NEWS

China’s Xi Jinping is hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin, just days after welcoming Donald Trump to Beijing. The Chinese leader is set to discuss energy security and trade, while balancing access to European markets, as Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu explains.

The U.S. Air Force says it does not expect the last of its huge C-5M Galaxy cargo planes to be replaced by a Next-Generation Airlift (NGAL) platform until Fiscal Year 2050. This is roughly five years later than the retirement schedule for the C-5M fleet that the service had laid out last year. NGAL is also expected to supplant the C-17A Globemaster III, but the plan is for those aircraft to keep flying through 2075. The C-5s are a vital part of the Air Force’s current strategic airlift force, but they have a long history of being hard to maintain despite major upgrades in the past.

The latest sunset timeline for the Galaxy and details about the near-term plans for NGAL are contained in the Air Force’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request. The service currently has 52 C-5Ms in its inventory, all of which were upgraded from older B and C variants, the last of which were built in 1989. Service through 2050 means the youngest examples will be 61 years old at the time of their retirement. The Air Force also just recently disclosed that the C-5 fleet’s mission capable rate has slumped to 37 percent. The Air Force also has 222 C-17As, the last of which it acquired in 2013. Neither the C-5 nor the C-17 is still in production today.

The C-5M is the largest airlifter in U.S. military service today, and one of the biggest in operational use anywhere globally. In addition to just being able to accommodate much larger payload mass and volume compared to the C-17A, it has the benefit of being able to load cargo and personnel from the nose and tail ends, and do so simultaneously. The Galaxy offers a unique capability within the U.S. military for moving outsized and unusual payloads by air, including satellites and other space-related items. The services of the C-5 remain in high demand, as highlighted by support provided for ongoing operations against Iran, as well as during the build-up to that conflict, along with other contingencies around the Middle East in the past few years.

“In accordance with [the] Air Force’s strategic direction, C-5 Modernization Efforts funding supports Next-Gen Airlift (NGAL) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and Concept Development efforts,” per the service’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget documents. “NGAL is projected to fully replace the C-5M fleet tentatively in FY 2050 and maintain the Strat Air [sic] program floor of 223 C-17 aircraft and 52 C-5 aircraft per the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).”

The Air Force is asking for $8.9 million to support the NGAL AoA and related concept development work through the C-5 Modernization Efforts line in Fiscal Year 2027. This is on top of $200,000 in funding received for NGAL in this part of the budget in the 2027 Fiscal Year. The AoA process offers a means to assess potential options and further refine requirements for new weapon systems and other capabilities.

“NGAL efforts will include but [are] not limited to operational analysis, concept development, and acquisition strategy framework to prepare for Milestone A approval and entry into the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase of a major defense acquisition program,” the budget documents further note.

As mentioned, the Air Force released a strategic airlift strategy document last year that envisioned the C-5Ms being replaced by the mid-2040s.

“With an accelerated NGAL Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) in FY27 [Fiscal Year 2027] and an uninterrupted acquisition process with consistent funding, the first NGAL aircraft could be produced as early as FY38,” the Airlift Recapitalization Strategy document, dated November 18, 2025, said. “It is estimated the NGAL program will reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY41.”

“One NGAL aircraft will replace one C-5M aircraft until the entire C-5M fleet is retired. Then, the C-17A fleet will be replaced by NGAL at a one-for-one swap,” the document added. “Uninterrupted inter-theater airlift capacity is paramount for global operations during fleet recapitalization. Current recapitalization projections require C-5M viability until 2045 and C-17A viability through 2075.”

“We’re working forward on the NGAL to combine the view of the C-5 and the C-17 fleet, and figure out what the next strategic airlifter needs to be,” Air Force Lt. Gen. Rebecca Sonkiss had also told TWZ and other outlets at a roundtable on the sidelines of the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) annual Warfare Symposium in February. “That conversation in my book can’t happen enough, or can’t happen fast enough, candidly.”

Sonkiss is Deputy Commander of Air Mobility Command (AMC). She has been serving as the interim commander of AMC since her predecessor, Gen. John Lamontagne, became Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force in January.

As mentioned, the Air Force’s C-5s are key strategic airlift assets, but are also aging and increasingly difficult to sustain. Keeping the Galaxy fleet flying has already presented significant challenges for years now.

“I’m a year and a half out of the conversation. The last data point I got was from U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) commander Gen. [Randall] Reed‘s congressional testimony, where he said that the mission reliability rate, I believe, had fallen to 46%,” retired Air Force Gen. Michael “Mini” Minihan, who last served as commander of AMC, told TWZ in an interview in February. “So, if that’s true, then it’s still an enormous concern. I don’t know any part of your life where you tolerate a critical capability operating less than half the time when you need it. So C-5s are an enormous concern for me.”

At a hearing before the House Appropriations Committee in April, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach told members of Congress that the C-5’s mission capable rate had fallen to 37 percent, further underscoring these difficulties.

“It has to be,” Lt. Gen. Sonkiss had said at the roundtable in February when asked if it was reasonable to expect the C-5 to remain viable even to 2045.

“Define risk. I’m not trying to be pejorative in here, but what risk would you like me to talk about?” she added when asked about the risks this might entail. “There’s a financial risk to having to sustain an older aircraft. And we’ve shown in the Air Force that we’re capable of doing that. The C-5, we’ve invested a lot of money to keep it on board, and it is, and there is no other aircraft that can provide the capacity that the C-5 does.”

“We’ve shown time and time again that when that aircraft [the C-5] is asked to perform, it does. And so we’ll continue to invest,” she continued. “What I would like to see us do, though, is move forward from having to pour that much money into something old to the pathway to a modernized fleet.”

Especially given Sonkiss’ comments here about the C-5’s unique attributes, questions have also already been raised about the viability of a common replacement for that aircraft and the C-17A. The Globemaster III is also an essential and heavily demanded component of the U.S. strategic airlift force today, but is a very different aircraft with its own distinct capabilities. In particular, the C-17 offers significant short and rough field performance that enables it to bring heavy payloads very far forward for an aircraft of its size, even in the absence of improved runways. It was designed from the outset to transport combat-ready ground units, including tanks and other heavy armor, to landing zones at or at least near the front lines, as well as drop paratroopers into those same areas.

Watch This C-17 Making A Gigantic Dust Cloud – Dry Lake Bed Takeoff

There is also the matter of an ever-expanding threat ecosystem, which the Air Force expects to include anti-air missiles with ranges of up to 1,000 miles by 2050. This will pose increasing challenges to advanced aircraft, let alone non-stealthy and slower-flying types. Key supporting assets, like airlifters and aerial refueling tankers, would also be top targets during any conflict, and even more so in a high-end fight, such as one against China in the Pacific.

One company, Radia, is actively pitching a new airlifter that is bigger than the C-17 and the C-5, and is being designed with a high degree of operational flexibility in mind, to meet the Air Force’s NGAL needs. Development of that aircraft, called Windrunner, originally started with a focus on carrying oversized components for wind turbines, and its projected range is shorter than that of either the Galaxy or Globemaster III. Overall, Windrunner is still in a very aspirational stage, as you can read more about here.

The world’s largest plane is being built to carry wind turbines

Lockheed Martin and Boeing, among others, have also been publicly showing various concepts for advanced transports and tankers in recent years. This includes stealthy types and blended wing body designs. A BWB aircraft could also offer a more limited degree of low-observability (stealthiness) together with significant internal payload capacity.

“I think there are options out there when it comes to large-volume aircraft that exist, that are being worked now, that can help us get capability quickly,” former AMC commander Minihan said in his interview with TWZ earlier this year. “And then I think there are concepts out there, like the commercialization of the C-5 fleet, that need to be taken seriously as well and apply commercial standards, commercial supply chain to increase the readiness of it. And between a combination of those two, I think that you can sustain what America needs to project large volume lift.”

There has also been significant overlap in work on future airlift concepts and potential designs for next-generation aerial refueling tankers, something the Air Force has also been hoping to get into service in the 2040s timeframe. The Air Force’s proposed Fiscal Year 2027 budget shifts work on future aerial refueling capabilities from what had been called the Next Generation Air-refueling System (NGAS) to a new effort dubbed Advanced Tanker Systems.

“We are shifting to what’s called Advanced Tanker Systems,” Air Force Maj. Gen. Frank Verdugo, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Budget, had said during a briefing on the rollout of the service’s latest request last month. “It’s looking to offer more options than just NGAS, and to make sure that our future advanced tanker systems are more resilient and can operate in contested environments.”

What this means for when the Air Force might see a next-generation tanker enter service, and how that might factor into NGAL, is unclear. The service’s current aerial refueling plans include more purchases of KC-46s in the coming years, which will increase the total objective fleet size. Older KC-135s are still expected to remain in service for years to come.

The Air Force’s future airlift strategy also clearly has yet to fully solidify, with the C-5s now set to remain in service into Fiscal Year 2050.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The MQ-9 Reaper has become the latest platform to test-fire laser-guided 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets. The trials, conducted with the U.S. Air Force, involved an MQ-9 employing the APKWS in its original air-to-ground capacity, as well as against aerial targets. While giving MQ-9’s standard APKWS capability against ground targets seems relatively straight forward, putting the air-to-air optimized variant of the rocket on the MQ-9 would open up another option for the counter-uncrewed air system (C-UAS) mission, which has only gained in importance since the war with Iran.

General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI), the manufacturer of the MQ-9, confirmed today that it had conducted recent flight tests of an Air Force MQ-9A armed with APKWS at the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR).

According to the company, “the demonstration featured multiple types and variations of shot profiles, including aerial targets. All shots were executed flawlessly by the MQ-9A crews using laser-guided rockets and a specialized launcher.”

The utility of APKWS against ground targets for the MQ-9 family of drones is abundantly clear. It provides an extremely precise, relatively low-collateral option that can also drastically expand the drone’s magazine depth. Standard APKWS can be used against a large number of ground and surface targets, from lightly armored vehicles to troops under shallow cover.

Redefining Precision with the APKWS® Laser-Guided Rocket

Then there is the air-to-air application. In U.S. military service, the laser-guided air-to-air rocket is known as AGR-20F, a variant of the APKWS II, specifically, also known as the Fixed Wing, Air Launched, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Ordnance (FALCO). In its press release, GA-ASI refers to the rocket simply as APKWS. FALCO includes the modified laser-guidance and control section and a proximity fuze that is ideal for taking down smaller aerial targets. FALCO-equipped rockets can also be used against soft ground targets, like standard vehicles and fast boats.

The test campaign was, in part, a response to “real-time technological adaptation requirements,” GA-ASI explained. The urgent need for C-UAS capabilities saw the trials accelerated, reducing the time between planning, integration, and flight test.

“We recognize the value that a system like APKWS brings to the MQ-9 aircraft as a tool to counter one-way attack drones,” said GA-ASI President David R. Alexander. “APKWS can increase the number of weapons the MQ-9A is able to carry, as well as being able to carry new, lower-cost weapons. More than anything, this integration effort underscores how government and industry can collaborate to rapidly test and make new capabilities available to warfighters.”

Exactly how many APKWS a single MQ-9 can carry is unclear, but the standard pods used for these weapons are loaded with seven rounds, as seen loaded on the MQ-9A involved in the live-fire trials. Nineteen-round rocket pods are also a possibility. The MQ-9 in its standard configuration has seven hardpoints, with six main underwing pylons usually utilized for weapons.

The potential of the MQ-9, or MQ-9 variants, to carry APKWS for the C-UAS role is something that GA-ASI brought up last month.

In particular, the Mojave short takeoff and landing (STOL) drone was earmarked for C-UAS, as part of a broader mission scope for the aircraft.

“We’ve shown APKWS mounted to Mojave in a static display at some of the recent U.S. Army shows where Mojave STOL was present,” General Atomics spokesperson C. Mark Brinkley told TWZ in April. “Integrating new weapons is a multi-part process. Fit tests, weight considerations, captive carry for airworthiness, software, [and] actual live-fire.”

“For Mojave STOL and other GA-ASI aircraft, we’re inside that process now with APKWS,” he added. “It’s flying and firing soon, [in] weeks, not months.”

Meanwhile, GA-ASI presented a CGI video showing the Mojave STOL undertaking the rocket-armed drone-hunter mission “somewhere in the Western Pacific.” In this scenario, the Mojave STOL used an EagleEye multi-mode radar, as well as its infrared sensor in the turret under its nose, to spot and track a pair of kamikaze drones clearly modeled on the Iranian-designed Shahed-136 pattern.

Mojave STOL: Real. Rugged. Ready Today.

The drone is then depicted warning a forward U.S. outpost about incoming uncrewed aerial threats through a satellite link. From a ruggedized laptop on the ground, an operator directs that the kamikaze drones be neutralized. A Mojave equipped with two 19-shot rocket pods then moves in and destroys them. The aircraft is later shown being rearmed at a very austere jungle airstrip.

It is noteworthy that, prior to APKWS, MQ-9s and related drones have demonstrated, during testing, their ability to destroy airborne targets using various other weapons, including AIM-9X and Hellfire missiles.

Meanwhile, APKWS has emerged as an increasingly popular choice in the air-to-air C-UAS role since U.S. Air Force F-16s began employing the rockets this way in combat against Houthi drones in 2024. TWZ was first to report on this development. The total number of U.S. military and foreign aircraft platforms cleared to use a variant of the rocket specifically optimized for air-to-air use continues to grow.

There are advantages and disadvantages to using a drone like the MQ-9 or Mojave STOL as a drone-hunter.

Drones of this kind have questionable survivability in high-end operations. The latest conflict with Iran has underscored the vulnerability of the Reaper, in particular.

On the other hand, TWZ has previously highlighted how a drone like the Mojave could be used to provide more localized force protection, including against uncrewed aerial threats, at forward outposts and rear areas in the context of a larger conflict.

The attributes of the Mojave STOL — including its short- and rough-field capabilities — make it especially relevant for a future conflict in the Pacific. Here, it would be able to push its C-UAS and other capabilities far forward, including to island outposts. As for the MQ-9, as used in the live-fire trials, this aircraft is not rough-field-optimized like the Mojave STOL, but can still operate from forward areas with semi-prepared airstrips.

At the same time, the capabilities inherent in the Mojave STOL mean it can also operate from aircraft carriers and big-deck assault ships, opening up the possibility of rocket-armed examples setting up counter-drone screens in maritime scenarios.

When it comes to the air-to-air APKWS, this weapon is well-suited to slower-flying and less dynamic targets. Compared to traditional air-to-air missiles, it comes with a much lower cost-per-engagement and offers greater magazine depth, as you can read about here.

In terms of finding targets, drones like the MQ-9 and Mojave STOL have limited situational awareness compared to traditional air-to-air platforms. They can be fitted with onboard radar with air-to-air modes, which could serve as a primary detection sensor. So, too, could infrared search and track (IRST) sensors, which have been tested extensively on other GA-ASI drones. Thereafter, the MQ-9’s MTS electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) turret would provide target ID and engagement functions. Taking advantage of tactical networks could also provide the drone with critical initial telemetry to aid in the IR/EO sensor’s lock-up.

It’s also worth noting that drones like the MQ-9 or Mojave STOL are not anywhere near as quick to respond to incoming drone threats, and especially run down multiple incoming hostiles in a short period of time, as fighters. On the other hand, they are able to loiter for far longer at a fraction of the cost, providing resilient combat air patrols. They could also perform strike and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support while on station.

For its part, the MQ-9 offers these capabilities coupled with a higher performance and a more extreme endurance over the Mojave STOL. With hundreds of MQ-9s available, many could be armed with APKWS and tasked to provide anti-drone screening against lower-volume raids across large areas.

Indeed, it could be well imagined how APKWS-armed MQ-9s could have played a valuable role in this context during the conflict with Iran earlier this year, protecting allied Arab gulf states and U.S. installations from incoming one-way attack munitions. An MQ-9 picket line of sorts could have been set up over the Gulf, for instance, thinning incoming drones waves. Or these aircraft could have been perched to the east of major bases, providing a final airborne layer counter-drone defense.

With the MQ-9 and the related MQ-1C Gray Eagle being widely operated by the U.S. military and a number of export customers, the ability to transform these aircraft into rocket-armed drone hunters could be of high interest indeed.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Iran has publicly outlined key elements of its latest peace proposal to the United States, demanding reparations for war damage, the withdrawal of United States forces from areas near Iran, and the lifting of economic sanctions as part of any broader agreement.

According to comments from Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi, the proposal also calls for the release of frozen Iranian assets, an end to restrictions affecting Iranian trade and shipping, and a halt to hostilities across regional conflict zones including Lebanon.

The proposal emerged after United States President Donald Trump announced that he had paused a planned military strike against Iran to allow additional time for negotiations regarding Tehran’s nuclear programme and regional security issues.

Iran Pushes for Broader Regional Settlement

Tehran’s proposal reflects an effort to expand negotiations beyond nuclear issues into wider geopolitical and security concerns across the Middle East.

Iran appears to be seeking a comprehensive arrangement that addresses not only sanctions and military pressure but also the broader regional balance of power involving Lebanon, the Gulf region, and United States military deployments.

The demand for reparations is particularly significant because it frames the recent conflict as an act requiring compensation for damage caused by joint United States and Israeli military operations.

Iranian officials also continue insisting that economic sanctions and frozen overseas assets remain central obstacles to any sustainable agreement.

United States Signals Openness but Maintains Pressure

Trump stated that there was a strong possibility of reaching a deal that would prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons while avoiding renewed military escalation.

However, Washington has not publicly confirmed any major concessions in negotiations. Reports suggesting the United States may release a portion of frozen Iranian funds or allow limited peaceful nuclear activity under international supervision remain unverified by American officials.

At the same time, United States officials continue denying claims that sanctions on Iranian oil exports would be fully waived during negotiations.

The situation reflects a complex diplomatic balancing act in which Washington seeks to maintain leverage while preventing a wider regional conflict that could destabilise global energy markets and military alliances.

Regional Powers Push for De Escalation

Regional governments including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates reportedly urged Trump to delay military action in hopes that negotiations could succeed.

The involvement of regional mediators highlights growing concern across the Gulf about the economic and security consequences of another large scale conflict involving Iran.

The Strait of Hormuz remains especially important because it serves as one of the world’s most critical shipping routes for oil and energy exports. Any escalation threatening maritime trade could have severe consequences for global energy prices and economic stability.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has reportedly continued acting as a communication channel between Tehran and Washington after previously hosting peace talks between the two sides.

Ongoing Tensions Despite Ceasefire

Although a ceasefire has largely held since the suspension of major hostilities earlier this year, tensions remain extremely high across the region.

Iran and its regional allies continue facing accusations of supporting drone activity and proxy operations targeting Gulf states and Israeli interests. At the same time, Iran maintains that it has survived military pressure without abandoning its nuclear capabilities, missile programmes, or regional alliances.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Trump previously justified military operations as necessary to weaken Iran’s nuclear programme and reduce its influence through allied militias across the Middle East.

However, analysts note that Iran still retains significant strategic capabilities despite extensive military strikes and economic sanctions.

Analysis

Iran’s latest proposal demonstrates that Tehran is attempting to negotiate from a position of resilience rather than surrender.

By demanding reparations, sanctions relief, and troop withdrawals, Iran is signalling that it expects recognition of its regional influence and strategic endurance despite months of conflict and economic pressure. The proposal also reflects Tehran’s broader objective of reducing the long term military presence of the United States near its borders.

For Washington, the negotiations present a difficult challenge. The United States wants to prevent Iran from advancing toward nuclear weapons capability while avoiding another prolonged regional war that could damage global markets, strain military resources, and increase political pressure at home.

The talks are also shaped by wider geopolitical realities. Gulf states increasingly prioritise regional stability and economic security, making them more supportive of diplomacy than direct military confrontation. Rising energy prices and fears of shipping disruptions further increase international pressure for a negotiated outcome.

At the same time, deep mistrust continues to define relations between both sides. The United States remains sceptical of Iran’s regional ambitions, while Tehran sees sanctions and military deployments as tools of long term containment.

Ultimately, the negotiations reveal a broader struggle over the future balance of power in the Middle East. Even if temporary agreements are reached, the underlying strategic rivalry between Iran, the United States, and Israel is unlikely to disappear in the near future.

With information from Reuters.

Workers represented by a local union say ICE presence would create a climate of fear during the FIFA World Cup 2026.

Workers at the SoFi Stadium in Los Angeles have decided to go on strike if federal immigration enforcement agents are deployed at the venue when it hosts FIFA World Cup matches in June and July.

The UNITE HERE Local 11 – a labour union representing some 2,000 hospitality employees – on Monday demanded federal guarantees that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would not be used during the matches scheduled at the stadium.

The venue, which will be known as the Los Angeles Stadium during the tournament, will host eight World Cup games, including the opening fixture for the United States on June 12.

Workers at the world’s most expensive sports arena say the ICE presence would create a climate of fear for themselves and for fans.

“ICE should have no role in these games,” said Isaac Martinez, a stadium cook, at a protest outside the venue.

“We do not want to live in fear coming to work, or fear being detained going home.”

“If we do not reach an agreement, my colleagues and I are ready to strike,” Martinez added, speaking on behalf of a workforce composed largely of food and beverage concession staff.

ICE has led the charge in President Donald Trump’s immigration crackdown.

Human rights groups have condemned the agency for its conduct during raids in several US cities, including Los Angeles last year.

In early 2026, ICE agents fatally shot two American protesters in Minneapolis.

Workers on Monday also raised alarms over FIFA’s accreditation process, which requires employees to submit personal data before the tournament, which runs from June 11 to July 19 across the US, Canada and Mexico.

“We ask FIFA not to share our information with ICE agencies, foreign countries, or intelligence services,” worker Yolanda Fierro said.

Protesters carrying plastic balls and signs reading “Kick ICE Out of the World Cup” drew support from Tom Steyer, a Democratic candidate in California’s gubernatorial race.

ICE’s mandate is border control, the financier-turned-politician said.

“Can anyone explain what that has to do with the World Cup? Nothing,” Steyer said.

“How is it possible that this is the agency that is going to be here when we know in fact they’re an absolute threat, a lawless threat, to workers in California?”

Victor Wembanyama outduelled Shai Gilgeous-Alexander to lead the San Antonio Spurs to an epic 122-115 double-overtime triumph over the Oklahoma City Thunder in game one of the NBA Western Conference finals.

Wembanyama scored 41 points and pulled down 24 rebounds in the thrilling game on Monday. He forced the second overtime with a dazzling three-pointer and delivered nine of the Spurs’ 14 points in the second overtime as San Antonio handed the defending champions their first defeat of these playoffs.

“It was, like, sheer willpower,” 22-year-old Wembanyama told broadcaster NBC after the game.

The French star played 49 minutes, producing a pair of dunks and a crucial block late in the second overtime to seal the victory.

With the triumph at Oklahoma City’s Paycom Center, the Spurs stole home-court advantage in the best-of-seven series that will send the winners to the NBA Finals.

Gilgeous-Alexander’s MVP motivates Wembanyama

Wembanyama admitted the sight of Thunder star Gilgeous-Alexander receiving his second straight Most Valuable Player trophy before the game made the clash more personal “for sure”.

He earned Defensive Player of the Year honours but finished third in the MVP voting announced on Sunday.

Spurs coach Mitch Johnson said the sight of Gilgeous-Alexander lifting the MVP award “100 percent” motivated his star.

“He’s competitive,” Johnson said. “If you’re a competitor and you see another competitor get rewarded with what you want.”

But Wembanyama said the main message of the night was that the young Spurs “are ready to go in any environment, in any place, against anybody”.

“And even though we’ve still got a lot to learn, our effort should be over anybody else’s and tonight we were relentless.”

Rookie Dylan Harper, starting in place of injured De’Aaron Fox, scored 24 points and snagged seven steals for San Antonio. Stephon Castle added 17 points and 11 assists as the Spurs extended their season dominance of the Thunder.

Oklahoma City, trying to become the first team to repeat as champions since Golden State in 2017 and 2018, piled up a league-best 64 regular-season wins but dropped four of five contests against the Spurs, who won 62 regular-season games to return to the playoffs for the first time since 2019.

Gilgeous-Alexander was limited to 24 points, shaking off a sluggish start to key the Thunder’s bid to rally from a 10-point fourth-quarter deficit.

‘Wasn’t able to bring my best game’

Alex Caruso scored 31 points to lead the Thunder and Jalen Williams returned from a six-game injury absence to score 26.

Oklahoma City trailed by 10 in the fourth quarter, but the Thunder clawed back, and it was knotted at 99-99 with 33.2 seconds left when Wembanyama spun in for a basket that put San Antonio up 101-99.

Gilgeous-Alexander then tied it up with a layup and Chet Holmgren blocked Wembanyama’s potential game-winner at the buzzer.

Gilgeous-Alexander’s dunk put the Thunder up 108-105 with 57.6 seconds left in the first overtime.

But Wembanyama drilled a transition three-pointer to tie it, and they went to the second extra session.

“I know what my teammates are capable of, what we’re capable of as a team when we bring it,” Gilgeous-Alexander said. “It’s just unfortunate I wasn’t able to bring my best game tonight.

“But that’s how it goes sometimes … you’ve got to roll with the punches, don’t get discouraged and stay true to who you are.”

The Thunder, who swept the Phoenix Suns and LeBron James’s Los Angeles Lakers in the first two rounds, will try to bounce back when they host game two on Wednesday before the series shifts to San Antonio for games three and four on Friday and Saturday.

The series winners will face either the New York Knicks or the Cleveland Cavaliers in the NBA Finals.

Police fired tear gas at protesters in La Paz as miners and unions marched on the presidential palace, demanding that President Rodrigo Paz step down over a worsening fuel shortage and economic crisis.

When the ancient Greek historian Thucydides chronicled the Peloponnesian War, he did not write only about the clash between Athens and Sparta. He documented the fate of the small city-states caught between them in 431BC. Corcyra and Potidaea, neutral territories with no grand strategy of their own, were crushed, annexed, or forced into allegiance as the two great powers dragged the entire Greek world into conflict.

Thucydides famously wrote that it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable. Yet for the smaller states, there was no trap to escape. There was only destruction when great powers fought. This forgotten truth frames the most dangerous bilateral relationship on earth today.

When President Xi Jinping invoked the Thucydides Trap during his May 2026 summit with President Donald Trump in Beijing, he framed it as a question between two great powers asking whether China and the US can rise above the so-called Thucydides Trap and create a new framework for major-power relations. The concept was popularized by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, who identified sixteen historical cases over the past five hundred years where a rising power challenged an established one, with twelve ending in war. Allison’s framework casts China as the rising Athens and the US as the established Sparta. It centers on whether these two great powers can avoid destroying each other, while leaving less examined what happens to the smaller states caught in between. At the summit, President Xi warned that if mishandled the two countries could clash or even enter into conflict, leading the entire China-US relationship into a highly dangerous scenario. He emphasized that the Taiwan issue is the most critical matter in their bilateral relation, implicitly acknowledging that miscalculation could materialize the very trap he warned against.

The competition between the US and China has grown far beyond trade into something that locks other countries into its orbit. What started as a tariff dispute has become overlapping conflicts across technology, finance, energy, and data governance, each one reinforcing the others and closing off neutral ground. This creates a situation close to a legal Catch-22 where China’s Ministry of Commerce used its blocking statute for the first time in May 2026 against US sanctions and put multinational companies in a position where following Washington’s extraterritorial rules meant breaking Beijing’s laws and following Beijing’s rules meant breaking Washington’s. This is not a byproduct of the competition but is becoming the competition itself.

US bans on advanced semiconductors and AI chips combined with Chinese limits on gallium, germanium, and rare earths along with rival payment systems like China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), which provides cross-border payment services to more than 5,000 banking institutions across 190 countries and regions as an alternative to Western banking rails and clashing visions of internet sovereignty have built up into a tightly connected system where doing business globally increasingly means either choosing a side or paying escalating costs for staying neutral, with the heaviest pressure in tech and finance while other domains retain more space for hedging. These costs hit hardest not the US or China but the countries and firms that have no power over either. China-US trade, technology, and regulatory pressures have repeatedly spilled over into third countries, and Southeast Asia has often been caught in the middle. Vietnam has faced US scrutiny over goods assembled with Chinese-linked inputs, Cambodia experienced significant trade diversion during the 2018 US-China trade war, Malaysia came under pressure to tighten controls on semiconductor shipments, and Singapore has had to navigate the compliance burdens created by competing US and Chinese rules.

More broadly, small states across the globe must navigate between two major powers, leaning toward China for economic reasons and toward the US for security reasons. ASEAN has long relied on non-alignment and hedging to preserve, and of course expand, room to maneuver if possible, but intensifying US-China competition is narrowing that room. Some states have turned rivalry into opportunity. Vietnam has attracted manufacturing shifts and foreign investment as companies diversify supply chains away from China. India, Gulf states, and others actively play both sides or carve strategic niches, extracting economic benefits while maintaining security partnerships. Yet these adaptive strategies have limits, and the space for maneuvering narrows as competition intensifies, leaving smaller states with growing pressure, higher compliance costs, and reduced autonomy.

The relationship between China and the US remains the world’s most dangerous bilateral relationship not because President Xi and President Trump might make war on each other but because small countries worldwide will be the first casualties when that war comes or even when competition intensifies. The real Thucydides Trap is not whether America and China can avoid war with each other but whether small states can survive the rivalry even if both of them somehow manage peaceful coexistence. As fence sitting becomes tense and the legal arms race traps countries in impossible dilemmas, more countries face choices that progressively erode the strategic autonomy they have long relied on. Thucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian War with eyes on all participants including the allies of Athens and Sparta who became victims of the trap. The lesson from ancient Greece is very clear that when great powers fight the weak do not survive, and the stories of Corcyra and Potidaea matter just as much as the struggle between Athens and Sparta.

When Athens and Sparta finally went to war, the first thing that died was the freedom of everyone caught between them. The US and China may or may not escape their trap but regional powers, developing nations, and many other small countries already know themselves to be inside it.

Foad Izadi of Tehran University says US President Trump’s repeated threats of renewed full-scale war are a sign of weakness, coming after 37 days of US bombing failed to force Iran into capitulation.

In the northwest corner of the United States, Oregon has fostered a reputation as a left-wing stronghold. Since the 1980s, the Beaver State has consistently elected Democrats in most of its statewide races.

But even in a comfortably blue state like Oregon, the fight to hold onto political power can be competitive.

On Tuesday, the state will hold its latest primary races, with each of the major parties picking its nominees for November’s midterm elections.

But a packed field of roughly 25 contenders, both Democrats and Republicans, is jockeying to replace Tina Kotek as she seeks a second term as governor.

Tuesday’s vote could also serve as an economic bellwether. Voters will weigh in on a referendum that could repeal a state fuel tax, as the US-Israel war on Iran heaps strain on consumers at the gas pump.

Who is running? And which races have attracted the most attention? We tackle those questions and more in this brief explainer.

What time do polls open?

Polls will open on Tuesday at 7am Pacific US time (15:00 GMT) and close at 8pm (4:00 GMT).

Who is running for governor?

Incumbent Governor Kotek is making a bid for a second four-year term. But she is fielding competition from dozens of other candidates, including nine Democrats.

Going into the Democratic primary, Kotek is the frontrunner. Her challengers include a children’s book author, the leader of an Indigenous nonprofit and an inventor who hopes to address water shortages.

Even more contenders are angling for the Republican gubernatorial nomination.

Among them is State Senator Christine Drazan, who ran against Kotek in 2022. Drazan has been critical of President Donald Trump’s tariff policies but supportive of his tough stance on immigration.

Also on the Republican ballot is former NBA player Chris Dudley, who was the Republican gubernatorial candidate in 2010. He had the smallest losing margin of any Republican candidate in decades.

State Representative Ed Diehl, meanwhile, is hoping to capitalise on the momentum he gained after leading the charge to block Kotek’s gas tax and fee increase package.

What are the opinion polls saying about the governor’s race?

Polls show Drazan leading the race to receive the Republican nomination, with 35 percent support.

Kotek is likely to grab an easy victory in the Democratic primary, with none of her opponents polling close behind.

What about the Senate race?

Another Democratic incumbent attempting to hold onto his seat is US Senator Jeff Merkley.

The 69-year-old, who began his career working on affordable housing, is running for a fourth consecutive six-year term. He first took office in 2009.

But while the senator faces eight rivals on the campaign trail – one Democrat and seven Republicans – his seat is considered relatively safe.

He is expected to win the Democratic primary on Tuesday and become the frontrunner for November’s general election.

What other positions are up for grabs?

All six of Oregon’s members of the US House of Representatives are running for re-election and will face the primary process on Tuesday.

Five are Democrats. One, Cliff Bentz, is a Republican, and he represents Oregon’s second congressional district, a sprawling area encompassing the entire eastern half of the state.

Also on Tuesday, voters will choose their party representatives in races for the state Senate and House.

The election will also determine a nonpartisan commissioner to lead the state Bureau of Labor and Industries.

Why does this race matter?

Oregon is a closed primary state, meaning that voters choose nominees only for the party they are registered under.

Given the state’s left-wing bent, the winners of the statewide Democratic primaries will likely emerge as frontrunners in November’s midterm races.

Still, there is room for surprise. According to state voter rolls, less than 25 percent of Oregonians are registered Republicans. But only 32 percent are registered Democrats, with the largest proportion of voters identifying as “non-affiliated” with any party.

Primary races in right-leaning areas like Oregon’s second congressional district could signify how closely the state’s Republican politicians want to align with President Trump.

Voters will also have a chance to vote on the referendum that could repeal the gas tax increase on Tuesday’s ballot.

Democrats in the state legislature raised Oregon’s gas tax to pay for roads and supplement the state’s transportation budget.

But as the US-Israel war on Iran causes gas prices to skyrocket, Republicans have used the referendum to appeal to voters on the cost of living. Gas is now averaging about 80 cents more in Oregon.

In addition, there are nearly 100 local measures sprinkled on ballots across the state, tailored to different counties. Many will focus on funding local fire departments, schools and libraries.

When are results expected?

Preliminary results are expected on Tuesday evening, shortly after polls close at 8pm local time.

But ballots will continue to arrive after election day, as mail-in votes and provisional ballots are counted, and some races may not be officially called until days later.

Caracas, May 17, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – The Venezuelan government turned over former minister and diplomatic envoy Alex Saab to the US to face charges on Saturday.

The executive led by Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced the “deportation of Colombian citizen Alex Saab Morán” through a statement issued by the Administrative Service for Identification, Migration, and Immigration (SAIME).

The statement said the measure was adopted “taking into consideration that [Saab] is implicated in various crimes in the United States of America, as is publicly known and widely reported.”

According to local media reports, Saab was transferred under custody from the El Helicoide detention center in Caracas to Simón Bolívar International Airport in Maiquetía, where a US government airplane was waiting for him. The operation reportedly involved agents from the FBI and the CIA, under the supervision of the US Justice and State Departments.

EFE confirmed Saab’s arrival at Opa-locka Airport in Miami-Dade County at 9:15 p.m. local time, escorted by Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) personnel. Footage of his arrival showed him placing his fingerprints on a biometric scanner upon entering the airport terminal. 

US authorities have yet to issue a public statement on Saab’s detention. The charges against Saab reportedly include criminal conspiracy, money laundering, and bribery of Venezuelan officials. According to the indictment filed in the Southern District Court of Florida, he is accused of having falsified documents and used intermediaries to facilitate international transfers of public funds.

Rumors of Saab’s detention in Caracas, allegedly at Washington’s request, began to circulate in February, with Venezuelan authorities offering no confirmation or denial on his status and whereabouts.

A Colombian-born businessman who later received Venezuelan citizenship, Saab was previously detained on US charges in 2020, during a plane refueling stop in Cape Verde while on a trip to Tehran to negotiate food and fuel imports amid shortages in Venezuela. He was charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering.

Saab’s arrest and subsequent forced departure to US soil saw the Nicolás Maduro administration launch a significant effort to denounce the “kidnapping” of a government diplomatic envoy and demand his release. The “Free Alex Saab” campaign saw Venezuelan authorities and international solidarity movements organize multiple demonstrations and digital campaigns demanding the envoy’s liberation from US custody.

In 2021, Venezuelan National Assembly President and lead negotiator Jorge Rodríguez suspended a dialogue process with the Venezuelan opposition in Mexico following what he described as “the brutal aggression against Saab’s diplomatic status,” insisting at the time that Venezuela would exhaust “all available legal and diplomatic resources” to secure his release.

The Maduro government secured Saab’s return in December 2023, with US President Joe Biden granting him a presidential pardon, as part of a prisoner exchange. Venezuelan authorities released 10 US citizens, including two former Green Berets who had taken part in a failed mercenary incursion. The Venezuelan government hailed Saab’s release as a “victory of truth and dignity.”

He was appointed president of the International Center for Productive Investment (CIIP) in January 2024 and minister of industry in October 2024. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez replaced him in both posts in January, three weeks after the US military strikes and kidnapping of President Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

Saab’s wife, Camilla Fabri, was likewise removed from her government responsibilities as communications vice-minister and head of the “Return to the Homeland” migrant return program.

During his prior detention, Saab’s legal team argued that the Barranquilla-born businessman had acquired Venezuelan nationality and was entitled to diplomatic immunity as a government special envoy. His Venezuelan citizenship allowed him not only to serve as minister, but also to vote in the 2024 presidential elections. Under Article 69 of Venezuela’s Constitution, Venezuelan citizens cannot be extradited.

However, the SAIME communiqué refers to Saab exclusively as a Colombian citizen, without explaining the legal procedure for his removal from the country. Likewise, the statement frames the move as a “deportation” rather than an extradition, although Saab was immediately flown to US territory. At the time of writing, there has been no judicial sentence publicly issued to approve the surrender of the former minister to US authorities.

Edited by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.

Ukraine has provided imagery of its first homegrown glide bomb, which it says is now ready for combat. Developments by both sides in the Ukraine conflict underscore the fact that standoff munitions of all kinds are in particularly high demand, to counter the increasing density and lethality of enemy air defenses.

According to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Mykhailo Fedorov, the development of the weapon — the name of which hasn’t been revealed — took 17 months. A product of Brave1, the defense tech arm of the Ukrainian government, the weapon is said to carry a 250-kilogram (551-pound) warhead, to which is attached a wing kit and some kind of guidance system, the nature of which has not been disclosed.

In a statement today, Brave1 said the glide bomb “has completed all required trials,” and has now been declared ready for combat. The weapon is said to be able to hit targets “dozens of kilometers behind enemy lines.”

With the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense having placed a first order, pilots are now said to be training with the weapon, meaning that combat deployment is “imminent.”

Ukrainian authorities claim that the weapon was designed from scratch and was “not copied from Western or Soviet systems.”

An accompanying video shows the release of the weapon from a Ukrainian Air Force Su-24 Fencer swing-wing attack jet. The bomb is then seen with its range-extending wings deployed; interestingly, these are seen extended immediately after release. Otherwise, the weapon also features notably large cruciform tailfins. The apparent lugs seen under the body of the munitions suggest that, like Russian glide bombs, the weapon ‘topples over’ to assume the correct profile before the wings deploy.

We have reached out to Brave1 for more details on the glide bomb.

It is also worth noting that a previous video, from August 2024, showed another type of air-launched munition, apparently also homegrown, being released from a Ukrainian Su-24, as you can read about here.

Again, we have reached out to Brave1 to better understand if there is any relationship between these weapons. However, the development of the new weapon officially began in December of 2024, several months after the mystery munition appeared.

As for the Ukrainian Air Force, the new glide bomb should provide an important addition to Western-supplied weapons in this class.

Ukraine already employs the Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) and AASM-250 Hammer bomb supplied by the United States and France, respectively. The Ukrainian Air Force also makes extensive use of the U.S.-supplied Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), which also has pop-out wings.

At the same time, the new weapon helps Ukraine match similar weapons that are proliferating in the Russian inventory. The Russian Aerospace Forces have, for several years now, been making extensive use of increasingly larger dumb bombs fitted with add-on precision guidance kits. Russia has also been working to refine its glide bombs, making them more effective than the original, fairly crude designs.

Based on Ukraine’s experience with its expanding roster of longer-range kamikaze drones and glide bombs currently in service with both sites, a satellite navigation-assisted inertial guidance system would be used to direct the glide bomb to a specific set of coordinates. Additional seekers are possible, but not probable at this time.

It is not clear if the new Ukrainian weapon has any kind of powerplant. Ukraine has already been employing multiple types of jet-powered kamikaze drones. More importantly, Ukraine’s French-supplied Hammer precision-guided bombs also feature a rocket booster. This feature is of unique utility for Ukraine, which often slings its glide bombs via pop-up launch profiles from low level executed by its fighter and attack aircraft. This is due to the extremely heavy air defenses near the front lines. Even without a motor, however, the weapon provides an important capability and one that is increasingly important as stocks of Western-supplied munitions are eroded or their supply is otherwise interrupted.

A video compilation provides a look at the French-made Hammer munition being used by Ukrainian Su-25 attack jets, including low-level toss bombing:

ЖАБА. ЗСУ Су-25 . З Новим роком , друзі !

We will likely have to wait to see the weapon in action before establishing whether it can be launched from platforms other than the Su-24, although this would seem almost guaranteed.

While Ukraine’s Su-24s are the country’s launch platforms for stealthy Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles provided by the United Kingdom and France, its MiG-29 Fulcrums and Su-27 Flankers have been the primary carriers for other Western-supplied air-launched precision air-to-ground munitions like the JDAM-ER, SDB, and Hammer bombs, as well as AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM). The size of the weapon would allow it to be carried by any of these platforms, as well as Su-25 Frogfoot attack jets, which also deliver Hammers.

Whatever the launch platforms and the new weapon’s exact capabilities, its biggest advantage is that it offers a domestic source of air-launched precision-guided munitions with some kind of standoff range. The longer-range Storm Shadows and SCALP-EGs were provided only in relatively limited quantities to Ukraine. They can only be launched by the Su-24 and are reserved for more strategic targets.

Meanwhile, the JDAM-ER has never been in widespread use with the U.S. military or other foreign armed forces, so the quantities available are questionable.

To help meet the shortfall, the U.S. Air Force launched a project to develop a new, relatively low-cost precision-guided air-launched standoff munition focused primarily on meeting Ukrainian demands for weapons of this kind. In August of last year, it was reported that Washington had approved the transfer of thousands of these Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAM) to Ukraine. As well as the Rusty Dagger from Zone 5 Technologies, CoAspire developed the Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile (RAACM) under the ERAM program. 

However, evidence of these weapons being employed by Ukraine has yet to emerge.

There is also the fact that a domestically developed standoff weapon can be used without restriction against any kind of target. Previously, longer-ranged Western-supplied weapons have come with restrictions on their employment. As a result, Ukrainian officials have repeatedly and publicly called for more flexibility in striking targets inside Russia proper. This became especially critical during the Ukrainian incursion into the latter country’s Kursk region.

The apparent rapid pace of development of Ukraine’s first homegrown glide bomb suggests that this is an urgent requirement and one that may well have been driven by problems in the availability of equivalent Western munitions. With that in mind, combined with claims that the weapon is now ready for combat, we may not have to wait too long for evidence of it being used in action.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Imagery has emerged that appears to show a previously unknown two-seat version of the Sukhoi Su-57 Felon, Russia’s most modern and capable fighter. Provided the available photo is legitimate, and there is nothing obvious to suggest otherwise, at this point, the Russian development would parallel China’s work on a two-seat version of the stealthy J-20. While the exact role of China’s two-seat J-20S remains the subject of debate, it is noteworthy that Russia’s use of dual-seat tactical jets is well-established, as is China’s, and that Sukhoi had previously drafted a two-seat Felon specifically for an Indian requirement.

The apparent first publicly available photo of the two-seat Su-57 appeared on the Fighterbomber Telegram channel, which has close ties to the Russian Aerospace Forces. The same account claims that the aircraft is now undergoing taxi trials.

The most prominent modification to the aircraft is a redesigned forward fuselage, with a tandem two-seat cockpit that is broadly similar to that on the Su-30 Flanker family and on the two-seat Su-27UB Flanker-C. As on the Su-30, the rear seat is positioned significantly higher than the front one, providing a much better view forward from the rear cockpit.

The background of the photo has been blurred, so the location cannot be identified. Typically, tests of this kind would take place at Zhukovsky, near Moscow, the major hub for Russian experimental aerospace testing.

Some reports suggest that this new version of the Felon is designated Su-57D or Su-57UB, but this remains unconfirmed. In a Russian aerospace context, the suffix D would normally denote long range, while UB signifies a combat trainer.

There have been suggestions that the two-seat Su-57 might have been built using an existing single-seat Felon airframe, namely one of the prototypes, T-50-5R.

With no previous reports that Sukhoi was actively working on a two-seat version of the Su-57, the aircraft’s appearance now is all the more intriguing.

However, back in 2023, details of a patent emerged for a “multifunctional two-seat low-observable tactical aircraft,” with plans published showing a two-seat Su-57. According to Russian media reports, the planned two-seat aircraft is intended for “acting as an airborne command post for network-oriented operations of mixed groups of aircraft.” This is a concept that actually dates all the way back to when the Su-30 was first drafted at the end of the Soviet era. At the same time, the patent points to the utility of such an aircraft for crew training. Regardless, the accompanying illustration looks very similar to the two-seat Felon we see in the image from Fighterbomber.

As far as the Russian Aerospace Forces are concerned, only 76 Su-57s (presumed to be single-seaters) are on order. This is a surprisingly low number, with Moscow instead having chosen to invest in the cheaper and well-proven Su-35S and Su-30SM/M2 families of tactical fighters. The Su-57 first appeared, then in T-50 pre-production form, a decade and a half ago.

The idea that Russia might be seeking a combat trainer to help convert pilots to the Su-57 seems very unlikely, especially considering the small number of frontline Felon fighters currently planned. Stealth fighters have dropped the two seat trainer companion concept from the Cold War era. The extreme focus of signature control, high cost of the aircraft, higher levels of automation, as well as enhancements in simulated training over the years, have spurred this.

It may be that Sukhoi is seeking to promote a two-seat combat version of the Su-57 as a direct successor to the twin-seat Su-30SM/M2. These aircraft are widely used by the Russian Aerospace Forces for both long-range air defense and ground attack/strike, two roles for which Russia has long prized having an extra crewmember on board.

There is also the fact that the two-seat Su-57 is intended to operate alongside loyal wingman drones, specifically the Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik-B (Hunter-B) flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV).

The emergence of crewed-uncrewed teaming will be greatly enabled by a second person acting as a ‘mission commander’ of sorts. In this case, they would occupy the rear seat of the Su-57 and help control uncrewed systems, coordinating tactics with them near the forward edges of the fight. It is in this capacity that the two-seat version of China’s J-20 is widely expected to operate.

There have already been signs that the Su-57 and S-70 programs are directly linked, including ‘loyal wingmen’ cooperative testing. A two-seat Felon would offer a much more suitable platform for this kind of teaming to be taken further. It is perhaps no coincidence that one of the vertical fins of the two-seat Su-57 carries the silhouette of an apparent S-70.

Первый совместный полет БЛА «Охотник» и истребителя Су-57

As well as the S-70, the tail marking also appears to show the Sukhoi Su-75 Checkmate fighter, the S-71 stealthy air-launched missile, and some other kind of munition, perhaps generic.

This marking may well suggest that the two-seat fighter is intended to work in conjunction with all of these platforms, to various degrees, forming a new family of Russian air combat systems. This would be in line with a similar kind of tail markings we have seen on single-seat Felons, including the aircraft that was involved during previous cooperative testing with the Okhotnik-B.

Of course, a two-seat Su-57 would potentially be able to provide the Russian Aerospace Forces with a platform that can undertake all these roles: long-range air defense, ground attack/strike, drone controller, and combat trainer.

The two-seat Felon is very likely also being aimed at the export market. There would also be a precedent here, in the shape of India.

Back in 2003, Russia and India signed a letter of intent concerning the joint development of the Prospective Multirole Fighter (PMF), commonly referred to in India as the Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA).

In 2010, a contract was signed covering the preliminary design of the PMF, to be jointly developed by Sukhoi and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) of India on the basis of what was then known as the T-50 — the prototype of the Su-57 Felon.

Notably, the Indian Air Force wanted a two-seat PMF.

It’s not clear how far Sukhoi progressed on a two-seat PMF to meet the Indian requirement, but the result would have looked very much like the two-seat Felon now apparently under test.

This was all academic, however, since India walked away from the PMF in 2018. This followed an embarrassing incident, in which the fifth prototype T-50 caught fire on the runway at Zhukovsky, reportedly in full view of an Indian delegation.

Nevertheless, Moscow has continued to push the Su-57 for India, as that country struggles with acquiring new advanced fighters and fielding them in the required numbers.

At the same time, Russia has sought to kickstart the Felon program by finding other export customers for the Su-57E version.

So far, only Algeria has confirmed, via its state-run media, that it has bought the Su-57E, as we discussed at the time. It appears that two aircraft have already been delivered to the North African nation, out of a possible total of 14.

That creepy high pitched tone of Algeria’s Sukhoi Su-57E fighter jets. Algeria is currently the only country in Africa to operate 5th Gen stealth fighters. They have already received two Sukhoi Su‑57 aircraft and plans to acquire an additional 12 units. The Algerian Air Force is… pic.twitter.com/QLLDZNhaco

— Defense News Nigeria (@DefenseNigeria) March 16, 2026

Being able to offer a two-seat Felon could well attract more foreign interest, especially customers that might be looking to acquire members of the Su-30 family, or who might be looking to replace these same aircraft.

Potentially, Sukhoi might choose to combine the two-seat Felon with the improvements incorporated in the long-promised Su-57M. Also known as the ‘second stage’ Su-57, the Su-57M would be powered by the new AL-51F-1 (izdeliye 30) turbofan engine, replacing the current AL-41F-1, with increased thrust, lighter weight, and lower operating costs, as well as other advanced features. As you can read about here, Sukhoi has also unveiled a new type of thrust-vectoring engine nozzle for the aircraft, intended to improve the low-observable features of the Felon.

Still, adding another seat to the Su-57 will cause an impact on performance. Range could be decreased due to reduced internal fuel load, and the aircraft’s general performance, including speed and turning capabilities, could also suffer. Its radar signature, especially from the critical frontal aspect, will be affected as well. At the same time, the Su-57 is not a very low-observable aircraft, or even close to it. It was designed around a different philosophy than Western fifth-generation fighter aircraft, which took limitations in low-observable technologies and cost into heavy consideration. You can read more about this here.

The absence of Russian interest in buying more Felons has meant the Su-57M program has progressed only very slowly.

Getting more export customers would provide a huge boost to the Su-57 and would also help the Russian military.

Foreign investment is vital to speed the development of the Felon. The same was true in the late 1990s when India’s purchase of the Su-30MKI Flanker essentially secured the development of the multirole version of this fighter, which was only later acquired by Russia. On the other hand, any export customer would be taking a big risk due to the war with Ukraine and its impact on the Russian aerospace and defense industry, as well as its geopolitical standing.

While we await more imagery and details of the latest iteration of the Su-57 Felon, it is certainly noteworthy that a two-seat version of another fifth-generation fighter now appears to have broken cover.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

President Donald Trump on Monday said he called off a new round of airstrikes he claimed were set for tomorrow. In a post on his social media outlet, Trump said he made the decision at the best of Gulf Arab allies because of improving efforts to end the war. 

“I have been asked by the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, and the President of the United Arab Emirates, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, to hold off on our planned Military attack of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was scheduled for tomorrow, in that serious negotiations are now taking place,” Trump proclaimed on Truth Social, adding that, “in their opinion, as Great Leaders and Allies, a Deal will be made, which will be very acceptable to the United States of America, as well as all Countries in the Middle East, and beyond.”

“This Deal will include, importantly, NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR IRAN!” the president emphasized. “Based on my respect for the above mentioned Leaders, I have instructed Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, The Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Daniel Caine, and The United States Military, that we will NOT be doing the scheduled attack of Iran tomorrow, but have further instructed them to be prepared to go forward with a full, large scale assault of Iran, on a moment’s notice, in the event that an acceptable Deal is not reached.”

However, as Axios reporter Barak Ravid noted, “Trump has extended deadlines and postponed planned attacks on Iran at least half a dozen times since the war began.”

So it remains to be seen whether this latest statement has any merit or if it is another effort to kick the can down the road.

Trump’s latest claim about the war highlights the ever-changing narrative of events. Earlier in the day, Axios reported that Iran had given an updated proposal for a deal to end the war, “but the White House believes it is not a meaningful improvement and is insufficient for a deal,” citing a senior U.S. official and a source briefed on the situation.

At issue is the future of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and specifically their stockpile of enriched uranium. Trump’s bottom line is that Iran needs to give up any and all future nuclear ambitions, and the enriched uranium it already has, while the Iranians maintain they have the right to enrich uranium and will not hand over any of their existing material. Tehran’s control of the Strait, its ballistic missile and drone arsenal, and support for proxies are other sticking points.

U.S. officials say Trump wants a deal to end the war, but is considering resuming it “due to Iran’s rejection of many of his demands and refusal to make meaningful concessions on its nuclear program,” Axios added. “Trump is expected to convene his top national security team in the Situation Room on Tuesday to discuss military options, two U.S. officials said.”

Axios stated that the senior U.S. official said if Iran won’t shift its position, the U.S. will have to continue the negotiations “through bombs.”

In contrast, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei on Monday told reporters that his country’s “nuclear enrichment is a right that ‘already exists,’” an indication that Tehran isn’t budging on its stance. Still, Baghaei also described how negotiations with the United States are still continuing through Pakistani mediation.

All this comes against the backdrop of reports that the U.S. and Israel have been carrying out their most intense preparations yet to renew attacks on Iran, possibly as soon as this week, two Middle Eastern officials told The New York Times on Friday.

Monday’s back and forth comes a day after Trump issued a new warning to Tehran, saying “For Iran, the Clock is Ticking, and they better get moving, FAST, or there won’t be anything left of them. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE!”

In the wake of renewed threats from Trump, Iran claims it is prepared to defend against the U.S. and Israel if needed.

“In case of aggression against Iran again, Iran’s armed forces have new #surprises for the enemy,” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei warned, according to a post on X by the official Iranian IRIB media outlet. “Contradictory behaviors and threats of the enemy do not confuse or scare us.”

The tough talk between the U.S. and Iran clearly also includes some amount of bluster as the two sides seek a way forward without appearing to have caved to the other’s demands. Trump’s claim about holding off on an attack due to improving negotiations may be another example of that. But eventually time on this kind of posturing will run out and this week could be that inflection point.

UPDATE: 5:53 PM EDT –

New satellite imagery shows damage to three Iranian ships caused by the U.S-Israeli  bombing campaign against Iran’s Navy.

Satellite imagery dated May 17 from Shahid Bahonar Port appears to show the IRIS Makran, a forward base ship of the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, with a large hole in the deck alongside other heavy damage.

Imagery shows the IRGC Navy’s expeditionary base ship IRIS SHAHID MAHDAVI apparently sunk.

Satellite imagery dated May 12 also shows the Iranian IRIS Kordestan, an Iranian Navy forward base ship in the Persian Gulf with light to moderate damage due to the airstrikes.

Dozens of U.S. Air Force refueling jets now deployed to Ben Gurion Airport are expected to stay in Israel at least until the end of this year, Israel’s N12 News reported on X.

“The presence of the aircraft—not the U.S. military—is causing significant operational difficulties at Ben Gurion Airport, as they are parked almost everywhere possible at the port,” the outlet added.

בישראל התקבלו מסרים מהאמריקנים שלפיהם עשרות מטוסי התדלוק המוצבים בנמל התעופה בן גוריון צפויים להישאר בארץ לפחות עד סוף השנה האזרחית. נוכחות המטוסים שלא הצבא האמריקני מעוררת קשיים משמעותיים בתפעולו של נתב”ג, שכן הם חונים כמעט בכל מקום אפשרי בנמל@Dean_Fisher_

— החדשות – N12 (@N12News) May 18, 2026

UPDATES

On Monday, the country’s Supreme National Security Council said a newly formed Iranian agency, called the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), would provide “real-time updates” on operations and the latest developments in the Strait, a crucial chokepoint through which about 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas pass in peacetime.

The announcement about the PGSA follows news that Iran “started a Bitcoin-backed insurance service for shipping companies that want to transit the Strait of Hormuz,” Bloomberg News reported, citing the semi-official Fars news agency reported, which claimed it has documents obtained from Iran’s Ministry of Economy and Financial Affairs.

Dubbed Hormuz Safe, “the Iranian government says it could generate more than $10 billion in revenue for the Islamic Republic,” Bloomberg noted, adding that Fars provided no time frame or a breakdown of how the service would work.

Iran has started a Bitcoin-backed insurance service for shipping companies that want to transit the Strait of Hormuz, the semi-official Fars news agency reported https://t.co/0L0nyM3eAT

— Bloomberg (@business) May 18, 2026

The effort is widely seen as a way for Iran to get around calling any fee for crossing the Strait a toll.

“The Iranian regime is introducing a formalized toll system under the guise of maritime insurance policies and continuing to deploy incentives and threats to vessels in the Persian Gulf as part of their efforts to normalize and solidify Iranian control over the Strait,” the Institute for the Study of War posited. “This system appears designed to be more palatable than an outright ‘toll’ by framing it as a ‘maritime insurance policy.’ The insurance presumably insures the vessel against an Iranian attack.”

“As the President stated, the Strait is international water, and we are not going to let Iran toll the Strait or normalize an illegal regime where they attempt to control traffic through the Strait.,” a White House official told us.

Coinciding with its growing efforts in the Strait, PGSA unveiled an account on X on Monday.

“The Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) is the legal entity and representative authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran for managing the passage and transit through the Strait of Hormuz,” PGSA asserted. “Navigation within the introduced boundaries of the Strait of Hormuz, which were previously determined by the Armed Forces and authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is contingent upon full coordination with these entities, and passage without permission will be considered illegal.”

2/
دریانوردی در حریم معرفی شدهٔ تنگه هرمز، که حدود آن پیش از این از سوی نیروهای مسلح و مقامات جمهوری اسلامی ایران تعیین شده، منوط به هماهنگی کامل با این نهاد است و عبور بدون مجوز، غیرقانونی تلقی خواهد شد.

— PGSA | نهاد مدیریت آبراه خلیج فارس (@PGSA_IRAN) May 18, 2026

Iran has divided its operational control over the Strait of  Hormuz area between the Iranian Navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) Navy.

“From the shores of Makran to the Strait of Hormuz, it is managed by the Iranian Navy, and the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf are managed by the IRGC Navy,” the official Iranian IRIB news outlet announced on X.

🚨A division of duties has been carried out among the Iranian armed forces.

From the shores of Makran to the Strait of Hormuz, it is managed by the Iranian Navy,
and the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf are managed by the IRGC Navy. pic.twitter.com/PU2Md8eOim

— IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting) (@iribnews_irib) May 18, 2026

Despite the ongoing U.S. blockade of its ports, Iran is still loading crude into tankers, “although (not right now) in Kharg Island,” Bloomberg commodities and energy columnist Javier Blas reported on X. “Instead, it’s loading a tanker at Jask, an alternative terminal outside the Strait of Hormuz (but inside the US Navy blockade line).”

Iran is still loading crude into tankers — although (not right now) in Kharg Island. Instead, it’s loading a tanker at Jask, an alternative terminal outside the Strait of Hormuz (but inside the US Navy blockade line).

Left May 17 🛰️Sentinel-2; right, May 18 🛰️Sentinel-1 pic.twitter.com/iU2o6YXAmD

— Javier Blas (@JavierBlas) May 18, 2026

In a post on X, TankerTrackers.com stated that there “are actually plenty of able, cargo-empty tankers within the US Navy blockade perimeter but Iran has already lowered its oil production to match consumption and some storage buildup on land. The storage situation does not appear to be dire for the time being.”

As we have previously reported, a major goal of the blockade is to hurt Iran economically, including by threatening its ability to store oil.

Incorrect. There are actually plenty of able, cargo-empty tankers within the US Navy blockade perimeter but Iran has already lowered its oil production to match consumption and some storage buildup on land. The storage situation does not appear to be dire for the time being. https://t.co/mmlpHIr9ZI

— TankerTrackers.com, Inc. (@TankerTrackers) May 18, 2026

Pakistan has reportedly deployed thousands of troops, jets and air defense systems to Saudi Arabia to help defend the kingdom amid a shaky ceasefire.

Pakistan’s contribution to the mutual aid pact includes Chinese weapons, Reuters explained. It “has deployed a full squadron of around 16 aircraft,” mostly JF-17 Thunder fighters, which were ​sent to Saudi Arabia in early April. Pakistan had also sent “two squadrons of drones,” Reuters reported, adding that Islamabad could also send more troops, plus a Chinese-made HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile system.

The equipment is operated by Pakistani personnel and financed by Saudi Arabia, the news outlet pointed out. It remains unclear exactly what this means, if it pertains to the deployment or to the hardware itself.

Earlier this year, we reported that talks about the jets were underway, potentially to be paid for by converting some of the billions of dollars of Saudi loans taken out by Islamabad. However, at the time, shortly before the war broke out, it remained unclear if the Saudis even would want a light fighter like the Thunder at all, especially considering it could cause a rift with the U.S. at a critical time. In the past months, the kingdom had been offered the U.S.-made F-35, as you can read about here, and operates advanced fighters like the F-15SA and Typhoon.

The JF-17 was developed jointly by China’s Chengdu and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), and the first prototype took to the air in 2003. The aircraft is powered by a single Russian-designed RD-93 turbofan engine, an improved version of the RD-33 that is found in the twin-engined MiG-29 Fulcrum. Presumably, the JF-17s will help defend Saudi skies from drone and cruise missile attacks, although that too isn’t perfectly clear at this time.

It is possible that amid the shaky ceasefire, Iran’s proxies may be carrying out attacks on Arab Gulf nations. On Sunday, both the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia said they were attacked by drones. UAE officials said the attacks were carried out by Iran or its proxies while Saudi said it was struck by drones launched from Iraq.

The UAE Defense Ministry said an electrical generator outside the inner perimeter of the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant was struck by one of three drones launched at the country. Two other drones were successfully intercepted, it said.

In its initial statement on X, the MoD said that the drones “entered the country from the western border direction,” without assigning blame. UAE officials later updated that to say the drone was “launched by Iran or one of its proxies” in what officials called a “dangerous escalation.”

The officials did not get more specific. The Houthi rebels of Yemen operate southwest of the UAE while several Iranian-backed militias operate in Iraq, northwest of the country.

The Emirate MoD “affirmed that it remains fully prepared and ready to address any threats and will firmly confront any attempts to undermine the country’s security, in a manner that safeguards its sovereignty, security and stability, and protects its national interests and gains.”

UAE air defences intercept 3 UAVs.

The Ministry of Defence announced that on 17th May 2026, UAE air defence systems intercepted three UAVs that entered the country from the western border direction.

The ministry said that two of the UAVs were successfully intercepted, while the… pic.twitter.com/Ca6JRwc8w8

— وزارة الدفاع |MOD UAE (@modgovae) May 17, 2026

In a post on X, the IAEA expressed “grave concern” about the incident and said military activity that threatens nuclear safety is unacceptable. The [director general] reiterates call for maximum military restraint near any NPP to avoid the danger of a nuclear accident.”

The IAEA has been informed by the UAE that radiation levels at the Barakah NPP remain normal and no injuries were reported after a drone strike this morning caused a fire in an electrical generator located outside the inner site perimeter of the NPP. Emergency diesel generators… pic.twitter.com/km2rg08Gvd

— IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ (@iaeaorg) May 17, 2026

Pakistan on Monday “strongly condemned” the drone attack on the UAE’s nuclear power plant.

“Any deliberate targeting of nuclear facilities constitutes a grave violation of international law, including international humanitarian law, the United Nations Charter, and the fundamental principles of nuclear safety and security enshrined in the Statute and resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency,” Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said in an X post. “Nuclear installations must never be targeted under any circumstances. Such reckless actions carry potentially catastrophic and irreversible consequences for human life, the environment and regional, as well as global peace and security.”

Pakistan’s condemnation comes as it is trying to keep a flagging peace process going amid an increasingly tenuous ceasefire.

🔊 PR No.1️⃣1️⃣8️⃣/2️⃣0️⃣2️⃣6️⃣

Pakistan Strongly Condemns the Drone Attack on the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant of the United Arab Emirates

🔗⬇️https://t.co/7J7r1j6ZCH pic.twitter.com/DyMIR7bmoQ

— Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Pakistan (@ForeignOfficePk) May 18, 2026

Saudi Arabia said it too was attacked by drones on Sunday, but did not say who launched them.

The official spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense (MoD), Major General Turki Al-Maliki, “stated that on the morning of Sunday…three drones were intercepted and destroyed after entering the Kingdom’s airspace coming from Iraqi airspace,” the Saudi MoD stated on X. Al-Maliki “affirmed that the Ministry of Defense reserves the right to respond at the appropriate time and place, and will take and implement all necessary operational measures to respond to any attempt to infringe on the Kingdom’s sovereignty, security, and the safety of its citizens and residents on its territory.”

There are several Iranian-linked proxy groups in Iraq that have been attacking U.S. and allied facilities in that country.

صرح المتحدث الرسمي باسم وزارة الدفاع اللواء الركن تركي المالكي أنه في صباح يوم الأحد الموافق (17 مايو 2026م) تم اعتراض وتدمير 3 مسيّرات بعد دخولها المجال الجوي للمملكة قادمة من الأجواء العراقية.

وأكد اللواء المالكي على أن وزارة الدفاع تحتفظ بحق الرد في الزمان والمكان المناسبين،… pic.twitter.com/80hZw8z7BU

— وزارة الدفاع (@modgovksa) May 17, 2026

On Monday Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan. According to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, the two discussed issues related to the ongoing diplomatic process and the latest regional developments, in their seventh call since the ceasefire began.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi held a phone call with his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan, a day after Riyadh said it was attacked by three drones originating from Iraq.

According to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, the two discussed issues related to the ongoing… pic.twitter.com/UiuEZ8RMno

— Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران (@ariel_oseran) May 18, 2026

The New York Times is reporting that Israel established at least a second base in Iraq to aid its air campaigns against Iran. As we previously noted, the presence of the first one was reported by The Wall Street Journal.

In its story, the Times stated the base it was writing about pre-dated the current conflict and was used during last year’s 12-Day War between Israel and Iran. The newspaper also said a Bedouin shepherd was killed by helicopter fire after stumbling on the base in an effort to keep it secret.

The Times story lines up with our earlier reporting that Israel likely created facilities in Iraq during the 12-Day War. We also predicted at the time that it would likely happen again in the future.

As we noted in the past, Israel used the base reported on by the Journal to stage troops and equipment and provide combat search and rescue service if needed for downed pilots during the current conflict. 

Israel spent over a year preparing a covert site in Iraq for its operations against Iran, regional officials say. Iraqi officials later confirmed the existence of a second base.
By @ErikaSolomon & Falih Hassanhttps://t.co/l6fIJdfTFx

— Malachy Browne (@malachybrowne) May 17, 2026

Amid its own ceasefire agreement with the Lebanese government, Israel is continuing to hit Hezbollah targets in the southern part of that country where it has a growing military presence.

חיל-האוויר וכוחות חטיבה 769 בפיקוד אוגדה 91 השמידו בסגירת מעגל מהירה מחסן נ״ט ששימש את ארגון הטרור חיזבאללה נגד הכוחות הפועלים במרחב. pic.twitter.com/WmBpY0gbdM

— Israeli Air Force (@IAFsite) May 18, 2026

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

As far as we know, the US invading forces that attacked the country on January 3 did not plant any mines on Venezuelan soil. But, figuratively speaking, they did, because every day, here and there, a situation erupts that is clearly a consequence of the bombing and the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

Some of these explosions even appear far more precise than the military operation – a term its proponents insist on using to describe it, despite the fact that it left more than a hundred people dead and caused significant material damage. In the four months that have passed since that traumatic morning, the country has witnessed what appear to be controlled demolitions at the very foundations of Venezuela’s 21st-century anti-hegemonic policy: the return of the US embassy; visits by high-ranking officials (including the head of the CIA); reintegration into the International Monetary Fund; reforms to fundamental laws; and even actions that appear motivated by a desire for symbolic humiliation, such as the removal of uranium from a historic but decommissioned nuclear reactor located on the outskirts of Caracas or Donald Trump’s alleged intention to annex Venezuela as the 51st state.

Every “mine” that explodes deepens a wound that, strictly speaking, is far from healing because it was inflicted on Venezuelan pride and hurts, above all, the Chavista base, but also people from other political camps who share a strong sense of nationalism.

Managing this systematic destruction of icons has been one of the most demanding challenges for the acting government, especially in terms of responding to its own supporters and to real internal power brokers, both within the sphere of popular power and within the military and police forces.

Peace and continuity

One of the most surprising aspects of the political period marked by the events of January 3 is that the country – which was invaded, bombed, and had its president kidnapped – has managed to maintain internal peace. Even more astonishing is that Chavismo, subjected to such a decapitation operation, has remained in power and has swiftly reestablished diplomatic and even cordial relations with the aggressor power.

This strange phenomenon was immediately exploited by internal and external opponents of the Bolivarian Revolution to disseminate accusations of treason. Those accused have responded by arguing that this was not a voluntary compromise, but rather concessions that any rational person would make in a hostage situation and under the threat of even worse attacks and reprisals.

In an unusual move, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres weighed in on this debate, voicing his suspicion that there was internal collusion in the military operation against Maduro.

A significant portion of Chavismo understands the need to reject these hypotheses and agrees that national peace is well worth the sacrifice of some of the slogans that propelled this movement to rise and remain at the pinnacle of political power.

The conflict arises when it becomes clear that, for many revolutionary activists, these slogans embody fundamental principles and values.

The controversy surrounding this issue lies dormant beneath the surface, like a geological fault line that became active following the bombing. At times, it surfaces in the form of minor tremors, through the critical attitudes of figures associated with Chavismo. The ground also trembles from the doubts and unanswered questions in the daily lives of sectors affiliated with or sympathetic to the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

One of the voices that has been speaking out from the ranks of the organic intelligentsia is that of Luis Britto García, who has raised objections to the reforms of the Hydrocarbons and Mining Laws, which, in his view, will allow for the unfettered plundering of Venezuela’s abundant natural resources and enable any disputes to be settled by foreign courts. He also rejects the return of the IMF, given the role that this and other multilateral organizations have played in imposing economic policies that are fundamentally anti-popular.

Britto García is unwavering in his ideological and legal objections, but he is also extremely careful not to present himself as an internal opponent of the acting president. Drawing on his immense moral authority, he has taken on the role of being the public voice for many who lack the ability or opportunity to express their views.

Meanwhile, some who clearly do not wish to be named say they have chosen to contribute through their silence, as the timing is highly inappropriate for taking sides.

Others, however, have chosen to openly dissent. Prominent among them is journalist Mario Silva, who built his career as an opinion-maker on the provocative television show La Hojilla and was later elected to the 2017 National Constituent Assembly and the 2021–2025 National Assembly. With his opposition to the oil and mining reforms as well as amnesty policies for opposition figures who participated in insurrections and riots, Silva has stirred up controversy, particularly among segments of the grassroots Chavista movement that identify with his dramatic and incisive style, which was once strongly supported by Commander Hugo Chávez.

In the vacuous yet highly topical realm of social media influencers, “dissidents” have also emerged, such as Diego Omar Suárez, “Michelo,” an Argentine YouTuber and TikToker who moved to Venezuela in 2024 and had been a key figure in the online discourse on these and other social media platforms, supporting the government of Nicolás Maduro and, in the early weeks, that of Delcy Rodríguez. However, he changed his stance to speak out against treason and collusion with the US. (1)

The Pilgrimage strategy

These disruptions have further obstructed the path of the interim government, which is grappling with a very difficult economic situation; they have become additional “landmines” along the way, forcing the government to move forward with extreme caution while navigating these threats.

One of the strategies designed to maintain popular support and mobilization has been the Pilgrimage against the blockade and the unilateral coercive measures or sanctions imposed by the US and its allies.

The Pilgrimage sought to mobilize support from the Chavista parties, which in the days immediately following January 3 had taken to the streets demanding the return of the presidential couple. That demand was redirected toward calling for a Venezuela free of economic sanctions.

Beyond giving new momentum to the Chavista camp, the mobilization sought to broaden the government’s support base by prioritizing the elimination of the blockade and sanctions.

To achieve this new consensus, the acting president has capitalized on the groundwork laid by the Amnesty Law, the Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence, and other reconciliation initiatives, such as the one established for labor issues, which allowed her to get through May 1 by decreeing increases in bonuses without committing to meaningful wage hikes.

Fundamental in this regard has been the willingness of Chavismo to cede institutional spaces – such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ministry of Higher Education, several vice ministries, and several embassies – to figures from the moderate opposition. It is clear that the support obtained outside the Chavista camp has been the result of these prior concessions.

What about the opposition?

In this complex political landscape, the opposition forces appear, now more than ever, to be watching the game from the sidelines, standing around the table, while the pieces are moved by the acting government and the United States.

The moderate opposition, which participated in the 2025 parliamentary elections and entered the new National Assembly that began its term on January 5, has since January 3 wavered between capitalizing on the moment by supporting the so-called “reinstitutionalization” of the country and reverting to old obstructionist tactics that are largely ineffective given the overwhelming majority that Chavismo holds in the national legislature.

From the perspective of public opinion, everything seems to indicate that this opposition faction has failed to present itself to the country as a genuine option for change, with a platform capable of rallying the masses to follow its leaders.

At the other extreme is the faction led by María Corina Machado, clearly identified as the one that demanded (and continues to demand) most vehemently that the country be sanctioned, blockaded, and attacked militarily, based on the premise that she would automatically be called upon to head a de facto government resulting from the bombing and the kidnapping of the constitutional president.

Donald Trump’s surprising support for Delcy Rodríguez’s government has left Machado high and dry. Neither her obsequious submission to the US president nor her lobbying of the Western corporate elites has done her any good so far, as she remains relegated to the sidelines – a situation that must be particularly humiliating for her.

Under the current circumstances, Machado appears more a part of the internal US political diatribe than of the Venezuelan political scene. Following her failed efforts to secure Trump’s endorsement (to whom she gifted her Nobel Prize), she seems to be actively working with the Democrats and elements of the Deep State with the aim of inflicting a defeat on the Republican president in the midterm elections.

It seems her allegiances have shifted, creating a bizarre paradox: Venezuela’s radical opposition is betting against Trump, while Chavismo feels more secure if the president who ordered the brutal military aggression does not emerge too battered from the November contest.

It appears, then, that the “metaphorical landmines” planted by the US during its brief invasion are also exploding, one after another, on the grounds of the right and the far right.

(1) Editor’s note: this article was written before the May 16 handover of former minister and diplomatic envoy Alex Saab to US authorities.

Clodovaldo Hernández is a journalist and political analyst with experience in higher education. He won the National Journalism Prize (Opinion category) in 2002. He is the author of the books Reinventario (poetry and short stories) De genios y de figuras (journalistic profiles) and Esa larga, infinita distancia (novel).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelan editorial staff.

The U.S. Army is pressing defense contractors to come up with proposals for a new interceptor for the Patriot surface-to-air missile system with a unit cost under $1 million. This is far cheaper — about a fifth of the price — than what the Army is paying for current-generation Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors now.

As a supplement to existing interceptors, a lower-cost alternative would improve Patriot’s cost-per-intercept ratio, especially against lower-tier threats like drones and cruise missiles. The design could also be easier to produce at scale, helping address increasingly worrisome strains on stockpiles and supply chains. These are issues TWZ has been calling attention to for years now, and that have been magnified by Patriot’s heavy use during the latest conflict with Iran.

Last Friday, the Army’s Capability Program Executive (CPE) for Defensive Fires quietly put out a call for information about prospective new low-cost interceptor designs for Patriot.

“We are running a very aggressive Low Cost Interceptor (LCI) missile and missile sub-system competition,” Army Maj. Gen. Frank Lozano, the Army’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Fires (PAE Fires), wrote in a post on LinkedIn yesterday, calling attention to the contracting notice. “We will be holding an Industry Day in DC in the very near future. We are looking to generate the greatest amount of interest and participation across the entirety of the missile technology industrial base as possible! This effort is intended to result in multiple awards that can lead to multiple different capable yet affordable missile interceptor solutions!”

The contracting notice itself breaks the $1 million unit price target into four component groups, each of which the Army wants to cost no more than $250,000. These are: Low-Cost Interceptor All-Up Round (AUR) and Fire Control, Low-Cost Rocket Motor, Low-Cost Seeker, and Fire Control and Flight Guidance Implementation. The Army is also seeking information about a potential contractor to serve as the central integrator for all of those “best of breed” elements, which could come from different sources.

When it comes to the complete missile, or AUR, and associated fire control system elements, the Army wants to integrate the missiles into existing M903 trailer-based launchers and leverage the service’s new Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) network. The M903 is already capable of accommodating newer PAC-3 series interceptors, including the MSE variant, as well as older PAC-2 types that remain in inventory.

Northrop Grumman’s IBCS was designed from the outset with a modular, open-systems approach to make it easier to integrate new systems and functionality as time goes on. You can read more about IBCS in detail in this past TWZ feature.

Northrop Grumman Integrated Air Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) Flight Test

“The Government seeks a component-level solid rocket motor (SRM) capable of meeting the rigorous kinetic and kinematic requirements necessary for an AMD interceptor and capable of being integrated as part of a MOSA AMD interceptor,” according to the contracting notice. “The Government seeks a component-level seeker capable of threat acquisition, tracking, and terminal guidance in support of AMD missions against the stated threat sets within contested and degraded environments (e.g., active electronic warfare, harsh weather, cluttered terrain, etc.).”

“The Government seeks a component-level fire control and flight guidance implementation capable of providing engageability options to the IBCS and providing post-launch management of interceptor flight and communications messaging,” the contracting notice adds.

Overall, the new low-cost interceptors are intended to “serve as supplementals to the Integrated Fires Air and Missile Defense mission against Air Breathing Threats (ABT), Cruise Missiles, Close-Range Ballistic Missiles (CRBM), and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM),” per the notice. SRBMs are typically defined as ballistic missiles with maximum ranges under 620 miles. The U.S. military also uses the term CRBM to categorize ballistic threats that can hit targets out to no more than 186 miles.

The Patriot system currently has the ability to engage all of the threats listed above, but that capability comes at a cost. The unit price of each PAC-3 MSE interceptor has risen to approximately $5.3 million, according to the Army’s latest proposed budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year. This is up from a historical average of around $4 million for each one of these missiles. These are also exquisite munitions that take years of lead time to produce, something we will come back to later on.

In 2024, the Army announced that it had axed plans for a new interceptor for Patriot, previously called Lower-Tier Future Interceptor (LTFI), in large part due to projected costs.

“So, right now, the Army has decided that we are not going to move forward on what we were calling a Lower Tier Future Interceptor,” then-Brig. Gen. Lozano said in a live interview with Defense News‘ Jen Judson from the floor of the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual conference that year. “That was going to be a very expensive endeavor. … Interceptors in that family or class of interceptors are very capable, but also very expensive.”

There had been subsequent signs that a follow-on of some kind to LTFI was in the works. “This year we’re starting a new interceptor program that will have longer range [and] higher altitudes,” Army Lt. Col. Steven Moebes, Product Manager for Lower Tier Interceptors, told Secretary Pete Hegseth during a show-and-tell at the service’s Redstone Arsenal last December, at which media outlets were also present.

War Sec. Pete Hegseth Visits The New Site For U.S. Space Command Headquarters In Huntsville, Alabama

“We want to see if we can bring, from scratch, an interceptor that we can own the IP [intellectual property] for, then go find contract manufacturing,” Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll also told reporters at the Pentagon just earlier this month, according to The Wall Street Journal.

Driscoll reportedly indicated at that time that the total price point the service was aiming for was $250,000. As mentioned, we now know that this is the cost target for each of the four elements that would combine to form an interceptor costing $1 million or less.

A goal to acquire an anti-air interceptor that is capable of engaging everything from lower-tier air-breathing threats to SRBMs, but does not cost more than $1 million, is still ambitious. It is also in line with Pentagon-wide initiatives to expand the acquisition of lower-cost munitions, including by leveraging new, non-traditional industry partners well beyond established prime defense contractors, and open-architecture approaches. Secretary Driscoll’s mention of Army ownership of the IP also highlights another important aspect of these initiatives, which is aimed at preventing vendor lock, and allows for new competitions to be readily run for AURs and subcomponents.

To reiterate, the new low-cost interceptor is intended to be a supplement to existing options for the Patriot system. At the same time, not all threats require something like a PAC-3 MSE. So, as noted, adding a new relatively cheap alternative to the mix would offer benefits in terms of cost-per-intercept ratio. The price associated with using the system to knock down lower-tier threats, particularly long-range kamikaze drones with unit prices measured in tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, has become a major talking point in the past decade. Patriot also offers an important layer of defense against shorter-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phases of their flight, which present real threats, as underscored by the latest conflict with Iran, and are increasingly proliferating. As such, being able to provide lower-end terminal ballistic missile defense at a reduced cost point will also be increasingly valuable going forward.

A new, but still capable interceptor for Patriot that is relatively cheap compared to existing types like the PAC-3 MSE could be beneficial when it comes to stockpile management and supply chains, especially if it is also faster to produce at scale. The recent conflict with Iran and other crises in the Middle East in recent years, along with support to allies and partners, particularly Ukraine, have underscored the need for new steps to ensure sufficient numbers of anti-intercepts and other critical munitions remain in U.S. inventory.

Though the Pentagon has insisted that America’s arsenal is still sufficiently stocked to address current and future contingencies, U.S. officials have openly called attention to the potential impacts of high expenditure rates and the importance of diversifying the industrial base that supplies these weapons. The up-front need for a large stockpile of anti-air and other munitions, and the ability to refill it rapidly, not on a timeline measured in years, would only be even pronounced in any future high-end fight, such as one against China in the Pacific.

When it comes to Patriot, there is a separate, but directly related issue of overall capacity. The Army’s Patriot force continues to be inadequate to meet existing demands, let alone what would be required in a future major conflict against an adversary like the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The Army has been working to expand the total size of its Patriot force, as well as improve the capabilities of the system through the addition of new radars and other functionality. The Pentagon has also reached deals with the PAC-3 MSE’s prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, to ramp up production of those interceptors. The service is now looking toward new containerized launchers for the Patriot system, which could be carried by future uncrewed trucks, as well.

The PATRIOT Missile in Action

However, many of these developments are still likely years away from fully materializing and are subject to their own supply chain limitations. The Navy is now working to integrate PAC-3 MSE into the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), adding a valuable new anti-air interceptor to its sea-based arsenal, but also further increasing demand. Growing U.S. demand around the Patriot, overall, including as a result of heavy use of the system in the latest conflict with Iran, has had second-order impacts on other customers globally.

Altogether, a new lower-cost interceptor for the Patriot system could be an important, if not increasingly essential, addition to the Army’s arsenal. At the same time, whether the service can meet its goal of finding a missile that meets its significant requirements, but still costs less than $1 million, remains to be seen.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

BREAKINGBREAKING,

Authorities say they are deploying ‘significant resources’ to the scene of the incident at Islamic Center of San Diego.

Police in California have said they are responding to an active shooter at a mosque in San Diego.

Authorities called on residents in Monday to avoid the area of the incident at the Islamic Center of San Diego.

There have been no official reports of casualties, but the Associated Press news agency cited officer Anthony Carrasco as saying that he believes people have been shot.

The police department said later on Monday that the situation remains active but has been “contained” without providing further details. “We have significant resources on scene at this time,” the department said.

Aerial television footage shows a heavy police presence outside the mosque.

San Diego Mayor Todd Gloria said he is continuing to receive reports about the incident. “Emergency personnel are on scene and actively working to protect the community and secure the area,” he wrote on X.

The office of California Governor Gavin Newsom said he is following the situation and coordinating with local law enforcement agencies. “We are grateful to the first responders on the scene working to protect the community and urge everyone to follow guidance from local authorities,” the office said in a statement.

The mosque is in a heavily residential neighbourhood about 9 miles (14 km) north of downtown San Diego. It is the largest mosque in San Diego County, according to its website.

More to come…

The World Health Organisation (WHO), a United Nations specialised agency, has declared the resurgence of the Ebola epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) a case of international concern. Following the declaration of the 17th Ebola epidemic in Ituri province on Saturday, May 16, the WHO announced that the resurgence is attributed to the Bundibugyo strain found in both the DRC and Uganda. 

Tedros Ghebreyesus, WHO’s Director General, said the declaration is based on several elements, notably the high level of positivity of the first samples of tests, the already documented propagation outside Congolese borders, as well as the absence of a vaccine or approved treatment against the specific strain. He noted that the current epidemic does not meet the criteria for a pandemic emergency at this time. 

The recent Ebola virus outbreak is occurring in an area of the country plagued by violence against civilians, which is linked to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels, who continue to inflict suffering on the local population despite ongoing joint military efforts by the Congolese armed forces and the Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF). In addition to the joint operations, various local militia groups are also active, including the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO), the Zaire faction, the Convention pour la Revolution Populaire (CRP), and others. This situation has deteriorated the humanitarian conditions in this region of the DRC, leading to a significant displacement of people.

However, the government of Rwanda, through its Ministry of Health, has said it is closely monitoring the resurgence of the Ebola epidemic in the DRC’s Ituri province, noting that no cases of the virus have been detected in Rwanda so far. The government noted that it has taken some measures, including increased vigilance on border posts with the DRC.

“As a precautionary measure, Rwanda has reinforced the testing and vigilance at entry points situated along the border with the DR Congo. Health teams have been mobilised, and the surveillance systems have been reinforced in order to ensure early detection and a rapid intervention in case of need”, the Rwanda Ministry of Health announced in a statement dated May 17.

Sabin Nsanzimana, the country’s Minister of Public Health, who is also an epidemiologist, noted that his ministry would continue to collaborate with national, regional, and international partners to protect the health and security of the Rwandan population.

The epidemic in Ituri province arose nearly six months after the Congolese government announced the end of the 16th Ebola epidemic in Kasai province on Dec. 1, 2025. Following the recovery of the last patient on Oct. 19, 2025, no cases were recorded during the subsequent 42 days.

However, Roger Kambathe, DRC’s Minister of Public Health, Hygiene, and Social Welfare, rejected speculations in the country’s socio-political circles that the resurgence of the Ebola virus is due to negligence on the part of relevant health infrastructure and authorities. During a press conference on Saturday, May 16, the minister addressed accusations of failure in the sanitary surveillance system to manage alerts about the new Ebola epidemic in Ituri.

“You have said something that surprises me. You have said: ‘What did not work, the epidemic has been here for one month and you did not react’. I want to remind you that there was a patient, a nurse, who died in Bunia of an illness which was not reported. I gave the date: 24th April,” the minister said, clarifying that the corpse was eventually transferred to Mungwalu, where local traditional funeral rites caused the propagation of the virus.

“It was during the funeral ceremony that people were crying, thinking that the nurse died from a mysterious disease and touching the corpse, that cases of the virus started appearing,” Roger noted, adding that the first official notification of the virus was on May 5. “This first social notification was through social networks.”

“Three days afterwards, our teams made the official notification. Samples were taken”, the minister continued and stressed that the first analysis did not permit the identification of the particular Ebola strain. “We first researched the Zaire strain, but the results were negative.”

He also said samples were eventually sent to the national biomedical research institute in Kinshasa for complementary analyses, “and it was before yesterday that we received the confirmation of another strain. Thus, I do not know why you say ‘what did not work?’”.

Samuel argued that “there is a rule called ‘7-1-7’: be alerted in 7 days, intervene immediately, and post the diagnosis promptly. And that is what was done”. He assured that response measures are currently in place, particularly through logistics and aerial resources. Between May 8 and May 17, aircraft were already dispatched. This spans just under nine days, and the minister stated that the issue does not lie with the system.

One day before the official government communication on May 16, Jean Kaseya, the Director General of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, warned of the high risk of regional spread of the epidemic. Faced with the situation, a high-level regional meeting was convened with the health authorities of the DRC, Uganda, and South Sudan, as well as several international partners, including the WHO and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF).

According to Jean, who is in charge of the African Union’s health agency, the efforts would be centred on strengthening epidemiological surveillance, laboratory capacities, infection control, community engagement, and transborder coordination.

In a related development, measures to fight against the virus are being intensified in Ituri province. At least five tons of medical supplies were sent to Bunia on Sunday, May 17, to support teams fighting the virus. The material arrived at Murongo airport aboard a humanitarian flight, coordinated by the WHO and its partners. On arrival in Bunia, Anne Ancia, WHO representative in DRC, confirmed that the logistical support aims to urgently reinforce response capacities in the zones affected by the epidemic. According to her, the situation requires rapid mobilisation and coordination to prevent the disease from spreading further in the province, which is already weakened by insecurity and population displacement.

“We call on the population to collaborate with the health teams, to rapidly report suspected cases and to respect preventive measures. The response cannot succeed without the involvement of the community”, Anne Ancia charged. The equipment, including individual protective gear, tents, and hospital beds, would enable intensified frontline interventions, strengthened prevention, and infection control to protect communities in the affected zones.

This medical assistance comes while several suspected cases and deaths linked to Ebola have been reported in certain health zones of Ituri, notably in Rwampara and Bunia, forcing the health authorities to reinforce the surveillance and prevention measures. On the ground, medical teams continue community sensitisation, follow-up contacts, and the installation of health control mechanisms to limit the chain of transmission.

Iran’s national football team has arrived in Turkiye for a pre-World Cup training camp, but players are yet to receive visas for entry into the US. FIFA says it is confident Iran will be able to play in next month’s tournament despite the uncertainty.

A drone attack that caused a fire close to the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant in the United Arab Emirates has raised further concerns about nuclear security and military escalation in the Gulf as discussions of peace between Iran and the United States hang in the balance.

Barakah was the first nuclear power station to be built on the Arabian Peninsula. Here is what we know about it:

What is the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant?

Barakah is a nuclear energy plant located in Al Dhafra, the largest municipal region of the emirate of Abu Dhabi. It is the UAE’s only nuclear power plant.

Construction of the plant began in 2012, and its first reactor became commercially operational in 2021.

The plant is located close to the border with Saudi Arabia, about 225km (140 miles) west of the UAE’s capital city, Abu Dhabi.

The facility features four pressurised water reactors, the most common type of nuclear power reactor. The model used here is the advanced power reactor 1400, a pressurised water reactor design developed in South Korea. Each reactor of this type has the capacity to produce 1,400 megawatts (MW), which is enough to power roughly 1 million homes.

According to the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), the plant’s reactors produce 40 terawatt-hours (TWh) each year, which is equivalent to about 25 percent of the UAE’s electricity needs. The website for the London-based World Nuclear Association also confirmed that Barakah, when fully operational, meets 25 percent of the UAE’s electricity needs.

According to a September report by the Abu Dhabi media office, Barakah had produced 40TWh of clean energy over “the past 12 months”.

Since nuclear power plants produce a lower amount of carbon dioxide emissions than conventional power plants, the ENEC said Barakah saves up to 22.4 million tonnes of carbon emissions each year, equivalent to removing 4.8 million cars from the roads.

What happened in the attack on Sunday, and how has the UAE responded?

Authorities in Abu Dhabi said a single drone strike caused a blaze to break out at an electrical generator outside the Barakah plant’s inner perimeter in the Al Dhafra region on Sunday. No injuries were reported, and officials said radiation levels remained normal.

The UAE’s nuclear regulator said operations at the Barakah facility had not been affected. “All units are operating as normal,” it said in a social media post.

In a statement, the UAE’s Ministry of Defence said two more drones had been “successfully” intercepted and the drones had been launched from the “western border”. It did not give more details.

The UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted a statement on X on Sunday saying the country condemned “the unprovoked terrorist attack” in “the strongest terms”.

The statement added: “The UAE emphasised that it will not tolerate any threat to its security and sovereignty under any circumstances, and that it reserves its full, sovereign, legitimate, diplomatic, and military rights to respond to any threats, allegations, or hostilities in a manner that ensures the protection of its sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and the safety of its citizens, residents, and visitors, in accordance with international law.”

There was no immediate claim of responsibility, and the statements by the ministries did not publicly blame any country.

But Anwar Gargash, an adviser to the UAE’s president, wrote in an X post on Sunday: “The terrorist targeting of the Barakah clean nuclear power plant, whether carried out by the principal perpetrator or through one of its agents, represents a dangerous escalation and a dark scene that violates all international laws and norms, in criminal disregard for the lives of civilians in the UAE and its surroundings.”

Gargash’s post appeared to blame Iran and its proxy network of allied armed groups in the region, which Tehran calls the “axis of resistance”.

The launch point of the drones remained unclear, but on Sunday, Saudi Arabia also reported it had intercepted three drones that had been launched from Iraq, where some Iran-allied groups operate. If Iranian Shahed-136 drones, which have an estimated range of 2,000km to 2,500km (1,240 to 1,550 miles), were fired from Iraqi territory, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE would fall well within their reach.

Other reactions

Neighbouring Gulf states Saudi Arabia and Qatar condemned the attack on the Barakah plant.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait also issued a statement denouncing the attack, which it called “heinous”.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs condemned the attack, calling it “unacceptable”, saying it represented “a dangerous escalation” and urging a return to diplomacy.

Has Iran responded to the incident?

Iran has not claimed responsibility for the drone attacks, and there has been no public statement from Iran about the incident at Barakah.

However, in the aftermath of the drone attacks, United States President Donald Trump wrote in a Truth Social post: “For Iran, the Clock is Ticking, and they better get moving, FAST, or there won’t be anything left of them. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE!”

Iranian Ministry of Defence spokesperson Reza Talaei-Nik said on Sunday that the military is “fully prepared” to confront any new aggression from the US and Israel.

Iran has previously warned that countries where US military assets are deployed or Israeli-linked interests are located are viewed as legitimate targets.

Iran has also accused the UAE of strengthening ties with Israel while reports have emerged that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a “secret” visit to the Gulf state during the US-Israel war on Iran. The UAE has denied this.

US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee also said last week that Israel had deployed Iron Dome air defence systems and personnel to the UAE to help defend against possible Iranian attacks.

What has the IAEA said?

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the global nuclear watchdog, said Sunday’s incident in the UAE had forced one reactor to rely temporarily on emergency diesel generators.

IAEA chief Rafael Grossi expressed “grave concern” and warned that military activity threatening nuclear facilities was “unacceptable”.

How serious could a strike on a nuclear facility be?

Attacks on nuclear power plants are especially worrying because they can risk damaging critical safety systems or reactors, which could release radioactive material into the atmosphere, not only over the country targeted but also across neighbouring states. Radiological material, specifically the hazardous isotope Caesium-137, could be released into the atmosphere.

The release of radioactive material could result in environmental contamination and poses major risks to public health. Water, if contaminated, becomes undrinkable while farmland and fisheries could become unsafe for decades, depending on the isotope released.

Short-term, acute exposure to radioactivity can cause burns and acute radiation sickness, which can be life-threatening.

Prolonged exposure, even to smaller doses, can increase the risk of illnesses such as cancer, especially thyroid cancer and leukaemia. Children and pregnant women are especially vulnerable.

Over the course of the US-Israel war on Iran, energy infrastructure has become a target.

Iran’s only functioning nuclear plant, the Bushehr power plant, has come under repeated attacks in the war. There are fears that damage at Bushehr could contaminate water across the entire Gulf region, most of which lacks groundwater and relies heavily on the desalination of seawater. Desalination plants are not specifically built to filter radioactive material, and not all plants currently are fitted with the technologies required to do so.

Finance ministers from the Group of Seven met in Paris to address rising global financial instability triggered by a bond market selloff and concerns over inflation linked to the ongoing conflict involving Iran.

The meeting comes at a time when global bond markets from Tokyo to New York are under pressure, as investors anticipate that higher energy prices could force central banks to maintain or increase interest rates.

Officials are also preparing for a broader discussion on structural global imbalances and coordination ahead of an upcoming G7 leaders summit.

Bond Market Pressure and Inflation Concerns

Bond yields have risen sharply across major economies as investors reassess inflation risks. Markets are increasingly focused on whether rising energy costs will translate into sustained price pressures that limit the ability of central banks to ease policy.

French officials have described the current situation as a correction rather than a crisis, though they acknowledge growing sensitivity around sovereign debt levels and fiscal sustainability.

The volatility has raised concerns particularly in highly debt sensitive economies such as Japan, where bond market movements are closely watched for spillover effects.

Diverging Views Within the G7

Despite the shared concerns, divisions remain among G7 members over how to respond to global economic instability.

European officials have emphasized the need for coordinated, temporary, and targeted responses to market shocks, while acknowledging that consensus with the United States may be difficult.

Some members argue that global economic imbalances are becoming structurally entrenched, with consumption and investment patterns increasingly misaligned across major economies.

Global Imbalances and Structural Concerns

A central focus of the discussions is the growing imbalance in global economic activity. European officials argue that long term trends show excessive consumption in some economies, under consumption in others, and insufficient investment in parts of Europe.

These structural disparities are seen as contributing to persistent trade tensions, capital flow imbalances, and financial market instability.

Officials warn that without coordinated policy responses, these imbalances could eventually lead to more severe market corrections.

Critical Minerals and Supply Chain Strategy

Another key agenda item is the global competition over critical minerals and rare earth supply chains, which are essential for electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, and defense technologies.

G7 members are exploring ways to reduce dependence on dominant suppliers, particularly China, through coordinated investment, joint procurement strategies, and diversification of supply chains.

Proposals under discussion include pooled purchasing mechanisms, market monitoring systems, and industrial policy coordination to strengthen supply security.

Analysis

The G7 meeting highlights a convergence of financial instability and geopolitical fragmentation. Rising bond yields and inflation fears are no longer isolated market issues but are now directly linked to geopolitical disruptions in energy supply and global trade routes.

At the same time, disagreements within the G7 reflect deeper structural tensions in the global economy, particularly around debt levels, consumption patterns, and industrial policy priorities.

Efforts to coordinate on critical minerals signal a shift toward more strategic economic alignment among advanced economies, where supply chain security is becoming as important as price stability.

Overall, the meeting underscores a global transition toward a more fragmented and politically driven financial system, where economic coordination is increasingly shaped by geopolitical risk rather than purely market based forces.

With information from Reuters.

Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), using publicly available open-source information. Check out last week’s map here.

The Ford is finally home. The supercarrier, with nearly 4,500 Sailors aboard, pulled into Naval Station Norfolk on Saturday, greeted by hundreds of families and friends after completing a grueling 326-day combat deployment. The well-deserved homecoming capped the longest deployment in more than five decades, which was extended multiple times to support operations across two continents and combatant commands.