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Joint statement says Israeli land grab is ‘deliberate and direct attack’ on the viability of a Palestinian state.

Foreign ministers of 19 countries, including Turkiye, Qatar, France and Brazil, have signed a joint statement condemning Israel’s moves to unlawfully extend and consolidate its control over Palestinian land.

The statement issued late Monday by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs described Israel’s plans to begin land registration in the occupied West Bank, which will sanction the seizure of land from Palestinians who cannot prove ownership, as “de facto annexation”.

“Changes are wide-ranging, reclassifying Palestinian land as so-called Israeli ‘state land’, accelerating illegal ⁠settlement activity, and further entrenching Israeli administration,” said the joint statement, also signed by Saudi ‌Arabia and Egypt, as well as the heads of the Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

Israel’s plans, signed on February 15, will see registration introduced across Area C, which makes up about 60 percent of the West Bank’s territory, according to the illegal settlement monitoring organisation, Peace Now.

The joint statement warned Israel’s moves could permanently alter the “legal and administrative status” of territory that is largely under Israeli military control, with limited Palestinian self-rule, but which would constitute part of a future Palestinian state.

“Such actions are a deliberate and direct attack on the viability of the Palestinian State and the implementation of the two-State Solution,” the statement said, rejecting measures altering “the demographic composition, character and status of the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem”.

Signatories also called on Israel to end settler violence against Palestinians, pledging to take “concrete steps, in accordance with international law, to counter the expansion of illegal settlements in Palestinian territory and policies and threats of forcible displacement and annexation”.

The foreign ministers stressed that Israeli settlements constitute “a flagrant violation of international law”, including previous United Nations Security Council resolutions and the 2024 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The landmark ICJ ruling stated that Israel’s “abuse of its status as the occupying power” rendered its “presence in the occupied Palestinian territory unlawful”.

According to the ICJ, approximately 465,000 Israeli settlers live in the occupied West Bank, spread across some 300 settlements and outposts, which are illegal under international law.

Earlier this month, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that Israel’s land registration plan could lead to the “dispossession of Palestinians of their property and risks expanding Israeli control over land in the area”.

Signatories of the statement urged Israel to immediately release withheld tax revenues owed to the Palestinian Authority in accordance with the 1994 Paris Protocol.

They also stressed the importance of preserving the historic and legal status quo in Jerusalem and its holy sites, particularly during the holy month of Ramadan.

The U.S. buildup of forces in the Middle East ahead of a possible attack on Iran relies very heavily on the performance of the U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC). Hundreds of its cargo jets and aerial refueling tankers have moved materiel into theater and helped tactical jets, radar planes and other aircraft deploy across oceans to places like Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, among many other locations. At the same time, the current crisis in the Middle East pales in comparison to the massive spike in demand for airborne logistics that would occur during a Pacific fight against China. Regardless, ever greater demand is being placed on an increasingly aging AMC fleet.

Few people know the nuts and bolts of AMC and its mission better than Michael “Mini” Minihan, a retired Air Force general who led the command from October 2021 to November 2024. In a 45-minute interview, Minihan offered his insights on that and a whole host of other topics. They include the current crisis and its airlift demands, challenges from China, future airframes, arming airlifters and refuelers, the connectivity issues he championed, AI and the leaked memo that put a cap on his career.

Since retiring, Minihan serves as a strategic advisor and board member to defense and technology companies, non-profits, and think tanks while continuing to write and speak on leadership, national security, and the future of air mobility and global power projection.

Some of the questions and answers have been edited for clarity.

Q: The C-17 Globemaster III heavy lifters have been supporting one crisis after another it seems. Have the hours accumulated faster on those airframes? What do you think should replace them and when? 

A: All the things I was concerned about while I was in uniform, I remain concerned about right now. The options on the table are service life extension programs [SLEP] that the C-17 is already a candidate for. There was talk late last year about the KC-135 Stratotanker receiving another [SLEP]. You know, those types of things are concerning to me. At the end of the day, I think this nation needs to pay for the Air Force it needs, and the Air Force that it needs has a modern, capable mobility fleet. It’s not just old stuff that keeps getting patched up to get older. That’s the reality. So I’m concerned.

Q: Right now, a massive buildup is underway in the Middle East. AMC is doing the heavy lifting there as always. But in a crisis in the Pacific, would we have enough airlift aircraft to support moving quick enough across that vast theater, especially to respond to an invasion of Taiwan? 

A: What you’re talking about is always a concern, regardless of the scenario. The reality is that America relies on the mobility fleet to project its power… So there’s not any scenario, even in the day-to-day competition, where you’re happy with the supply-demand intersection. So I think that we’ve got to work on capacity, certainly out of the entire mobility fleet, when it comes to the airlift and the air refueling. And then if you overlay that in contested environments, the concern gets bigger.

Q: Considering how long it has taken to build up forces in the Middle East, where tankers and cargo jets are flying over uncontested airspace, how concerned are you about being able to project enough power over long distances to protect Taiwan from an attack by China?

A: The alarm that I had when I was active duty exists today… So the reason I’m a civilian right now is because I was ringing the bell on the exact questions that you’re asking right now and that concern still remains. The reality is against a China or against a Russia, they’re going to challenge you in all domains, from great distances. They absolutely understand that the mobility fleet is America’s capability to project power quickly. So there’s going to be a focus on it. But once again, you’re describing concerns that I had and expressed when I was active duty, and I still have those same concerns.

Inside Taiwan’s Strategy to Counter a Chinese Invasion | WSJ

Q: What response did you receive when you expressed those concerns in a memo that was leaked to the public in 2023?

A: Well, I’m a civilian right now.

Q: Is that the reason why?

A: The leak created antibodies that would want me in another job. That memo was getting after all the things that you’re asking about right now. It was getting after capability and capacity. It was getting after readiness. It was getting after explode into theater. It was getting after the mobility fleet being able to do what it’s asked to do, despite being extremely vulnerable, despite it being extremely antiquated – all those things. 

I believe that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force [Gen. Kenneth S. Wilsbach] now is focused on modernization and readiness. Those were 100% things that I was championing very early. And I think those things exist now, and I think we need to continue to put pressure on [those things] to get the resourcing, to get not just the Air Force, but America’s mobility fleet, to the capability and capacity that it needs to be at, so that we can not have concerns about China and not have concern about [deploying] to Europe when needed.

Q: Were you fired over the memo?

A: I was not fired. I thought for two weeks that I was going to be fired, but I was thankfully allowed to serve out the rest of my command tour. But I was asked to retire.

Q: What were the biggest lessons learned by Mobility Guardian and our readiness to meet the challenge China poses in the Pacific? 

A: We’ve got to explode into theater very quickly. We’ve got to be able to explode into theater in numbers and volumes and challenges that we’ve not experienced in any of the modern…operations. We’ve got to put the entire joint force in place. We’ve got to do it quick enough that it gives an enormous deterrent value and also be able to provide that decisive victory, should it get to that.

We’ve got to transition from a deploy to an employ phase very quickly. So that’s establishing hubs and spokes. And then the last thing I’ll say – this is about maneuver. We have got to maneuver at a tempo required to win. So we got to put America’s unique and amazing capabilities in a position of advantage, and then once they’re in that position of advantage, we’ve got to be lethal, and that requires logistics, sustainment, supply maneuver, all the things that have to come together in the joint force to be lethal have to be there, and we need to work extremely hard to do that. 

So Mobility Guardian was really a rehearsal, and we demonstrated that we couldn’t explode into theater. We demonstrated that we could go from deploy to employ. But we also learned some hard lessons, and to get it to the scale and the volume of the tempo that we needed to be, we’ve got work to do.

Mobility Guardian 2023

Q: What were some of these lessons?

A: The lessons are connectivity. You probably heard me say that a bunch both in uniform and out of uniform, but connectivity became my number one thing. I testified before the House Readiness Committee on that. I came up with a concept called 25% of the fleet by 2025, but the reality is that the car I rented right now driving from the airport to my hotel room has more connectivity in it than the overwhelming majority of the mobility fleet. So connectivity matters. 

We’ve got to operate at a tempo required to win, which means we need to do extremely long missions. We need to have exquisite situational awareness. We need to understand the changing dynamic of the operational environment. When it comes to red forces, blue forces, threats, priority receivers, priority users. We’ve got diffuse information and logistic priorities across services, so there’s almost an unlimited amount of lessons learned. And then command relationships matter as well as command and control. All those things matter too. So plenty of lessons learned. I don’t think any of those are surprising. I think they’re accounted for in the Air Force’s readiness and modernization. But we also need to get resources so that we can be the Air Force this country needs.

Q: How would you peg our overall readiness, realistically, to confront China in the Pacific militarily? 

A: We’re ready. I like the way that [IndoPacific Command leader] Adm. [Sam] Paparo uses it. He says we’re ready, but he’ll never admit to being ready enough. This is kind of like the coaches that you love to play for – they are never satisfied. I would broaden it beyond readiness. I would say readiness, integration and agility of the joint force is what matters. And as ready, integrated and agile as we are, we need to be more. And those things have a deterrent value in themselves, and they’re also the essentials to decisive victory. So China enjoys positional advantage, but America enjoys extreme warfighting capabilities that can always get better, and it starts with readiness, integration and agility. We want to get to the point where we’re so ready that they don’t want to take us on.

Q; What were the three biggest problems you faced in your job and how did you go about solving them? Were you successful?

A: The three biggest problems I faced during my command tour at Air Mobility Command was resourcing, resourcing and resourcing – articulating the state of the mobility platforms and securing the resources necessary to get them on step to where they need to be. And so I said resourcing three times, and I mean it.

This is all about money. You can say everything you want. You can say all the things are important. You can say ‘you’re right, General Minihan, we agree with you,’ but if it’s not followed up with resourcing, then it’s meaningless, you know? So at the end of the day, this is all about resourcing. Can we decide to be the Air Force, the joint military that puts the resourcing behind what it means to decisively defeat a near peer adversary? Or do we wait until another December 7, or another September 11 event to finally get all the things pulled together that we need to pull together. So I get it. This is expensive. 

We’ve got a chance of a century right now, I believe, with this administration. When you line up the executive orders, when you line up the acquisition reform, when you look up the possibility of a $1.5 trillion defense budget, you know those things come together means that we can move faster and move differently than we’ve ever done but we’ve got to be ready to do it.

We can’t apply all the opportunities over the same template of how we acquire, how we take risk, how we get our warfighters the things that they need and expect a different outcome at the end of the day. The overall statement for this, and this is big into problem statements. If I were to describe the problem statement we’re trying to solve is, can we get critical war-winning capabilities to our warfighters faster than China? At the end of the day, if we can answer yes to that question, then we’re going to be okay. If it’s a maybe or a no, then we’re going to have some significant concerns moving forward.

Trump Calls For Massive Increase To Defense Spending: $1.5 Trillion For 2027

Q: Were you successful in your efforts to solve those problems?

A: Was I successful? I would say I was successful at ringing the bell. I needed three more years to get it across the line. And I’m not comparing myself to a Gen. [Curtis E.] LeMay or a Gen. [Wilbur L.] Creech, but those two [Major Command] MAJCOM commanders – who are the fathers of the modern strategic bomber force and the father of the modern fighter force –  were both MAJCOM commanders for over six years. So if I had to give myself a grade, I would say me and my teams were A-plus for effort and articulation and at the end of the day, getting the system to react quickly within three years proved extremely challenging.

Q: What was your grade for that?

A: It’s to be determined. You know, the money process takes a little time. I think there’s money for connectivity coming up in the current and the next few years, which is a great sign and a big change. If I were to grade it for what I wanted, I would have given myself a C, but I think it’s a higher grade than that, due to the circumstances, due to the realities of the budgeting and the resourcing process.

Q: What are the three biggest problems facing current interim AMC Commander Lt. Gen. Rebecca Sonkiss (formerly deputy AMC commander until Gen. John D. Lamontagne was named Air Force Vice Chief of Staff earlier this month). 

A: The problems are getting resourcing across the line. Can you deliver them? Money. You know, at the end of the day, MAJCOMs don’t have the money to get the things that they need and under the current process. So how do you affect the organizations and entities above you, so that you can align the resourcing to do the things that it needs to do, and the timelines that you need to do it when that’s always a challenge for everybody. 

Air Mobility Command (AMC) Change of Command Ceremony – Scott AFB

But if you’re asking what [Lamontagne] needs to worry about…if you look at the first Iran operation, if you look at the Venezuela operation, whatever is going to happen over the next short-term future for the Middle East, you can walk away saying, ‘we’re just fine.’ You can walk away saying, ‘Hey, we can project power over long distances. We can impose America’s will. We can do the things that our president and our nation asked us to do.’ And that’s right, you can do it under those circumstances. 

The courage of the joint team is phenomenal. The capability of the joint team is phenomenal, but it does not compare to what will happen in a near-peer fight in the Pacific or in Europe. We are going to be contested from long distances in all domains, and the fleet that we have now is not going to be successful in that environment unless we take quick action and fix things.

Q: There is a lot of hype around Rapid Dragon and giving the airlift community a ‘shooter’ role. But in a major conflict, won’t the fleet be tasked to the max just with its core logistics mission? Do we need more airframes to really do the Rapid Dragon concept justice?

A: I hear this one a lot. So here’s the reality. I’ve got to carry the missile, the bomb anyway. Okay, I’m not trying to be Global Strike. I’m not trying to be a fighter. I’m not trying to compete with capabilities that are legit and high-end when it comes to delivering kinetic effects. But if I have to carry it anyway, and there’s an ability for C-130s, C-17s  and other airlift platforms, why would you not want that capability? 

So I’m not saying it can go into the high-threat areas or the medium-threat areas. I’m not saying that it needs to be a primary mission. But let’s really look at the thing – at the entire process here. I’ve got to carry that stuff anyways, so I am either gonna stop and drop it off for someone else to shoot, or I could have the ability to do it. If a combatant commander needs a demand signal, there’s a ton of C-130s. Our foreign partners and allies operate them. These aren’t complex systems. The munitions already exist. It’s essentially air-dropping it out of the airplane. And I think it has enormous viability in the Pacific. It can service medium- to low-[threat] targets all day long that need servicing and free up the other sets to get after the high-end threat environments where they need to be focused. So I think it’s something we need to consider.

Rapid Dragon

Q: That segues nicely to my next question. What are the biggest threats China poses to our tankers and airlifters during a time of war?

A: The ability to get out of town by dropping electrical grids and navigation signals. This is true for all the platforms. This is why I say we’ll be contested at great distances in all domains. Critical infrastructure matters and getting out of town – we already talked about what it means to explode into theater. So it’d be silly to think that they’re going to not take a very inexpensive way to disrupt our ability to do that. And then, the farther you get to the threat, regardless of which way you’re heading around the ocean, you know is going to increase their ability to reach out with long-range effects and stop mobility. 

If you stop one tanker, you stop six fighters. That sounds like a good return on investment if you’re an adversary trying to prevent us from projecting power. I don’t think I’m saying anything I haven’t said before, and I don’t think I’m saying anything that’s inconsistent with others [are saying] about what the real environment is going to look like. 

They’re students of us. They have unimpeded access to our critical infrastructure for a decade or more, and we’re going to expect them to call in on their investment and impose a cost on us a great distance.

Q: Is there any particular Chinese system or munition that worries you the most?

A: What worries me the most? I’m worried, just like I was in uniform, about the multi-domain aspect for which they’re going to go after us. I’m worrying about how those all come together. Certainly, without connectivity in the mobility fleet, it’s hard for mobility aircraft to understand where the threats are, especially the kinetic threats. So our ability to understand if you’re in a threat ring or a dynamic threat environment is extremely handicapped. And certainly the kinetic ones are of the biggest concern. Like they are in any war. 

Q: We have seen interest from the DoW in multiple fronts on how to give our existing tankers better defenses, from better situational awareness to giving them mini interceptors to pairing them with [collaborative combat aircraft] CCA-like companions. What do you think the best cocktail of solutions is here?

A: The single biggest contributor to survivability in a big airplane is connectivity. The biggest contributor is not having a 12-hour-old Intel brief that you’re relying on to get you through the mission. So real-world updates, real-time updates, just like our fighters and our bombers enjoy. Battle management that gets after maneuver and not just kill chain. Those things matter. 

If you were to ask me what I would want most when it comes to survivability, it would be connectivity that gives me the situational awareness to let our young crews – our captains, our lieutenants, our NCO – go out there and make great decisions as they’re operating under delegated authorities. Connectivity matters most. No doubt. Connectivity is why I put the priority on it when I was in uniform, because it’s the single biggest contributor to survivability. I just don’t think because of the size of these airplanes, in the maturity of the threat, that we’re going to be able to rely on traditional means of survivability.

Q: What about mini interceptors, or pairing these aircraft with CCA-like companions? Would that work?

A: I mean, I love it. The whole concept we came up with, the next-generation air lift [NGAL] and next-generation air refueling systems [NGAS]. I definitely see a role for CCA beyond just loyal wingman to fighter. So we can do this with everything from a CCA version of a tanker. We can do it with a stealth version of a tanker. I don’t think we need huge numbers of those. We can do stealth-like characteristics, like blended wing. 

We can certainly have aircraft that are multirole, both cargo and air refueling. And so then you can have a lot of tankers that look like the tankers that we have now, the ability for small CCA and drones and other things to do electronic warfare and spoof and jam and other things like that are all on the table in my book and things that we should be exploring.

Q: What about a stealth tanker? Would we be able to afford it? Has adapting the B-21 Raider stealth bomber been looked at? What are your thoughts on that?

A:  I think that we’ve got to have a family approach to air refueling, and that’s where the NGAS concept came up. It’s hard for me to believe, to think that you’re going to be able, in a highly contested environment, to get our highest capabilities into the high-threat environments without having some sort of stealth-like CCA air refueling capability. I don’t think we need big numbers of them. I understand completely that they’re expensive, but we’ve got to work through that process, and we’re doing it with NGAS. So everything I’m telling you, I’ve said for years, and I’ve got a lot on the record out there that’s getting after the questions you’re asking, and I’ve not changed since I got out of uniform. 

The announcement by Northrop Grumman, the partnership with Embraer gets after this. If you go tackle that announcement, it gets after creating a family-of-systems approach to the problem, as opposed to we’re just going to field one piece of the problem at a time. We’re not going to work the integration in advance. We’re not going to work the readiness in advance. We’re not going to work the agility in advance, and I was happy to see in that announcement that they’re approaching the problem differently, because that’s the kind of approach I think we need to be successful.

Q: Have you looked at adapting the B-21 for this kind of stealth tanker role?

A: I don’t know what they’re looking at adapting, but I think there’s eloquence in the solutions that exist and that they’re working on, and then broadening their missions to beyond just the original intent for which they were designed. So I think that there’s great value in looking at those opportunities.

Q: What about an Agile Combat Employment (ACE) tanker capable of supporting small numbers of fighters from forward airfields? The KC-390 is being pitched for such a role. Do we need smaller tankers capable of operating from shorter fields?

A: We need a family of tankers that can address all the warfighter needs in all the warfighter environments. So we need tankers that look a lot like the ones we have now, that can handle the low-threat environments. We need tankers that can push into the medium-threat environments and service the big volume offloads in the abundant amount of receivers that will be out there. We need tankers that can operate in a medium- to high-threat with blended wing and stealth characteristics. And then we need stealth like tankers that can go into a higher-threat environment, as well as unmanned and CCA. 

I believe there’s room in the Air Force for all in that capability. Let’s be clear, it’s what the kinetic force needs, you know. So the strike force and the bomber force are [fifth-generation] fifth-gen and [sixth-generation] sixth-gen, and yet we still operate a mobility force that’s on its best day, 2.5 Gen and in some cases, second generation. So we’ve got to catch up, not because of ego, but because of capability. At the end of the day, this is about equilibrium of the enabling force to actually do what it needs to do, so that the strike force can carry out its missions in all environments. That’s what needs to happen.

Q: Is there money to do that? Is there a will from higher headquarters and then the administration to make that happen?

A: Well, there needs to be. Like I said, I think the opportunity is here with this administration. Its executive orders, its acquisition reform, and the possibility of a significant increase in the budget. But this gets back to, are we going to pay for the Air Force that this country needs? It’s been under-invested in, especially in mobility, and we need to ensure that this president and every future president, when they call on the Air Force to support the joint force, to project America’s power to serve the national interests and impose our will when needed, that we need to develop these kind of things. We have to do this if we want to be the Air Force that this country needs.

Q: Have you talked to anybody in the current administration or the current Department of War about this, and what’s your sense of the interest there?

A: I think the conversation is turning where it needs to go. I have not talked to the current administration about this specifically, but I think there’s an appreciation, when you line up the talking points that align the priorities of where the department is going, I think that there is 100% alignment with what my priorities were when I was in uniform, what my priorities are now that I’m out of uniform, with the priorities of where this administration is going.

I realize it’s still hard. I realize there are still challenges. I realize there are no easy answers to any of this, and I realize that there’s more to modernization and readiness than just the mobility fleet. And I also realize that these are the things that we need to do.

Q: Low-end drones are a big problem, especially for big airplanes sitting idle on the ground. What do you think should be done to defend our airlift assets against lower-end drones?

A: Just like everyone else, I watched the [Operation Spider Web] attack that Ukraine carried out on Russia’s strategic forces. And the only thing that surprised me about that is that people were surprised and that it took so long for them to do it. This is a real threat. It gets down to air base defense. It’s something that we championed in Air Mobility Command during my time there, because of the drone incursions that were happening over multiple Air Mobility Command bases and multiple Air Mobility Command missions. So this isn’t a surprise to me. 

This is going to have to be a joint solution, and I know the Army is working very hard on this, but there’s also going to have to be a capability of the Air Force and wings that are deploying to be able to do this on their own as well. So no easy answers here. 

I feel like we’re behind, but catching up. I think it nests nicely into the Golden Dome opportunity as well. But you know, you gotta be able to handle everything from the low-cost drones all the way up to the highest capability missiles that could attack the homeland. This all fits in a spectrum of threats that we need to be concerned about. 

Q: You brought up drone incursions. When and where did they happen and was the source ever found?

A: The incursions took place in late 2021 and early 2022 for Joint Base Andrews in Maryland and constantly at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst in New Jersey throughout my command. I’m not tracking that the source of those incursions was identified. It doesn’t mean that they weren’t. To my knowledge they weren’t. But, you know, at the end of the day, if you can’t control the airspace, including the airspace that drones are using, that’s a problem. It doesn’t matter if you’re in garrison or deployed. We’ve got to have the ability to defend at a greater capability than we have. 

Q: How are the C-5M Galaxy cargo jets doing? Are readiness rates improving? Will we need a direct replacement of something its size when their time finally comes to head to the boneyard? Was the M upgrade program successful?

A: I’m a year and a half out of the conversation. The last data point I got was from U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) commander Gen. [Randall] Reed‘s congressional testimony, where he said that the mission reliability rate, I believe, had fallen to 46%. So, if that’s true, then it’s still an enormous concern. I don’t know any part of your life where you tolerate a critical capability operating less than half the time when you need it. So C-5s are an enormous concern for me. 

I think there are options out there when it comes to large-volume aircraft that exist, that are being worked now, that can help us get capability quickly. And then I think there are concepts out there, like the commercialization of the C-5 fleet, that need to be taken seriously as well and apply commercial standards, commercial supply chain to increase the readiness of it. And between a combination of those two, I think that you can sustain what America needs to project large volume lift, but also get much higher than a 46% mission reliability rate.

Q: Do you see the need for a similar sized cargo aircraft to replace the C-5 when it’s finally time for them to retire?

A: I do. I think building large, colossal aircraft is one of the hardest things to do on the planet, when you think about it. I need someone to help fact check me on this, but I don’t think more than 250 large aircraft have ever been built. You know, when you include the Hughes aircraft, include the C-5, include the Russian Antonovs, the fleet has been small because it’s hard. At the same time, it does things that nothing else can do. You don’t have to condemn your cargo to sea lift only. You can move things very quickly – large volume things, critical capabilities. And so we need to have this capability. 

But I don’t see the Air Force buying C-5 replacements. I see them transitioning C-5s to a different model, like commercialization. And I see the manufacturer of a large aircraft that can handle the volume being in the CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet], and being a service concept that can get America the stuff we need when we need it. As opposed to developing another C-5 replacement, in addition to what’s going to have to eventually replace the C-5…

Q: Was the M upgrade on the C-5 successful?

A: I wasn’t there for when it was done, but … I would love to see what the original predictions were. When you spend all that money on that airplane and then still have a 46% mission reliability rate, it sounds like it is still challenged, like it used to be.

Q: Why hasn’t the Air Force gone big into uncrewed smaller logistics aircraft like China has? Especially considering dispersed ops in the Pacific?

A: Aviation right now is at a point of affordability and simplicity that we have got to distribute capability down to more tactical levels and have less centralization. Drones, automated aircraft 3,000 pounds or less, need to be a part of that equation. They need to be a part of the equation. 

I am a big fan of drones…The problem we’re trying to solve is getting winning capabilities to our warfighters faster than China. That’s what we need to be focused on. We have got to be infatuated with automation and connectivity. We have to be infatuated with drones and automated aircraft from small to medium to large capabilities. 

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The biggest question I hear about why people don’t want small- and medium-capability is because they’re concerned about who commands and controls it and in my mind, that’s the point. You don’t have to command and control it. This is like a distributed maneuver pool, like a Jeep used to be in the Army. It’s inexpensive, it’s easy to operate, and we give it to maneuvering commanders in the field. We get TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command out of the command and control of it. We let commanders determine their own priorities and service them, and then all we have to do is integrate them into the critical capabilities that Air Mobility, Command and TRANSCOM provide. You know those and we actually free up more of their assets to do that strategic and operational lift, as opposed to always having to get down into the capabilities that can be served by something much smaller. Does that make sense?

Q: Yes. Single pilot tanker operations, what’s your final thought on that?

A: Final thought on that is, we need to do more of it. I’m not saying we need to do more testing, but when it comes to automation, when it comes to concepts, when it comes to the tempo, the things we’re going to be required to do, we have to set ourselves up to be successful in an extremely deadly and demanding operational environment. 

And to think that we’re going to apply the old dogma over this new operational environment, it’s just going to put us in a really challenging place to be successful in. So single tanker pilot ops made a comment on autonomy. It made a comment on what we need to do to win in the Pacific. It made a comment on risk taking, and it made a comment on, I think, a command team that understood how to apply real concepts over real problems and come out with an informed way forward. So there was a larger message than just single pilots in tankers.

Q: Finally, how did you see the rise of AI influencing AMC and how do you see it being used by the command in the future?

A: I’m a big fan of AI as long as commanders maintain the risk and the priority settings. You know I tried hard to get AI incorporated in Air Mobility Command, but the entire ecosystem wasn’t ready to have that conversation yet. I think AI and data are its own domain. 

Like other domains we’re going to need supremacy and superiority in it. We’re going to need to fight for it and fight from it. It’s going to benefit from the other domains, but I think disproportionately it’s going to benefit the other domains. More so our ability to sense and seize opportunity, our ability to simplify, our ability to reduce variables, our ability to gain decision advantage, our ability to make better decisions, quicker, at a higher tempo than the adversary. I think all those things are AI- and data-oriented, and I’m still not certain that we see it that way. We have got to get first mover advantage in the AI domain, and that’s going to take some work. I think that we’re starting to get there, but I think we have a long way to go on it.

Boeing KC-46A Tanker Refuels Military Aircraft Using 3D

Q: Why do you think that there’s been such resistance to AI?

A: I’m not certain most people actually use it. It’s new. Certainly there’s a newness to it. But at the end of the day, this is about data. Can you trust the data? It really flips the script, if you think about it as its own domain, because then you understand the magnitude of its importance, and you understand that this is about decision making and trust, and that you’re actually not off-shooting that to the machine to do. That you’re asking the machine and the AI to reduce variables and increase simplicity.

Then you really think about, how does a commander be able to set priorities, set risk tolerances, adjust those as required, and then, at the end of the day, this is about better decision making. I think that there’s a complexity to this that just needs to play out a bit, but I know one thing, I don’t think our adversaries are downplaying AI and data as a domain. I think that they’re 100% embracing it, and I think we need to do the same. And of course, it’s American ingenuity. We’ll get better at it and dominate.

Q: Any final thoughts you want to share? Any questions I didn’t ask?

A: No, I appreciate the opportunity here. I think that the Air Force has it right when it comes to modernization and readiness. I think that the Air Force has it right, and we need to have the resourcing to be their Air Force that this country needs. I think mobility has a longer way to go than most within the Air Force. So I continue to champion that. Those things I cared about in uniform, I care about out of uniform, and I didn’t wait to retire to have an opinion on these things. So I want to be the generation of Americans that gets this straight before we get slapped like we did on December 7th and September 11th. Let’s not wait till we get slapped to get the act together. Let’s go now hard, because our sons and daughters deserve it.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Kyiv, Ukraine – Hennady Kolesnik never expected the full-scale Russian invasion to last this long.

“These are the worst and longest years of my life,” the 71-year-old retired welder told Al Jazeera four years after the aggression that began on February 24, 2022.

In the first days of the war, he and many Ukrainians were afraid Kyiv would be lost, as well as the third of their France-sized nation that lies on the left, eastern bank of the Dnipro River.

Tens of thousands of Russian troops, including elite airborne units and motor rifle brigades, occupied north of the Kyiv region, while the Kremlin’s supporters triumphantly touted that the capital would be seized “within three days”.

Months later, “we were ecstatic about what we’d regained” after Russian forces withdrew from around Kyiv and were ousted from northern Ukraine, said Kolesnik, a grey-haired, pallid-faced and emaciated pensioner, clutching a cane.

He is recovering from a case of pneumonia that he feared he would not survive amid days-long power outages and disruptions of central heating caused by Russian drones and missiles during a cold spell, when temperatures plunged to as low as -23 degrees Celsius (-9.4 degrees Fahrenheit).

“But we’re still standing, and that’s the most important thing in a fight,” Kolesnik, who used to dabble in boxing, said with a smile.

His wife, Marina, 70, agreed: “Nobody expected us to last that long, and we’re still here.”

However, Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive failed to cut Moscow’s “land bridge” from western Russia to annexed Crimea, and Russian troops keep inching forward.

But their advance is glacial amid staggering losses. Last year, they occupied less than 5,000 square kilometres (1,930 sq miles), or about 0.8 percent of Ukraine’s total area, according to Ukrainian officials and Western analysts.

Overall, Russia controls about 19 percent of Ukraine’s territory.

“The front line froze like during World War I,” Nikolay Mitrokhin of Germany’s Bremen University told Al Jazeera. “So far, Russia doesn’t have enough forces or new technologies for a decisive and successful advance, but it can still squander thousands of [its soldiers’] lives.”

This month, Russian forces encountered a dual communication problem that reversed their progress.

Elon Musk’s SpaceX company shut down smuggled Starlink satellite internet terminals used by Russian soldiers, while Moscow’s efforts to block the Telegram messaging app further disrupted coordination.

Ukrainian forces counterattacked, regaining about 200 sq km (77 sq miles) in the eastern Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions.

But in other front-line areas, the pressure is mounting.

Russian drones with attached optic fibre immune to jamming began reaching a heavily-fortified town in the southeastern Donetsk region.

“It has gotten a lot noisier. There are more outages; some locals are panicking,” Sviatoslav, a serviceman stationed in Kramatorsk, told Al Jazeera. He withheld his last name in accordance with wartime protocol.

Moscow insists Kyiv surrender Kramatorsk and the rest of Donetsk – about 1,000 sq km (386 sq miles).

What could affect Ukraine’s stance is further Russian strikes on energy infrastructure.

“Ukraine keeps the front line well, but the functionality of its energy system is hanging by a thread, which may affect a lot,” Mitrokhin said.

Eighty-eight percent of Ukrainians think Russia’s strikes are designed to “force them to capitulate”, according to a survey by the Kyiv International Sociology Institute (KMIS) conducted in late January.

Nevertheless, two-thirds of those polled said Ukraine’s armed forces should fight for “as long as it takes”.

“People en masse are more ready to keep resisting [the invasion] than to capitulate,” Svetlana Chunikhina, vice president of the Association of Political Psychologists, a Kyiv-based group, told Al Jazeera.

And even though there is a spike in depression, anxiety, and chronic stress among Ukrainians, there are no “abrupt jumps” in these conditions, she said.

“People adapt – including through depression – to the war’s horrible circumstances; people keep functioning,” she said.

Ukrainians still hope for a better future, she said.

Only one in five polled Ukrainians hopes the war will end this year, but two in three are sure that in 10 years, Ukraine will be a “thriving” member of the European Union.

“This is the literal realisation of the philosophic principle: ‘get ready for the worst, hope for the best,’” Chunikhina said.

However, brain fog and cynicism are on the rise, she said.

“For the Ukrainian public whose fight against the Russian aggression is largely fuelled by moral virtues – including high ones, such as altruism, patriotism, responsibility to future generations – cynicism could be really destructive,” she said.

News brings little relief.

United States President Donald Trump has so far failed to deliver on his pre-election pledge to end the war “in 24 hours”.

Meanwhile, Russian public figures who support the Kremlin still try to present the invasion as a step to “protect” Russian-speaking Ukrainians.

Moscow-based analyst Sergey Markov claims that the war began on February 23, 2014, when pro-Russian protesters began rallying in Crimea, urging the Kremlin to annex the Ukrainian peninsula.

“It was a peaceful uprising of the Russian people for freedom, peace and true democracy,” he wrote on Telegram on Monday.

It’s apparently naming season for autonomous air combat drones. Earlier today, we reported that General Atomics had given the name Dark Merlin to its YFQ-42A Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) design. Now Northrop Grumman has stamped a new name on its YFQ-48A: Talon Blue.

Northrop Grumman first unveiled the drone this past December, at which time it was referred to simply as Project Talon, as you can read more about in our initial report here. Later that month, the U.S. Air Force gave it the formal designation YFQ-48A, and described it as “strong contender” to be part of its future CCA fleets. Currently, General Atomics’ YFQ-42A and Anduril’s YFQ-44A are the designs formally in development as part of the first phase, or Increment 1, of the Air Force’s CCA program. Northrop Grumman may now be under contract for the program’s Increment 2, but this remains unconfirmed.

The “YFQ-48A Talon Blue’s designation within the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program underscores the strategic alignment between Northrop Grumman’s manufacturing agility and the Air Force’s acquisition goals for low-cost, cutting-edge technology,” according to a press release the company put out today. “The aircraft’s design provides mission versatility through advanced modular manufacturing techniques that reduce part count and overall weight – shortening production timelines without sacrificing capability.”

The release does not offer a clear explanation of the significance of the new Talon Blue name. Northrop Grumman previously told TWZ and other outlets that the Project Talon moniker was a callback to the T-38 Talon jet trainer, as both had been designed with high performance, high maneuverability, and affordability in mind.

“And it’s got a cool sound to it, too,” Tom Jones, President of Northrop Grumman’s Aeronautics Systems sector, at the time of the drone’s official unveiling.

As for the new Blue addition to its name, this could be another callback, this time to Northrop’s hugely successful Tacit Blue demonstrator, aka the ‘Whale,’ which revolutionized America’s understanding of stealth technology at the dawn of the stealth age. Lockheed’s stealth demonstrator that led to the F-117 Nighthawk stealth combat jet was also called Have Blue. As TWZ has noted previously, the YFQ-48A is clearly optimized with low-observable (stealthy) characteristics. It also shares many similar features and a general layout with Tacit Blue. You can read more about what else is known about the Talon Blue design so far here.

Regardless, the Talon Blue name is welcome. As we noted with the announcement of the Dark Merlin name for General Atomics’ YFQ-42A, the nomenclatures and terms associated with the U.S. Air Force’s CCA program can often be obtuse to the general public. Being able to use specific names for the different drones helps. Anduril’s YFQ-44A has carried the nickname Fury from the very start, which traces back to its origins as a ‘red air’ training drone.

Beyond the YFQ-48A, Northrop Grumman is now also describing Project Talon as an entire “portfolio of modular, cost-effective and rapidly deployable aircraft that meet the customers’ autonomy needs.” That portfolio includes Talon IQ, formerly called Beacon, a “next-generation autonomous testbed ecosystem” that has been leveraging the Prism autonomy suite and Scaled Composite’s Model 437 Vanguard jet. Scaled Composites is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Northrop Grumman that was also involved in the development of Talon Blue.

Digital Ecosystem Takes Flight

Northrop Grumman has also now released a picture of the YFQ-48A flanked by the Model 437 and one of Scaled Composites’ earlier Model 401 jets, also known as the ‘Son of Ares,’ but it is not immediately clear if the latter is also part of the Project Talon portfolio. The Model 437 evolved from the Model 401. Concepts for uncrewed versions of the Model 401 and Model 437 have been shown in the past.

In December, Northrop Grumman said it was targeting a first flight for YFQ-48A about nine months down the road, or sometime in August of this year.

In terms of the Air Force’s CCA program, the service still has yet to make a decision about which Increment 1 CCA design, or both, it wants to buy in larger numbers. Nine companies are also now under contract to refine concepts under Increment 2. To date, the Air Force has not disclosed the names of any of the Increment 2 awardees, which, as noted, could include Northrop Grumman.

When it comes to the YFQ-48A, the company could also pitch it to prospective foreign customers. The marketspace for CCA-type drones, like what is now dubbed the Talon Blue, is steadily growing globally.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

On 18 February 2026, reports emerged that Britain was withholding American permission to use Diego Garcia in any hypothetical strike against Iran. The following day, Trump posted “DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA” on Truth Social, linking the base directly to potential operations against Tehran in terms that left no room for diplomatic interpretation. The sequence lasted forty-eight hours and revealed what months of careful legal construction had obscured: that the architecture of conditional access Britain had built around a strategically significant military installation was worth precisely what the decisive power chose to make it worth. Whether the intervention also carried tactical signalling toward Tehran is a legitimate question, and intra-alliance friction of this kind sometimes functions as maximalist positioning before settlement. What matters analytically, however, is not the post itself but what the post revealed when operational pressure arrived. It was also, for anyone who had read Washington’s December 2025 National Security Strategy carefully, entirely predictable.

Power Does Not Ask

There are two ways to understand how military power operates in the international system, and the Chagos episode forces a choice between them. The first holds that great powers are meaningfully constrained by the frameworks they inhabit, alliance structures, legal agreements, and diplomatic settlements, and that these frameworks produce stable, predictable behavior even when the underlying interests they were designed to manage come under pressure. The second holds that frameworks are expressions of power relationships at a given moment rather than independent constraints upon them, so that when power shifts or decides to assert itself, the frameworks adjust to reflect the new reality rather than containing it. The first is the language of liberal internationalism. The second is the language of realism, and what February produced was an unambiguous realist moment.

The December 2025 National Security Strategy had already committed this diagnosis to paper. The document did not describe Europe as weak through circumstance. It described Europe as having chosen weakness, identifying a “loss of national identities and self-confidence” as the continent’s defining condition and stating openly that it is “far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” The strategy framed European concerns about Russia as evidence of that same condition, noting that this lack of self-confidence was most evident in Europe’s relationship with Russia, despite the fact that European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure save nuclear weapons. Washington’s reading of its European partners, formalized two months before the Diego Garcia friction became public, was of states that had systematically preferred institutional solutions over sovereign ones, legal arrangements over unconditional control, and managed conditionality over the exercise of will. Britain’s handling of Chagos was, in that context, not an anomaly. It was a confirmation.

What is analytically significant about Trump’s intervention is not simply that he rejected the deal but that he did not engage it at all, did not address the ICJ ruling that gave it legal foundation, did not contest the lease terms that were its operational expression, and did not enter the diplomatic logic that had produced it over months of negotiation. A decision of this kind does not derive its authority from the framework it overrides, because it precedes that framework, and the framework itself only ever existed on the sufferance of the power now choosing to move against it. When Trump asserted that leases are “no good when it comes to countries,” he was not making a legal argument that could be answered within the same register. He was stating a principle about the nature of sovereign will: that when it moves, it moves prior to and above whatever conditional arrangements were constructed in the period of its dormancy.

This is realism in its purest operational form, in which states pursue interests, great powers pursue interests with the capacity to enforce them, and legal architecture functions as an instrument of power when it serves those interests and an obstacle to be displaced when it does not. The Chagos deal did not alter the underlying power relationship between Washington and London, but it did create a layer of conditionality over an asset Washington considers operationally essential, and when operational pressure arrived, that conditionality became intolerable, not because Mauritius is hostile, not because Britain is an adversary, but because no great power conducting military projection at a global scale can accept that a weak state sits structurally inside the chain of its operational decisions, regardless of how that state arrived there or how benign its intentions are understood to be.

Beneath the realist logic sits a transactional one, and the two reinforce each other in ways that matter for how Britain should read what happened. Trump does not evaluate alliance relationships by their historical depth or their institutional architecture. He evaluates them by what they yield in the current moment, and every asset is a leverage point to be maximized. Diego Garcia represents unconditional American operational value. The Chagos deal reduced that value by inserting a condition. From a transactional perspective, that insertion was not a diplomatic nuance to be managed but a concession to be reversed, because Trump’s governing principle across every alliance relationship is maximum American gain, and conditionality is by definition a reduction of gain. The decisionism explains how he responded. The transactionalism explains why.

The Geography of Decision

Diego Garcia is not incidental to American power projection in the region, though its significance is that of an enabler rather than a prerequisite. The base sits at the center of the Indian Ocean, within operational reach of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca, and the East African littoral, and it has supported American military operations across that entire arc for half a century through bomber rotations, logistics chains, and a sustained forward presence that no other installation in the basin fully replicates at the same scale and permanence. It does not make American power projection possible in any absolute sense, but it makes it faster, cheaper, and more sustained, which in the context of time-sensitive operational planning against a target like Iran is not a marginal difference but a meaningful one.

The Iran dimension exposes the conditionality problem with particular clarity because the operational context in which Diego Garcia’s value is most acute is precisely the context in which conditional access is most dangerous. American military assets have accumulated across the Middle East, talks are active, and a base capable of projecting strategic airpower directly into the Persian Gulf theater is not a background consideration but a variable whose availability, or unavailability, shapes what options exist and on what timeline. Britain’s reported reluctance to grant operational clearance, under a deal still unratified and still contested in domestic courts, still legally dependent on Mauritius’s continued cooperation, revealed that the conditionality embedded in the arrangement had already entered the operational calculus before any of the stabilizing assumptions behind the deal had time to establish themselves. Strategic friction did not arrive at the end of a long maturation period. It arrived in weeks, because operational pressure does not wait for diplomatic frameworks to consolidate.

That compression of the timeline is itself the most realistic lesson. Power does not defer to the developmental logic of legal arrangements, and when the operational moment arrives, whatever sits between a great power’s will and its objective is reclassified from a framework to be respected into a problem to be solved.

The Structural Position of the Weak

The analytical core of the Chagos case is not about Mauritius’s intentions, which by all available evidence are not hostile, but about the structural position that the deal assigned to it within the architecture of American operational planning, because in the logic of great power competition, it is position rather than intention that determines strategic relevance. By inserting itself, or being inserted, into the chain of conditions governing a great power’s operational freedom, a weak state acquires a form of leverage it could never achieve through military means, and the Chagos deal gave Mauritius exactly that position, not through hostility but through legal standing, not through power but through presence within a conditional architecture that a great power now had reason to find constraining.

For Washington operating within a decisionist strategic logic, that presence is categorically unacceptable regardless of Mauritius’s intentions. The relevant question is not whether Mauritius would obstruct American operations but whether, under the terms of the arrangement, it structurally could, and the answer is yes in a way that no amount of diplomatic goodwill can fully neutralize. Sovereignty transferred to Mauritius is not sovereignty parked with a neutral party but sovereignty that now sits within reach of Chinese economic leverage, meaning the lease does not merely introduce conditionality but introduces conditionality whose future content Washington cannot determine or guarantee. A great power conducting global military projection cannot organize its operational planning around the sustained goodwill of a small state whose strategic orientation it cannot guarantee. That such goodwill is required at all is the problem the deal created.

Weak states do not constrain great powers through legal arrangements in any durable sense, because the constraint only holds when the great power chooses to honor it, and great powers choose to honor constraints only when the cost of non-compliance exceeds the cost of compliance, a calculation that shifts decisively once operational necessity enters the equation and the framework reveals itself to be dependent on tolerance rather than grounded in power.

Conclusion

Britain converted unconditional sovereign control over a strategically significant military installation into a conditional leasehold arrangement whose operationalization depended on a small state’s legal cooperation and presented that conversion as a resolution of vulnerability rather than the creation of a new one. Britain was not being naive. It was an attempt to preserve the base’s long-term legal viability against mounting international pressure, a calculation that the alliance relationship would absorb any friction that followed. What Britain did not account for was that its ally evaluates arrangements not by their legal durability but by whether they constrain American will, and a solution sophisticated enough to satisfy international law was simultaneously insufficiently decisive to satisfy Washington.

From the perspective of the December 2025 National Security Strategy, that conversion was not a surprise. It was the predictable output of a European strategic culture that Washington had already formally diagnosed: one that reaches instinctively for institutional solutions when strong states would resolve through will, that mistakes legal legitimacy for strategic security, and that has internalized the habits of the post-Cold War order to the point where it can no longer easily distinguish between a framework and the power that makes frameworks real.

Trump’s response was the most realistic verdict on that presentation, not an argument against the deal’s legal coherence, which was never in question, but a decision that the framework was insufficient for the operational reality it was meant to serve, delivered in terms that made the underlying logic unmistakable. The framework did not collapse under the pressure. It was revealed, under pressure, to have rested entirely on the assumption that the decisive power would continue to choose not to decide otherwise, an assumption that realism has always identified as the central fragility of arrangements built on consent rather than grounded in power.

The strong do not negotiate with the architecture of constraint, and for Europe, February was less a shock than a reminder that the rules it has built its strategic identity around have always depended on the continued willingness of a decisive power to operate within them.

New Zealand says it, too, will support the UK government if it decides to remove the disgraced prince from succession to the throne.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has announced that his government is writing to Commonwealth countries about its support to have the United Kingdom’s former prince, Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor, removed from the line of royal succession over his links to convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein.

Albanese’s announcement on Tuesday came as neighbouring Commonwealth member New Zealand declared that it would also support the UK government if it proposes the removal of Mountbatten-Windsor from the line of succession to the throne.

“Australia likes being first, and we have made sure that everyone knows what our position is, and we’ll be writing today to the other realm countries as well, informing them of our position,” Prime Minister Albanese told Australia’s ABC public broadcaster.

Australians were “disgusted” by revelations about late US sex offender Epstein’s relations with public figures, and they want the government to be clear about its position, Albanese told the ABC.

“King Charles has said that the law must now take its full course. There must be a full, fair and proper investigation. And that needs to occur,” he added.

The former 66-year-old prince was arrested last week, detained and questioned as part of an investigation into alleged misconduct in public office following revelations about his dealings with Epstein.

Albanese also said the UK would have to initiate any proposed change to the line of royal succession, and it would need the agreement of the 14 other Commonwealth nations that have King Charles III as head of state.

Albanese wrote to UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and informed him that, “in light of recent events”, the Australian government would “agree to any proposal to remove [Mountbatten-Windsor] from the line of royal succession”, according to Australian media.

“I agree with His Majesty that the law must now take its full course and there must be a full, fair and proper investigation,” Albanese wrote.

“These are grave allegations and Australians take them seriously,” he added.

New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said that if the UK government proposes to remove Mountbatten-Windsor from the order of succession, New Zealand would support it, the UK’s Press Association reports.

“The bottom line is, no one is above the law, and once that investigation is closed, should the UK government decide to remove him from the line of succession, that is something we would support,” Luxon told reporters.

Officials in the UK have told media outlets that any moves to change the line of succession would come after the police conclude their investigation into the former prince, who is eighth in line to the throne.

Starmer’s official spokesman said on Monday that the government was not ruling out any steps in relation to the disgraced prince, but it would not be appropriate to comment further during the police probe.

Mountbatten-Windsor, who was stripped of his royal title last year as news of links to Epstein emerged, has denied any wrongdoing over his relationship with Epstein, who was ruled to have taken his own life in prison in 2019. He has not directly responded to the latest allegations regarding misconduct in public office.

The U.S. Air Force has given us our first look at one of Anduril’s YFQ-44 Fury ‘fighter drone’ prototypes carrying an inert AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM).

“The Air Force has entered the next phase of developmental testing for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program, initiating disciplined weapons integration and captive carry evaluations using inert test munitions to validate airworthiness, safety, and systems performance,” according to an Air Force press release put out this evening. “This milestone represents a deliberate step forward in integrating CCA into the Air Force’s future force design.”

“CCA program officials emphasized that this phase remains developmental and focused on safe systems integration — not operational employment,” the release also noted. “The use of inert test weapons allows engineers and test pilots to evaluate performance characteristics and separation safety in a controlled environment without live ordnance.”

“Throughout development and testing, a human retains authority over weapons release decisions,” the Air Force has also stressed. “CCA is designed to operate within established command structures and legal frameworks that govern all Air Force weapons systems.”

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach first announced this new development at the Air & Space Forces Association’s annual Warfare Symposium, at which TWZ is attendence. The YFQ-44 is one of two designs now under development as part of the first phase, or Increment 1, of the service’s CCA program. The other is General Atomics’ YFQ-42A Dark Merlin. No images have yet been released of the YFQ-42A carrying inert munitions.

Renderings have previously been shown of Fury carrying AIM-120s under its wings. The design, at least as it exists now, does not have an internal munitions bay. Anduril has also talked about weapons testing as part of its larger plans for the ongoing development of the YQ-44A in the past.

“We are following the same detailed approach used in every other aircraft developmental test program to validate structural performance, flight characteristics and safe separation,” Wilsbach said in a statement accompanying the release. “This ensures the CCA can safely integrate inert weapons before future employment.”

“CCA is a critical part of a larger, integrated system-of-systems that will give our warfighters the overwhelming advantage,” Wilsbach added. “This program is about delivering a network of effects that will sense, strike, and shield our forces in contested environments. We are empowering our teams to take smart risks and deliver this capability faster, ensuring we can deter, and if necessary, defeat any adversary.”

What other munitions beyond the AIM-120 may be included in the weapons integration and captive carry test plan remains to be seen. The Air Force has said in the past that future operational CCA drones are expected to be armed with AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missiles (JATM). JATM, which is still in development, is the planned successor to the AMRAAM.

The Air Force is not the first to fly a CCA-type drone with an AIM-120. Australian authorities, together with Boeing, announced the first live test shot of an AMRAAM from an MQ-28 Ghost Bat drone in December. You can read more about that milestone here.

Uncrewed MQ-28 Ghost Bat showcases its combat capability

In November, Turkish drone-maker Baykar had also announced a similar test involving its fighter-like Kizilelma. The drone fired a Turkish-made radar-guided Gökdoğan air-to-air missile in that instance.

Bayraktar #KIZILELMA | GÖKDOĞAN Füzesi Atış Testi

The beginning of weapons integration and captive carry testing is still an important development for the U.S. Air Force CCA program, and Increment 1 more specifically. Both the YFQ-42A and YFQ-44A only made their first flights in the second half of last year.

Carrying air-to-air missiles is exactly what these drones were intended to do, at least to start. CCAs will also help increase the sensor reach of crewed fighters they’re teamed with. Overall, the Air Force sees CCAs as providing critical combat mass while helping to reduce risk and providing new tactical possibilities, especially potential high-end fights against opponents such as China.

The Air Force has yet to decide which Increment 1 CCA, or both, it wants to buy in larger numbers. Whatever the Air Force chooses will be set to become its first operational ‘fighter drones’ intended to carry live munitions into real combat alongside crewed companions.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The attack on alleged drug smugglers brings death toll of US military campaign against suspected drug boats to about 150.

The United States military has announced another strike in the Caribbean Sea that it said targeted drug smugglers, killing three people.

The Southern Command of the US military (SOUTHCOM) shared footage of the attack on Monday, showing a small boat exploding and going up in flames after the strike.

“Intelligence confirmed the vessel was transiting along known narco-trafficking routes in the Caribbean and was engaged in narco-trafficking operations,” SOUTHCOM said in a statement.

“Three male narco-terrorists were killed during this action. No US military forces were harmed.”

The attack brings the death toll from US boat strikes on boats allegedly smuggling drugs, which began last year, to about 150.

Rights advocates have said the US military campaign targeting alleged drug smugglers amounts to extrajudicial killings and risks violating international and domestic laws.

The administration of US President Donald Trump has argued that all the targeted boats were carrying drugs, but it has offered little evidence other than grainy footage of the strikes.

United Nations experts warned last year that the attacks “appear to be unlawful killings carried out by order of a Government, without judicial or legal process allowing due process of law”.

“Unprovoked attacks and killings on international waters also violate international maritime laws,” the experts added.

“We have condemned and raised concerns about these attacks at sea to the United States Government.”

The strikes started in September last year, as the US was building up its military assets in the Caribbean amid tensions with Venezuela. Since then, the attacks have expanded to also targeting boats in the eastern Pacific Ocean.

A separate US strike on an alleged drug-smuggling boat on Friday also killed three people.

The campaign has continued even after US forces abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro early in 2026.

Trump and other US officials have argued, without providing evidence, that each bombing saves thousands of lives from overdose deaths. But it is not clear whether the deadly campaign has significantly affected the drug trade in the region.

The latest attack comes as Mexican authorities push to curb violence by drug cartels after the killing of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel leader, Nemesio Ruben Oseguera Cervantes, also known as “El Mencho”.

Trump has been pushing to present himself as launching a literal war on drugs across the Western Hemisphere.

“Mexico must step up their effort on Cartels and Drugs!” Trump wrote on Truth Social on Monday.

The US has often accused its critics in Latin America, including Colombian President Gustavo Petro, of ties to the drug trade.

Meanwhile, in December, Trump pardoned former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez, who was serving a 45-year prison sentence in US jails after being convicted of drug trafficking.

As well as being a key component of Russia’s attack helicopter force in the war in Ukraine, the Mi-28 Havoc has been in the news recently on account of its apparent delivery to Iran. Meanwhile, one lesser-known aspect of the Mi-28 is its ability to transport two or three passengers in a cramped fuselage compartment, a feature that is seen clearly in a recently published video of the rotorcraft.

The footage in question originates with the state-owned Russia Television and Radio channel and shows a Russian Aerospace Forces Mi-28NM — the latest domestic version of the gunship — undergoing pre-flight checks at a forward airstrip somewhere in the Ukrainian conflict zone. The video reportedly dates from this month.

At the start of the video, a technician is seen handling hoses that run into the helicopter’s port-side rear fuselage via an open door. Typically, such hoses are attached to dehumidifier units, which then blow warm, dry air through the aircraft to keep everything dry. This is especially important for sensitive avionics in cold weather, as on this snowy airfield. Once the helicopter is fully powered up, it should keep itself warm enough for moisture not to be a problem.

What’s most interesting, however, is that the open door provides a rare look into this rear-fuselage compartment, which has the capacity to carry two or three people, or an equivalent load of cargo. Of course, this is in addition to the Mi-28’s two crew seated in tandem in the cockpit — the weapon system operator/navigator forward and the pilot to the rear.

The fuselage compartment, unique among in-service attack helicopters, was part of the Mi-28’s design when it was first schemed back in the second half of the 1970s. The Soviet Union had ordered Mil to design a new-generation combat helicopter, equivalent to the U.S. AH-64 Apache, but this feature was all its own.

The Mi-28’s configuration was broadly similar to the AH-64, but marked a significant move away from the philosophy enshrined in the previous Mi-24 Hind. As we have discussed in the past, the Mi-24 had been built around a passenger/cargo cabin — with space for a squad of infantry — although, as it was developed, it expanded its anti-armor capabilities, too.

A walkaround video of a privately owned Mi-24 in the United States. The passenger/cargo cabin is seen in detail from around the 11:30 mark:

Hind MI-24 Helicopter Walkaround Tour

In contrast, the Mi-28 was a tank-killer first and foremost, with no cabin, and better overall performance. However, there was internal space for a much smaller compartment and one that would be very useful for retrieving downed pilots from the battle area, especially for grabbing a pilot who went down within the same flight. Bearing in mind the expected aircraft losses on Europe’s Central Front — especially among low-flying helicopters — this made a lot of sense.

Other tasks could have included moving mechanics and tools to conduct limited repairs of other helicopters in an emergency. Potentially, it could even have been used for inserting and picking up infiltrators or saboteurs.

Having the option of using the Mi-28 as a kind of ad-hoc, or non-traditional combat search and rescue (CSAR) asset would also mean that the aircraft could operate on its own and on the fly if other air or ground assets were not available. Traditionally, CSAR helicopters have to operate with an armed escort. It’s unknown whether the passenger cabin has been used at all in the war in Ukraine, but the limited space, presence of avionics equipment, and complete lack of windows mean it’s only really suited to emergencies. For more typical CSAR missions in the Ukrainian theater, Mi-8 Hips and Mi-24s are typically used, with an escort of Mi-28 or Ka-52 Hokum attack helicopters.

As for other attack helicopter types attempting personnel recovery, the best-known incident is likely that involving two British Army Apache gunships in Afghanistan in January 2007. During that dramatic mission, four Royal Marines strapped themselves to the outside of two Apaches for an attempted combat rescue. Ultimately, they were only able to recover the body of their fallen comrade, Lance Cpl. Ford, who had already been killed.

The Italian Army, too, has explored the concept of using its A129 Mangusta attack helicopters for personnel rescue, strapping a pair of soldiers to the main landing gear struts. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command operates MH-6M Little Birds with side-mounted planks to externally airlift special operators. A more elaborate modular system, used to transport small numbers of personnel, was schemed for the Bell 360 Invictus armed scout helicopter, as you can read about here.

It’s also worth pointing out another planned ‘survival’ feature of the Mi-28, namely its crew-escape system. Unlike the Ka-52, the Mi-28 doesn’t have ejection seats. Instead, the Zvezda/Tomilino Pamir-K crew seats have belts that tighten automatically when high-g loads are encountered. As originally envisaged, the crew escape system would work as follows: During any kind of catastrophic failure at altitude, the cockpit doors would be blown off, the stub wings would be jettisoned together with their loads, and an inflatable door-sill sleeve would be filled with air. This was to protect the crew from the protruding main landing gear and cannon and help them clear the helicopter, after which they would return to the ground by parachute. In theory, at least.

Ka-52 alligator and its unique K-37-800M ejection seats. Before the rocket in the ejection seat deploys, the rotor blades are blown away by explosive charges in the rotor disc and the canopy is jettisoned. pic.twitter.com/BzPP9SNXMZ

— Владимир З. (@VladZinen) December 11, 2020

In practice, it seems the crew escape system never reached operational status on the Mi-28, likely due to the very limited window in which it would be of practical use.

According to the Oryx open-source tracking group, Russia has lost 19 Mi-28s since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine four years ago. This figure could be higher because Oryx only tabulates losses it can confirm visually. Russia began the conflict with a force of around 110 Mi-28s of all versions.

⚡️Video of the destruction of the Mi-28 of the 🇷🇺Russian Air Force using an 🇺🇦FPV drone. The first recorded case pic.twitter.com/LWosDeX2Ah

— 🪖MilitaryNewsUA🇺🇦 (@front_ukrainian) August 7, 2024

The Mi-28 has had a notably protracted history since it was first flown in prototype form in 1982. The original Havoc was abandoned by the early 1990s, and Mil pressed ahead with the radar-equipped, night-capable Mi-28N version. Deliveries of production Mi-28N helicopters to Russia began in 2008, and export versions have since been sold to Algeria, Iraq, Uganda, and, apparently, now also Iran.

For Russia, the basic version remains the Mi-28N, which also undertook combat operations in Syria starting in 2016.

Less common is the Mi-28UB (only 24 of which were produced), which received a mast-mounted radar, lacking on the Mi-28N, and dual controls. As for the latest Mi-28NM version — as seen in the video above — this also has the mast-mounted radar and other changes, including new missiles. As well as having been ordered in quantity for Russia, there are also plans to bring older Mi-28N aircraft up to Mi-28NM standard.

Video of the radar-equipped Mi-28UB during a live-fire exercise in the Krasnodar region, March 2020:

Russian Mi-28UB live fire exercise

For all the changes that the Mi-28 has undergone since it first appeared, its highly compact passenger compartment remains one of its most unusual features.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, six frigates, three light warships, and approximately thirty fighter jets and support aircraft have entered the Middle East by order of Donald Trump who, by repeatedly touting the slogan “I have ended six/seven/eight wars,” has considered (and continues to consider) himself deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize. What objective do all these tensions that the U.S. administration has generated in the region actually pursue? The weakening of Iran, or the overthrow of the incumbent government? Whatever his and his administration’s aim may be, it appears that—within the cost–benefit calculations of his trader’s mindset—he has yet to arrive at a definitive conclusion as to what kind of blow, and at what scale, could deliver the desired outcome. His recent military posturing around Iran and his increasingly threatening rhetoric against the Islamic Republic have placed him in a no-win situation whose end few can predict.

Why a no-win situation for Trump?

First Strike Doubt: Trump and the constellation of officials currently in the White House—who, notably, are far from unified or aligned on how to approach Iran—have reached no certainty regarding the effectiveness of a first strike against Iran or the likelihood of achieving their desired results. It is evident to all that the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither Venezuela, nor Libya, nor Syria, nor Afghanistan, nor Iraq, nor anything akin to the historical cases in which the United States has intervened militarily in the name of democracy verbally and in pursuit of its own interests operationally. This very reality has, thus far, prevented Trump from issuing the order to “open fire” on Iran up to now.

On the other side, there is no sign of the flexibility or concession sought by the United States in the behavior or rhetoric of Iranian officials—a fact acknowledged by American officials themselves. This indicates that pressure, intimidation, and threats have thus far yielded no results. The reason is clear: the Islamic Republic views any potential confrontation as an existential war and is unwilling to grant any concessions. Trump, however—who seeks to manufacture achievements out of even the smallest events and whose penchant for exaggeration is among his defining traits—perceives such circumstances as detrimental to his personal prestige and standing.

Iran’s Resilience: The experience of the Israeli attack and the hybrid war launched against Iran in June 2025, with direct assistance from the United States and indirect support from so many others, demonstrated that the instability they sought within the governing structure of the Islamic Republic and even the internal social fragmentation and rifts that had been cultivated for years through various media tools did not materialize. Despite the blows inflicted on Iran, none of the long-term strategic objectives of the United States and Israel were achieved. Likewise, the unrest and riots of January 8 and 9, despite the violence and damage they caused to the public and the state, were ultimately brought under control and culminated in a multi-million-person rally on January 12 condemning the unrest and supporting the central government of the Islamic Republic.

High costs and Persian Gulf Worries: Operationalizing a military threat would impose heavy costs on the United States and its allies. The Islamic Republic has explicitly declared that any military action against its territory, at any scale, would be regarded as all-out war, and that, consequently, the entire region—as well as U.S. interests wherever they may be—would fall within range of Iran’s retaliatory strikes. This serious warning has also prompted Persian Gulf states to mobilize their capacities to dissuade Trump from attacking Iran. The strikes on U.S. bases at Ayn al-Asad and Al-Udeid entrenched the perception that the Islamic Republic does not shy away from responding to foreign aggression, even if large segments of the world regard the attacking state as a “superpower.”

Global Energy Risks: The ignition of war in the Persian Gulf would amount to a grave threat to global energy supply routes. Roughly 30 percent of the world’s crude oil and 20 percent of liquefied natural gas are supplied by Persian Gulf countries, and 20–25 percent of global crude oil transits the Strait of Hormuz. Any aggressive action by the United States would jeopardize the security of one-fifth of the world’s fuel and profoundly affect the global economy.

Although the U.S. National Security Strategy does not place the Middle East among America’s top strategic priorities, the same document states that: “We (the United States) want to prevent an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass while avoiding the forever wars”, which shows Persian Gulf oil is still of high importance for Washington.

Tilting Power Balance: In addition, heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf would endanger China’s economic interests, and any large-scale military confrontation would likely lead to a more pronounced military-security presence by Russia and China in the Gulf—tilting the balance in favor of America’s rivals.

And finally?

The embers beneath the region’s ashes today could be ignited by the slightest breeze, engulfing a vast area. Israel, while likely the first target of Iran’s retaliatory response in the event of a U.S. attack, is nevertheless eager to initiate confrontation based on the calculation that a war waged with the full might of the United States could ultimately erode the very existence of the Islamic Republic or weaken it to the point of capitulation. In this context, it is not far-fetched to suggest that the disclosure of new documents and details concerning Trump’s links to the notorious Epstein case and his mysterious island may have been driven by the Mossad, as such revelations could compel the U.S. president to undertake an irrational action to divert attention elsewhere.

Today, Trump is acting more than ever in contradiction to his own professed principles—from trampling on his signature MAGA slogan and morphing it into MIGA (Make Israel Great Again), to undermining his administration’s efforts to reduce unnecessary international expenditures; from his paradoxical pride in having ended “eight wars” to the strategy of off-shore balancing the Middle East. Should a war of this magnitude and consequence erupt, no country involved—whether through direct action or geographic proximity—would be spared its consequences. Regarding these circumstances, it appears that the only desirable scenario for Trump, the region, and the world at large is the opening of a genuine dialogue, free from the shadow of threats, intimidation, and American bullying.

Slovakia had issued a two-day ultimatum to Ukraine to reopen the Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline so that it could receive Russian oil deliveries.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has said his country will halt emergency electricity supplies to Ukraine until Kyiv reopens a key pipeline transporting Russian oil to Slovakia, making good on an ultimatum he issued to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Fico’s announcement on Monday came two days after he warned Zelenskyy on social media that he would ask state-owned company SEPS to halt emergency supplies of electricity if flows of Russian crude oil via the Soviet-era Druzhba pipeline crossing Ukraine did not resume.

“As of today, if the Ukrainian side turns to Slovakia with a request for assistance in stabilising the Ukrainian energy grid, such assistance will not be provided,” Fico said in a video on his Facebook page.

Ukrainian grid operator Ukrenergo said in a statement that it had not been officially informed yet, but that it would “not affect the situation in the unified power system of Ukraine”.

“The last time Ukraine requested emergency assistance from Slovakia was over a month ago and in a very limited volume,” it said.

Fico said the stoppage would be lifted “as soon as the transit of oil to Slovakia is restored”.

“Otherwise, we will take further reciprocal steps,” he said, adding his country would also reconsider “its previously constructive positions on Ukraine’s EU membership”.

He said the stalled oil supply was a “purely political decision aimed at blackmailing Slovakia over its international positions on the war in Ukraine”.

Slovakia and neighbouring Hungary, which have both remained dependent on Russian oil since the Kremlin launched its invasion of Ukraine almost four years ago, have become increasingly vocal in demanding that Kyiv resume deliveries through the Druzhba pipeline, which was shut down after what Ukraine said was a Russian drone strike hit infrastructure in late January.

Ukraine says it is fixing the damage on the pipeline, which still carries Russian oil over Ukrainian territory to Europe, as fast as it can.

Slovakia and Hungary say Ukraine is to blame for the prolonged outage and have declared emergencies over the cut in oil deliveries.

The EU imposed a ban on most oil imports from Russia in 2022, but the Druzhba pipeline was exempted to give landlocked Central European countries time to find alternative oil supplies.

Meanwhile, the European Union failed to agree on new sanctions on Russia for the fourth anniversary of Europe’s biggest war since World War II, after Hungary vetoed the move.

Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban – the friendliest EU leader to the Kremlin – is stalling the sanctions and a 90-billion-euro ($106bn) EU loan to Ukraine until Kyiv reopens the oil pipeline.

Fico also said he has refused to “involve the Slovak Republic” in the latest EU loan due to Zelenskyy’s “unacceptable behaviour”, alluding to Ukraine’s earlier halting of Russian gas supplies after a five-year-old transit agreement expired on January 1, 2025, which Fico claimed is costing Slovakia “damages of 500 million [euros; $590m] per year”.

Hungary and Slovakia have accounted for 68 percent of Ukraine’s imported power this month, according to Kyiv-based consultancy ExPro. It was not immediately clear if emergency electricity supplies were included in that figure.

At the BAFTA Film Awards, a guest with Tourette syndrome involuntarily shouted a racial slur during the BBC’s tape-delayed broadcast, prompting apologies after it aired unedited. The BBC did cut filmmaker Akinola Davies Jr.’s “free Palestine” line, sparking criticism.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum says that calm is being restored and that improvised cartel roadblocks are being removed.

Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has sought to assuage fears following a government raid that killed one of the country’s most-wanted drug trafficking leaders, prompting a series of violent outbursts by cartels across the country.

Speaking alongside Sheinbaum during a press conference on Monday, Security Secretary Omar Garcia Harfuch said that 25 members of the National Guard had been killed in fighting with criminal groups in the state of Jalisco after the raid.

“What is important now is to guarantee peace and security of all the population, of all of Mexico,” Sheinbaum said, adding that conditions have improved and Mexico “is calm” after the Sunday raid that killed Nemesio Oseguera, also known as “El Mencho”, of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel.

The killing of Mencho comes as Mexico is under growing pressure from the United States to take a more aggressive stance towards drug-trafficking groups, although the killing of top-level cartel figures in the past has had little impact on the drug trade and has often created a leadership vacuum that others violently act to fill.

The raid also set off a wave of reprisal attacks and impromptu roadblocks that have spread fear and uncertainty through Mexico, where criminal groups violently jostle for control of territory.

Garcia Harfuch said that the 25 members of the National Guard were killed in six incidents across Jalisco, adding that 30 people he described as criminal suspects were also killed in the clashes, along with four in Michoacan.

“First there was a huge gun battle, and then another, and another,” an anonymous resident of the town of Aguililla in Michoacan told the news service AFP, saying that cartel gunmen attacked a local outpost of soldiers on Sunday. “But they couldn’t advance because the soldiers stopped them.”

Defence Secretary Ricardo Trevilla said that an additional 2,500 security force members would be sent to Jalisco to reinforce the armed forces already deployed there, and Sheinbaum said that all of the more than 250 roadblocks erected across 20 states in response to the raid have been removed.

Mexican officials have sought to downplay the prospect of long-term disruptions stemming from the raid, with Sheinbaum saying that flights to and from Puerto Vallarta, located in the state of Jalisco, are expected to resume on Monday or Tuesday.

“In Puerto Vallarta, flights continue to be disrupted due to availability of flight crews. The Embassy is in close contact with airlines to monitor their plans,” the US Department of State Consular Affairs said in a social media post on Monday. “All other airports in Mexico are open, and most airports are operating normally. If you are traveling via any airport other than Guadalajara or Puerto Vallarta, we have received no indication of any security-related flight disruptions.”

The Mexican embassy to the US has shared social media posts debunking online rumours of attacks on civilians at Guadalajara airport and US tourists being held hostage.

Attack on Nablus-area mosque is latest in surge of Israeli settler and military violence targeting Palestinians.

Israeli settlers have defaced and set fire to a mosque in the occupied West Bank during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, marking the latest incident in a wave of Israeli violence against Palestinians in the territory.

The Wafa news agency reported on Monday that settlers graffitied racist slogans on the walls of Abu Bakr as-Siddiq Mosque, located between the towns of Sarra and Tal, near Nablus in the north of the West Bank.

Worshippers arriving for the day’s first prayers found the damage and a smouldering fire that spewed black smoke across the mosque’s entrance and stained the ornate doorway, The Associated Press reported.

“I was shocked when I opened the door,” Munir Ramdan, who lives nearby, told the news agency. “The fire had been burning here in the area, the glass was broken here and the door was broken.”

Ramdan told AP that security camera footage showed two people walking towards the mosque carrying gasoline or petrol and a can of spray paint, and running away a few minutes later.

The attackers spray-painted graffiti denigrating the Prophet Muhammad, as well as the words “revenge” and “price tag” – a term used to describe attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinians and their property.

The assault comes amid a wave of intensified Israeli settler and military violence across the West Bank in the shadow of Israel’s genocidal war against Palestinians in the nearby Gaza Strip.

At least 1,094 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli troops and settlers in the West Bank since the Gaza war began in October 2023, according to the latest United Nations figures.

Last week, the UN Human Rights Council warned in a new report (PDF) that Israeli policies in the West Bank – including “the systematic unlawful use of force by Israeli security forces” and unlawful demolitions of Palestinian homes – aim to uproot Palestinian communities.

“These violations, together with pervasive and growing settler violence committed with impunity, are fundamental to the coercive environment that induces forced displacement and forcible transfer, which is a war crime,” the report said.

It added that these policies are aimed at “altering the character, status and demographic composition of the occupied West Bank, raising serious concerns of ethnic cleansing”.

Back in the West Bank village of Tal on Monday, resident Salem Ishtayeh told AP that the Israeli settlers’ assault on the local mosque was “directed especially” at Palestinians who are fasting during Ramadan.

“So they like to provoke you with words. It’s not that they are attacking you personally, they are attacking your religion, the Islamic faith,” Ishtayeh said.

According to the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, settlers vandalised or attacked 45 mosques in the West Bank last year.

The Israeli military and police said they responded to the latest incident and were searching for suspects.

But human rights groups say the Israeli authorities have allowed the settlers to operate with total impunity in their attacks against Palestinians.

Israeli organisation B’Tselem has accused Israel of actively aiding the settlers’ violence “as part of a strategy to cement the takeover of Palestinian land”.

The UN also warned last year that settler attacks were being carried out “with the acquiescence, support, and in some cases participation, of Israeli security forces”.

Amid the steady drumbeat of reports pointing to the growing likelihood of strikes on Iran, there are indications that officials from Washington and Tehran will meet this week for another round of talks centered on the Iranian nuclear program. While the two sides remain generally at loggerheads, Iranian officials are now openly talking about possible concessions on their nuclear program in return for sanctions relief and the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.

The Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, told CBS over the weekend that U.S. and Iranian negotiators would likely hold more discussions in Geneva on Thursday, with the aim of making “a fast deal.” Iran and the United States resumed negotiations earlier this month.

Now, Araghchi says that he thinks there is still a good chance of finding a diplomatic solution in planned talks with U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff. However, he added that “If the United States attacks us, then we have every right to defend ourselves.” Iran has repeatedly threatened to strike U.S. bases in the region if it is attacked.

On Sunday, Mexican security forces killed 59-year-old Nemesio Ruben Oseguera Cervantes, alias “El Mencho”, the leader of the notorious Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), based in western Mexico’s Jalisco state.

The Mexican defence ministry acknowledged that the lethal operation had been conducted with “complementary information” from the United States, whose “peacemaker” president, Donald Trump, has repeatedly threatened to attack Mexico to combat the drug cartels.

Mind you, these are organisations that owe their very existence to US policy and drug consumption in the first place.

US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau greeted the news of El Mencho’s death with glee, taking to X to proclaim: “This is a great development for Mexico, the US, Latin America, and the world.”

And yet things aren’t looking quite so “great” thus far.

As anyone who has ever paid remote attention to global affairs might have predicted, violence has broken out across several Mexican states in the aftermath of the killing – which is generally what happens when you take out a cartel kingpin.

Gunmen have torched vehicles and blocked highways in various locales while various US media have reported sensationally on the plight of American tourists “stranded” in Mexican resort cities on account of the upheaval.

Shortly after his initial enthusiastic post, Landau returned to X with a “PS, I’m watching the scenes of violence from Mexico with great sadness and concern.” But no matter: “We must never lose our nerve.”

The deputy secretary of state ended his “PS” with some words of encouragement in Spanish for the Mexican nation: “¡Animo Mexico!” (Cheer up, Mexico!)

But again, there is hardly room for cheer given that there is not a single example in pretty much the entire history of the world in which the killing of one cartel boss has resolved the narcotrafficking problem – or anything else, for that matter.

Recall the case of Pablo Escobar of the Medellin Cartel, killed in 1993 by Colombian police with a whole lot of help from the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).

Despite Escobar’s absence, the international drug trade proceeded apace, and ensuing decades played host to spectacular levels of violence in Colombia – much of it coincidentally perpetrated by heavily US-backed state security forces.

In one particularly memorable episode, members of the Colombian army slaughtered an estimated 10,000 civilians and passed the cadavers off as left-wing “terrorists”.

To this day, Colombia remains the world’s top producer of cocaine.

In other words, to hail El Mencho’s demise as a “great development” for Mexico or anyone else is at best preposterously delusional.

On Sunday I phoned a Mexican friend in the southern state of Oaxaca, a supporter of Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, for our requisite argument over the day’s events. In his view, Mexico’s government had simply been “doing its job” in the “war on drugs” by eliminating El Mencho, and the US had nothing substantial to do with it.

Indeed, much like her predecessor and mentor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, Sheinbaum has perfected the art of doing the gringos’ dirty work while purporting to act in a “sovereign” fashion – and even to defy the imperial overlords to the north.

Granted, she does not have a whole lot of room to manoeuvre given the recent kidnapping by the US of Venezuelan head of state Nicolas Maduro – and the fact that Trump has made it known that he is beholden to no law, whether domestic or international.

But while Sheinbaum may have seen no choice but to temporarily placate the Americans and satisfy Trump’s need for blood, Mexicans will pay a heavy price.

A brief review of contemporary Mexican history confirms as much. No sooner did then-Mexican President Felipe Calderon launch his “drug war” under US guidance in 2006 than homicides and enforced disappearances skyrocketed in the country.

Well over half a million people have since been killed and disappeared, many of them victims of militarised agents of the state who often operate in cahoots with organised crime.

Nary a dent has been put in the northward flow of drugs while the southward flow of US-manufactured weapons continues unabated.

The state of Jalisco itself happens to have the highest number of enforced disappearances in all of Mexico and made headlines last year with the discovery of a clandestine crematorium on a ranch outside Guadalajara, one of the host cities of the upcoming World Cup.

The ranch was reportedly used by the CJNG as a recruitment and training centre as well as an extermination site.

And the removal of El Mencho from the equation will do precisely nothing in terms of pacifying the landscape – just as the respective extraditions to the US of Sinaloa cartel leaders Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman and Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada merely set off an ongoing violent battle for power.

Contrary to lofty soundbites from US officials, the empire is not at all interested in getting rid of either drug trafficking or violence south of the border as both phenomena provide a perennial excuse for US interference in Mexico and beyond.

Were the gringos actually serious about ridding “Mexico, the US, Latin America, and the world” of the whole cartel problem, a decriminalisation of drugs would do much to nip the business in the bud by rendering the movement of drugs far less fantastically lucrative.

A moratorium on the US’s obsessive manufacture of weapons would also help.

Obviously, nothing so much as resembling those potential solutions is even on the horizon. If it were, that would be one hell of a “great development” indeed.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Who: Pakistan vs England
What: 2026 ICC Men’s T20 World Cup Super Eight
When: Tuesday, February 24, at 7pm (13:30 GMT)
Where: Pallekele International Cricket Stadium, Kandy, Sri Lanka
How to follow: We’ll have all the build-up on Al Jazeera Sport from 10:30 GMT in advance of our text commentary stream.

Click here to follow our live coverage.

The second Super Eight ties of the 2026 ICC Men’s T20 World Cup starts on Tuesday with an intriguing contest between former champions who both consider themselves legit title contenders: Pakistan and England.

Pakistan, despite being humiliated by India in the group phase, possess a stacked roster who, on their day, can compete with any cricket team in the world.

England, listed as the pre-tournament joint-second favorite to raise the T20 world crown, are slowly building momentum in the competition, as exhibited by their dismantling of host nation Sri Lanka in their Super Eight opener on Sunday.

Al Jazeera Sport takes a look at the matchup, which may turn out to be a pivotal outcome affecting both nations’ semifinal qualification hopes.

What’s at stake in the Pakistan-England Super Eight tie?

Pakistan desperately need a win after their first match against New Zealand was washed out on Saturday.

A defeat would put England, who skittled Sri Lanka out for just 95 runs, through to the semifinals with a game to spare.

Pakistan would then need to beat Sri Lanka in their final Super Eight match and hope other results go their way to reach the last four.

History will be against Pakistan as they have never beaten England in three previous Twenty20 (T20) World Cup clashes.

“We are confident and our morale is high,” said Pakistan batsman Sahibzada Farhan, who scored an unbeaten 100 against Namibia in Pakistan’s final group match.

“We are focused on this match to win and progress.”

Weather watch for Pakistan in Pallekele

Persistent rain in the Sri Lankan capital Colombo forced the abandonment of Pakistan’s opening Super Eight game with New Zealand without a single ball being bowled, forcing the sides to split the points at R Premadasa Stadium.

Pakistan will be hoping that the weather does not play a factor in their crucial second tie as another split result would all but end their semifinal aspirations.

Thankfully, the forecast looks good for Tuesday’s match against England at the Pallekele International Stadium in Kandy, with 33 degrees Celsius (91F) predicted with only a 25 percent possibility of rain. In short, there should be a result and a full match is a strong possibility.

England rounding into form

England kicked off their Super Eight campaign with a 51-run victory over Sri Lanka, a statistically dominant result that vaulted them to the top of the Group 2 standings on net run rate.

The two-time champions have now won their last three matches at the tournament.

Will Jacks has been the breakout star with the bat at the tournament, averaging 65 on a scintillating 195 strike rate.

Pakistan to put England in a spin

Pakistan on Monday warned England’s inconsistent batting lineup to expect a trial by spin when the teams clash.

Farhan told reporters that England struggled to 146-9 against Sri Lanka’s spinners on Sunday.

The in-form opener said that England can expect more of the same from Pakistan’s spinners when they meet on the same Pallekele ground on Tuesday night.

“What we saw in the Sri Lanka-England game was that the ball was gripping and England struggled against spin,” said Farhan on Monday.

“Sri Lanka have one or two spinners, but we have five in all, so we will give England a tough time on a pitch that looks good and will grip,” he added.

Pakistan’s spinners have taken 26 wickets in the four matches so far. Their seamers have dismissed only seven batsmen.

‘Will not be difficult’: Farhan on Archer express

Farhan, who tops the T20 World Cup run-scoring chart with 220, said he was ready for the threat of England’s express pace bowler Jofra Archer.

“Facing Archer will not be difficult because I have faced similar bowlers in Pakistan,” said Farhan.

“So if he has plans against me, I also have plans against him.”

Pakistan team news

Pakistan are likely to bring in spinner Abrar Ahmed in place of seaming all-rounder Faheem Ashraf.

Shaheen Shah Afridi’s omission from the final group stage match against Namibia and the Super Eight opener against New Zealand was a huge shock.

The bowling superstar was expensive in the group phase, with his side pivoting to a spin-dominant strategy.

With Pakistan desperately needing a win against England, the left-arm quick is expected to return to the starting XI.

England team news

England may name an unchanged side for the fifth match in succession with Liam Dawson, Will Jacks, Adil Rashid and Jacob Bethell providing their spin options.

Form Guide:

Pakistan

W-W-L-W-NR (most recent result last)

England

W-L-W-W-W (most recent result last)

What is England’s T20 World Cup record?

England has won the T20 World Cup title twice, in 2010 (defeated Australia) and in 2022 (defeated Pakistan).

They jointly hold the record for the most T20 World Cup titles alongside India (2007, 2024) and the West Indies (2012, 2016).

What is Pakistan’s T20 World Cup record?

Pakistan are three-time finalists, but have only lifted the trophy once.

The first appearance in the final came in the inaugural competition in 2007, when India claimed a five-run win.

The second edition, in 2009, saw Pakistan beat Sri Lanka in the final, but a 13-year wait ensued for the next appearance in the showpiece finale – only for England to sweep to a five-wicket victory.

What happened the last time England played Pakistan in a T20 match?

England and Pakistan have not played each other in a Twenty20 fixture since before the last T20 World Cup in 2024.

The sides competed in a four-game series in England with the home side winning 2-0, capping off their triumph in the last fixture with a seven-wicket victory at The Oval on May 30, 2024.

Head-to-head

This will be the 32nd meeting between the countries in cricket’s shortest format.

England has won more than two-thirds of matches with 21 victories, while Pakistan has nine wins. There has been one “no result”.

Possible Pakistan playing XI

Sahibzada Farhan, Saim Ayub, Salman Ali Agha (c), Babar Azam, Usman Khan (wk), Khawaja Nafay, Shadab Khan, Mohammad Nawaz, Shaheen Shah Afridi, Abrar Ahmed, Usman Tariq

Possible England playing XI

Jos Buttler (wk), Phil Salt, Jacob Bethell, Harry Brook (c), Tom Banton, Sam Curran, Will Jacks, Jamie Overton, Liam Dawson, Jofra Archer, Adil Rashid

United States Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee has faced condemnation from Arab and Muslim countries after suggesting Israel has a biblical right to much of the Middle East.

In an interview with prominent right-wing American commentator Tucker Carlson, Huckabee suggested that Israel has a God-given right to land stretching from the Euphrates River to the Nile, which would encompass Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and parts of Saudi Arabia.

“It would be fine if they took it all,” he said, arguing that the geographical borders of Israel are rooted in the Bible, a belief shared by Christian Zionists.

The US diplomat, a self-professed Christian Zionist and staunch supporter of Israel, later walked back his comments, calling them “somewhat hyperbolic” and adding that Israel is not seeking expansion but has a right to security within its current borders.

But were his comments indeed hyperbolic in the Christian Zionist worldview? Or is that precisely what he and his fellow proponents of the ideology believe?

How did Christian Zionism begin, and what are its tenets?

In 1878, William Blackstone, a student of the prominent American evangelist Dwight Moody and a believer in the biblical restoration of Israel, published a book titled Jesus Is Coming. The best-selling work popularised among Americans a belief held by some Christian leaders: that God had given the land of Israel to the Jewish people.

This conviction, often taken from a Protestant evangelical perspective, draws on the ancient biblical idea that, nearly four millennia ago, God promised the land to the Jews, who would rule it until the return of Jesus to Jerusalem for the rapture. According to this theology, Christians will be saved upon Christ’s return while non-Christians who do not convert will face damnation.

The most commonly quoted Bible verse relating to this covenant is Genesis 12:3, in which God tells Abraham: “I will bless those who bless you and I will curse those who curse you and in you all the families of the earth will be blessed,” according to the Religion Media Centre.

According to ChristianZionism.org, a website run by professors, pastors and leaders of church-related organisations, four themes can be found in Christian Zionist thought: One, the founding of today’s nation-state of Israel in 1948 marked the final human era and signals an end of times. Two, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East is a part of God’s plan with a great and final war preceding the second coming of Christ. Three, God’s covenant with Israel is eternal and unconditional. And four, failing to support Israel’s political dominance today will incur divine judgement.

Writer and historian David Swift said that although many Christians – evangelical or otherwise – supported the creation of Israel before 1948, they cannot be called Christian Zionists in the modern parlance.

“This is because Christian Zionism essentially fuses religious belief with a military, strategic and even economic programme,” Swift told Al Jazeera.

“Specifically, Christian Zionism is not just the belief that the biblical land of Israel is the ordained country of the Jewish people but that it is in America’s strategic, military and economic interest to support the expansion of Israel.”

Fathi Nimer, a policy fellow at Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network, described the movement as one that “translates into absolute unquestioning support for the Israeli regime”.

He described hearing a podcast about a Christian Zionist woman visiting Bethlehem who, after seeing the separation wall, Israeli soldiers and the harsh conditions in Palestinian refugee camps, remarked: “I feel bad for them, but scripture is scripture.”

“‘Scripture is scripture’ – that overrides everything,” Nimer told Al Jazeera.

“That’s why it’s such a powerful tool for brainwashing.”

How many American Christian Zionists are there?

According to author and academic Tristan Sturm, the largest population of Christian Zionists is in the US, and it numbers more than 30 million. Most are affiliated with evangelical churches in the southeast and south-central regions, often referred to as the “Bible Belt”.

The biggest organisation is Christians United for Israel, which itself boasts 10 million members, Nimer said.

“They are overwhelmingly conservative Republicans, found mostly in the Bible Belt, but also other places in the United States, and they form one of the most formidable voting blocs in the Republican Party,” he said.

Swift stated that only a few million from this group, however, are “fully signed up to the political, military and religious aspects of Christian Zionism”.

What impact do Christian Zionists have on US policy?

Nimer argued that Christian Zionists are “deeply intertwined” with American politics. “A lot of the major donors to the Republican Party and also the Democratic Party are Christian Zionists,” Nimer said.

According to the analyst, Christian Zionists are a cornerstone of Israeli lobbying groups, ranging from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to the Anti-Defamation League, “that work to spread the Israeli narrative” in American society.

Meanwhile, a lot of members of the US Congress are “openly” Christian Zionist, Nimer said.

“[Politicians like] Mike Huckabee, … they reached the highest echelons of the state. And they bring these beliefs into their politics, into their policies,” the analyst said.

US foreign policy on Israel is, therefore, heavily influenced and shaped around the underlying biblical premise that the Jewish people are divinely destined to be restored to Palestine, he argued.

“When it comes to Palestine and the region in general, as you see right now with the [potential] war in Iran, they’re saying that the ballistic missile programme is now on the table,” Nimer said.

“It has nothing to do with the nuclear deal, … but the idea is that Israel must be able to maintain its superiority over every country in the region, and that’s a decree by God because if Israel prospers, then that’s another step towards the end of the world.”

Christian Zionist groups have also backed Israel’s illegal settlement project in the occupied West Bank and other measures that they see as reinforcing Israeli Jewish sovereignty.

Furthermore, for two decades, organisations such as HaYovel have been bringing in hundreds of American Christian volunteers to work in Israeli settlement agricultural projects, especially during the genocidal war on Gaza, when Jewish Israelis were called for military duty. Many also strongly endorsed US President Donald Trump’s moving of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2017.

Swift, however, said Christian Zionists have played only a minor role in shaping US support for Israel and their influence is waning.

He argued that while Christian Zionism is integrated with a “broader neoconservative foreign policy agenda” also tied to the “US defence industry and broader military-industrial complex”, the group does not have much influence in American politics, and, in fact, it is declining.

Traditionally, US government support for Israel was driven by Cold War considerations and by pressure from the Jewish community within the US and lobbying groups like AIPAC. What played less of a role was support for Israel from evangelical Christians and the smaller community of Christian Zionists, Swift said.

“The US president is finally de facto abandoning the previous theoretical support for a two-state solution – although not for Christian Zionist reasons. When Trump talks of ethnically cleansing Gaza and turning it into a beach resort, he uses the language of real estate, not the Old Testament,” the historian said.

According to the analysts, very representative.

“It is pretty representative: Christian Zionists derive their understanding of the proper borders of Israel from the same place as people like [Israeli National Security Minister] Itamar Ben-Gvir and [Israeli Finance Minister] Bezalel Smotrich: the Old Testament. Therefore, they think Israel should expand to include all of the territory of ‘biblical Israel’,” Swift said, referring to the far-right Israeli cabinet members who have worked to expand and protect Israeli settlements and outposts in the occupied West Bank, which are illegal under international law.

Nimer said Huckabee’s statement is also not something that can be criticised within the Christian Zionist community.

“You’re not allowed to criticise that because it’s like you’re criticising prophecy and you’re criticising God and the return of Jesus,” he said.

Huckabee’s comments, therefore, come as no surprise despite infringing upon the sovereignty of US allies in the Middle East, Nimer said.

On Monday, Smotrich said Israel would eventually occupy the Gaza Strip and establish a Jewish settlement there despite a “ceasefire” that went into effect in October.

“We are giving US President Donald Trump the opportunity to do it in his own way. If he does not succeed in eliminating Hamas, the Israeli army will get international legitimacy and American support to do it,” he said in statements to Israeli radio.

How do Jewish Israelis view Christian Zionists?

Mimi Kirk, the director of the Institute for the Study of Christian Zionism and the associate director of Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, writes that “despite the matter of their supposed end-of-times demise according to this view, Jewish Israeli leaders have embraced the money and influence on US foreign policy that Christian Zionists offer,” especially as its adherents include top officials from the first Trump administration, including former Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

Nimer said it’s a rather “cynical relationship”, given that the Christian Zionist worldview, which sees all non-Christians going to hell, is “anti-Semitic to the bone”.

“But they support Israel, so it’s fine,” the policy analyst said.

“They care about what they can get out of them right now as the biggest support base in the West currently.”

Israel is further banking on this support because it is quickly losing its “progressive facade” of a “liberal democracy” with “all these progressive rights”, Nimer added.

“This has completely faded over the last few decades, and especially since the genocide in Gaza, this has become completely unacceptable.”

How do Christians in Palestine view Christian Zionists?

Palestinian Christians have long voiced concern that the Christian Zionist position threatens their existence, further entrenching Israel’s occupation while marginalising their community and undermining the historic churches of the Holy Land.

Just last month, the Patriarchs and Heads of the Churches in Jerusalem said activities by local individuals advancing “damaging ideologies, such as Christian Zionism” “mislead the public, sow confusion, and harm the unity of our flock”.

The Christian leaders warned that these efforts could undermine the Christian presence not only in the Holy Land but across the wider Middle East.

The statement came amid growing concern among Palestinian Christians that Israel’s policies – including land confiscation, settlement expansion and pressure on church property – are accelerating the erosion of one of the world’s oldest Christian communities.

Are there critiques of Christian Zionism among other Christians?

Criticism of Christian Zionists from within Christianity is abundant.

In the US, the Institute for the Study of Christian Zionism was created to critique and combat the movement through liberation theology, seeking justice for Palestinians and a resolution to the ongoing conflict.

Swift pointed out that many of the world’s most Catholic countries, from Ireland to those in South America and Southern Europe, “tend to be quite pro-Palestinian”.

Meanwhile, Palestinian Christian scholars “have written very detailed theological critiques of Christian Zionism”, Nimer said, as have pastors from other parts of the Global South.

A prize awarded by the Nelson Mandela Foundation last year was explicitly aimed at initiatives working against Christian Zionism, and a conference next month in Turkiye is being organised to combat the ideology, Nimer said.

“The world is waking up to how insidious this ideology is and how it creeps into societies and makes it impossible to have any kind of solidarity with Palestinians as long as they believe it,” he said.

We finally have something else to call General Atomics’ Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) by other than its formal YFQ-42A designation: Dark Merlin

Dark Merlin is one of two designs that the USAF has officially chosen for development and flight testing under the first increment of its CCA program, which intends to give fighter aircraft a ‘loyal wingman’ uncrewed companion.

General Atomics gives its reasoning for the naming as such:

“Dark merlins, deadly falcons known for their black feathers and devouring of other falcons as prey, often collaborate in groups for maximum effect against their targets. The Cornell Lab of Ornithology describes the merlin as a “small, fierce falcon that uses surprise attacks” to bring down its prey in flight. The dark merlin is native to the Pacific Northwest of the United States, often migrating into southern California, where bird spotters routinely report seeing them near the YFQ-42A’s manufacturing home in San Diego.”

The 1962 book “Profiles of the Future” imagined global technological marvels yet to change the world, offering that “any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” It’s no coincidence that the Dark Merlin name also reflects the wizardry of Merlin from
Arthurian legend, paying homage to the somewhat supernatural new era of semi-autonomous
air combat.

“Dark merlins are hunting machines, built for speed and aerodynamics,” said GA-ASI President David R. Alexander. “They harass other falcons for fun, and they eat what they kill. The name sums up our new uncrewed fighter perfectly.”

The name is a very welcome development. We have discussed internally in our newsroom on multiple occasions that the designations for the CCAs, the other being Anduril’s YFQ-44A, which goes by the nickname Fury, carried over from its roots as a ‘red air’ training drone, are a bit hard for the public to follow. Now, with General Atomics giving their ‘fighter drone’ a unique nickname, referring to them as Dark Merlin and Fury will be a bit easier.

Both aircraft are currently in flight testing, and General Atomics has already put Dark Merlin, which is based on the firm’s Gambit chassis-centric family of combat drones concept, into production. This is ahead of the USAF making a decision on which Increment 1 CCA, or both, it wants to buy in larger numbers.

The naming also comes after it was announced that the Marines will use Dark Merlin as a testing surrogate for its own CCA program, which could possibly open the door to the Corps purchasing the ‘drone fighters’ for operational use.

Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com

Remarks from Ministry of Foreign Affairs come after Trump says he is considering an attack if a nuclear deal is not reached.

As a new round of talks between the United States and Iran is scheduled to take place in Geneva, Tehran has reiterated that it wants to find a diplomatic solution with the US on its nuclear programme but will defend itself if Washington resorts to military action.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said on Monday that any US attack, including limited strikes, would be considered an “act of aggression” that would precipitate a response after US President Donald Trump said he was considering a limited strike on Iran.

“An act of aggression would be regarded as an act of aggression. Period. And any state would react to an act of aggression as part of its inherent right of self-defence ferociously, so that’s what we would do,” Baghaei said during a media briefing.

Trump said on Friday that he was considering a limited strike if Tehran did not reach a deal with the US. “I guess I can say I am considering that,” he said in reply to a question from a reporter.

On Sunday, ⁠Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said nuclear talks with the US have produced “encouraging signals” but warned that Tehran is prepared for any scenario in advance of another round of negotiations set for Thursday.

“Iran is committed to peace and stability in the region,” Pezeshkian wrote on X.

The two countries concluded a second round of indirect talks in Switzerland on Tuesday under Omani mediation against the backdrop of the largest US military build-up in the region since the 2003 Iraq war. They resumed talks in Oman this month.

A third round of indirect talks is scheduled for Thursday in Geneva, but the US has yet to confirm. Oman said on Sunday that the talks are set “with a positive push to go the extra mile towards finalising the deal”.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been leading the negotiations for Iran while the US is represented by envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner.

‘Iranians had never capitulated’

Baghaei dismissed any claim that a temporary agreement had been reached with Washington, adding that speculation on the nuclear talks is not uncommon.

“We do not confirm any of the speculation. The details of any negotiation process are discussed in the negotiating room. The speculation raised about an interim agreement has no basis.”

Al Jazeera’s Tohid Asadi, reporting from Tehran, said there was a “mixture of optimism and pessimism” in Iran’s capital.

“Let’s call it a pragmatically calibrated cautiousness that we see when it comes to Iran’s statements over the past few weeks, specifically following the major military build-up by the Americans in the region,” he said.

He said Iran is considering both scenarios “on the basis of readiness for diplomatic engagement on the one hand and regional confrontation on the other hand”.

The Trump administration said it has been intensifying its build-up of an array of military assets in the Middle East during the talks with Iran. In an interview with the Fox News TV channel on Sunday, Witkoff said Trump was wondering why Iran has not “capitulated” in the face of the military deployment.

Baghaei on Monday stressed that Iranians had never capitulated at any point in their history.

“This is not the first time we have encountered contradictory claims,” the Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

“We leave the judgement to the discerning people of Iran and the country’s political elites to decide about Iran’s negotiating approach and, in turn, the negotiating approach of the United States,” he added.

“No negotiation that begins with an imposed burden and prejudgement will naturally reach a result,” the official said.

He also stressed that Iran’s positions on its nuclear programme and sanctions relief are clear-cut.

“Any negotiation process requires joint action, and there is hope for results if there is goodwill and seriousness on both sides,” Baghaei said.

After two years of a grinding war, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are observing the holy month of Ramadan during an unabating economic catastrophe as Israel continues to impose restrictions on the entry of food and other supplies despite a “ceasefire” reached in October.

For most families, the daily struggle to secure a mere loaf of bread has replaced the traditional festive atmosphere before the war. An analysis by Al Jazeera, based on official data, reveals that skyrocketing prices for basic commodities have made a complete iftar meal to break the daily fast a distant dream for the vast majority of the population.

Skyrocketing costs

During periods when Israel tightened its siege or completely closed the crossings into Gaza, food prices spiked by more than 700 percent. While prices have retreated slightly since the “ceasefire” began in October, they remain significantly higher than pre-war levels.

According to Mohammed Barbakh, director general of policy and planning at the Ministry of Economy in Gaza, official data tracking prices from before the war began on October 7, 2023, to the first days of this Ramadan show staggering increases.

Al Jazeera’s analysis of the ministry’s price data reveals the following hikes:

• Chicken: Prices rose from 14 shekels ($4.49) to 25 shekels ($8.01) per kilogramme (2.2lb), an 80 percent increase.
• Frozen fish: Prices jumped from 8 shekels ($2.56) to 23 shekels ($7.37) per kilo, a 190 percent increase.
• Frozen red meat: Prices rose from 23 shekels ($7.37) to 40 shekels ($12.82) per kilo, a 75 percent difference.
• Eggs: A tray of 30 eggs now costs 35 shekels ($11.22) compared with 13 shekels ($4.17), a 170 percent increase.

Vegetables, a staple of the Palestinian diet, have also seen dramatic surges. Tomatoes have doubled in price while cucumbers have jumped by 300 percent, rising from 3 shekels ($0.96) per kilo to 12 shekels ($3.85). Cheese prices have increased by up to 110 percent, directly impacting the cost of suhoor, the predawn meal before the daily fasting during Ramadan begins.

The cost of a meal

Based on data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Al Jazeera estimated the cost of a basic iftar for a family of six. The meal includes two chickens, rice, salad, appetisers, a soft drink, cooking gas and oil.

The price of the meal has risen to about 150 shekels ($48), up from 79 shekels ($25.32) before the war, an increase of 90 percent.

For suhoor, a simple meal of cheese, hummus, falafel and bread now costs 31.5 shekels ($10.10), compared with 18.6 shekels ($5.96) previously.

The combined daily cost to feed a medium-sized family now stands at 181.5 shekels ($58.17), an 88 percent jump from pre-war figures.

Economic obliteration

These price hikes coincide with a collapse in purchasing power. A United Nations report released in late 2025 indicated that the annual per capita income in Gaza plummeted to $161 (503 shekels) in 2024, down from $1,250 (3,900 shekels) in 2022.

The labour market has essentially vanished. In a statement issued in October, Sami al-Amsi, head of the General Federation of Palestinian Trade Unions, said unemployment stood then at more than 95 percent as workshops, farmland and fishing fleets were destroyed.

“The worker is no longer looking for a job because there is no work at all,” al-Amsi said. “Today, the Palestinian worker is looking for a food parcel to survive.”

Blockade and monopoly

Economic researcher Ahmed Abu Qamar attributed the inflation to Israel’s restrictive entry policies and “coordination fees” imposed on trucks.

“The humanitarian protocol stipulates the entry of 600 trucks daily, yet the Israeli occupation effectively allows only between 200 and 250 trucks,” Abu Qamar told Al Jazeera, noting that the Strip actually requires 1,000 trucks daily to meet minimum demand.

He also highlighted a monopoly system under which only about 10 merchants are authorised to import goods through four Israeli companies, restricting competition and keeping prices artificially high. He called for a return to a free market system and the full opening of crossings to alleviate the burden on a population already crushed by conflict.