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Key deals this week: Organon, UMG, Whitestone REIT, Gilead and more

M A - concept waiting for mergers and acquisitions.3D rendering on yellow background.

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Here’s a list of key deals reported across sectors this week:

  • Organon (OGN) climbed ~23% on Friday, on track to record its best-ever intraday rally after media reports from India indicated that Mumbai-based generic drugmaker Sun Pharmaceutical

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Frp holdings outlines 2026 NOI of $37.1M-$37.7M while integrating Altman platform (NASDAQ:FRPH)

Earnings Call Insights: FRP Holdings, Inc. (FRPH) Q4 2025

Management view

  • “2025 was a transition year operationally… As we enter 2026, our focus is shifting from repositioning and investment toward execution and the conversion of embedded value into cash flow.” (COO & President David deVilliers

Seeking Alpha’s Disclaimer: This article was automatically generated by an AI tool based on content available on the Seeking Alpha website, and has not been curated or reviewed by humans. Due to inherent limitations in using AI-based tools, the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of such articles cannot be guaranteed. This article is intended for informational purposes only. Seeking Alpha does not take account of your objectives or your financial situation and does not offer any personalized investment advice. Seeking Alpha is not a licensed securities dealer, broker or US investment adviser or investment bank.

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How Captain Aziz Keeps Beirut Airport Open Amid Iran War Chaos

Home Features Q&A: How Lebanon’s Aviation Chief Keeps Beirut Airport Open Amid Iran War Chaos

With most carriers suspending operations, Aziz, a former Middle East Airlines’ advisor, discusses how the Beirut airport keeps operating despite Israel’s strikes on Lebanon.

Since the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran in late February, air traffic across the Middle East has been severely disrupted. Large portions of regional airspace are either closed or avoided, forcing airlines to reroute flights and cancel services.

In Lebanon, the situation is even more extreme: Israel strikes Beirut and its southern suburbs almost daily, just minutes from the country’s only international airport. With most carriers suspending operations, Middle East Airlines (MEA) remains the only one flying, maintaining a fragile lifeline with the rest of the world.

Global Finance sits down with Captain Mohammed Aziz, head of Lebanon’s Civil Aviation Authority and former senior advisor to MEA’s CEO, to discuss how the Beirut airport continues to operate under fire and what this means for the airline’s business.

Mohammed Aziz, CEO, Middle East Airlines
Mohammed Aziz, Lebanon, Civil Aviation Authority

Global Finance: How is the airport operating these days?

Aziz: Considering what’s going on around us, the airport is operating in a very nice way. For example, on April 1st, there was a hit near the airport road. The security forces closed the road for half an hour, the time for the bombing to happen and for it to be cleaned. They then resumed operations. But the airport didn’t stop at all during this period. We are ensuring that the airport remains open safely and securely despite the situation.

GF: How do you know when a strike is going to happen and when planes can go in or out?

Aziz: First, most of the time, [Israeli authorities] announce where they want to bomb, especially if it’s around Beirut. Second, we can see on the radar if there are planes coming in for bombardment. They also know when a civilian aircraft is coming in, and they try to avoid it. Only once or twice did they come during a civilian operation. We had to hold the aircraft in the air until they finished their job before landing.

GF: Who are the airlines flying in and out?

Aziz: MEA is flying on all its routes, except to destinations where the airports are closed, like Kuwait, Doha or Abu Dhabi. They are losing about 40% of their traffic because many Gulf airports are closed. Gulf carriers are not coming to Beirut anymore because either their airport is not operating, or, when it is, they have other priorities. European carriers stopped serving the whole region from day one.

GF: What are the MEA’s operations?

Aziz: MEA now has 22 planes; five or six are parked continuously abroad, so they don’t get exposed if anything happens. That means they are practically operating with 16 aircraft. But even these 16 planes are not at full capacity. For example, some airports that used to take Airbus A330s now receive A321s. They have to maintain a balance in order to minimize their losses and insurance exposure.

GF: Why is the MEA the only airline flying?

Aziz: Well, because it’s a Lebanese carrier. For MEA to stay alive, they have to fly. They also consider it a duty to maintain the link between Lebanon and the outside world. This has always been MEA policy. They only stop when the risk assessment tells them not to fly. This occurred a lot during the civil war (1975-1990) and more recently during the 2006 war. But for the time being, MEA is still flying.

GF: How does flying from and to Beirut still make sense business-wise for the MEA?

Aziz: To be able to fly in such a situation, you need a daily risk assessment conducted at the highest level, with the highest contacts. The head of civil aviation, the chairman of MEA and the head of the security forces have to be in direct contact with the government 24/7. The government is in contact with embassies and foreign ministries. So if anything changes, we can know immediately and take the right decision. Every day we have a coordination meeting. If anything changes, we know about it, but this is time-consuming. Now, if Lebanon is 100% of your operations, you do it because the only alternative is to stop. But for foreign airlines, Beirut is just one of thousands of flights, so they say, “OK, forget about it, when the situation gets better, we will return.”

GF: How does insurance cost evolve in a situation like this?

Aziz: Insurers look at many aspects: the risk management done by the company, by the authorities, their own information, and they adjust their policy accordingly. Sometimes they give higher premiums, sometimes they lower the ceiling, sometimes they say you can continue as you are. And it changes constantly. Today might be one thing, tomorrow another, so we have to keep in touch with them.  

GF: During a war situation, are there other extra costs?

Aziz: Sure. We have to pay employees extra to encourage them to come in and thank them for being here under the circumstances. If they feel they don’t want to come, they still get their salary. We also have special sleeping facilities for the staff to stay close to the airport. Then there are fuel costs. The ton used to be $700; it’s now $1,500. That’s over a 100% increase. And finally, some routes are now longer. For instance, Beirut to Dubai previously took three hours. Now, it’s about five because planes have to go from Dubai to Oman to Saudi Arabia to Egypt to Cyprus to Beirut instead of coming straight. In addition to the extra fuel costs, the longer flight time means more aircraft maintenance and more staff hours. It’s these incremental cost that keep on adding up.

GF: How can a company like MEA compensate for this extra cost?

Aziz: They cannot compensate 100%, but they can offset some of the cost with yield management. If you have many empty seats, you lower the price of the ticket; when the plane gets full, you raise it. It doesn’t recover all the extra costs, but the only alternative would be to stop flying. Even if they suffer some temporary losses, the MEA considers that people will appreciate that they kept flying, and when things return to normal, they will remain loyal customers. We are confident that the future will be bright. This is why we are working day and night to ensure that the airport remains open and that people’s confidence in the airline and the country remains the same, so that whenever things settle down, they know they have a good airport that never lets them down.

GF: Do you see opportunities in this time?

Aziz: Yes, we are using the current situation as an opportunity to accelerate the improvements to the departure and arrival areas we had started last year. Normally, it should take a year. However, the density of travelers is now 20-25% of what it normally is. I think we can finish it in two to three months.

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Corridor Of Power: China’s Inland Hub Connects to ASEAN

Thanks to the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor, trade and economic cooperation between inland China and Southeast Asia are growing fast.

China’s New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor (New ILSTC) is a critical component of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), linking the western inland regions to global maritime routes and—it is hoped—enhancing connectivity with ASEAN countries.

Last year was a very, very good year for the New ILSTC. And momentum is expected to continue in 2026.

The corridor’s rail-sea services handled 1.425 million TEUs of cargo in 2025. That’s up 47.6% year-on-year and surpassing 1 million tons for the first time with some 1,300 to 1,316 categories shipped, including electronics, vehicles, auto parts, and machinery. Trade value between January and October of last year saw combined imports and exports via the New ILSTC reach 1.35 trillion yuan ($196 billion), up 17.9% year-on-year.

“Trade between China and ASEAN has surged since 2017, when the New International Land-Sea Corridor was introduced, with ASEAN’s share of China’s exports surging from 12.4% to 17.6% in 2025,” notes Lynn Song, chief economist, Greater China at ING in Hong Kong. “It seems like there are local plans to continue to expand these logistics channels, which should continue to contribute to trade growth between China and ASEAN overall.”

From Beijing’s perspective, trade growth was nothing short of spectacular in the first two months of this year.

Shipments from China to Southeast Asia in dollar terms surged by 29.4% in January and February. Overall Chinese exports grew by 21.8% during that period, defying a Reuters economists’ poll in December that predicted 7.1% export growth. Chinese imports also increased overall, rising 19.8% during the same period. But China still booked a record $213.6 billion trade surplus for a 25.3% gain over the same period in 2025: a year when the country’s trade surplus hit an all-time high of $1.2 trillion.

“The share of exports from China to ASEAN economies has steadily grown from around 5.5% in 2000 to more than 15% in 2024,” says Professor Christoph Nedopil Wang, director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University in Brisbane. “However, there was no significant breaking point: rather, it was a general growth in line with the ASEAN economies’ overall growth. Imports from ASEAN countries, meanwhile, have stagnated over the past five years at around 15% of total imports to China.Chongqing is still relatively small, handling about 251,800 TEU or only 0.5% of Shanghai’s 55 million TEU.”

That is expected to change as the Guangxi Pinglu Canal opens for 5,000-ton vessels later this year, offering river-sea access from inland hubs to southern ports and the ASEAN countries.

“Once the Pinglu Canal is opened at the end of 2026, with its 89 million tons annual capacity, Chinese southwestern inland provinces will be better connected to ASEAN economies by reducing transport times from weeks to days, says Nedopil-Wang. “Furthermore, several ASEAN countries, such as Singapore or Malaysia, could identify new opportunities to fill existing agreements with live programs, such as the Singapore-Chongqing Connectivity project.”

The latter was established in 2015 to enhance connectivity between the two countries and also between landlocked western China and ASEAN. Last December, the links grew closer when Singapore’s Infocomm Media Development Authority and China’s National Data Administration signed an MoU for a Digital New ILSTC, focusing on AI, blockchain, data analytics, and digital economy cooperation. The same month, the People’s Bank of China provided a further boost to the New ILSTC when it outlined a raft of financial support measures aimed at expanding supply chain finance and infrastructure funding for the project, encouraging the use of digital renminbi for settlement and aiming to broaden intra-Asian trade.

“The Land-Sea corridor is likely further strengthening opportunities for China’s exporters,” observes Nedopil-Wang. “But to what extent ASEAN members will benefit from improved export opportunities to China through the corridor depends on their ability to provide attractive industrial or consumer goods relevant to the southwestern regions of China.”

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The Hidden Figures in Venezuela’s Latest GDP Report

After years of statistical silence, the Venezuelan Central Bank (BC) has now published GDP growth figures. The new series—annual and quarterly, in real terms and using 2007 as the base year—at least allow economic discussion to return to the realm of data. However, the comeback is partial. As has been customary, the BCV released rates of change, but not GDP levels at constant prices, nor values at current prices, nor the sectoral weights needed to understand how the economy is composed.

This omission is not a technical detail. Without weights, growth rates float in a vacuum. They indicate the direction of movement, but not its relevance. A sector may grow by 20% and still remain marginal. Another may expand only slightly and yet dominate the aggregate outcome. Reading GDP solely through growth rates is like looking at a map without a scale.

Based on the sectoral variations published by the BCV, it is possible to conduct an indirect exercise: reconstruct volume indices with base 2007 = 100 and, from them, estimate the implicit sectoral weights within GDP. This is not meant to replace official national accounts, but to extract structural information that is not explicitly presented in the published figures. The result helps answer a key question: what is the Venezuelan economy that has emerged after the recession and the recent rebound actually made of?

Less State production, greater private weight

The first finding is institutional in nature. In 2018, at one of the deepest points of the crisis, the private sector accounted for just 44.8% of GDP, the lowest level observed in the reconstructed series. The public sector, by contrast, exceeded 52%, reflecting both the collapse of private activity and the relative weight of State-led production.

Since then, the relationship has reversed. By 2025, the private sector reaches around 52.1% of GDP, while the public sector declines to 42.4%. The Venezuelan economy emerging from the crisis is, in relative terms, less state-driven than it was at the end of the previous decade.

Oil typically accounted for around 12% of GDP and was often surpassed by manufacturing. Today, the oil sector can be up to four times larger than manufacturing.

This shift should be interpreted with caution. It does not necessarily imply vigorous expansion of the private sector in absolute terms. It rather reflects a sharper and more persistent contraction of the public sector as a direct producer of goods and services. Still, the rebalancing is significant and marks a break from the pattern observed during the most acute years of the crisis.

Oil: renewed centrality with statistical caveats

The second axis of this restructuring is the oil sector. In the new series, its share of GDP stands at around 20.5% in 2020 and rises to approximately 25.9% in 2025. At first glance, these figures suggest an economy once again dominated by oil.

But here a methodological warning is essential. The 2007 base year coincides with a period of high oil prices. This tends to inflate the sector’s relative weight in real terms. In the previous series, based on 1997, oil typically accounted for around 12% of GDP and was often surpassed by manufacturing. Today, the oil sector can be up to four times larger than manufacturing.

This figure should not be dismissed, but it must be interpreted carefully. It reflects both the current structure of the economy and a statistical effect derived from the change in base year. Oil’s centrality remains indisputable, although its exact magnitude depends on the methodological lens.

Sectors gaining ground: information, services, agriculture

Among non-oil activities, the most structural change is observed in information and communications. For more than a decade, between 2007 and 2019, this sector averaged just 5.2% of GDP. From 2020 onward, its share consistently exceeds 10%, consolidating it as one of the main beneficiaries of the recent restructuring.

This increase points to an economy reorganizing around connectivity services, telecommunications, and information flows. It does not necessarily imply high productivity, but it does signal a clear shift in the basket of value-generating activities.

Agriculture follows a different dynamic. While it remains a moderate-scale sector, it now represents about 5% of GDP, compared to an average of 3.3% between 2007 and 2019. The key lies in its relative resilience during the 2014–2020 recession: it declined less than other sectors and, as a result, gained weight within a smaller economy.

Within the services universe, real estate, professional, scientific, technical, administrative, and support activities also stand out. This is a broad and heterogeneous sector, yet it shows a clear pattern over time. Before the crisis, these activities accounted for around 11% of GDP and, like agriculture, displayed relative resilience during the most difficult years of the downturn. In a context of high inflation and exchange-rate volatility, services (particularly professional and technical ones) tend to adjust more flexibly than activities intensive in inventories or physical capital.

Enthusiasm for some growing sectors fades when considering their weights in 2025 GDP: approximately 3.6% for construction, 1.5% for finance, and just 0.8% for mining.

That said, the sector is not without nuance. In 2020 it reached a peak of around 16.7% of GDP, but part of that gain later moderated, settling at about 13% in 2025. This reflects the fact that the aggregate includes very different dynamics: while some professional and technical services expanded, more affected segments, such as real estate activities, continue to operate below historical levels. Even so, as a whole, this block has consolidated itself as the largest non-oil sector in Venezuela’s current economy.

Other sectors, by contrast, show greater structural stability. Trade and vehicle repair, which now account for around 5% of GDP, fell to as low as 3.8% during the most acute years of the crisis (reflecting the collapse in consumption) but have since returned to ranges similar to pre-crisis levels.

A similar pattern is observed in accommodation and food services, which hit a low point during the pandemic (1.3% of GDP in 2020) as a direct consequence of mobility restrictions, closures, and the near paralysis of tourism. It has partially recovered since then, reaching about 1.6% in 2025. Despite the recent attention it has received, its aggregate impact remains moderate and its behavior more stable than popular perception might suggest.

The biggest losers: manufacturing and the producing State

Still within non-oil activities, manufacturing illustrates the scars of the crisis. After exceeding 10% of GDP up to 2013, its share collapsed to a low of around 5.4% in 2019. In subsequent years, a partial recovery is observed, reaching roughly 6.8% in 2025, but still far from historical levels. Rather than reindustrialization, the data point to stabilization at low levels.

The most abrupt adjustment, however, is seen in general government services. After reaching a historic peak of about 22.9% of GDP in 2019, its share drops to just 10.8% in 2025. No other sector loses as much weight in such a short period. The State remains relevant, but its role as a direct producer of value added is now much smaller.

Spectacular growth, limited impact

The highest growth rates in recent years correspond to sectors that remain small. Specifically, between 2023 and 2025, construction recorded cumulative growth of nearly 57%, financial and insurance activities around 40%, and mining close to 27%.

However, the enthusiasm fades when considering their weights in 2025 GDP: approximately 3.6% for construction, 1.5% for finance, and just 0.8% for mining. These are dynamic sectors in percentage terms, but with limited macroeconomic impact due to their size. It is a reminder of why sectoral weights matter as much as growth rates.

What this restructuring tells us, and what it doesn’t

The Venezuelan economy that emerges from this exercise is different from that of fifteen years ago: relatively greater private-sector weight, statistically dominant oil, expanding information services, weakened industry, reduced finance, and a much smaller State as a direct producer.

It is important to stress the limits of the analysis. The weights discussed here are implicit, not official, and depend on the internal consistency of the growth rates published by the BCV. Future revisions could alter some magnitudes.

Even so, the central message is clear. Behind the growth rates that currently capture public attention, there is a silent restructuring of the Venezuelan economy. Understanding it is essential for any serious discussion of economic policy, investment, or productive development. Because in the end, it is not only how much GDP grows that matters, but (perhaps above all) what it is made of.

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