TODAY

The use of high-altitude balloons is becoming ever-more routine for U.S. Army units in the Pacific. The service is pushing to deploy more of these lighter-than-air platforms as a key component of a new persistent surveillance and reconnaissance ecosystem across the region. The same kinds of balloons could also perform these and other missions, including communications relay, electronic warfare, or even launching kinetic strikes, around the globe. This is all underscored by a recent contracting notice about the potential purchase of commercial-off-the-shelf high-altitude balloons, sensor packages, and datalinks connected to SpaceX’s space-based Starlink network.

“This is a commodity requirement for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or modified-COTS high-altitude balloon systems and associated equipment,” according to the contracting notice from the Army’s 921st Contracting Support Battalion, which was posted online earlier this week. “The required supplies and software licenses will be delivered to locations within the INDOPACOM AOR [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility] (specifically Hawaii).”

The notice stresses that the 921st is currently only conducting “market research” and that a “full and open competition” could follow, but is not guaranteed. The battalion is headquartered in Hawaii, but is the Army’s main contracting arm in the Pacific, and has elements spread across the region.

The “commodity requirement” the 921st outlined in the notice includes a call for 15 high-altitude balloons, five each of three different sizes (12-, 16-, and 24-gore). The term gore here refers to the individual segments making up the balloon’s exterior. A greater number typically translates to a larger inflated volume, and, by extension, to higher altitude capability and/or payload capacity. The contracting notice mentions a desired “burst altitude (90k–120k ft class)” for the 24-gore type, but does not otherwise lay out specific performance or payload requirements for any of the balloons.

The notice also includes a call for several different sensor packages, described as follows:

• Five “EO/IR [Electro-optical/infared]” types with “resolution (1080p/4K/MWIR/LWIR); gimbal stabilization; telemetry bandwidth (Starlink/LTE/MPU5); power draw; onboard processing; environmental hardening.”
• Five “Long Wave Infrared” types with “Spectral band (8–14 μm); NETD sensitivity (≤50 mK ideal); optics (germanium lenses, FOV options); thermal stabilization; data interface (Ethernet/SDI/USB-C).”
• Seven “Electronic Sensing” types capable of providing “(RF/EM/atmospheric/SIGINT); frequency coverage; antenna configuration (omni/directional/array); data logging (local vs. downlink); EMI shielding for high-altitude ops.”

The Army would also want eight payload buses with Starlink connectivity and MPU5 radios, as well as seven more with Starlink only. This separately speaks to the growing prevalence of Starlink, and its government-focused cousin, Starshield, across the U.S. military, something TWZ just recently highlighted.

There is also a call for helium and other ancillary items to complete the full package. The contracting notice does not say whether or not these balloons and other equipment would be intended for operational use, training, and/or supporting test and evaluation activities. TWZ has reached out to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) for more information.

Use of balloons by the Army and other branches of the U.S. military, as well as other countries globally, both historically and as part of more contemporary activities, is not new. This is something TWZ had been calling attention to for years before a Chinese spy balloon passing over parts of the United States and Canada in 2023 thrust the topic into the public consciousness. China has used balloons and other kinds of lighter-than-air craft for intelligence-gathering and other purposes across the Pacific. The use of high-altitude balloons as launch platforms for swarms of drones and other payloads has also been an active area of development in China. This is something the U.S. military and others have also been experimenting with.

Modern high-altitude balloons can stay aloft for days, weeks, or even months on end. There are designs that can be precisely navigated to areas of interest and then hold their general position in spite of prevailing winds, moderating their altitudes to remain on station persistently for very long periods at a time. As the recent contracting notice makes clear, these balloons also have sufficient payload capacity to act as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, as well as signal relay nodes. They could perform other missions, too.

In 2024, the Army made a particularly public demonstration of the value of high-altitude balloons in modern operations during Exercise Valiant Shield 24. Balloons fitted with “electromagnetic spectrum sensors and radio networking equipment” were part of the kill chain in a live-fire test of Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) short-range ballistic missiles against a moving target ship. Valiant Shield 24 involved forces deployed to various locations across the Pacific.

Also in 2024, the Army’s Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) put out a contracting notice seeking details about prospective small radars and signals intelligence suites for use on high-altitude balloons. The mention of radars here highlighted how balloons could provide another layer of ground-moving target indicator and synthetic aperture radar imaging (GMTI/SAR) capability.

CECOM’s request for information was specifically tied to an experimentation and demonstration effort called High-Altitude Platform-Deep Sensing (HAP-DS). The Army said at the time that the goal was for HAP-DS to feed into a larger program called the High-Altitude Extended-Range Long-Endurance Intelligence Observation System (HELIOS).

The Army has continued to expand its experimental efforts since then with a clear eye toward future operational capabilities. Last year, the service disclosed plans to launch as many as 100 balloons, and maybe even more, in an upcoming exercise.

“Our primary goal is to demonstrate autonomous swarming capabilities that generate a persistent, cost-effective presence in the stratosphere,” Andrew Evans, Director of Strategy and Transformation with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, or G-2, told Breaking Defense in an interview in August 2025. “Once operationalized, this type of capability will enable us to conduct a range of military operations including enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the extension of tactical communications, and the rapid reconstitution of on-orbit capabilities when space is denied or degraded.”

At that time, Evans also highlighted how large groups of high-altitude balloons networked together could help provide resiliency against potential losses, including just due to bad weather.

Large numbers of balloons would be needed to provide wide-area persistent coverage for ISR and other missions. They could also be used to create mesh and other kinds of hub-and-spoke-type networks, which could be especially valuable if communications assets in low Earth orbit (LEO) are threatened.

Earlier this year, the Army shared that it had established a new schoolhouse for high-altitude balloon training, including a basic skills course for “High-Altitude Soldiers”, at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington State. As of March, Army Green Berets, as well as Air Force personnel from weather units, and even individuals from unnamed civilian agencies, were said to have gone through the training program.

The Army has said that the training program includes the use of 16-gore high-altitude balloons – one of the types mentioned in the recent contracting notice – made by a company called Urban Sky. This is from a line of what the firm markets as “Microballoons,” which can be deployed by relatively small teams in minutes. Urban Sky says its 16-gore design can soar at altitudes up to 70,000 feet and carry payloads weighing up to 50 pounds. The company also offers a payload called Wallabee that combines “EO/IR imaging, signals intelligence, and communications downlink in a single package,” again fully in line with the “commodity requirement” recently outlined by the 921st Contracting Support Battalion.

Other companies, including Aerostar and the Sierra Nevada Corporation, also offer broadly similar designs that can be configured for ISR, signal relay, and other missions.

Raven Aerostar – Thunderhead Balloon System

“Routine events such as the AHABC [Army High-Altitude Basics Course], conducted here at home station, have enabled our unit to both maintain individual proficiency and provide more repetitions to leaders to sharpen their HA skills,” Army Capt. Tyler McWilliam, described as a “High-Altitude Planner,” said in an official release in March. “The plan for the future is to offer more High-Altitude Basic Courses for service members in other units to spread High-Altitude knowledge across the joint force.”

The Army has made no secret about the overarching end-goal of its current high-altitude balloon plans. The service is moving “forward in building a persistent, all-domain sensor architecture for the Indo-Pacific theater,” the March press release stated right up front.

The complete architecture is also set to include other components, including the Army’s new High Accuracy Detection and Exploitation System (HADES) ISR business jets. Glider-like drones also designed to operate in the stratosphere are something else the service has been actively experimenting with in recent years. As noted, like China and others, the U.S. military has also been exploring high-altitude balloons as launch platforms for swarms of drones deep inside hostile territory. This, in turn, has opened the door to the potential for using balloons to launch kamikaze drones and other kinds of munitions. They could carry electronic warfare payloads or seed small sensors on the ground, too.

All this being said, despite the Army’s clear support for high-altitude balloons, and years of experimentation, the service still has yet to put them into more widespread operational use. There is a distinct and continued disparity here compared to China’s extensive use of balloons and other lighter-than-air craft in the Pacific.

The capabilities that high-altitude balloons stand to offer the U.S. military could be very relevant for providing persistent surveillance and supporting other missions elsewhere globally, too. U.S. Central Command has previously highlighted interest in using lighter-than-air platforms to help meet high demand for ISR capacity across the Middle East.

The recent contracting notice, as well as the establishment of the new training programs at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, do show that the Army is pressing ahead with its plans to make high-altitude balloons a more regular aspect of its operations, especially in the Pacific.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

A recent video out of Russia once again highlights the drastic efforts being taken to provide Moscow with additional air defense coverage against the threat of long-range Ukrainian drones. While we have seen examples of the Pantsir short-range air defense system installed on buildings in Moscow before, the footage shows the counter-drone-optimized SMD-E variant being lifted onto the top of a skyscraper by helicopter.

The viral video appeared on social media this week and shows a Russian Aerospace Forces Mi-26 Halo heavy transport helicopter lowering a Pantsir-SMD-E system onto the top of a building in Moscow. The tower has been identified as the 42-story Nordstar Tower, an office building completed in 2009, with a roof height of 563 feet. The building is located in central Moscow, not far from the Kremlin.

For the Mi-26, which can lift a load of more than 44,000 pounds, internally or as a slung load, moving the Pantsir-SMD-E is no problem at all.

As we have explained in the past, the Pantsir-SMD-E, with its self-contained static configuration, is designed to help protect critical static infrastructure from uncrewed aerial threats. For this, it can be loaded with as many as 48 small TKB-1055 anti-drone interceptors.

Alternatively, the SMD-E variant can fire up to 12 of the larger 57E6 short-range command-guided surface-to-air missiles, suitable for more traditional threats. A mix of effectors can also be used.

While the TKB-1055 has a stated maximum range of just over four miles, the 57E6 is claimed to be able to hit targets at nearly 12.5 miles.

The SMD-E’s turret also features two integrated radars, one for detecting and tracking targets and another fire-control type for directing the command-guided missiles.

Unlike earlier Pantsir systems, no cannons are included.

A video showing the previous Pantsir-S1 with combined gun/missile armament:

Pantsir-S1 Air defence missile/gun system

The development of the SMD-E version is hardly surprising given the fact that, for some time now, Ukrainian forces have been launching increasingly longer-range drone attacks on military bases and industrial facilities inside Russia.

On the other hand, it’s worth noting that previous members of the Pantsir family have earned a very mixed reputation since their introduction in the early 2010s. This has been underscored by reportedly poor performance in Syria and Libya, although the Pantsir is still widely fielded by Russia, and has even been adapted as a ‘quick-fix’ maritime air defense system. It has also been widely exported.

The previous versions of the Pantsir have also become popular choices for the counter-drone mission, especially in terms of defending Russia’s critical military, government, and industrial facilities.

In early 2023, Pantsirs began to appear on rooftops in Moscow, and another was deployed close to one of President Vladimir Putin’s official residences just outside the capital. Earlier this month, German media reported that Russia had significantly expanded its air defense network around the capital, deploying more than 40 additional Pantsir systems in 2025 alone.

In Moscow, a Russian Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile system has been placed on the roof of a building of the Central District Department of Education on Teterinsky Lane, for the reasons so far unknown.

55.745352, 37.651179 pic.twitter.com/qMd1NVDYhW

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) January 19, 2023

Of course, these are just elements of a much larger array of additional layered air defenses deployed in and around the Russian capital. This extends from S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile batteries to attack helicopters tasked with gunning down drones in midair.

The recent development of the Pantsir-SMD-E means that it very likely incorporates lessons from experience using the earlier versions in the counter-drone role.

Putting the system on a skyscraper provides a safer firing location, although it doesn’t remove the risk of interceptors going astray, or debris from destroyed drones causing damage or injury.

At the same time, this rooftop perch does ensure a clear line of sight for the radar, extended reaction time, and offers a much wider range of firing angles. For this reason, Russia has previously also built elevated towers for Pantsir batteries around the Moscow region.

The emergence of the system underscores just what level of danger Ukraine’s drone attacks have come to pose to Russia. Since Ukraine first began to employ long-range one-way attack drones, their designs have been optimized and their ranges extended, putting highly prized facilities deeper and deeper inside Russia within their crosshairs. The threat to Russia is only set to grow, as Ukraine expands production and capabilities, including adding long-range cruise missiles to its inventory.

A video showing the homegrown Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile in action:

Випробувальний пуск ракети “Фламінго”

It is also worth noting that Russia, while at war, is not alone in these concerns. In the United States, since 9/11, Washington, DC, has quietly evolved into one of the most heavily defended urban airspaces in the world. This includes systems like Stinger missile turrets positioned atop key government buildings. The planned air defense capacity for the new White House Ballroom is a glaring example of this same trend. This is being spurred primarily by major concerns about the growing drone threat.

Speaking earlier in the Oval Office, President Trump called the ballroom being constructed to replace the White House East Wing a “gift,” while adding that it will have bulletproof glass and walls, along with a “drone port” which Trump says was supposed to be Top Secret. pic.twitter.com/1zP9KaFxFc

— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) May 21, 2026

Depending on the success of the Pantsir-SMD-E in protecting the Russian capital, we may well see more of these systems deployed both in Moscow and elsewhere. As we have discussed before, the system apparently offers the potential to be fitted on vehicles and vessels, as well.

The appearance of the Pantsir-SMD-E on a Moscow skyscraper hammers home the reality of the drone threat, not just in Russia, but also more generally, on the battlefield, as well as against critical infrastructure, military and civilian.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Voters in Colombia will head to the polls on May 31 for a presidential election. Some of the main concerns for Colombians are healthcare, corruption, and security. Al Jazeera’s Teresa Bo reports from Bogota. 

“In my humble opinion, you have never known how to make coffee or Negroes. The former you leave too light, the latter too black.”

– Venezuelan poet and politician Andrés Eloy Blanco to US visitors, 1944

Contemporary racist attitudes in Venezuela have deep roots in the colonial period (sixteenth to nineteenth centuries). After independence, Venezuela constructed a national narrative that claimed to have overcome racism through miscegenation. We were (are) a “café con leche” (coffee with milk) nation, a blend in which racial differences had dissolved. But this supposed harmony concealed a persistent idea: whiteness remained the ideal, while African and Indigenous identities were seen as something to be diluted and gradually eliminated. 

This whitening process was not only biological, but also cultural and political. Paradoxically, racism in Venezuela became invisible to those who practiced it and even to those who suffered from it, masked under the pretext that “here we are all mestizos.” However, we have seen that when political conflicts intensify, the mask of mestizaje falls away and colonial prejudices resurface. 

The origin of an ideology

Although the validity of the term “race” has been questioned – on the grounds that we all belong to the human race and differ only in phenotypic traits – according to Venezuelan historian Luis Felipe Pellicer, “…if racism exists, race exists,” but only as an ideological construct of domination, and by no means as a scientific truth.

Racism emerged in Venezuela as a result of an exploitative and extractive economy that created a need for enslaved labor. Initially, this labor force consisted of Indigenous people and was later supplemented by individuals brought from the Atlantic coast of Africa. Countries such as present-day Ghana, Togo, Benin, Angola, and the Republic of the Congo were particularly affected. 

Now, the issue of slavery in Africa has deeper roots that warrant a more comprehensive examination, but in the Americas this system underwent a transformation, and what began as an economic activity ultimately established ideas that created negative associations around those subjected to slavery, thereby inventing the political and social category of “blackness.” By merging the condition of slavery with skin pigmentation into a single concept, the colonial mindset ended up stigmatizing every cultural and vital expression of these groups, considering them inferior, ugly, and despicable.

One of the characteristics of enslavement in the Americas was dehumanization and its racial justification. That is to say, here the idea of enslavement due to war or debt repayment was abandoned. The automatic association was: you are a slave because you are a Black African, and vice versa. This phenomenon created the idea that all Africans and their descendants were predestined for servitude and forced labor. 

The racist backlash

The recent incident in Madrid that saw supporters of far-right leader María Corina Machado shout slogans against Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez reflects a deep social divide. Sectors of the opposition who identify – whether phenotypically or aspirationally – with a Eurocentric worldview and the ideal of “whiteness” believe that the exercise of power by groups they associate with or perceive as people of African descent constitutes a historical affront. For decades before the Bolivarian Revolution, epithets like “monkey,” “mulatto,” “zambo,” “bembón,” and “bad hair,” among others, paraded across TV screens and in the national press with complete normality and often disguised as jokes – another mechanism for propagating Venezuelan racism. Following his government’s post-2001 radicalization of revolutionary reforms, Hugo Chávez was himself notoriously called a “monkey” and prominently caricatured as such by Venezuela’s right-wing opposition.

It is no surprise, then, that the presence of figures such as Venezuela’s current acting president transcends the issue of political ideology to constitute a rupture in “quality,” a term used in eighteenth-century Venezuela. “What is quality or race?” asks Pellicer. “It is an idea of inferiority regarding a human group that is transmitted, corporeally, through sexual reproduction.” It is an affront, then, to the natural order of things, to the pyramid of colonial society that placed peninsular Spaniards at the apex and people of African descent at the base. 

With the chant “Fuera la mona” (“Out with the monkey”), the Venezuelan far-right hurled an insult that reveals their undemocratic nature. But more importantly, these insults are not even linked to any incompetence in governance, but rather to what these groups perceive as “racial incompetence.” It is the expression of a wounded “whiteness” that uses racism as a defense mechanism against what they see as a displacement of their traditional privileges. It is, in essence, an attempt to restore a colonial order. 

Racism is a power structure. “Colonial thought,” Pellicer observes, “invents the other, whether Indigenous, mestizo, mulatto, or Black, as well as the white self … thereby establishing the ideology of race as the primary marker of inequality, beginning with the invasion of the Americas.” The struggle for honor in the colony was a struggle for differentiation and political recognition. Today, the “animalization” of non-white political leaders is the continuation of that colonial war, which is why the Madrid slur is not a simple rudeness; it is an act of historical violence. It is the voice of the eighteenth century trying to silence the twenty-first. And at this point, one must ask: what is admirable about the idea that, based on skin color, some are more or less fit to govern a country? 

The slave owner/racist does not see a person; he sees a tool, a piece of property, and for this to happen, the mind must adopt a psychopathic and callous mindset. The racist needs to strip the oppressed of their status as subjects in order to invoke a visceral fear of otherness that, if acknowledged, threatens their illusion of superiority. Choosing to be part of this ideological operation of domination today should be a source of shame, for it is the most glaring expression of a violence that heralds the end of humanity.

From Cortés to Díaz Ayuso

This exclusionary mindset is part of a transatlantic trend toward neocolonial revival that seeks to re-legitimize old hierarchies. A telling example is Spanish right-wing politician Isabel Díaz Ayuso’s recent visit to Mexico, where her proposal to celebrate the figure of Hernán Cortés serves as an ideological parallel to the “Fuera la mona” chants heard in Madrid. By attempting to portray the invasion and genocide in the Americas as a “civilizing” feat, Ayuso revives the logic of the “society of qualities”: a structure where moral and political superiority is an exclusive Hispanic and white inheritance, while Indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples are reduced to a state of barbarism remediable only through paternalistic tutelage.

This narrative is not merely a historical debate, but a contemporary validation of the racial hierarchy and justification for overthrowing processes of popular sovereignty in Latin America. Ayuso’s discourse seeks to reaffirm a “Hispanic identity” that views ethnic otherness as a threat to the values of Western civilization. In this sense, what happened in Madrid is a clear symptom of the reactionary neo-fascist wave sweeping large parts of the Global North and South.

Racist remarks

The trauma of Venezuela’s War of Independence (1810–1830) and the Federal War (1859–1863) created the need to invent a narrative in which Venezuelan society was free of conflicts and differences, and thus the persistence of racial and social tensions has been glossed over. However, it resurfaces in comments such as: “Fuera la mona”; “We need to improve the race”; “Black but refined”; “Money whitens.” 

In 1948, conservative writer Arturo Uslar Pietri responded to Rómulo Gallegos’s presidential campaign by stating: “Anyone who speaks of blacks or whites, anyone who invokes racial hatred or privileges, denies the essence of Venezuela. In Venezuela, in political and social matters, there are neither whites nor blacks, neither mestizos nor Indigenous people. There are only Venezuelans .” This argument was almost exactly the same as that put forward by María Corina Machado when asked about the event at La Puerta del Sol, stating that it had occurred because of the fissures of hatred that Chavismo introduced into its discourse over 27 years in power. 

The end of denial

As part of the commemoration of the Day of Venezuelan Afro-Descendance, established under the Hugo Chávez government in 2005 to be celebrated every May 10 [on the anniversary of the 1795 slave uprising led by José Leonardo Chirino], it is both pertinent and necessary to reflect on and understand that racism in Venezuela is a long-standing phenomenon that surfaces with particular virulence during times of political crisis. The historical association between power and whiteness, inherited from the colonial era and reinforced by twentieth-century positivist thought, remains alive in the minds of sections of society that refuse to accept the nation’s diversity, including among working-class communities through what is known as endoracism. 

Understanding the origin of this phenomenon is the first step toward dismantling it. We must move from the false harmony of “café con leche” to true decolonial justice, where a person’s “quality” is not dictated by their “whiteness.” The Madrid incident reminds us that the battle for Venezuela’s mental independence far from over.

Rosanna Álvarez holds an MSc in History of Republican Venezuela from the Central University of Venezuela (UCV). She is a researcher at the Centro de Estudios Simón Bolívar and Fundación Hugo Chávez, as well as a writer at the Libertador 8 Estrellas magazine. She is the author of Venezuela vista e imaginada. Un recorrido visual por nuestra historia and host of the Bolívar Nuestro show on Radio del Sur.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelanalysis editorial staff.

Proposed $250 bill would mark the first time a living person has appeared on US currency in more than a century.

US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent says preparations are under way to print a new $250 banknote featuring President Donald Trump’s face, with lawmakers to decide whether the bills will be put into circulation.

US law bars any living person from appearing on US currency, but legislation was introduced last year to create an exception to allow current and former presidents to be featured.

Speaking at the White House on Thursday, Bessent said a design had been prepared in anticipation of a change in the law.

“Right now, there is proposed legislation – front of the House, in front of the Senate – to change the first requirement so that a living person, Donald J Trump, could be on a $250 bill,” Bessent said.

Bessent made his comments after The Washington Post reported that Treasurer Brandon Beach, a Trump appointee, has been pushing the Bureau of Engraving and Printing to expedite the process for a new currency note to mark the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence.

“I don’t think that there’s anything untoward about having the president of the United States, the person who’s president of the United States, on the 250th anniversary bill,” Bessent told reporters.

A design mock-up obtained by The Washington Post showed the words “America 250 anniversary”, a nod to the US declaring its independence on July 4, 1776.

The Treasury Department did not immediately respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment.

Behaviour of dictators, monarchs

A banknote featuring Trump’s face would be the latest example of the US president expanding his personal brand in his official capacity since returning to the White House in 2025.

Banners featuring Trump’s portrait have been hung on the Department of Justice and other federal buildings.

And his slate of appointees to the Kennedy Center governing board added his name to the national performing arts facility, which Congress originally designated as a memorial to assassinated President John F Kennedy.

Trump’s signature is also set to appear on US currency as part of plans to mark the 250th anniversary, a first for a sitting president.

US banknotes have until now featured the signatures of the Treasury secretary and the treasurer.

In March, the US Commission of Fine Arts, led by Trump appointee Rodney Mims Cook Jr, approved the minting of a commemorative gold coin bearing the Republican president’s image.

The announcement, which relied on a legal loophole for commemorative coins, prompted a backlash from critics, who likened the move to the behaviour of dictators and monarchs.

Boeing is now conducting test flights of its MQ-28 Ghost Bat drone out over the Pacific from the U.S. Navy’s base in Point Mugu, California. The company says its main goals are to demonstrate the maturity of the design, originally developed for Australia, and promote export sales. The specific choice of testing location also seems notable given Boeing’s involvement in the Navy’s still-evolving carrier-based Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) plans.

The MQ-28 has now flown at least three times within the Point Mugu Sea Range off the coast of southern California, according to a Boeing press release. The expansive range is routinely used for a wide array of research and development and test and evaluation activities, as well as training. Naval Air Station Point Mugu, part of Naval Base Ventura County, sits right on the coast, surrounded by farmland, with direct access to the range and minimal risk to bystanders. Its location makes it well suited for uncrewed aircraft operations, and it already has a major role in this regard in relation to the MQ-4C Triton and managing target drones.

MQ-28 first international flights

“This testing shows the MQ-28’s ability to operate seamlessly from allied facilities, which helps Boeing demonstrate the aircraft’s maturity and potential export opportunities to international customers outside Australia,” per the press release from Boeing. “Tests at Point Mugu validate autonomous systems while following required airspace, range safety and regulatory approvals.”

Boeing also described this as “MQ-28’s first international operation in allied airspace,” but it is unclear when the first sortie from Point Mugu occurred.

In December, the Pentagon released a video of Secretary Pete Hegseth visiting Naval Air Station Point Mugu with an MQ-28 clearly visible in the background. However, the drone seen in that footage also had an early-style paint scheme with high-visibility orange trim. Pictures and video that Boeing released along with its announcement of the Point Mugu Sea Range flight testing show a Ghost Bat with a two-tone gray livery. It also has an infrared search and track (IRST) sensor system in the nose, something not seen on the example in the Hegseth video. The MQ-28 is a highly modular design, with the nose section designed to be readily swappable.

There have also at least been indications of Ghost Bat flight testing in the United States in the past. The U.S. Air Force previously said it had made use of at least one MQ-28 to support advanced uncrewed aircraft and autonomy development efforts.

Boeing itself released a picture of an MQ-28, again with the early paint scheme and no IRST, at MidAmerica Airport outside of St. Louis, Missouri, back in 2023. In that instance, the Ghost Bat was displayed alongside the demonstrator the company had been using to support the development of the MQ-25 Stingray tanker drone for the Navy.

How many Ghost Bats are currently in the United States is unknown. TWZ has reached out to Boeing for more information.

The MQ-28 has been flying in Australia since 2021, two years after the design was first shown publicly. Boeing’s subsidiary in Australia had already been working on the design before then under the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) Airpower Teaming System (ATS) program. To date, RAAF has received eight Ghost Bats in a pre-production Block 1 configuration.

Boeing is now working to build the first of a batch of nine Block 2 drones, which are seen as an intermediate stepping stone to an operational Block 3 version. The Block 3 type is expected to be substantially larger and have greater range. It will also feature an internal weapons bay that could accommodate a single AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), two GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB), or equivalently sized stores.

Boeing and the RAAF have already conducted at least one live-fire AIM-120 launch from a Block 1 Ghost Bat, with the missile having been carried aloft on an external pylon under the drone’s fuselage.

Uncrewed MQ-28 Ghost Bat showcases its combat capability

Block 1 MQ-28s have also been used to demonstrate other important capabilities in testing to date. This includes crewed-uncrewed teaming with RAAF E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft and F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters. The ability to operate from allied facilities that Boeing says the Point Mugu sorties demonstrate could be valuable just for Australia for future coalition operations.

MQ-28, Wedgetail, Super Hornet: Drone Intercept Behind-the-Scenes

Boeing has also been open about its interest in pursuing sales of the MQ-28 outside of Australia. The company has publicly named Japan as a potential customer and has said it is exploring potential opportunities with other unnamed countries in the Indo-Pacific region. In March, Boeing Australia announced a partnership with Rheinmetall in Germany to pitch the Ghost Bat to that country’s armed forces. A carrier-capable version of the design with a tail hook has been pitched to the United Kingdom in the past, as well.

This latter point brings us to what is largely absent in Boeing’s announcement about MQ-28 flight testing from Point Mugu: the U.S. Navy.

In September 2025, the Navy confirmed that it had awarded Boeing, as well as Anduril, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman, contracts to develop “conceptual” carrier-based CCA drone designs. At that time, the service also announced that Lockheed Martin was under contract for work on an accompanying common control architecture.

In April 2025, Navy Capt. Ron Flanders, public affairs officer at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition (RDA), had also told TWZ directly that “the U.S. has expressed strong interest in leveraging the MQ-28’s AI-driven autonomy and modular design for future air combat operations.”

As mentioned, Boeing is also developing the MQ-25, a production representative version of which just flew for the first time in April. Beyond the important aerial refueling and other capabilities the Stingray is set to bring to the Navy’s carrier air wings, the service routinely describes it as a “pathfinder” to future uncrewed aviation capabilities.

MQ-25A Stingray First Flight

All this being said, the Navy’s CCA plans are still very much evolving. The service, by its own admission, has been trailing behind the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps in the development of CCA-type drones.

Flight testing now from Point Mugu is certainly an important development for the MQ-28 program as a whole, and one Boeing hopes could open the door to new opportunities for the Ghost Bat. Whether or not that includes deeper U.S. Navy involvement remains to be seen.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Ministers in France are meeting to assess the country’s preparedness for heatwaves, while tennis number one Jannik Sinner bowed out of the French Open after suffering from the heat. Meanwhile, Italian authorities issued a red heatwave alert for the capital, Rome, where it topped out at 32C on Thursday.

Al Jazeera runs you through this season’s UEFA Champions League final between Paris Saint-Germain and Arsenal.

Europe’s premier club competition concludes on Saturday when the final of the UEFA Champions League is played.

From qualifying to a comprehensive league phase and then the drama of the knockouts, the tournament now comes down to two teams.

Al Jazeera runs you through the top 10 things you need to know about the showpiece event for European football’s governing body, UEFA.

Who is playing in the Champions League final?

This year’s final will be contested by English Premier League club Arsenal, who overcame Atletico Madrid in the semifinals, and French giants Paris Saint-Germain, who defeated Bayern Munich in their last-four clash.

Who is the defending Champions League winner?

PSG are the defending champions, having lifted the tournament for the first time last season.

The French club beat Inter Milan in the final with an incredible 5-0 scoreline that humiliated the Italian Serie A club in Allianz Arena in Munich, Germany.

Desire Doue scored twice to cement his place as one of the biggest names in the game, even at the tender age of 19.

Achraf Hakimi was also on the scoresheet alongside Khvicha Kvaratskhelia and Senny Mayulu. Incredibly Ballon d’Or winner Ousmane Dembele missed out on netting a goal despite being one of the star names en route to the final.

Who is the favourite to win this year’s final?

PSG are the heavy favourites to defend their crown, but Arsenal are being tipped as one of the rising forces in European football.

The Gunners have never won Europe’s most prized footballing trophy but have just ended a 22-year wait to lift the Premier League.

Who are PSG’s key players for the Champions League final?

Doue and Dembele remain the key figures for PSG although the latter is an injury doubt for the final.

Hakimi is also one of the most recognisable players in the Parisians’ ranks, but he is the major concern for the match, having missed both legs of the semifinal and the last four Ligue 1 games of the season because of an injury.

Khvicha Kvaratskhelia tops PSG’s scoring charts across all competitions this season by one goal ahead of Dembele, who has 18. Bradley Barcelo has 13 strikes to his name while Doue has 12.

At the back, PSG are lead by Brazilian international Marquinhos.

Who are Arsenal’s key players for the Champions League final?

Declan Rice is seen as the heart of Arsenal’s team, not least as the England midfielder operates in the centre of the park.

Viktor Gyokeres has grown into the role of leading the line in attack, and the Swedish international has returned 19 goals in his debut season for the North Londoners.

The two players that are often regarded as having the magical touches for the Gunners, though, are England internationals Bukayo Saka and Eberechi Eze, who have netted 10 and 7 times, respectively.

Much like PSG, Arsenal have a Brazilian powerhouse at the back in the form of Gabriel Magalhaes.

Where is the Champions League final being played?

The final is being staged at Puskas Stadium in the Hungarian capital, Budapest.

The stadium – named in honour of the country’s most famous footballer, Ferenc Puskas – was rebuilt in 2017, and construction was completed for its reopening in 2019. It has the capacity for 67,215 spectators.

What trophies have Arsenal and PSG already won this season?

Arsenal sealed their first league title since 2004 when Arsene Wenger’s “Invincibles” went unbeaten all season. The campaign went to the penultimate match when Manchester City’s failure to win at Bournemouth meant the North Londoners could no longer be caught. The Gunners also reached the final of the League Cup, but they were defeated by City.

PSG finished six points clear of Lens in the French league, beating their nearest challengers in the penultimate round to secure the trophy.

It is their fifth consecutive league title and their 12th in 14 seasons, taking their overall tally to 14 Ligue 1 crowns.

When is the Champions League final, and what time is kickoff?

The match is being played on Saturday and will kick off at 6pm (17:00 GMT).

Will the Champions League final be free to watch?

No. The UEFA Champions League is part of a subscription package across the world, as sold by the continent’s governing body.

How can I follow the Champions League final?

Al Jazeera Sport will bring you our comprehensive build-up before kickoff from 2pm (13:00 GMT) on Saturday before our text commentary stream of the match.

EU says the sanctioned individuals and groups violated a range of rights, from the right to physical and mental integrity, to the right to education.

The European Union has sanctioned four entities and three individuals it says are “extremist Israeli settlers” responsible for “serious” human rights abuses against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank.

The EU said they had violated a range of rights, including the rights to physical and mental integrity, privacy and family life, freedom of religion and education.

The announcement on Thursday is part of an EU sanctions package agreed earlier this month to punish Israeli settlers and Hamas leaders.

The sanctions include the Nachala Settlement Movement and its director, Daniella Weiss. The EU says the group “encourages and facilitates coercive acts that lead to the forced displacement of Palestinians”.

Israeli NGO Regavim and its director, Meir Deutsch, are also on the sanctions list for lobbying “for the demolition of Palestinian property” in order to expand Israel’s control over the entirety of the West Bank, plus the demolition of an EU-funded Palestinian primary school.

Also sanctioned is the Hashomer Yosh NGO and its president, Avichai Suissa for supporting “at least 28 violent outposts and settlements”. It also recruits armed volunteers and provides guards who engage in violent attacks, the EU added.

The Amana cooperative association of the settler movement Gush Emunim was also sanctioned, the EU stating it had likewise “played a key role in initiating, financing, and facilitating at least 30 violent outposts and settlements”.

Long-awaited sanctions

With Thursday’s additions, the EU said it now sanctions 136 persons and 41 entities from a range of countries under its Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime.

The regime was created in 2020, and applies to acts such as genocide, crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations or abuses.

The measures targeting Israeli settlers because of violence against Palestinians were long-awaited, having been blocked by the self-styled illiberal government of Hungary’s former premier Viktor Orban.

However, the appointment of new Prime Minister Peter Magyar saw the veto quickly lifted earlier this month.

Israel earlier condemned the sanctions, asserting that Jews have the right to settle in the occupied West Bank, despite that being in violation of international law.

In 2025, the expansion of Israeli settlements reached its highest level since at least 2017, when the United Nations began tracking data.

Since the start of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, the West Bank has been gripped by almost daily violence involving Israeli troops and settlers. More than 1,000 Palestinians have been killed in the territory, according to the UN.

Foreign workers in South Africa are yet again facing violence and protests by anti-immigrant groups. They accuse them of residing and working in the country illegally and are demanding that they leave by June 30.

South Africa has seen recurrent waves of anti-immigrant violence in the past decade – often directed at other African nationals.

Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the country has become a destination for thousands of workers from neighbouring countries. But many South Africans say the government is not upholding its immigration laws.

So, does South Africa still need foreign workers?

Presenter: Tom McRae

Guests:

William Gumede – Associate professor, School of Governance at the University of the Witwatersrand

Lindiwe Zulu – Member of the ANC Committee on International Relations and a former South African minister of social development

Ashraf Essop – Immigration lawyer

US and Iranian negotiators have reached a memorandum of understanding on a proposed 60-day ceasefire extension, according to US sources, but the deal still requires President Donald Trump’s approval.

Israeli ambassador to the UN says Tel Aviv will cut ties with UN chief Antonio Guterres over the upcoming report.

The United Nations has “added Israel to the blacklist of sexual violence in conflict zones”, prompting Israel to cut ties with UN chief Antonio Guterres, the country’s ambassador to the UN says.

“We are done with this secretary-general,” Israeli ambassador Danny Danon added in a video posted on X on Thursday, denouncing the upcoming report from Guterres’s office.

The UN secretary-general’s annual report on conflict-related sexual violence is customarily presented to relevant states before publication. Last August, the report warned that Israel could be added to the list of parties suspected of, or responsible for, sexual violence in situations of armed conflict.

“The decision to blacklist Israel and accuse us of using sexual violence as a weapon of war is an outrageous decision,” Danon said.

“The secretary-general and his team continue to spread lies against Israel. To put us and Hamas terrorists on the same list, that’s unacceptable.”

The Israeli mission to the UN said in a statement that it will have no contact with the secretary-general’s office as long as Guterres serves as head of the organisation.

The country’s foreign ministry also expressed anger over the upcoming report.

“The shameful and absurd UN decision to include Israeli entities in the annex to the CRSV (conflict-related sexual violence) report is further proof of the UN’s true nature: a politicised and corrupt organisation that has abandoned its founding principles and systematically targets Israel as its primary mission,” Oren Marmorstein, a spokesperson for the Israeli foreign ministry, said on X.

Guterres’s spokesperson said they were aware of Danon’s remarks.

“For our part, the secretary-general’s door remains open,” Stephane Dujarric said.

Systematic pattern of abuse

Last August, the UN cited “credible information” regarding sexual violence committed by Israeli security forces against Palestinian detainees in prisons and other detention centres, and said UN inspectors had been denied access to the facilities.

“We invited the representative of the UN to come to Israel to check those ridiculous allegations. They chose not to come,” Danon said.

Palestinians detained in Israeli prisons, especially those taken from Gaza during Israel’s brutal war since 2023, have long revealed how they suffer dehumanising treatment by guards and soldiers, including torture and sexual violence. According to international human rights organisations, these testimonies are part of a broader and systematic pattern.

Furthermore, a report from the West Bank Protection Consortium last month found that sexual violence and other forms of gender-based abuse committed by Israeli settlers and soldiers are spurring Palestinians to leave the occupied West Bank.

Even foreigners, namely those on board a recent Gaza-bound aid flotilla, say that freed activists who were abducted from international waters faced abuse while in Israeli detention, including at least 15 separate cases of sexual assault or rape.

Earlier this month, Israel also rejected accusations of rape by its forces, which were detailed in a column by longtime New York Times journalist Nicholas Kristof. The Israeli government had responded to the report by stating that it would take the extraordinary step of suing the paper. Kristof’s reporting was based on the accounts of 14 male and female Palestinian victims.

Relations between the UN and Israel are fraught and have reached an all-time low since October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched an attack that preceded Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, which has killed more than 72,000 Palestinians.

Israeli authorities have criticised Guterres and other UN officials for their condemnation of its brutal conduct in Gaza. The UN chief was declared “persona non grata” in Israel in 2024.

At least 16 students were killed and dozens injured after a fire tore through the dormitory of a girls’ boarding school in Kenya’s Rift Valley early Thursday. Panicked parents gathered outside the school searching for their children hours after the blaze was extinguished.

The United States has carried out strikes near Bandar Abbas, the second attack in less than a week on Iran’s strategically important port city, escalating tensions around the Strait of Hormuz despite a fragile ceasefire that has been in place between Washington and Tehran since April 8.

Reuters and The Associated Press, quoting unnamed US officials, reported that US forces shot down four Iranian drones and struck a ground control station for drones on Wednesday in Bandar Abbas.

The strikes followed explosions in Bandar Abbas on Tuesday. Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Washington of violating the ceasefire through “aggressive acts” in Hormozgan province, where the port city is located.

The semiofficial Iranian news agency Tasnim also reported that Iranian forces had fired on an “American airbase” in the region in response to a US attack near Bandar Abbas.

The escalation came after US President Donald Trump said during a cabinet meeting in Washington, DC, on Wednesday that “nobody’s going to control” the Strait of Hormuz as he spoke about ongoing negotiations between Tehran and Washington.

Bandar Abbas, home to key Iranian naval forces, occupies one of the most strategically sensitive positions in the Gulf. Its location on the Strait of Hormuz has made it central to both Iran’s military position and the wider confrontation with the US. Here is what we know:

Where is Bandar Abbas?

Bandar Abbas lies on Iran’s southern coast, on the northern side of the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway linking the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea.

The city, which had a population of more than 526,000 people at the time of Iran’s 2016 census, sits roughly 60km to 70km (35 to 45 miles) north of the strait’s narrowest point.

Its position gives Iran oversight of one of the world’s most important shipping lanes. About one-fifth of global oil and gas supplies transit through the Strait of Hormuz during peacetime.

Since the ceasefire was announced on April 8, Iran has continued to control shipping through the Strait of Hormuz while US forces have imposed a blockade on Iranian ports.

What is the military significance of Bandar Abbas?

Bandar Abbas is the headquarters of both Iran’s conventional navy and the naval arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The conventional navy has used it as its base since 1977 when Iran moved much of its fleet from Khorramshahr at the western edge of Iran’s Gulf coastline, to Bandar Abbas, transforming the city into the country’s main southern naval command centre.

According to the Middle East Institute, the IRGC navy later relocated its headquarters from Tehran to Bandar Abbas to improve operational control along the Strait of Hormuz.

Although Trump and Israeli officials claimed Iran’s naval capabilities have been heavily damaged in their recent attacks, Tehran still maintains a fleet of fast attack boats operated by the IRGC navy.

The vessels are designed for “swarm” tactics and are being used against commercial ships that do not have authorisation from Iran to sail through the narrow Strait of Hormuz. They were used recently against two Indian ships and two foreign container vessels, the Panama-flagged MSC Francesca and the Liberian-flagged Epaminondas, which Iran said had not been given approval to transit the waterway.

Why is Bandar Abbas important to Iran’s economy?

The Strait of Hormuz is not just a military chokepoint but also an economic lifeline.

Analysts estimated that more than 90 percent of Iranian crude shipments transit through the strait.

That makes Bandar Abbas and nearby Gulf infrastructure critical to government revenues, including the trade networks that help Iran circumvent sanctions, particularly by exporting oil to China.

Why are the US attacks significant?

Samir Puri, a visiting lecturer in war studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera the ceasefire has not yet formally collapsed despite these latest exchanges of fire.

He described those incidents as “limited” compared with strikes carried out before April 8. These attacks can be characterised as “tit-for-tat military-to-military engagements rather than attacks on infrastructure or widespread destruction en masse”, he said.

“What the US military is attempting to do is explore whether it can physically deny the IRGC and Iran the ability to control the Strait of Hormuz,” he said.

“Iran, of course, wants to show it cannot be denied that capability.”

What does this mean for peace negotiations?

Diplomatic and military operations are unfolding simultaneously as Iran and the US have exchanged a volley of proposals and counterproposals for peace since the ceasefire began.

“This is unfolding on parallel tracks. There is a military track and a negotiating track all unfolding at the same time,” Puri said. These limited strikes are, therefore, ultimately being launched as part of the negotiations, he said.

“The negotiators can only present the leverage they have from the field of battle. Is the US going to put itself into a position in which it can say to Iranian negotiators that they do not control the Strait of Hormuz? Because if you try to amass forces around Bandar Abbas and launch attacks from that coastal area, we can strike back.

“But Iran will not want to be pushed into that position and will want to say it retains the ability to strike shipping and US bases hosted by Gulf allies and partners. So that’s the duality that’s unfolding right now.”

Puri said both Washington and Tehran still appeared to have incentives to continue mediation but the two sides are approaching negotiations with very different objectives.

“Trump and the US administration want to impose a victor’s peace on Iran. Iran’s reading of the same script that they’re being handed is very different, and Iran probably wants to stretch out these negotiations for as long as possible without conceding.”

“So again, you end up in a situation that wars elsewhere have seen – negotiations without an endpoint or even the promise of an endpoint but still an incentive for both parties to participate, for now.”

The war that Donald Trump declared won last month looks rather different from the inside of the Pentagon. The resulting stalemate has drained American military stockpiles, emboldened Iranian commanders, and left the US with far worse options than before the conflict began.

The administration’s triumphalist framing has struck a jarring note among those who have spent careers studying the Iranian military and the limits of American power projection. Declaring victory when the enemy is still standing, still armed, and still controlling the waterway you went to war over is not a strategy. It is a wish dressed up as a press release.

At the heart of the impasse are two demands that Tehran has consistently and categorically rejected. Iran will not surrender what it regards as its sovereign right to develop its uranium program, and it will not yield control of the Strait of Hormuz. Those two positions were Iran’s red lines before the fighting started. They remain Iran’s red lines now. Nothing in between has changed.

What has changed is the arithmetic of munitions. The United States entered this conflict with a military built around expensive, technologically sophisticated weapons systems, precision instruments that take years to design, years more to manufacture, and that have now been expended at a rate the American defense industrial base is poorly positioned to replenish. Iran, by contrast, relies on a dispersed network of robotic small boats, undersea mines, tactical ballistic missiles, and unmanned systems. These weapons are cheap, simple, and easy to produce at scale.

The United States essentially deployed a Ferrari into a demolition derby. The Iranians didn’t need high-end technology; they just needed a relentless volume of cheaper assets to overwhelm the defense.

Trump, for his part, has shown no appetite for nuance. “We have totally obliterated their military capacity, there’s nothing left, believe me, nothing,” he told supporters at a rally in Georgia. Pentagon planners reviewing the same battlefield data have reached a rather different conclusion.

The American strikes produced mixed results. Iran does not maintain a conventional naval fleet or a modern air force in the Western sense. Its control of the strait rests not on destroyers or fighter wings but on a distributed, resilient system of asymmetric capabilities. The Iranian systems that dispersed into the terrain absorbed the strikes and began reconstituting almost immediately. Defense analysts point out that the Iranians have adapted from what they observed, replenished their stocks, and may now be better positioned than when the conflict began.

The strategic picture is further complicated by the political pressures that shaped the original decision to go to war. Analysts describe a decision driven less by tactical opportunity than by commitments made to Israeli leadership and to influential pro-Israel donors whose support was central to Trump’s political coalition. The result was a military campaign calibrated to political timetables rather than operational logic.

READ: Israeli premier expresses concern over US handling of Iran nuclear file in call with Trump: Report

Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, a member of the Armed Services Committee, called the conduct of the conflict “a case study in how not to use military force.” Representative Thomas Massie of Kentucky, before his defeat in his primary, was more pointed: “We went in without a declaration of war, without a clear objective, without an exit strategy, and now we’re supposed to celebrate because we used up half our missile inventory and the Iranians are still there.”

The regional picture adds further complexity. Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf monarchies are acutely aware of their own exposure. A major Iranian strike on above-ground oil and desalination plants could critically impede the GCC’s government’s ability to maintain economic prosperity. The GCC states have no appetite for an escalation that leaves their vital water infrastructure in ruins. While they favor the containment of Iran, preventing a regional war is a matter of sheer survival.

The broader strategic damage extends well beyond the Gulf.

The conflict has exposed, with uncomfortable clarity, the brittleness of an American military model that prioritized theoretical sophistication over the practical demands of sustained combat. The long-overlooked vulnerability of the missile supply chain has now emerged as the primary constraint on future American options. Restoring that capacity, according to officials, will require years of industrial retooling.

Washington has come to realize that Iran acutely recognized US vulnerabilities, designing asymmetric systems specifically to deplete America’s most expensive capabilities with its cheapest assets. This is not a temporary setback; it is a structural crisis.

For now, President Trump appears caught between the political cost of acknowledging stalemate and the military risk of a second round of strikes that the Pentagon itself doubts would achieve different results. The operational pause is not a logistical necessity. The forces are forward-deployed and ready. The pause is a search for a rationale, a way to resume the fight that does not require the White House to explain why the first attempt failed.

By most accounts, the search has not yet succeeded.

OPINION: The bell tolls in Beijing: Xi’s warning and the shadow of Thucydides

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

The Middle East has been a difficult region to deal with in oil markets. When it comes to energy geographies, the region has proven to be a disproportionately significant part of the world’s energy resources, with export facilities traversing a handful of maritime routes and political situations that have been tense, if not outright volatile, at times. The change in 2025 and into 2026 isn’t the nature of the forces but rather the confluence of overlapping pressures: ongoing sanctions enforcement, multiple theaters of conflict, OPEC+ tensions that are more public than ever in previous years, and disruptions to shipping in the Red Sea, which now seem to have become a semi-permanent part of the shipping route landscape.

There is no background information for commodity traders, market analysts, and energy investors. It’s a real-time, constantly evolving dynamic that can make all the difference in the day-to-day performance of prices, and it’s particularly important when prices are sliding around rapidly, and the stories behind them are changing just as fast.

The Behavior of Prices and the Risk of Middle East Supplies

Traders who follow crude oil price live data are the first ones to witness this. Real-time feeds are a reflection of more than just the fundamental supply-demand elements, but the market’s real-time assessment of the value of geopolitical risk and how much it “should” be worth at any given moment. A news event, which is a minor detail in a more stable environment, can cause future prices to move $5 or more in less than an hour. The consistent and tough question – and it is a tough one – is, which events actually have physical supply implications and which ones are sentiment-driven moves that die in a session or two?

The Strait of Hormuz

About 20-21 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products go through the Strait of Hormuz, which is about 20% of the world’s oil consumption. No readily available bypasses can be found that can absorb that flow at a similar cost. There are partial alternatives, including the IPSA pipeline and Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, but they would not even come close to filling the deficit should the Hormuz be closed en masse.

Source

It is a strait between Oman and Iran. Geography makes it so that any serious disruption in U.S.-Iran relations or of security conditions in the Gulf in general puts Hormuz back on the market’s agenda. Traders are all familiar with this: when there is a lot of Iranian tension, the futures positioning will always reflect the chokepoint risk, even if there is no incident per se.

Production Outages That Don’t Make the Front Page

Key Risk Factors Shaping Market Sentiment in 2026

Active Conflict Zones and Exposure to Infrastructure

The Persistent Iranian Supply Question

Infrastructure Concentration Risk

OPEC+ Internal Dynamics

Non-State Actor Activity and Shipping Friction

How the Market Prices Geopolitical Risk

Risk Premium in Practice

Geopolitical risk premiums in times of heightened Middle East tension have varied from around $4 to $10 per barrel, depending on the market participants’ views on the probability of actual physical supply disruptions in the case of Brent crude, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights. That’s a fairly broad window for economic trading, and it has a tendency to close up very fast when the tension subsides and without a supply event, which is the more common scenario.

The geopolitical risk premium factors analysts may consider are:

• The nearness to active conflict, producing fields, or the working export terminals.
• Production capacity that would be available to make up for the loss of production elsewhere.
• The availability and magnitude of the IEA’s strategic stockpiles to be tapped.
• Current tanker market conditions and the viability of an alternative route.
• Diplomatic messages sent by governments in the area, including the United States and other great powers
• Past examples of similar events, which have had identifiable supply impacts.

It is not easy to give exact weights to these inputs. Part of the reason for the price action to seemingly be different with comparable geopolitical events can be due to different analysts forming different conclusions from the same events.

Historical Supply Disruptions and Price Responses

The 2025-2026 entry is a more diffuse form of market pressure than those acute events listed above. It is not one particular incident, but rather sanctions enforcement and Iranian volumes kept low and shipping activity in the Red Sea continuing to cause friction in the transport system, which has kept transport costs elevated. The World Economic Outlook from the IMF pointed out that this type of persistent supply constraint is likely to have a longer-lasting impact on medium-term price expectations than acute supply shocks, which markets have historically been able to absorb and turn around in relatively short periods of time. Thus, a slow-burning risk premium can be more ‘sticky’ than a dramatic risk premium.

Broader Market Implications

Strategic Reserve Releases (SRRs) as a Counterweight

Geopolitical Risk Analysis: What It Does and Doesn’t Accomplish

Conclusion

Disclaimer

Marcelo Bielsa is widely revered as a pioneer of coaching, but his unconventional methods risk ruining Uruguay’s World Cup chances before the tournament has even begun, with rumours of dressing room unrest.

Nicknamed “El Loco”, which means madman, the 70-year-old’s bold, attacking approach has proved an inspiration to a younger generation of coaches, including Pep Guardiola and USA boss Mauricio Pochettino.

Yet, his famously demanding standards have often caused friction during a nomadic coaching career, and his stint in Uruguay has been no exception.

The Argentinian’s arrival initially generated huge excitement, which was fuelled by landmark victories over Brazil and Argentina in qualifying.

But they needed that flying start just to make it through after winning just three of their final 12 qualifiers.

The tipping point for many in the squad came at the Copa America in 2024.

Uruguay finished a creditable third, eliminating Brazil along the way, but Bielsa’s intensity during the monthlong tournament did not endear him to his players.

Luis Suarez hit out at Bielsa’s methods after retiring from international football months later, claiming he had reduced former Liverpool striker Darwin Nunez to tears at half-time of a 2-0 win over Argentina, such was the force of his criticism.

Bielsa accepted that after the former Barcelona striker’s backlash, his “authority was affected” with the rest of the dressing room.

Results have also regressed, with Bielsa stating he was “ashamed” by a 5-1 friendly defeat by the USA in November.

Now, as his third World Cup with a third different nation approaches, the question is whether Bielsa can win back the faith of his players for a country so used to punching above its weight on the world stage.

And there are doubts as to how his high-energy style will fare in the gruelling conditions of Miami and Guadalajara, where Uruguay will face Saudi Arabia, Cape Verde and Spain in Group F.

Pochettino hails Bielsa as a ‘genius’

Bielsa made his name winning three league titles in Argentina with Newell’s Old Boys, where the stadium now bears his name, and Velez Sarsfield.

“For me, he’s a person I will always admire,” said Pochettino, whom Bielsa recruited for Newell’s as a 13-year-old.

“He’s a genius. A person with charisma and a personality very different from us, normal coaches, and that’s what makes him special.”

Bielsa’s sides in Bilbao with Athletic Club, where he reached the Europa League and Copa del Rey finals in 2011-12, and Marseille, where he led Ligue 1 at the halfway stage in 2014-15, were also admired but ended up empty-handed as their energy ran out.

In Leeds, murals still bear Bielsa’s face, four years on from his departure, after he led a sleeping giant of English football back to the Premier League for the first time in 16 years in 2020.

His time there ended in familiar fashion with an exhausted squad that was relegated to the second tier the season after he departed.

Yet, the esteem with which he is held for his daring tactical approach endures.

“To be loved is this biggest title, bigger than the Champions League or Premier League or whatever,” said Guardiola, who went to visit Bielsa in Argentina before setting out as a coach at Barcelona.

“To be loved is the most important thing, and I think Marcelo has that more than any other manager in the world.”

Bielsa, who oversaw Argentina’s group-stage elimination in 2002 and Chile’s round-of-16 loss to hosts Brazil in 2014, has already hinted ‌that he may not remain as manager ⁠of Uruguay beyond ⁠July, saying his job with the team ends with the World Cup.

“Our job ends with the World Cup,” ⁠Bielsa said at an event organised by the Uruguayan Football Association last Friday.

Although he did not elaborate on his remarks, local media reported ⁠that the Argentinian will not continue once his current contract expires at the end of the June 11-July 19 tournament.

“It is a miracle in any ‌professional’s sporting career to take part in the World Cup,” he said. “I will be forever grateful to Uruguay for allowing me to enjoy a competition like the World Cup.”