NEWS

Ukrainian forces also strike two shadow fleet tankers near port of Novorossiysk, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says.

Ukrainian forces have launched a drone attack on the Russian Baltic Sea ⁠⁠port of Primorsk, the governor says, as Kyiv and Moscow accuse each other of killing civilians in overnight air raids.

There was no oil spill caused by Sunday’s attack on Primorsk, a major oil-exporting outlet, but it caused a fire in the town that was extinguished, Leningrad Governor Alexander Drozdenko said. More than 60 drones were downed overnight over the northwestern region, he added.

Primorsk, ‌‌one of Russia’s largest export gateways, has the capacity to handle one million barrels per day of oil.

It has been hit multiple times in recent months as Ukraine has stepped up attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and other targets and United States-brokered talks to end the Ukraine war have stalled.

Ukrainian ⁠⁠President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said his country’s forces also struck two shadow fleet tankers in waters at the ⁠⁠entrance to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.

“These tankers had been actively used to transport oil – not anymore,” Zelenskyy said on Telegram. “Ukraine’s long-range capabilities will continue to be developed comprehensively – at sea, in the ⁠⁠air, and on land.”

The two neighbours have been launching hundreds of explosive-packed drones at each other on a near-daily basis throughout the four-year war.

Other Russian regions also reported drone attacks on Saturday and Sunday. Moscow Governor Andrei Vorobyov ⁠⁠said on Saturday evening that a 77-year-old man ⁠⁠died in a village in a drone strike.

Sergei Sobyanin, the mayor of Moscow, said four drones were downed on their way to the Russian capital.

Vasily Anokhin, the governor ‌‌of the western region of Smolensk, said three people, including a child, were injured on Sunday in a drone attack on an apartment block.

Attacks in Ukraine

Russian drone strikes on Ukraine killed at least three people across the country, local officials said on Sunday.

Attacks on southern Ukraine’s Odesa region, home to key export terminals, killed two people, including a truck driver at a port, Governor Oleh Kiper said on social media.

“Enemy drones hit three residential buildings, and two more were damaged. … Facilities and equipment for the port infrastructure were also damaged,” he said.

Elsewhere, Russian strikes on the front-line region of Kherson in southern Ukraine also killed one person, officials said.

Russia fired 268 drones and one ballistic missile in the overnight attacks, Ukraine’s air force said.

In eastern Ukraine, Russian troops were ‌‌inching ‌‌towards the city of Kostiantynivka in the Donetsk region, Ukraine’s top army official said on Saturday.

China currently boasts one of the lowest rates of homicide, violent crime, and gun and explosive incidents globally. The Chinese-style sense of security is a comprehensive system integrating advanced technology, community engagement, and continuous improvement in living standards. This has positioned China as one of the safest countries in the world, according to the 2025 Global Security Report, with 98.2% of Chinese citizens feeling safe by 2025, further solidifying its status as a globally stable destination. The pillars of this Chinese-style sense of security are built upon advanced digital technologies, relying on smart networks and modern surveillance systems such as facial recognition and artificial intelligence to enhance the security network within China.

The phrase “Chinese-style security” refers to China’s model for achieving social stability and reducing crime rates. This model is based primarily on three pillars: proactive prevention systems, where, rather than simply addressing crime after it occurs, China focuses on prevention and control through extensive security networks and a constant police presence in key areas; the continuation of the community mobilization system (the Fengqiao model), a historical concept (currently revived) that involves citizens and local committees in resolving community disputes before they escalate into crimes or legal cases, thus promoting the idea of ​​self-regulation and public cooperation with Chinese authorities; and the use of digitalization and artificial intelligence technologies, where China has heavily invested in smart city technologies and the Skynet system. Skynet utilizes millions of cameras equipped with facial recognition and big data analytics to predict suspicious activities and track wanted individuals with high precision. This combination aims to create a secure environment that supports economic growth within China, despite the occasional international debates it sparks regarding the balance between public security and individual privacy.

Data and reports confirm exceptional social stability in China, with citizens’ sense of security exceeding 98% for six consecutive years. This security is attributed to effective governance, advanced digital technologies, and a high standard of living, making China a safe destination for investment and a source of stability. Key features of Chinese governance and the sense of security include increased levels of trust and optimism, with the Chinese people ranking among the world’s highest in trust in the government and optimism about the future, according to trust index reports. A robust safety net exists, built on Chinese-style security through crime prevention systems, community mobilization, and enhanced digitalization. These systemic features, along with numerous other advantages, reflect the stability within China and the state’s ability to fulfill its commitments and provide a safe and stable social environment, earning international praise, particularly in light of global geopolitical conflicts. With the continuation of Chinese-style modernization, ongoing modernization has contributed to raising living standards, thus strengthening the sense of security within China.

Accordingly, the Chinese government and the authorities of the ruling Communist Party of China support several pillars and points that support this approach to enhance the sense of security within the country. Based on current developments, focusing on security as the foundation for development in China, the stability of the situation in China is seen as a key element in boosting investor confidence and building a safe and stable living environment for citizens, which contributes to economic growth. With the intensification of the Chinese-style modernization model, modernization in China is not limited to economic growth but also focuses on improving the quality of life, providing employment opportunities, and upgrading social services, which significantly raises living standards. With the stable sense of security, China, through well-considered social policies, has succeeded in maintaining a high level of social security, which enhances public trust in the government and contributes to long-term stability. This has resulted in continued international praise (amidst crises). At a time when several regions around the world are experiencing geopolitical conflicts, China’s stability stands out as a model attracting the attention and scrutiny of international observers, particularly due to the Chinese state’s ability to effectively manage its internal affairs compared to many systems worldwide, including American and Western ones. This strengthens China’s capacity to lead the developing Global South and strongly promote its model of Chinese governance.

Based on the preceding understanding and analysis, we can see how the development for security strategy can form a fundamental pillar within the Chinese governance system. Improving living standards contributes to consolidating social stability and public security within China. This analysis highlights a delicate equation in the contemporary Chinese landscape, where continuous development (Chinese-style modernization) is linked to social stability, creating a secure environment in a turbulent world.

EXPLAINER

Iran has sent the US a new 14-point proposal to end the war.

United States President Donald Trump says he will review the latest Iranian proposal to end the war but has expressed doubt that the new plan will lead to a deal as the two sides have escalated their rhetoric.

Tehran has sent a 14-point plan to Washington, calling for guarantees of nonaggression, sanctions relief, the lifting of a naval blockade and an end to the war “on all fronts”, including in Lebanon. This proposal seeks to postpone nuclear talks to a later stage, an issue Trump has considered a “red line”.

Despite the diplomatic opening, the US president did not rule out the possibility of renewed hostilities. “If they do something bad, there is a possibility it could happen,” Trump said.

The Iranians have also fired back with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) saying it is on standby for a return to war.

Here is what we know as the conflict enters day 65:

In Iran

• While Washington requested a two-month ceasefire, Tehran wants to focus on ending the war instead of extending the truce and wants all issues to be resolved within 30 days, according to Iran’s Tasnim News Agency.
• The 14-point Iranian plan includes guarantees of nonaggression, the withdrawal of US forces from the vicinity of Iran, the lifting of the US naval blockade, the release of Iran’s frozen assets, the lifting of sanctions and an end to the war “on all fronts“, including in Lebanon, according to Tasnim.
• The IRGC said it is on standby for a return to war with the US, saying a resumption of hostilities is “likely” as “evidence shows that [the US] is not committed to any agreements or treaties”.
• Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Trump’s description of the US capture of Iranian vessels as “piracy” is a “direct and damning admission of the criminal nature of their actions” against Tehran.
• TankerTrackers.com said an Iranian supertanker has evaded the US blockade and reached the Asia Pacific while carrying more than 1.9 million barrels of crude oil valued at nearly $220m.

Diplomacy

• The US has approved $8.6bn in major arms deals and military support for Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Israel.
• A convoy of 70 tanker trucks carrying Iraqi crude oil has crossed into Syria via the al-Yarubiyah border crossing as Baghdad seeks alternative export routes after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

In the US

• Trump said he is studying Iran’s latest 14-point peace proposal but warned that attacks could resume if the Iranian government “misbehaves” or does “something bad”.
• The US is seeking to form an international naval coalition called the Maritime Freedom Construct (MFC) to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, which in effect has been blocked by Iran since the US-Israel war on the country began on February 28. According to US media, its core functions would be to share intelligence among member nations, coordinate diplomatic efforts and enforce sanctions to manage shipping through the strait.
• Trump said a US troop withdrawal from Germany could far exceed 5,000 soldiers as tensions between the two allies rise over the war on Iran.

In Lebanon

• At least 41 people have been killed as Israel launched 50 air strikes on southern Lebanon in 24 hours despite a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon being in place since April 16. The death toll since the latest escalation in the war between Israel and Hezbollah began on March 2 has risen to 2,659 people.
• The Israeli military issued a new warning, threatening attacks on 12 towns and villages in southern Lebanon and ordering residents to flee their homes.The towns and villages include al-Duwayr, Arab Salim, al-Sharqiya (Nabatieh), Jibshit, Braashit, Sarafand, Dounin, Briqa, Qaaqaiya al-Jisr, al-Qasiba (Nabatieh) and Kfar Sir.
• Israel’s military has admitted to striking and damaging a Catholic “religious building” in southern Lebanon on Saturday as criticism grows over Israeli attacks on Christian sites.

Our two England fans fly out of Heathrow on Monday, 15 June with return flights to JFK in New York costing just over £500 each – which is good value.

With the Three Lions’ final group game taking place in New Jersey, it is the most cost-effective way to travel to the US and back, with the first stop being Dallas.

After landing in the States, they pick up a flight to Dallas the same night – this costs £283 per person.

Four nights at the Hampton Inn & Suites Dallas Market Center cost £624 (£156 a night) for a twin.

Double rooms, which are more available in all cities, come in cheaper at the Hilton Dallas Medical District at £560 (£140 a night).

Both properties have breakfast included, meaning Dallas – which also has free shuttle buses from stations to the stadium in Arlington – is an affordable start to the trip.

The England supporters fly to Boston on Friday, 19 June with the fare £378 each.

Boston is at the other end of the scale as one of the more expensive host cities for accommodation.

Our couple stay at the Hampton Inn & Suites Boston Crosstown Center, costing £1,650 (£330 a night), including breakfast, for five nights.

The cheapest twin-bed option in the city itself is £2,041 (£408 a night) without breakfast at the Courtyard Boston Downtown/North Station.

It is possible to book a hotel near the airport £500 cheaper but with five days in the city, it may not be worth the saving.

With England’s third game being in New Jersey, there is no need to take a flight. The supporters can hop on the Amtrak train to New York on Wednesday, 24 June with tickets £42 each.

Unlike in Boston, there are still lots of hotel options in New York with a five-night stay before the flight home on 29 June.

A double at the Truss Hotel Times Square costs £1,184 (£237 a night) while a twin at the AMTD Idea Tribeca Hotel is £1,275 (£255 a night).

This time, however, you will need to head out for breakfast.

But the last two games come with a sting – train tickets to the stadiums cost £59 per person from Boston and £114 from New York.

Just to get to the States and travel around, the estimated costs for two friends are £6,273 and for a couple £5,855.

And what of the family? It is going to cost £9,008 to get to the States, get around and put your heads down.

Costs are helped by some hotels offering free stays for children.

In Dallas, the Comfort Inn Dallas Medical-Market Center costs £627 (£156 a night).

The same Hampton Inn is used in Boston with a higher cost of £1,763 (£353 a night).

Over in New York, the Holiday Inn in Times Square costs £1,589 (£318 a night).

A fragile ceasefire may have paused the US-Israeli war on Iran, but the economic cost is crippling the daily lives of Iranians. The US is blockading Iranian ports, while the price of goods skyrockets and businesses struggle to keep employees.

Satellite imagery has emerged showing China’s two massive stealthy flying-wing high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft at its secretive test base near Malan. TWZ first identified both of the previously unseen aircraft last year in Planet Labs archived imagery of the airfield, which is known to be on the leading edge of the PLA’s unmanned combat aircraft development efforts. However, this is the first time both have been captured outside their hangars simultaneously, or on the main apron at all. Overall, the image, dated March 26th, 2026, underscores the major uptick of very advanced drone testing activity at the installation.

The flying wing with the longest wingspan (red arrow in the image at the top of the article), which some have dubbed “WZ-X,” and what we refer to as “The Monster of Malan,” is parked on the main apron next to the runway. The very large flying wing has a span of approximately 173 feet — roughly the width of a B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. You can read more about this impressive aircraft in our previous coverage here and here. Other details about its true designation or its manufacturer remain unknown.

The second large flying wing (green arrow) is seen in the image sitting outside a hangar that is part of the sprawling new high-security facility on the opposite side of the complex. It features a ‘cranked kite’ planform with a wingspan of approximately 137 feet, although it would appear to have a significantly higher gross weight and likely lower operating ceiling than its wider stablemate. Based on our previous analysis, this variant is suited for the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) role, but could also work as a supersized unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) capable of performing very long-range heavy strike missions.

Both of these aircraft appear to have been flying now for a number of months. You can read about this here and here.

There is also what appears to be a stealth fighter-like drone (orange arrow) and a Xi’an Y-20 transport plane on the main apron in the image.

China has shown off a very large number of fighter-drone concepts, very loosely similar to the U.S. Collaborative Combat Aircraft initiative, in recent years. A Chinese military parade in 2025 was really Beijing’s major public thrust into this area of advanced fighter-like drone development. Since then, testing of at least one configuration has been ramped up considerably.

Just reviewing Planet Labs archived images of Malan in recent months shows the aircraft configuration seen above to be very active at the base. This relatively large unmanned ‘fighter’, analogous to a manned light-to-medium weight fighter in size, is a tailless design that features a very similar planform as the J-XDS 6th generation manned fighter. It also appears similar in shape to another CCA-like aircraft that has been photographed flying.

One drone shown off during China’s big military parade looks very similar to it, in particular. But regardless, this general design appears to be a focus of testing at the base.

Other mysterious aircraft have appeared at the installation as well, which is clearly set up specifically to run many programs within its high-security confines at any given time.

Beijing is actively pursuing a range of flying-wing drones of various sizes, including large HALE drones, designed to perform a diverse set of missions, including ISR and strike. For many years, TWZ has assessed that this was an area of the Chinese aviation industry most likely to see an explosion of investment. The WZ-X is still the largest Chinese design in terms of wingspan that we have seen in this category to date. The cranked-kite design is certainly the heaviest.

This new look at China’s two large flying wing combat drones comes as we got our first good look at America’s own RQ-180 HALE stealth drone, which has been flying for some time and is now being used operationally. It also comes as China is rushing ahead on all fronts with its next generation air combat ecosystem, and making impressively quick progress to show for its efforts. Still, a formidable looking aircraft doesn’t mean it can fight as impressively as part of a joint force as it looks, or survive against enemy air defenses. Regardless, China is clearly betting substantially on advanced and large unmanned flying wing designs.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@teamrecurrent.io

The attack, the second in a week, follows months of relative calm in the city after government forces regained control last year.

A drone strike carried out by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has killed five civilians in Khartoum, according to an NGO.

The attack, which Emergency Lawyers, an independent legal group supporting victims of human rights violations in Sudan, reported on Saturday, is the second to take place in the capital within a week. It follows months of relative calm in the city after government forces regained control last year.

The NGO said it holds the RSF fully responsible for the strike, accusing the group of breaching international humanitarian law.

Emergency Lawyers said the incident forms part of an ongoing pattern of attacks on civilians. Nearly 700 civilians were killed in drone strikes in the first three months of this year, according to UN figures.

‘Completely free’

On Tuesday, a drone struck a hospital in the Jebel Awliya area, around 40 kilometres (25 miles) south of central Khartoum, a security source and eyewitnesses told the AFP news agency. It was the first such attack in the area in months.

The Sudanese army, which now enjoys a solid grip in the north and east, launched a rapid counteroffensive last year that pushed the paramilitary forces out of the capital.

Following intense fighting around the capital last year, Sudan’s military government declared the Khartoum region “completely free” of RSF.

Since then, the RSF has largely concentrated on expanding its control in its stronghold in the western Darfur region and pushing into neighbouring areas, capturing valuable oil-producing assets.

Violence has also spread to southeastern Blue Nile state near the border with Ethiopia, raising fears of a more prolonged and fragmented conflict.

The RSF carried out a series of drone strikes on Khartoum last year, largely targeting military sites, power stations and water infrastructure.

In recent months, however, the capital has seen relative calm. More than 1.8 million displaced residents have returned, and the airport has resumed domestic flights. That said, much of the city remains without electricity or basic services.

The conflict between the Sudanese government and the RSF – a former ally – began in April 2023. Since then, around 14 million people have been displaced and two-thirds of the population are in urgent need of humanitarian support, according to the United Nations.

US budget carrier Spirit Airlines shuts down after talks for a government bailout failed, leaving 17,000 workers jobless and many passengers stranded. Rising fuel prices from the US-Israel war on Iran partially blamed for Spirit’s rapid decline.

The US president says he will ‘soon be reviewing the plan Iran has just sent to us’, but doesn’t think he can make a deal.

The whale calf’s repeated stranding off the coast of Germany sparked widespread concern and extensive media coverage.

A humpback whale calf that earned huge media attention and the nickname Timmy after being repeatedly stranded in shallow waters near Germany has been released into the North Sea by rescue team.

The operation to save the sea mammal, launched as its health deteriorated, transported Timmy in a water-filled barge and released him off Denmark on Saturday.

Karin Walter-Mommert, one of the private financiers of the operation, said the whale appeared to be swimming freely and in the right direction upon his release, the APF news agency reports.

He “should now swim up the Norwegian coast toward the Arctic”, she said.

Timmy was first spotted near Germany’s Baltic Sea coast on March 3. He repeatedly got stuck in shallow waters, despite efforts to encourage him back to the deeper sea.

Far from his natural habitat of the Atlantic Ocean, the whale became distressed, and the public became invested in his plight as his health deteriorated and experts worried that he would not survive.

Several efforts to rescue him, including using inflatable cushions and a pontoon, were unsuccessful, leading German officials to suggest he was doomed.

A private initiative to save the animal was then approved by Germany’s Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state, but that sparked debate as to whether it would be best to let him die in peace or push him to return home, an ordeal that could have proved too much for him.

Timmy developed a skin condition as a result of the Baltic Sea’s low salt content, and would barely move for days at a time, his breathing irregular.

The International Whaling Commission said in April that with each stranding causing additional harm, “the chances of survival [had become] negligible”.

However, the use of the special barge finally saw Timmy returned to his natural habitat.

It is not clear why the whale swam into the Baltic Sea, far from the Atlantic Ocean. Some experts say the animal may have lost its way while swimming after a shoal of herring or during migration.

A GPS transmitter was reportedly attached to the whale before his release, suggesting there could be more updates to come, with the case having been furiously followed by online media in particular.

After the shooting at the White House Correspondents’ Association dinner, has the US entered a new age of political violence? The third alleged attempted assassination of US President Donald Trump in recent years follows a series of politically motivated violent incidents last year, including the assassinations of right-wing activist Charlie Kirk and Democratic state legislator Melissa Hortman. What is causing the increase in political violence in America? And how much is the Trump administration driving the politically divisive atmosphere with violent rhetoric and lethal foreign policy?

This week on UpFront, Redi Tlhabi speaks with Robert Pape, professor of political science at the University of Chicago and author of the upcoming book “Our Own Worst Enemies: America in the Age of Violent Populism”.

Welcome to Bunker Talk. This is a weekend open discussion post for the best commenting crew on the net, in which we can chat about all the stuff that went on this week that we didn’t cover. We can also talk about the stuff we did or whatever else grabs your interest. In other words, it’s an off-topic thread.

TIRANA, ALBANIA – SEPTEMBER 16: View inside the Bunk’Art Museum, a vast underground bunker built for the former Albanian dictator and high-ranking dignitaries, featuring five floors, 106 rooms, and a cinema hall for government meetings, covering an impressive area of 2,685 m2, seen on September 16, 2024, in Tirana, Albania. (Photo by Artur Widak/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

Prime Directives!

• If you want to talk politics, do so respectfully and know that there’s always somebody that isn’t going to agree with you. 
• If you have political differences, hash it out respectfully, stick to the facts, and no childish name-calling or personal attacks of any kind. If you can’t handle yourself in that manner, then please, discuss virtually anything else.
• No drive-by garbage political memes. No conspiracy theory rants. Links to crackpot sites will be axed, too. Trolling and shitposting will not be tolerated. No obsessive behavior about other users. Just don’t interact with folks you don’t like. 
• Do not be a sucker and feed trolls! That’s as much on you as on them. Use the mute button if you don’t like what you see.  
• So unless you have something of quality to say, know how to treat people with respect, understand that everyone isn’t going to subscribe to your exact same worldview, and have come to terms with the reality that there is no perfect solution when it comes to moderation of a community like this, it’s probably best to just move on. 
• Finally, as always, report offenders, please. This doesn’t mean reporting people who don’t share your political views, but we really need your help in this regard.

Syria is receiving hundreds of Iraqi oil trucks hauling crude overland to its Baniyas port as an alternative energy corridor to Europe, creating a costly but crucial workaround while the Strait of Hormuz is largely blocked by the US-Israeli war on Iran.

In August 2026, Kazakhstan will hold an unusual election. The newly established unicameral parliament—the “Kurultai”—will, for the first time, be formed entirely through party lists. Independent candidates and regional representatives will no longer enter the core of state power. As a representative institution of so-called “steppe democracy,” the Kurultai has undergone multiple transformations throughout history, both in its functions and in the composition of its participants. According to recent constitutional arrangements, this mechanism has been elevated to an unprecedented level. This raises a key question: what direction does this transformation reveal in the current round of political modernization?

Historically, the Kurultai functioned as an important mechanism of consultation in steppe society, not as a system of mass participation, but as a platform composed of multiple layers of elite actors. Its participants included khans and sultans who held political authority, biys who were responsible for adjudication and governance, military leaders who organized mobilization in times of war, as well as tribal elders and influential akyns and zhyrau who shaped public discourse. In addressing critical issues such as succession, warfare, and internal conflict, the Kurultai did not rely on formalized procedures or fixed institutional rules. Instead, decisions were reached through authority, negotiation, and consensus. Although ordinary people did not possess direct institutional channels of participation, their interests and attitudes indirectly constrained decision-making through tribal structures, public opinion, and their willingness to comply with and implement decisions.

During the Soviet period and the early years of Kazakhstan’s independence, the Kurultai gradually lost its function as an operative political institution and became a symbol of historical memory and cultural identity. It was not until 2022, amid a serious crisis of political trust, that this traditional symbol was revived and institutionalized as the “National Kurultai,” reintroduced as a new format of public dialogue within the framework of state governance. Its declared purpose is to strengthen interaction between the government and society. In terms of composition, the National Kurultai formally continues the tradition of “broad participation,” including regional representatives, members of parliament, professionals from various sectors, and leaders of social organizations with a degree of public influence. However, this diversity is largely structural rather than functional. It reflects broad inclusion, but does not necessarily translate into a substantive mechanism for reconciling competing interests. The institution lacks the capacity to independently coordinate diverse social demands.

Moreover, the agenda-setting process and operational logic of the National Kurultai remain distinctly top-down. Key issues are primarily defined by the state, while participants tend to act as interpreters and endorsers of pre-established policy directions. In this sense, “consultation” often takes the form of explaining and legitimizing the state agenda. Through the participation and symbolic endorsement of elite actors, the state is able to construct an image of “broad public dialogue,” thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of its reform agenda. In this respect, the National Kurultai should not be seen as a simple continuation of a traditional consultative institution, but rather as an institutionalized platform for political communication and discursive integration. Its core function lies not in generating genuinely competitive policy alternatives, but in organizing a process of “consensus production” aimed at shaping values, mobilizing society, and reproducing the legitimacy of ongoing reforms.

In 2026, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced a major reform of Kazakhstan’s parliamentary system, proposing the transition to a unicameral “Kurultai Parliament.” Its members will be elected entirely through proportional representation based on party lists. The reform abolishes both the presidential quota and the special quota previously allocated to the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. At the same time, quota guarantees for women, youth, and persons with disabilities will be retained, but incorporated into party list mechanisms rather than being directly allocated by the state.

From the perspective of institutional design, this reform strengthens the role of political parties as key intermediaries within the political system, positioning them as the primary channel through which social demands are transmitted to the state. In the context of electoral competition, parties are expected to secure support by more effectively representing public interests, while also integrating fragmented social demands. Compared with the previous mixed model of representation, which included multiple categories of actors, a party-centered system enhances the coherence of political positions: social demands are systematically aggregated and restructured before entering the political arena, thereby improving, to some extent, the efficiency of policy articulation and decision-making.

Building on this, if meaningful and substantive competition among political parties can be established, this model has the potential not only to integrate social interests but also to more fully reflect the diversity of social groups. Political parties could function not merely as instruments of organization and coordination, but also as a crucial link between diverse societal demands and the process of state decision-making—balancing efficiency in representation with breadth and inclusiveness.Under such conditions, the consultative model of the Kurultai may gradually evolve from an elite-driven mechanism of integration into an institutionalized system of interest articulation grounded in party competition, thereby enhancing, to a certain extent, its capacity for bottom-up representation.

In Nigeria’s North East, the Boko Haram insurgent group once carved out territory and declared a caliphate. In the North West, terrorist groups operate as fluid, profit-driven networks, embedding themselves in local economies. In the Middle Belt, communal violence reflects deeper contests over land, identity, and survival. In the South East, separatist agitation by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) has fused with armed enforcement and criminal opportunism. Along the southern waterways, oil theft and piracy threaten economic lifelines.

Across all these theatres, one institution has remained consistently engaged: the Nigerian military, often as the default responder in the absence of effective civilian governance. Public perception often frames this engagement as a failure as attacks continue and civilians remain vulnerable. A closer, evidence-based reading tells a more complex story, however, though available data remains incomplete and, at times, contested. 

The Nigerian military appears to have adapted under pressure and recalibrated aspects of its doctrine, and, in key moments, helped reverse trajectories that once pointed toward state collapse. It has delivered tangible gains, some strategic, others tactical, many costly. Still, those gains sit on unstable ground because governance gaps, political interference, corruption, and weak institutional follow-through have repeatedly blunted them. Communities liberated from one threat find themselves exposed to another. 

The North East war: reversing a collapse

By early 2015, Nigeria was on the brink of losing control in the North East. Boko Haram had evolved from an insurgent group into a territorial force controlling large swathes of Borno State and parts of Yobe and Adamawa. It administered territory, collected taxes, and imposed its authority over local populations. Gwoza was declared the headquarters of a so-called caliphate. Entire communities were displaced, and military formations overrun.

The turning point came with a shift in military posture, in which command structures were reconfigured, and the operational headquarters was relocated to Maiduguri, the Borno State capital, bringing leadership closer to the frontline. Coordination with regional forces under the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) also intensified as air and ground operations were synchronised.

The results were immediate and significant, though the durability of these gains has varied across locations. Key towns like Monguno, Bama, Dikwa, and even Gwoza, the symbolic heart of Boko Haram’s territorial claim, fell back under government control in rapid succession. Data from ACLED shows that between 2015 and 2025, the military recovered at least 259 territories. 

With this territorial success, supply routes were disrupted, and fighters were killed in large numbers. Civilians began to return to these areas, in some cases under fragile security conditions. 

It marked the collapse of Boko Haram’s experiment with territorial governance, and the battle for Sambisa Forest reinforced this shift.

For years, Sambisa had functioned as a strategic sanctuary where fighters trained, hostages were held, and leadership structures operated with relative security. It also carried psychological weight. As long as Sambisa remained intact, Boko Haram retained a sense of permanence.

The military’s assault on the forest required sustained effort involving navigating difficult terrain, dealing with improvised explosive devices, and confronting entrenched fighters. Airstrikes softened targets while ground troops advanced in phases, enabling special forces units to penetrate deeper into the forest.

The symbolic impact was significant, though not decisive in ending insurgent capacity. Boko Haram could no longer claim a fixed territorial base for as long as was once the case. Its command structure was disrupted, and its image of invincibility weakened.

And so Boko Haram fragmented into factions. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) emerged as a more structured and strategic actor while the Shekau-led faction became more erratic, marked by extreme violence and unpredictability.

The military adjusted again.

Operations shifted from territory holding to mobility and disruption. Intelligence-led raids targeted leadership and logistics. Airpower became central to deep strikes in difficult terrain. Operation Lafiya Dole, the codename for the counter-insurgency operation, transitioned into Operation Hadin Kai, reflecting a recalibrated effort.

Today, the insurgency remains active, particularly in remote areas and along the Lake Chad basin. But the scale and nature of the threat have changed.

The North West: fighting a war without frontlines

The North West posed a different challenge. Armed groups here are diffuse. It lacks a central command and is driven by economic incentives rather than ideology, so groups form, splinter, and realign quickly. Local grievances and criminal enterprise also intersect here.

Estimates suggest tens of thousands of terrorists operate across this region, covering multiple states including Zamfara, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Kaduna. This fragmentation complicates the military response, as frontlines, headquarters, and leadership structures (the usual strategic targets) are not clear. The military has responded by leaning heavily on airpower and targeted ground operations. This has not gone without major problems, such as the repeated “accidental bombing” of civilian populations, which have drawn criticism from rights groups and affected communities. 

Still, airstrikes have been used to hit camps deep within forested areas that are difficult for ground troops to access. Intelligence plays a critical role in identifying targets. Data shows that the sustained air campaign has yielded at least 909 strikes and 10,237 fatalities in 10 years. ACLED data shows that about 560 of these fatalities were civilians.

Ground forces usually conduct follow-up operations to recover weapons and temporarily secure areas.

Large numbers of kidnapped victims have been rescued during coordinated operations. Livestock, often a key economic asset for communities, has been retrieved. Such attacks have also killed some high-profile terrorist leaders, but they have also led to the loss of officers. 

In some areas, these operations appear to have had a temporary stabilising effect, though violence frequently resurges. Communities report periods of reduced attacks, farming activities have resumed in limited corridors, and confidence in security presence has improved, though often temporarily. 

Still, armed violence regenerates as the effects of weak governance in the North East are the same in the North West: new leaders emerge, and fighters disperse and regroup. Economic incentives remain strong. 

The Middle Belt: stabilising a political conflict

Violence in the Middle Belt is often described as a farmer-herder conflict, but the region’s violence reflects a complex mix of land disputes, ethnic tensions, and environmental stress. Armed militias operate alongside opportunistic criminal actors, while cycles of reprisal deepen mistrust between communities. 

There are too many dynamics in play here to reduce the crisis to a “military versus any specific group” conflict. Most of the time, softer kinetic actions, such as arrest and deterrence, are used. 

In certain corridors, the presence of military forces has reduced the frequency of mass casualty events. But the limits are clear. Several parts of the region still depend on self-help vigilante groups, who are often outgunned during terror attacks. 

There is also a growing distrust between communities and security operatives, who are sometimes accused of slow response and complicity. In April, residents of Gashish, a rural community in Barkin Ladi Local Government Area of Plateau State, staged a protest over continued attacks in the community despite military presence. A checkpoint manned by troops of Operation Enduring Peace was destroyed during the demonstration. 

The military has denied such accusations, but independent verification remains limited. 

However, in other areas, the visibility of armed forces has also had a deterrent effect on opportunistic attacks. 

At its core, the conflict in the region is driven by political and environmental factors. It revolves around identity and access to land and water. While military deployments can suppress violence temporarily, they cannot resolve competing claims or rebuild trust between communities. Without political solutions, stability remains provisional.

The South East: managing a hybrid threat

The South East presents a hybrid security challenge. Separatist agitation, particularly linked to IPOB, has evolved into a mix of political mobilisation and armed enforcement. The group has enforced sit-at-home orders through violence and intimidation while the Eastern Security Network (ESN) operates in forested areas.

The military’s response has been presented as targeted and intelligence-driven. Operations focus on dismantling camps, intercepting arms, and arresting key figures. Urban centres are secured to prevent escalation into wider insurgency.

Yet the approach carries risks.

Heavy-handed operations have generated grievances. Allegations of abuses have eroded trust in some communities. This complicates intelligence gathering, which is critical in a conflict where fighters blend into civilian populations. 

The Niger Delta and maritime domain: securing economic lifelines

In the South South and along Nigeria’s maritime corridors, the military, particularly the navy, has delivered some of its most visible successes. A decade ago, the Gulf of Guinea was a global hotspot for piracy. Sustained operations, including improved surveillance, increased naval patrols, and collaboration with international partners, have changed that landscape. These have led to the destruction of illegal refining sites and to arrests that disrupt networks involved in oil theft.

These gains have helped to protect revenue streams, stabilise energy production, and reinforce Nigeria’s position in regional maritime security, although illegal activities have not been fully eradicated. 

“The Nigerian military is overstretched”

According to World Bank data collected from development indicators in 2020, Nigeria has roughly 223,000 active personnel across the army, navy, and air force. The army, which carries out most internal operations, has about 140,000 to 150,000 troops.

In the battlespace, there are simultaneous operations in at least six theatres. That constitutes multi-domain internal security warfare. Nigeria has about 0.1 per cent of its population under arms. When compared to countries facing sustained internal conflict, which often exceed 0.3 to 0.5 per cent, the country is operating below the threshold needed to dominate territory.

On the geography front, Nigeria is over 923,000 square kilometres, with vast forests, porous borders, and ungoverned rural space. It is impossible to hold ground everywhere with the limited available personnel. So troops are cycled, which then leads to fatigue because units stay deployed for long periods with limited rest.

Retired Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai, the country’s former Chief of Army Staff, recently said, “The military is overstretched, defence budgets are diverted to routine policing duties, and the Armed Forces’ preparedness for conventional threats is reduced.”

However, there are also welfare issues and equipment gaps, especially at the tactical level in remote theatres. The result is predictable: Tactical wins, like killing terror commanders or rescuing hostages are visible, but strategic stagnation remains because you cannot sustain presence everywhere.

The structural constraint: why gains do not hold

Despite these efforts, Nigeria’s security situation remains volatile. 

In many areas, once the military has cleared armed actors, there is limited follow-through by civil authorities, as local administration is weak. So, communities do not experience the full return of the state, allowing armed groups to exploit this gap to re-enter or reorganise.

Economic conditions sustain conflict. Studies have shown that high levels of poverty and unemployment, particularly among young people, create a pool of potential recruits when armed groups offer income, however precarious.

Trust deficits also weaken intelligence because communities that distrust state actors are less likely to share information. This limits the effectiveness of intelligence-led operations and increases reliance on force.

Finally, strategy remains fragmented. Nigeria faces different types of violence that require tailored responses. Yet policy often treats them through a similar lens. Counterterrorism approaches are applied to terrorist attacks, while military solutions are prioritised in conflicts that require political negotiation.

The Nigerian military has played a significant role in preventing state collapse in multiple regions.

At the height of Boko Haram’s expansion, the possibility of sustained territorial loss was real. That threat has been largely reversed. In the North West, despite persistent violence, terrorist groups have not been allowed to consolidate into a territorial authority. In the South East, tensions have been contained below the threshold of full insurgency. In the maritime domain, economic lifelines have been secured.

However, good governance remains the only real pathway out of a cycle of violence. 

Yet the reality remains harsh. Lives are still lost daily. Families continue to sell everything they own to pay ransoms. The military has contributed to pushing back elements of the threat with measurable, though uneven, success, but it has not eliminated them.

Additional data provided by Mansir Muhammed. 

We can analyze China’s current stance on the escalating Iranian conflict by understanding its true position. China does not desire a full-scale war that would destroy its oil interests, but it is not averse to the continuation of the neither-peace-nor-war situation that drains its adversaries, such as Washington. This positions China as a player that pushes for calm during critical times, while simultaneously providing Iran with the economic lifeline it needs. Here, China plays a dual and complex role in the Iranian conflict (the Iranian-American/Israeli conflict), balancing its strategic support for Tehran to safeguard its energy interests and undermine American influence with its pursuit of a ceasefire to avoid widespread economic chaos.

Based on current developments up to early May 2026 and statements by Iranian officials that war is a possibility, the regional and international landscape reveals a divide between actual military escalation and cautious diplomacy. The Chinese position and the likelihood of war can be analyzed based on several factors. China views the current conflict with Iran as a proxy war, prioritizing stability over stability. China considers Iran a strategic partner, and its stance is characterized by a delicate balance. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly called for de-escalation and a complete ceasefire to prevent further escalation in the Middle East, while simultaneously condemning American escalation. China has stated that American and Israeli military operations against Iran violate its sovereignty and has expressed grave concern about the potential imposition of a blockade on Iranian ports and the Strait of Hormuz. While Beijing seeks to protect its investments and economic interests, China is deeply concerned about any disruption to oil and energy supplies, especially since a direct war would lead to imported inflation, negatively impacting its economy. Therefore, China’s current stance is characterized by a cautious, mediating role. China is attempting to play the part of a peace broker but is also wary of the potential damage a war could inflict on its relations with the United States, especially given the ongoing diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.

Regarding the likelihood of war (and the expected scenarios), despite the tense rhetoric, a full-scale, direct war between the United States and Iran remains a risky prospect for all parties. Current indicators suggest that a war is already underway (indirectly), particularly since the start of direct military operations (US/Israeli strikes) against Iran and its allies in February 2026. This indicates that a direct war remains a strong possibility. The option of blockade and proxies also remains a possibility. Chinese intelligence and military assessments suggest that Iran might prefer to carry out its threats through proxies in the region or by disrupting oil shipments in the Strait of Hormuz, rather than engaging in a direct war, to avoid a conventional military defeat. Despite Chinese diplomatic efforts to contain the situation, and despite the escalation, attempts are still underway, such as Pakistani mediation, to reach a ceasefire. This indicates a desire among the parties to keep the door open for political solutions.

As for my perspective on the proxy war between China and Iran against the United States and Israel, the current conflict is likely to continue as a proxy war of attrition, with limited and precise strikes, rather than a full-scale ground invasion. China will likely exert further pressure, continuing to push for diplomatic solutions because any large-scale war would threaten the stability of global energy supplies, on which it depends. It’s worth noting that the region is going through a critical moment and a dangerous phase of mutual deterrence. Iranian officials’ statements are as much messages of deterrence as they are an acknowledgment of the potential for escalation.

Regarding China’s role in the continuation of the war or its support for Iran (strategic and economic support), China considers the Iranian Strait of Hormuz and its purchases of Iranian oil as a vital economic lifeline. China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil (approximately 80-90% of exports), providing Tehran with crucial funding to sustain its activities. China also seeks to help Iran circumvent US sanctions, assisting Iran in bypassing these sanctions through an unofficial oil fleet, thus keeping the Iranian economy afloat. Furthermore, there is a strategic Chinese-Iranian partnership opposed to the West and US sanctions against Tehran. China views Iran as a partner in undermining the US-led global order through organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Moreover, China is exploiting the current situation to its advantage. Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security analyses suggest that the continuation of the Iranian war drains US resources and provides China with an opportunity to enhance its influence, absorbing the shock of the war and potentially emerging with strategic gains.

At the same time that China is playing a role in halting the Iranian war through mediation diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, with China acting as a hidden mediator to urge Tehran to cooperate and reach a ceasefire with the United States to protect its economic interests, despite China’s support for Iran, the war harms China by closing the Strait of Hormuz and threatening its energy security. This prompts Beijing to urge an end to the war and the reopening of waterways. Therefore, China is pursuing a policy of diplomatic pressure, consistently calling for restraint and believing that the best solution is an immediate ceasefire, according to statements by its permanent representative to the United Nations.

Accordingly, we conclude that a full-scale war is theoretically possible but practically unlikely as a final option due to the exorbitant cost to all parties. However, the continuation of retaliatory strikes and economic sanctions remains the most probable scenario at present.

The U.S. Air Force said its new interim Air Force One jet, dubbed the VC-25B Bridge aircraft, has officially completed modifications and flight testing and is being painted in the red, white and blue livery sought by President Donald Trump. The extremely lavish 747-8i Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) – donated by Qatar to the U.S. last year for use by Trump – is set to serve in the Air Force One role while the White House awaits the delayed delivery from Boeing of two fully-outfitted VC-25B Air Force One aircraft. There are no plans to retire the VC-25As that currently serve as Air Force One until both full-up VC-25Bs are operational.

The Air Force said the VC-25B Bridge aircraft is on schedule to roll out in its new paint scheme and be delivered to the Presidential Airlift Group this summer. It is not clear when it will start flying Trump. The White House referred us to the Air Force for additional information.

The jet recently underwent flight testing in Texas, which you can see in the following photos that aviation photographer TT-33 operator was kind enough to share with us at the time.

The USAF now says that with the Boeing VC-25B deliveries delayed far past its initial 2024 target and VC-25A heavy maintenance cycles being extended, an interim capability became “an absolute imperative.” How accurate this claim actually is isn’t clear. Trump has been talking about an interim Air Force One aircraft for some time since deliveries of the new VC-25Bs were pushed back beyond his second term. We heard of no actual requirements originating for this capability from within the USAF prior to the new administration or far in advance of Trump’s deal with the Qataris to source the jet. Very early in the new administration, Elon Musk was even working to find out how to get Trump a new Air Force One as fast as possible, for instance.

The Air Force claimed that in February 2025, a dedicated task force launched a “full-court press” on the VC-25B Bridge program while simultaneously working to accelerate Boeing’s long-term VC-25B production.

Though questions were swirling about the legality and ethics of receiving the gifted plane, the Pentagon last May took delivery of the aircraft and said it would rapidly undertake the required modifications.

It’s one thing to have a donated ultra-luxury jet, but turning it into one safe and connected enough to carry a president is another story.

As TWZ has previously noted, converting any aircraft into one that is secure enough to transport the president is a complex undertaking. The aircraft needs to provide constant, secure communications, including what is needed to order a nuclear strike under extreme conditions. Historically, it also needs to be physically hardened both inside and out to withstand myriad threats, from the electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear weapon going off to incoming surface-to-air missiles to enemy intelligence-gathering efforts. To do this requires significant modifications right down to the aircraft’s outer structure. It is very unlikely, if not impossible, that this aircraft was hardened against EMPs in the timeframe required for fielding it.

The VC-25As are speckled with missile approach warning sensors and many laser countermeasures turrets (DIRCM). They also include the legacy Matador infrared countermeasure system above their jet engines and APU. This is in addition to other defensive features which are less visible and remain closely guarded secrets.

Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM)

In previous coverage, we noted that at the very least, “this aircraft will have to feature some kind of DIRCM setup to repel shoulder-fired heat-seeking missiles, and modular units are available that can be attached in a canoe to the bottom of the aircraft. These systems, such as Elbit’s C-MUSIC or Northrop Grumman’s Guardian, are in service with foreign VVIP 747s, as well as commercial aircraft, including those flying for Israeli airline El Al. You can read all about these systems here. Still, while they offer far less defensive capacity compared to what is seen under the belly of a VC-25A, they would offer a significant layer of protection.” We still don’t see any evidence of the aircraft being modified with defensive countermeasures.

L3Harris, known for its communications systems and aircraft alterations, was selected to undertake the “complex modification of the bridge aircraft,” the Air Force explained. The company already delivers “secure, reliable and resilient communications” for VC-25A and the executive airlift fleet “but has extensive experience with self-protection and customization of VIP aircraft,” the Air Force added. “The accelerated timeline was further made possible by a mission-focused partnership with Boeing, who provided the necessary engineering data to support the required structural modifications.”

In addition, “elite specialists from multiple government agencies developed advanced protocols to detect and – if necessary – neutralize potential technical hazards on previously owned aircraft,” according to the Air Force. “Their rigorous approach on the Bridge aircraft has literally ‘written the book’ and set the benchmark for integrating used airframes into the secure military inventory.”

In response to our question about what modifications the jet received, the Air Force told us the following:

“Safety and security were at the forefront of this program. We deliberately minimized interior aesthetic modifications to focus on modifications for safety, security and mission execution. We assessed which requirements were necessary for an interim capability. We had greater flexibility in developing our mission requirements.

After safety and security, we focused on the mission communications systems.

We have made deliberate decisions such as the reduction of the number of airstairs, less chiller space, and exclusion of the Golden Eagle mission [to fly the remains of former presidents] to minimize structural modifications, while prioritizing modifications focused on safety, security and secure communications.”

We also asked whether this jet will be able to fly overseas and into higher-risk areas, but have not gotten a response. At this point, based on the limited info we have at this time, that seems unlikely. But if this is the case, the question then can be raised why the USAF is spending billions on two full-up Air Force One aircraft if standards have been so relaxed that this simpler aircraft can do all their missions? We will update this story with any pertinent details the USAF provides.

To help speed up the delivery process of this interim Air Force One jet, the Air Force said it “constructed an at-scale mockup of the interior, complete with virtual reality views, to enable early commissioning activities for White House staff.”

“Our commitment to providing the president with a secure, resilient and reliable airborne command post is unwavering,” said Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen. Ken Wilsbach. “The VC-25B Bridge program is a testament to the Air Force’s ability to innovate and rapidly evolve to ensure the continuity of our government under any conditions.”

The Air Force said the estimated delivery of Boeing’s VC-25Bs is now expected in 2028. If that holds up, then this ‘bridge’ aircraft will have served at most around two years until the first full-up VC-25B is delivered.

We will continue to follow developments in this program and provide updates when warranted.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Addressing the cameras following reports of spiralling youth violence, including the killing of the 21-year-old former Israeli soldier Yemanu Binyamin Zalka last week, Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir was clear.

“This will be a total war,” he said, announcing a national operation to target a surge in youth violence. “We will restore security to the streets and calm to parents. Anyone who harms Israeli civilians will face the strong hand of the Israel Police and pay a heavy price.”

The response was sharp, aligned itself with the victim, and promised a solution.

That, critics say, is a sharp contrast to Ben-Gvir’s response – or lack of one – to the ongoing epidemic of violence in Israeli towns and villages populated by Palestinians, which has so far led to the deaths of almost 100 people and, according to Israel’s own finance ministry, costs the country up to $6.7bn a year.

Allegations of two-tier policing, to the detriment of what Israelis refer to as the “Arab sector”, have dogged Israel’s police for decades. But the situation has gotten worse under the current administration of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which has been in power since the end of 2022, and Ben-Gvir, a far-right politician who is in charge of the police.

The statistics since Ben-Gvir came into office back up the narrative that the crime wave in Palestinian communities has gotten significantly worse. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that the murder rate in Israel’s Palestinian communities increased from 4.9 per 100,000 in 2020, to 11 per 100,000, on par with the murder rate in Sudan and Iraq.

In contrast, the murder rate in Israel’s Jewish society stood at approximately 0.6 per 100,000.

That increase can not totally be attributed to the current government – Netanyahu himself was prime minister in 2020, when the murder rate was lower. But critics argue that the introduction into government of figures like Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who they say are openly disdainful of Palestinians, has contributed to the sharp uptick in violence.

Analysts and experts who spoke to Al Jazeera had little doubt over the Netanyahu government’s culpability in the increased murder rate.

“They really don’t mind that Palestinians are killing each other, as they’ve been left to do for years,” lawmaker Aida Touma-Suleiman, a Palestinian member of the Hadash party and a longstanding critic of the lack of policing in Palestinian communities in Israel, said.

“It would never occur to the police that they should provide a service to Arab neighbourhoods,” she said of the lack of physical police presence within Palestinian communities. “It’s about enforcement. It’s hostile.”

While police stations are standard in Israel’s Jewish-majority areas, there are only about 10 in Palestinian-majority areas.

Among the decisions that have most angered Palestinian advocacy groups in Israel was the government’s December approval of a $68.5m cut to an economic development programme for Palestinian communities in Israel, in order to fund more policing in the communities.

Critics agreed that more funding was needed for the police, but bemoaned that the money was coming from a fund designed to address the root causes of criminality by addressing housing and economic development, areas where Palestinian communities are notoriously underfunded in comparison to Jewish ones.

Hardwired poverty

Palestinian citizens of Israel make up around 21 percent of the country’s population. Disadvantaged economically, they are the descendants of Palestinians who did not flee after the 1948 establishment of Israel – an event they know as the Nakba, when an estimated 750,000 Palestinians were ethnically cleansed and forced out.

Often concentrated in separate towns and villages from Israeli Jews, Palestinians frequently describe a reality of chronic underinvestment, with the presence of the state either limited or non-existent.

Joblessness has long been woven into their daily lives, analysts say, but the unemployment rate has worsened since Israel choked off access to the occupied West Bank, where many worked, after the Hamas-led October 7 attack on Israel and the start of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza in 2023.

The most recent official date, based on 2024 figures, shows that 37.6 percent of Palestinian households in Israel live below the poverty line.

Local criminal networks in Israel’s Palestinian towns and villages have grown in scale and influence in recent years, in some cases taking on the form of mafia-style organisations, untroubled, critics say, by the current government.

“There is a wide network of criminal gangs who exert control across Arab neighbourhoods,” said Daniel Bar-Tal, professor of social-political psychology at Tel Aviv University, adding that criminality and even murder were allowed to continue with the state’s own complicity.

“In part, the government just likes it. They get to say, ‘Look, this is Arab culture, this is Arab society. This is what they do.’ They also rely on the collaboration of the gangs to gather information on what’s going on in these communities,” he said, referring to numerous accounts of how friends who had reported criminal activity in their neighbourhoods were dismissed. “And lastly, it is because the police force is controlled by Ben-Gvir, a racist who actively enjoys dehumanising Arab society.”

Ben-Gvir has previously rejected accusations of racism and says he is only against those who harm Jews.

Policed by the enemy

From leveraging his position in government to urge on the genocide in Gaza, to defending officers under his charge filmed raping a Palestinian prisoner, Ben-Gvir’s actions have dismayed many of Israel’s self-styled liberals, just as they have shocked observers around the world.

However, following an uptick in crime in Israel, criticism of Ben-Gvir’s performance in his role as national security minister has begun to enter the domestic mainstream.

As well as more predictable opinion pieces in Israel’s liberal press, accusing the National Security Minister of being “busy on TikTok” while Zelka was killed, or concentrating his efforts on arresting professors wearing Palestinian flags on their kippahs while murder rates break records, there have also been criticisms from those closer to the establishment.

Earlier this month, Israel’s High Court intervened in a row between Ben-Gvir and Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, ordering the two to reach an accommodation after Baharav-Miara called for his ousting following what she claimed was his attempts to make political interventions in the police’s work.

“Nobody cares if Ben-Gvir’s good at his job,” political scientist Ori Goldberg said. “He’s there to punish Palestinians, even those in Israel. They’re punished through a lack of security, just as they’re punished through hostile planning, and a lack of healthcare punishes them. This is how the apartheid Israel always works.”

Follow our live build-up, with full team news coverage, ahead of our text commentary stream.

The United Arab Emirates’ announcement of its withdrawal from OPEC and the OPEC+ alliance, effective May 1, 2026, represents a major strategic shift in the global energy market, with direct and significant implications for China, the world’s largest oil importer. The primary impact of this UAE withdrawal on China is the enhancement of Chinese energy security, as it will increase available supplies. The UAE will now be able to raise its production towards its target of 5 million barrels per day by 2027, without being bound by OPEC quotas. This expansion will provide China with a substantial and stable source of oil outside the constraints of production alliances. Furthermore, the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC will impact China’s diversification policy, as China relies on imports to cover approximately 70% of its oil needs. The UAE’s departure will grant Beijing greater flexibility in purchasing from the spot market at potentially more competitive prices.

This also has a significant impact on import costs (prices) through prolonged downward pressure. The UAE’s increased oil production (up to 680,000 barrels per day above previous levels) is expected to put downward pressure on global Brent crude prices in the medium term (12-24 months), thus reducing China’s energy import bill. This could lead to short-term volatility, as, despite the potential benefit, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz (due to current regional tensions in April 2026) limits the immediate ability to capitalize on the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC, since most of the UAE’s exports to China pass through this waterway.

China could benefit from the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC by enhancing its capacity for financial and trade cooperation and expanding trade in local currencies, particularly the Chinese yuan. The UAE’s departure from OPEC could (facilitate the expansion of oil trade agreements) in rubles, rupees, and yuan, moving away from OPEC’s traditional dollar pricing. This aligns with China’s drive to internationalize the yuan. Such a move could boost joint investments, given China’s existing stakes in UAE oil concessions. With Abu Dhabi freed from restrictions, these Chinese investments could generate higher returns through increased production. Furthermore, China might leverage the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC to bolster the strategic and geopolitical value of weakening OPEC’s influence. This withdrawal diminishes OPEC’s ability to control global supply, which benefits major consuming nations like China by reducing the likelihood of price shocks resulting from collective production cuts.

In this context, Chinese discussions and analyses have intensified, examining the potential benefits for China from the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC. Chinese experts are analyzing the likelihood and impact of such a move should it materialize, particularly given the UAE’s increasing production capacity and its desire for greater flexibility. If we assume the UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC is indeed the case, China stands to be the biggest beneficiary for the following reasons. First, it would break the dominance of the petrodollar. The departure of a player the size of the UAE from traditional OPEC constraints opens the door wide to bilateral agreements for pricing oil in digital yuan (or Chinese yuan), thus supporting Beijing’s strategy of internationalizing the yuan to reduce its dependence on the Western financial system (SWIFT). In addition to the increased Chinese-Emirati supply, since Chinese companies such as CNPC and CNOOC hold stakes in oil concessions in Abu Dhabi, the UAE’s release from OPEC production quotas means these companies can increase production and secure China’s growing energy needs at preferential prices and with favorable terms. This facilitates the revitalization of joint UAE-China investments, allowing for deeper Chinese capital flow into the UAE’s refining and petrochemical sector. The exchange of finished goods and crude oil within an economic cycle based on local currencies reduces conversion costs and the risks associated with dollar fluctuations. This supports China’s policy of moving towards BRICS+. As the UAE is a member of the BRICS group, any move away from traditional OPEC frameworks aligns with the group’s overall direction to create a parallel financial system that supports the ruble, rupee, and yuan. This scenario, if it were to occur, would transform the relationship from one of buyer and seller to a comprehensive strategic partnership, making energy the driving force behind the new financial system that China seeks to lead.

Accordingly, the UAE’s withdrawal represents a strategic gain for China in terms of increased supply and potential cost reductions, but maximizing the benefit remains contingent on the stability of shipping lanes in the Arabian Gulf.