the integration of the BAE Systems mission system that Dave and his team provide.

Dave Harrold: We’re the prime mission equipment provider, so that’s our co-prime split, and we build all of that up in Nashua, New Hampshire. We build that equipment, we test it, we lay it out. We have an integration lab up there, where we actually lay it out as if it were in the aircraft, and then we ship that off to Jason’s team, who then lay it out to make sure it all fits again before they put it on the actual aircraft. It’s a very choreographed way to make sure that we’re hand in hand about building the equipment, that the cabling is all appropriate, and all that kind of stuff, so that Jason’s team can integrate it on the aircraft.

Jason Lambert: The EC-130H is still in service today, but it is obviously a very different airplane in terms of the capability set. We think about it, we think about the SWAP — size, weight, and power are three constraints or criteria that we look at. Obviously, they are very different on a business jet platform, but we’ve successfully done that integration on the new system. Now we can, of course, put that all on an aircraft that’s got a much larger range, time on station, and altitude to be able to perform this mission.

The EC-130 Crew

TWZ: Returning to the EC-130H comparison. Can you compare the performance of the two platforms? How does that affect survivability?

Jason Lambert: From a speed perspective, the EA-37B flies at Mach 0.82… versus 300 miles an hour for the EC-130H. For altitude, the EC-130H flies at 20,000 feet. The EA-37B is going to be north of 40,000 feet. So we have double the altitude. And when we think about time on station, it’s not comparable. I mean, from a range perspective, we have more than double. We have around 2,300 nautical miles on the EC-130H and 4,400 nautical miles on the EA-37B. Couple that with additional content that can be put on from defensive perspective, and it’s far more survivable, no question about it. In terms of how it operates, the altitude it operates, the standoff range it can operate at, it’s a different plane

 TWZ: Does greater altitude improve your ability to do this missions with greater standoff?

Dave Harrold: It actually does. Just the geometry of being at that higher altitude, you can get a far greater view to the horizon, and and not just on the ground, but communication at large. So think what might be above you as well as below you.

Returning to survivability, I think the other thing to remember is that the mission here is to degrade, disrupt, and deny the adversary’s ability to communicate. And so by doing that, we’re contributing to the survivability of the whole campaign, and by itself, also the platform itself, right? If I’m out there disabling different comms networks that are integral to threats actually being successful, the platform is making itself much more survivable through its actual core mission.

TWZ: Could it go and operate as an escort jammer? I mean, could it go and follow a package to a certain point to protect it?

Jason Lambert: I mean, I guess. I guess we use the word jammer. But it’s not just a simple jammer. It’s a very different mission set, a very discrete set of techniques. But it is absolutely essential to the overall strike package to make sure that that the goals of that package are achieved.

TWZ: Can we just talk a little more about some of the improvements in the EA-37B version of Compass Call? I guess one of the big improvements is the ability to rapidly insert new capabilities in the form of upgrades. Is there anything you can say about that?

Dave Harrold: I think as we move forward, the original baseline was really about just cross-decking the capability from the EC-130H. Now we’re moving into a much more software-defined radio architecture, an open systems architecture. The whole point there is that we go from SABER [BAE Systems’ Small Adaptive Bank of Electronic Resources], which is sort of what I would call Baseline 3.5, interim, the bridge, to get to Baseline 4, which is the fully open software-defined radio architecture. The whole point there is that it used to take months or longer to find a threat, get a new technique, and figure out how to put it on the hardware. Hardware now is all about adaptability and speed, and, more importantly, it’s not just about BAE Systems’ techniques that this open architecture allows for. Anybody who has the right technique can come and plug into our system. We’ve got a development kit that people can get access to, and they can write new skills that we can rapidly insert into the open architecture. As the threat environment gets more sophisticated, we have to get more sophisticated with how rapidly we can come forward with something to counter those threats.

TWZ: Just in terms of the CONOPS, does this airplane follow a scripted battle plan? Or can it do real-time adjustments, performing more dynamically?

Dave Harrold: It’s a sophisticated system that is adaptable and flexible to the combatant commanders’ needs, so it can be tasked in that way, to be used optimally, for whatever the commander needs. I also think the exploitation that the system needs to do is flexible enough to be able to change depending on if we are pre-war or at war.

TWZ: How do the mission players actually see the data? Is it processed on board, or can it be worked offboard as well?

Jason Lambert: We’ve got a crew of up to nine people on the aircraft. Of course, the pilot and co-pilot are responsible for the flying, but there are an additional seven members in the back that operate and employ the electronic attack mission system and equipment that’s permanently integrated into the mission and cargo compartment. That crew can include a mission crew commander, which would be an electronic warfare officer, and a weapon system officer. There are experienced cryptologists, linguists, analyst operators, and airborne maintenance technicians. So it’s an entire team that’s up there. The aircraft can process that work onboard, or it can send signals and content to other aircraft in the network.

BAE Systems Compass Call Jammer

TWZ: Can a ground operating team manipulate the Compass Call system? Or does it have to be done airborne?

Jason Lambert: I’m a little cautious on how to answer that question, just in terms of the nature of the classification. I’ll just say it is set up to operate in theater and on a network and so also autonomously. As we continue to evolve our solution set, not just for Compass Call, but what we’re doing on our other ISR platforms, AI is becoming a big part of that in terms of operator workload and being able to do more of the mission set with fewer individuals on the plane. That is evolving as the threat goes up.

TWZ: I think that’s an obvious thing, isn’t it, to want to have fewer operators on board?

Jason Lambert: It helps with weight. If you take out a member of the personnel and a mission crew station, now you can do the same on either a smaller platform, or you can bring more gear onto the same aircraft. There’s always that tradeoff.

TWZ: Can we go back very briefly to the point about reducing the personnel on board. How will you harness AI to do that?

Jason Lambert: It’s really through AI decision content provided to the operator. So think about it in terms of an AEW&C [airborne early waring and control] equation, and a little bit different in terms of what would happen in Compass Call. But in the AEW&C equation, your operators are looking at the number of assets to track. Think of aircraft, airborne assets. They could be ballistic threats, anything that’s been launched and in the sky. There’s a certain number per operator and that number is typically classified. But if you think about it in terms of the things that the human in the system can actually manage at any one point in time, the AI will help that human be able to do a lot more of that by giving the information, compacting the information, and the decision tools to enable them to do more. That’s really what AI does. It’s not a supplement. It’ss an enhancement for the operators.

TWZ: In terms of expandability, the nose and the tail are currently empty. Are you looking at putting anything in there? Is there a need for that? Could you add additional cooling, for example, in the future?

Jason Lambert: We have expansion options for additional content. So we’re continuing to look at that in terms of what you mentioned on the nose. In terms of cooling, there’s both air cooling and liquid cooling on the platform, and so we typically operate in both environments. More broadly, though, about expandability, we talk a lot with our customer about what a roadmap to additional capabilities might look like. Whether that’s new techniques because of emerging threats, prime mission equipment itself, or other capabilities that might take advantage of real estate on the platform. So we’re executing an existing program and at the same time talking about what incremental upgrades might look like in the future.

TWZ: Could you expand the mission set by adding new sensors?

Jason Lambert: It’s actually not so much the hardware, it’s the software, right? And it’s all software defined. The expandability in the mission packages is really designed to evolve based on what the threat package looks like. And so the threat identification is more and more about the adversary, then we can involve the system through the software integration on the platform. It’s already like it’s designed to be self-expanded. Again, that’s why this simultaneity thing is really important, it’s because as new mission sets come on board, I don’t have to sacrifice one mission for another mission and I can simultaneously execute.

TWZ: The first export customer for the EA-37B is Italy, with two jets on order. Can you talk about those aircraft?

Jason Lambert: They will be the same. Italy may use a different nomenclature when the aircraft are delivered, but they will be EA-37B aircraft. We both co-prime this program for the U.S. Air Force. We also do that for Foreign Military Sales [FMS]. Italy is our first international customer, and there is some additional interest beyond that.

TWZ: So you are going to build additional sets of the Compass Call kit to go in that?

Jason Lambert: We are. That particular contract, and the way we execute these programs on an international basis, is we do a hybrid contract. We do a direct commercial sale, typically on the airplanes, and then the mission system and integration are done on an FMS case through the U.S. Air Force. Of course, this has to go through U.S. government approvals with the State Department in terms of policy release and whatnot, for the technology, which has been approved for Italy. There are additional customers that are also interested on the international front.

TWZ: Presumably the benefit there is that the Italians already have G550s and the associated infrastructure?

Jason Lambert: We have an ISR program known as JAMMS [Joint Airborne Multi-Mission Multi-Sensor System]. When you think about a country that wants to go take on an electronic attack capability, the precursor to that is, typically, an ISR capability. They’ve got an aircraft known as JAMMS. We have a legacy program called SPYDR that we’ve done with the Italians. Understanding the signals that you want to go and eventually exploit and get dominance over in terms of the electromagnetic spectrum, having that understanding of them first through the ISR path is typically the starting point. In recent news you might have seen we have also successfully delivered MC-55A Peregrine to the Australians. That’s their foray into this space as well. And they’ve got interest in potentially looking at the EA-37B Compass Call downrange. But to start right now, it’s the ISR capability that’s been delivered.

TWZ: And so do other export customers for the EA-37B get a U.S.-standard Compass Call, or is it going to be a slightly different standard? How will they work alongside the U.S. Air Force jets?

Jason Lambert: It’s all subject to releaseability in the U.S. Air Force. But they will be getting the same capability. It’s helpful for the United States, because you want to have your partners involved in this. In an unclassified realm, right now, the need from the U.S. Air Force is over 20 planes. We’re currently under contract, in terms of the mission system, for 10. There are congressional plus-ups that have been looked at for FY 26. The budget’s been increased, and it looks like there’s going to be another two aircraft placed on order for this fiscal year. We’re excited about that. As industry, we’re always looking at how we can expand capacity to go address that need. But you think about a need of 20-plus aircraft in an unclassified space with 10 under contract, soon to be 12. Partners are a big part of how we can go address that global challenge, for the global threat. Italy is the foray into doing that in the EUCOM theater, and what could be done in the eastern realm of NATO. Now, potentially, we’re working with partners from PACOM.

Dave Harrold: The RC-135 Rivet Joint is another aircraft in the U.S. Air Force asset base. That is our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset employed by the United States and United Kingdom. Again, that works hand in hand and collaboratively with the EA-37B feet. They will combine, and they can also provide information to each other.

TWZ: In terms of the airframes, the G550 program has come to an end. Where will you source new aircraft from?

Jason Lambert: The G550 is currently out of production. Right now, on any given day, there are roughly a dozen aircraft that are available for sale. Think of it as high-net-worth individuals or corporations that want to trade up or trade in their business jet fleet. So we would go procure those aircraft as they were looking to go buy another asset from Gulfstream or another partner, and we would take those aircraft and work with Gulfstream to do that modification work and get ready to go host the BAE Systems mission kit. That’s how we grow the current G550 base with the used assets on the market.

Additionally, the U.S. Air Force has got 16 C-37 or G550 aircraft that they operate. There are discussions right now on a recap program. Not all those aircraft are a perfect fit for the mission system. They have to be above a certain serial number in terms of how they were produced. Five of the 16 are potential candidates that could be converted to Compass Call. That’s incremental, of course, on top of dozen or so the VIP market. But there are planes available for us to do the expansion. When Dave and I look out and we get the question from Air Force about how do we grow and expand, industry is ready to go do that. We know the need is for greater numbers and we have plans to be able to go execute that.

TWZ: So the extra two EA-37Bs for the Air Force will be existing airframes that you will harvest from somewhere else?

Jason Lambert: We will purchase those from the market. We’ve already identified owners and tail numbers. We’re ready to go.

We want to thank Jason Lambert and Dave Harrold for taking the time to answer our questions about the EA-37B and share their passion for the aircraft with our readers.

Contact the editor: thomas@thewarzone.com

After spending decades criticising China, a succession of leaders from Western countries have been lining up to engage with its leadership.

In recent months, many of them have visited Beijing, seeking business opportunities.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is the latest to land in China.

Merz says Beijing must not be overlooked when tackling the big global challenges.

United States President Donald Trump’s huge tariffs are said to have pushed Western countries closer to China.

But can China be an alternative?

And what does it have to offer?

Presenter: James Bays

Guests:

Jost Wubbeke – Managing partner at Sinolytics and an expert on China’s industrial policy, rare earths and supply chain strategy

Harry Broadman – Former assistant to the US trade representative

Dan Wang – Economist and director on Eurasia Group’s China team

The 10th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was held on November 3 in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. The main theme of this year’s summit was ‘Turk Time’. The organization, which has set goals such as the long-term Vision of the Turkic World 2040 and the short-term Strategic Roadmap of the OTS 2022-2026, has added a new vision with ‘Turk Time’. So, is the Turk Age possible in the 21st century? Could Turks become an effective political center in the new era? Is Turk Time just a slogan? Or is it based on reality?

Turmoil in the Current Global System gave birth to the Organization of Turkic States

The 2008 economic crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the weakening of United States (US) hegemony that emerged with its military withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq left great chaos and a vacuum in international order.[1] Especially with the COVID-19 pandemic and the US debt ceiling crisis, the US hegemony tool, dollar hegemony, has suffered a major shake-up and has become controversial.[2] This vacuum and chaotic environment triggered an effort to build a new alternative order for countries that were uncomfortable with the existing international order, and to gain a position in the new order to be established. As the rise of Asian economies continued in the global economy, organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS accelerated the construction of an alternative multipolar order. The world was divided into two camps: defenders of the old unipolar world order and proponents of the new multipolar world order. The weakening of US hegemony and global chaos paved the way for the OTS. The transformation of the organization in 2021 coincided with the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Turkey, in particular, plays a decisive role in the OTS. In recent years, Turkey has experienced sharp ruptures in its relations with the US, EU, and NATO. The weakening of Turkey’s relations with the West is a reflection of the decline of US hegemony in the global order. At the same time, Turkey’s increasing cooperation and friendship with Russia and China played a positive role in the establishment of the OTS. The organization should be seen as an attempt to become part of a multipolar world order. For example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statement that the world is bigger than five is an expression of the need to build a just multipolar world order. As the Turkic states increase cooperation, trade, and prosperity among themselves, they serve regional peace and the establishment of a just order. With the OTS, Turkey aims to increase prosperity in the region, improve infrastructure, maintain a common culture, and increase its defense and counter-terrorism cooperation capabilities. Turkey’s objectives in the OTS in Central Asia are an effort to take part in a multipolar world that will strengthen peace and prosperity. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan aims to continue the Turk Time with Turkey and for the Turkic world to become the world’s rising power.[3] Turkey wants to be a subject, not an object, in the multipolar order. In sum, Turkey is trying to play a stronger role in the new international system to be established by establishing good relations with the advocates of the multipolar world order.

Organization Strengthens by Institutionalizing

After the transformation of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States into the OTS with the Istanbul summit in 2021, the organization entered the process of building a stronger institutional infrastructure. Analyzing the outcomes of the Astana Summit, efforts to complete the institutionalization of the organization stand out. This year, the organization continued to increase institutionalization in areas such as the Civil Protection Mechanism, the Turkic Judicial Training Network, the Union of Notaries of the Turkic World, the Turkic Investment Fund, and the Organization of Trade Unions of Turkic States. The final declaration expresses satisfaction with the activities carried out within the framework of the organization in one year.[4] For example, the Alliance of Turkic News Agencies (ATNA) was established after the summit between Turkey’s news agency Anadolu Agency (AA), Azerbaijan State News Agency (AZERTAC), Kyrgyz National News Agency (Kabar), Uzbekistan National News Agency (UzA), and Kazakhstan’s news agency Qazcontent. After the establishment of ATNA, Binali Yıldırım, Chairman of the OTS Council of Elders, said: “We aim to bring the truth to the people in the fastest way and to prevent colonialist countries from covering the events. Serdar Karagöz, who was elected president of ATNA, emphasized the importance of combating disinformation.[5] In short, in the field of media, OTS has placed establishment of a media network that will challenge the media of the unipolar world and represent the oppressed at its center. During the next few years, it is possible to predict that the organization will institutionalize in various fields.

The organization Aims to Strengthen Trade

There are two important cooperation areas between the member states of the OTS. The first is the development of cooperation in the energy field. Turkic states are rich in valuable minerals such as energy, natural gas, oil, and uranium. Therefore, the member states of the organization tend to deepen their cooperation in the field of energy. The second meeting of the OTS Working Group on Energy Cooperation of the Ministers Responsible for Energy of the OTS was held on September 28, 2022, in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The parties adopted the OTS Energy Cooperation Program and the related action plan for 2023-2027, which includes the exchange of information and ideas on legislation and national programs in the energy sector, renewable and alternative energy sources, fossil fuel energy, nuclear energy, energy efficiency, dissemination of new technologies, capacity-building programs, and enhancing cooperation in the international arena. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan emphasized the importance of making efforts to make the Middle Corridor even more attractive for investment and to transport trans-Caspian resources, particularly Turkmen gas, to Turkey and Europe. Strategic energy infrastructure projects such as the Organization, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, Southern Gas Corridor, Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP), and Trans Adriatic Pipeline Project (TAP) contribute to the prosperity of Turkic states and European and global energy security. [6]

The second is to take steps to strengthen trade along the Silk Road belt. The member states of the OTS had a trade volume of $ 700 billion. However, only $ 18 billions of this trade volume is carried out among the member states themselves. This situation is the main driving factor in the establishment of the organization. Because Turkey and the member states are determined to develop trade among themselves. The member states of the organization focus on removing or facilitating trade barriers among themselves. Eliminating trade barriers and providing infrastructure investments on roads. In this respect, there is no other way but to work in harmony with the Belt and Road Initiative of the OTS. The implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the 2023-2027 OTS Transport Connectivity Program adopted at the Astana summit is expected to significantly increase the transit potential of the Middle Corridor and make Caspian transits smoother.

The establishment of the Turkish Investment Fund was on the agenda at the Istanbul Summit. During the two-year period of the organization, sub-commissions carried out infrastructure work to establish the Turkish Investment Fund. On March 16, 2023, the Agreement on the Establishment of the Turkish Investment Fund was signed at the Extraordinary Summit of the OTS held in Ankara. Before the Astana summit, Turkey voted the proposal for the establishment of the Turkish Investment Fund as a law in its parliament: “The capital participation commitment of the Republic of Turkey to the Turkish Investment Fund and the payments to be made within the framework of this commitment cannot exceed the equivalent of USD 100,000,000.[7] The President is authorized to increase the amount up to five times.  Thus, the OTS has gained an institutional structure to finance its investments among itself. All of these developments are efforts to increase the economic trade volume of the organization and strengthen economic cooperation.

Russia, Iran, and China should be part of the OTS

The fate of Turkic states depends on the revival of the Silk Road and the Belt and Road Initiative. Historically, trade flowing from China to Europe via the Silk Road played an important role in enriching Turks and building powerful states. Today, China, the world’s second-largest economy, has regained its historical position. The revival of the historical Silk Road plays an important role in the revival of the Turkic world. There must be an air of unity in Eurasia in order for the OTS to succeed. In this respect, the accession of Iran, Russia, and China, which have Turkic-speaking peoples, to the OTS will add significant strength to the organization. There is already such an expectation in the OTS. Chairman of the Council of Elders of the OTS Binali Yıldırım stated that China and Russia are natural members of the OTS.[8]

The sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of Russia’s operation in Ukraine have highlighted the strategic importance of the Middle Corridor.[9] Moreover, although 96 percent of the trade from China to Europe is by sea, the US continues to blockade the South China Sea. Currently, the Middle Corridor is the safest port for trade flow. The most important goal of the OTS is to make the Middle Corridor more active. “We should also pay special attention to the development of transport networks between our countries. With this understanding, we continue our efforts to activate the Caspian Trans-Caspian East-West Middle Corridor. We should strengthen our cooperation in removing obstacles to transportation and trade, enriching transportation networks, facilitating border crossings, and visa procedures”.[10]

Conclusion

The world is on the brink of a global rupture, and OTS is an organization that emerged on the brink of this global rupture. Shortly after the Republic of Turkey celebrated its 100^th anniversary on October 29, the OTS organized a summit with the theme of ‘Turk Time’, which reflects the expectation of Turks to become a global actor for the 200^th year. To achieve this goal, the Organization of Turkic States must unite in Eurasia. In this respect, it is vital for the OTS to strengthen its cooperation with China, Iran, and Russia. These states are the leading powers of Asia and home to Turkic-speaking peoples. Economically, the Middle Corridor is vital for the OTS. Trade between China and Europe passes through Central Asia via railroads, which indicates the revival of the historic Silk Road. Controlling the Silk Road, the OTS can regain its historical role, gain a geopolitical advantage, and become an important figure in world politics. Turks have always had their own special goals, called the ‘Red Apple’. The Ottoman Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror set the conquest of Istanbul and the establishment of a new Roman Empire as the Red Apple. In the 16-18^th centuries, the Ottoman Sultans identified the conquest of Vienna and Rome as the Red Apple. In the 20^th century, Turkist ideologues had the Red Apple of establishing a Turan State. In the 21^st century, it is clear that the Turks’ Red Apple is the greatest ideal to be a center in the multipolar world order under the slogan of ‘Turk Time’.

The views contained in this article are the author’s alone and do not represent the views of Shanghai University.

[1] Francis Fukuyama, Francis Fukuyama on the end of American hegemony, 8 November 2021, https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2021/11/08/francis-fukuyama-on-the-end-of-american-hegemony

[2] CFR, The Future of Dollar Hegemony, 22 August 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/future-dollar-hegemony

[3] Türkiye Yüzyılı’nda ‘Türk Devri’ başlıyor, 3 November 2023, https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/turkiye-yuzyilinda-turk-devri-basliyor-809286.html

[4] Organization of Turkic States, “Declaration of the Tenth Summit of the Organization of the Turkic States”, 3 November 2023, https://www.turkicstates.org/assets/pdf/haberler/astana-declaration-3113-215.pdf

[5] AA, “Türk Haber Ajansları Birliğinin ilk genel kurulu yapıldı”, 6 November 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/kurumsal-haberler/turk-haber-ajanslari-birliginin-ilk-genel-kurulu-yapildi/3045736#

[6] Türkiye İletişim Başkanlığı, 21. Yüzyılın Parlayan Yıldızı: Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı, İstanbul, Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı Yayınları: 2023

[7] Resmî Gazete, Türk Yatırım Fonu Kuruluş Anlaşmasının Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun, 11November 2023, https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2023/11/20231111-1.htm

[8] Sputnik, Aksakallılar Konseyi Başkanı Yıldırım: Rusya ve Çin Türk Devletleri Teşkilatı’nın doğal üyesidir, https://tr.sputniknews.com/20211126/aksakallilar-konseyi-baskani-yildirim-rusya-ve-cin-turk-devletleri-teskilatinin-dogal-uyesidir-1051186836.html

[9] Zeynep Çetinkaya, & Zeynep Canlı, “Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı Türkiye’den geçen ‘Orta Koridorun önemini daha da artırdı.” AA, 2022, 1 Mart 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/rusya-ukrayna-savasi-turkiyeden-gecen- orta-koridorun-onemini-daha-da-artirdi/2519232.

[10] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, “Türk dünyasının barışı, refahı ve güvenliği yönünde adımlar atmayı sürdüreceğiz”, 3 November 2023, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/150055/-turk-dunyasinin-barisi-refahi-ve-guvenligi-yonunde-adimlar-atmayi-surdurecegiz-

Tehran, Iran – Another round of indirect talks between Iranian and United States officials ended with a mediator claiming “significant progress” but still no clear evidence that either side was willing to concede enough on their positions to avoid war.

After the conclusion of the talks in Geneva on Thursday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said further technical talks would be held next week in Vienna and progress had been “good”.

“These were the most serious and longest talks,” Araghchi said.

Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, who mediated the talks, said Iranian and US diplomats would consult with their governments before the Vienna talks.

Few details have emerged about the discussions, but Araghchi was reported to have met US envoy Steve Witkoff – if only briefly, according to Iran’s Tasnim news agency.

The Iranian team, led by Araghchi, handed over on Wednesday night Tehran’s written proposals to Al Busaidi, who also mediated previous rounds of talks in Geneva and Muscat.

The Omani diplomat then met with the US delegation on Thursday, led by Witkoff and US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. Al Busaidi mediated between the two teams throughout the day, and the US delegation also held separate talks over Ukraine.

Also taking part in the talks was Rafael Grossi, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which will have to undertake nuclear monitoring and verification duties in Iran in case of any agreement.

The UN watchdog will hold several days of board meetings starting on March 6, which is around the 10- to 15-day deadline floated by Trump last week for Iran to reach a deal.

Western media outlets have suggested the board could once again consider a move to censure Iran depending on the results of the Geneva talks. Iran has accused Grossi of taking politicised action and criticised the IAEA after Israel attacked Iran in June, one day after the agency passed a resolution saying Tehran was not complying with its commitment to nuclear safeguards.

Fundamental differences

The two sides have been at odds over key issues, including uranium enrichment and missiles.

Washington has repeatedly emphasised, in lockstep with Israel, that it will not accept any nuclear enrichment taking place on Iranian soil, even at civilian-use levels agreed during the 2015 nuclear deal that Iran agreed with world powers. Trump unilaterally abandoned that deal in 2018.

In the days leading up to the Geneva talks, US officials increasingly focused on Iran’s ballistic missile programme, saying the missiles threaten US military bases across the Middle East as well as Israel. Iran has refused to entertain any talks on its conventional weapons. Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, have repeatedly said they will never develop nuclear weapons.

Speaking to local officials during a provincial visit, Pezeshkian also shot back at Trump’s assertion during a lengthy State of the Union speech that Iran was “the world’s number one sponsor of terror”.

Pezeshkian said numerous Iranian officials and nuclear scientists have been assassinated over the decades, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the country’s 1979 Islamic revolution.

“If the realities are seen fairly, it will become clear that Iran is not only not a supporter of terrorism, but one of the main victims of terror in the region and across the world,” he said.

The Iranian government’s IRNA news agency said Tehran’s proposal was expected to gauge US “seriousness” in the talks because it contained “win-win” offers.

Iranian officials have not publicly discussed all the details of their proposals, but they are believed to include diluting part of the country’s 60-percent enriched uranium and keeping the uranium inside the country. Iranian authorities envisage that could be paired with economic opportunities for the US related to Iranian oil and gas and the purchase of airplanes.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has maintained his tough rhetoric against the US as well, casting doubt on the chances of any agreement. He also said Trump would be unable to overthrow Iran’s government after the US president said regime change would be “the best thing that could happen” in Iran.

Araghchi said during an interview on Wednesday that even if Khamenei is killed, the theocratic establishment in Iran would carry on because it has legal procedures in place to appoint a successor. Pezeshkian added on Thursday: “They can eliminate me, eliminate anyone. If they hit us, a hundred more like us will come up to run the country.”

Double-digit inflation as Iran braces for war

Iranian and US officials have been hailing supposed “progress” in the indirect talks this month, but many Iranians continue to prepare for war.

In Tehran and across the country, people are buying bottled water, biscuits, canned foods and other essentials in case of a war.

“A few days ago, I bought a power bank to keep the electronics charged. Now I’m looking for a short-wave radio so we can hear the news if the state shuts down the internet and electricity infrastructure is bombed,” said a 28-year-old resident of the capital who asked not to be named.

As bombs fell during the 12-day war with Israel in June, Iranian authorities cut off almost all internet access for several days, followed in January by an unprecedented 20-day total blackout imposed on about 92 million people as thousands of people were killed during nationwide protests.

The Iranian government, which blames “terrorists” armed and funded by the US and Israel for the protests, has rejected Trump’s claim that 32,000 Iranians were killed during the demonstrations. It said more than 3,000 people were killed, and rejects documentation by the United Nations and international human rights organisations that its security forces were behind the killings.

As the threat of war intensifies, not all Iranians are capable of stocking up on food and other necessities due to rising inflation that has gripped the country for more than a decade as a result of a mix of chronic local mismanagement and US and UN sanctions.

According to separate reports by the Statistical Centre of Iran and the Central Bank of Iran released on Thursday, inflation has now shot beyond 60 percent.

The Statistical Centre put annual inflation in the Iranian month of Bahman, which ended on February 19, at 68.1 percent, while the Central Bank said it was 62.2 percent.

Food inflation was by far the strongest driver at a whopping 105 percent. That included a 207-percent inflation rate for cooking oil, 117 percent for red meat, 108 percent for eggs and dairy products, 113 percent for fruit and 142 percent for bread and corn.

Iran’s national currency, the rial, stood at about 1.66 million rials to the US dollar on Thursday, near an all-time low.

Venezuelanalysis editor Ricardo Vaz joined Ileana Chan on the Global Majority for Peace podcast to take stock of Venezuela’s political reality following the January 3 US attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro.

The discussion focuses on the long history of imperialist attacks against the Bolivarian Revolution and the US’ efforts to take control of the Venezuelan oil industry.

Source: Empire Watch

Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel has drawn criticism at home amid tensions over Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi says India and Israel will collaborate more closely on defence technology while pursuing a free trade agreement, as he wrapped up a controversial two-day visit.

Modi and his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu said at a joint news conference in Jerusalem on Thursday that they would also foster collaboration on technologies, such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, as their countries concluded more than a dozen bilateral agreements.

“The future belongs to those who innovate and Israel and India are bent on innovation,” said Netanyahu. “We’re proud ancient civilisations, very proud of our past. But absolutely determined to seize the future, and we can do it better together.”

A joint statement highlighted cooperation in the field of “horizon scanning”, describing it as a mechanism that “helps identify emerging global trends in areas like technology, economy and society, by leveraging data”.

Israel also agreed to allow 50,000 more Indian nationals into the country, where tens of thousands of South Asians have filled construction and caregiving jobs since new restrictions were placed on Palestinian workers at the start of its war on Gaza.

Strategic embrace

Modi’s visit, his second since he took office in 2014, has drawn criticism at home, signalling an ongoing expansion of India’s strategic embrace of Israel amid ongoing tensions over Israel’s genocidal war against Palestinians in Gaza, which has killed more than 72,000 people.

Confirming their growing ties, the leaders’ joint statement referenced the Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and an April 2025 attack on tourists and civilians in Pahalgam, in Indian-controlled Kashmir.

“Terrorism cannot be accepted in any form or expression,” said Modi, who has historically supported the establishment of a Palestinian state yet has sometimes abstained from criticism of Israel in international forums, including the United Nations.

Earlier this month, India was among the countries that condemned Israeli measures to effectively deepen its control over the occupied West Bank.

Both countries also lauded United States President Donald Trump’s plan to advance the “ceasefire” in the Gaza Strip.

The continuous clashes between the M23 rebels and the security forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have caused massive displacements and unrest in various communities. Thousands have sought refuge in Ngungu, located in the Bahunde area of the Masisi Territory in North Kivu.

Displaced families arriving in central Ngungu are facing increasingly difficult situations and strained reception from local residents. Humanitarian workers in the area told HumAngle that the continued influx of displaced people is putting overwhelming pressure on host households in Ngungu. 

“Receiving families share the little they have with arriving families, but the situation is becoming untenable,” a humanitarian worker who asked for anonymity for security reasons said. “In several quarters of Ngungu, modest households are currently obliged to welcome three extra families, and promiscuity, lack of food, and insufficient potable water are complicating the daily lives of the displaced persons, who are composed mostly of women and children.”

Local sources said affected communities have received no government intervention, as individuals survive through communal solidarity in an already fragile economic situation.

Community leaders said they have reached out to humanitarian organisations for urgent assistance. Their immediate priorities include distributing food and essential supplies, ensuring access to clean drinking water, and providing healthcare for vulnerable individuals.

“Despite their own personal difficulties, the inhabitants of Ngungu continue to show proof of solidarity towards the displaced persons. The people are organising communal initiatives to share food and temporary shelter,” a local community leader revealed.

Local civic actors stress that while solidarity is commendable, it cannot sustain itself in the long term without structured external assistance. Given the profound needs and increasing vulnerability of displaced persons, the residents of Ngungu are hopeful for a swift response from humanitarian partners to prevent a worsening of the humanitarian crisis in North Kivu.

The 2026 Annual Sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), known as the “Lianghui,” are a pivotal event. They will witness the official launch and final adoption of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). This plan serves as a roadmap not only for China but also for countries of the Global South, focusing on the shift from quantitative growth to “new qualitative productive forces” based on innovation and technology. It is worth noting that formulating medium- and long-term plans to guide China’s economic and social development is a crucial method of governance employed by the Communist Party of China.

The “Two Sessions” meetings (National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) in China in 2026 represent a strategic focal point for the Global South, outlining the 15th Five-Year Plan, supporting high-quality development through new productive forces, and strengthening trade partnerships, particularly in the areas of energy, transportation, and the digital economy. Its importance to the Global South lies in China’s leadership of economic integration. China aims to promote openness and cooperation, providing an opportunity for the Global South to benefit from the growth of the world’s second-largest economy. Here, (The Global South’s benefit from China’s innovative development models): During the Two Sessions in March 2026, China will present a model of governance and technological innovation that developing countries and countries of the Global South can utilize to achieve sustainable development and digital transformation. Additionally, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan and the Two Sessions in March 2026 will strengthen the foundations for trade between China and the Global South in particular: These meetings will pave the way for China to enhance trade with countries of the Global South in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, supporting infrastructure and economic growth in the Global South under China’s leadership. Most importantly, the Two Sessions in March 2026 and China’s 15th Five-Year Plan will support the Asia-Pacific region and the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s Vision 2026 focuses on “building a community with a shared future,” promoting investment projects and economic exchanges with developing countries. Therefore, the upcoming two-day meeting in China in March 2026 is crucial in guiding the Chinese economy towards domestic consumption and innovation, opening new markets and opportunities for developing countries in the Global South.

This tenth five-year plan represents China’s economic and social roadmap for the second half of the current decade, emphasizing “high-quality development” and technological innovation that will benefit developing countries in the Global South. Thus, during the 2026 meetings, China will work to “promote the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative with high quality.” This “Chinese-style modernization” will contribute to creating more development opportunities for countries around the world, especially those in the Global South, in accordance with President Xi Jinping’s principles of a shared future for mankind, win-win cooperation, and mutual benefit for all, particularly developing countries. The developing world. It aims to achieve the goal of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping of doubling the size of China’s national economy by 2030. To this end, the State Council of China held a plenary meeting on February 6, 2026, to review the draft government work report and the draft 15th Five-Year Plan before submitting them to parliament during the joint sessions of the two councils in March 2026. The annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) to discuss the draft 15th Five-Year Plan is scheduled to begin on March 5, 2026, while the session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) will commence on March 4, 2026.

The meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2026 are of exceptional importance, as they mark the official launch of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). These meetings, known as the “Two Sessions,” will chart China’s economic and political course for the second half of the current decade, with a focus on transitioning to “new productive forces.” The strategic significance of the Two Sessions in China in 2026 stems from adopting the Decade Roadmap: The 15th Five-Year Plan serves as a crucial link in achieving China’s goal of socialist modernization by 2035. Furthermore, the meetings will address how China will respond to global challenges: These meetings come at a time when China is facing a slowdown in global growth, geopolitical tensions, and internal structural pressures. With a discussion of the (mechanisms and plans for transforming China’s economic model): The upcoming meetings of the Two Sessions in March 2026 aim to shift the Chinese economy from reliance on traditional manufacturing to an innovation- and technology-driven economy. Emphasis will also be placed on further modernizing the state’s governance system and capacity, raising the level of social civilization, enhancing cultural confidence, continuously improving the quality of life for the Chinese people, achieving new progress in providing sufficient and high-quality employment, making significant new strides in building a “beautiful China,” establishing a green lifestyle and production model, strengthening national security, and effectively promoting the construction of a “safe China” at a higher level.

The Chinese political leadership is currently laying the groundwork for the Two Sessions in March 2026, which will determine the contours of the country’s social and economic development over the next five years. Chinese President Xi Jinping held meetings with senior officials to discuss the key priorities of the new Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), while Chinese state media launched a nationwide campaign to gather public feedback. During a symposium held in April 2025 to discuss the 15th Five-Year Plan, President Xi Jinping, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, emphasized that “in planning economic and social development for this period, it is essential to proactively assess the impact of changes in the international landscape on China and adapt to them by adjusting and improving the country’s economic structure.” President Xi highlighted several key areas, including ensuring economic stability by stabilizing employment, supporting businesses, and continuing China’s broad-based economic opening-up. During his speech at the April 2025 symposium to discuss China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, Xi Jinping strongly emphasized scientific and technological development. He specifically called for new, high-quality productive forces to play a more prominent role in the country’s economic revitalization. He also called for strengthening the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, developing emerging industries, and accelerating the construction of a modern industrial system.

In a speech published in the Communist Party’s magazine “Qiushi” in July 2025, President Xi Jinping stated that “the world is undergoing changes unseen in a century, making the technological revolution and competition among major powers increasingly intertwined.” He urged the Chinese nation to consolidate its strategic advantage in the global technology race.

Herein lies the most important strategic dimension of the 15th Five-Year Plan and its impact on the Global South, through leading the technological transformation. The plan aims to achieve “self-reliance” in advanced technology fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and semiconductors. For countries in the Global South, this represents an opportunity to break the Western monopoly on technology and gain access to advanced Chinese technological alternatives. Furthermore, China offers a “high-quality development model” during the 15th Five-Year Plan period, transitioning from labor-intensive industries to smart and green manufacturing. This approach provides the Global South with an inspiring model for integrating environmental sustainability with economic growth, particularly in the areas of solar energy and electric vehicles. Finally, the plan promotes “dual-cycle development” by focusing on reducing dependence on foreign markets and boosting domestic consumption. This transformation could lead to a reshaping of global supply chains, opening new horizons for countries in the Global South to export their products to the massive Chinese market, which is expected to reach $20 trillion by 2026. Furthermore, the timing of the launch and discussion of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan presents an opportunity to enhance regional and multilateral cooperation, coinciding with China’s hosting of the APEC summit.

  In 2026, the 15th Five-Year Plan will focus on (strengthening economic integration with Asia-Pacific and Global South countries), emphasizing the digital economy, transportation, and energy. Beyond its strategic security and resource implications for the Global South, the 15th Five-Year Plan includes new strategies for marine resource exploitation and deep-sea innovation, a vital area for many coastal developing countries seeking to develop their “blue economy,” drawing on China’s experience in this field.

The 15th Five-Year Plan, covering the period from 2026 to 2030, is expected to focus on enhancing economic resilience and strengthening China’s technological and innovative capabilities. It will be adopted during a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Chinese Five-Year Plans are the country’s most important policy blueprints, outlining strategic goals for economic and social development over a five-year period. These plans began with the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. They define national priorities, particularly in the areas of economic growth, industrial development, education, and social development, and serve as binding guidelines for all local, regional, and national governments. China, a leading force and supporter of the Global South, draws upon its experience.

As for the main topics of discussion during the 15th Five-Year Plan, which will take place during the 2026 Two Sessions in China, legislative and political deliberations will focus on several key pillars, most importantly: how China can achieve technological independence and self-reliance. This will be accomplished by discussing mechanisms and plans for achieving “Chinese self-reliance” in critical technologies, such as advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. This will be achieved by studying and discussing ways to strengthen scientific and technological capabilities to achieve self-sufficiency in vital industries through advanced manufacturing and artificial intelligence, transforming the manufacturing sector towards smart technologies to enhance innovation. Emphasis will be placed on China’s firm commitment to the “Made in China policy,” aiming to propel China to the forefront of a range of high-tech industries, including aerospace, electric vehicles, robotics, and communications. The discussions will also explore ways to achieve common prosperity and well-being for the Chinese people by improving living standards and ensuring a more equitable distribution of the fruits of modernization.

The 2026 meetings of the Joint Conference will also focus on structural reforms, implementing over 300 reform measures to enhance the efficiency of the Chinese national economy within a complex international environment. This year’s meetings in China will also address the “green transition,” continuing to support clean technologies such as solar power and electric vehicles, and promoting renewable energy (solar and wind) to achieve peak carbon emissions by 2030. Furthermore, they will discuss boosting domestic demand by exploring ways to encourage household consumption as a primary driver of growth, rather than relying excessively on foreign investment. The meetings will also address strengthening national security, exploring ways to bolster industrial supply chains, and ensuring water and food security for Chinese society, including the modernization of 700,000 kilometers of pipeline infrastructure. Finally, they will discuss achieving maritime development by utilizing marine resources and innovating in deep-sea technology as part of balanced regional growth.

From the preceding analysis, we understand that the two sessions of the Global Summit in China in March 2026 represent a strategic pivotal point for reshaping globalization and the developments of the Global South under China’s leadership. This will lead to a more inclusive and multipolar world, moving away from traditional economic dependence, thus strengthening China’s position as a leader and key driver of development in the Global South in the coming decade.

A Palestinian mother from Gaza says she recognised her missing son, Mohammed Sharab, when he was shown shackled, blindfolded and listed as ‘for sale’ in a post shared by Israeli soldiers.

Aiden Markram smacked 82 not out off 46 balls as South Africa beat West Indies by nine wickets to maintain their unbeaten record at the 2026 T20 World Cup.

South Africa’s captain struck seven fours and four sixes as South Africa chased 177 with 23 balls to spare to move two points clear at the top of Group 1 in the Super 8s and put one foot in the semi-finals.

The 31-year-old, who brought up his half-century off 27 balls, shared a 95-run opening stand with Quinton de Kock (47 off 24) before the wicketkeeper was removed by Roston Chase in the eighth over. Ryan Rickelton chipped in with a quickfire 45 not out off 28 at number three.

Markram sealed South Africa’s fifth win of the tournament in Ahmedabad with his 11th boundary.

The victory puts the Proteas on the verge of the semi-finals without making them mathematically sure. They will go through if India beat Zimbabwe in Thursday’s other game. West Indies play India in their final match of the group knowing a defeat will likely eliminate them.

South Africa, finalists in 2024, should have been chasing a significantly lower total after taking four wickets in the powerplay and later reducing West Indies to 83-7.

However, the two-time champions fought back through Romario Shepherd and Jason Holder, who put on 89 (57) for the eighth wicket to drag West Indies beyond 170.

After smacking spinner Keshav Maharaj’s opening over for 17, West Indies, who piled on 254-6 against Zimbabwe in their Super 8 opener on Monday, lost four wickets in 11 balls to slump from 29-0 to 43-4 inside four overs, with Kagiso Rabada and Lungi Ngidi collecting two wickets apiece.

Sherfane Rutherford, who couldn’t capitalise on being dropped on three, Rovman Powell, and Matthew Forde joined the procession back to the dressing room before Shepherd and Holder came together in the 11th over.

After rebuilding steadily, the pair burst into life from the 15-over mark, Shepherd accelerating from 21 (17) to finish unbeaten on 52 (37) and Holder reaching 49 (31) before being run-out off the penultimate ball of the innings.

They added 58 runs off the final five overs, including Holder taking the 18th, bowled by Marco Jansen, for 23.