TODAY

Beirut, Lebanon – The accusation from Lebanon’s prime minister that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is in charge of Hezbollah’s operations against Israel comes as relations between the Shia group and the Lebanese government are at their lowest in years.

But, according to analysts, that animosity does not mean that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam was incorrect in his analysis of the situation.

In comments made on Sunday to the Saudi Arabian television station al-Hadath, Salam said that the IRGC – a branch of Iran’s military that answers directly to that country’s supreme leader – was directing Hezbollah in its fight against Israel, and in launching drones at Cyprus from Lebanon.

Israel’s latest attacks on Lebanon have, since they started in early March, killed more than 1,000 people and displaced at least 1.2 million, more than 20 percent of the country’s population. Human Rights Watch researchers say the mass displacement alone could amount to a war crime.

While Salam’s claims might be hard to definitively prove, analysis from experts and reporting suggest that the IRGC has played a crucial role in Hezbollah’s preparations for reentering the war waged against Lebanon since 2023.

IRGC calling the shots

In his interview with al-Hadath, Salam accused the IRGC of “managing the military operation in Lebanon” and of firing a drone at a British Air Force base in Cyprus, earlier this month. He accused IRGC officials of entering Lebanon with false passports.

On March 2, Hezbollah fired six rockets across the border. The group said that it was in response to the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, and a response to more than a year of unanswered Israeli aggression on Lebanon, which had killed hundreds.

The move shocked much of Lebanon’s population and political establishment, after Hezbollah had reportedly given assurances to its allies in government, including Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, that it would not enter the war in support of Iran, its close ideological ally.

The Lebanese government – which had already been moving to disarm Hezbollah – responded by banning the powerful group’s military activities and asking some Iranians believed to have links to the IRGC to leave. But the action has had little impact on the ground, where Hezbollah continues its war efforts against Israel, including battling the Israeli military on the ground in southern Lebanon – the fight that Salam believes is managed by the IRGC.

Ties between the IRGC and Hezbollah are longstanding.

Hezbollah was founded in 1982, three years after the Islamic revolution in Iran. The group was created in coordination with the IRGC and has since counted Iran as its benefactor and spiritual guide.

Immediately after a November 2024 ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, Iran sent IRGC officers to Lebanon to conduct a post-war audit and restructure, according to reporting by the Reuters news agency.

Hezbollah’s chain of command was reportedly restructured from a hierarchical one to smaller cells with greater decisional autonomy, something also practised by the IRGC and known as the “mosaic” defence.

Nicholas Blanford, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, said that sources in Hezbollah and the Lebanese government had told him that the original Hezbollah rocket attack on March 2 was conducted by the Islamic Resistance, Hezbollah’s military wing, possibly in direct coordination with the Quds Force, the IRGC’s foreign unit. Hezbollah’s senior leadership may not have been aware of the plans for the attack.

“I think the IRGC is calling the shots,” Blanford told Al Jazeera. “They are working together.”

Lebanese government out of options

On Tuesday, Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji declared the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon a persona non grata and gave him until Sunday to leave the country.

The move indicates that Lebanon is trying to counter Iranian influence in Lebanon and came just hours after Israel’s Defence Minister, Israel Katz, announced that his country’s military would create a “security zone” in southern Lebanon stretching to the Litani River, roughly 30km (20 miles) north of the Israeli border – essentially an illegal occupation of the area.

But analysts and experts said there is little Lebanon can do before the war with Israel ends.

The Lebanese government had worked under heavy international pressure to disarm Hezbollah during the ceasefire period from November 2024 until earlier this month. But Israel violated the ceasefire more than 10,000 times, according to UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. For any progress to be made on disarmament, analysts said, Israel cannot continue attacking Lebanon.

“What the Lebanese government was supposed to do was a gradual disarmament of the party, which is also something that many Lebanese would like to happen,” Ziad Majed, a Lebanese political scientist, told Al Jazeera. “However, it cannot happen while Israel is bombing.”

However, the attacks don’t seem likely to cease in the short term. US President Donald Trump said that his envoys, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, had engaged in talks with Iran on Monday over a possible end to the war. Iran subsequently denied that talks took place.

Many in Lebanon believe that Israel’s campaign in Lebanon won’t be included in any potential agreement between Iran, the US, and Israel to end the war. Katz’s statement on Tuesday seems to suggest Israel plans to carry on its invasion of southern Lebanon until its forces reach the Litani River.

Hezbollah’s threats

The government’s efforts to retake control of southern Lebanon may be even more difficult now that it is dealing with a reemboldened Hezbollah.

Mahmoud Qamati, deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, compared the Lebanese government to France’s World War II Vichy government, which collaborated with the Nazis. Qamati was criticised for his comments, but later said they were misinterpreted.

More ominous comments came from Wafiq Safa, who was until recently the head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit. He sent a message to the Lebanese government during a recent press interview.

“We will force the government to backtrack on the decision to ban the party’s military activities after the war, regardless of the method,” he said.

In March 2003, a million people took to the streets of London to oppose the illegal invasion of Iraq. Seeing straight through the lie that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, protesters warned the British government in no uncertain terms: This action would trigger a spiral of misery, hatred and death.

More than 20 years on, most people now recognise the Iraq war for what it was: a catastrophic mistake that fuelled a string of subsequent conflicts and instability. The United Kingdom had followed the United States into an illegal war – and more than a million Iraqi men, women and children paid the price.

Unfortunately, not everybody has learned the lessons from the past. It has been almost a month since the US and Israel launched their attacks on Iran. More than 1,400 Iranians and more than 1,000 Lebanese people have been killed.

In seeking to justify the bombing, US President Donald Trump spoke of the need to eliminate “imminent threats from the Iranian regime”, whose “menacing activities directly endanger the United States, our troops, our bases overseas and our allies throughout the world”. He said the goal was to make sure Iran “will never have a nuclear weapon”. Sound familiar?

The first casualty of war is the truth, so let us get the facts straight: These are lies that have been peddled to justify an illegal and unprovoked war. As the National Counterterrorism Center Director, Joe Kent, said in his resignation letter last week, Iran “posed no imminent threat to our nation” and that it was “clear that [the US] started this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby”.

There is only one nuclear-armed state in the Middle East: Israel. Next month’s UN Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would have been the perfect place to call for an end to the nuclear arms race. A diplomatic solution was possible, but the US and Israel chose war instead. In doing so, they have jeopardised the safety of humankind around the world. So, too, have those nations that have decided to lend support to their war of aggression.

Shortly after the attacks on Iran began, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer gave the US permission to use British military bases for strikes on Iranian missile sites. Last week, his government agreed to let the US use British bases to strike Iranian sites targeting the Strait of Hormuz.

The UK could have followed in the footsteps of Spain and said, “No way, absolutely not. We will not be involved in this illegal war in any way whatsoever.” Instead, it has dragged itself into another catastrophic conflict.

Astonishingly, the prime minister still maintains that the British government is not involved – a line that has been regurgitated by many across our media. He says the UK is allowing its sites to be used only for “defensive” strikes. What nonsense.

The reality is, if a bomber takes off from Royal Air Force base Fairford and bombs targets in Iran, we are involved in that act of aggression. If civilians die, will their families stop mourning when they are told that they were bombed for “defensive purposes”? No matter how Starmer dresses it up, he cannot change the truth: The UK is directly involved in this war.

Mark my words: This is a historic mistake that jeopardises the safety of us all. That’s why, earlier this month, I tabled a bill in the House of Commons that would require parliamentary approval for any British involvement in military action. That includes the use of British bases by other nations.

So far, the prime minister has refused to pass this legislation. With no debate, no discussion and no vote, he is dragging Britain into another disastrous illegal war.

Just like with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, today, those of us who oppose the war on Iran are accused of giving succour to authoritarian regimes and leaders. Whatever one thinks of the governments of various places, there is no basis in law for an attack to bring about regime change. There is no basis in history that bombing from the sky would bring about human rights either.

Trump couldn’t care less about people’s human rights. Whether it’s in Iran, Venezuela or Cuba, he is interested in one thing and one thing only: seizing resources and political control around the world.

If the UK cares about international law, it would be standing up to Trump, not bending over backwards to appease him.

The story of US-led foreign interventions is a story of chaos, instability and misery. How many more of these catastrophic failures do we need before we learn the lesson? And what will it take for the UK to finally defend a consistent, ethical foreign policy based on international law, sovereignty and peace?

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

When it comes to understanding air and missile defense, especially in the Middle East, David Shank has few peers. The retired Army colonel served as Commandant of the Air Defense Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma and as the 10th Army Air Missile Defense Commander in Europe, back when Israel was defended by U.S. European Command. He also commanded a Patriot battery that deployed to Qatar, Bahrain and Jordan.

In an exclusive, hour-long, wide-ranging interview on Sunday, Shank offered some unique insights into the challenges faced by the U.S. and its partners in the region after four weeks of defending against Iranian missile and drone barrages. He is now a consultant for Orion 360 Consulting, his family-owned company which works with prime contractors on counter missile and drone capabilities.

Some of these questions and answers have been edited for clarity.

Q: Are you surprised with how many drones and ballistic missiles are getting through U.S. and allied defenses in the region?

A: I am not surprised based on Iranian overmatch with regards to the vast numbers of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The only surprise to me were the attacks on Gulf nations’ population centers and the reported 1,500-plus [missiles and drones fired at] the UAE.

There’s no system that’s 100% guaranteed. As a former U.S. Army air defender, we’ve planned, we’ve studied, we’ve exercised against an Iranian threat, where we clearly understood that they possessed thousands of long range ballistic missiles, long range rockets, cruise missiles. And then, of course, in the last 10-plus years, the use of unmanned aerial systems. It’s not just the Iranians, but their proxies also, which are across the region from Iraq to Hezbollah and Lebanon to Hamas that we’ve seen recently, down to Yemen and the Houthis.

Q: There have also been a lot of drone attacks in Iraq from Iranian proxies there.

A: Yes, they’ve targeted some U.S. footprints in Iraq and across the region. And on that note, across the Middle East, we’ve had U.S. and coalition forces forward deployed for decades. They didn’t just show up there last week or two months ago. We’ve been occupying some of the same terrain for decades. And so this goes back to one of your initial questions of, why do we think Iran is able to penetrate the U.S. and Israeli and other coalition defenses. It is because 1.) they’re known targets for the Iranians, and 2.) because of the vast number of missiles and now drones and long range rockets they possess along with their proxies.

Q: What is your observation of how these systems and personnel are performing?

A: Well, you know, the American soldiers are the very best. And as a former air defender, yeah, I’m a little biased. I think they’re performing extremely well. From an Israeli perspective – and I’ve spent many, many days and weeks on the ground in Israel during my time as the 10th Army Air Missile Defense Commander from 2017 to 2019 while stationed in Europe. U.S. European Command at that time had the responsibility for the defense of Israel, and so I’ve made a number of trips in and out of Israel during that two-plus-year period. I’ve walked the ground. We exercised. We deployed Patriot capabilities. We deployed [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] THAAD capabilities during that time frame, primarily as an exercise, but it was a rehearsal for what’s taking place today. 

So while some of the war plans have changed and been adjusted, as we do over time, the outcome remains the same. That’s U.S. forces standing shoulder to shoulder with the Israelis in the State of Israel on ground. As for the rest of the region, we’ve had Patriot battalions and THAAD batteries rotating in and out for probably going back to the mid-to-late 2000s. I was a Patriot battalion commander in 2013. I deployed with my battalion to Qatar, Bahrain, and then was tasked to put Patriot capability in Jordan at the time, because of what the Assad regime was doing to the civilian population – those chlorine gas bombs. That was under the Obama administration. So this has been ongoing for decades.

Q: What makes you say these systems and personnel are performing well?

A: The Army has rehearsed this. We’ve exercised these requirements for decades. The Israelis fight every day against proxies who consistently lob or launch long-range rockets or some type of device, either from the north or from the south, or even by the Houthis. It’s been a constant. So it’s easily, if not every day, at least once a week. And Israel has been enduring this for decades.

And so we are a trained force. We’re a capable force. The forensics continues, battle-tracking continues, the number of interceptors launched, the number of hits to kill, what that battle damage looks like. And then, of course, when, when a ballistic missile or cruise missile or even a drone is able to penetrate the defenses, at least from an American perspective, we roll up our sleeves and we determine, ‘Okay, why did that happen’?

When a ballistic missile or cruise missile or even a drone is able to penetrate the defenses, we conduct these very detailed and sometimes challenging after-action reviews to do our very best to ensure that that doesn’t happen again. 

Q: Speaking of which, Israeli media outlets are reporting that a THAAD system failed to intercept ballistic missiles that attacked the southern Israeli cities of Arad and Dimona, the site of Israel’s unacknowledged nuclear weapons program. These claims are unverified, with suggestions that it could have been an Israeli David’s Sling system that missed, but what would the U.S. after-action investigation into a potential THAAD failure look like?

A: The investigators will try to determine whether it was a system malfunction. It starts with the network. It starts with the communications piece, both voice and data. All part of this integrated network. It starts with sensing. There are sensing radars for long range specifically, and how they’re interconnected on this network. And then, of course, passing those tracks to an effector. And then there’s the human in the loop, the decision maker. There’s a decision maker that ultimately directs a subordinate echelon to engage a specific target. So the investigation will look into all these aspects. It could be human error, or it could be a technical glitch. And they’ll determine that.

Q: What makes drones like the Shahed-136 so hard to target and successfully engage?

A: Radar cross section. Let’s look at one radar versus one Shahed-136. If you’re not looking for that size and that speed of a target, you’re not going to see it. And so you’ve heard the cliche, there’s no silver bullet, right? And this drives the importance of a layered defense, and that layered defense includes radars. So very elementary nonetheless, but it’s radar cross section. 

Q: What’s being done to calibrate sensors to be able to pick up these Shaheds? And is it working?

A: I think we’ve had a great deal of success against some of these Group-3 drones, specifically the Shahed-136s. From a technical standpoint, the industry is continuing to work and make adjustments to their sensors, especially those that are programs of record, but also sensing capabilities that are non-programs of record to the Department of War and U.S. forces. So yes is the answer. And again, it goes back to layering. 

And one other point worth mentioning – you can probably tie this into some of the other comments I made. From a U.S. air defense perspective, and really, probably any coalition or friendly force, we’re not defending dirt. If a ballistic missile is going to land somewhere in the desert – if it’s uninhabited – it’s not an area that we need to be concerned with defending. We’re going to let it impact. And so sometimes people get lost in those types of impacts. 

Now turn around, and we talked a little bit earlier about Dimona, right? Whether the Israelis have nuclear capability or not, when you know if a ballistic missile is targeting a population center – or, let’s say, an air base, a logistics center, or maybe even oil or naturl gas fields – those are deemed critical assets and would have some type of defensive capability to prevent any type of strike against those assets. Hope that helps.

Q: What Iranian ballistic missile technology have you seen during this conflict that is concerning in terms of Iran’s ability to penetrate even the best defense?

A: Well, I think that [attempted] strike against Diego Garcia got everyone’s attention because of the range. Reports were that there were two ballistic missiles, one broke up in flight. I think [the other missile reached a distance of] 3,800 kilometers [about 2,400 miles], and our expectation was that they had a ballistic missile they could travel 2,000 kilometers [about 1,240 miles]. Maybe they decreased the size of the warhead in order to travel further. I’m not an engineer. I own a set of post hole diggers, and that’s my PhD, by the way.

We’ve known for decades that Iranians have possessed thousands of ballistic missiles, long-range rockets and cruise missiles. And in the last 10 to 15 years, the evolution of drones has changed the character of war. It’s clearly evident that Russians are assisting the Iranians, not just with missile technology, but now with drone technology. And so the Russians have a lot of lessons learned. Ukrainians have a lot of lessons learned unless you’ve had your head in the sand. The Ukrainians are also assisting in the region to provide not just awareness but expertise in both offensive and defensive actions, using drones and defeating drones.

Q: The U.S. and allies are expending a large amount of interceptors, batting down a variety of missiles and drones. How concerned are you about America’s magazine depth of these critical defensive weapons? 

A: Very, very concerned. Clearly, I recognize the efforts, at least in the last several months, of increasing production, for example, of the Patriot interceptor. And we haven’t talked about the cost curve, but Patriot PAC-3 interceptors are not cheap. You know, $3 million, $4 million, $5 million each. That THAAD interceptor, I’ve heard numbers anywhere between $8 million and $12 million per and that’s just from a U.S. perspective. So not cheap at all, especially when you’re engaging potentially a $200,000 target. So you can recognize the cost curve very quickly.

And these munitions are limited, hence, the aggressive movement towards effectors that have an unlimited magazine, or a very deep magazine, such as directed energy. Are we moving fast enough to get to directed energy? Maybe, maybe not. There are some use cases and the one in El Paso was not so well coordinated. In fact, it wasn’t coordinated at all, in my opinion. And it showed a very concerning disconnect between departments here in the U.S. But, the US Navy possesses some directed energy capability.

Q: From what you’re seeing on this conflict, do you think the proper planning was in place in terms of magazine depth of defensive weapons?

A: My experience is the number of interceptors were always factored into the war plans, and so recognizing that based on the number of whether it’s Patriot or THAAD or both interceptors on hand, clearly, we would war game. We would rehearse. We would recognize, okay, through modeling and simulation, certain Patriot locations would go what we call Winchester (out of ammo in military parlance). You’re out of ammunition by a specific day in a conflict. That drives the importance of air power and nowadays, cyber strikes, and even the potential for ground warfare. All of that is factored in. I’m sure additional munitions, potentially from other combatant commands around the globe, were moved to the region to prepare for what’s transpiring now.

Q: In addition to interceptors, the U.S. has shipped a lot of air defense systems from Europe and the Pacific to the Middle East. How concerning is that for other regions, specifically Pacific? If a fight broke out in the Pacific tonight, do we have enough systems and munitions there to defend us assets?

A: It’s a really good question. And so hence the importance of our allies and partners possessing their own capability, because it alleviates some of the stresses on the U.S. force and other nations for that matter. And so to answer your question, if a second conflict were to take place today in another part of the world, there’d be some challenges, but there’d also be some reliance on our allies and partners. They provide their capability and become part of whether it’s a coalition or multilateral bilateral agreement, but it would definitely require additional capability from other nations.

Q: Pacific allies have expressed concerns about U.S. air defense assets heading to the CENTCOM region. How much does that concern you?

A: The State Department is heavily engaged when it comes to having those difficult conversations with some of our allies and partners and explaining why, for example, we need to move a Patriot from the Pacific to the Middle East. I’m sure they’re receiving push back. Because there is a concern, whether it’s PRC, or whether it’s the DPRK, there’s always that concern [about being properly equipped].

Q: You mentioned moving air defense assets. What does it take to move a Patriot battery, which can have up to eight trailer-mounted launchers, as well as an AN/MPQ-65 multifunction phased array radar and other fire control, communications, and support equipment, operators and maintenance personnel?

A: It’s very taxing on the airlift, the C-17s and C-5s. One Patriot battery would take eight to 10 C-17s, it’s a lot. And that was just for an initial deployment. So potentially not the full complement of launching stations. These are very large trucks, very large pieces of equipment. You ship the interceptors in a different airframe, because of the munitions aspect. So there’s some synchronization involved as you think through this. If you put a Patriot battery on the ground, and the radar comes in last, it’s no good. You’ve got to synchronize the flow. 

Q: How many flights would it take for a whole battalion, which includes a headquarters element, along with between three and five firing batteries?

A: I’d say about 70 to 75 aircraft. This is why the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) stored at a number of locations around the world are so important.

Q: Based on the information at hand, it appears that Iran has been able to destroy one U.S. AN/TPY-2 radar in Jordan and damage the massive American-made AN/FPS-132 phased array radar in Qatar. Reportedly, Iran has hit 12 US and allied radar and SATCOM terminals since the start of the war. How difficult are they to replace and how do their losses affect the overall situational awareness, command and control, reaction time and the overall ability to identify and destroy threats?

A: It’s no different than what we do to an adversary. We conduct some type of air campaign. First thing we want to do is we want to blind, right? We want to take out their communications. We want to take out their air defenses radars so our aircraft can get deep into a country, and strike strategic-level targets initially. The Iranians are doing the same. 

If they can take out our sensing capability, or how we see air threats thousands of kilometers away, that’s one of their targets. A high payoff target for the Iranians is to destroy a THAAD radar like the  AN/TPY-2 you mentioned. The AN/FPS-132 that you mentioned. If they can destroy these types of long range sensors, that benefits the adversary. 

Patriot radars are a target. They emit a signal, and so it drives the importance that they’re not easy to move. It drives the importance of emissions control. When you turn on a radar, when you turn it off, how long is it operating for? Again, you’re not just going to pick up a Patriot, but this is very difficult for some – even American leaders – to understand. You don’t just move a Patriot battery on a dime. I mean, it’s not a tank. And so I know during my career, it was challenging to explain that to senior leaders who were not air defenders. 

Q: How difficult are these radars to replace how are these losses affecting the overall situational awareness, command and control, reaction time and ability to identify and destroy threats?

A: Well, you only have so many radars. There are no radars just sitting around in a motor pool, not being used, except at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where they do the training. That’s the first point. So they’re limited in number. If and when a radar is destroyed, it goes back to that integrated network where there’s potential, depending on proximity and range, that one Patriot battery could actually sense for another Patriot battery. For example, if a radar is destroyed or non-mission capable, say, a technical issue, depending on range, one radar could sense for another battery. 

Same at the battalion level. If you have loss of capability there’s capability where one battalion could provide sensing for another battalion’s launchers. And again, it’s all about being on the network as well – an integrated network of sensors. Coupled with what you’ve probably written and talked to people about – launch-on-remote, engage-on-remote – we have done a lot of that testing and experimentation within the last 10 years. So that is supporting the loss of sensors.

Q: Is there anything we can do to improve defending these systems?

A: Get more systems. We’ve learned so many lessons with what’s going on in Ukraine when it comes to a drone war. There’s persistent surveillance, 24/7. Now you can expect to have eyes on your location if you’re a Ukrainian soldier. Now bring that to the Middle East. You know Ukrainians are producing thousands of drones and counter system capabilities a month and now we’re seeing how that’s impacting the Middle East and the requirements for us and partner nations.

So that’s what we need. We need more capability. There’s always someone that says we need more Patriot. We need more THAAD, we need more Aegis, we need more SM-6s. We need more defensive counter air airframes. I do work in and out of the Middle East. And when you talk to those service members and their leadership, their greatest concerns are Group 3 drones, and we’re seeing it play out in real time.

CCTV footage shows an Israeli soldier throwing a stun grenade into a shop during a night raid near Ramallah.

Former prosecutor at the International Criminal Court Geoffrey Nice says that the US-Israel war on Iran was not based on imminent threat and warns that holding powerful states accountable is ‘unrealistic.’

Iran has launched a round of missiles targeting Israel, causing damage and injuries in Tel Aviv, as uncertainty swirled over possible talks to end the three-week US-Israel war on Iran.

The missiles triggered air raid sirens in Israel on Tuesday, including in Tel Aviv, where gaping holes were torn through a multistorey apartment building. It was not immediately clear whether the damage was caused by a direct hit or debris from an interception.

Israel’s Magen David Adom emergency medical service said: “Six people were lightly injured at four different sites.”

Police in Tel Aviv said they were dealing with “several impact sites of munitions”.

Israel’s National Fire and Rescue Authority said the search was on for people trapped in one building in Tel Aviv, adding that civilians were found in a shelter in another damaged building.

Meanwhile, the Israeli military said on Tuesday that its jets carried out a wave of strikes in central Tehran on Monday, targeting key command centres, including facilities associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ intelligence arm and the Iranian Intelligence Ministry. It said more than 50 additional targets were hit overnight, including ballistic missile storage and launch sites.

Video shows the aftermath of an airstrike in Iraq’s Anbar province on a headquarters of the pro-Iran Popular Mobilisation Forces, where at least ten people were killed during a commanders’ meeting.

Mérida, March 23, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government announced a 45-day electricity saving plan as extreme temperatures and regional outages impact Venezuela’s power grid. 

The announcement, made by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez on Saturday, comes on the heels of recurring blackouts, particularly in western states. 

“We are entering a period where solar radiation will impact our territory directly, intensifying heat and drought across the country,” Rodríguez stated during a televised cabinet meeting with officials responsible for the electricity and infrastructure portfolios.

She explained that the “perpendicular passage” of solar rays would significantly increase energy demand for cooling. Alongside drought forecasts, officials expect a greater strain on Venezuela’s electricity generation and transmission infrastructure.

As part of the contingency plan, the Ministry of Electric Energy is set to publish a protocol urging reduced air-conditioning use other rationing measures. In addition, the government has authorized the deployment of thermal drones to monitor high-temperature areas and prevent forest fires from compromising transmission lines.

In March 2025, the Nicolás Maduro administration implemented a similar electricity-savings plan and was compelled to reduce public sector work hours to half a day to ease demand. While the 2025 measures were temporary, the recurrence of shortages underscores the systemic vulnerabilities of the electric grid.

Last Friday, residents in Zulia, Táchira, Mérida, and Trujillo experienced widespread power outages lasting several hours. Local media outlets in the Andean region reported that some sectors are facing daily rationing of up to four hours. Nationwide electricity fluctuations were likewise registered on Monday, with parts of Caracas suffering temporary outages.

The origins of Venezuela’s electrical instability extend over a decade, culminating in the 2019 widespread nationwide blackouts that authorities blamed on “cyber-sabotage.” The alleged attacks compounded infrastructure hard-hit by years of economic sanctions, as well as underinvestment, inadequate maintenance, and the departure of skilled personnel.

Venezuela’s electric grid remains heavily dependent on the Simón Bolívar Hydroelectric Plant, also known as the Guri Dam, in southeastern Bolívar state, which provides approximately 80 percent of the nation’s power. 

However, the transmission lines stretching from the southeast to the western border are often unable to handle the load, with thermoelectric plants in the region unable to cover the additional demand. Current estimates indicate that while Venezuela has an installed generation capacity of approximately 34 gigawatts (GW), only around 12 to 14 GW are currently operational.

Sanctions and push for private investment

In her Saturday address, Rodríguez reiterated the damage caused by US-led unilateral coercive measures and called for their removal. The Venezuelan acting president argued that sanctions hampered the state’s capacity to procure essential technology and components from international suppliers.

“The blockade has impeded the full recovery of this essential service,” Rodríguez said. “Though we have recovered capacity through our own efforts, sanctions limit our response to a demand that grows alongside the economy.”

The Venezuelan government has also announced plans to scale back state control over the electricity sector in order to attract private investment. Earlier this month, authorities unveiled a “pilot plan” to promote foreign investment into the electric grid, following similar blueprints from the oil industry.

Under the proposed framework, the government aims to update the Organic Law of the Electricity System (LOSSE) to allow private companies to assume control of generation and distribution through joint ventures.

According to the Venezuelan Chamber of Construction (CVC), a preliminary investment of US $1.29 billion could lead to the reincorporation of over 6,300 MW to the grid in two phases. The CVC is specifically promoting a project with the Latin America Development Bank to stabilize 2,000 MW in the central industrial region.

The new electricity management model would allow private actors to take control of specific “industrial nodes,” ensuring a reliable supply for manufacturing while retaining a portion of the proceeds to cover maintenance costs.

However, the immediate focus for the Venezuelan executive remains on electricity rationing. Rodríguez concluded her address by calling for “national consciousness,” urging the public to see energy saving not just as a government mandate, but as a collective necessity to navigate the coming weeks of extreme heat and drought.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Zidane will succeed his former national side teammate Didier Deschamps as France head coach, according to the report.

French football ‌icon Zinedine Zidane has ⁠agreed ⁠to take over his national team’s head coaching duties following this ⁠summer’s FIFA World Cup, ESPN reported on Monday.

Zidane, 53, reportedly ⁠reached a verbal agreement with the Federation Francaise de Football to replace Didier Deschamps, who has held ‌the role since 2012.

Zidane, who managed La Liga powerhouse Real Madrid for two stints (2016-18, 2019-21), has long been expected to eventually become the skipper ⁠for France.

As a player, ⁠the dynamic midfielder won the 1998 Ballon d’Or and was a three-time ⁠FIFA World Player of the Year (1998, ⁠2000 and 2003).

He ⁠helped France win the World Cup in 1998 and finish second in 2006. ‌He was infamously sent off during the final of the latter ‌World ‌Cup when he head-butted Italy’s Marco Materazzi in the chest.