NEWS

On Tuesday night, fans gathered outside the stadium and nearby pubs while rivals Manchester City played Bournemouth, needing a win to keep the title race alive.

In the end, Pep Guardiola’s side could only draw – confirming Arsenal as champions for the first time in 22 years.

As the full-time whistle went on the south coast, there was an explosion of cheer in pubs across north London as Arsenal fans celebrated a moment they felt, after recent title near misses, might never come.

Arsenal legend Ian Wright, who scored 185 times for the club and won the title in 1998, was mobbed by fans as he celebrated outside the Emirates.

There were celebrations also at the Gunners’ training ground.

That is where the Arsenal squad had gathered for the evening and, much as in the pubs, the final whistle was greeted by huge celebrations. Players and staff danced and hugged while chanting: “Campeones, Campeones, Ole Ole Ole!”

Last month, Arsenal captain Declan Rice was seen insisting “it’s not done” after the Gunners lost to Manchester City. But on Tuesday, with the title race decided, he posted a picture on social media of players celebrating, captioned: “It’s done.”

The title win came in Mikel Arteta’s seventh year in charge, and underlined just what can be achieved if a manager is given time.

“Mikel Arteta’s been there a long period of time. The best gift you can give a good manager is time,” former Premier League goalkeeper Paul Robinson told BBC Radio 5 Live.

“Yes you can give them hundreds of millions of pounds but you have to mould that money into a team, into a dressing room, a winning side.

“You give a good manager time? There’s the proof.”

A nationwide transport strike in Kenya over surging fuel prices, blamed on the United States-Israeli war on Iran, has been suspended for a week after four people were killed in mass protests against the increases.

Kenya, one of many African countries heavily reliant on fuel imports from the Gulf, has raised petrol prices by 20 percent and diesel by almost 40 percent since Iran in effect blocked traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, a key chokepoint that normally handles about a fifth of the world’s oil.

The strike was launched on Monday by transport operators, particularly the “matatu” bus operators who provide most of Kenya’s public transport, in response to the latest sharp fuel price hike.

“The strike that is going on is suspended for a period of one week to provide an avenue for consultations and negotiations between the government and stakeholders,” interior minister Kipchumba Murkomen told reporters on Tuesday.

Albert Karakacha, the president of Matatu Owners Association, confirmed the suspension.

Authorities said four people were killed and more than 30 were injured nationwide on Monday. Police said on Tuesday that more than 700 people had been arrested in connection with the protests over fuel price increases.

Rights groups condemned the use of lethal force by security forces, with Amnesty International calling for “maximum restraint”.

The unrest also disrupted Kenya’s main trade corridor, with local media reporting that truck drivers had refused to move cargo amid fears their vehicles could be attacked and set alight by demonstrators.

The national energy regulator said last week the government had spent $38.5m to cushion consumers from rising diesel and kerosene costs.

In a further emergency measure, Kenyan authorities last month temporarily suspended fuel quality standards in a bid to maintain supplies amid growing shortages.

Despite being one of East Africa’s most dynamic economies, Kenya still has deep structural inequalities: about a third of its roughly 50 million people live in poverty and unemployment remains high.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto unveiled ambitious economic growth and fiscal deficit targets for 2027 while promising reforms aimed at restoring investor confidence and strengthening state institutions. The announcement comes after months of market concerns over government spending plans, policy uncertainty, and weakening confidence in Southeast Asia’s largest economy.

Government Sets Ambitious Economic Targets

Prabowo outlined a growth target of 5.8 percent to 6.5 percent for next year while aiming to lower the fiscal deficit to between 1.8 percent and 2.4 percent of gross domestic product. The government also expects inflation to remain under control and pledged to improve food security and attract greater investment.

Investor Confidence Faces Pressure

Indonesia has faced growing scrutiny from investors and rating agencies this year. Credit rating outlooks were downgraded due to concerns about policymaking credibility, fiscal discipline, and transparency. Market fears intensified after discussions around possible changes to the country’s long standing fiscal deficit ceiling and rising state spending commitments.

Commodity Control Plan Sparks Market Concerns

Prabowo confirmed plans to establish a new state agency to oversee exports of major commodities including coal, palm oil, and nickel. The government says the move is intended to reduce revenue losses and strengthen national control over natural resources, but investors worry it could disrupt pricing systems and reduce private sector profitability.

Private Sector Role Remains Important

Despite increasing state involvement in strategic sectors, Prabowo stressed that Indonesia still welcomes private companies and small businesses as partners in economic development. He called for cooperation between the government and the private sector to achieve long term prosperity.

Analysis

Indonesia’s latest economic strategy reflects a balancing act between ambitious state led development goals and the need to maintain investor confidence. While the government aims to accelerate growth and strengthen control over key resources, markets remain cautious about rising fiscal risks and unpredictable policy changes.

The proposed commodity export agency could significantly reshape Indonesia’s role in global resource markets because the country is one of the world’s largest exporters of coal and palm oil. However, stronger government intervention may create uncertainty for foreign investors and commodity traders.

At the same time, maintaining fiscal discipline will be critical as Prabowo moves forward with large welfare programmes and economic reforms. The success of his agenda will likely depend on whether the government can reassure markets while delivering growth, stability, and stronger institutional credibility.

With information from Reuters.

President Lai says Taiwan’s future is up to its people as the island faces Chinese and US headwinds.

Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te said the future of Taiwan should not be decided by “foreign forces” but is instead in the hands of its 23 million citizens.

Speaking on the second anniversary of his inauguration on Wednesday, Lai said his goal as president continued to be maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait – the 180km (112-mile) waterway dividing Taiwan from China – and to prevent “external forces” from altering the island’s political status quo.

The president said he was still willing to engage with Beijing, which cut off communication with Taipei in 2016, but only through “orderly exchanges” based on the principles of “equality and dignity”.

Taiwan is a responsible member of the international community, not a “party that undermines stability”, he also said, in an apparent swipe at Beijing.

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office on Wednesday accused Lai of inciting “cross-strait confrontation” by supporting “Taiwan independence” in remarks coinciding with his anniversary.

The office’s spokesperson, Zhu Fenglian, said Lai “peddles separatist fallacies” while using a narrative of “democracy versus authoritarianism” to describe the Taiwan-China relationship.

Zhu also accused Lai of ignoring the wellbeing of the Taiwanese public to pander to “external forces attempting to ‘seek independence through foreign aid’ and ‘seek independence through force’.”

Lai has faced a tumultuous 24 months as president, with pressures from both inside and outside Taiwan, including from traditional ally the United States.

The opposition-controlled legislature cut down a signature special defence budget from $40bn to $25bn, and this week tried and failed to impeach him over a tax revenue dispute.

He has a 38 percent approval rating, according to a poll conducted earlier this month by news network TVBS, which, while low, is still better than his 32 percent approval rating during his first year in office.

His disapproval rating has also fallen from 55 percent to 44 percent.

Lai said on Wednesday that his government would take other measures to make up the shortfall in Taiwan’s defence spending.

As president, Lai has also had to contend with uncertainty from the US, Taiwan’s longstanding unofficial ally, amid growing pressure from China, which has staged five rounds of military exercises around Taiwan since his May 2024 inauguration.

US President Donald Trump said last week that US arms sales to Taiwan could be used as a “very good negotiating chip” with Beijing.

Trump’s remarks followed a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, where the Chinese leader called on Trump to take a stronger stance on Taiwan’s political status.

The US has for decades maintained a deliberately ambiguous stance on the issue.

Lai was also forced to delay a state visit to Eswatini, formerly known as Swaziland, Taiwan’s only diplomatic ally in Africa, in April when several countries denied him access to their airspace due to alleged Chinese pressure. He later made the trip through a circuitous route on board Eswatini King Mswati III’s private jet.

The daughter of mosque security guard Amin Abdullah is remembering him as the “absolute best dad in the world.” Family and community members gathered Tuesday to honour Abdullah, who was killed while confronting gunmen during the attack on a San Diego mosque.

DEVELOPING STORYDEVELOPING STORY,

Xi and Putin hold talks just days after US President Donald Trump made an official visit to China.

A meeting between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin has started in Beijing, Chinese state media report.

Xi welcomed Putin to the Chinese capital on Wednesday, shaking hands with the Russian leader outside the Great Hall of the People before their talks, video by Russian media showed.

Before entering the Great Hall, Putin and Xi walked down a red carpet, rolled out to greet the Russian leader, and stood as a military band played their two national anthems.

Putin began the talks by hailing the “strong, positive” momentum in cooperation between Russia and China, according to Russian media.

“Even amid unfavourable external factors, our cooperation and economic cooperation is showing strong, positive momentum,” Putin told Xi.

Addressing Putin, Xi lauded the “unyielding relationship” between China and Russia.

“We have been able to continuously deepen our political mutual trust and strategic coordination with a resilience that remains unyielding despite trials and tribulations,” Xi told Putin, according to China’s Xinhua news agency.

The Chinese leader also addressed war in the Middle East, telling his Russian counterpart that further conflict was “inadvisable” and a ceasefire was necessary.

“A comprehensive ceasefire is of utmost urgency, resuming hostilities is even more inadvisable and maintaining negotiations is particularly important,” Xi said, according to Xinhua.

Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu, reporting from Beijing, noted that Putin’s visit and that of the recently concluded trip by US President Donald Trump to China were very different.

Putin, she said, is marking 25 years of the Sino-Russian friendship, has visited China dozens of times, and met with Xi on more than 40 other occasions.

“So this visit will really be about deepening existing coordination and cooperation,” Yu said.

“We are expecting that the two sides will update each other on the situation in the Middle East, as well as Ukraine. No doubt, Xi Jinping will also talk to Putin about what was discussed with Donald Trump last week,” Yu said.

Putin is being accompanied by a large delegation of Russian businesspeople and government leaders, and the Kremlin has announced that the two leaders will sign some 40 different agreements, Yu said, covering everything from the economy and tourism to education.

“But I think for Putin, the main topic of discussion with Xi Jinping is going to be on energy security,” Yu said.

“Since the war in Ukraine, any gas sales that were previously heading to Europe – that is all dried up – and Russia is in desperate need of revenue to replace that, especially since we are in the fifth year of the Ukraine war,” she added.

In a video address released before meeting Xi, Putin said Beijing and Moscow are prepared to cooperate with each other on “core interests ‌of ⁠the two countries, including the protection of sovereignty and national unity”, the Reuters news agency reports.

Both countries are actively expanding ⁠ties in economy, politics and defence, Putin said, adding that “a close” and “strategic” connection between Moscow and Beijing ⁠was playing “a stabilising role” in global relations.

“We are not aligning against anyone, but working ⁠for the cause of peace and universal prosperity,” Putin said.

There are moments when nations move dangerously close to collapse before the public fully realises it. It begins with carefully framed messages that conceal or even deny a storm, then the country is described as dangerous, lawless, and extremist-tolerant. By the time formal consequences arrive, the political judgment has often already been made. By late 2025, Nigeria was approaching that threshold in Washington DC, the United States’ capital. 

Donald Trump was accusing the Nigerian state of failing Christians, and Republican lawmakers were describing the country as one of the world’s deadliest countries for Christians. Evangelical organisations in the United States were also mobilising around massacre narratives from Benue, Plateau, Southern Kaduna, and parts of the North Central region. These led to congressional pressure, visa restrictions, and discussions of sanctions. Later, Trump threatened military action and warned that the United States could move into Nigeria “guns-a-blazing” if the killings continued.

Inside sections of conservative American politics, Nigeria was no longer merely a troubled African country but was becoming a pariah state, a symbol of global Christian persecution, failed governance, Islamist expansion, and state weakness.

Then, the trajectory shifted. Within months, the same Trump administration that had threatened consequences against Nigeria began working with Abuja on counterterrorism cooperation. American intelligence support deepened, and US military involvement expanded, leading to widely criticised (for their lack of any real impact) airstrikes targeting Islamic State-linked and Lakurawa positions in northwestern Nigeria in December 2025. However, in May 2026, Trump publicly celebrated a successful joint Nigerian and American operation that killed Abu Bilal al-Minuki, described in both countries’ security circles as one of the most important Islamic State figures operating across Africa.

Nigeria had moved from an accused state to an operational partner, even though many have wondered what the cost might have been or continues to be. Behind that dramatic transition was one of the most consequential diplomatic-security campaigns mounted by Abuja in recent years. It involved diplomats, intelligence officials, military officers, embassy staff, policy advisers, lobbyists, diaspora actors, civil society networks, and security partners.

At the centre of this coordination stood National Security Adviser (NSA) Nuhu Ribadu, the coordinating figure who pulled the necessary elements together: the presidency’s political authority, the security establishment’s operational credibility, the embassy’s diplomatic access, the military’s counterterror capacity, policy networks in Washington, and a message that American officials could not easily dismiss.

Working with figures including a senior Nigerian career diplomat in DC, an influential woman at the NSA’s secretariat, senior defence and intelligence officials, foreign affairs officials, and other intermediaries, Ribadu helped steer Nigeria away from a potentially disastrous confrontation with Washington, DC.

The crisis Abuja could not treat as routine

Nigeria has faced criticism from the United States before on corruption, election disputes, human rights abuses, military excesses, and oil theft — all governance failures. None of those carried the same immediate danger as the late-2025 escalation. This crisis was different because it had moved beyond policy disagreement into moral accusation. The phrase “Christian genocide” changed the stakes.

Inside conservative American evangelical circles, Nigeria had already become symbolic before Trump’s escalation. Reports from groups such as Open Doors, International Christian Concern, Aid to the Church in Need, and Nigerian Christian advocacy organisations had repeatedly described Nigeria as one of the world’s deadliest places for Christians. Killings in Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, Southern Kaduna, parts of Niger State, and other flashpoints circulated widely through American church networks. 

Nigeria’s First Lady, Pastor Remi Tinubu, also operated far beyond the ceremonial margins. Using her deep evangelical and clerical networks, she became a decisive force in breaking resistance, opening doors that formal diplomacy and security channels could not. Her interventions softened hardened positions, clearing the path for diplomatic and security engagement to gain some traction.

“Nigeria is facing a complex security crisis that has sustained for over two decades and has currently metastasised into several violent crimes, including active insurgencies, farmer-herder violence, armed groups, gang violence, ethnic militias, and vigilantism, among several others,” Managing Director of Beacon Intelligence Consulting, Dr Kabiru Adamu, told HumAngle.

“While the triggers of the violence sometimes include identity such as ethnicity and religion, other factors, including socio-economic, political and environmental causes, are behind the violence.”

Amara Nwankpa, Director General, Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Foundation, argued that acknowledging complexity should not become a shield against responsibility.

“Nigeria is facing a complex security collapse,” he agreed. “But saying the crisis is ‘complex’ should not become a way to avoid the harder question of why some communities consistently suffer more than others.”

“The Nigerian state is weak. In many places, it genuinely struggles to protect people because of overstretched security forces, corruption, political fragmentation, and poor state capacity. That matters. A state that cannot protect is different from a state that deliberately chooses not to. But that distinction does not remove responsibility,” he told HumAngle.

“The mistake of the ‘Christian genocide’ framing is that it treats all the violence as one coordinated religious project,” he said. “The mistake of the ‘it’s complicated’ response is that it sometimes uses complexity as an excuse for inaction.”

Johnstone Kpilaakaa, an award-winning journalist who has closely followed the Middle Belt crisis, submits that the violence cannot be separated from the collapse of state protection across rural Nigeria. “Overall, the crisis reflects the broader failure of the Nigerian state to provide protection for its citizens,” he said. “Rural communities in the Middle Belt, many of which already experience a near-total absence of state presence, even in basic social services, have become especially vulnerable to terror attacks and organised violence.”

According to Kpilaakaa, the genocide narrative gained traction in the Middle Belt partly because many of the most devastated communities were Christian. “Historical memory also plays a role. The legacy of the 19th-century Sokoto Jihad, which faced resistance in parts of the region, continues to shape perceptions and fears today.” Children, he added, are raised with those stories, and those inherited fears continue to shape how violence is interpreted.

James Barnett, a fellow at the Hudson Institute, framed the crisis more as systemic collapse than coordinated extermination. “Nigeria is experiencing something more like a nationwide security crisis than a specific campaign targeted at one group,” Barnett said. “This is a collapse of state capacity that is felt in all corners of the country to different degrees, and it’s allowed militant and criminal groups of various stripes to kill, loot, and take over communities with significant impunity.”

He acknowledged that some armed actors operate with religious motivations. But much of the violence, he argued, is driven by opportunism, local disputes, criminal economies, and governance breakdown. That complexity became Abuja’s central diplomatic argument later in Washington.

The conservative machinery turns against Nigeria

Several American political actors helped turn the issue into a Washington crisis. Senator Ted Cruz became one of the strongest congressional voices accusing Nigeria of systemic anti-Christian violence. He introduced the Nigeria Religious Freedom Accountability Act of 2025 and repeatedly cited casualty figures involving Christians killed, churches destroyed, and communities displaced.

Congressman Riley Moore also became a central figure in the pressure campaign. He pushed the White House towards stronger action and publicly accused the Nigerian state of failing to protect persecuted Christians. But the deeper force came from evangelical networks. American evangelical activism is not simply moral advocacy but also an organised political ecosystem. It has media platforms, donor structures, church mobilisation capacity, congressional access, lobbying relationships, legal advocacy groups, and influence inside Republican politics.

Pastors, televangelists, diaspora activists, advocacy groups, conservative influencers, and social media personalities amplified reports from Nigeria, often portraying the country as the global epicentre of anti-Christian violence. Prayer campaigns followed. At the same time, misinformation and disinformation flooded digital spaces, blurring the line between verified atrocities and fabricated claims. Across Telegram channels, Facebook pages, WhatsApp broadcasts, podcasts, YouTube ministries, and conservative media networks, emotionally charged narratives circulated with little scrutiny, shaping international perceptions of Nigeria’s security crisis.

Yet even some analysts sympathetic to Christian suffering warned that the narrative was becoming distorted. “In attempting to draw global attention to the suffering of communities in the Middle Belt, some evangelical advocacy networks and social media actors have also oversimplified the crisis,” Kpilaakaa said.

“In certain cases, this has involved the circulation of half-truths, selective reporting, or sensationalised accounts that do not fully capture the complexity of the situation.” He stressed that multiple forms of violence were being collapsed into a single frame. “Beyond terrorist violence, the Middle Belt also faces attacks carried out by local militia groups and criminal networks, particularly in states such as Benue,” he said.

“Unfortunately, many of these distinct forms of violence are often merged into a single narrative of religious persecution, which can make the crisis more difficult to properly understand, analyse, and address.”

Nwankpa reached a similar conclusion, though he warned against dismissing the suffering that fuels those narratives.

“Some evangelical networks and social media platforms have distorted global understanding of the violence, but not by inventing suffering,” he said. “The suffering is real. Many Christian communities, especially in parts of the North and Middle Belt, have experienced terrible violence.”

According to him, the distortion emerges when an entire national security collapse is reduced to a single religious explanation.

“Incentives also drive that simplification. In the US, persecution narratives mobilise donors and audiences very effectively. Clear stories raise more money than messy realities.”

He added that diaspora activism had amplified simplified narratives globally, often detached from the wider context of Nigeria’s security breakdown.

Kabiru Adamu was direct. “Yes,” he said when asked whether evangelical networks and social media had distorted international understanding of Nigeria’s violence. “Their narrative of Christian genocide and the bandying of falsified figures contributed to the Trump administration’s earlier stance.”

Still, he warned against swinging to denial. “This is not to say Christians are not being killed. They are. But so too are Muslims.”

Christians had been killed, churches attacked, villages emptied, and priests abducted. But Muslims are also dying in larger numbers as Nigeria’s conflicts defy simple religious labels. Islamic State affiliates targeted Muslim communities, soldiers, traders, aid workers, schools, and transport routes. Armed groups kidnapped indiscriminately. Farmer-herder conflict, jihadist expansion, criminal economies, land pressure, governance failure, and communal grievances all overlapped. The genocide frame compressed those realities into one dangerous explanation. 

Trump turns pressure into a state crisis

In late 2025, Trump’s administration escalated pressure against Nigeria under international religious freedom frameworks, including the Country of Particular Concern designation. He accused Nigeria of allowing Christians to be killed by “Radical Islamists” and threatened possible military action. 

For Abuja, the implications were dire. They could bring about diplomatic isolation, damage to intelligence and security cooperation, and investor panic in an already fragile economy. This was where Ribadu’s office became central. The National Security Adviser understood that Nigeria could not defeat the pressure campaign through blunt denial.

So, Abuja adopted a more difficult strategy that involved acknowledging the insecurity while rejecting the genocide label and repositioning the crisis as part of a broader counterterror and state fragility problem.

Kpilaakaa argued that, “The absence of proactive state action, credible investigations, and timely justice creates space for speculation and mistrust, while trauma inevitably shapes the perceptions and judgment of survivors.” 

The Nigerian response, therefore, focused less on arguing morality and more on changing strategic calculations in Washington. The message became simple: weakening Nigeria would strengthen the so-called Islamic State.

Nwankpa believes Ribadu’s intervention succeeded not because it resolved the crisis, but because it changed how Washington interpreted it.

“Ribadu did not solve the crisis,” he said. “What he did was change the diplomatic framing, and he did it very effectively. He shifted the conversation from ‘Nigeria is allowing Christians to be killed’ to ‘Nigeria and the US are facing a shared terrorism problem.’ That helped cool tensions with Washington and turned pressure into cooperation.”

But he warned that the strategic success came with consequences.

“Once the relationship became centred on counterterrorism, the space for human rights and accountability pressure became smaller,” Nwankpa said. “The focus moved from protecting vulnerable communities to fighting shared threats. In that sense, the deeper issue of impunity remained unresolved. It was postponed.”

Ribadu’s reframing strategy

Ribadu’s role with coordination happened because many parts needed to move in specific directions. For example, the presidency had to provide political authority, the military had to provide operational credibility, diplomats had to reopen channels in Washington, intelligence officials had to frame the regional threat, lobbyists and intermediaries had to reach spaces formal diplomacy could not easily penetrate, and the central message itself had to remain consistent.

Nigeria was a battered state confronting overlapping extremist, criminal, communal, and regional threats, and if the state weakened further, Boko Haram and a confluence of other terror groups across the country would benefit.

Kabiru Adamu believes Ribadu deserves significant credit for the diplomatic de-escalation. “The NSA Nuhu Ribadu can be credited for de-escalating the earlier US stance when the Trump Administration, after designating Nigeria a country of particular concern due to perceived religious persecution and Trump’s threat to come ‘guns a blazing,’” he said. “Ribadu led a high-level delegation to the US and followed through with engagements that led to the creation of a joint working group between the two countries as well as deeper defence engagement.”

Barnett reached a similar conclusion. “The Nigerian government has responded pretty effectively on the diplomatic front so far,” he said. “After initially being caught unprepared for the Country of Particular Concern designation, it realised that it wouldn’t get very far by publicly protesting Trump’s narrative and instead sought to leverage Washington’s focus on Nigeria to secure new security cooperation.”

That recalibration reshaped the relationship because even though the United States still publicly raised concerns about religious freedom, Nigeria became increasingly valuable as a regional counterterror partner. Barnett noted that the new working relationship also elevated Ribadu internationally. “The US-Nigeria working group has boosted Ribadu’s profile internationally,” he said.

Kpilaakaa observed that Abuja’s strategy prevented a deeper rupture. “Despite recent joint military operations in Metele, Borno State, which reportedly led to the death of a senior ISWAP leader, some influential American politicians continue to frame US involvement as part of an effort to stop what they describe as a genocide against Christians in Nigeria only,” he said.

“That suggests the National Security Adviser has not fully succeeded in reshaping the narrative.” Even so, he argued that the cooperation itself remained strategically necessary. “Beyond the competing narratives, effective counterterrorism operations remain in Nigeria’s national interest,” he said. “If military cooperation is conducted professionally, ethically, and strategically, the outcome should contribute to greater security and stability for all Nigerians, regardless of religion or ethnicity.”

Why Trump changed course

Trump’s shift appeared dramatic from Abuja. One moment, he was threatening Nigeria. Months later, he was celebrating joint counterterror operations with Nigerian forces. But analysts say this logic was less ideological than transactional. “The change in stance by the Trump administration from declared hostility to now engagement is mainly because of the diplomatic engagements by Nigeria, including Ribadu’s engagements,” Adamu said.

“There is also the lobby group contracted by the Federal Government that may have played a role in supporting a de-escalation.” Barnett believes Nigeria itself was never central to Trump’s broader worldview. “Nigeria is not actually a foreign policy priority for Trump, despite how much it might feel to Nigerians like he is now a looming presence in their politics,” he said.

“The US government has dedicated much more time and resources to its Venezuela and Iran policies, for example, than it has to Africa. When Trump threatened to go into Nigeria ‘guns a blazing’ last year, he was essentially calling on the US national security bureaucracy to come up with ideas to ‘do something’ in Nigeria that would look impressive but not consume significant energy and resources or entail political risk.”

The solution Washington eventually settled on was a partnership rather than confrontation. “The US military, for its part, would always prefer to fight jihadists with the help of a capable local partner rather than opposition from the host government,” Barnett explained.

“So, when the Nigerian government signalled it was willing to work with the US military, that gave the Trump administration an opening to show its supporters that it was fighting terrorists, supposedly in defence of Christians overseas, without engaging in a messy humanitarian intervention or state-building exercise.”

Nwankpa argued that the political logic behind Trump’s shift reflected both American strategic interests and Nigerian sensitivity to external pressure.

“Trump changed position because the political framing changed,” he said. “Threatening Nigeria appealed to parts of his evangelical and religious freedom base. Working with Nigeria appealed to American security interests. Once Abuja accepted the counterterrorism framing, Trump no longer needed a public confrontation.”

But he also pointed to a deeper Nigerian calculation.

“Most Nigerians want stronger security responses, but very few want foreign powers taking over the process,” Nwankpa said. “There is a strong sovereignty instinct in Nigeria. External pressure that appears paternalistic often collapses domestic coalition support, even among people who agree with the underlying criticism… Ribadu’s approach worked partly because it allowed Nigeria to engage America as a partner, not as a country being lectured or managed from outside.”

Kpilaakaa argued that Trump never completely abandoned the persecution narrative. “I do not believe there has been a complete shift in position,” he said. “Even recently, Trump shared material on Truth Social that reinforced the same narrative that frames every attack as religious persecution targeting Christians alone.”

He added that religious framing remains deeply embedded in Trump-era politics. “The use of religion, in this case Christianity, as a framework for discussing political and security issues is synonymous with the Trump administration,” he said.

Yet, Abuja avoided turning the disagreement into a public confrontation.

“It is also significant that Nigerian authorities have largely avoided engaging in public confrontation with Trump or his allies,” Kpilaakaa said. “Instead, they have focused on maintaining cooperation around the shared objective of combating terrorism and protecting lives, irrespective of religion or ethnicity.”

The Sahel and Nigeria’s strategic value

Regional realities strengthened Abuja’s hand. The Sahel was deteriorating rapidly; Mali had drifted away from Western influence, Burkina Faso remained unstable, Niger’s political upheaval disrupted Western security architecture, and Russian-linked actors expanded across the region.

Washington needed a capable African partner, and Nigeria’s geography, population, intelligence infrastructure, military size, and position between multiple conflict systems made it indispensable. Ribadu’s team aggressively leveraged that reality.

Weakening Nigeria, they argued, would not save Christians. It would strengthen the very extremist groups killing Christians and Muslims alike. That logic resonated strongly inside American security circles because it aligned humanitarian concern with strategic necessity.

The limits of the recovery

None of this erased the suffering that produced the controversy. Benue, Plateau, and Southern Kaduna still bleed. Communities across Niger State, Borno, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, Yobe, and Adamawa continue to experience displacement, extortion, killings, and fear.

The average Nigerian, irrespective of their faith and ethnicity, genuinely believes the Nigerian state has failed them and the state must do more, not only to save lives, but to regain their trust in governance. The deeper question now is whether security cooperation alone can sustain the diplomatic recovery if the violence continues unresolved.

Kpilaakaa warned that “military cooperation alone will not resolve the deeper structural issues driving instability in the Middle Belt.” “Addressing land disputes, prolonged displacement, impunity, and the absence of justice remains critical,” he said.

He pointed to one grievance. “One of the most persistent grievances among affected communities is that many victims have spent more than a decade in displacement, with little accountability for the violence they endured. Without credible justice, reconstruction, and long-term conflict resolution, security cooperation may contain the violence temporarily, but it will not produce lasting peace or stability.”

“No,” Adamu said when asked whether security cooperation could survive if killings and impunity continue. “Evangelical groups will continue to mount domestic pressure on the Trump administration should the killings continue.”

Barnett also cautioned that Abuja should not assume permanent stability in the relationship. “You can’t be too certain where things go from here as Trump is notoriously unpredictable,” he said.

“He might be satisfied with periodic strikes against the Islamic State that make for good Fox News content while the militaries engage in more routine behind-the-scenes coordination and training.”

But the pressure networks inside American politics remain active. “There is also a vocal American constituency on this issue,” Barnett warned. “Those folks can be highly critical of the Tinubu government, and they are likely to perceive any continued violence, particularly in the Middle Belt, as justification for sanctions or even more radical forms of intervention.”

His conclusion was stark. “Tinubu can’t be certain he’s out of the woods just yet.” That is the reality beneath Nigeria’s diplomatic recovery. Abuja escaped one dangerous moment in Washington, but it has not solved the crisis that created it.

Back in Abuja, Ribadu remains trapped in a far more complicated war. His growing influence has unsettled opposition figures, threatened entrenched interests within the ruling party, and fuelled quiet anxieties about his long-term political ambition, multiple sources within Abuja policy networks implied. “If Ribadu misreads that terrain, his ambition could become his greatest vulnerability.”

U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is moving to demonstrate a new, fully integrated extended-range strike capability for the AC-130J Ghostrider gunship. The two core elements of this effort are an active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar and the AGM-190A Small Cruise Missile (SCM), work on which has been underway separately for some time now. TWZ has long highlighted how giving the AC-130J an AESA radar would boost its ability to engage targets at longer ranges. This, in turn, could also help ensure the Ghostrider’s relevance in future high-end fights, especially in the Pacific region.

Col. Justin Bronder, head of SOCOM’s Program Executive Office for Fixed Wing (PEO-FW), discussed the integration of the radar together with the AGM-190A on the AC-130J earlier today. Bronder spoke to TWZ and other outlets alongside other SOCOM acquisition officials at a roundtable on the sidelines of the annual SOF Week conference.

AGM-190A is the formal U.S. military designation for the SCM, developed by Leidos, originally under the name Black Arrow. It has now also emerged that SOCOM refers to the missile by the nickname Havoc Spear. With a demonstrated range of at least 400 miles, the missile has far greater reach than any of the other missiles and precision bombs that the AC-130J is known to be able to employ now by a huge margin. The Ghostrider’s current armament package, which also includes a 30mm automatic cannon and a 105mm howitzer, is focused on close air support and interdiction missions against targets at much closer ranges.

“A lot going on in that space,” Col. Bronder said today. “Our unique teaming with Leidos, that started with a CRADA [Cooperative Research and Development Agreement], that accelerated through an express development program on the now called AGM-190 Havoc Spear affordable cruise missile.”

A CRADA is a non-traditional research and development mechanism through which elements of the U.S. military can pool resources with private companies and other organizations. These agreements allow the parties involved to pursue mutually beneficial work, but without a typical contract or even money necessarily changing hands.

“That program [the AGM-190] has really been moving along quite, quite quickly,” Bronder continued. “We’re looking at ways to kind of accelerate fielding of that weapon in the not too distant future with close teaming with AFSOC [Air Force Special Operations Command] partners to really collapse that development and operational test timeline. So, real big acquisition success there.”

Leidos completes successful test launch of a Small Cruise Missile

“We have tech demonstrations with the AESA radar and the small cruise missile that we’re now looking to see how we can augment and accelerate fielding those types of capabilities for the SOF [special operations forces] fleet,” Bronder added.

“CRADAs produced the AGM-190A Havoc Spear small cruise missile that offers an affordable mass solution with significant range to our service partners,” U.S. Navy Adm. Frank Bradley, head of SOCOM, also said separately during his keynote address at the SOF Week conference earlier today. “Integrated with the AESA radar on the AC-130 gunship, [it is] a formidable capability.”

SOCOM’s proposed budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year, released last month, had hinted at plans to demonstrate the new combination of capabilities for the AC-130J in the next year or so. The command is asking for nearly $5.9 million to support work on the so-called Precision Strike Package (PSP) for the AC-130J. PSP is the overarching system through which all weapons and associated sensors are integrated onto the Ghostrider.

The new funding “is required to integrate AESA radar capabilities into the PSP,” according to SOCOM’s budget documents. The planned work “includes software and hardware development to incorporate the AESA functionality into the Battle Management System and other associated AC-130J systems.”

What specific AESA radar is going on the AC-130Js is unclear. At last year’s SOF Week conference, Col. Bronder said there was “pathfinding” underway involving Northrop Grumman’s AN/APG-83, also known as Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR).

SABR AESA Radar for the F-16

“AFSOC is exploring the development and use of the AESA Radar on the AC-130J as the command continues to operate as both the SOF component to the Air Force and air component to USSOCOM,” AFSOC told TWZ when asked for an update in August 2025. “We cannot discuss the type of radar due to operational security.”

The APG-83 does remain a very plausible choice. The Air Force has already been in the process of integrating this radar onto a significant portion of its fleets of F-16C/D Viper fighters for years now. Beyond its target detection and tracking capabilities, the AN/APG-83 has a synthetic aperture mapping mode and is capable of producing ground moving target indicator data. Also referred to as SAR mapping, this mode allows SABR to produce high-resolution radar imagery. GMTI tracks can be overlaid on those images. All of this, in turn, can be used for target acquisition and identification purposes, as well as general reconnaissance.

There are other AESA radars on the market, as well, including a growing number of compact designs. Radars of this type, in general, can spot objects of interest, even ones with smaller radar cross-sections, faster and do so with greater precision and fidelity compared to older mechanically-scanned models. They can also just scan faster and perform multiple functions near-simultaneously, and do so with improved resistance to radiofrequency jamming and far greater reliability.

As mentioned, TWZ has long pointed out that the addition of an AESA radar would be a huge upgrade for the AC-130J’s ability to spot, track, and engage targets at extended ranges, even in bad weather. The radar would be able to provide real-time midcourse updates to a stand-off weapon if it had a data link capability. This would make engaging moving targets possible if the missile also had a terminal seeker capable of doing so.

Overall, the capability boosts the AESA radar offers are especially important when paired with new, longer-range strike munitions like the AGM-190A. The radar could also help improve the Ghostrider’s effectiveness when employing other shorter-range munitions, including GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) now and GBU-53/B StormBreakers (also known as SDB IIs) in the future.

AESA radars will also expand the AC-130J’s general surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, as well as provide improved general situational awareness.

This is all reflected in SOCOM’s budget documents, which state: “AESA radar enhances the AC-130J’s situational awareness, precision targeting, and survivability while replacing phased-out legacy radars, enabling the Gunship to close Joint Force kill webs and expand its role in support of USINDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] and Western Hemisphere operations.”

The mention here of the Indo-Pacific region underscores broader questions about future operational relevance that have been facing the AC-130 fleet in recent years. The Ghostrider and its immediate predecessors were workhorses during the Global War on Terror era, flying heavily over countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Even so, they flew almost exclusively under the cover of darkness to help reduce vulnerability to ground fire.

Can The AC-130 Gunship Stay Relevant?

Threats to AC-130s would be far more pronounced in any future high-end fight, such as one against China in the Pacific. For years now, this has been the chief scenario driving U.S. military planning around force structure and other requirements. The latest conflict with Iran, as well as other U.S. operations in and around the Middle East in recent years, have made clear that more capable air defense systems are steadily proliferating to smaller nation states and even non-state actors, as well.

The integration of a new stand-off strike capability paired with an AESA radar is one way for the AC-130J to respond to this evolving threat ecosystem. It could also open the door to other new capabilities for the Ghostrider, as well as other AFSOC aircraft like the OA-1K Skyraider II light attack plane. Similar questions about future relevance have been raised about the OA-1K, a design that is also primarily geared toward counter-terrorism missions and other low-intensity conflicts.

The AC-130J fleet is also in the process of receiving a number of other upgrades, including improvements to its defense countermeasures suite.

It is very possible that the AGM-190A could find its way out of the special operations community and into more widespread U.S. military use. The Air Force is currently planning to buy nearly 28,000 low-cost strike munitions over the next five years through its Family of Affordable Mass Missiles (FAMM) program.

“We’re also continuing to talk to the Air Force about what they’re doing with their Family of Affordable Mass Munitions [sic]” to see “if there’s some continued interplay there for us to do a service-to-SOF or SOF-to-service transition,” Col. Bronder said today.

Last week, the Pentagon also rolled out a plan to acquire at least 10,000 lower-cost cruise missiles, primarily for surface-launched applications from containerized launchers, in the next three years. Leidos is among the companies now involved in this Low-Cost Containerized Missiles (LCCM) program, and is developing a derivative of the AGM-190A to meet those requirements.

For the AC-130J, a full-up demonstration of the pair of an AESA radar and the AGM-190A cruise missile will mark another step toward giving the gunships a valuable, if not increasingly essential, boost in capability.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Warning comes after Trump threatened military action against Iran and gave it ‘two to three days’ to strike a deal.

Caracas, May 19, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez held a meeting with a World Bank delegation at Miraflores Palace on Friday.

In a statement, Caracas described the summit as “cordial and constructive,” with both parties “exploring possible collaboration in matters of technical assistance.”

“The Venezuelan government and the World Bank agreed on the need to deepen dialogue and agreed to work together to establish concrete areas for technical collaboration for the benefit of the Venezuelan people,” the communiqué read.

Rodríguez was flanked by Economy Vice President Calixto Ortega and Finance Minister Anabel Pereira. The World Bank delegation was led by Susana Cordeiro Guerra, the US-based organization’s vice president for Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Rodríguez administration recently reestablished ties with both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund following a seven-year hiatus due to Washington’s non-recognition of Venezuelan authorities. However, relations with the two institutions had been frozen several years prior. Former President Hugo Chávez disengaged Venezuela from the multilateral bodies in 2007, calling them “weapons of US imperialism,” though the country remained a formal member.

Since the January 3 US attacks and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro, Caracas has fast-tracked diplomatic rapprochement with the Trump administration, which recognized Rodríguez as Venezuela’s “sole leader” in March. The Venezuelan government has launched a series of pro-business reforms and struck agreements with Western energy and mining corporations.

On May 13, Venezuela’s acting president announced the launch of a debt restructuring process as part of efforts to return the Caribbean nation to global financial markets. Venezuelan authorities plan to present a macroeconomic framework and debt sustainability analysis to stakeholders next month.

Venezuela’s foreign debt is estimated as high as US $170 billion, from a combination of defaulted bonds and loans with accrued interest, as well as international arbitration awards. US financial sanctions from 2017 severely exacerbated Venezuela’s economic crisis and blocked the country from fulfilling its debt obligations.

The acting Rodríguez administration has vowed that the country’s priority is to access $5 billion in IMF Special Drawing Rights and that there are “no plans” to contract IMF loans. Venezuela’s Central Bank President Luis Pérez recently announced that a delegation will head to Washington to meet with IMF officials by the end of May.

Trump billionaire allies move in

Caracas’ opening to Western conglomerates has seen multiple Trump officials visit the country alongside business executives to discuss investment opportunities.

Erebor Bank, backed by far-right tech mogul and close Trump ally Peter Thiel, has reportedly pitched its services to Venezuelan officials to restore the country’s access to the US financial system. According to Bloomberg, Erebor co-founder Jacob Hirshman has made several trips to Caracas in recent weeks and met with Central Bank authorities and private bank executives.

Hirshman reportedly told Venezuelan authorities that he counts on US government support. For its part, Erebor confirmed that it held “preliminary conversations about correspondent banking and related financial services” with Venezuelan counterparts. 

Erebor is a digital-only bank registered in Ohio that received its US banking charter in February.

The lure of lucrative investment prospects has also attracted smaller players such as Yorkville Advisors, a New Jersey-based financial firm with ties to Trump’s family, which plans to raise $200 million for acquiring assets in Venezuela.

The company created a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) and stated that businesses in Venezuela will require “substantial capital investment […] to capitalize on improving macroeconomic conditions.”

In April, Acting President Rodríguez installed a commission to evaluate the “strategic” value of Venezuelan state assets and their possible privatization. Venezuelan private sector companies have begun raising funds ahead of potential sell-offs.

Caracas’ pro-business overtures have also caught the eye of US billionaire investor Fred Ehrsam. The co-founder of crypto exchange Coinbase has likewise made multiple visits to Venezuela in recent weeks to explore “investments ranging from oil and gas to fintech and digital payments,” according to Bloomberg.

Ehrsam held discussions with Venezuelan government officials and reportedly argued that the present moment was ripe for investment as Venezuelan assets remained “deeply undervalued.”

Edited by Lucas Koerner in Caracas.

The US has banned non-Americans who have visited DR Congo, Uganda or South Sudan in the last 21 days from entry.

The United States will ensure that the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) football team can enter the country to play in the World Cup, making an exemption to an Ebola-related entry ban, according to a senior Department of State official.

“We expect the DRC team to be able to attend the World Cup,” the official said on condition of anonymity.

The US has banned non-Americans who have been in the DRC, Uganda or South Sudan in the previous 21 days from visiting the country due to a deadly outbreak of Ebola.

The US official said the DRC team, the only one among the three countries to have qualified for football’s premier event, had already been training in Europe, so they may not have been subject to the ban in any case.

But if they had, in fact, been in the DRC over the last 21 days, they would be subject to the sort of strict screening required for returning US citizens.

“We’re working to get them into the same protocol for testing in isolation that American citizens returning and permanent residents would be,” the official said.

The official said the exemption would not apply to everyday fans from the DRC looking to come to cheer on the team.

The DRC begin their World Cup campaign in Texas against Portugal on June 17.

Newly emerged imagery of the two-seat version of Russia’s Sukhoi Su-57 Felon fighter offers the clearest look yet of the aircraft, which only broke cover over the weekend. The imagery, which was released through official Russian industry channels, shows the dual-seat version of the Su-57 making what was reportedly its first flight at an airfield in Russia. You can get up to date with our previous reporting on the two-seat Su-57D version here.

According to the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), the first flight of the Su-57D was conducted in the hands of Sergei Bogdan, chief test pilot at the Sukhoi Design Bureau. The flight proceeded as planned in accordance with the flight mission parameters, UAC said.

“Flight tests have begun on the prototype of the Su-57, a fifth-generation two-seater fighter.  This aircraft, developed independently by our aircraft manufacturers, will, in addition to its unique combat characteristics, also possess the capabilities of a combat trainer and a command and control aircraft,” said Denis Manturov, First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia.

“We are continuing our work on improving and expanding the capabilities of our most advanced fifth-generation aircraft complex. I am confident that the two-seater version of the aircraft will significantly contribute to its success in foreign markets,” added Vadim Badeha, CEO of UAC.

We now have a much better view of the two-seater, which we can compare with the standard single-seat Su-57 already in Russian service. The new aircraft features an elongated cockpit canopy with a steep elevated position for a second crew member behind the pilot. While the definitive role of the new version remains unclear, many observers believe the aircraft represents Sukhoi’s attempt to transform the Felon into a command-and-control platform to operate as part of a future crewed-uncrewed teaming concept, a concept of operations the Felon is already participating in developing.

The first image emerged through the Fighterbomber Telegram channel, a source closely associated with Russian Aerospace Forces personnel. According to the claims accompanying that first photo, it showed the aircraft during taxi tests, an important stage before any flight trials.

The appearance of the twin-seat Su-57D places Russia in a very exclusive club. At present, China is the only other nation publicly associated with a two-seat fifth-generation fighter program through its Chengdu J-20S variant, an aircraft also widely acknowledged to be associated with crewed-uncrewed teaming for the growing family of Chinese uncrewed combat air vehicles (UCAVs) and fighter-like loyal wingman drones.

A composite image that compares the two-seat J-20S with improved single-seat J-20A, and the original single-seat J-20:

The extra crew station could dramatically reduce pilot workload during high-intensity missions involving the control of formations of drones, but also in missions such as electronic warfare and strike coordination. Of course, the aircraft could also be used as a combat trainer.

The second crew member may eventually direct formations of Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik-B UCAVs. Russia has already experimented with linking the Okhotnik drone to existing single-seat Su-57 prototypes during previous testing campaigns.

Первый совместный полет БЛА «Охотник» и истребителя Су-57

The emergence of the aircraft is also intriguing in the context of the abandoned Indo-Russian FGFA program, an effort once intended to create a customized export version of the Su-57 for India. One of New Delhi’s longstanding requests involved a two-seat configuration, but negotiations collapsed years ago amid disagreements over technology transfer, performance concerns, and design priorities. Ironically, the very concept India once sought may now finally be materializing.

There will be various other changes beyond the cockpit redesign. Accommodating a second seat will likely have required some internal rearrangement involving avionics bays, fuel storage, and mission systems. The changes to the outer mold-line of the jet will also have a negative impact on the aircraft’s low-observability (stealthy) characteristics and performance.

The Su-57 program has long faced a degree of (sometimes unfair) skepticism in the West due to limited production numbers, sanctions pressure, limited combat employment, and persistent questions surrounding the overall level of stealth performance. Nonetheless, Russia continues to push upgrades for the aircraft. In recent years, imagery has also surfaced showing experimental low-observable engine nozzles and revised propulsion systems intended to improve maneuverability and survivability.

Despite the intrigue surrounding the new imagery, many uncertainties remain. There is still no indication of whether the aircraft is intended primarily for Russian use or export customers, or if the program has any kind of formal Russian state backing. However, a comment on Telegram from Rostec says that the Su-57D “was developed by specialists at UAC on their own initiative.”

The project may be aimed largely at attracting more international buyers for the Su-57, which has so far struggled to find export interest amid intensifying global competition in the stealth fighter market, and Russia’s pariah status since its invasion of Ukraine.

For now, the newly surfaced imagery provides a very interesting glimpse into a previously unknown program. However, the emergence of the two-seat Su-57D at the very least signals a major evolution in Russia’s fighter ambitions.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Sweden has chosen its future surface combatant, the Luleå class, its largest in decades, in the shape of the French FDI frigate. The unusual design, with its inverted bow, won out against rival warships from the United Kingdom (a vessel based on the Type 31 frigate) and Spain (the all-new ALFA 4000 frigate).

The announcement was made today on the deck of the stealthy Visby class corvette Härnösand. The Visby class is currently the largest surface combatant used by the Swedish Navy, but it will be dwarfed by the Luleå class. While the Visby class has a displacement of 705 tons and a length of 238 feet 6 inches, the French design has a displacement of 4,390 tons and is 400 feet 3 inches long.

According to reports, the Defense Materiel Administration (FMV), Sweden’s defense procurement organization, chose the French design primarily based on its advanced integrated combat systems and the maturity of the design. As you can read about here, the first example for the French Navy began sea trials in late 2024.

15.09.2025 : Départ de la FDI Amiral Ronarc’h de Lorient

Thirdly, Sweden factored the speed of delivery into the equation. This last point reflects the urgency of the requirement, as the country looks to rebuild its naval power since joining NATO and against the resurgent Russian threat.

While Sweden had long been looking for a next-generation warship to follow on from the Visby class, it originally envisaged a more modest design, with four air defense corvettes based on the Visby design. Since then, the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Sweden’s joining NATO have changed the security landscape dramatically.

When it first pitched its FDI frigate for the program, France had offered to supply Sweden with the first fully equipped warship in 2030, a notably bold timeline. Unlike the rival offers, Naval Group is already building the FDI warships — meaning Frégate de Défense et d’Intervention, or Defense and Intervention Frigate — at its yard in Lorient. Sweden expects to receive one vessel per year starting in 2030.

Despite choosing an off-the-shelf foreign design, there will be industrial benefits for Sweden, with local defense contractors, in particular, Saab, involved in kitting out the warships.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson today heralded the selection of the new warship as “tripling the Swedish [ground- and surface-based] air defenses.” The frigates were always expected to focus heavily on anti-air warfare capabilities, something that’s of growing interest to the Swedish Navy and the importance of which has been underscored by recent conflicts.

For Sweden in particular, a new frigate with enhanced anti-air warfare capabilities will be better able to protect itself, other vessels, and even shore areas or islands, against threats from the air. The overwhelming numbers of crewed aircraft, drones, and missiles that Russia could potentially put up in a conflict involving Sweden have been a significant concern even before the country joined NATO.

The Luleå class will swap out some of the original French combat systems found in the baseline FDI frigate and replace these with locally made equipment.

However, for its critical air defense role, Swedish Minister of Defence Pål Jonsson confirmed that the Luleå class will be armed with two types of missiles from the pan-European MBDA. The first of these is the Aster 30, which, as we have described in the past, is the primary anti-air weapon of the French FDI. In its baseline form, the FDI hull can accommodate 16 Aster missiles in a pair of eight-cell launchers — later vessels will be able to carry 32 by doubling the number of launchers.

The Aster 30 is able to engage targets at more than 75 miles. Recent improvements to the Aster 30 include enhancing its capabilities against anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), a relatively new type of threat.

Aster 30 will be complemented by the CAMM-ER, the extended-range version of the Common Anti-air Modular Missile that is being added to the five Visby class corvettes, to expand their anti-air warfare capabilities. The CAMM-ER surface-to-air missile can engage a wide variety of threats out to a range of around 25 miles.

In terms of anti-ship missiles, the Swedish boats will carry the locally made RBS 15 instead of the MM40 Exocet on the French ships.

Polish Navy demonstrates the excellence of RBS15

As well as an onboard helicopter, anti-submarine firepower will be entrusted to the Swedish Torped 47 instead of the MU90. This new, lightweight torpedo has recently been tested by the Swedish Navy, being fired from a corvette, and during live-fire exercises from a submarine, as seen in the video below.

Torped 47 – den nya lätta

With its long track record of naval artillery, Sweden will provide the Bofors 57mm instead of the OTO 76mm, while the Bofors 40 Mk 4 will be used as the close-in weapon system (CIWS) in place of the 21-tube RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM). The Bofors 40 Mk 4 can fire Bofors 3P (Pre-fragmented, Programmable, Proximity-fused) ammunition, which can be programmed in six different modes to provide
optimised effect against different targets, including airbursts against aerial drones.

BAE Systems Bofors 3P Counter UAS ammunition

Smaller-caliber guns will be fitted in the form of the Saab Trackfire 12.7mm remote weapon stations (RWS), replacing the Lionfish 20 or Narwhal 20mm.

At this stage, it appears that the French-made SETIS combat management system will be retained on the Swedish warships and not replaced with a local equivalent, such as the Saab 9LV. However, the Sea Giraffe 1X radar, from the same firm, will reportedly be included in the sensor array. This would displace the original Thales Sea Fire radar found in the baseline FDI design and would extend air defense surveillance out to a significant range.

Choosing an existing French design means that Sweden will be able to share some of the costs of the program with other operators. As well as France, Greece is ordering the FDI design, and other potential customers include Sweden’s neighbor, Denmark. At the same time, operating common or very similar warship designs enhances interoperability, especially during joint operations.

The decision also further cements the military relationship between France and Sweden. Welcoming the Swedish choice, President of France Emmanuel Macron today wrote on X that it reflected the burgeoning defense partnership, which has also seen France select the Saab GlobalEye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) to replace its E-3F Sentry Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) fleet, as well as Swedish participation in advanced deterrence. The latter refers to the forward deployment of nuclear-capable French Rafale fighters to Sweden, as European NATO members look at bolstering their deterrence capabilities independent of the United States.

For the Swedish Navy, the primary area of operation has been the Baltic theater, an area of resurgent strategic relevance, as the host to regular and sometimes hostile Russian military activity, maritime, airborne, and also increasingly in the ‘gray zone’ or hybrid warfare.

Once the new Luleå class frigates arrive, starting in 2030, according to plans, the improved capabilities of these powerful vessels will not only bolster Swedish Navy operations in its traditional Baltic area of operations but also out into the wider North Atlantic region, reflecting Sweden’s developing military ambitions as it becomes a more established NATO member.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Tragic flooding has swept through communities in Douala, Cameroon’s economic capital. On  Monday, May 18, the disastrous incident caused a five-year-old child to drown as heavy torrential rains led to severe flooding in the country’s economic hub. 

The child was swept away in the Banya-Sable area, located in Douala’s 5th district.

“Trapped by the rapidly rising waters, the child was carried off by a strong current. The body was recovered a short time later and taken by the parents to the Ad Lucem hospital, where the death was confirmed,” said Nana Paul Sabin, an eyewitness.

The flooding affected the 5th, 4th, 3rd, and 2nd administrative districts, as well as residential and administrative areas such as Bonapriso and Bonanjo in Douala’s 1st district.

“The floods caused significant disruptions and blockages in traffic, and in certain locations, the water levels rose alarmingly due to drainage issues,” a resident from Douala’s 3rd district stated.

In response, the Douala Urban Council issued a statement urging residents to exercise caution in their daily activities. The council advised individuals in high-risk areas to limit non-essential travel, avoid flood currents, stay clear of unstable structures, and be especially vigilant with children.

“The Douala Urban Council also emphasises the importance of keeping drainage pathways clear and encourages civic responsibility to help preserve lives,” the communiqué read. 

It also noted that technical teams have been deployed to address the aftermath of the heavy rainfall.

“Let us stay alert, united, and responsible,” the statement concluded.

In this episode of TWZ: Special Access, Jamie Hunter talks with Lt Col “Evil” Marcus, a B-1B Lancer test pilot assigned to Air Force Reserve Command at Edwards AFB, California, about how the B-1B’s armament is morphing to meet the challenges of facing off against a peer threat. This includes reactivating its external pylons, which have been gone since it lost its nuclear mission decades ago, as well as the introduction of hypersonic missiles to its menu of available weapons options.

Check out the video:

B-1B Lancer’s Future Weapons According To Its Test Pilot

Contact the editor: Tyler@twz.com

Israel and Argentina have launched a direct flight starting in November as the two countries boost their ties under Argentina’s far-right President Javier Milei and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The twice-a-week flight comes as Israel is aggressively pushing to cement its geopolitical footprint in Latin America amid its growing international isolation and its entrenched image as an occupying power.

On May 7, Israel’s national carrier, El Al, opened bookings for a direct flight between Tel Aviv and Buenos Aires covering a distance of 12,000 kilometres (7,460 miles) – the longest route in the airline’s history.

However, the 16.5-hour journey is driven by political ambitions rather than mere commercial viability.

During a celebratory event in occupied East Jerusalem last month, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu welcomed Argentina’s Milei to hail the “first direct flight” between the two nations.

The event showcased a striking political alignment, further highlighted by the presence of US Ambassador Mike Huckabee, who jokingly promised to buy the first ticket and described the two leaders as US “President Donald Trump’s biggest friends”.

The route aims to translate the “Isaac Accords” – a Latin American framework inspired by the “Abraham Accords” – into tangible reality. Morocco and Sudan established diplomatic ties with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords signed under President Trump’s first term.

Championed behind the scenes by Rabbi Axel Wahnish, Argentina’s ambassador to Israel, the framework aims to establish strategic cooperation in security, counterterrorism, and artificial intelligence with Latin American nations, including Ecuador, Costa Rica and Paraguay.

Trading tech for legitimacy

Israel is acutely aware that its status as an occupying power, exacerbated by the genocidal war on Gaza, has severely damaged its international standing. To secure recognition and bypass boycotts, particularly from an increasingly critical Europe, Israel is leveraging its advanced military and surveillance technologies.

Ihab Jabarin, an analyst specialising in Israeli affairs, told Al Jazeera that Israel’s strategy has shifted.

“Israel’s moral image has completely eroded,” Jabarin said. “The logic now is: ‘you may not like us, but you need us.’ Israel is offering its expertise in cybersecurity, AI systems like Lavender, border management, and drones – technologies tested on Palestinian bodies and land – to countries grappling with internal conflicts and organised crime,” he told Al Jazeera.

Jabarin noted that Israel uses infrastructure – whether ports, underwater cables, or civilian aviation – as tools for national security and influence. “This flight is not just about transporting passengers; it is a permanent corridor for security and tech businessmen,” he explained.

This strategy of using technology and security to buy diplomatic loyalty mirrors Israel’s approach in Africa. It has forged close ties with Ethiopia, Kenya and Chad. Last December, Israel became the first country in the world to recognise Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia.

It has used smaller island states like Micronesia in the Asia Pacific to secure favourable votes at the United Nations and break its international isolation.

“Israel is trying to create a global network of interests that forces countries to weigh their relationship with Israel against their stance on the Palestinian cause,” Jabarin added. “It wants to make the world unable to live without it.”

The Milei-Netanyahu chemistry

The driving force behind this Latin American link is the ideological bond between Netanyahu and Milei. While left-wing leaders in the region, such as Brazil’s Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, have severed ties or strongly condemned Israel’s actions in Gaza, Milei has embraced the Israeli narrative unconditionally.

For Milei, who declared himself the most Zionist president in the world in March, the alliance offers rapid positioning in the Middle East, closer ties to Washington lobbies, and a stance against Latin America’s traditional left. For Netanyahu, Milei offers unconditional emotional and symbolic support that Israel has largely lost in Europe.

“Netanyahu understands the value of a symbolic ally,” Jabarin said. “He needs leaders who can be marketed as proof that Israel can still forge ideological alliances, not just pragmatic ones. Argentina, under Milei, has become Israel’s most important ‘island of influence’.”

A ‘safe haven’ from war crime probes

The direct flight also serves a highly practical security purpose for Israel. With mounting legal challenges and arrest warrants targeting Israeli soldiers and officials in Europe over alleged war crimes in Gaza, the Tel Aviv-Buenos Aires route offers a crucial bypass.

On Tuesday, Israel’s far-right Finance Minister ⁠Bezalel Smotrich said he was informed that the ⁠International Criminal ⁠Court (ICC) ⁠had ⁠requested a warrant for his arrest. Prime Minister Netanyahu is also sought by the ICC for war crimes committed in Gaza.

Currently, travellers between the two countries rely on 21 to 33-hour transit flights through European hubs like Madrid or Paris.

Diego Ruzzarin, a Brazilian writer and analyst, argued that the project aims to secure hassle-free travel for Israelis, particularly military personnel, sparing them from international security interrogations or the risk of arrest in Europe.

Jabarin echoed this assessment, noting that the fear of legal pursuit in Europe is a significant concern within the Israeli establishment.

“The direct flight bypasses any potential legal harassment in Europe,” he said. “Latin America is now appearing in Israeli calculations as a more politically flexible space compared to rights-focused Europe.”

Economic risks and domestic pushback

Despite its strategic value, the flight faces significant logistical and economic hurdles. Because Israeli planes are banned from the airspace of several African nations, including Libya, the flights must take a costly detour over the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.

To mitigate the economic risks of the long-haul route, the Israeli government has taken the unusual step of granting El Al a 20-million-shekel ($5.4m) subsidy, spread over three years.

The success of the route will heavily depend on Argentina’s Jewish community – the largest in Latin America, estimated at up to 300,000. According to Sabre data, roughly 55,300 people travelled between the two countries in 2025, a 37 percent increase from 2024, but still below the 71,200 recorded in 2019.

The project has sparked domestic criticism in both countries. In Israel, the transport ministry reportedly warned that pulling Boeing 787 Dreamliners from highly profitable US routes to service Buenos Aires could drive up ticket prices for Israelis travelling to North America.

In Argentina, left-wing congresswoman Myriam Bregman accused Milei’s government of dragging the country into an “imperialist war” without congressional approval, warning of a constitutional overreach.

Furthermore, the influx of Israeli tourists, many of whom are recently discharged soldiers, has caused friction in southern Argentina. Local residents and activists have blamed Israeli tourists for devastating fires in the Patagonia nature reserves due to negligence, the most recent being a massive blaze in January 2026 that destroyed 77,000 hectares (190,000 acres) and led to the arrest of an Israeli tourist.

For Israelis, however, an El Al flight to Buenos Aires carries profound historical symbolism. In May 1960, the Mossad used an official El Al flight to smuggle captured former Nazi official Adolf Eichmann out of Argentina to face trial and execution in Israel.

New Delhi, India — When Argentina’s Gonzalo Montiel converted a penalty to seal his country’s third FIFA World Cup title in December 2022 in Qatar, Lionel Messi fan Vishwas Banerjee celebrated the Albiceleste’s triumph with abandon in Bangalore, a football-crazy city in southeastern India.

Unable to hold back his excitement, Banerjee screamed and tossed his shirt away as he watched the match on a big screen at a street crossing close to midnight.

“It was one of the best nights, watching Messi lift the World Cup,” he told Al Jazeera.

“Everyone went crazy. We danced on the streets,” Banerjee said, reminiscing about the excitement felt more than 3,000 kilometres (1,900 miles) away in an otherwise cricket-mad country.

While Messi is expected to make his World Cup swan song at the upcoming tournament in North America, football fans in India, the world’s most populous nation, are set to miss out on watching the biggest sporting event.

With just over three weeks to the tournament’s kickoff in Mexico, organisers FIFA have not found any buyers for broadcasting its most coveted product in India.

Here’s what we know about the World Cup broadcast rights crisis in the South Asian nation:

How many people watch the FIFA World Cup in India?

When the World Cup was played in Qatar nearly four years ago, India trailed only China in overall engagement figures, with more than 745 million fans following the action across all media platforms in the country, according to figures released by FIFA.

In television viewing numbers, India was among the top 10 countries – ahead of World Cup participants Germany, France and England – with nearly 84 million viewers.

Digital viewership numbers were also significant in India. For the final alone, an unprecedented 32 million viewers tuned in on Reliance’s JioCinema – a subscription video-on-demand over-the-top streaming service – as the tournament clocked 40 billion minutes of watch time on the platform.

Reliance’s Jio paid $60m for tournament rights in 2022, while Sony Sports secured broadcasting rights for the 2014 and 2018 FIFA World Cups, as well as the Euro 2016 championship, for around $90m in 2013.

So when FIFA began selling media rights for the 2026 tournament and the 2027 Women’s Cup, it expected plenty of takers for an estimated price of $100m.

But with 23 days until the tournament and the asking price reportedly slashed significantly, FIFA is still struggling to find buyers in one of its biggest markets.

Why are there no buyers for the World Cup 2026 in India?

Experts say the kickoff times for the majority of the matches are the biggest concern for Indian broadcasters.

With the tournament being staged in the United States, Canada and Mexico, many games will be played at odd hours for the Indian audience, with a 10-12 hour time difference between the host cities and the South Asian nation.

Only 14 out of the total 104 World Cup games will begin before midnight for fans in India.

The final will be held in New Jersey on July 19, beginning at 12:30am in India (19:00 GMT). By comparison, 98.4 percent of matches at the 2018 World Cup started before midnight, and 82.5 percent at the following edition in Qatar.

Karan Taurani, executive vice president at investment firm Elara Capital, sees TV as a “struggling” medium in India.

“When you have these kinds of sporting events, effectively it is mostly digital that is monetising and raising big money,” Taurani told Al Jazeera. “That is a big reason why no one’s showing interest in the FIFA World Cup.”

Taurani explained that cricket leads the sports economy market in India.

“Only a small fraction of people who watch the Indian Premier League [IPL] will watch the FIFA World Cup,” he said, adding that an even smaller fraction tune in past midnight to watch a match.

For broadcasters and advertisers, Taurani explained, these factors shrink the target audience.

He also pointed out that a recent ban by the Indian government on fantasy real-money betting apps had reduced the macro form of money in the sports entertainment industry.

The World Cup begins 10 days after cricket’s IPL 2026 final, one of the most-watched sports events in India and one where major prime-time advertisers focus the majority of their annual sports spending.

The price of football streaming in India has been going down anyway. The English Premier League rights, which were sold for $145m for three seasons between 2013 and 2016, went for $65m for 2025-28. There are no major takers for La Liga matches in India.

FIFA appears increasingly concerned that weak broadcaster interest in India could dent both revenues and its long-term ambition to grow football in one of the world’s largest media markets.

In the capital New Delhi, the high court is hearing a plea on the lack of a tournament broadcast deal and has sought responses from India’s information and broadcasting ministry and Doordarshan, India’s state-owned public television broadcaster.

“Without timely judicial intervention by this court, the petitioner and millions of Indian citizens will be irreparably deprived of their fundamental rights with no adequate alternative remedy,” the petitioner, a lawyer and football fan, has said in the plea.

He claims that missing out on the tournament violates the constitutional protections of freedom of speech.

“It is important to note that by denying access to the information in question or by not taking necessary steps to broadcast the FIFA World Cup, the respondents have directly infringed the petitioner’s fundamental right to acquire and receive information, which is an integral part of freedom of speech and expression under the constitution,” the petitioner argued in the plea.

With China’s state broadcaster signing a late World Cup deal with FIFA last week, there’s still hope and time for football fans in India. However, if no deal is signed, all eyes will turn to Doordarshan, which last beamed the tournament in 1998.

The continuing uncertainty is chipping away at the excitement of the football World Cup. “I’m heartbroken that we will not have any reliable way to watch the World Cup this year,” said Banerjee, the Messi fan from Kolkata.

“But we will tune to pirated streams anyway,” he added. “No one can stop that.”

The recent Ebola outbreak in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has resulted in a rising death toll, reaching 118 fatalities on Monday, May 18, which is a significant jump from the 80 deaths recorded just two days earlier. This outbreak is the 17th recorded Ebola virus epidemic in the DRC and has been described as a matter of international emergency by the World Health Organisation (WHO).

Patrick Muyaya, the DRC government spokesperson, announced that two additional health zones have been identified as impacted by the virus. These include Nyankunde in the Irumu territory of Ituri province. A suspected case has also emerged in Goma, the chief town of North Kivu.

The outbreak is now affecting multiple geographic areas, including Mongwalu, Rwampara, Bunia, Nyankunde in Ituri, as well as Butembo-Katwa and Goma in North Kivu. 

Butembo, a commercial town in North Kivu, was severely impacted during the Ebola Zaire strain outbreak from 2018 to 2020. Goma, which has been under the control of the M23 rebels since early 2025, serves as a significant regional transit hub on the border with Rwanda and Uganda.

The Bundibugyo Ebola strain, noted as the 17th epidemic in the DRC, was declared on May 15. Complete sequencing of the viral genome confirms that it is a genetically distinct variant from previous Bundibugyo outbreaks in 2007 and 2012, originating directly from an animal reserve, according to Jean-Jacques Muyembe, director of the DRC National Institute of Biomedical Research.

On May 17, after the WHO declared the epidemic an international public health emergency, the British organisation Oxfam also estimated that the global number of infections currently stands at 400.

China’s Xi Jinping is hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin, just days after welcoming Donald Trump to Beijing. The Chinese leader is set to discuss energy security and trade, while balancing access to European markets, as Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu explains.